Differentiating the Pearl From the Fish Eye: Ouyang Jingwu (1871-1943) and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism

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"Differentiating the Pearl From the Fish Eye: Ouyang Jingwu (1871-1943) and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism"

Abstract

This dissertation explores the rise of Buddhist scholasticism in Republican China (1911-1949) through the career of one of its most outspoken leaders, Ouyang Jingwu (歐陽景無, 1871-1943). Ouyang Jingwu, a lay Buddhist intellectual, charismatic teacher and polemical writer, is most recognized for his critique of the East Asian Buddhist tradition, a critique that stands at the heart of the dissertation. In addition to presenting this critique, this dissertation will explore one of the most innovative hermeneutical alternatives offered by this influential and creative thinker. To date, the importance of Ouyang for later intellectual developments has been overlooked by scholars. I argue here that understanding Ouyang's critique is crucial for later developments in Chinese intellectual history both within and without Buddhism.

The first chapter of this dissertation outlines Ouyang's biography, in order to provide a broader intellectual context. The second and third chapters discuss Ouyang's critique of the East Asian tradition. Chapter three surveys the problems Ouyang identified in the East Asian Buddhist tradition, while Chapter four highlights the core problem, in Ouyang's view, which is the spuriousness of the *Awakening of Faith* (*Dasheng qixin lun*). Finally, the fifth chapter introduces one of

Ouyang's most controversial and idiosyncratic solutions to the problems he identified in the tradition, his "Two Paradigms" theory.

My dissertation concludes that Ouyang's alternatives posed one of the greatest challenges to traditional Chinese thought in the modern period. It offered a systematic critique, based on the medieval Indian Buddhist scholastic tradition. Later attempts to adapt traditional Chinese thought to the modern period, such as those by Buddhist apologists and the rise of the influential New Confucian movement, are closely linked to the scholastic Buddhist movement. It is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter.

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"The Intellectual seeks, in various ways...to endow his life with pervasive meaning and thus find unity with himself, with his fellow men and with the cosmos"
-- Max Weber[1]

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Ouyang Jingwu and the Inner Studies Institute

In 1928, James Bissett Pratt (1875-1944), professor of philosophy and religion at Williams College, published an influential two volume monograph on Buddhist pilgrimage. In his chapter dealing with the revival of Buddhism in China he said:

> The aspect of the revival movement which I suppose is most in harmony with the Chinese genius is the effort that is being made for the spread of the scholarly knowledge of Buddhist thought. There are two or three Buddhist colleges where serious study is given to Mahayana Sutras, under the direction of really able scholars. One of these centers is Mr. Ouyang's[2] college in Nanjing. The institution is small...but the work done is of serious nature and the young laymen that go out from Mr. Ouyang's instruction are well grounded in Mahayana metaphysics.[3]

Another visitor to China in those days was the Norwegian Lutheran Missionary to China Karl Ludvig Reichelt (1877-1952), who specialized in converting Buddhist monks. Reichelt had this to say:

> Of a quite different character is the aristocratic Buddhist Academy conducted by the old Confucian scholar Ouyang Jingwu in Nanjing...Mr. Ouyang's school is named "Zhina neixue yuan"...a fine scholarly and

[1] Max Weber, *Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 125.

[2] Here and also later in this work I have changed the transliteration to Pinyin to standardize the way Chinese is transliterated.

[3] J.B. Pratt, *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism and a Buddhist Pilgrimage* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 387.

> humanistic spirit prevails in the beautiful old-fashioned "xuyuan[4]," with which the work has been conducted up till now; and one meets there with a rare group of well-educated, better class Chinese. But religious zeal and warmth are very markedly lacking. It is significant that no regular worship is held in the school. Each one is supposed to cultivate Buddhism privately.[5]

These two separate accounts briefly tell the story of arguably the most influential Buddhist center in China of the early twentieth century, the China Inner Studies Institute (*Zhina neixue yuan* 支那內學院), which was headed by one of the most controversial and innovative Buddhist thinkers in modern China, Ouyang Jingwu (歐陽竟無 1871-1943). This institute, opened officially in 1922, had a crucial impact on intellectual, doctrinal and institutional developments during the Republic of China (hereafter ROC, 1911-1949), both in Buddhist and non-Buddhists circles. It is therefore my intention in this dissertation to focus on the leader of this institute, Ouyang Jingwu, his Buddhist scholastic thought and the impact that he had on modern Chinese intellectual history.

Cheng Gongran who wrote about Ouyang explained why he chose Ouyang as his focus: "The colorful names [of modern Buddhists thinkers] began to find their way into my heart, but there was one name among them that was mostly outstanding – Mr. Ouyang Jingwu or *upāsaka* Ouyang Jingwu. He was different. His all-encompassing, otherworldly lifework and thought were enough to stimulate my,

[4] It is not clear to me what the author meant by "xuyuan." Chinese characters were not provided and it is possible that this is a typo, and should have been "xueyuan" or academy.

[5] K.L Reichelt, *Truth and tradition in Chinese Buddhism; a study of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism* (Shanghai: China: The Commercial Press Limited, 1934), 301.

at that time, young, wild and idealistic heart."[6] As we will see below, Cheng's reaction was not unique. Ouyang's charismatic figure and bold teachings often evoke reaction, both supportive and critical, from his contemporaries all the way to contemporary figures like Cheng Gongrang.

Ouyang's vision for his institute was far-reaching and reflected the high hopes he had for Buddhism in his time. He took as his model, no less than, Nālanda University, the well-known monastery that was the center of Buddhist studies in medieval India. Ouyang envisioned an institution that would be a center for the study of the different Indian Buddhist schools and other non-Buddhist sciences and would restore the past glory of Buddhism.[7] Reality, however, was different, for Ouyang lived through turbulent times that were not favorable for a Nālanda-like intellectual and institutional undertaking. Yet, despite not turning into one of the leading centers of study in China, as Ouyang hoped, this institution was one of the longest lasting and most innovative Buddhist institutions in China. In addition, the seeds that were sown there -- by Ouyang and his followers -- were destined to challenge the content, form and practice of Chinese Buddhism as it developed for more than a millennium.

Scholastic Buddhists called into question some of the foundational principles of the Buddhist tradition in China. Ouyang and his cohorts introduced new methods for the study of Buddhism that transformed the traditional Buddhist education. They challenged the monastic authority as representative of the

[6] Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought* [歐陽竟無佛學思想研究] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 2000), 2.
[7] Ouyang Jingwu, Ouyang, Jingwu. "Keynote Speech in a Conference at the Inner Studies Institute [支內學院研究灰會開會辭]," *Neixue neikan* 1 (1923): 7-8.

Buddhist tradition[8] and, accordingly, they envisioned and effected institutional changes that reflected their novel ideology. The degree that Ouyang's milieu shook up the monastic establishment is measured by the vehement criticism they drew from both conservative and progressive circles within the Saṅgha.[9]

But Ouyang and his disciples did not challenge only the Buddhist establishment. For the first time since the Song dynasty (960-1279), they undertook to transform Buddhism into a viable alternative to Confucian orthodoxy and state ideology, and to some extent they succeeded. Liang Qichao, one of the most prominent intellectuals of the day and a disciple of Ouyang, commented, "Among the late Qing Scholars of "New Learning,"[10] there were none who did not have some connection with Buddhism."[11] This "connection" -- as strong in the first part of the ROC as it was in the late Qing -- was formed partially because Buddhism assisted those intellectuals[12] in coming to terms with existential uncertainty, intellectual crisis and an unstable political and social world. Many of those prominent

[8] More on the lay scholastics challenge to monastic Buddhism in chapter two.

[9] For example the renowned scholar-monk Yinshun summarized their main "contribution" in these words, "They specialized in reviling monks and nuns and starting arguments between clergy and laity." see Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival of China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 34. More conservative factions of the Buddhist Saṅgha were much less diplomatic. Yinguang, a prominent conservative monk, was once asked by one of his disciples if he should study with Ouyang and replied adamantly, "Ouyang Jingwu is a great king of devils and you may not study under him." see Ibid.,119. Even modern day Buddhist and Buddhist scholars in Mainland China are suspicious of Ouyang. In a conversation with a professor of Buddhist studies in China, I was told about his teacher, a well-known scholar of Buddhism, who warned his students "to be careful not to be influenced too much by Ouyang" because he was too critical of Chinese Buddhism.

[10] New Learning refers to the reformist intellectuals who broke with the Confucian tradition of China and were looking for intellectual and conceptual resources to China's political and social predicament in non-Confucian and Western systems of thought.

[11] Chan Sin-wai, *Buddhism in Late Ch'ing Political Thought* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 29.

[12] Among them one can find thinkers such as Zhang Taiyan, Tan Sitong, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao himself.

intellectuals frequented the Inner Studies Institute and contributed to the growing reputation of Ouyang and his school.

One reason Ouyang and his followers could influence Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike was that his most salient contribution was in the realm of ideas more than in Buddhist practice or institutional reforms. Ouyang challenged basic paradigms and attempted to redefine what "real" Buddhism is and to distinguish it from the "non-genuine" elements within Chinese Buddhism. The alternative he offered was a return to "authentic" Indian[13] Buddhism. We will see that Ouyang and other scholastic Buddhists identified a particularly influential Buddhist teaching that can be labeled for the sake of convenience, *tathāgatagarbha* (the womb of the *tathāgata*) or Buddha Nature, which was an umbrella term to a plethora of doctrines that developed in India and later in East Asia. As we will discuss below, Ouyang and other scholastics had serious doubts regarding the authenticity of the mainstream Chinese interpretation of this doctrine. Instead he advocated the return to Indian Buddhist teachings of Abhidharma and Madhyamaka, but mainly to the highly sophisticated teachings of the Yogācāra School.

1.2 The purpose of the dissertation

This study developed out of my long-standing interest in the processes and strategies employed by religious intellectuals when coping with the so-called "modern" period. The

[13] As I will discuss below Ouyang was less concerned with "Indian" as opposed to "Chinese" Buddhism than with what is authentic and beneficial in Buddhism and what are later corruptions. He is critical of later development in Chinese Buddhism but, for him, once reliable translations were available Chinese could have access to the authentic teaching exactly like it was done by Yogācāra follower during the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE).

term modernity or "the modern period" is one of the most problematic terms used as analytical categories. Is it temporal? If so, when does it begin and what exactly does it signify? Many philosophers[14], sociologists[15] and religious studies scholars[16] among others continue to grapple with this question using various approaches. In this dissertation I will limit my usage of the notion of "modernity" to "Chinese modernity", which I define as a process that began in the middle of the nineteenth century, spearheaded, and dictated by the growing dominance of Western powers and consequently of Western cultures. I am linking "Chinese modernity" with the impact of the West, following Gustavo Benavides who contends that "[the notion of] modernity, confronts us with a concept that most readers, and most authors as well, will consider as having an identifiable place and time of birth. Whereas the time will be debated...the place of birth, the west, will be relatively uncontroversial." [17]

Despite obvious changes in cultural background and historical circumstances, religious thinkers from various cultures around the world had to deal with similar challenges during the modern period, such as growing secularization and post enlightenment "disenchantment" with religion[18] as well as growing nationalism and the

[14] See for example Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987) and his Jürgen Habermas, *Modernity: An Unfinished Project,* in *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity,* ed. Maurizio d'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 38-56; see also Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992)

[15] See for example Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). See also S. N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publication, 2004).

[16] See for example Marilyn Ivy, "Modernity," in *Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism*, ed. Donald Lopez (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 311-31. See also Gustavo Benavides, "Modernity" In *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, ed. Mark. C. Taylor edited (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 186-204.

[17] Gustavo Benavides, "Modernity," 186.

secular separation of "church" and "state."[19] Non-Western religious traditions, however, had an additional challenge. Since the center of gravity for the dramatic changes in the modern period occurred in Europe, many non-Western societies and cultures often felt as if they were being swallowed by stronger outside forces, which threatened their core identity and even physical existence, and forced them to adapt and reconsider their traditional values. In this dissertation I examine the rise of Chinese Buddhist scholasticism as a strategy that emerged from these pressures and was designed to turn Buddhism into a tradition relevant, to and as a potential solution for, the social, political and existential predicament China was facing in Ouyang's day.

Ouyang has received very little scholarly attention in non-Chinese languages sources and was a partial subject of only one work in a Western language.[20] It is, therefore, one of my primary goals to introduce Ouyang's thought and career to a Western audience, and to highlight the contribution of scholastic Buddhists to the intellectual history of modern China.

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[18] In many ways, it can be argued that, since the changes in the last two centuries were so dramatic, any thinker in the modern period is, in fact, reacting to the radical changes of this period.

[19] One can argue, for example, that the growing impact of Islamic radicalism is partially a reaction to the disappointment with Arab nationalism and the growing secular tendencies in Muslim societies. In his book *Fundementalism ve-moderniyut* (Fundamentalism and Modernity), S.N. Eisenstadt argues that the fundamentalist movement, although often considered as anti-modern should be understood only as a modern phenomenon. See S.N. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism u-Moderniyut* (Tel Aviv, Ministry of Defense/Universitah Meshuderet, 2002) [in Hebrew].

[20] See Gotelind Müller, *Buddhismus Und Moderne : Ouyang Jingwu, Taixu Und Das Ringen Um Ein Zeitgemasses Selbstverstandnis Im Chinesischen Buddhismus Des Frühen 20. Jahrhunderts* (Münchener Ostasiatische Studien; Bd. 63. Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1993).

1.3 Methodological Approach:

I approach this project mainly as an intellectual historian. For the purpose of this dissertation I am following Brian Young's definition of intellectual history as a discipline "which is concerned with understanding how ideas originate and evolve in specific historical contexts; it is also concerned with tracing their histories within the broader histories of the societies and cultures which they have helped to shape, and which have shaped them."[21] Intellectual history will be taken in the narrow sense of intellectual developments within the boundaries of the history of religion.

The field of intellectual history has undergone radical transformation in the last few decades. From a discipline with a bad reputation and under attack for its disembodied ideas that "appeared to waft through time,"[22] it had a remarkable come-back by the late 1970s with the works of theoreticians such as Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau, Roger Chartier and others. As some scholars argued, these theoreticians "have not merely reinvigorated *intellectual* history, but have contributed to its "dizzying' success."[23] While those theoretical currents indeed have changed the way contemporary scholars conceive intellectual history and have benefited the discipline, they have also created a sharp divide in the field between two kinds of historians. On the one hand, we have those who felt that the influx of methodological tools from, among others, literary criticism, social sciences, philosophy of language and post-structuralist theories are a detrimental factor, which undermines the value of historical truth (historians whom LaCapra called ironically "self-sufficient"

[21] Brian Young, "Introduction," in *Palgrave Advances in Intellectual History,* ed. Richard Whatmore and Brian Young (New-York: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2006), 2.

[22] Elizabeth Clark, *History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 6.

[23] Clark, *History, Theory, Text*, 107.

historians). On the other hand, there are historians who welcome introduction of such methodological tools into their scholarly arsenal (whom other historians see as "murderers of the past"[24]).[25] While I agree that enlarging and enriching the methodological tools of the intellectual historian revitalize the field, I see my primary goal in this dissertation as giving center stage to Ouyang and to let him "speak."[26]

This is by no means an indication that Ouyang and his scholastic movement have nothing to contribute to the themes that are currently at the heart of the study of religion and intellectual history. For example, Ouyang and his movement -- influenced by internal dynamics and traditional thought as much as by Western thought -- can challenge our assumptions with regard to the dynamics of colonial rule, which are dominantly represented in many post-colonial inspired works in the field of Asian Studies.[27] Ouyang and his movement also serve as an excellent case study for how, despite our constant usage of terms

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[24] See for example, Keith Windschuttle, *The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists are Murdering Our Past* (New York: Encounter Books, 2000).

[25] Many of the so-called positivist historians and some of the historians who were more open to post-structuralists and other criticism did try to find a middle ground between the Rankean ideal of history as a window to the past and the more radical criticism of theorists, such as Hayden White and Franklin Ankersmit. For example, Appleby, Hunt and Jacob's employment of Hillary Putnam's idea of practical realism in their *Telling the Truth about History* and James Kloppenberg's employment of Dewey's pragmatism (see Clark, *History, Theory, Text*, 40). Another example is the later writings of Dominique LaCapra, who is trying to find a useful approach that will enable him to employ post-structuralists theories without their negative impact, which he sees as the collapse of any norm for determining a clear distinction between historical fact and fiction in different disciplines, between literature and history and past and present (see Amos Goldberg's introduction to the Hebrew translation of *Writing History, Writing Trauma* Goldberg, Amos. "Introduction," for Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*. [Li-khetov hisṭoryah, li-khetov ṭra'umah]. Trans. Yaniv Farkash (Tel Aviv: Resling and Yad ṿa-shem, 2006), 13*).* This seems to me a welcome attempt to incorporate and make use of important contributions of other disciplines without undermining the value and meaning of intellectual history and history as a whole.

[26] There are, of course, many theoretical problems in the assumption that Ouyang is "speaking" through his text. Yet, I find no better way to let his thought and work to assume the center stage in this dissertation. I will discuss the reasons for this choice below.

[27] See, for example, Philip Almond, *The British Discovery of Buddhism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) or Judith Snodgrass, *Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and the Columbian Exposition* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

such as elite vs. popular cultures, in practice, the two dimensions are closely intertwined.[28] In addition, studying the reasons that led to the overlooking of Ouyang and Buddhist scholasticism in the study of modern Chinese thought can increase our sensitivity to problematic historiographical practices and how we, as historians of religion, should be sensitive to our own assumptions and predispositions.[29]

In addition, one of the most enriching factors in reading texts from other cultural setting, Chinese in our case, is a sincere attempt to listen to them in order to learn how they can augment our own theoretical perspective instead of trying to read Asian thinkers through theories we commonly employ in the West. I am using here the "phenomenological epoché" in the weak sense of the term in an attempt to bracket out assumptions that we are bringing to the reading of a text from our own cultural world[30] and background, thus leaving open the possibility of enriching our own theoretical frameworks.[31]

Since the nature of Ouyang's work was very controversial, in addition to outlining Ouyang's major critique of the tradition, I have also included counter arguments leveled by more traditional opponents against Ouyang and other scholastic Buddhists. For others, Ouyang's thought was inspirational. To show the appeal of Ouyang's thought I also included

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[28] While Ouyang and his movement are an elite movement par-excellence (see page 2 above "well-educated, better class Chinese,"), he still incorporated, for an interesting set of reasons, tantric teachings into his institution curriculum.

[29] More on the reasons for overlooking Buddhist scholasticism below.

[30] I am indebted here to Adam Lobel for exposing me to a new way of understanding phenomenology in the context of the study of religion through his excellent unpublished paper (Adam Lobel, "Experience in The Past and Future of the Phenomenology of Religion" (Unpublished paper, 2008).

[31] Here I benefited from the guidance of Michael Puett who calls for a sincere attempt to study Asian thinkers without our "*a priori* assumptions."

voices of supporters and disciples who further developed Ouyang's critical assessment of the tradition and who brought it to a new level of sophistication and precision.

1.3.1 Question of historiographical priorities or why has Ouyang been ignored thus far?

If, as I argue, the rise of scholastic Buddhism and Ouyang's career are of great importance to our understanding of later developments in Chinese thought, how can it be that the revival of scholastic Buddhism has been almost ignored until recently?[32] And why has only one western work treated Ouyang Jingwu thus far? A complicated set of circumstances surrounds the lack of scholarly attention to Ouyang's career. However, two main reasons can be identified as having prevented a serious study of Ouyang and other Chinese scholastic Buddhists. First, skewed historiography often read back realities of the second half of the twentieth century into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In other words, historians habitually accounted for events such as the May Fourth

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[32] For more on modern Chinese Buddhism, see, for example: Stuart Chandler, *Establishing a Pure Land on Earth: The Foguang Buddhist Perspective on Modernization and Globalization* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004). Charles Brewer Jones, *Buddhism in Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999). Don Alvin Pittman, *Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms* (Homolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001). Francesca Tarocco, *The Cultural Practices of Modern Chinese Buddhism: Attuning the Dharma* (London, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2007). Xue Yu, *Buddhism, War and Nationalism: Chinese Monks in the Struggle against Japanese Aggressions, 1931-1945* (London, New York: Routledge, 2005). Gabriele Goldfuss, *Vers un bouddhisme du xxe siècle: Yang Wenhui (1837-1911), réformateur laïque et imprimeur*, Mémoires De L'institut Des Hautes Études Chinoises, V. 38. (Paris: Collège de France Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 2001).

For more on Modern Chinese Buddhist thought see: Chan Sin-wai, *Buddhism in Late Ch'ing Political Thought* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985). Marcus Bingenheimer, *Der Mönchsgelehrte Yinshun (*1906) und seine Bedeutung für den Chinesisch-Taiwanischen Buddhismus im 20. Jahrhundert* [the Scholar-Monk Yinshun (Born 1906) and His Role in Twentieth Century Chinese-Taiwanese Buddhism], Wuerzburger Sinologische Schriften. (Heidelberg, 2005). Scott Hurley, "A Study of Master Yinshun's Hermeneutics: An Interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine ", PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2001. William P. Chu, "A Buddha-Shaped Hole: Yinshun's (1906-2005) Critical Buddhology and the Theological Crisis in Modern Chinese Buddhism." PhD diss., UCLA, 2006.

movement[33] and the rise of Communism as the endpoint of an intellectual road.[34] This kind of history is problematic because instead of studying the intellectual history of the period from the standpoint of the actors themselves, scholars have searched anachronistically and exclusively for the roots of Marxism's supposed triumph,[35] ignoring all other trends, important and interesting as they might be.

According to this commonly held narrative, there was only a narrow window of time prior to the May Fourth incident during which intellectuals such as Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao, and others had the opportunity to propagate a modernized version of traditional teachings. With the triumph of the May Fourth movement's new spirit of scientism and the adoption of Western thought that window closed. The May Fourth movement in itself was a storehouse for many conflicting ideas, but none of them was as powerful as that of socialism and, later, communism, which became the new state ideology in

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[33] Here I follow Chow Tse-tsung who perceives the May Fourth movement in the broader sense of a social and intellectual phenomenon and not only as the series of anti-imperialist demonstrations that followed the signing of the Versailles Treaty. The May Fourth movement was active between the years 1916-1925 and was composed of a group of young scholars and intellectuals who articulated their dissatisfaction with the socio-political situation in which China found itself during that time. They called for a comprehensive adaptation of Western ideas while negating traditional Chinese traits which they considered outdated and responsible for China's predicament, see Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 1-3.

[34] Consider, for example, the voices of the pivotal scholars who studied the period such as Chow Tse-tsung: "...the students and new intellectual leaders promoted an anti-Japanese campaign and a vast modernization movement to build new China through intellectual and social reforms. They stressed primarily Western ideas of science and democracy. Traditional Chinese ethics, costumes, literature, history, philosophy, religion and social and political institutions were fiercely attacked." Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement,* 1. Or "This was the first time Chinese intellectuals recognized the need to for a complete transformation of traditional Chinese civilization." (ibid., 11-15). Or Vera Schwarcz's view of the May Fourth as the "Chinese Enlightenment" in the sense of a sharp break with the past and as an attempt to "alter the foundations of national identity," see Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

[35] See for example John K. Fairbank, who saw the May Fourth spokesmen as "unconsciously preparing the ground for the triumph in China of Marxism as a 'science of society.'" See John Fairbank, *The great Chinese revolution, 1800-1985.* (New York: Perennial Library, 1987), 185.

modern China. With this understanding of history there appeared to be little import to studying the unrelated intellectual concerns of those who preceded it or those who did not fit the paradigm.

Today, with the reemergence of Confucian thought in China and the revival of religion, it is possible to say that though this narrative is not entirely inaccurate, it does not constitute the whole story. It is undisputable that the growing influence of the West resulted in the May Fourth movement, and that few would doubt that the May Fourth incident was indeed a watershed moment in modern Chinese history. However, when we read the entire modern history of China as a march to the emergence of the May Fourth movement and Communism, we run the risk of overlooking a wide range of new discourses during that period that did not share the May Fourth movement's main concerns. This point is expounded convincingly in an excellent review article, "The Plurality of Chinese Modernity".[36] In the article, the authors skillfully argue for the need to "move beyond the May Fourth paradigm" and "decenter the May Fourth" paradigm in order to open up the stage to alternative forms of what they call "modernities," which can also be seen as alternative views and solutions prevalent at that time.

