PALESTINE -- PEACE NOT APARTHEID |
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Chapter 15: THE PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI ELECTIONS, 2006 For several reasons, including the Israeli withdrawal of settlers from Gaza in August 2005 and the threat of success by Hamas candidates, the scheduled Palestinian parliamentary elections were postponed from July 2005 until January 2006 -- almost exactly ten years after Yasir Arafat and Legislative Council members first took office. Although the results of previous campaigns had been predictable, the entry of Hamas candidates brought uncertainty and drama to these 132 contests. This time there was an outpouring of international observers, in addition to our Carter Center-DI team. In order to obtain approval from Washington, our American delegation had to refrain from meeting with Hamas leaders or candidates -- at least prior to the election. With Ariel Sharon incapacitated by severe illness, Ehud Olmert was acting as prime minister and the head of Kadima, a new political coalition that was formed when Sharon withdrew from the Likud Party in November 2005. Sharon's purpose was to implement the unilateral disengagement policy and to complete building a wall to separate Palestinians from territory to be claimed by Israel. To distinguish itself from the right-wing Likud Party, Sharon's new organization maintains that "the balance between allowing Jews to fulfill their historic right to live anywhere in the Land of Israel and maintaining the continued existence of Israel as the national Jewish home necessitates a choice that requires territorial compromise." Kadima claims that the advancement of the peace process with the Palestinians is a primary goal: "Israel's existence as the national home of the Jewish people mandates the acceptance of the principle that the end of the conflict will be manifested in the existence of two nation states, based on existing demographic realities, living in peace and security side by side." Sharon positioned the party as a centrist movement that, except for Israel's crippling caveats, supports the Roadmap for Peace. Because of the strong potential challenge from Hamas, Israeli officials and many Fatah leaders had wanted to postpone or cancel the Palestinian elections. Hamas had not accepted the PLO's commitments at Oslo that recognized the "right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security" and that renounced the use of terrorism and other acts of violence, but the United States exerted enough pressure to permit the elections to be held. Hamas was now holding many local posts, and their incumbent officials had been free of any allegations of corruption and, for sixteen months, had meticulously observed a cease-fire commitment, which they called hudna. Fatah, the party of Arafat and Abbas, had become vulnerable because of its administrative ineffectiveness and alleged corruption. Another factor was that both Israel and the United States had ignored Abbas as an acceptable negotiating partner in the search for peace, publicly branding him (and Fatah) as insignificant. In preparation for the election, many of Fatah's old-line leaders were replaced by younger candidates loyal to Marwan Barghouti, a militant serving a life sentence in an Israeli prison. He was said to have orchestrated the intifada and also the hudna, and his statements from jail had a great impact. He seemed to be the most popular Fatah leader, and at times it appeared that the Israelis wanted to promote his suggestions, often at the expense of Abbas. They had permitted Barghouti to meet with other prisoners and to be interviewed by news media with global distribution. Late results from both Israeli and Palestinian pollsters indicated that about 35 percent of the parliamentary seats would go to Hamas candidates. Israel had announced that without a dramatic moderation of its policies, even this involvement by Hamas would preclude any initiation of substantive peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians (already absent for the past five years) and could terminate humanitarian aid and other funds that had been channeled through the Palestinian government. Shortly after arriving in Israel, Rosalynn and I had an extensive discussion with Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, whom we had known for more than twenty years. He and I have had many arguments (and some agreements) since he was a young Likud parliamentarian, and I've come to appreciate his intelligence, political acumen, personal ambition, and strong will. We considered him to be a formidable leader of the new Kadima Party and, almost certainly, Israel's next prime minister. Current polls showed that Kadima had actually gained support since Olmert replaced Ariel Sharon. He told us that he would continue Sharon's policies and made it plain that he could resume peace talks with Abbas only after all radical Palestinian groups were completely disarmed and all violent acts were prevented, emphasizing the all. I asked if a genuine good-faith effort to control violence would be sufficient, pointing out that total peace was a hopeless prospect in any society. He shook his head, with a smile. The following morning (Monday), I addressed the Herzliya Conference, the foremost annual forum for Israeli and international leaders to express their views concerning the most important current issues. Even though recognizing the conservative makeup of the audience, I expressed my opinions frankly and briefly, emphasizing my role in previous peace efforts, deploring Israel's expansive settlement policy and the intrusive route of the dividing wall, and extolling the Geneva Initiative as a reasonable basis for peace. Then I answered a series of questions for about half