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INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY-- REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE

110th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee Print

November 20, 2008

"I believe our niche lies in the fact that we can provide the ability to exploit personnel based on how our enemies have done this type of thing over the last five decades. Our enemies have had limited success with this methodology due to the extreme dedication of [American] personnel and their harsh and mismanaged application of technique. The potential exists that we could refine the process to achieve effective manipulation/exploitation. We must have a process that goes beyond the old paradigm of military interrogation for tactical information or criminal investigation for legal proceedings. These methods are far too limited in scope to deal with the new war on global terrorism." -- JPRA instructor Joseph Witsch

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The first attachment to the July 26, 2002 memo was "Physical Pressures used in Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees." That attachment included a list of techniques used to train students at SERE school to resist interrogation. The list included techniques such as the facial slap, walling, the abdomen slap, use of water, the attention grasp, and stress positions.  The first attachment also listed techniques used by some of the service SERE schools, such as use of smoke, shaking and manhandling, cramped confinement, immersion in water or wetting down, and waterboarding.

JPRA's description of the waterboarding technique provided in that first attachment was inconsistent in key respects from the U.S. Navy SERE school's description of waterboarding. According to the Navy SERE school's operating instructions, for example, while administering the technique, the Navy limited the amount of water poured on a student's face to two pints. However, the JPRA attachment said that "up to 1.5 gallons of water" may be poured onto a "subject's face." While the Navy's operating instructions dictated that "[n]o effort will be made to direct the stream of water into the student's nostrils or mouth," the description provided by JPRA contained no such limitation for subjects of the technique. While the Navy limited the use of the cloth on a student's face to twenty seconds, the JPRA's description said only that the cloth should remain in place for a "short period of time." And while the Navy restricted anyone from placing pressure on the chest or stomach during the administration of this technique, JPRA's description included no such limitation for subjects of the technique.

Attachment one also listed tactics derived from JPRA SERE school lesson plans that were designed to "induce control, dependency, complia[n]ce, and cooperation," including isolation or solitary confinement, induced physical weakness and exhaustion, degradation, conditioning, sensory deprivation, sensory overload, disruption of sleep and biorhythms, and manipulation of diet.

DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes told the Committee that although he could not recall if he had seen the specific list of SERE physical pressures sent to his office on July 26, 2002, he knew that he had seen a list of physical pressures used in JPRA resistance training.

Mr. Haynes also recalled that he may have been "asked that information be given to the Justice Department for something they were working on," which he said related to a program he was not free to discuss with the Committee, even in a classified setting.

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Dr. Ogrisseg said that Lt Col Baumgartner also asked him "to comment on both the physical and psychological effects of the waterboard," which he described in his memo as an "intense physical and psychological stressor" used at the U.S. Navy SERE school. Although Dr. Ogrisseg had not used the waterboard himself, he had observed its use in a visit to the Navy SERE School. He stated that, based on that visit, he did not believe that the ''water[] board posed a real and serious physical danger to the students" who experienced it at the SERE school, stating that the "Navy had highly qualified medical personnel immediately available to intervene, and their students had all been medically screened prior to training. Psychologically, however, the water[] board broke the students' will to resist providing information and induced helplessness."

Dr. Ogrisseg said that he was surprised when he found out later that Lt Col Baumgartner had forwarded his memo to the General Counsel's office along with a list of the physical and psychological techniques used in SERE school.  Dr. Ogrisseg said that his analysis was produced with students in mind, not detainees. He stated that the conclusions in his memo were not applicable to the offensive use of SERE techniques against real world detainees and he would not stand by the conclusions in his memo if they were applied to the use of SERE resistance training techniques on detainees.

In a written response to a question posed by Senator Carl Levin after the Committee's June 17, 2008 hearing, Dr. Ogrisseg elaborated on that point noting several "important differences between SERE school and real world interrogations that would limit [the] conclusions [in his memo] to the SERE school training population." Among those differences Dr. Ogrisseg identified were (1) the extensive physical and psychological pre-screening processes for SERE school students that are not feasible for detainees, (2) the variance in injuries between a SERE school student who enters training and a detainee who arrives at an interrogation facility after capture, (3) the limited risk of SERE instructors mistreating their own personnel, especially with extensive oversight mechanisms in place, compared to the risk of interrogators mistreating non-country personnel, (4) the voluntary nature of SERE training, which can be terminated by a student at any time, compared to the involuntary nature of being a detainee, (6) the limited duration of SERE training, which has a known starting and ending point, compared to the often lengthy, and unknown, period of detention for a detainee, and (7) the underlying goals of SERE school (to help students learn from and benefit from their training) and the mechanisms in place to ensure that students reach those goals compared to the goal of interrogation (to elicit information).