The second reason for the overlooking Ouyang and the scholastic Buddhists' contribution is the highly specialized disciplinary divisions within the Western academy. Few scholars are trained in both Sinology and Buddhology. Indeed, a work on the revival of Buddhist scholasticism in early twentieth century China demands an understanding of the intellectual and historical developments in modern China, as well as familiarity with the

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[36] Ip Hung-Yok, Hon Tze-Ki Hon, and Lee Chiu-Chun, "The Plurality of Chinese Modernity: A Review of Recent Scholarship on the May Fourth Movement." *Modern China* 29 (2003): 490-509.

history of scholastic Buddhism in India, especially the sophisticated system of the Yogācāra School and the way it was transmitted and developed in China.

1.3.2 Textual approach

There are many possible approaches to the study of Buddhist scholasticism as an intellectual phenomenon, and all are important for our understanding of Buddhist scholasticism. One can study their institutional and educational innovations, their "practice," or how they reshaped the dynamics between the laity and the Saṅgha to name a few. However, what I deem crucial in an attempt to understand a scholastic thinker such as Ouyang, and scholastics in general, is a careful textual study. The best way to learn about Scholastics is to learn "their texts," or their works and exegeses. To put it in the words of William of Baskerville, the hero of Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose*, "We are trying to understand what happened among men who live among books, with books, from books, and so their words on books are also important."[37] In the case of this dissertation, the core of this work explicates Ouyang's critique of the main schools of Chinese Buddhism and their underlying assumptions. In addition, it outlines Ouyang's unique reading of and solution to Chinese Buddhism's "problems." It will do so by focusing on a selection of Ouyang's important texts, most of which were written as prefaces to Buddhist *sūtras* and *śāstras* that he edited.

[37] Umberto Eco, *The Name of the Rose* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), 112.

1.3.3 Ouyang as a Yogācārin

At the height of his career, Ouyang was interested in a very particular kind of Buddhism, i.e. the teaching of the Yogācāra School. The Yogācāra tradition is one of the most sophisticated systems of metaphysics, psychology and philosophy created in Buddhist history. It was a monumental attempt by medieval Indian thinkers to interpret Buddhist teaching through the prism of Mahāyāna Buddhism. This tradition flourished in India from the fifth century until the Buddhist decline in the subcontinent. In China, however, it enjoyed a considerable amount of influence until the eighth century. Later, considered imperfect and rudimentary, this school had gone into decline and was marginalized. In the chapters below, I will discuss this school in Indian and East Asian Buddhism and situate Ouyang as a Yogācārin. I will also discuss why he chose the Yogācāra teaching as a corrective to the flaws he found in Chinese Buddhism and what he thought was the alternative model Yogācāra had to offer.

1.4 Scholastic Buddhism:

In this dissertation I use the category of scholasticism as outlined by José Cabezón in his *Buddhism and Language*. Cabezón argues that if we take scholasticism in its broader meaning, detached from the specific meaning of the medieval European movement, then we can use scholasticism as a "useful theoretical construct in the cross-cultural study of philosophy."[38] The list of characteristics of this mode of religious practice contains many similarities with the practices and

[38] José Ignacio Cabezón, *Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994), 1.

concerns of the Chinese thinkers mentioned above, and, specifically, with Ouyang's work. Some of the relevant characteristics of scholastic Buddhism mentioned by Cabezón[39] include:

(1) Formal nature

(2) Systematicity

(3) Preoccupation with scriptures and their exegesis in commentaries

(4) Rationalism and reliance on logic

(5) Dialectics in defense of outlined tenets

(6) A penchant for lists

(7) Classification and categorization

(8) Tendency toward abstraction

Another shared characteristic, which separates scholastics from secular scholars, is the tendency of scholastics to operate within the boundaries of the tradition to which they subscribe. By contrast, secular scholars tend to roam beyond the boundaries of a specific tradition if their inquiries lead them to the rejection of traditional truths as stated in the canon.

Some scholars have argued that the term "scholasticism" might be too vague to be used outside of its "intrinsic cultural context."[40] I disagree, and maintain that scholasticism is a useful category. As Cabezón argues, there is a responsible way to employ a category in a broader sense than in its limited sense

[39] José Ignacio Cabezón, *Buddhism and Language,* 15.

[40] When talking about the "intrinsic cultural context," Leonard Van der Kujip refers to the medieval European movement during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when Greco-Roman intellectual heritage, especially the teaching of Aristotle, was introduced through growing contact with the Islamic and the Byzantine empires. See Leonard Van der Kujip, "Reviews of Buddhism and Language", *Journal of American Oriental Society* 118, no. 4 (1998), 563.

for comparative purposes without losing its cultural context. One does this by taking the familiar as a starting point and then expanding to incorporate the differences. "This process leads to a kind of de- and the re-construction of the original category, culminating not in meaninglessness, but in new meaning(s) embodied in the now modified and necessarily more complex category."[41] In addition, the term "scholasticism" is already used by scholars in several religious traditions.[42] In Buddhism, it is often associated with the Abhidharma and Yogācāra scholarly practices,[43] both of which were the main influences on Ouyang's Buddhist thought.

1.4.1 History of Scholastic Buddhism

Buddhist scholasticism is often associated with early attempts by Abhidharma scholars to formulate the Buddha's teaching into a coherent system. Debates about doctrinal points spring from the very early stages of these formulations. These debates and disagreements resulted in the formation of different schools, some of which, we know, had their own Abhidharma system as part of their canon. Unfortunately, we do not possess most of those canons. Only

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[41] José Ignacio Cabezón, *Scholasticism: cross-cultural and comparative perspectives* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 2.

[42] The term appears both in the Jewish context to refer to those Jewish thinkers, who were influenced by or reacted to Christian scholasticism, and in the Islamic context to refer to the tradition of *Kalam.* For the Jewish context see, for example, M. Zonta, *Hebrew Scholasticism in the Fifteenth Century: a History and Source Book* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). For the Islamic context, see for example R. G. Hovannisian and G. Sabagh, *Religion and Culture in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 18.

[43] See for example C. Willemen, B. Dessein and C. Cox, *Sarvastivada Buddhist Scholasticism* (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1998); or B. Dessein, *Samyuktabhidharmahrdaya: Heart of Scholasticism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1999).

two sets of Abhidharma *piṭakas* have survived, that of the Theravāda preserved in Pāli and that of the Sarvāstivāda School preserved in Chinese.[44]

In China, an early serious attempt to systematically introduce and study Abhidharma texts was made by Daoan (道安 312-385 CE). Other forms of scholastic Buddhism that captured the attention of Chinese Buddhists were the Sanlun school's study of Madhyamaka and later the study of the Yogācāra teaching, introduced by the Dilun and Shelun schools. This scholastic approach culminated with the careers of Xuanzang and his disciples. After the eighth century, major scholastic innovations are linked to the interpretation and systematization of the Buddhist teaching by the native Huayan and Tiantai thinkers, who were independent of the Indian scholastic tradition.

Scholastic practices in China also extend beyond the Buddhist tradition. Throughout history, Confucian scholasticism has shaped Chinese thought and culture far more than its Buddhist counterpart. One crucial scholastic movement that is particularly relevant to this study is the movement known as evidential research or *Kaozheng xue* (考證學). This movement, active throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was responsible for the rise of Confucian scholars who used scholastic, especially philological, methods to gain new insights into indigenous Chinese Confucian and non-Confucian classics. Ouyang Jingwu was

[44] We also have some Abhidharma works which are non-Theravāda or Sarvāstivāda – such as the *Śāriputrābhidharma* believed to be a Dharmaguptaka work or the *Abhidharmakośa* believed to be a Sautrāntika work –- however, only the two examples mentioned above had survived as canonical sets.

an heir to this tradition and, as we will see below, had a pioneering role in applying these methods of investigation to the study of Buddhist texts.

Scholastic Buddhism was far from it heyday after the Song dynasty. For one thing, Imperial patronage was not as lavish as in times past. Rather, the mastering of Neo-Confucian teachings became the benchmark by which political success was measured. With this preference, alternative visions, such as Buddhism, were marginalized. As is well known from other scholastic movements, or from modern universities for that matter, patronage is crucial to the success of scholastic movements. There are buildings and institutions to maintain, libraries to build and books to purchase, and teachers to be paid and the students' cost of living often needs to be subsidized. There is, therefore, little chance for a vibrant scholastic effort without patronage by the social and political elite classes.

Within Buddhism, the systematic learning of exegetical literature was far less widespread, partially due to the influence of Chan anti-scholastic rhetoric and Pure Land emphasis on faith in external powers for salvation. Studies of the Abhidharma, although still conducted, were not pursued seriously since the Abhidharma, the foundation of Buddhist scholasticism, was often associated with Hīnayāna. During the Ming dynasty there were several attempts to revive scholastic practices but once a lively transmission of scholastic tradition was cut off it proved difficult to revive them. Texts had been lost. Buddhism has ceased to be an independent and vibrant tradition in the Indian subcontinent; consequently external sources of philological and philosophical skills were no longer available in China. It was only in the twentieth century that the socio-political and intellectual

circumstances allowed for humble beginnings in re-establishing the scholastic tradition.

While scholastic Buddhism existed after the fall of the Tang, modern Buddhist scholastics are unique in their return to the Indian Buddhist textual tradition, specifically that of the Yogācāra school. In doing so, they rejected the primacy of what was arguably the hallmark of East Asian Buddhist thought, the so-called concept of *tathāgatagarbha*, which will a focus of chapter four. Consequently, the return and employment of Yogācāra teaching necessarily entailed the questioning of long held assumptions and foundational teachings. Indeed, this scholastic movement criticized the dominant form of Buddhism that developed in China and later spread to other East Asian regions, and which had elevated teachings inspired by apocryphal texts such as the *Awakening of Faith* or the **Śūraṃgama sūtra.* By contrast, these new scholars proposed a return to the original Indian texts (both *sūtras* and *śāstras*) and regarding medieval Indian Buddhist thinkers, such as Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Nagārjuna as authorities, rather than relying on the interpretation of native Chinese Buddhist thinkers. By doing so, a very different Buddhism emerges, Buddhism that is less unified than that promulgate by the East Asian tradition and which is more systematic and critical.

1.4.2 Scholastic Buddhism as a modern East Asian phenomenon

Recently, scholars have become aware of characteristics shared by scholastic movements in different parts of East Asia in the modern period. One prominent example among them is of course Ouyang and his disciples in the Inner Studies

Institute, the scholar monk Yinshun (印順 1906-2005), who insisted on the primacy of Madhyamaka[45] and the reevaluation of the Āgamas' importance. Another example is the controversial Japanese Critical Buddhist movement (*Hihan bukkyō*), spearheaded by leading two scholars of Buddhism Hakamaya Noriaki (袴谷憲昭) and Matsumoto Shirō (松本史朗).

In *The Pruning of the Bodhi Tree*, a book dedicated to the Critical Buddhist movement, Lin Chen-kuo argues that both Ouyang Jingwu and his disciple Lü Cheng should be understood as Critical Buddhists as well.[46] Lin draws attention to common features shared by Chinese and Japanese Critical Buddhists. Both Japanese and Chinese Critical Buddhists held that Sinicized forms of Buddhism are corrupt, that some foundational East Asian Buddhist text are "fake," and that consequently the doctrine and practices developed in East Asia are either severely flawed or even, in the case of the Japanese Critical Buddhists "non-Buddhist."

The argument that we should understand the scholastic movement as a broader phenomenon, and not merely as a collection of individuals who happen to be criticizing mainstream Buddhism, was lately outlined in an excellent dissertation written by William Chu, who focuses his study on the career of the scholar monk Yinshun.[47] Chu argues that, to many, Yinshun epitomizes a "cultic figure" who

[45] See, for example, Yinshun's description of direct realization as following the right understanding of emptiness. Yinshun, *The Way to Buddhahood* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1998), 299-300.

[46] Lin, Chen-kuo. "Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate between Two Buddhisms," in *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 298-313.

[47] William Chu, "A Buddha-Shaped Hole: Yinshun's Critical Buddhology and the Theological Crisis in Modern Chinese Buddhism" (PhD Diss., UCLA, 2006).

"blends critical Buddhology with Buddhist devotion."[48] Yinshun was but one prominent exemplar of a larger movement of critical Buddhists that "share strikingly similar features."[49] He then concludes "Republican Buddhism's intellectual depth and complexity owed much to the steep ideological polarization and self-reflection brought about by critical Buddhism."[50]

I share with both Lin and Chu the opinion that the Japanese *Hihan Bukkyō* or critical Buddhism and some Buddhists in China had similar concerns and methods However, I disagree that they shared similar historical and social background.[51]. As suggested by Jonathan Z. Smith, when doing comparative study, it is equally important to pay attention to the differences.[52] An important difference to bear in mind is that while some scholastics, such as Yinshun, were monastic, most Japanese critical Buddhists and their Chinese counterparts were laymen. This is especially true of the Chinese context, where the traditional boundaries between monastic and laity remained a crucial factor in the dynamics among Buddhists. The challenge scholastic Buddhists such as Ouyang posed to the monastic institution was an

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[48] See William Chu, "A Buddha-Shaped Hole: Yinshun's Critical Buddhology and the Theological Crisis in Modern Chinese Buddhism," 2. While, indeed, Yinshun is a "cultic figure" in contemporary Chinese Buddhism, he is by no means the first. As Chu argues, by combining "modern Buddhist studies" and "Chinese Buddhist theology" (see Ibid., 20), Ouyang and his Inner Studies Institute circle employed critical methods and "theological" concerns a generation before.

[49] Ibid., 74.

[50] Ibid., 20.

[51] Ibid., 75. Chu does not explain what he means exactly by shared similar historical and social background. The so-called Critical Buddhists lived throughout the twentieth century in different historical, social and Buddhist environments.

[52] See for example, Jonathan Z. Smith, *Imagining Religion: from Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1, 21.

important part of their scholastic agenda, which was obviously not the case with Yinshun, who was committed to the monastic institution and its agenda.

There are also important differences between Ouyang or Lü Cheng, or Yinshun for that matter, and the Japanese scholastics with respects to the set of concerns and the reasons that led to the emergence of the movement. One of the strongest motivations of Hakamaya and Matsumoto's critique is ethical, while the Chinese case is almost purely doctrinal.[53] These differences led to a diverse kind of "critical Buddhisms" or scholastic traditions that we must account for when we collect them together as a part of one phenomenon.

One characteristic shared by most East Asian scholastic Buddhists is a critical view of traditional East Asian Buddhism. They often target East Asian interpretations of *tathāgatagarbha* or Buddha Nature theory as imperfect, and as either a mere expedient means (Yinshun) or quite boldly preannounce it as fake and non-Buddhist (Hakamaya, Matsumoto and Lü Cheng). They all, in one way or another, called for a return to what they understood as more authentic Buddhism, and are clear that this "authentic Buddhism" was the "Indian" form of Buddhism even if they hold different opinions as to what kind of "Indian Buddhism" East Asian Buddhism needs to return to.

[53] Although, at least in later Lü Cheng's writing, we can find traces of ethical and social concerns, where he argues that Mahāyāna thought originated from the ordinary people and not from the ruling class, who favored Brahmanism. This Mahāyāna thought propagates the notion of the transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*), a concept that hides the ordinary people's dissatisfaction with the social situation in which they live (see Lü, Cheng. "Discussing Chinese Buddhism Fundamental Thought in Regard to the Mind and Nature [式論中國佛學有關心性的基本思想]," in *Collected Writings of Lü Cheng's Buddhist Writings* [呂澂佛學論著選集] (Jinan: Qilu Shushe Press, 1991c), 1413-1424). First, we have to take into account that Lü wrote this article after 1949, when Marxist thought was orthodoxy. But, even then, his concerns were less ethical and social and are better understood as doctrinal in nature.

In sum, based on José Cabézon's pioneering work and based on its already prevalent usage in the Buddhist context, I find the category of scholasticism to be an adequate category to describe Ouyang's method and concerns. As we saw, modern scholasticism was not limited to Ouyang alone, but it was a broader phenomenon practiced by different people and groups. Despite having different agendas they also shared some similar characteristics that distinguished them from other East Asian Buddhists in the modern period.

1.5 Contribution to the field

This project is multi-dimensional, and touches upon themes that are relevant to several audiences and academic disciplines. It is of interest to Buddhologists who are interested in Buddhist doctrine and its relevance in the modern period. In particular, how a twentieth century thinker, such as Ouyang Jingwu, used and developed the medieval Yogācāra teaching for the needs of his own day.

This project also touches on the problem of the so-called Sinification of Buddhism, a central focus of inquiry in the field of East Asian Buddhism. At the heart of this discussion is the question of whether or not Buddhism underwent transformation when it adapted to China and whether new developments signify a departure from Indian Buddhism. This project will not offer a critique of the old models and theories,[54] but instead will focus on the

[54] For a partial discussion of the problem of Sinification see H. R. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), especially the questions and methods chapter; Robert Gimello, *Chih-Yen, 602-668 and the Foundations of Hua-Yen Buddhism* (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1976); Peter N. Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the sinification of Buddhism* (Princeton, N.J.: *Princeton University Press*, 1991); Robert Sharf, *Coming to terms with Chinese Buddhism: a reading of the treasure store treatise* (Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 2002); Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002).

contribution of Ouyang and his contemporaries to the discussion from an emic perspective in times where the question of "Chinese" Buddhism vs. "Indian" Buddhism began to occupy the minds of Chinese Buddhists themselves.

In addition to Buddhologists, this project is relevant to scholars interested in the History of Religion. First, this project will focus on the reaction of a religious tradition confronted with the dramatic impact of globalization in the post-second half of the nineteenth century, especially in the non-Western world. The question of the strategies employed by religious traditions when encountering so-called "modernity" is a complex one that has been widely theorized and discussed in the field of Religious Studies.[55] This dissertation is focused on one particular relation, namely the rise of scholasticism and reliance on medieval teaching as a resource for dealing with contemporary concerns among religious intellectuals.

Finally, I hope that this dissertation will contribute to our understanding of Chinese intellectual history in the modern period, and is therefore relevant for scholars of modern China and modern Chinese intellectual history and religions. As mentioned earlier, this work seeks to add the voice of Buddhism to the rich array of alternative discourses to the crumbling imperial Confucian orthodoxy. For the most part, for reasons discussed above, Buddhism is marginally mentioned in intellectual histories of the period for reasons

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Recently, scholars have come to appreciate the fact that the question of Sinification is at the heart of other aspects of Buddhism and not limited only to ideas. Thus, a new and rich study of different dimensions of the Sinification began to emerge. See, for example, Zhiru Ng's study of the transformation of the cult of the Bodhisattva Dizang in China. see Zhiru Ng, *The Making of a Savior Bodhisattva: Dizang in Medieval China* (Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), or in the way Buddhism penetrated dominant discourses outside of Buddhism as in the case of Daoism, see S. R. Bokenkamp, *Ancestors and Anxiety: Daoism and the Birth of Rebirth in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

[55] See notes 14, 15 and 16.

discussed above. This dissertation argues that this oversight ignores the impact of Buddhism, especially that of the scholastic tradition in the early ROC.

A good example for the importance of revaluating the impact of Buddhism is the movement known today as "New-Confucianism." Chinese scholar Fang Keli argues that, "New Confucianism ranks second only to Marxism in terms of its creative theoretical qualities, influence, and longevity."[56] If this movement is indeed second only to Marxism in its influence on contemporary China, then it reinforces the need to focus on the revival of Yogācāra and Ouyang's movement. Ouyang was the teacher of the two most prominent "founders" of the New Confucian movement, Xiong Shili (熊十力 1885-1968) and Liang Shuming (梁漱溟 1893-1988).[57] Xiong studied with Ouyang as part of his quest for "peace of mind and a meaningful existence" , but later rejected his teaching and propagated a Confucian correction to Yogācāra thought based on Wang Yangming's philosophy and the *Yijing*'s (*Book of Changes*) ontology, which he named "New-Yogācāra Theory" (新唯識論). The New-Yogācāra Theory was in fact an attempt to propagate his thought by outfitting it with Yogācāra "garb."[58]

1.6 Chapter outline

The major goal of this dissertation is to argue for the relevance of scholastic Buddhists to the study of the intellectual history of China and Chinese Buddhism,

[56] John Makeham, *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 2.

[57] John Hanafin argues that despite his later allegiance to Confucianism, Liang Shuming never actually renounced Buddhism and that he "should be regarded as a Buddhist rather than as a Confucian." Ibid., 5; and John Hanafin, "The 'Last Buddhist': The Philosophy of Liang Shuming." In *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination,* ed John Makeham (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 206.

[58] The New Yogācāra Theory was also the name of his most influential book that later became one of the cornerstones for the New-Confucians movement.

and to postulate that scholastic Buddhism was one of the strategies Buddhists, and religious thinkers in general, chose in order to cope with the challenges of the modern period. This argument is developed by focusing on the case study of one of the most prominent Chinese Buddhist scholastics in the modern period, Ouyang Jingwu.

The second chapter of the dissertation is dedicated to offering the necessary historical context to better understand Ouyang and the period in which he lived. I begin by delineating the sense of angst and crisis that engulfed most of the intellectuals of the period. The second part of the chapter deals with Ouyang's biography with a major emphasis on the events that played a role in the formation of his thought and style of discourse. In addition to Ouyang, the chapter also mentions other dominant Buddhist scholastics who either impacted on or were impacted by Ouyang, such as his teacher Yang Wenhui, his close friend Gui Bohua or his student Lü Cheng. Finally, the biographical chapter will also outline the major points of the historical setting in which the rise of Buddhist scholasticism and Ouyang's career unfolded.

The third chapter discusses Ouyang's critique of mainstream Chinese Buddhism, focusing on Chan, Tiantai and Huayan traditions. Partially due to his independent study of Buddhism, using evidential research methods, Ouyang began a process of a thorough reevaluation of the Buddhism that he saw practiced and expounded around him. This in turn made the critique of Chinese Buddhism one of the dominating factors in Ouyang's career. In order to show how controversial Ouyang was in his criticism of Chinese Buddhism I will mention other, more

conservative, constituents within the Saṅga and discuss how they reacted to Ouyang's criticism.

In addition, despite Ouyang's sympathy to Yogācāra teaching, he was critical of the attempts made by his predecessors in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) to revive Yogācāra. His critique of the Ming Yogācārins will prepare the ground for the discussion in the fourth chapter, which will focus on the root problem of Chinese Buddhism i.e. its interpretation of *tathāgatabarbha* teaching as expressed in the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna* (大乘起信論 *Dasheng qixin lun*).

The fourth chapter will focus on Ouyang's critique of the teaching found in the *Awakening of Faith*, a foundational text in the intellectual history of East Asian Buddhism. This chapter will contextualize Ouyang's critique of the text within the general discussion of the provenance of the text, the philosophical value and authenticity of its teaching in East Asia of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Since Ouyang identified the *Awakening of Faith's* teaching as the root problem, this chapter will also discuss the problem of authenticity in religious studies and how Ouyang understood this problem at the earlier phases of his career.

The fifth chapter delineates Ouyang's alternatives to the flaws he found in Chinese Buddhism. Ouyang redefined Buddhist teaching based on his two paradigms theory of *weishi* and *faxiang*, which is considered one of the most controversial and innovative contributions he made in his study of Buddhism. This chapter will focus on his unique hermeneutics, its source, how it was a response to the critique outlined in previous chapters and the controversy that followed. In addition, this chapter will focus on Ouyang's controversial statement that essence

(ti 體) and function (yong 用), two very loaded terms in Chinese philosophy, are exclusively separate, a view that runs counter to commonly held assumptions that they are interrelated. Through his doctrinal reform we can understand the full power of Ouyang's vision, which was intended to reposition Chinese Buddhism onto the right track and correct the flaws that haunted the tradition for over a millennium, and bring back from what he saw as a state of decline. For Ouyang, there was great promise and value in Buddhism. It was the daunting task of making this teaching available in China that Ouyang took upon himself and was so determined to carry through with success.

