PALESTINE -- PEACE NOT APARTHEID |
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Chapter 9: THE OSLO AGREEMENT It was during this period of relative goodwill under Rabin's leadership that, without America's involvement, Norway's Foreign Minister Johann Hoist, Professor Terje Larsen, and their wives helped to orchestrate highly secret peace talks between the government of Israel and the PLO. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin had a series of more than a dozen sessions, mostly in Oslo, with PLO leader Yasir Arafat's team, headed by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala). During the early months of 1993, both Peres and Arafat kept me informed about these efforts. I was in the northern part of Yemen in August 1993 when I received an urgent request from Arafat to meet him in Tirana. I returned to the capital city by helicopter and found the PLO leader almost beside himself with excitement. He told me that the peace talks had been successful and that the Israelis were flying to the United States to inform the Clinton administration about the achievement. Above all else, Arafat emphasized the provision in the agreement that called for the formation of a Palestinian National Authority with the election of a president and members of a national assembly. A few weeks later, Rosalynn and I were invited to a signing ceremony at the White House, where President Bill Clinton presided and Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat were to make a public declaration of peace. I was ushered to a prominent seat among the observers, along with other public officials, and my wife was a row or two behind me. I was surprised and embarrassed to see the Norwegians, Hoist and Larsen, far back in the crowd and to notice that their key role in the peace effort was not mentioned. In sum, the Oslo Agreement provided for a phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the West Bank, the establishment of a Palestinian governing authority with officials to be elected, and a five-year interim period during which the more difficult and specific issues would be negotiated. Athough Rabin, Peres, and Arafat all received the Nobel Peace Prize for their historic achievement, there was strong opposition from radical elements on both sides. As part of the agreement, in September 1993, Chairman Arafat sent a letter to Prime Minister Rabin in which he stated unequivocally that the PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, committed itself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, renounced the use of terrorism and other acts of violence, affirmed that those articles of the PLO covenant that deny Israel's right to exist were no longer valid, and promised to submit these commitments to the Palestinian National Council for formal changes to the covenant. Although Israel recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians in the peace negotiations and promised five years of further progress, Arafat had failed to obtain other specific concessions concerning a timetable for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories. In effect, what he got from the Oslo Agreement was the assurance of organizing a form of Palestinian government and staying in power so that he could administer Palestinian affairs in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis wanted and achieved much more. It must be remembered that the status of Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza had changed dramatically in 1987 with the first intifada. Earlier, Israeli Jews in the West Bank had almost complete freedom of safe movement and required minimum military protection -- about 10,000 troops in all the occupied territories. The relatively harmonious administration of local affairs by respected Palestinian notables already had been replaced in 1981 by Ariel Sharon with some "village leagues," often composed of outcast Palestinians who were willing to be hired by the Israelis. Dissension and danger prevailed. By 1988, no Israeli could travel in the area without Palestinian guides and some prior assurances of safe passage, and 180,000 Israeli troops were deployed to protect settlers and preserve the peace. With the Oslo Agreement, Israel's plan was that Arafat and the PLO would assume responsibility for local administration, free to receive and distribute (or perhaps retain a portion of) the international financial support that would be available to the Palestinians. Following Oslo, Prime Minister Rabin emphasized that the agreement for which he had been honored had avoided the tight restrictions accepted by Menachem Begin at Camp David: We ourselves obtained this concession from the Palestinians -- from those with whom one should make such deals -- without any American promises as in the Camp David agreements. Jewish settlements will be placed under an exclusive Israeli jurisdiction; the [Palestinian] Autonomy Council will have no authority over them. The forces of the Israeli army will be redeployed in locations determined only by us, unlike the Camp David agreements which mandated a withdrawal of the Israeli army forces. In the agreement we reached we didn't consent to use the formula "withdrawal of Israeli army forces" except when it applied to the Gaza Strip. In application to all other places the only term used is "redeployment." ... I prefer that the Palestinians cope with the problem of enforcing order in Gaza. The Palestinians will be better at it than we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the [Israeli] Association for Civil Rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule there by their own methods, freeing -- and this is most important -- the Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they will do. A key advantage that the Oslo Agreement gave to Israel was the shedding of formal responsibility for the living conditions and welfare of the territories' rapidly increasing population, still completely dominated by Israeli forces. Prime Minister Rabin soon concluded a peace accord with Jordan and announced his willingness to negotiate with the Syrians, and he and Arafat concluded an agreement in May 1994 that applied to the Gaza Strip and to Jericho and its environs. It addressed four main issues: security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters, and economic relations, and it pledged withdrawal of Israeli military forces from a number of Palestinian communities, including Gaza and Jericho, and a transfer of some civil authority from the Israeli Civil Administration to a Palestinian authority. There was also a commitment for elections to form a governmental structure for the Palestinians. The hope for further steps toward peace following the Oslo Agreement was severely damaged with the assassination of Rabin in November 1995 by an Israeli right-wing religious fanatic, who declared that his goal was to interrupt the peace process. There was still some goodwill remaining from Oslo two months later, as indicated in this excerpt from President Clinton's memoir, My Life: Shimon Peres came to see me for the first time as prime minister, to reaffirm Israel's intention to turn over Gaza, Jericho, other major cities and 450 villages in the West Bank to the Palestinians by Christmas and to release at least another 1,000 Palestinian prisoners before the coming Israeli elections.
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