In addition, Dr. Ogrisseg also stated that, since writing his memo in July 2002, he had reviewed studies about the effects of near death experiences, and that he had become concerned about the use of waterboarding even as a training tool.  The U.S. Navy SERE school abandoned its use of the waterboard in November 2007.

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Mr. Becker stated that "interrogation approaches are limited only by the imagination of interrogators" and that it would be "impossible to list every possible interrogation approach." His memo stated that "drugs such as sodium pentothal and demerol may be used with some effectiveness," that female interrogators could be used to make the detainee feel ''unclean,'' and that "sleep deprivation" can be effective.  Mr. Becker told the Committee that he based his statement about the effectiveness of the use of drugs on a rumor that [delete [CIA]] had used drugs in their interrogation program.

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[Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, GTMO Staff Judge Advocate] We may need to curb the harsher operations while ICRC is around. It is better not to expose them to any controversial techniques. We must have the support of the DOD.

[David Becker, GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief] We have had many reports from Bagram about sleep deprivation being used.

[Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, GTMO Staff Judge Advocate] True, but officially it is not happening. It is not being reported officially. The ICRC is a serious concern. They will be in and out, scrutinizing our operations, unless they are displeased and decide to protest and leave. This would draw a lot of negative attention.

[COL Cummings] The new PSYOP plan has been passed up the chain.

[LTC Diane E. Beaver]  It's at J3 at SOUTHCOM.

[Jonathan Fredman, Chief counsel to the CIA’s Counter Terrorist Center] The DOJ has provided much guidance on this issue. The CIA is not held to the same rules as the military. In the past when the ICRC has made a big deal about certain detainees, the DOD has "moved" them away from the attention of ICRC. Upon questioning from the ICRC about their whereabouts, the DOD's response has repeatedly been that the detainee merited no status under the Geneva Convention. The CIA bas employed aggressive techniques on less than a handful of suspects since 9/11.

Under the Torture Convention, torture has been prohibited by international law, but the language of the statutes is written vaguely. Severe mental and physical pain is prohibited. The mental part is explained as poorly as the physical. Severe physical pain described as anything causing permanent damage to major organs or body parts. Mental torture described as anything leading to permanent, profound damage to the senses or personality. It is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong. So far, the techniques we have addressed have not proven to produce these types of results, which in a way challenges what the BSCT paper says about not being able to prove whether these techniques will lead to permanent damage. Everything on the BSCT white paper is legal from a civilian standpoint [Any questions of severe weather or temperature conditions should be deferred to medical staff.] Any of the techniques that lie on the harshest end of the spectrum must be performed by a highly trained individual. Medical personnel should be present to treat any possible accidents. The CIA operates without military intervention. When the CIA has wanted to use more aggressive techniques in the past. the FBI has pulled their personnel from theatre. In those rare instances, aggressive techniques have proven very helpful. ...

Yes, if someone dies while aggressive techniques are being used, regardless of cause of death, the backlash of attention would be severely detrimental.  Everything must be approved and documented. ...

The videotaping of even totally legal techniques will look "ugly". ...

The Torture Convention prohibits torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. The U.S. did not sign up on the second part, because of the 8th amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), but we did sign the part about torture. This gives us more license to use more controversial techniques. ...

If a well-trained individual is used to perform this technique ["wet-towel"] it can feel like you're drowning. The lymphatic system will react as if you're suffocating, but your body will not cease to function. It is very effective to identify phobias and use them (ie, insects, snakes, claustrophobia). The level of resistance is directly related to person's experience. ...

The CIA makes the call internally on most of the types of techniques found in the BSCT paper, and this discussion. Significantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOJ. ...

Does the Geneva Convention apply? The CIA rallied for it not to.

The Torture Papers:  The Road to Abu Ghraib, Edited by Karen J. Greenberg, Joshua L. Dratel, Introduction by Anthony Lewis

Table of Contents

Note on Source Material Used in the Preparation of the Report (U)
List of Acronyms Used in the Report (U)
Executive Summary and Conclusions (U)