Chapter Two: Historical Background and Biography

2.1 The rise of Chinese scholastic Buddhism: historical background

2.1.1 Intellectual developments during the Qing

Ouyang and others in his generation lived through a period of great transitions. As such they were, to a large extent, a product of two worlds. They grew up during late Qing dynasty and lived their adult life in the post-Imperial period. Experiencing the collapse of a two millennia world order was a traumatic event that served as a catalyst to radical changes in the thought of many of them. At the same time, they were still a product of classical Chinese education and were still engaging the world based on their native Chinese culture and thought. Among the different dimensions of classical education that proved crucial to Ouyang's investigation of Buddhist scholasticism was the evidential research (*kaozheng xue* 考證學) movement of the Qing dynasty.

It is often postulated by scholars that the rise of scholastic Buddhism owes its success to the introduction of Western thought to China and the methods acquired through contacts with Western orientalists.[1] The sensitivity to the impact of dominant powers over native traditions is an important contribution that postcolonial theorists have made to our understanding of this question. While this

[1] Here of course the usage of the word orientalism is not in the Saidian disparaging sense, but to refer to a scholar who studies the "Orient." This term, which was used in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century, was replaced by more regional specific names. Today Max Müller would probably be called an Indologist or simply an "Asianist."

approach is not a mistaken, I think that it is more helpful to adopt a more balanced approach, which examines both internal and external influences, such as that offered for example by Charles Hallisey,[2] and Richard King.[3] The influence of evidential research on Ouyang and other Buddhist scholastics is a good case in point.

The evidential research movement was a critical reaction to the Confucian scholarship of the Song and Ming dynasties (hence the movement was also known as "Han Studies" as opposed to the speculative nature of the so-called "Song Studies" movement). It was in many ways a reaction against the incorporation of speculative practices and external influences from Daoism and Buddhism and a call to return to a more empirical study of the Confucian classics.

Since a fuller account of this important development[4] will divert our attention from our current concerns, I will limit myself here to outlining some of its major characteristics, which are also evident in Ouyang's own approach to Buddhism. According to Elman, some of the predominant characteristics of evidential research scholarship were: (1) the "search for evidence" in order to retrieve the past or, in other words, historical or philological proof for the authentic teaching.[5] Qing evidential research scholars "stressed exacting research, rigorous analysis, and the collection of impartial evidence drawn from ancient

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[2] Charles Hallisey, "Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravada Buddhism," in *Curators of the Buddha*, ed. Donald Lopez (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 31-62.

[3] King, Richard. *Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and "the Mystic East"* (London, New York: Routledge, 1999), 149-150.

[4] For the most comprehensive treatment of the evidential research in English see Benjamin Elman, A. *From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China* (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 2001).

[5] Ibid., 3.

artifacts and historical documents and texts."[6]This was precisely Ouyang's methodology and the lack of "exacting research, rigorous analysis" etc. was one of Ouyang's main critiques against the Buddhists of his day; (2) Qing evidential research scholars wished to "resume the interrupted conversation with antiquity."[7] While among the Qing literati, the "interruption" was created by Neo-Confucians who infused into Confucian teaching Daoist and Buddhist ideas, for Ouyang, it was the millennium of *tathāgatagarbha* ideology, which distorted the "authentic" teaching of Buddhism; (3) a move from Ming comprehensiveness or the "amateur Ideal" to Qing specialization. In Ouyang's case, this corresponds to his in-depth study of Yogācāra thought that was rarely done prior to his day;[8] (4) revival of the study of non-orthodox texts and thinkers. In the Qing, literati became interested in non-Confucian thinkers, as well as Confucians who were not part of the Neo-Confucian mainstream e.g. Xunzi.[9] For Ouyang, it was the focus on Yogācāra teaching, which was marginalized in China for over a millennium; (5) turning to teaching as a vocation and not just as a job for those unable to secure a position in the imperial bureaucracy.[10]As we will see below, Ouyang was as committed to teaching as he was for scholarship.

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[6] Benjamin Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology,* 4.

[7] Ibid., 29.

[8] Ibid., 102-3.

[9] Ibid., *112-15.*

[10] Ibid., 168-172.

2.1.2 Intellectual crisis in the late Qing and early ROC

Historical developments such as the rise of Buddhist scholasticism in China do not happen in a vacuum, but often involve intricate complex processes. In this case, two factors are crucial for our discussion: rapid globalization, mainly through international presence in China, and the social, political and intellectual crisis that followed. Chang Hao, in his *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis,* paraphrased the words of Song Yuren, a scholar-official from Sichuan in the late 19th century: "Both Western sciences and Western religion brought in ideas and views at odds with traditional values and world views. The Copernican universe of Western science was bound to collide with traditional Chinese world view." Further: "This conflict (i.e. of the two world views)... would inevitably undermine the whole traditional hierarchical order."[11] Indeed, Song's premonition proved to be correct. The late Qing dynasty and early ROC were among the most dramatic times in Chinese history, times of social, political and economic upheavals, which led to a period of uncertainty and instability. Consequently, Chinese intellectuals and public figures began to reflect on those changes and saw urgent need to reevaluate fundamental intellectual paradigms.

According to Chang Hao, several new approaches marked the new direction Chinese intellectuals turned toward in the late nineteenth century:

1. The first and foremost, as predicted by Song Yuren, was the influx of Western thought and ideas from the West, initially mainly indirectly from

[11] Chang Hao, *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (1890-1911)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 6.

Japan and later directly through Western scholars who came to China (such as Bertrand Russell and John Dewey).

2. The renewal of interest in non-canonical texts and schools of thought (諸子學). This is a development that is closely linked to the rise of the evidential research (考證學) movement of the Qing, which gained greater popularity and legitimacy during the late nineteenth century. Mohism for one attracted the attention of scholars and enjoyed a revival of interest it had not had since the late Warring States period two millennia earlier.[12] Others turned to Xunzi, the Warring States Confucian whose views were rejected by later Confucians.

   It is interesting to note in this context that one of the tendencies of the Han Learning scholars, who used evidential research methods, was the return to the original texts. This return to the original is often described in the Buddhist context as influenced by the Western fascination with the "original Buddha" and his "original teaching." In Ouyang's case however it was to a large extent the heritage of the evidential research methods that guided his return to the origin or to authentic Buddhism through what he deemed authentic texts.

3. The most relevant development to this project was the fascination of lay intellectuals with Buddhism. This fascination began with intellectuals such as Yang Wenhui but continued throughout the twentieth century with eminent intellectuals such as Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, and Mou

[12] Chang Hao, *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning* ,9.

Zongsan, especially in his *Buddha Nature and Prajñā* (佛性與般若). It is in this context that Ouyang first encountered the Buddhist teaching.

Chang Hao and many others[13] were right to stress the sense of crisis that engulfed many Chinese intellectuals in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but one also needs to bear in mind that beyond the tragedies of these turbulent times it was also a period of innovations, and original intellectual engagement with the problems of the period, which in many ways laid the foundations to developments we see today.

2.1.3 The Role of Buddhism

What was the role Buddhism played in this period? Buddhists played a constructive but limited role in the politics of those days. According to Gray Tuttle, Buddhism was used to strengthen the ties between China and Tibet, as a mean of claiming Tibet as part of China.[14] During the republican period politicians and warlords were fascinated by Buddhist tantric technologies and rituals, which they used both to foster ties with the population they governed, and also in an attempt to gather divine aid in their wars and attempts to secure their fragile regimes.[15]

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[13] Many other books about the period convey the sense of existential angst among intellectuals and others in China of that period e.g. Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: the Túng-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (New York: Atheneum Press, 1966); James Sheridan, *China in Disintegration: the Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912-1949* (New York: Free Press, 1975) and also Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

[14] Gray Tuttle, *Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

[15] For more see Jason Clower, "Republic of Tantra" (Unpublished paper, 2003).

Buddhists also had a growing role in the social welfare network of Chinese society with their work in prisons, hospitals and orphanages.[16] However, religiously and intellectually speaking, the collapse of the Confucian state and the end of the Imperial era put Buddhism in a difficult position. Buddhism, alongside other religions, was accused of contributing to the backwardness of China,[17]and was therefore forced to defend itself and prove its relevancy.

As claimed above (see page 4) by Liang Qichao, leading intellectuals in the late nineteenth century[18] and their followers were involved with Buddhism in one way or another. The list is very long starting from Liang Qichao's famous teacher, Kang Youwei (康有為 1858-1927), who was influenced by the Bodhisattva ideal and who secluded himself in the mountains to calm his mind by practicing Buddhist meditation. Others were Tan Sitong (譚嗣同 1864-1989), another dominant figure in the One Hundred Days reform movement who decided to die as a martyr for the movement's cause instead of fleeing like Kang Youwei or Zhang Taiyan (章太炎 1869-1936), the Chinese philosopher, philologist and revolutionary. These intellectuals were attracted to different dimensions of Buddhism. Some, like Kang,

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[16] See Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival of China*, 121-131.

[17] See Hu Shi, "The Indianization of China: A Case Study in Cultural Borrowing," in *Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Art and Science, Independence, Convergence, and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought, and Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), 219-48. see also, Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 85-113 (especially 104-6 where he discusses Buddhism).

[18] Many of those intellectuals were involved in the One Hundred Days reform (Ch. Wuxi bianfa 戊戌變法). This short-lived reform movement led by Kang Youwei and supported by emperor Guangxu in 1898 is considered the last serious attempt to reform the Chinese Imperial bureaucracy and ideology before the 1911 revolution. Opposition to the reforms, led by the more conservative faction in the Imperial court and supported by Empress Dowager Cixi led the way to the rise of more radical calls for overthrowing the Manchu rule and the necessity of a revolution.

were attracted to contemplative life and techniques offered by Buddhism, others were attracted by Tiantai or Huayan thought. But no other Buddhist teaching left such an imprint on the intellectual history of the period as the revived Yogācāra thought.

2.1.4 The Yogācāra (Weishi 唯識) Revival

Wing-tsit Chan wrote about the Yogācāra revival: "The development of Buddhist thought in the twentieth century has been exclusively the story of Buddhist Idealism."[19] While this is clearly an overstatement,[20]it is indeed hard to think of other form of Buddhism that had such a remarkable impact on Chinese intellectual life beyond the sectarian boundaries of Buddhism. The Yogācāra movement in the twentieth century not only attracted many intellectuals to Buddhist philosophy and repositioned Buddhism as a viable resource, it also challenged many of the foundational practices and assumptions of traditional Chinese and Buddhist Chinese thought and by that contributed to a more sophisticated level of discourse among Chinese Buddhists at large.

But, why Yogācāra and why at that particular historical moment? At first glance, it seems peculiar that in light of the existential crisis, with a feeling of immanent danger to the very existence of China as a political and cultural entity and growing pressure from Western powers, there would be a renewal of interest in

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[19] Wing-tsit Chan, *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 93.

[20] As we saw, one example is the resurgence of Esoteric Buddhism, but also the reforms in Chan led by Xuyun (虛雲 ?-1959), Laiguo (來果 1881—1953) and others, and the revival of Pure Land Buddhism led by the influential monk Yinguang (印光 1861－1940).

medieval Indian philosophy. These questions will be treated at greater length throughout this work but let us begin by considering the following factors.

One of the major characteristics of the Yogācāra teaching is a highly sophisticated and systematic presentation of issues that resemble themes discussed in the German idealist tradition, a tradition that found resonance in China of those days. These issues include epistemological concerns such as how we know and what do we know, questions such the nature of the mind and the status of external phenomena, and further questions about ethics and society and the meaning of human life and history. Among the young scholars attracted to idealism one can find thinkers such as He Lin,[21] Wang Guowei[22] and others.

The retrieval of many Yogācāra texts that were lost in the upheavals of the Tang dynasty but preserved in Japan was another important historical development that led the way to the emergence of extensive Yogācāra studies in the Republican period. In the early twentieth century more than two hundred volumes of Buddhist texts were retrieved by Yang Wenhui through his friendship with Nanjio Bunyiu (南條文雄 1849-1927).[23] Most important among them were copies of Yogācāra texts such as 1) Kuiji's commentary on the *Cheng weishi lun* (*Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 T.1830.43.229a-606c), completed in 651 and considered to be the most authoritative commentary on the *Cheng weishi lun* 2) *Yuqieshidilun lunji*, a

[21] Ci Jiwei, "He Lin's Sinification of Idealism," in *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy,* ed. Cheng Chung-ying and Nicholas Bunnin (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 188-210.

[22] Wang Keping, "Wang Guowei: Philosophy of Aesthetic Criticism," in *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy,* ed. Cheng Chung-ying and Nicholas Bunnin (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 37-56.

[23] Nanjio was one of the leading reformers of Buddhism in Japan and a student of Max Müller.

commentary by Dunlun[24]on the *Yogācārabhūmi-śastra* (瑜伽師地論倫記, also known as *Yuqiu lunji* 瑜伽論記 T.1828.42.311a-868b) 3) 大乘法苑義林章 (*Dasheng fayuan yilin zhang* T45.1861.0245a03-374c11), a work by Kuiji in which he discusses the principles of the Yogācāra. 4) Works of Buddhist logic such as the *Yinmingruzhenglilunshu* (因明入正理論疏, also known as *Yinming dashu* 因名大疏 T44.1840.91b07-143a20), a commentary on the **Nyāyapraveśa* also written by Kuiji.[25]

It is important to note that until Chinese intellectuals and Buddhists such as Ouyang's disciple Lü Cheng developed the linguistic skills to read Sanskrit and Tibetan, the Chinese commentaries were the only available source for understanding classical works. Once Lü Cheng and others developed the necessary linguistic skills they faced with problems similar philological and philosophical problems to those faced by contemporary Buddhologists.

With growing Western impact came the importance of rationality, logic, the importance of intellect and reason over spiritualism, and the prioritizing of systematic philosophy instead of abstract metaphysical discussions. Scholastic Buddhists considered the Yogācāra tradition a better response to questions and issues raised by Western philosophy, which followed the rational and analytical standards promoted by the modern age.

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[24] Or Doryun, a Korean monk from the Tang dynasty.

[25] Deng Zimei, *20th Century Chinese Buddhism* [二十世紀中國佛教] (Beijing: Minzu Press, 2000).

2.1.5 Ouyang Jingwu and the Yogācāra revival

The Yogācāra movement of the early twentieth century encompassed many thinkers with different approaches and agendas. I am chosing to focus on Ouyang Jingwu, since I identify him as arguably the most important figure in the Yogācāra revival movement. Earlier figures were either his teachers or colleagues, while the younger generation saw him as a teacher, a role model to emulate or an opponent.

It is hard to overestimate Ouyang's contribution to Buddhist thought and Buddhist Studies in modern China. If the revival of Yogācāra had any significance beyond a small group of specialists it is mainly due to the remarkable career of Ouyang Jingwu. Ouyang's mission was to propagate Buddhism, which he deemed necessary for the modern age and a meaningful personal life.

As we already saw above, Ouyang's image in Republican China was that of a controversial yet thorough thinker. However, it is important to differentiate the perception of Ouyang from the complex figure that he actually was. Even as he was acquiring his fame as a scholastic Buddhist, a propagator of Yogācāra teaching and a critic of mainstream Buddhism, Ouyang also, over the years, became more syncretic in his approach, not only toward Buddhism but also toward Confucianism. This development is important for our understanding of Ouyang as a dynamic thinker. While this dissertation focuses on one critical phase in Ouyang's career, this chapter will describe his entire biographical and intellectual trajectory in order to have a better understanding of the this phase in the context of his career as a whole.

2.2 Ouyang Jingwu: a Biography

2.2.1 Phases in Ouyang's career

Below is an outline of the major phases in Ouyang's career, which are described in greater detail in the rest of this chapter. Drawing on the analysis of Cheng Gongrang,[26] I have divided the career of Ouyang into three main phases, which are further divided into sub-phases:

1. **Early phase – Confucian education. 1877-1901**

    a. Traditional Education [between 1877 and 1894] -- Ouyang focused mainly on Chengzhu School of thought and still aspired to an official career.
    b. The Discovery of the Luwang School [1894-1901] -- During the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 Ouyang decided that Chengzhu thought, which was the state ideology in China would neither help his personal quest "for the meaning of life and death" nor to save China. He turned then to the competing Luwang School of thought. This phase ended in 1901, when he was introduced to Buddhism.

2. **Adulthood – The Buddhist phase subdivided into three stages [1901-1931]**

    a. First Steps into Buddhism [1901-1904] -– in 1901 Ouyang was introduced to Buddhism by Gui Bohua, a friend who studied under Ouyang's future teacher Yang Wenhui. Gui introduced Ouyang to the Buddhist thought of Yang Wenhui's circles, which Ouyang characterized later as "[a group that] study Huayan and venerate the *Awakening of Faith.*"
    b. Yang Wenhui's protégé [1904-1911] -- In 1904 Ouyang traveled to Nanjing to meet Yang Wenhui for the first time. In the period between their first meeting and Yang's death Ouyang studied under Yang Wenhui and thoroughly investigated the different schools of Chinese Buddhism. At this stage, although he still found the Huayan-*Awakening of Faith* position to be the core of Buddhism, he gradually made further research into the teaching of the Weishi School and became known in Yang Wenhui's circle as the Weishi specialist.
    c. The Yogācāra/Weishi phase and failed institutional reforms [1911-1923] -– after Yang Wenhui's death in 1911, Ouyang turned his attention to reforms within Buddhism. In a few provocative and bold steps he tried to undermine monastic authority and establish an overarching association, which would oversee all Buddhist institutions. This radical move met a vehement monastic response, which led to the establishment of a new institution, "The Buddhist Association of China" led by monks. This new institution along with the failure of his own association shifted Ouyang's focus to the realm of ideas and Buddhist education, where he was

[26] Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought.*

destined to make his most important contribution.

d. Harmonizing Yogācāra with *Prajñāpāramitā* thought [1923-1931] -- In 1923 Ouyang lost his second son and two of his favorite students, Xu Yiming and Huang Shuyuan. Grieving over his multiple tragedies he made a vow to propagate *Prajñāpāramitā* thought. This vow was the beginning of his attempts to synthesize *Prajñāpāramitā* and Yogācāra thought. At a conference that year Ouyang remarked: "For a long while now we who studied together exchanged views over the Faxiang teaching and we can say that we have already kindled some light of understanding. I wish now that you will explore the secrets of the *Prajñāpāramitā* and turn [this light] into a torch of wisdom." He instructed his students that in addition to a thorough learning of Yogācāra they must probe into the true characteristics of "Nāgārjuna studies" as well. In 1928 Ouyang wrote a preface to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra* in which he brought to completion his attempts to harmonize Yogācāra with Madhyamaka thought.

3. Returning home, Ouyang's late thought [1931-1943]

a. In the later stages his of his life Ouyang rediscovered Huayan thought and studied the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, texts and approaches, which he repudiated in his early career. In this final phase of his career he tried to harmonize his earlier thought with these new emphases. This led to the creation of his own *panjiao* system (a doxographical method which he had criticized in the past but found useful toward the end of his life.)

b. In his later years he also made a surprising return to Confucianism. Using the same syncretic approach, Ouyang tried to synthesize Buddhism and Confucianism, arguing that they are essentially the same and that they "return to the same source" (歸一). Around 1931, when Ouyang turned 60, he attempted a systematization of the Confucian canon and teachings modeled after his experience with Buddhist teachings. This attempt was intensified after he moved to Sichuan in 1937 and continued up until his death in 1943. Ouyang thought that, since they share the same principles, the current strength of Buddhism could help restore Confucianism. He remarked then, "Alas, Confucianism is dying. If we will get down to the essence of the Buddhist canon and refined *prajñā* we will be able to revive the state of Jin by means of the State of Qin[27] [and] the Dao of King Wen and King Wu will not crumble." .

[27] Revive Confucianism by means of Buddhism.

2.3 Ouyang's biography in detail

2.3.1 Early Years

2.3.1.1 Family Background

In 1936, when Ouyang was sixty-six he wrote to his uncle:

> My study of Buddhism is different from others; you, my uncle, are familiar with the hardships that my mother experienced. Confucianism offered no answers to my inquiries into matters of sickness and life and death. As to the end-point, where [cultivation] and the ultimate converges, and as to the starting-point, where one takes up cultivation, I still felt as perplexed and remained uncertain. Hence, after my mother passed away, I cut off reputation, wealth, and attachment to food and sex. I set foot on the *śramaṇa* path and turned to teachers and friends to ask about that path, and yet my wish was difficult to fulfill. After thirty years of study, and searching for answers among all the ancient sages from the West (i.e. Indian Buddhist teachers), [Buddhism] touched my heart and enlightened me. [Meanwhile] tragedies [haunted] my family. My daughter, Ouaygn Lan, studied with me in Nanjing. When I returned from Gansu, where I had gone on printery business, I learned that she had passed away. I howled and lamented deep into the nights, but there was nothing I could do about [her death]. Then, I made a determined effort to read [Buddhist] scriptures, often until dawn. As a consequence, I understood the meaning of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and was enlightened to the meaning of consciousness-only (*weishi* 唯識). This was why I made the trip to Yunnan, where scholars gathered daily from all directions [to study with me]. [At that time], my son Zhanyuan, an exceptional talent with high ideals, drowned while taking a swim. I was determined then to study the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, the *Huayan sūtra*, and the *Nirvana Sūtra*. I then understood them one after the other. Gradually, I arrived to my current mastery of the material, where for the first time, everything is clear. [On this basis], I have come up with the definitive understanding [of the Buddhist doctrines] (論定學說)[28]

This passage summarized major events that shaped Ouyang's intellectual trajectory. As can be seen from the quote, Ouyang's biography is closely connected to developments and changes in his thought. These vicissitudes serve as a reminder that as intellectual historians we have to be sensitive to changes and continuations

[28] Ouyang Jingwu, "Reply Letter to Wei Siyi [覆魏斯逸書]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集 (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976)], 1554-55.

in the thought of the individuals we study. In Ouyang's thought we see that although Ouyang was mostly famous for his study of the Yogācāra tradition (the phase on which this dissertation focuses) it would be a mistake to reduce him to merely a Yogācārin. In many ways, each phase has its own, slightly different, "Ouyang Jingwu."

Ouyang Jingwu was born as Ouyang Jian (歐陽漸), courtesy name Ouyang Jinghu (歐陽鏡湖), on October 8th 1871, in Yihuang County (宜黃), Jiangxi province. He changed his name to Ouyang Jingwu when he was in his early 50's.

Ouyang's ancestors were peasants. The family became known only with Ouyang Jingwu's paternal great-grandfather, Ouyang Wenkai (歐陽文楷 ??-1855). Wenkai did not achieve success through the imperial exams but he was a man of letters, whose poems, painting and calligraphy were known to his contemporaries.[29] The real breakthrough in the family fortune happened in the time of Wenkai's son, Ouyang Dingxun, who passed the imperial exams at the provincial level (中舉人). After his success in the provincial examination, Ouyang Dingxun passed the imperial exams in the capital and received a teaching position at the Jingshan Imperial School. He was the first from Yihuang County to enter this path of civil service. Dingxun's promising career was brought to an abrupt end when his father died. Upon hearing the news, Dingxun started his journey back home but it is said that he died of sorrow during the journey.

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[29] Xu and Wang, *A Critical Biography of Ouyang Jingwu* [歐陽竟無評傳] (Nanchang Shi: Bai hua zhou wen yi chu ban she, 1995).

Dingxun had three children (one of them was in fact his nephew who was raised as part of the family). His oldest son, Ouyang Hui (歐陽暉 1822-1876), was Ouyang Jingwu's father. Ouyang Hui had passed the provincial exam (舉人), lived in the capital for 20 years and, like his father and grandfather, made a name for himself as a calligrapher and as a man of letters. Despite his relative success he continuously failed to pass the national imperial exam.

The mid-nineteenth century in China was turbulent, and rebellions broke out in several places, many of which were violent and damaged the effective rule of the Qing Imperial house. But none was as devastating and bloody as the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864) The Taiping armies exposed the ineffectiveness of the Qing banners armies. The Qing rulers had to support a new form of armed forces, which helped save the dynasty, the local militias, which helped save the dynasty. Ouyang Hui, who by that time had given up the ideal of passing the national exam, returned to Jiangxi and helped build the local militia there.

2.3.1.2 Death of his father and its aftermath

Despite Ouyang Hui's reputation and his achievement as a *juren,* life in the Ouyang's household was never free of economic strain. Since Dingxun could not make ends meet, Ouyang Hui had to support his parents in addition to his own household. He found a job at the local government in Jiangsu but died shortly after in 1876.