an hour. I had a respectful and polite reception, but I commented in closing that their questions had received more applause than my answers. We later met with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, Labor Party leader Amir Peretz, Shimon Peres, Quartet special economic envoy James Wolfensohn, a public relations spokesman for Hamas (but not its candidates), candidates of Fatah and independent parties, Yossi Beilin and others who had orchestrated the Geneva Initiative, the U.N. coordinator for Middle East peace, and leaders of the major international election observer groups. We drove to Ramallah to consult with the leaders of the Central Election Commission and then met with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Although he expressed confidence in the outcome of the election, he was obviously distressed at having been bypassed or ignored in the "nonexistent peace process." He pointed out that the people of Palestine now had few opportunities for gainful employment or for contact with either Israel or the outside world, that the Palestinian economy was in a shambles, and that Olmert was threatening to withhold about $55 million per month in taxes and customs receipts that were collected on behalf of the Palestinians under an economic protocol signed in 1994. The Palestinian National Authority already had a $900 million deficit and would have difficulty paying its bills or meeting payrolls. He said that Israeli policy had precluded the training and equipping of his security force, so that only 10 percent of its personnel had sidearms or communications equipment. On election day, Rosalynn and I visited more than two dozen polling sites in East Jerusalem and its outskirts, Hebron, Ramallah, and Jericho. The same rigid restraints were imposed by Israel to minimize voting in East Jerusalem, but otherwise the election was orderly and peaceful. It was obvious to our observers that there was a clear preference for Hamas candidates even in historically strong Fatah communities. Even so, we were all surprised at the size of the Hamas victory. Hamas received a narrow victory in popular votes but won such a clear majority of parliamentary seats (74 of 132) that members of the Fatah government immediately announced their resignation. I remained for an extra day to assess the situation and to talk with key leaders. In Ramallah I found President Abbas willing to retain his office during the three years remaining in his term but in a quandary about how to deal with the Hamas victory, the formation of a new government, the near-bankruptcy of the Palestinian National Authority, and uncertainty about Israeli policies. He was proud of the honest, fair, and safe election process. Hamas leaders had expressed their desire to form a unity government with Fatah and the smaller independent parties, but Abbas's intention was not to cooperate with them, and he resisted my urging him to reconsider. The Fatah leader was not prepared to acknowledge the allegations of corruption that were a significant cause of the Hamas success, but he pointed out that one of the major factors in the voting had been his apparent ineffectiveness because he had been ignored by Israel and the Quartet leaders. There had been a few token meetings during his first year as president, but he said that neither the United States nor Israel was prepared for substantive peace talks, using the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza as an excuse. He reminded me that there had been no opportunity for a Palestinian leader to participate in peace talks for the past five years, as the Israelis confiscated more and more land in the West Bank and imposed increasingly severe restrictions on his people. Israel had taken more control of the consumer and production sectors of the area's economy, making it an exclusive market for many Israeli products even among the local Palestinian citizens, who could not sell their own products in Israel, Jordan, or other places. Abbas said that despite the conduct of exemplary democratic elections, the Palestinians had never had an opportunity to forge a viable government. Their economic system had been forced back into the preindustrial age and their territory broken into ever-smaller fragments. Abbas informed me that there were not enough funds available to meet his February payroll for police, teachers, nurses, and other service providers, and any reduction in their income because of the election results would be disastrous. Although I had had no direct contact with Hamas since Arafat's election as president and had pledged to refrain from meeting with them until after this recent election, I decided that it was time for me to consult with them again. In The Carter Center's Ramallah office set up to monitor the election, I talked to Hamas member Dr. Mahmoud Ramahi, an anesthesiologist who reminded me that I had met with him ten years earlier. He was later chosen as the legislature's secretary and a spokesperson for Hamas in the West Bank. (Along with some other Hamas legislators who live in the West Bank, he is now imprisoned by the Israelis.) When I questioned him about the necessity for Hamas to renounce violence and recognize Israel, he responded that they had not committed an act of violence since a cease fire was declared in August 2004 and were willing and able to extend and enforce their cease-fire (hudna) for "two, ten, or fifty years" -- if Israel would reciprocate by refraining from attacks on Palestinians. He added that there had been no allegations of terrorism or corruption among their serving local leaders, and that Israel had so far refused to recognize the Palestinian National Authority (only the PLO) and had rejected the key provisions of the Oslo Agreement. Hamas's first priorities