Ouyang Jingwu's mother was one of Ouyang Hui's three wives. Her surname was Wang (汪) and she came from a village in the vicinity of Guiyang in Guizhou

province. She gave birth to one son and two daughters, one of whom died young. When Ouyang Hui died in 1876, Ouyang Jingwu was only 5; suddenly the household of 8 people had no support. As a result Ouyang's family sank deeper into poverty. Shortly after the passing of his father, his uncle Ouyang Xuan died too. Left with no other choice, the whole extended family had to rely on Ouyang Yu (歐陽昱 1837-1904), the cousin of Ouyang Hui. It was Ouyang Yu who was responsible for most of Ouyang's early education.

Ouyang Yu passed the *bagong* exams (拔貢)[30] and later also the imperial exams and earned a second rank in the court exams. But, being dissatisfied with the job he was assigned to, he was not interested serving in the imperial bureaucracy and instead he devoted himself to studying. Since he gave up his official career, his family economic situation continued to be dire. In addition to his family, Ouyang Yu had to support the families of his two cousins who died prematurely (i.e. Ouyang Dingxun's sons). His income came from tutoring children of the nobility.

2.3.1.3 Early Education

Ouyang Yu, who was responsible for Ouyang Jingwu's early education, was a traditional thinker, and was hostile to the modern trends in his intellectual environment, resulting from the encounter with the West. Specifically, Ouyang Yu was very critical of the New Text movement and their interest in the *Gongyang*

[30] The *bagong* exam was less prestigious than the imperial exams and was designed to find young talents to serves as teachers in imperial institutions.

commentary.[31] Politically, He opposed the 100 days reform movement of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.

After the death of Ouyang Yu, Ouyang Jingwu wrote about how he first set his mind on education, "My brother Huang gave up his studies at a very young age. My uncle shed tears and tried to talk him out of it. He beat him with a stick and cried about my father. Once he gave me a book and said, 'Your father taught me this book, and today I give it to you'. I opened it and looked at it. Despite not understanding a word of it I was deeply moved."[32] In the following years Ouyang stayed close to his uncle throughout his journey to find new jobs, and despite the constant economic pressure, he never gave up studying or contemplated returning to the peasantry.

For young Jingwu, Ouyang Yu was more than a teacher or a mentor; he was the father figure that he had lost when he was just a child. Ouyang's affection and gratitude toward his uncle was felt throughout his life.[33]His uncle remained his role model even when he later renounced Confucianism and moved away from his teachings.

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[31] The debate between the "New" and "Old" Text schools is a long one, and goes back to the Han dynasty debate about which canon was genuine the "old" canon was argued to be the "real" canon of the pre-Qin burning of the Confucian classics, rediscovered during the Han. The "new"canon was the canon used in the early Han, and was supposed to be a reconstruction of the old canon. Modern New Text thinkers, such as Kang Youwei and the early Liang Qichao, relied on the *Gongyang* commentaries on the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Chunqiu*) to reject the cyclical historiography and to propagate a more linear historiography that would allow and call for reform. The New Text thinkers were also well known for introducing more "religious" elements into Confucianism, for example, by interpreting Confucius as semi-messianic prophetic leader.

[32] Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought,* 13.

[33] One can see this, for example, in the foreword that he wrote to his uncle's autobiographical "The Trivial Records of My Encounters" (見聞瑣錄) in which he supplement his uncle's account with his own memories of Ouyang Yu.

The education Ouyang Jingwu received from his uncle was broad and encompassed most of the traditional branches of knowledge that were supposed to prepare a young scholar for a path of scholarship and service. According to Wang Enyang, who was Ouyang's student, after basic writing and reading skills, Ouyang Yu taught Jingwu the art of writing poetry and prose. Later he introduced young Ouyang Jingwu to the philological method of scholarship of the Han Studies movement. After that Ouyang Yu turned to the traditional foci of classical education, the philosophy of the Chengzhu school of Confucianism.[34]

Indeed, according to Gong Jun, one way to understand Ouyang's thought is as a result of this tension between the more metaphysical teaching of the Chengzhu branch and the more scholastic methods of the evidential research movement.[35] For Gong Jun, the tension between his scholastic tendencies and his normative search for the existence of moral order is also a reflection of the tension between the traditional and modern strands of thought in his lifetime.

Gong Jun's point is valuable for our general understanding of Ouyang. Ouyang was not only the iconoclast thinker that he is remembered as. In his career and character he encompassed complexities that include both his genuine Buddhist beliefs and critical scholarship. This of course should not surprise anyone who understands Ouyang to be a scholastic Buddhist or as he might be called today a

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[34] Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought,* 29, 39.

[35] Gong Jun, "Three Propositions in Ouyang Jingwu's Thoughts [歐陽竟無思想中的三個論題]," *Zhexue Yanjiu* [哲學研究] 12 (1999), 51.

"Buddhist theologian" rather than a scholar of Buddhism in the Western academic sense of the word.

2.3.1.4 A full cup of *duḥkha*: experiences of losses in early life

Ouyang experienced human transience early in his life. Those experiences, and his failure to find answers for the vulnerablility of human life in the Confucian tradition, were part of the reasons that led him eventually to Buddhism. His first encounter with death, as stated above, was the loss of his father when he was 5, but that was only the beginning. Ouyang outlived his entire family, and witnessed the death of his parents, siblings, wife and all of his children. Ouyang's father had 3 wives; each gave birth to 3 children. Of his nine brothers and sisters, 4 died as children, among them Zhaodi who was his sister from of his mother. His children -- two sons, Ouyang Ge (1895-1940) and Ouyang Dong (1905-1923) and one daughter, Ouyang Lan (1899-1915) -- all died prematurely in tragic circumstances.

Intellectuals in the modern period China were in constant search for answers for the national crisis that had swept China since the nineteenth century, and Ouyang was no exception. But at the same time we must not forget the personal despair and tragic circumstances of Ouyang life, for many of the reasons for his intellectual choices were impacted by personal events of his biography as much as they were influenced by large events on a national scale.

2.3.2 Embarking on an Independent Path

2.3.2.1 Jingshun Academy and the meeting with Gui Bohua

In 1890, when Ouyang was nineteen years old he was admitted into Jingxun Academy (經訓書院) in Jiangxi's capital, Nanchang. Jingxun academy was one of the three major institutions for higher learning in Nanchang in those days. While the major emphasis of the school was on traditional learning of the Confucian canon and the dynastic histories, the school also taught Western studies, the importance of which became more and more evident in late Qing China. Moving from a small town to the capital of the province was the first opportunity for Ouyang to expand his horizons beyond the boundaries of the traditional education of his uncle. It was here for the first time that he learned about indigenous unorthodox views and the novel ideas coming from the West.

Beyond the exposure to cutting edge innovations in academic studies of those days,[36] another contribution of the Jingxun Academy period was his meeting with Gui Bohua (桂伯華 1861-1915),[37] who was destined to have a far reaching impact on Ouyang's development. Ouyang and Gui Bohua developed a strong friendship. Gui Bohua, who was 10 years older than Ouyang, exposed the young

[36] For example, Zhang Zhidong's willingness to accept Western studies subordinated to the traditional Chinese curriculum under the well known formula of "Chinese studies as the essence and Western studies for practical or functional purposes" (中體西用) or the reform movement of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao to which Ouyang was exposed through his friend Gui Bohua.

[37] Gui Bohua's original name was Gui Mingzu and he came from Jiujiang County in Jiangxi. Later he moved to Nanchang for his studies. He was an enthusiastic supporter and activist in the reform movement led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. After the failure of the reform movement and with Cixi's army trying to capture its participants, Gui Bohua hided for a short time. Later he traveled to Nanjing and studied Buddhism with the "father" of Buddhist revival in modern China Yang Wenhui (more on Yang Wenhui below). In 1910, he went to Japan to study esoteric Buddhism and befriended Zhang Taiyan. He died in Japan in 1915.

student from Yihuang County to new intellectual horizons and eventually to Buddhism.

2.3.2.2 The Sino-Japanese war and Ouyang's conversion to Luwang thought

While Ouyang studied in the Jingshu Academy, China suffered one of its most traumatic defeats in the history of the Qing, the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, with the humiliating Shimonoseki treaty[38] that followed.[39] Where was Ouyang during all those dramatic developments? Despite the fact that he sympathized with the reform movement and despite the fact that, like other young intellectuals, he was shocked by the defeat in the war and its outcome, Ouyang did not actively participate in the movement. In 1895, he left Nanchang and returned to Yihuang to get married, and then stayed there to support his mother.

Ouyang deeply sympathized with the cause of the reform, but nonetheless, his reaction to the defeat was different from that of his more politically active friends, and was more intellectual in nature. Lü Cheng recalled, "The war in the East

[38] The Shimonoseki treaty was a major blow to the Chinese pride. Among other requirements the treaty forced China to accept Japan as a colonial power, and turn Korea over to be a Japanese protectorate after more than a millennium of subordination to the Chinese emperor. China also had to open four more treaty portsl to allow Japan to build there factories owned by Japanese and to pay Japan indemnity for the losses Japan suffered as a subsequence of the war.

[39] This defeat, which resulted in heavy losses to the Chinese forces, forced the Qing government to accept the treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895. It became clear now that despite the self-strengthening efforts of the previous decades, China was not on the right track. As Jonathan Spence put it, the result of the Sino-Japanese war was a "dark conclusion to the brightest hopes of the era of self-strengthening" see Jonathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton Press, 1990), 224. China could not face the might of the Western imperial forces, but now even the Japanese, which were always considered to be subordinated to the rule of the Chinese emperor, joined the growing number of imperial forces that threatened the existence of China.

There is a direct link between the rude awakening of the Qing intellectuals and the birth of the Reform Movement of 1898. Chinese intellectuals reacted immediately after the signing of the Shimonoseki treaty with protests and demands for reforms. When such a reform was finally offered by the young emperor Guangxu, it found many young supporters like Gui Bohua.

has already been conducted and the affairs of the state deteriorated day by day. The master indignantly saw miscellaneous studies[40] as unhelpful, and focused on the Luwang School's teaching as a possible remedy to the social problem of the day."[41] During these years he diligently studied Wang Yangming thought before his gradual conversion to Buddhism. It took a few years of self-study and discussion with close friends to make this shift happen.

2.3.2.3 Gradual Embracing of Buddhism – Gui Bohua's impact

On September 21, 1898, the conservative faction of the imperial house, led by Cixi forced the emperor Guangxu into house arrest and crushed the reform movement. The failure of the reform movement had a devastating impact on Gui Bohua. Ouyang, in his biographical account of Gui Bohua writes, "After the death of the six martyrs[42]and the arrests made among the 'Kang [Youwei] Party' Bohua hid in his village. Because of the cold winter he was sick with malaria and was lying in his bed in the middle of the night with one candle. He received a copy of the *Diamond sūtra,* which he constantly read and which awakened him suddenly to the illusory nature of human life. Upon his recovery he went to Jinling [printery] and

[40] The miscellaneous teachings that Ouyang refers to probably relates to the traditional education that he receive in his childhood, especially the teaching of the orthodox Chengzhu School.

[41] Lü Cheng, "A Brief Biography of My Teacher Mr. Ouyang [親教師歐陽先生事略]," in *An Anthology of Materials from Chinese Buddhist Thought* [中國佛教思想資料選編], ed. Shi Jun et al (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju Press, 1983), 354.

[42] Ouyang refers to the six who were executed by the Imperial regime after the fall of the Reform Movement.

studied Buddhism under Yang Renshan (i.e. Yang Wenhui). It was another turn in [Bohua's] studies."[43]

Despite the fact that Ouyang did not follow Gui Bohua right away he could not stay detached from the changes his close friend went through. One time, Ouyang invited Gui Bohua to visit him at his hometown. When Gui Bohua arrived, they debated Buddhism and Wang Yangming thought, but Ouyang was not an easy convert. Despite Gui Bohua's skills in argument, Ouyang had an excellent background in philosophical and textual studies that he had received from his uncle and in the academy. After a long and heated debate he was not persuaded. Before Gui Bohua left he made a last attempt. Ouyang relates, "He gave me copies of the *Awakening of Faith* and the **Śūraṃgama sūtra,* and said, 'How about that for the time being, you take these and put them next to your bed? Make them your bedtime reading?' I did not feel like taking them."[44]

However, despite his reluctance, perhaps out of respect to his friend, Ouyang took the books. These two texts, which were the foci of study in Wang Wenhui's circle, were the gateway through which Ouyang encountered Buddhism for the first time.

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[43] See Ouyang Jingwu, "Gui Bohua's Biography in Jingwu's Poetry and Prose Collection [竟無詩文:桂伯華行述]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976) , 1855.
Cheng Gongrang plausibly argues that Gui Bohua was exposed to Buddhist ideas even before returning to his hometown, through his interaction with the reform movement Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought*, 33. Most of the intellectuals that were involved with the reform movement Tan Sitong, Kang Youwei or Liang Qichao for example all had deep interest in Buddhist practice and thought.

[44] Ibid., 1856.

In addition to his commitment to and interest in the teachings of the Luwang School of Neo-Confucianism, Ouyang had another reason for which he was reluctant to embrace Buddhism. In 1897, his brother, Ouyang Huang died, and he was left the only remaining support for his family. In order to be able to earn money as a scholar, he had to tread in the path of his ancestors and take the imperial examinations. Like many other young intellectuals in the end of the Qing dynasty, Ouyang was not interested in taking the imperial exams, but the death of his elder brother and family responsibility changed his plans.

In 1904, Ouyang passed the prefecture exam but achieved only the second rank (二等). While those who achieve the first rank went to elite national schools (國子監) those in the second rank often obtained minor official positions. Ouyang became an instructor in Guangchang, Jiangxi province. Since the examination system was abolished a year later. Ouyang never tried the *juren* exam.

Shortly after Gui Bohua's visit to Ouyang's hometown, Ouyang did read the two scriptures that Gui Bohua gave him. He was gradually influenced by the religiosity and the enthusiasm of Gui Bohua but at the same time he kept both feet in the Confucian world. It was a tradition in which he felt at home, a tradition that promised success and work, and one that would fulfill the destiny of his ancestors, who strove to serve the court through the official path.

2.3.2.4 Ouyang and Yang Wenhui

In addition to the two scriptures given to him, Gui Bohua also told Ouyang about his teacher, Yang Wenhui (楊文會 1837-1911). Yang Wenhui is considered to

be “the father of the [Buddhist] revival,”[45] and taught Buddhism to many prominent intellectuals of Ouyang’s day.[46] Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Yang Wenhui established himself as an authoritative figure on Buddhism. Monks and lay people came to study under him. He is well known for his contribution to the spread of the dharma, especially through printing and teaching. In 1866, the destruction Buddhism suffered after the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) prompted Yang Wenhui, with a help of likeminded friends, to open the Jinling Sūtra Printery (金陵刻經處). The Jinling printery was located in Nanjing (and still is today), where many intellectuals came to study Buddhism under Yang’s guidance. Despite the fact that Ouyang knew of Yang Wenhui and developed an interest in Buddhism, it took him a few more years before he met him for the first time in 1904.

Lü Cheng recounts that after passing the imperial exams, Ouyang, on the way back from Beijing to his native Yihuang, stopped in Nanjing to visit his friend, Gui Bohua, who studied with Yang Wenhui at that time. Gui Bohua introduced Ouyang to Yang Wenhui, and the latter preached to Ouyang. After the meeting, Ouyang’s faith in Buddhism “was increased and solidified.”[47] But Ouyang still was

[45] Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 2.

[46] Yang Wenhui was one of Ouyang’s biggest influences and was arguably the most important figure in late Qing Buddhism. His fame came for the depth and breadth of his study of Buddhism, for his novel approach to Buddhist education, for introducing new forms of Buddhism back into China, for his propagation of Buddhism through his printery, and for training the next generation of intellectuals who made Buddhism the foci of their intellectual pursuits. Since much has been written on Yang and in order to keep Ouyang at the center of this study, I will here discuss only the aspects of Yang Wenhui’s life that are relevant to Ouyang’s own biography. For more on Yang Wenhui see Gabriele Helga Goldfuss, "Binding Sūtras and Modernity: The Life and Times of the Chinese Layman Yang Wenhui (1837-1911)," *Studies in Central & East Asian Religions* 9 (1996), 54-74. Gabriele Helga Goldfuss, *Vers un bouddhisme du xxe siècle*. Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China.* (Especially the first chapter); Chen Jidong (Chin Keitoo), *Shinmatsu bukkyō no kenkyu: yo bunkai o chushin to shite* [清末仏教の研究 : 揚文会を中心とし て] (Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin, 2003).

not entirely persuaded. In addition, as a loyal son, as long as his mother was still alive, he could not turn his back on his father's heritage and embrace Buddhism. Cheng Gongrang notes that there are no concrete details about the actual content of the meeting, but he plausibly speculates that part of the conversation revolved around the different teachings of the *Awakening of Faith* and Wang Yangming thought, and that this question was resolved to Ouyang's satisfaction.[48] In 1905, Gui Bohua left to study in Japan, and Ouyang took on an instructor position. During this time he devoted himself to the study Buddhism, with a critical approach, but now more sympathetic.

Toward the end of his life, especially after his years in London, Yang Wenhui promoted a "return to ancient Buddhism" which for him meant, among other things, the Yogācāra tradition. In their 1904 meeting, Yang urged Ouyang to study the *vijñāptimātra*[49] tradition. For Ouyang this was to be the gateway through which he was able to fully convert to Buddhism. Yogācāra eventually gave him the answers that he was looking for and which he failed to find in the *Awakening of Faith*. Despite the fact that he overcame his intellectual doubts, the commitment to the family's heritage still prevented him from fully embracing Buddhism.

This last condition changed in the following year, and the event dramatically altered Ouyang's life. In February 13, 1906, Ouyang's mother passed away. Ouyang, who was very close to her, grieved deeply, and Lü Cheng tells us that

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[47] Lü Cheng, A Brief Biography of My Teacher Mr. Ouyang, 354.

[48] See Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought,* 42. see also Xu and Wang, *A Critical Biography of Ouyang Jingwu,* 48.

[49] A synonym for the Yogācāra teaching.

as a result Ouyang decided to "refrain from meat and sex, stop his official career, put his trust in the Buddhadharma and strive for unsurpassed awakening."[50] After their mother's death, Ouyang's beloved sister who lived with his mother and served as a tutor to Ouyang's children moved to live in a Buddhist monastery as well.

In 1907, Ouyang visited Yang Wenhui in Nanjing for the second time and spent some months there. Later in the same year, he left together with his cousin Ouyang Yi to study in Japan. Ouyang lived together with Gui Bohua in Tokyo. In Tokyo he met Kuai Ruomu (蒯若木) who was one of Yang Wenhui's disciples, and later became a government official; Kwai was to donated money to help Ouyang establish his Inner Studies Institute. Beyond these details we know little about Ouyang's time in Japan.

In the autumn of 1908, Ouyang returned to China. Initially, he taught at Guangdong and Guangxi but he had to resign due to sickness and returned home. After his recovery, Ouyang decided to become a scholar recluse living as a peasent off the land. He moved with his Jingxuan academy classmate Li Zhengang to Jiufeng Mountain in the vicinity of Yihuang. This happy phase in Ouyang's life did not last long. Soon the cold weather on the mountain took its toll on Ouyang's health and he had to give this life up. Upon his recovery Ouyang decided to concentrate instead on Buddhism, and to do so in the most effective way he had to return to Yang Wenhui in Nanjing.

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[50] Lü Cheng, A Brief Biography of My Teacher Mr. Ouyang, 354.

In 1908, Yang Wenhui was busy establishing a higher learning Buddhist Studies institute, which he called the Jetavana Vihāra Academy (祇洹精舍).[51] The institution was short lived and was closed in 1909 because of financial difficulties. Instead, In 1910 Yang Wenhui established a Buddhist Research Association with some like-minded intellectuals. Their intention was to promote a new style of lay Buddhism, which was critical of the Chan Buddhists dismissive approach toward the Buddhist scriptures. Sharing Yang's criticism of Chan, Ouyang joined Yang Wenhui and participated in the Research Association's activities. The Research Association later became the model for his own Inner Studies Institute.

Ouyang's determination to turn his back on his former life and stay with Yang Wenhui came a little too late. Yang Wenhui died a year later in 1911, and his death marks the beginning of arguably the most important stage of Ouyang's life; the phase of establishing himself as a Buddhist thinker, an educator of a new generation of intellectuals and of a promoter of Buddhist teaching that he helped to revive in China - the Yogācāra teaching.

2.3.2.5 The Death of Yang Wenhui

Yang Wenhui died on August 17, 1911 surrounded by his family and his close disciples Kuai Ruomu, Mei Guangxi and Ouyang Jingwu. It was just two days before the revolution began in Wuhan, a revolution that would bring the Imperial era to an

[51] One of the students who studied under Yang Wenhui at that time was Taixu the well-known reformer monk. Cheng Gongrang quoted Taixu who said that Ouyang was also among Yang's student in the short-lived Jetavana Vihāra academy. Cheng argues that it is impossible because Ouyang was with his friend Li Zhengang on Jiufeng Mountain and could not be in Nanjing. By the time Ouyang decided to give up the farming ideal the Jetavana Academy was already closed (see Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought,* 58).

end. In his will, Yang Wenhui left the business of publishing *sūtras*, which was his most salient contribution to Modern Buddhism, to Ouyang Jingwu. Ouyang recounted the incident, "When the master left for the West[52] he entrusted the [publishing business] to me and said 'You will come to my assembly and I will go to yours,[53] [for now] I am entrusting in your hands the continuation of the engraving of the scriptures', humbled, I bowed my head and respectfully accepted his will."[54]

It is interesting to ask why it was Ouyang Jingwu who received this honor. After all, Yang Wenhui had so many disciples, many of whom studied with him longer than Ouyang. One plausible answer is that Ouyang came to Yang after he decided to dedicate his life to the study Buddhism. Based on their previous encounters Yang was already familiar with Ouyang's philological and philosophical skills, and his critical and careful research method. He therefore probably saw Ouyang as a suitable candidate to continue the propagation of Buddhism in this new era.[55]

Yang Wenhui's will was an attempt to balance Jinling printery's needs with those of his family. The Jinling printery's money and buildings were to be designated as a public domain, and would not go to the family. In addition, to ensure the continuation of the Jinling printery's work, Yang divided his

[52] Yang refers here to the Western Paradise of Amitābha or in other words when the master died.

[53] 我會上爾至, 爾會上我來.

[54] "The Origins of the *Sūtra* Exhibition in the Inner Studies Institute [內學院經版圖書展覽緣起] in Miscellaneous Writings [內學雜著]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwengfeng Press, 1976), 1457.

[55] Cheng Gongrang adds that besides Ouyang, there were two others who could be natural candidates. One of them was Gui Bohua who was at Japan at that time and had become interested in Esoteric Buddhism; and the other was Mei Guangxi, who worked for the government, and therefore could not dedicate all his energies to propagation of Buddhism.

responsibilities among three of his disciples, Chen Xian, who was responsible for the management; Chen Yifu who was responsible for public relations and Ouyang Jingwu who was responsible for publishing and academic matters. Yang Wenhui also left clear instructions for Ouyang. First and foremost, Ouyang was to finish and publish the remaining 50 fascicles of the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra,* a task which Yang did not finish in his lifetime,[56] he was also to publish Yang Wenhui's *Commentary on the Explanation of Mahāyāna-śāstra* (釋摩訶衍論集注) and his *Miscellaneous Records of Contemplations on the Equality and Non-Equality of Things* (等不等觀雜錄). Finally, Yang asked Ouyang to publish an Outline of the Buddhist canon, which would make accessible the whole range of texts that existed in the canon and that they were being engraved in the printery.

2.3.3 Carving his own path

After the death of Yang Wenhui, Ouyang felt that he and his friends shared a great responsibility for continuing the revival of Buddhism in China. However, Chen Xian passed away in 1918, and Chen Yifu resigned shortly after. These new developments left the way open for Ouyang to take over the lead of the Jinling printery, and run the place according to his own vision. Like Yang Wenhui before him, Ouyang had to establish his own reputation in order to secure funds to sustain

[56] The importance that Yang Wenhui saw in the publication of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is another indication of the growing significance of Yogācāra teaching in Yang Wenhui's later thought.

the Jinling printery and its activities. In the following years, Ouyang dedicated himself to achieving these difficult tasks.

The laity in China has always supported Buddhist activities, but funds went only to monastic institutions. The idea that the laity might support another layperson's institute, which would be dedicated to learning, was hard to promote among traditional Buddhist supporters.[57] Since Ouyang came from a scholarly background, and since he despised "superstitious" laypeople and "ignorant" monks, his natural course of action was to turn to influential and educated people, who appreciated learning and saw merit in advancing Buddhist studies in China. But in order to convince anyone to donate money to his cause, he had to establish himself as an authoritative figure. His first attempt was in the public arena.

2.3.3.1 The failure of the first Buddhist Association

In the March of 1912, Ouyang made his first attempt to build his reputation among fellow Buddhists. He and some of his friends petitioned to the newly established government in Beijing, which was headed by Sun Yat-sen, to unite the entire Buddhist institution under a Buddhist Association. This ambitious and controversial proposal came at a time of insecurity for the Saṅgha and its Buddhist property. While the Imperial regime traditionally protected and supported Buddhism, the new government was far less committed. As a result, Buddhists in the early ROC found themselves facing growing threats to their institution by progressive forces, greedy officials, bandits and warlords.

[57] See Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 9.

In order to face Buddhist adversaries' criticism and effectively preserve their property, Buddhists responded in a few different ways: They turned to rich and powerful lay Buddhists to make up for the lack of patronage from the central regime. They made attempts to reform their education system and adapt it to the demands of the new "modern" age. In addition, they searched for ways to unify the different Buddhist institutions under one Buddhist association, which would be able to coordinate Buddhist actions and reforms.

Ouyang's association,[58] which was proposed in March 1912, was the pioneering institute. Later, throughout the Republican era, many associations were established only to be dismantled soon after. The decision to establish the Chinese Buddhist Association (中國佛教會) in Nanjing was followed by the petition to Sun Yat-sen mentioned above. Its bold charter, which Holes Welch dubbed "astonishing,"[59] set forth the group's hope to supervise the entire Buddhist Saṅgha, lay and monastic. Since it is instructive and gives a vivid picture of Ouyang's ambitions at that stage, I will quote the charter in full.

> The Association shall have the right to superintend all properties belonging to all Buddhist organizations.
>
> The Association shall have the right to reorganize and promote all Buddhist business affairs.
>
> The Association will have the right to arbitrate disputes that may arise between Buddhists and to maintain order among them.
>
> The Association shall have the right to require the assistance of the National Government in carrying out all the social, missionary, and philanthropic works stated above.
>
> All activities of the Association within the scope of the law shall not be interfered with by the Government.

[58] Ouyang had a leading role in the intended association but it was not only his idea. He shared it with a few friends who shared his vision, such as Li Duanfu and Li Zhenggang.

[59] Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 34.

> The National Government is requested to insert a special article in the Constitution to protect the Association after it has been acknowledged as a lawful organization[60]

Welch commented, "Here was something far more dangerous than the invasion of Jinshan[61] – a plan to place the whole Buddhist establishment in the hands of men who despised the Saṅgha."[62]

Initially, the charter was approved by the Sun Yat-sen's government but it immediately provoked the anger of many other Buddhists, among them the most venerable monks of the age, such as Jichan (寄禪 1852-1912) also known as the "Eight Fingered Ascetic" (八指頭陀), Xuyun (虛雲 ?-1959) and Taixu. Their reaction was to found a new Buddhist Association in Shanghai headed by the charismatic Jichan, the abbot of Tiantong Temple. Most people in Buddhist circles accepted this association, and consequently Ouyang's Association was dissolved by itself. According to Xu and Wang, Ouyang avoided discussing this unflattering incident, which brought him many enemies within the Buddhist world.[63]

Ouyang's failure to establish himself as a public figure is not surprising, since he cut himself off from the more "popular religion" and tried to "correct flaws" in Chinese Buddhism that were dear to most of other Buddhists (e.g. ritual, meditative practices and mainstream doctrines). Ouyang was destined to leave his

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[60] Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 34.

[61] An attempt in 1911 by some reformer monks headed by Taixu and and another revolutionary monk named Renshan to take over Jinshan monastery and turn it into a modern school, a bold attempt that ended up with a scrimmage that damaged the Sangha's reputation (see Ibid., 29-33).

[62] Ibid., 34.

[63] Xu and Wang, *A Critical Biography of Ouyang Jingwu,* 50.

mark in another realm, that which he knew best, the realm of ideas and of intellectual engagement.

2.3.4 Studies in Yogācāra, Financial Challenges and Growing Reputation

2.3.4.1 Yogācāra (Weishi) Scholasticism

After the failure of Ouyang's "Coup de Saṅgha," he continued to devote most of his time and effort to the study of Yogācāra Buddhism. As noted earlier, Ouyang had already been immersed in studies of Yogācāra since his first meeting with Yang Wenhui in 1904. Eight years later, Ouyang had a much more comprehensive view of the Buddhist tradition, which encompassed a wide array of texts from different textual traditions. Ouyang did not learn Sanskrit but he was especially determined to explore the entire breadth of Indian Yogācāra based on the Xuanzang corpus.[64]

The Xuanzang corpus had not been seriously examined since at least the Ming dynasty. The sixth and seventh centuries were the heyday of Yogācāra studies in China. After the passing of Xuanzang in 664 CE, Yogācāra declined for philosophical and political reasons, i.e. due to shifts in imperial patronage[65] and an effective criticism of Xuanzang's doctrinal positions.[66] Many of the commentaries that elucidated the technical terminology of the Yogācāra tradition were lost in the

[64] He did however encourage his students to study Sanskrit and Tibetan.

[65] See Antonino Forte, *Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century: inquiry into the nature, authors and function of the Tunhuang document S.6502, followed by an annotated translation* (Napoli: Istituto universitario orientale, Seminario di studi asiatici, 1976). See also Chen Jinhua, "More Than a Philosopher: Fazang (643-712) as a Politician and Miracle Worker," *History of Religions* 42, no. 4 (2003): 320-58.

[66] See Robert Gimello, *Chih-Yen, 602-668 and the Foundations of Hua-Yen Buddhism,* 352-415.

upheavals of the second half of the Tang Empire and the Yogācāra teaching became "provisional" teaching.[67]

Yogācāra study during the Ming-Qing period was scarce. Texts were only partially accessible and were considered only as a background reading to the more "perfect teachings." When Yogācāra was studied, it was done thorough textbooks such as the *Eight Essential [Texts] of the Faxiang School*[68] (相宗八要), written by Xuelang Hongen (雪浪洪恩 1545-1608), or *The Essential teaching of the Mind Contemplation in the Cheng weishi lun*[69] (成唯識論觀心法要), by Ouyi Zhixu (藕益智旭 1599-1655). Ouyang Jingwu was very critical of the Yogācāra studies that were conducted during the Ming and later. For him, while Ming Yogācārins did study

[67] As a foundational Mahāyāna teaching, Yogācāra of course never really disappeared from China. It continued to be a "provisional" teaching, a teaching which aim was to explain the Buddhist teaching and make it accessible for people who cannot grasp the more "perfect" teachings. Its vocabulary also continued to be part of the more "perfect" Chinese teachings, especially this of Huayan. In Ming dynasty, there was a small scale Yogācāra revival however it did not last long and its impact was limited, especially due to the failure of the scholars involved to learn the tradition systematically as early Republic figures like Ouyang did. see Wu Jiang, "Buddhist Logic and Apologetics in Seventeenth-Century China: An Analysis of the Use of Buddhist Syllogisms in an Anti-Christian Polemic," *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 2, no. 2 (2003): 273-89.

[68] The eight are: (1) the **Mahāyāna śatadharmā prakāśamukha śāstra* by Vasubandhu (百法明門論 T45.1870); (2) the *Triṃśikā* by Vasubandhu (唯識三十論 T31.1586); (3) the *Ālambana parikṣa* by Dignāga (觀所緣緣論 T31.1624); (4) the commentary on the *Ālambana parikṣa* by Dharmapāla (觀所緣緣論釋); (5) the *System of the Six kinds of [Sanskrit] Compound* (六離合釋法式) from the *Huayan jing suishu yanyi chao*（華嚴經隨疏演義鈔錄 T36.1736）by Chengguan; (6) the **Nyāyapraveśa-śāstra* by Śaṃkarasvāmin (因明入正理論 T44.1840); (7) the *Three Parts of Syllogism* by Xuanzang (三支比量 X53.0861); (8) and the *Verses on the Structure of the Eight Consciousnesses* by Xuanzang (八識規矩 Root text can be found in Putai's T45.1865)

[69] X51.0824.0297a06- 454a05. This is a Ming dynasty work that attempt to explain the *Cheng weishi lun* based on works from late Tang to early Ming.

important texts like the *Triṃśikā* or the *Cheng weishi lun*, they also left out many important texts, such as the entire Asaṅga corpus.[70]

Ouyang was more comprehensive, and studied the notable Yogācāra treatises known collectively as the "One Root [text] and the 10 Branches"[71] (一本十支). The root text is the encyclopedic work traditionally attributed to Asaṅga, the *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra.*[72] The fact that that there was no living tradition of Yogācāra studies in China and that Ouyang had to rely solely on his Chinese sources and philological training made his reading of this enormous corpus especially challenging.[73]

In 1915, Ouyang's research into Yogācāra deepened following a tragic event. When Ouyang Jingwu was appointed by Yang Wenhui to continue his work in the Jinling printery Ouyang Lan, his daughter, came to Nanjing from their hometown in

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[70] More on the Ming dynasty revival of Yogācāra in the next chapter.

[71] The ten branches are: (1) the **Mahāyāna śatadharmā prakāśamukha śāstra* by Vasubandhu (百法明門論); (2) the **Pañca-skandha-prakaraṇa* by Vasubandhu (五蘊論 T31.1612); (3) the **Ārya śāsana prakaraṇa* by Asaṅga (顯揚聖教論 T31.1602); (4) the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha śāstra* by Asaṅga (攝大乘論 T31.1594, Xuanzang translation); (5) the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* by Asaṅga (阿毘達磨集論 T31.1605); (6) the *Madhyāntavibhāga bhāsya* attributed to Maitreya (辯中邊論 T31.1600); (7) the *Vimśatikā śāstra* by Vasubandhu (二十唯識論 T31.1590); (8) the *Triṃśikā śāstra* by Vasubandhu (三十唯識論) (9) *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra śāstra* attributed to Asaṅga or Maitreya (大乘莊嚴論 T31.1604), (10) the *Fenbie yuqie lun* attributed to Maitreaya (分別瑜伽論 did not survive only mentioned in other sources).

[72] The *Yogācārabhūmi* was the main focus of Ouyang's studies at that time. It was also the main focus of others who dedicated their career and intellectual pursue to Buddhism; people like Han Qingjing (see Cheng Gongrang, "Analysis of the Characteristics of Han Qingjing's Buddhist Thought [韓清淨居士佛教思想之特質析論]," *Pumen Xuebao* [普門學報] 1 (2001), 147-166. or Zhang Taiyan who studied this *śāstra* while he was in a Manchu jail from 1903-1906 (see Shimada Kenji, *Pioneer of the Chinese Revolution: Zhang Binglin and Confucianism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990).

[73] This would change with Ouyang's disciple and student Lü Cheng (呂澂 1896-1989), who, in addition to his native Chinese, had also good command of Sanskrit, Tibetan and Japanese. Lü Cheng's contribution to Buddhist studies is still largely ignored and unrecognized and he is certainly worthy of further scholarly attention.

Yihuang County. She studied there and took care of Ouyang Jingwu's household. The relationship between Ouyang Jingwu and his daughter was close and he was very attached to her. In 1915, when Ouyang was in Gansu for fundraising purposes, Ouyang Lan fell ill, and died soon after. Ouyang learned of her death only upon his return from Gansu. In a letter to his disciple he recounted, "I wailed at night and felt utterly hopeless."[74] After her death his research of Yogācāra became a therapeutic device and spiritual solace that helped him to mitigate the sadness over the loss of his daughter.

In 1917, Ouyang finished publishing the last fifty fascicles of the *Yogācārabhūmi* as he had promised Yang Wenhui and also concluded an intensive five years of research focusing primarily on the *Yogācārabhūmi,* which he prepared for publication. This period of focusing on Yogācāra studies culminated in the publication of his influential preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra* (瑜伽師地論敘). Around the time of the *Yogācārabhūmi* publication, Ouyang also published other important texts to which he added his commentaries. [75]His commentaries were most often prefaces (敘), in which he outlined the different components of the treatise together with its philosophical content, and added his own analysis and gave the historical context of the *sūtra* or *śāstra* and its author. The analysis section was where he most often was more creative and innovative.

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[74] See Ouyang Jingwu, "Another Response to Chen Zhenru [再答陳真如書]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 1591.

[75] Text such as the **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha śāstra* or the **Buddhabhūmisūtra śāstra* and so on.

Ouyang's commentaries were intellectually engaging and relevant for his contemporaries. He thus achieved in them both goals of keeping Yang Wenhui's mission going, and of building his own status, which would enable him to carry on his academic and publication plans. Ouyang's background in evidential scholarship and growing familiarity with Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts brought Buddhist scholarship in China to a new level of thoroughness and precision. His depth of philosophical and philological analysis enabled him to clarify to his contemporaries the abstruse teaching and vocabulary of Buddhism philosophy, and convince leading intellectuals like Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, and Xiong Shili of the importance of Buddhism. He also criticized the "flaws" he saw in Chinese Buddhism in a way that forced the more traditional forces in the Saṅgha to react with an equal level of sophistication. Some of the innovations and elucidations were so different from what Chinese Buddhists and intellectuals were used to that Lü Cheng tells us that his audience "was shocked."[76]

2.3.4.2 Financial difficulties and growing reputation

Financial challenges had been a part of Ouyang's life since early childhood and throughout his adulthood. Finances affected both his family's situation, the Jinling printery, and later also, later, the Inner Studies Institute.

As noted above, before Yang Wenhui died he attempted to secure both the continuous operation of the Jinling printery and the wellbeing of his family. The solution that he found was awkward and gave rise to numerous misunderstandings. The Jinling printery was granted independence, but on the condition that the Yang

[76] Lü Cheng, "A Brief Biography of My Teacher Mr. Ouyang, 355.

family could live in two of the four main courtyards and that they, on their part, would support the Jinling printery when they are able to afford it.[77] Conflicts between Ouyang and Yang family over the support of the family and real estate began right after Yang Wenhui's death and lasted until 1936.[78]

Dedicating all of his time and energy to the Jinling printery had an enormous impact on the wellbeing and economic situation of Ouyang's own family. As we saw earlier, the most tragic instance was the death of his daughter while Ouyang was on a fundraising trip in 1915. Ouyang lamented his loss bitterly and the fact that he was not around when his daughter needed him the most must have caused him serious distress. Both as a child and later as an adult, Ouyang never lived a life of comfort, a price that he paid for dedicating himself to scholarship and education.

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[77] Here is the account of Yang Wenhui's granddaughter from her autobiography: "Believing that he did not have long to live, Grandfather (i.e. Yang Wenhui) called together his pupils and members of the family to arrange his affairs. The Buddhist Press was assigned to a board of three men, Chen Xian (who had taught me at Wuchang) in charge of finance and management, Chen Yifu in charge of external relations, and Ouyang Jian in charge of editorial work. He reaffirmed his previous will that the Yanling Xiang property was to go to the Press, but that his family had the right to veto the sale of the property by the management. His pupils Kuai Ruomu and Mei Guangxi proposed that a separate house should be erected by subscription for the Yangs to live in. But Father did not want any public funds to be raised for the benefit of the family. After much discussion, an arrangement was made which has lasted to the present time. The westernmost courtyard was to be made into a shrine and tomb for my grandfather, and various branches of the family were to take turns in living in that courtyard to take care of the shrine. The next row of courtyards were for the rest of the family to use. The eastern half of the premises, including the front door at 49 Yanling Xiang, was for the use of the Press, except that all the woodblocks for printing the books were housed in a courtyard behind the shrine courtyard". Chao Buwei Yang, and Chao Yuen Ren, *Autobiography of a Chinese Woman, Buwei Yang Chao* (New York: The John Day Company, 1947), 90-91.

[78] See Holmes Welsh, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 319. In another of her works, Yang Wenhui's daughter describes an argument between Gui Bohua, Ouyang Jingwu and Yang Wenhui when the two disciples wanted to move the printery to Jiangxi and Yang refused. Cheng Gongrang argued that this is impossible because Gui Bohua was around that time in Japan (Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought,* 91), but regardless of whether this fact was true or not there is little doubt that mentioning this fact reflects bitter feelings on both sides.

While economically Ouyang faced challenges and uncertainties, his fame and reputation as a scholar soared. His name was known already in 1912 after his failure in forming the Chinese Buddhist Association. Naturally, he was well known in Yang Wenhui's circle, where he gradually became known as the Yogācāra expert. In the years after Yang's death, his reputation grew as an independent thinker and he was hailed by prominent intellectuals such as Zhang Taiyan and Shen Zengzhi[79] for his unique contribution to the study of Buddhism.

In the following decade, Ouyang's name was well established as a Buddhist authority. Young intellectuals came to study under him, and other prominent monks, like Taixu or Yinguang, criticized him and debated his views. His name appears in several national and international conferences and associations. For example, in 1920 the Yunnan military governor Tang Jiyao established a Dharma association and invited Ouyang to lecture on *sūtras*. Tang invited the most important monks of his time, Yinguang, Taixu and Dixian, and none of them could (or would) come, but Ouyang agreed. Finding Ouyang on the same list as these respected monks suggests that his authority as a Buddhist teacher was already established by 1920. In addition, in 1924, Taixu tried to establish the World Buddhist Federation, and he enlisted Ouyang as one of the delegates.[80]In 1925, Ouyang was

[79] Shen Zengzhi (沈曾植 1850-1922), a renowned poet, calligrapher and scholar in the late Qing, a Jinshi graduate who served in the imperial department of foreign relations (*zongli yamem*). In 1901 he was appointed the president of the Shanghai's Nanyang Univerity (which later became Jiaotong Univerity). He had a broad interest in both Western and Chinese traditional learning, after the collapse of the Qing also immersed himself in the study of Buddhism. For more see Ge Zhaoguang, "There was no Such a Man in the World: The Forgetting Shen Zengzhi and his Scholarship [世间原未有斯人:沈曾植与学术史的遗忘]," *Dushu* 9, no. 2 (1995): 64-72.

[80] Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 57. In his book Welch questioned whether Ouyang and others even knew about this federation, mainly because Taixu had some tension with Ouyang and some other listed.

invited for a conference on Buddhism in Japan.[81] The quotes from the opening from James Bissett Pratt and Karl Ludvig Reichelt at the opening of my introduction above suggest that Ouyang's name was well known enough that non-Chinese visitors to the ROC either knew about him or even visited the Inner Studies Institution and met him in person. Above all, the flock of adherents that came to his institute, together with the examples mentioned above, suggest that these were years when Ouyang emerged from anonymity to become an established authority on Buddhism, at least among intellectuals and members of the elite.

2.3.4.3 The Inner Studies Institute

Facing the challenges of running the Jinling printery as he envisioned, the constant disagreements with Yang's family, and the growing economical pressure, Ouyang was pushed to free himself from the shackles of his commitment to Yang Wenhui, his family and the publishing business. In 1919 he established a new institution, the focus of which was on education and scholarship. He called it the China Inner Studies Institute or *Zhina neixue yuan* (支那內學院). The institute was in the vicinity of the Jinling printery, so that he could continue to preside over both institutions. As mentioned in the introduction, Ouyang modeled his institution after Nalānda University, a fact that indicates the high hopes he had for his institution as a leading player in the propagation of Buddhism of his times.

The term *neixue* or Inner Studies is a peculiar one. Holmes Welch postulated that the term meant something like 'metaphysics,' which was contrasted the

[81] Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 204.

external studies i.e. science.[82] According to Ouyang, however, there are three meanings for the notion of "Inner": 1) uncontaminated (skt. *anāsrava* ch. 無漏); 2) Realization (ch. 現證); 3) the final or ultimate (究竟). The notion of "studies" means the study of the uncontaminated, realization and the final or ultimate goal of Buddhism.[83]

As for the term *Zhina*, it was a problematic terms that was used by Japanese to minimize the importance of China. The traditional name for China, *Zhongguo* -- literally means the 'Middle Kingdom' – was not adequate anymore for Japanese who no longer saw China as the most dominant force in Asia. *Zhina* was the transliteration of the Western name and to use it was to treat China as an equal country, merely one among many. By adopting the name Ouyang was later criticized by Chinese nationalists. He tried to justify it by claiming that it is the transliteration of the Sanskrit term for "sacred country." This apparently did not convince his contemporaries and in 1951 his disciple and successor Lü Cheng had to change the institution's name to *Zhongguo neixue yuan.*[84]

Ouyang established the Inner Studies Institute on the property of Mei Guangyuan, the brother of Ouyang's friend and Yang Wenhui's former disciple Mei Guangxi. The Institution was founded in autumn of 1919 and was officially opened on July, 1922. The initial funding came from donors such as Zhang Taiyan and from students' tuition, which covered their room and board. In order to assist Ouyang

[82] Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 319.

[83] See Ouyang Jingwu, "Discussing the Research of the Inner Studies" [談內學研究]," *Neixue neikan* 2 (1924): 1-3.

[84] Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 319.

with the management of the institute, his senior student, Lü Cheng, resigned his position as the principal of Shanghai's School of the Arts, and came to Nanjing. Other former students of Yang Wenhui and people who were familiar with Ouyang's work also volunteered to help.

According to two documents cited by Cheng Gongran, *The General Regulations of the Inner Studies Institute* (那內學院簡章) and *The Schedule of the Inner Studies Institute* (那內學院一覽表), the Inner Studies Institute was divided into academic and administrative sections. The academic section was further divided into three: middle school, university and research institute. The university was subdivided into the Faxiang (Dharma-characteristics) department with a focus on Yogācāra studies, Faxing (Dharma-nature) department with a focus on Madhyamaka[85] and a department dedicated to Esoteric Buddhism.[86] The research institute was responsible for *sūtra* reading groups, lectures and other related activities.

In 1922 Ouyang was busy with the official opening of the Inner Studies Institute. A year later a series of tragedies led to another dramatic shift in Ouyang's intellectual trajectory, a change that would seal his early Yogācāra phase and start a more syncretic approach to Buddhism. Of all the tragic events of 1923, it was the death of his youngest son, Ouyang Dong, which affected him the most. Ouyang Dong spent his early childhood with his mother in Yihuang but after the death of his

[85] Although the term Faxing (法性) was used in China most often to refer to the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching here, maybe deliberately, Ouyang uses this term to denote the Madhyamaka teachings.

[86] Ouyang's choice of Esoteric Buddhist department is interesting. Ouyang was known as an avid opponent of the more religious dimensions within Buddhism and yet he dedicated a whole department to the study of this highly ritualized and esoteric school. His reason was, of course, the fact that he modeled his institution after Nalānda University in which, according to the sources on which he relied, the study of Esoteric Buddhism was a part of the curriculum.

sister, he moved to Nanjing to live with his father. He was tutored by two of Ouyang's disciples Chen Mingshu and Xiong Shili. Ouyang Dong was a very talented pupil and after studying with his father's students he had good foundations in both Western and Chinese studies. In 1922 he followed Xiong Shili to Beijing. When Xiong received an appointment in Beijing University in 1923 Ouyang Dong was admitted to Tongji University in Shanghai as a student. Unfortunately his natural talent could not reach fruition. On 28 of September, 1923, he drowned while swimming. The sorrow that Ouyang experienced after the tragic death of Ouyang Dong was only worsened by the death of two of his close disciples in the following years; Xu Yiming (許一鳴 1902-1923) and Huang Shuyin (黃樹因 1898-1923). Xu Yiming died on the very same day as Ouyang's son.