would be to form a government, to maintain order, and to deal with the financial crisis. He also asked, "Where is the Israel you would have us recognize? Does it include the West Bank and East Jerusalem?" He added that they would have no need to relate directly to the Israelis but wanted a reciprocal cease-fire to be maintained. He hoped that Fatah would join in the new government and that Abbas would continue to serve as its president and to handle all foreign affairs. Their future actions would, of course, reveal their true commitments, but my guess was that during the immediate future they wanted to consolidate their political gains, maintain domestic order and stability, and refrain from any contacts with Israel. It would be a tragedy -- especially for the Palestinians -- if they decided to promote or condone terrorism. During the next few weeks Hamas attempted unsuccessfully to induce Fatah members to take some of the cabinet positions and finally proposed its own list, which President Abbas accepted. The most important posts would be held by Dr. Ismail Haniyeh as prime minister, Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar as foreign minister, and Speaker of the Assembly Dr. Aziz Dweik, who earned his doctorate at the University of Pennsylvania. A postelection public opinion poll indicated that 73 percent of Palestinians expressed their support for the two-state peace process with Israel, but most felt that Hamas should refrain from recognizing Israel until some of the final status issues were resolved. Only 1 percent of the people were in favor of Hamas's imposing Islamic law in Palestine. Equally encouraging was the result of a March 2006 opinion poll by the Truman Research Institute at Hebrew University revealing that 62 percent of Israelis favored direct talks with Hamas. The January 2006 election of a Hamas government raised the large and unresolved question of whether Palestinians would continue their policy of rejection of Israel pending a total restoration of their homeland. As president and as head of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas has made it clear that there is still an opportunity to find a path to permanent peace in the Holy Land through direct talks with Israel. Palestinian Prime Minister Haniyeh announced that his Hamas government was "ready for a dialogue" with the members of the Quartet, expressed approval for direct Olmert-Abbas peace talks, and said that Hamas would change its rejectionist position if a satisfactory agreement could be consummated and approved by the Palestinian people. Such Palestinian approval of a final peace agreement was an important facet of the Camp David Accords. Although there was still a wide difference in the prerequisites for talks, news analysts welcomed what seemed to be a more moderate Palestinian position. The U.S. response was that Hamas must first recognize Israel, renounce violence, and agree to honor previously negotiated agreements. Israel's response, delivered by its defense minister, was that all seventy-four Hamas members of the parliament would be targeted for assassination in case of another violent attack on Israelis by any Palestinian. Some Palestinian intellectuals tell me that a Hamas-influenced PLO could be more capable of modest compromises on such cardinal issues as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and Jewish settlements in the West Bank. With a single- mindedness amounting to tunnel vision, Palestinians see the restoration of their rights, defined by international law, as the key to peace throughout the broader Middle East, including the Gulf states. It should be remembered that Mahmoud Abbas is not only the president of the Palestinian National Authority, with substantial authority under Palestinian law, but the undisputed leader of the PLO, the only Palestinian entity recognized by Israel or the international community. He has publicly endorsed the international community's Roadmap for Peace without equivocation and has been eager to negotiate with Israel since first becoming prime minister three years before being elected president. It is certainly possible that the path of the Palestinians is leading to a dead end, and that even their Arab allies will tire of actively supporting the Palestinian cause. Martin Luther King, Jr., once said that nothing would hurt the black cause in America more than for whites simply to grow bored with it. Nor is Palestinian willingness to resort to violence likely to be any more fruitful in the future than it has been in the past. It must be noted that by following policies of confrontation and inflexibility, Palestinians have alienated many moderate leaders in Israel and America and have not regained any of their territory or other basic rights. The fate of all Palestinians depends on whether those in the occupied territories choose to pursue their goals by peaceful means or by continued bloodshed. A genuine move toward peace might bring rich dividends by arousing support in the United States and other nations. At about the same time as the Hamas government was formed late in March 2006, a small turnout of Israeli citizens divided their support so that among the 120 seats in the Knesset, the new Kadima Party had a disappointing 29 seats, Labor 20, Likud 12, Shas 12, and minor parties shared the other 47. At one time, Kadima had been expected to gain 43 seats based on its pledge of a unilateral expansion to the "great wall." The results showed an electorate more divided concerning the acceptance of this plan than had been expected, and they indicated some lack of confidence in Olmert as Israel's prime minister. No Arab-Israeli members are included among the twenty-five members of the cabinet.
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