The proximity of the deaths of these young people that were all dear to him shook Ouyang and he vowed to propagate *Prajñāpāramitā*'s thought. This vow was the beginning of his attempts to synthesize *Prajñāpāramitā* and Yogācāra thought. In a conference that started that year Ouyang remarked: "For a long time now we, who studied together exchanged views over the Faxiang teaching, can say that we already kindled some light of understanding. I hope that now you will explore the secrets of the *Prajñāpāramitā* and turn [this light] into a torch of wisdom."[87] He instructed his students that in addition to undertaking a thorough study of Yogācāra they must also probe into the true characteristics of 'Nāgārjuna studies.' During the 20's, which were the heyday of the Inner Studies Institute, Ouyang read

[87] Cheng Gongrang, "The Characteristics of Ouyang Jingwu's Biography, Career and Buddhist Thought [歐陽竟無先生的生平, 事業及其佛教思想的特]," *Yuan Kuang Buddhist Journal* [圓光佛學學報] 12, no. 4 (1999): 175.

thoroughly works on *Prajñāpāramitā* and Madhyamaka texts,[88] which resulted in the 1928 publication of Ouyang's commentary on the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā sūtra*. This was his major work in this phase of an attempting to harmonize Yogācāra with Madhyamaka thought.

The institute became a center for students and intellectuals who were interested in Buddhism, and found in Ouyang a Buddhist teacher who could speak in their language, and whose knowledge of Buddhism was more grounded in advanced research method compared with the kind of sectarian Buddhism preached by the leaders of the Saṅgha. Among Ouyang's students and disciples the two most prominent ones were Lü Cheng; and the New-Confucian scholar Xiong Shili; the renowned intellectual and public figure, Liang Qichao (1873-1929); the Confucian thinker, Liang Shuming (1893–1988); and the Buddhist Studies scholar Tang Yongtong (1893-1964), a former Harvard student who was later the head of the philosophy department at Peking University.

Impressive dignitaries were among those who served as members of the board. Among them was the former premier Xiong Xiling; Ye Gongchuo, a calligrapher and artist who served as a minister in Sun Yat-sen's government; Liang Qichao and Cai Yuanpei. Due to their influence, Ouyang and his Inner Studies Institute received funding to support the institute's activities.

In 1927, during the KMT army's Northern Expedition campaign, the Inner Studies Institute was affected for the first time by the socio-political events among which it operated. First, troops on the way to uproot warlords in the north camped

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[88] Texts such as the *Dazhidulun* or the *Mūlamadhyamaka kārikā*

inside the institution and interrupted the research and studies. Subsequently, the relative success of the KMT campaign damaged the financial foundation of the institute, which partially relied on donations from individuals associated with the warlords' governments. After the Northern Expedition, the institute operated on a much smaller scale, before moving into Jiangjin (江津), Sichuan in 1937, to escape the Japanese invasion.

Ouyang did not live to see the reestablishment of the Inner Studies Institute in Nanjing; this happened 4 years after his death, in 1947. The institute was active for a few more years in the hostile environment of the early years of the People Republic, and was eventually closed in 1952, after more than 30 years of operation. It was one of the longest lasting Buddhist academies in Republican China.

When James Pratt visited the Inner Studies Institute he described a nice looking building with ten to fifteen students. According to the Wang Enyang's *Overview of the Inner Studies Institute,* the teachers in the first two years were Enyang himself, Ouyang Jingwu, Lü Cheng, Qiu Xuming and Tang Yongtong. Lü Cheng taught Tibetan and Tang Yongtong taught Pāli and the curriculum was based mainly on the study of Yogācāra texts and thought, Buddhist logic and early Buddhist texts and thought.[89] Between the 1922, when the institution was officially opened, and the death of Ouyang in 1943, more than 300 students studied Buddhism there, and numerous texts were published.[90] Among those students we can find the

[89] Wang Enyang. "Overview of the Inner Studies Institute[支那內學院概覽]," *Neixue neikan* 2 (1924): 189-191.

[90] See Xu and Wang, *A Critical Biography of Ouyang Jingwu*, 91.

pioneers of Buddhist studies in China, who taught in the leading universities of Ouyang's day.

2.3.5 Later Developments in Ouyang's thought

The forced move from a central place to a relatively remote inland town distanced Ouyang from his major donors and disciples. The Sichuan branch of the Inner Studies Institute continue to operate in Jiangjin but Buddhism and Ouyang were no longer at the heart of intellectual interest, as they were when the Inner Studies Institute operated in Nanjing during the 20's and early 30's.

It is the radical change in his intellectual world that constitutes the most interesting development in Ouyang's later life. Since this dissertation focuses more on Ouyang's earlier phase of critical evaluation of the Buddhist teaching and Yogācāra studies, later stages of his career will have to be treated elsewhere. However, since these later stages are important to our understanding of the vicissitudes in Ouyang thought throughout his career, I will here briefly discuss the major shifts in his intellectual trajectory in the later part of his life.

Two developments were most dominatant in his later life. The first was his move away from a critical correction of Chinese Buddhist "flaws" and the reintroduction of "true" Indian Buddhism into China, toward a more harmonious and syncretic view of the Buddhist tradition. In addition, it was a move from a more sectarian approach to Buddhism, focusing on Yogācāra to a more holistic vision of Buddhism. The second development was his returning to Confucianism, almost thirty years after he renounced his ideological affiliation with the Luwang School and declared himself a Buddhist.

2.3.5.1 Ouyang's Later Buddhist Thought

Throughout his life, Ouyang used scholastic approach to revive 'authentic' Buddhism, and to criticize and correct what he saw as flaws in Chinese Buddhism. This tendency to stay away from harmonizing, and to prefer the scrutiny and precision of doctrinal analysis, began to change, as we saw earlier, after the deaths of his second son and two diciples, Xu Yiming and Huang Shuyin. A decade later, in his 60's Ouyang began to focus on the soteriological aspects of Buddhism, to paraphrasing Gombrich's words, he was more interested in the "how" instead in the 'what.'[91]

The beginning of this shift was, again, the result of a tragic event in Ouyang's life when his sister, Ouyang Shuzhen, died in 1926, after a charlatan who pretended to be a doctor misdiagnosed her. Ouyang wrote on the death of his sister, "On the 3rd day of the first month, when the bad news arrived, my heart was unbearably heavy, and I could not restrain myself. Since she already died, there was no point [in my reaction], how could it help my elder sister? I must continue transfer merit to her, conceal [my sorrow], control it and heal it. My chest burns, my head sweats and my eyes are dizzy. My body shivers as if I had malaria. Again and again, I cannot restrain myself and again and again I keep blaming myself."[92]

It was then that more existential questions reappeared in Ouyang's thought, and that he shifted his focus from Yogācāra and Madhyamaka to *sūtras* such as the *Nirvāna* and *Huayan Sūtras*.

In 1934 Ouyang promised in a letter he wrote to Chen Boyan that since his health is deteriorating, he would write the summary of the canon (大藏提要) that he promised to

[91] See Richard Gombrich, *How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 4, 16.

[92] Ouyang Jingwu, "The Inner Studies Institute Instruction Book, Part 1 [支那內學院院訓釋]: Instruction on Buddhist Compassion [釋悲訓]," *Neixue neikan* 3 (1926): 47.

Yang Wenhui on his deathbed, and which he indeed published in 1940 as the preface to his *Essentials of the Canon* (藏要敘). He also promised to publish the definitive teachings of his later years (晚年定論), which would outline his main view about Buddhism at his present stage.[93] He never explicitly wrote such a piece, but in the summer of 1937 Ouyang lectured to his disciples about his definitive teaching.[94] A year earlier, Ouyang published a commentary on the *Sūtra of the Secret Adornment* (大乘密嚴經), which considered to be the actual expression of his definitive views.[95] This commentary is crucial to the understanding of his later thought. Ouyang started his commentary by saying:

> *The Sūtra of the Secret Adornment* is one of the summaries for the entire Buddhist teachings and the path for the transformation of the two bases. There are numerous gates to the Dharma, which can be divided to the three aspects of teaching, practice and fruit. The fruit aspect is delineated in the *Mahāparinirvāna sūtra*, the practice aspect is delineated in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā sūtra* and the *Huayan sūtra* and the teaching aspect is delineated in *the Sūtra of the Secret Adornment*. This is why it is said that it is one of the summaries of the entire Buddhist teachings.[96]

Only in his later years did Ouyang read and commented on scriptures from all the three aspects of the Buddhist teachings identified here: teaching (教), practice (行) and the fruit of enlightenment (果). While in the earlier phases Ouyang put more emphasis on the teaching aspect of Buddhism, the time was ripe in his older years to try and focus more on

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[93] Ouyang Jingwu, "Reply Letter to Wei Siyi [覆魏斯逸書]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 1550-51.

[94] Lü Cheng, "A Brief Biography of My Teacher Mr. Ouyang, 356.

[95] Ouyang Jingwu, Reply Letter to Wei Siyi, 1553.

[96] Ouyang Jingwu, The *Sūtra* of the Great Vehicle Secret Adornment [大乘密嚴經] in Essentials of the Canon [藏要]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwengfeng Press, 1976), 1011-12.

the practice and fruit aspects.[97]

> In his commentary he elaborates on the meaning of the theory of the base.
>
> > All dharmas relay on the basis (i.e. *āśraya*); one must transform the two bases in order to become a Buddha. Illusion and awakening rely on the [basis of] suchness; defilement and purity rely on the [basis of] storehouse consciousness. To transform illusion to enlightenment one achieves *bodhi*, to transform defilement into purity one achieves *nirvāṇa*...why do we have to transform both of them when we transform the basis? Because substance (體) and function (用) are different, *bodhi* is the function while *nirvāṇa* is the substance.[98]

The theory of the basis and the way to achieve it correlate to the two later aspects of Buddhism i.e. practice and the fruit. Later in his commentary, Ouyang argued that among the two fruits of *bodhi* and *nirvāṇa*, the one that epitomize the ultimate goal of all dharma gates is the *nirvāṇa* with no reminder (Skt. *anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa* Ch. 無余涅槃) a concept which stood at the focus of Ouyang's interest in his later years.[99]

2.3.5.2 Ouyang the Confucian

Ouyang's shifting away from and returning to Confucianism is fascinating, and merits a scholarly attention that unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. I will leave the lengthy treatment of Ouyang's Confucianism for another occasion and give a brief summary so this important phase of his life will not be absent from this dissertation.

As we saw above, Ouyang preferred Buddhism over Confucianism because it provided

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[97] Ouyang started to read those sūtras and write about them when he was 56 after the death of his older sister in 1926. This process continued throughout his older years. (see Xu and Wang, *A Critical Biography of Ouyang Jingwu*, 196-7.)

[98] Ouyang Jingwu, The *Sūtra* of the Great Vehicle Secret Adornment, 1022-23.

[99] Generally speaking *anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa* refers to final liberation in which the body does not exist and there is no more karmic residue.

better answers to the "questions of life and death;" but why did he return from Buddhism to Confucianism later in life? Ouyang's first Confucian work was published in October 1931. The work entitled *Readings in the 11 themes in the Analects* (論語十一篇讀).[100] In this work we already see most of the views about Confucianism that Ouyang will continue to expound in his later Confucian writings. In 1932 he published his commentaries on the *Zhongyong* (*Readings in the Zhongyong* 中庸讀)[101] and the *Daxue* (*Reading in the Wang Yangming commentary on the Daxue* 大學王注讀).[102] Later that year he also published his work on Mencius (*Readings in the Ten Themes in the Mencius* 孟子十篇讀).[103]

A small number of central themes are at the focus of concern for Ouyang's research into Confucianism. First, Ouyang argues that we must distinguish between the real Confucianism of Confucius and his disciples in the pre Qin-Han period and the "fake", highly metaphysical and mythological Confucianism that has developed since the Han. This was a criticism shared by many Qing dynasty evidential research scholars beginning with Gu Yanwu (顾炎武1613-1682) and Li Shugu (李恕谷1659—1733), through Ouyang's generation and the campaign against Confucianism in the 20's. Second, however, what is unique about Ouyang was the links he precieved between "real" Confucianism and Buddhism. For example, he believed that since the post-Qin commentators were unreliable, the gateway to

[100] Ouyang Jingwu, "Readings in the 11 themes in the Analects [論語十一篇讀]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 3029-3132.

[101] Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface to Readings in the *Zhongyong* [中庸讀敘]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 2995-3001.

[102] Ouyang Jingwu, "Reading in the Wang Yangming commentary on the *Daxue* [大學王注讀]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 2963-2994.

[103] Ouyang Jingwu, "Readings in the 11 themes in the Analects [論語十一篇讀]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976) , 3029-3132.

Confucianism must therefore lie in Buddhism, more specifically in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. This was the second most important feature of Ouyang's late Confucian thought, i.e. his attempt to harmonize the essences of Buddhism and Confucianism.

His continuing work on Buddhism did not conflict with his work on Confucianism; on the contrary, they were complementary. While the crux of Confucianism appeared in the *Daxue* as "illuminating the lofty virtue *in society*" (明明德於天下者); the crux of Buddhism was appeared in the *Diamond sūtra* as to "lead people into the stage of *nirvāṇa* with no reminder" (令人無餘涅槃).[104] As Ouyang saw it, while their essences were the same, their function was different. Confucianism was designed to help cultivate the moral character in society while Buddhism had the role of liberating individuals and leading them to individual salvation.

Another interesting feature of Ouyang's Confucian writing was the timing of his delving into Confucianism. Although early signs of the reemergence of his treatment of Confucianism emerged already around the middle of the 20's, his first Confucian publication on the *Analects* appeared a month after the September 18th incident (see footnote 108) and was closely connected to the socio-political predicament of China and to the Japanese invasion to China. Evidence for this link between Ouyang's Confucian thought and China's political upheaval can be found in most of his Confucian writings. For example, Ouyang's preface for his commentary on the *Zhongyong* ends with the lamentation, "Alas, [Lu] Xiangshan, society is in great upheaval, and the Confucian teaching is about to wither. How

[104] See his preface to the *Sūtra of the Great Vehicle Secret Adornment*, Ouyang Jingwu, "The *Sūtra* of the Great Vehicle Secret Adornment (大乘密嚴經) in Essentials of the Canon [藏要]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集], (Taibei: Xinwengfeng Press, 1976), 1011-1066.

can I get to those people and meet with them shortly?"[105] Or when he says in his preface to his sub-commentary on the *Daxue* and Wang Yangming's commentary on it, "When the state is having a big calamity, the people help it by themselves; when there is a way to cross the road, the people figure it out by themselves. When a strong neighbor is swallowing their state, the people will rise up by themselves and fight against the invader."[106] As happened in his early years, Ouyang saw answers to China's quandary in the Confucian teaching, but it was not in the traditional Song-Ming Neo-Confucian thought, but a return to the original message of Confucius and Mencius.

2.3.6 Later Years and Death

Tragedies continued to haunt Ouyang throughout his life. The next series of sad events occurred in 1940. In June 1940 his wife and companion of many years passed away because of sickness. A month later, his oldest son, Ouyang Ge, was executed by Chiang Kai-shek.

Ouyang Ge (1895-1940) had a successful career and was a source of pride for his father. After the death of his siblings Ouyang Ge assisted and supported his father's Inner Studies Institute. When he was twenty years old he graduated from the naval officers' academy in Wusong and joined Sun Yat-sen. After the death of Sun in 1925, Ouyang Ge, who held a right wing ideology, joined the Chiang Kai-shek faction in the KMT. In 1926, he took part in the Zhongshan Warship Incident, and was subsequently punished for his part in the incident.[107] Later, he was promoted

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[105] Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface to Readings in the *Zhongyong* [中庸讀敘]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 3000.

[106] Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface to Readings in the *Zhongyong*, 2967.

and served in several warships as a commander, was promoted to a rank of general in the navy, and even served as a high ranking officer advisor to the government.

Ouyang Ge's career suffered a serious set back when following the anti-Japanese sentiments of "September 18th Incident"[108] and the "January 28th incident."[109] During the battle following the January 28th incident, nineteen army posts, which came under attacked by the Japanese, asked the navy for assistance. Ouyang Ge, who commanded the navy at that time, had just signed an agreement in Nanjing with the Japanese navy delegate, which prevent "mutual hostilities." Being loyal to the agreement, Ouyang Ge refused the calls for help. Ouyang Ge also retreated from the Madang battle in 1938,[110] wishing to preserve his power. In addition, he was charged with allegations of corruption and was finally arrested. In 1940 he was executed in Chongqing. By now Ouyang had lost all his relatives and his four grandchildren were all studying outside China. He remained lonely, depressed and bitter, but was still active both in running the Inner Studies Institute and in writing.

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[107] A coup that was organized by Chiang Kai-shek in order to damage the alliance between the communists in the KMT and Wang Jingwei, the KMT leader of that time. The Zhongshan was a warship headed by a communist commander name Li Zhilong. On the pretext that Li was planning a coup against Chiang, Chiang, together with several of his loyal officers, Ouyang Ge among them, arrested Li Zhilong and declared martial law in Canton. They arrested the local communist leaders, among them Zhou Enlai, and forced them to go through ideological training. Later, in order to appease the Russians, Chiang had to fire a few of the people involved, and among them was Ouyang Ge (Spence, *The Search for Modern China,* 344).

[108] The event that led to the Japanese occupation of North East China. On September 18, 1931 the Japanese army set off explosives on a railway line outside of Mukdan and used the skirmish that followed to open a full-scale attack on the Chinese forces. The result was the lose of Manchuria to the Japanese (Ibid., 391-2).

[109] A battle fought between Japan and China in Shanghai in 1932 followed by an aggression of the Japanese army the killed many innocent Chinese civilians (Ibid., 393-4).

[110] Another naval battle along the Yangtze River that took place on June 28, 1938 next to Madang in Anhui province.

In 1942, Ouyang wrote his last work, *Readings in the Heart sūtra* (心經讀), in which he continued to develop his synthesis of the teaching, practice and fruit of Buddhism. Lü Cheng tells us that Ouyang focused on this short *sūtra* during the last years of his life. He said: "In 1940, Ouyang's family was hit by tragedies. He took an oath to cultivate a meditation of recitation on the *Heart sūtra* through which he could taste the flavor of delusion and truth. He constantly did so, hoping to attain enlightenment. After 3 years he began [to grasp it] and his sublime words were preserved in his *Readings in the Heart sūtra*. This was his last exquisite work."[111]

A few months later, in February 1943, Ouyang, who was 73 years old and frail, became ill. A relatively mild cold deteriorated into pneumonia, from which his frail body could not recover. He died on February 23 in the Sichuan branch of the Inner Studies Institute in Jiangjin, where he was buried.

2.3.7 Evaluations and Critique

Ouyang won many admirers, as well as enemies and adversaries. Despite the fact that he was admired for his erudition and his teaching skills, Ouyang had a notorious reputation as an irritable man. Holmes Welch, for example, dubbed him as a man with a "prickly personality." He tells how once Ouyang was invited to a dinner in which Liang Qichao (who was his disciple) was the guest of honor. When Ouyang realized that Liang received the guest of honor seat while he received the

[111] Lü Cheng, A Brief Biography of My Teacher Mr. Ouyang, 356.

secondary seat, he decided to leave. It was only after the seats were rearranged and he was given the seat of honor that he was willing to stay.[112]

Jiang Canteng also adds an anecdote on Ouyang's temper, "When Lü Cheng first came to ask for instruction from the master, he presented him with a pact saying, 'I vow to be with the teacher for the rest of my life.' When the war with Japan broke out, the Inner Studies Institute moved to Sichuan to avoid the chaos, and they resided in Jiangjin. Lü Cheng came with the master and took care of his daily life needs. [Now], Ouyang was a man with fiery disposition and hot temper. Once, when Ouyang became very angry, everybody including Lü Cheng could not bear it. He then thanked the teacher and asked for permission to leave. But after Lü left, Ouyang did not have anyone to care of his everyday needs and share his hardships. Soon after, Ouyang became severely ill. He remembered the pact that Lü had gave him and that still existed, and sent someone to inform Lü Cheng in person that he must return. After Lü Cheng received the letter he returned to Jiangjin immediately. He bowed before Ouyang, and the master bowed back, then they both shed tears. Since that [incident] Lü Cheng was never even a step away from the master's side."[113]

But despite his personality, there were many who greatly admired him. Shen Zengzhi for example, wrote about the big crisis of the time, and thought that it could be corrected with self-purification and compassion. Commenting on Ouyang's institution he said: "Sons and daughters of good families, elders and Bodhisattvas

[112] Holmes Welsh, *The Buddhist Revival of China,* 120.

[113] Jiang, Canteng. *Controversies and Developments in Chinese Modern Buddhist Thought* [中國近代佛教思想的諍辯與發展] (Taibei: Nantian Press, 1998), 559-560.

are all developing the wisdom of Mañjuśri and practicing the vows of Samantabadhra; can I be unhappy about it and not help him?"[114] Zhang Taiyan said about his "friend Ouyang Jingwu:" "[Ouyang] Jingwu thinks that Buddhism is declining, and his views are deep and transcend those of ordinary people. [Since] he does not wish to hold the secrets concealed, [he therefore] imitated the Buddha's 'empty-fisted'[115] approach."[116]

We already saw that Liang Qichao became a disciple of Ouyang. In 1922 he spent two months in Nanjing before taking on a teaching position in Tianjin. During that time he frequented in the Inner Studies Institute to listen to Ouyang's talk. Before he left he wrote Ouyang a letter in which he said, "Master Ouyang: I attended your lectures for two months and what you have taught was immeasurable. I only hoped to hear more of your compassionate instruction in order to further establish my good roots...[although I have to go back,] I believe that, throughout my life, the benefits I received from the permeation (*xun* 熏) of your teaching will never be exhausted."[117]

Another example is the well known Chinese philosopher Tang Junyi (唐君毅 1909-1978), who said about Ouyang that "this man caused you to be immediately inspired" and "I, personally, have a great admiration for these two men (i.e. Liang

[114] Quoted in Xu and Wang, *A Critical Biography of Ouyang Jingwu,* 73-74.

[115] 師拳 (Skt. *ācārya-muṣṭi*) refers to the empty fist of the Buddha, a gesture Buddha used in his last sermon before he died to tell his beloved cousin and attendant Ānanda that the Tathāgata holds nothing in his closed fist. This gesture indicated that the Buddha revealed all and hid nothing from his disciples (see *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* DN 16). Zhang is probably quoting the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* 《瑜伽師地論》卷83：「遍開示者。謂無間演說不作師拳無所隱覆」(T30.1579.763.b9-10)

[116] Quoted in Xu and Wang, *A Critical Biography of Ouyang Jingwu,* 74.

[117] Ibid., 78.

Qichao and Ouyang Jingwu) for their position about what is means to be an upright person."[118]

More important than the different opinions on Ouyang's personality, were the different opinions on Ouyang as a thinker and on his contribution to Chinese Buddhism and Chinese intellectual history at large. Here, again, we find a range of opinions, from supporters to those who opposed him bitterly. At the extreme end of Ouyang's critics, we can find Buddhist conservatives such as the Pure Land master Yinguang (印光 1861—1940) who, feeling threatened by Ouyang's reactionary Buddhist position and the challenge he posed to the Saṅgha, said about Ouyang that he "is a great king of devils".[119] Taixu was another Buddhist opponent, whose different approach to Buddhist modernity will be treated at greater length in the chapters below; he was also critical of Ouyang's rejection of the "flaws" he found in Chinese Buddhism.

But thinkers such as Tang Junyi demonstrated that reactions to Ouyang's thought went beyond the limited circles of Buddhism. Those who objected to Ouyang often criticized his contribution to the "Indianization" of Chinese thought. This argument was by no means new. Blaming Buddhism for "contaminating" Chinese thought was as old as the introduction of Buddhism into China. In the modern period, the dominant voice in this direction came from the influential intellectual Hu Shi.[120] In his book, Cheng Gongrang cites the famous historian Chen

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[118] Tang Junyi, "Intellectual Trends in the Early Republic and the Course of My Philosophy Studies [民國初年的學風與我學哲學的經過]" *The Hong Kong Overseas Chinese Human Culture Weekly* [香港華僑人文周刊] 2/12/1968.

[119] Holmes Welsh, *The Buddhist Revival of China,* 119.

Yinke who said: "The Buddha's teaching recognized no [obligation to a] father and no [obligation to the] ruler. It contains not a single principle that does not conflict with Chinese traditional thought and existing systems;" further "As [in the case of] the *vijñaptimātra* of Xuanzang, although it shook the hearts of his contemporaries, it reached a sad end. Even though nowadays there are people who follow [Xuanzang] and ignite again those dead ashes, I suspect that in the end, they will not be able to revive [the Yogācāra teaching]."[121]

Another famous scholar who thought that Ouyang was not Chinese enough was Wing-tsit Chan. He said, "Ouyang deserves credit for raising the intellectual level of modern Chinese Buddhism. But his movement runs in the wrong direction. Aside from the fact that he looks to the past and defends the past, in modern Chinese religions his is the only movement toward particularization. All other schools, whether Buddhist or not, aim at synthesis." While Ouyang was "wrong" enough to try and understand the system of *vijñāptimātra* on its own term, without synthesize it with other Buddhist teaching, Chen, with a palpable relief, tells us that later, "the Idealistic tide was being reverted toward the glorious spirit of synthesis in Buddhism."[122]

It was this move towards "particularization," that is, Ouyang's insistence on doctrinal precision and the understanding of Buddhism on its own terms that characterized Ouyang's innovative approach to Buddhism. His critical study of

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[120] See Hu Shi, The Indianization of China: A Case Study in Cultural Borrowing.

[121] Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought,* 124.

[122] Chan, Wing-tsit. *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953).

Buddhism as a tradition based on its Indian texts, doctrine and systematic presentation rather than a reliance on faith, experience or texts composed in China, were in sharp contrast to the Buddhism he saw around him in his time. As a product of the evidential scholarship of the Qing dynasty, he was an inspiration to a generation of young Buddhists and non-Buddhists scholars, and a challenge to Buddhists that now had to defend Chan, Huayan and Tiantai with a more philosophically and doctrinally sound answers.

2.3.8 Summary

In sum, it is evident from Ouyang biography that the story of Ouyang's intellectual development and his unique contribution to both Chinese Buddhist and Chinese intellectual history are closely related to the time that he lived in, and the socio-political and existential uncertainties of the period.

Ouyang's career was influenced by external dynamics, but it was also affected by his tragic life story. Ouyang was a thinker that went against the tide on several fronts. As such, he had enemies, and lacked popular support. Consequently, he appealed neither to the mainstream Buddhists nor to the younger, pro-Western studies, intellectuals. But even though it persists among a relatively small elite movement, his impact has by no means disappeared. As we will see below, his heritage continues to live and is debated among both enemies and supporters.

Chapter Three: Ouyang's evaluation and Critique of Chinese Buddhism

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Ouyang's project

As is evident from Ouyang's biography, once he decided to dedicate his full attention to Buddhism he began a thorough assessment of its doctrines. Being dissatisfied with the Buddhist thought and practice prevalent in his day, he sought answers in the only place a person with his intellectual background could turn, namely in Buddhist texts themselves.

However, Ouyang chose to study not the texts most frequently studied by his contemporaries and predecessors, but the Yogācāra corpus, following the advice of his teacher Yang Wenhui. Now, with the texts that were sent by Nanjio Bunyiu from Japan (see chapter two, pages 37) Ouyang was equipped with commentaries that could elucidate abstract points impenetrable to Chinese Yogācārins since the Tang dynasty. Studying these texts substantiated many of his early doubts regarding the Chinese Buddhist tradition. He became confident that answers could be found in the Yogācāra treatises that contained the "authentic" Buddhist teachings of Buddhism and in the idea that it was necessary to distinguish genuine Buddhism from later developments.

Ouyang was in many ways the right person for the task of reassessing Buddhism. He was a new kind of Buddhist intellectual, a lay Buddhist who did not accept monastic authority. Thus he was free of the institutional Saṅgha's conventions, both in his teaching and practice. Ouyang, of course, was not the only

one who held this new vision of Buddhism but he was a dominant voice in the larger movement, in both China and Japan within which a more critical approach was taken to the Chinese Buddhist tradition. As we saw in my introduction above, while these features were shared by many Buddhists in the late nineteenth early twentieth centuries, Ouyang also represented one unique case in this tapestry of "multiple Buddhist modenrinities" that of the scholastic Buddhists, whose emphasis on a systematic approach to the study of Buddhism had a far reaching influence on East Asian Buddhism and on East Asian intellectual history in general.

3.1.2 The problems of Chinese Buddhism

What exactly were the aspects of Chinese Buddhism that Ouyang found unsatisfactory? In a famous lecture he gave in 1922 on the *Cheng weishi lun* entitled *Expositions and Discussions of Vijñāptimātra* (唯識抉擇談), Ouyang outlined ten themes that he identified as most crucial to the text. In each one of the ten expositions or doctrinal schemes[1]he chose to focus on one of the components of the scheme.[2] Before delving into each expositions (a few of which will be discussed in this and later chapters), Ouyang began by saying, "I will first explain the obstacles (蔽) confronting modern Buddhism. What is [the reason] for these obstacles? Briefly, they have, five causes."[3] The five are:

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[1] The term he used for those dominant schemes is expositions (Skt. *viniścaya* Ch. 抉擇), which can also mean "determination" or further analysis.

[2] For example when discussing the notion of two truths he focused on conventional truth. In another section where he discussed the substance and function, he focused on the function, etc.

[3] Ouyang Jingwu, "Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra* [唯識抉擇談]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 1359.

1. The negative impact of Chan;
2. The vagueness of Chinese thought;
3. The negative impact of Huayan and Tiantai;
4. "Secular" (i.e. Non-Buddhists) scholars' incorrect judgments of the Buddhist scriptures;
5. The lack of skill among scholars who attempt to study Buddhism;[4]

In essence, we can divide the five points above into three major areas of critique. (1) is the problematic nature of Chinese thought which is "vague and unsystematic" (儱侗) and "lacks careful investigation" (欠精密之觀察); the next (2) is mainstream Buddhism, especially Chan, Tiantai and Huayan (3) is the challenge and risk in the secular study of Buddhism. Beyond the dismissive remark he made about Chinese thought, Ouyang felt that two powers threatened Buddhism in China: internally, the practice and thought of mainstream Chinese Buddhism; and externally, the fact that scholars began to look at Buddhism for the wrong reasons. Ouyang did not specify who he was referring to, but one example of such an intellectual was Hu Shi, who became interested in Buddhism in that period for historical, methodological and political reasons rather than for soteriological ones.[5] In other words, intellectuals like Hu Shi ignored the normative value and soteriological potential of Buddhism in favor of "narrower" intellectual concerns.

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[4] Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1359-60.

[5] Hu Shi studied especially the Chan School and was concern with the historical study of Chan as an historical phenomena and not spiritual (see Hu Shi's famous debate with D.T. Suzuki in Hu Shih, "Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism in China its History and Method," *Philosophy East and West* 3, No. 1 (1953): 3-24).

I will leave aside the criticism of "secular" scholars for the time being as it is less relevant for our concern in this dissertation. Instead, I would like to focus on the second dimension, namely Ouyang's evaluation of mainstream Chinese Buddhism and his critique of the Chinese schools of Buddhism.

In terms of the scope of his critique, unlike other scholastic Buddhists in twentieth century China, such as Taixu, Yinshun or Lü Cheng, Ouyang never published a systematic historical criticism or an evaluation of Chinese Buddhism. Committed to the continuation of Yang Wenhui's mission to publish critical editions of Buddhist texts, Ouyang was busy studying the texts he published. His evaluation of the tradition thus appeared then less systematically in many of his lectures, writings and letters. However, it is still crucial for us to discuss his writings about Chinese Buddhist schools since, as we will see below, his critiques, unsystematic as they may be, would guide us to where he considered the main problem of the Chinese Buddhist tradition really was.

3.2 Critique of Chan

3.2.1 The anti-Chan sentiments of late Qing and early ROC

The Chan tradition was one of the most obvious targets for Buddhist reformers and critics in the early part of the twentieth century. Chan had been the single most influential form of Buddhism among members of the Chinese elite since the eighth century, and continued to symbolize for many the essence of Chinese Buddhism. Although in later imperial China sectarian boundaries were not as

strong as in the early days of the Chan School,[6] still many of the most eminent monks affiliated themselves with the Chan tradition.[7] In the twentieth century we can find among them eminent figures such as Jichan, Xuyun and Laiguo. Many others who did not affiliate themselves with the Chan School still saw it as the crown of Chinese Buddhism or at least as one of its important pillars. One well-known example was the monk Taixu, who wished to revive all Chinese Buddhist schools and saw them all as essential, but still acknowledged that Chan was the most prominent among them.[8]

In its earlier stages, Chan was a revolutionary school in almost every possible dimension. It had an idiosyncratic rhetoric, a strong self-identity and new methods of religious practice. Chan is famous for its antinomian approach to scriptural authority and for doubting the effectiveness of words and language to express the non-dual nature of reality. At the same time, the Chan School developed one of the most elaborate corpora of literature, including unique genres, with which it communicated its message.

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[6] Sectarian boundaries were never as tight in Chinese Buddhism as they were in Japanese Buddhism. For years, scholars in the West, influenced by Japanese scholars and Buddhists who introduced East Asian Buddhism to the west, tended to understand the meaning of the term "school" (Ch: *zong* 宗) in the Japanese sense of a different set of teachings, key texts and separate institutions. Scholars thus tended to view Chinese Buddhism as the predecessor of later Japanese Buddhism. Whenever aspects of Chinese Buddhism seemed not to fit the sectarian model it was often considered to be a sign of degeneration of the "pure" model. We now know that the meaning of "school" in China was different and more flexible than in Japan. However we are far from fully understanding the complexity and array of meanings of the term *zong.* What sense of identity a Buddhist felt when she was identified herself as belonging to a certain *zong* or school and how this notion changed over time. (For more see Robert Sharf's appendix "On Esoteric Buddhism in China" in Robert Sharf, *Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise*. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 263-78.

[7] For example the great Ming dynasty monks Hanshan Deqing (憨山德清 1546-1623) and Ouyi Zhixu (藕益智旭 1599-1656).

[8] See Taixu, "The Characteristic Feature of Chinese Buddhism is Chan [中國佛教特質在禪]," in *The Complete Works of Taixu* [太虛大師全書] (Taibei Shi: Hai chao yin she, 1950), 549. (Hereafter *TXQS*).

By the end of the Qing, however, the innovative character was long gone and the tradition was considered by many to be ossified. Both internal and external criticism of Chan was prevalent in the late Qing. One notable example is in the (auto)biography of Xuyun,[9] considered by many to be the most eminent Chan figure the twentieth century. Xuyun lamented, "In the Tang and the Song Dynasties, the Chan sect spread to every part of the country and how it prospered at the time! At present, it has reached the bottom of its decadence and only those monasteries like Jinshan, Gaomin and Baoguan, can still manage to present some appearance."[10] Chan was thus "only a name but without spirit".

For Ouyang and other intellectuals around him Chan's decadence was inherent within its problematic practices and approach to scriptures. As we saw in the biography chapter (see chapter two, page 30-32) the evidential scholarship tradition, which became widespread in the Qing, preferred a meticulous scholastic approach over metaphysical speculation. Yang Wenhui, Ouyang's teacher, despite admiring Chan's achievements, was very critical of this anti-intellectual and antinomian approach to the Buddhist scripture. He said,

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[9] The biography of Xuyun belongs to the genre of *nianpu* or yearly chronicle. It was not written by Xuyun himself but compiled by Xuyun's disciple Cen Xuelü (岑學呂1882-1963) out of notes and stories collected by his disciples and was supposedly later approved by Xuyun. The third edition of the *nianpu* includes a letter from Xuyun saying that his eyesight and hearing prevented him from reading Cen's manuscript thoroughly and that there were some mistakes in it that he asked his disciples to correct. See the section with the attached materials before the table of content in Xuyun, *Revised and Extended Version of Master Xuyun's Chronological Biography and Sermons Collection* [虛雲老和尚年譜法彙增訂本] (Taibei: Xiuyuan Chanyuan, 1997).

[10] Charles Luk (trans.). *Empty Cloud: The Autobiography of the Chinese Zen Master Xu Yun* (Dorset: Element Books, 1988), 157.

> If one is attached to the kind of method [embodied] in the concept of 'not relying on words and letters,' as a fixed teaching, then he is misleading himself and others. One must know that [although] Mahākāśyapa became the first patriarch (i.e. of the Chan School) and received the transmission, after the Buddha's death, he saw the collection of the teaching as an urgent matter. In addition, he transmitted the Chan teaching to no other but Ānanda, the preserver of the Buddha's knowledge and words. Later, generation after generation, everybody wrote commentaries, explained the scriptures and propagated the gist of the teaching. After Bodhidharma came from the West, the receiver of the transmission was Huike, who was familiar with the scriptures but failed to understand their meaning. If Huike did not understand the meaning of the teaching, how could he understand the depth of Bodhidharma's [mind]? When we get to the Sixth Patriarch [during the Tang dynasty], at first he appeared illiterate, in order to displaying the profundity of the unsurpassable path. [He taught that] the key [to the unsurpassable path] is to separate oneself from words and letters and gain realization by oneself. [However] later generations did not understand this idea and often understood the Sixth Patriarch to be illiterate. What an error![11]

In addition to antinomianism the Chan School was also blamed for over-emphasizing the quiescence of the mind. Similar criticism was leveled by Qing scholars against the Ming Confucians for appropriating Chan-like quietism. This was thought to in turn have led to detachment from real life, and as a result to the collapse of the dynasty. The connection between the Neo-Confucian Mind School and Chan Buddhism is almost self-evident. Zhang Taiyan, a Yogācāra enthusiastic and a one of the last representatives of the Hanxue tradition (i.e. who used

[11] 不 立文字是一種方便。若執為定法，則自誤誤人矣。當知摩訶迦葉承佛付囑為第一祖，至佛滅後，即以結集法藏為當務之急。及其傳心，不傳之他人，而傳之多聞總持 之阿難。後來世世相承，莫不造論釋經，宗說兼暢。達摩西來，得其傳者為精通內典之慧可。儻慧可未通教義，豈能識達摩之高深哉！及至六祖，始示現不識文字之 相，以顯無上道妙，要在離言親證，非文字所能及也。後人不達此意，輒以不識字比於六祖，何其謬哉！Cited in Fang Guangchang, "Yang Wenhui's Philosophy of Editing the Canon [楊文會的編藏思想]," *Zhonghua foxue xuebao.* 13, (2005): 179-205.

evidential research methods) remarked, "[The Chan School] treasures its own mind, it does not yield to spirit of the intellect (思神) and is similar to the Chinese [Confucian] Mind School"[12] Given the Hanxue scholars' traditional low esteem of the Mind School of Confucianism, equating them with Chan was by no means a compliment.

3.2.2 Ouyang's critique

What were the criticisms against the Chan School that led Ouyang to include it as one of the obstacles for Buddhism? Here is what Ouyang has to say about Chan:

> Since the School of Chan entered China, its blind adherents [mistakenly] understood the *Buddhadharma* to mean 'Point directly to the fundamental mind, do not rely on words and letters, see your nature and become a Buddha.' Why should one attach oneself to name and words? Little do they realize that the high attainment of the Chan followers only happens when reasoning is matched with those who have sharp faculties and high wisdom. Their seeds were perfumed with *prajñā* words from immemorial aeons. Even after they attained the path, they still do not dispose with the words of all the Buddhas; these [words] are written in the scriptures and they are not subject to a single conjuncture. But blind people do not know it; they pick up one or two Chan cases (i.e. *gongans*) as a Chan of words, meditating on them like a 'wild fox' and repeatedly say that the Buddha nature is not in language. Therefore, they discard the previous scriptures of the sages of yore and the excellent and refined words of the worthy ones of old, which lead to the decline in the true meaning of the *Buddhadharma*.[13]

From the above quote it is evident that Ouyang's main accusation against Chan is similar to that of his teacher, Yang Wenhui, i.e. that it disregards scriptural teaching and relies too much on one's own mind. Ouyang complains that Chan

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[12] See Deng Zimei, *20th Century Chinese Buddhism*, 228.

[13] 自禪宗入中國後，盲修之徒以為佛法本屬直指本心，不立文字，見性即可成佛，何必拘拘名言? 殊不知禪家絕高境界係在利根上智道理湊拍之時。其於無量劫前，文字般若熏種極久；即見道以後亦不廢諸佛語言，見諸載籍，非可臆說。而盲者不知，徒拾禪家一二公案為口頭禪，作野狐參，漫謂佛性不在文字之中；於是前聖典籍，先德至言，廢而不用，而佛法真義寖以微矣。 Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1359.

adherents merely repeat over and over the cliché that Chan's truth is outside the scriptures and beyond words. They forgot that actually "their seeds were perfumed with *prajñā* words from immemorial aeons," and that it is only because of that that they are now at a level of attainment.

Ouyang used the well-known Chan fox *gongan* to illustrate his point. This *gongan* tells the story of a monk who gave the wrong Chan answer to a question posed by a student of his in the times of the Buddha Kāśyapa. The question was whether the laws of causality could still affect a great cultivator of the path. The monk replied wrongly that such a man is not subject to the laws of causality and as a punishment was turned into a fox for five hundreds aeons. The fox-monk later posed the same question to Baizhang, who answered that such a cultivator could not be ignorant about the law of karma. When the fox heard Baizhang's answer he immediately attained enlightenment and his punishment was lifted.[14]

Ouyang brilliantly used the Chan *gongan* as a rhetorical device against Chan adherents themselves, accusing them of being, like the wild fox, attached to literalism without actually understanding the true meaning of the teaching. For Ouyang, even after one reaches a certain level of attainment, it does not mean that one can discard the Buddha's teaching. One cannot make further progress on the path without the map that the Buddhas and other "worthy ones of old" had drawn for us. Abandonment of the Buddhist scriptures will ultimately lead to an erroneous path and "to the decline in the true meaning of the *Buddhadharma*". We

[14] See the second case in the *Wumenguan* 無門關T48.2005.0293a15-b29.

will see below how he further developed this idea in his two-fold paradigm theory, which was partially a solution for the anti-canonical tendencies within Chan.

In his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, published in 1919, Ouyang indicated that one of the problems of Mahāyāna followers is attachment to the notion of emptiness , and that the word "only" in the compound consciousness-only indicates the correction of this attachment that might lead to nihilism.[15] Ouyang did not mention Chan explicitly, but he did allude to Chan's tendency to negate everything. This tendency to reject the Buddha's authority and his teaching is undermines the metaphysical foundations of the Buddhist practice. We will see below that for Ouyang it is impossible to practice the genuine teaching if one is not familiar with the path.

Interestingly, for Ouyang, as for his teacher Yang Wenhui, the adherents of the Chan tradition, despite their erroneous approach to texts, did not follow non-authentic Buddhism as their fellows from the Huayan and Tiantai schools did (see section 3.3 below). In September 1924, Ouyang gave another lecture titled "Discussing the Research of Inner Studies," in which he explained the importance of the research conducted in his institution. Here he argued that "Although the Chan School mingles indigenous Chinese elements in its thought, its principle coincides with that of the School of Emptiness (i.e. Madhyamaka), and it still originated from the West (i.e. India).[16] In addition, in the quote above we can see that despite his

[15] See Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi* [瑜伽師地論敘]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 317. More on this topic in Chapter Five below.

[16] See Ouyang "Discussing the Research of the Inner Studies," [談內學研究]," *Neixue neikan* 2 (1924): 5.

critique, Ouyang still considered Chan practitioners to be at the stage of the Path of Vision (Skt. *darśanamārga* Ch.見道, i.e. very advanced on the path, having already achieved the lower stages of sainthood). Ouyang, therefore, connected the Chan tradition to the School of Emptiness and did not make a clear connection between Chan and *tathāgatagarbha* Buddhism, of which he was very critical. As in the case of the Madhyamaka, he saw Chan's flaws as relatively minor compared with the flaws of the other Chinese schools he criticized. In that sense, Ouyang did not go as far as some Japanese scholars from the "Critical Buddhism" (*Hihan Bukkyō*) movement, who argue that "Zen is not Buddhism."[17]

3.3 Critique of Huayan and Tiantai

Ouyang's critique of Huayan and Tiantai was much sharper but again suffered from lack of clarity. He did not systematically treat the Huayan or Tiantai positions. Instead, his comments are scattered throughout his lectures and letters, and they are very different in nature from the treatment he gave to the texts he chose to publish, both in scope and in depth. There is no serious evaluation of the "flaws" he found in the two traditions. In addition, Ouyang often lumped Huayan and Tiantai

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This was not the case with his own disciple Lü Cheng, who argues that Chan was born out of the same kind of philosophy can be found in the *Awakening of Faith.* See Lü Cheng, "The Awakening of Faith and Chan: A Study in the Historical Background of the Awakening of Faith [起信與禪： 對於大乘起信論來歷的探討]," in *Investigating the Awakening of Faith and the Śūraṃgama Sūtra* [大乘起信論與楞嚴經考辨], ed. Zhang Mantao, (Taibei: Da sheng wen hua chu ban she, 1978).

[17] This is a famous and controversial argument leveled by scholars such as Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō. Despite the radical claim, even Hakamaya made a clear distinction between the Japanese tradition, which is not Buddhism, and the Chinese Chan Buddhism, which does have a "critical philosophy" approach. See Paul Swanson, "Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism: Recent Japanese Critiques of Buddha-Nature," in *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Paul Swanson and Jamie Hubbard, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 19.

together as if they represent one tradition, without differentiating between them, or being sensitive to how their thought and practices developed over time. However, from the little that he did write, I will argue, that we can detect indicators that point to where he thought the problem in fact lies.

3.3.1 Tiantai and Huayan founders lack true attainments

In his *Expositions and Discussions of Vijñāptimātra*, Ouyang has this to say about the two schools:

> Since Tiantai and Huayan began to prosper, the light of Buddhism has weakened. Among the founders of those traditions none have attained the level of sainthood (Zhiyi himself admitted that he attained [only] the five ranks),[18] the views that they held were inferior to those of the Indian masters. But their followers believed that their master is a Buddha born again in the world, they confined themselves within [limited] boundaries, and satisfied themselves with attaining only a little; indeed there are good reasons why the Buddhadharma is not understood.[19]

As the above passage indicates, Ouyang blamed the teachers of both schools for no less than dimming the light of Buddhism, failing to achieve the level of sainthood, satisfying themselves in achieving little and being inferior to the Indian

[18] For more about the five grades in Tiantai thought see T33.1716.733.a12-b28 and Leon Hurvitz, "Chih-I (538-597): An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of a Chinese Buddhist Monk," PhD Diss., Columbia Unuversity, 1959, 409. The reason Ouyang argues that Zhiyi attained "only" the five stages can be found in the colophon for *Mohe zhiguan* (摩訶止觀). Guangding, Zhiyi's disciple, tells us that Zhiyi "died while meditating, having attained the level of the five grades."

[19] 自天台、賢首等宗興盛而後，佛法之光愈晦，諸創教者本未入聖位（如智者即自謂係五品位。），所見自有不及西土大士之處。而奉行者以為世尊再世，畛域自封，得少為足，佛法之不明也宜矣。 See Ouyang Jingwu, Discussing the Research of the Inner Studies, 1360.

Buddhists saints.[20] But what was exactly was his argument against the Tiantai and Huayan traditions? In what way were they "dimming the light of Buddhism"?

3.3.2 Tiantai and Huayan's *panjiao* as creating a division in the *one* teaching

One specific problem that Ouyang raised is the two schools' doxographical practice, i.e. their *panjiao* differentiation of teachings:

> The cause and condition of this great matter (i.e. the Buddha's appearance in the world) is also the Buddha's only teaching (唯一不二之教). Although the Buddha turned the wheel three times,[21] and divided the teaching into three vehicles, yet there is in fact only one single teaching. [The teaching] is to lead all sentient beings into *nirvāṇa* without remainder and liberate them. Ignorant people talk about sudden, gradual, incomplete and complete [teachings]. For example, in Tiantai there is a division into four teachings, and in Huayan, there is also a claim for a five teachings theory. The Tiantai School's basis for their division in the *Sūtra of Immeasurable Meanings* (無量義經) and the Huayan School seeks the basis for its foundation in the *Sūtra of the Bodhisattva Necklace-like Deeds* (瓔珞本業經). Both schools differentiate [between the teachings] based on [different] concepts, [But, in fact] there is no difference between the teachings [themselves]. Therefore it is acceptable to differentiate between four or five teachings in terms of concepts and words but it is impossible to do so with the teaching[22].[23]

[20] Leveling such serious accusations without providing any systematic and rational account for this criticism led some scholars, such as Jiang Canteng, to argue that the only motive behind Ouyang's attack was nothing more than a wish to propagate his own vision of Yogācāra while using weak and arbitrary argumentation; see Jiang Canteng, *Controversies and Developments in Chinese Modern Buddhist Thought* [中國近代佛教思想的諍辯與發展] (Taibei: Nantian Press, 1998), 544-552. Although I think that his motives were more genuine and that he did have some specific critiques regarding those schools, which Jiang completely ignores, I agree that in contrast to his more careful analysis of the Indian texts his critiques of the Chinese schools were somewhat "weak and arbitrary."

[21] A reference to the *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra* wich discusses the Buddha's three turnings of the wheels. The first turning is in Benaras where he preached his first sermons on the four noble truths, the second is his teaching of emptiness in the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras* and the third time is when he proclaimed the middle path of representation-only which is the middle path between the first two turnings of the wheel.

[22] A rather convoluted way to suggest that one can use concepts to differentiate between different dimensions and nuances within the teaching, but one cannot claim that there are several "teachings." The Buddhist teaching is just one.

In other words, one of the main problems of the Tiantai and Huayan thinkers is that they created divisions within the teaching of the Buddha, a teaching that is fundamentally one. The only goal of the Buddha's teaching is to deliver sentient beings and to help them attain *nirvāṇa*. The rest is all conceptual differentiations for the same purpose of delivering sentient beings.

3.3.3 The flaws of Tiantai and Huayan cultivation methods

In 1924, Ouyang published an essay on meditation practice entitled *The General Meaning of Mind Studies* (心學大意) in which he outlined his critique of the two schools' meditation practices. The essay as a whole is a lengthy treatment of the Buddhist theory of meditation, and his critique of the Chinese schools' meditation practices appears briefly before he presents the classical meditation theory in depth.

First, he describes the types of meditation practice according to Tiantai's three main manuals of meditation, all written by Zhiyi: (1) *The Six Mysterious Gates* (六妙門) (2) *The Dharma Gate of Explaining the Sequence of the Perfection of Dhyāna* (釋禪波羅蜜次第法門) and (3) the *Mohe zhiguan* (摩訶止觀). Ouyang explained briefly the methods discussed in each one of the treatises, especially that of the *mohe zhiguan,* on which he remarked:

> The *Mohe zhiguan* is this school's most important treatise; the heart of this treatise is based on the verse from the fundamental text of the Prajñā

[23]「此大事因緣亦即是佛唯一不二之教。」 佛雖三時說，分乘為三，然教唯是一，即一切眾生我皆令入無餘涅槃而滅度之也。「諸有不知，說頓、說漸、說半、說滿。」如天台有四教之判，賢首亦有五教之稱。 尋其依據，天台則無量義經，賢首則瓔珞本業經，皆以事義判別，教味無殊；故說四說五，以義言則可，以教言則不可。 See Ouyang Jingwu, Discussing the Research of the Inner Studies, 1365.

School, the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna, [which explains the] correct meaning of dependent co-arising. The verse says, '[*Dharmas*] which are arise based on causes and conditions, I say that they are empty; they are also called provisional designations and they are also what I mean by the middle path'.[24] Based on this [the *Mohe zhiguan*] established the three *śamathas* and the three *vipaśyanās*. At first, both *śamathas* and *vipaśyanās* operate, then the three penetrate into each other just like [the three truths teaching i.e.] emptiness, the provisional and the mean. These three become one in one moment and the meaning of complete penetration (圓通) is thus established. Especially when examining this [theory] based on the Yogācāra's school notion of the perfected and real,[25] then [we see that] the perfect [penetration] is [indeed] perfect, but it is not real (未實). These three *śamathas* and three *vipaśyanās* [i.e. the practice of the *Mohe zhiguan*], only possesses the general characteristics (總相),[26] but if we analyze seeking what is real then [we will realize that] they do not exist. [This theory] should be further discussed.[27]

It seems that Ouyang's main concern here is that Zhiyi's meditation theory is perfect as an expedient means i.e. it is a useful category but it is not real (*dravya*).

[24] *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe* |
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā || MMK 24,18.

[25] Here Ouayng refers to the perfected nature (Skt. *pariniṣpanna*), part of the three natures theory of the Yogācāra School. The Chinese rendering that he uses literally means "the perfect and real" (圓成實) and Ouyang is playing on the two notions when he determines that the Tiantai meditation can get us only to what is "perfect" (Ch. *Yuan*圓) but not to what is "real" (Ch. *Shi* 實).

[26] Originally general *and* shared characteristics (Skt. *sāmānyalakṣana* Ch. 總相通相) however according to the Tang Tiantai teacher Zhanran (湛然 711–782) the general characteristics are also called shared characteristics (see T46.1912.299.a01通相亦名總相). Usually this concept appears together with its opposite ,the "specific characteristics" of a phenomena (Skt. *svalakṣana* Ch. 別相). While the general characteristics include characteristics shared by a larger group, such as all phenomena are non-self or impermanent, the specific characteristic for water will be wetness and for earth solidity etc. Here it seems that Ouyang refer to a fuzzy and confused usage of categories and an incoherent teaching that follows from that.

[27] 《摩訶止觀》，於此宗最為要典，其中心在於本般若宗龍樹《中觀論》"因緣所生法，我說即是空，亦名為假名，亦名中道義" 偈之緣生勝義，而立三止三觀（見甲圖）。初則止觀雙運，更進則融三為一而即空即假即中，於一剎 那打成一片，圓通之義於焉葉矣。特以瑜伽宗圓成實義格之。圓則圓矣，而未實也。彼三止三觀者，僅具總相通相，分析以求其實在則彼為無，是尚有待於商量者歟？ See Ouyang Jingwu, "The General Meaning of Mind Studies" [心學大意], in *Ouyang Jingwu Writing Collection* [歐陽竟無文集], edited by Hong Qisong and Huang Qilin (Taibei: Wenshu chu ban she, 1988), 180-181.

As a perfect method it is useful up until a certain point, but it will not lead us to see reality as it is, nor will it help us to attain the higher fruits of the path.

The problem of the Huayan School is similar to that of the Tiantai:

> This School follows the *Huayan sūtra*, which is no different from following the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra.*[28] To this extent this school should talk about the immeasurable *samādhis*, but instead they practice the [method of] "contemplation of the *dharmadhatū*," which again is also merely [concerned with] the general characteristics. Their doctrine discusses the notion that the one contains the whole and that the one is the whole in order to expound the doctrines of the four non-obstructed understandings,[29] four methods for attracting people[30] and the four kinds of complete identity" To that extent this doctrine is indeed subtle and thorough, but at the same time there is no clarity in regard to each one of the immeasurable *samādhis*. Therefore, the followers of this [tradition] confined themselves within the abstract teachings that are wayward and baseless. In the end, they do not find the gateway to the teaching of meditation (無由而入).[31]

Thus, in Ouyang's mind both schools share the same problem. Their categories are only provisional and cannot lead to higher attainments. Both schools do not offer a meditation practice with a clear path and correct categories on which one should meditate, but they differ in the acuteness of the problem. While in the

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[28] In the sense that both are legitimate texts in the Yogācāra tradition.

[29] The four unobstructed understandings of a Bodhisattva (Skt. *pratisaṃvidā* Ch. 四無礙解). These are the four skills or powers of a Bodhisattva which enable him to naturally grasp and expresse the truth of the doctrine. The four are (1) *dharma* or the ability to grasp and express the Dharma (2) *artha* or the ability to grasp and express the meaning of the teaching and make judgment about it (3) *nirukti* the ability to grasp and express the doctrine in any language and understand the different dialects (4) *pratibhāna* or the ability to speak skillfully to others according to their own needs and level; see *Foguang dictionary*, 1778.

[30] Skt. *catuḥ saṃgraha vastu* Ch. 四攝法. These are four methods of cultivation, which attract people to the Buddhist path and can lead them to enlightenment. The four are (1) Giving (Skt. *dāna saṃgraha* Ch. 布施攝) (2) Sweet words (Skt. *priya vādita saṃgraha* Ch. 愛語攝) (3) Beneficial conduct (Skt *arthacariyā saṃgraha* Ch. 利行攝) and (4) Sympathizing with others (Skt. *samānārtha saṃgraha* Ch.同攝) see *Foguang dictionary*, 1853.

[31] 此宗宗《華嚴》，即無殊宗《瑜伽》。應講各各無量三昧，而彼用法界觀，亦僅言總相通相。其謂一攝一切、一即一切，而發揮四無礙、四攝、四即之理，固為精到，然於各各無量三昧亦未有明；故從之者多以宕然無藉之玄譚自困，而於禪學卒亦無由而入也。 See Ouyang Jingwu, The General Meaning of Mind Studies, 181.

Tiantai case it leads to limited attainments in the Huayan it leads to a theory which is “wayward and without basis” and to a failior to find “the gateway to the teaching of meditation.”

3.3.4 Summary of the critique

As already stated, it is difficult to obtain a systematic picture from Ouyang’s writings of what exactly were in his opinion the doctrinal and practice-related problems of the two traditions. It seems that in regard to the complexity of these two traditions, Ouyang himself committed the same errors with which he charged his opponents, that is, providing an explanation with only “general characteristics.” We get the impression that his critique is too general and unfounded. But even from these few examples we can extract the gist of his contention:

(1) The Huayan and Tiantai doctrinal classifications create unnecessary divisions within the Buddhist teaching, which is essentially unified.

(2) Their meditation method is flawed and relies on general and unspecified categories, which are good skilful means at best, but will not lead us to see things as they really are.

(3) Taking into account the flawed understanding of the unity of teaching together with the school’s practice, there is little wonder that followers of those schools and even their patriarchs attained merely lower levels of attainments.

During the late Ming dynasty there was an attempt to revive the Yogācāra studies in China. One would think that Ouyang would welcome a turn toward the teaching of the Yogācāra School, but instead of welcoming the development, Ouyang was again very critical. Why was he so critical toward an earnest attempt to study the same tradition he propagated almost four hundreds years later? As we will see below his critique was concerned with the motives of the Ming Yogācārins and the inherited flaws outlined above, which tainted the Ming attempt to revive the old teaching.

3.4 Critique of the Ming dynasty's Yogācāra studies

During the late Tang, the three traditions mentioned above, namely Chan, Tiantai and Huayan, established themselves as the acme of Buddhism, while other forms of Buddhism, including the hallmarks of Indian Mahāyāna i.e. Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, were marginalized. These two were thought of as merely partial or nascent Mahāyāna teachings. Almost a millennium later, during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), however, serious attempts were made by the most eminent monks of the period to revive Chinese Yogācāra. What was the nature of these attempts, why did they fail and what was the reason Ouyang was critical of them? These are the questions that will be discussed briefly in this section.

Given the importance of Yogācāra to Ouyang's overall project, it is not surprising that he treated the history of Yogācāra in his writings. One place to learn about how Ouyang viewed the development of the school in China is his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In this text, Ouyang carefully scrutinized the different

approaches to Yogācāra throughout Chinese history, stratified the historical layers of Yogācāra history in Indian and China, and criticized the mistakes of the past.

Regarding the pre-Xuanzang (i.e. old) translations, Ouyang's major complaint is that they are "not smooth" and "not good," and that the low quality of the translation made the "sweet dew [of the Buddha's teaching] undrinkable."[32] The situation changed dramatically with Xuanzang and his school, which improved the quality, quantity and the precision of the translation of Yogācāra texts. But this phase was short lived. After the end of the Tang the authentic Yogācāra teaching ceased to exist in China. In the late Tang, Ouyang tells us, "Master Yongming Yanshou systematically presented the Faxiang teaching when he wrote the *Record of the Mirror of [The Chan] School* (*Zongjinglu* 宗鏡錄). Despite the fact that he did not establish the teaching,[33] he was still able to explain it."[34] But this short transition period was followed by the decline of the teaching in China, and Ouyang tells us that at the end of the Yuan dynasty many Yogācāra texts were lost and study of Yogācāra ceased until the late Ming.

The attempt to revive Yogācāra during the Ming is of greater interest to us since it was the Ming revivalists who set the path of Yogācāra studies for later generations, a path that was still the only available approach in the republican era

[32] Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi* [瑜伽師地論敘]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 350.

[33] In the sense that he did not propagate it in its own right but only to support his own teaching.

[34] Ouyang Jingwu, Preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, 352. Indeed the *Zongjinglu* quotes heavily from the writings of Kuiji, Xuanzang's disciple. The role of Yogācāra in the thought of Yanshou, a well known Chan teacher and a master of doctrine of the later Tang period, is an important link from the earlier Yogācāra to the way Yogācāra was later perceived in East Asia, especially in China. Traces of Yanshou can be seen in Ouyang's writing as well, and it is evident from his comments regarding Yanshou that Ouyang perceived him as the last stand of Yogācāra teaching in China before its long period of dormancy.

in which Ouyang lived. Yet, contrary to what one would expect Ouyang was critical of his Ming predecessors. Shengyan's article about Yogācāra in the Ming may provide us with an explanation. He says, "Late Ming Yogācāra, despite the fact that it originated from the treatises translated by Xuanzang, had different features from the [Yogācāra] of Kuiji's period. The old texts were lost, and there was no way to study them. [In addition,] the demands of Buddhism at that time were different from those of Kuiji's era. Kuiji established Yogācāra as the sole philosophical system, which explains the entirety of the Buddhist teaching, while the late Ming Buddhists used Yogācāra to tie the entirety of the Buddhist teaching to what was not sufficient and needed correction in the Buddhism of their own days."[35] If anyone during the late Ming bothered to study Yogācāra at all, it was through the lenses of the Ming revivalists, and it was those lenses that Ouyang wished to replace. In order to better contextualize his critique, a brief description of Yogācāra studies of the Ming is needed.

3.4.1 The Yogācāra Studies revival in the Ming

As we previously saw, during the Tang dynasty the Yogācāra teaching faded into the background, and very few Buddhist scholars were interested in pursuing a path that had lost its doctrinal primacy and imperial patronage. A revival of interest in Yogācāra occurred only toward the end of the Ming dynasty, when, according to Shengyan, seventeen prominent monk-scholars turned their attention

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[35] Shi Shengyan. "Late Ming Yogācāra Thinkers and Their Thought [明末的唯識學者及其思想]," *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal* [中華佛學學報] 2 (1987): 4.

again to Yogācāra. Among those monks we can find the most prominent names of the day, Zibo Zhenke (紫柏真可 1543－1603), Ouyi Zhixu (1599-1655) and Hanshan Deqing (憨山德清 1546-1623).[36]

Shengyan argues that, while a minority of those monks (only two) were genuinely interested in Yogācāra *qua* Yogācāra, the rest were Huayan or Tiantai scholars,[37] or in the majority of cases Chan monks. These monks used Yogācāra to support and give a doctrinal foundation to their sectarian systems or, in the case of Chan, to the school's soteriological path. The Chan followers became aware of the fact that the Chan of their generation was in decline compared to that of the golden age of the Tang and the Song. The Ming dynasty Chan masters felt that they could only imitate the past masters' gestures but were lacking in true understanding regarding the foundational teaching of their own tradition. They felt that the rigorousness of the Yogācāra tradition might be a gateway for a better understanding of the Buddhist tradition.

Another problem for the Ming Yogācārins was that they understood Yogācāra through the lenses of texts such as the **Śūraṃgama sūtra*, *The Sūtra of Complete Awakening* and the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna*. It was this interpretation

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[36] Although lately there is a growing interest in later Chinese Buddhism, there is still a serious lacuna in the study of these figures. For a general introduction see Yu Chun-fang, "Ming Buddhism," in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. D.C. Twitchet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 893-952.

[37] For example the lineage that started with Shaojue Guangcheng (紹覺廣承 ??~1600) who was Zhuhong's disciple and wrote a lexicon of the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論音義. Shengyan quotes Shaoguan as using terminologies from the two schools in his writings. For example, when he says, "The esteemed theory of [Tiantai's] Four Teachings is exactly the three Buddha lands [of the Faxing School]. The Four teachings which live together, the skillful means and the two teachings are in fact the one perfect teaching." (Shi Shengyan. Late Ming Yogācāra Thinkers and Their Thought, 27). Other examples he gives are Dazhen and the eminent Ming monk Ouyi, who also studied both traditions at the same time.

of his predecessors and contemporaries that, I argue, was the driving force behind Ouyang's critique of Chinese Buddhism, especially what he saw as the erroneous views expressed in the *Awakening of Faith.* The full breadth of this critique will be treated in our next chapter.

But why Yogācāra and not other forms of Buddhism? In his article on Buddhist logic in Ming China, Wu Jiang provides one possible explanation. According to Wu, Ming Buddhists used Buddhist logic as a tool in their anti-Christian polemics. The rise of Buddhist logic is closely linked to the Yogācāra school in China, as both were branches of Buddhist knowledge translated and propagated by Xuanzang and Kuiji. When Christian missionaries began frequenting China in the sixteenth century, their usage of logic to prove the existence of a creator-god triggered the need to find an adequate response to repudiate Christian claims.[38]

3.4.2 Ouyang's critique of the Ming Yogācāra revival

What were Ouyang's contentions against the Ming revivalists?

> [The] Ming revivalists tried to [re]build the wall of the [Faxiang's] teaching. They worked hard but had no achievements (唐功). Then, for over the course of several centuries, those who wish to have a command of this teaching did not carefully study any other [Yogācāra] text than the *Eight Essentials Text of the Faxiang School*[39] and *The Core Teaching of Weishi.*[40] Their discourse was a disunified shambles, and [they achieved only] a narrow

[38] Wu Jiang, Buddhist Logic and Apologetics in Seventeenth-Century China.

[39] A one-fascicle work by the late Ming monk Xuelang Hongwen. Xuelang prescribed the 8 essentials work of the Faxiang School and summarize their content. See X55.899.

[40] A ten fascicles work of Ouyi Zhixu on the *Cheng weishi lun* see X51.824. Also known as *Cheng weishi lun guanxin fayao* (成唯識論觀心法要) X51.824.

> sectarian view,[41] whereas [the scope of Faxiang] is as broad as heaven and earth and they did not know it; it has the excellence of being well structured but they did not make good use of it. They only cast their eyes over the surface, and then left it at that, who [among them] bothered with [the challenges of] the *Yogācārabhūmi*?[42]

In a way, it was not the revivalists' fault. Despite their genuine interest, how could they have revived the teaching after so many texts were lost? How could they understand the different voices of the tradition and be sensitive enough to the differences between Yogācāra and later Chinese Buddhism? But as the text quoted above stated, they did not even try. There was no "careful study" that attempted to understand Yogācāra on its own terms, only interpretations based on sectarian views, whether Chan, Tiantai or Huayan.

According to Ouyang, this sectarian approach to Yogācāra can be traced back to the Tang. It was in the Tang that monks such as Fazang (法藏643-712), Chengguan (澄觀738-83)[43] and Yongming Yanshou (永明延壽, 904-975) began to approach Yogācāra not as an end but as a means to establish their own teaching.

Beyond the general attitude and the wrong motives involved, one specific problem with the Ming revivalists was their disregard of the most important text in the Yogācāra corpus, the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Both Yang Wenhui and Ouyang attached great importance to the *Yogācārabhūmi.* We already saw that completing the

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[41] Literally "they had a view through a hole in the door or a window," but by extension it implies also narrow sectarian views.

[42] 明人壁造，勞而唐功。遂使數百余年，治此宗者，舍《相宗八要》、《唯識心要》以外，無別精研。支離破碎之談，戶牖一孔之見，有天地之大而不能知，有規矩之巧而弗獲用，惟望此而卻走，誰有事於《瑜伽》？ Ouyang Jingwu, Preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi,* 352.

[43] Especially in Chengguan sub-commentary on the *Huayan Sūtra* (華嚴經疏鈔).

printing of the whole *Yogācārabhūmi* was a part of Yang's will before he died. How could a serious study of Yogācāra be conducted without a serious study of its root text?

According to Ouyang, the big change happened only when Yang Wenhui retrieved the commentaries on the *Yogācārabhūmi* from Japan. Then interested Buddhists reacquainted themselves with the genuine Yogācāra teaching, and critical methods for reading the text were applied for its study. Consequently, the flaws of mainstream Chinese Buddhism could be exposed and treated.

Another criticism against the Ming revivalists appeared in Ouyang's *Expositions and Discussions of Vijñāptimātra.* As noted above this was a lecture that Ouyang gave five years after he published his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi.*[44] The problems of the Ming *Yogācārins* are discussed in the third section of this text, when Ouyang investigates the theory of two wisdoms, of which he focused on "acquired knowledge."

Discussing the two wisdoms or knowledges i.e. "fundamental knowledge" (Skt. *mūlajñāna* Ch. 根本智) and "acquired knowledge" (Skt. *prṣṭhalabdhajñāna* Ch. 後得智),[45] Ouyang wished to counter the over-emphasis of Chinese Buddhist tradition on fundamental knowledge. This focus on fundamental knowledge was the result of

[44] His treatment of the Ming revivalists was less comprehensive in this text, compared with his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Cheng Gongrang argues convincingly that the reason Ouyang treated the Ming predecessors less in this text is that while in his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi* Ouyang was interested in reforming the Weishi school *per se*, at this stage, five years later, he had expanded his objective to reform Chinese Buddhism, and even the course of the general intellectual development of China as a whole (Cheng Gongrang, *Studies in Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist Thought*, 149).

[45] To the best of my knowledge this pair of concepts appears for the first time together in Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (see T31.1597.366a15-29). It is later often used in Chinese commentaries including in the *Cheng weishi lun,* and other thinkers often used by Ouyang such as Kuiji or Dunlun.

the widespread acceptance of *tathāgatagarbha* thought in China and the doctrines associated with the *Awakening of Faith*. For Ouyang this emphasis on fundamental knowledge meant lack of sufficient attention to the importance of acquired knowledge. Acquired knowledge is a unique and important feature of Mahāyāna, because whereas fundamental knowledge is ineffable and cannot give rise to words for the benefit of others (不起言說以利他), acquired knowledge does just that. It is the means by which the truth of Buddhism can be communicated, and therefore it has a subtle function (妙用) that fundamental knowledge lacks.

Since the Ming revivalists followed the tendency of Chinese Buddhists to emphasize fundamental knowledge, they failed to appreciate the "purpose of the excellent function of acquired knowledge." This is again another dimension of the former contention. The Ming revivalists did not study critically the Yogācāra corpus, but mirrored former understandings of Buddhism in their reading of Yogācāra texts.

3.5 The Problem of "the branches and the root"

If Ouyang's teaching is to be understood as a response to the flaws he outlined in his *Expositions and Discussions of Vijñāptimātra*, why did he never fully develop those critiques? One of the main reasons was that he saw the critique of the tradition not as an end, but only as a means to continue Yang Wenhui's mission to revive Buddhism and make it relevant for the modern age. The practical reason that Ouyang did not elaborate on his critique of the Chinese school was the mission he inherited, i.e. to publish texts in the canon that were no longer available in China

and to correct texts with major editorial problems. Consequently, combining his commitment to publish texts and to scholarship, Ouyang included most of his views and assessments of Buddhism in his prefaces to the scriptural text that he published. Since he published mostly early Indian scriptures, which he deemed important, he naturally treated them in depth at the expense of later Chinese Buddhist innovations, which were more widely available and were considered by him flawed. The problems with the Chinese Buddhist schools came up mostly in the context of his treatment of old Indian teachings and texts.

The other, more significant reason that Ouyang did not elaborate on his problems with the East Asian schools was that Ouyang identified a root problem that is responsible for many later problems in the teaching of Chinese schools, especially those of Tiantai and Huayan schools. Using a metaphor often employed in Chinese philosophy, for Ouyang Chinese schools were like branches that were nourished by a problematic root. Historically, both Tiantai and Huayan Schools in late Imperial China followed the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching, especially as outlined in the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna.*[46] And indeed, while he devoted much less

[46] According to Gong Jun, the *Awakening of Faith* did not attract the attention of Zhiyi, Tiantai's foremost thinker. Acceptance of the *Awakening of Faith* as a part of Tiantai tradition that began with Zhanran in the Tang dynasty, who gave his own interpretation to the *Awakening of Faith's* claim that sunchness and phenomenal world are "neither same nor different". Zhanran did this in order to make a clear distinction between the Tiantai tradition he wished to revive and the Huayan tradition, which gain popularity during his lifetime. In the Song dynasty the well-known debate between the *shanjia* and *shanwai* factions continue to debate the *Awakening of Faith* where Zhili of the *shanjia* faction continued Zhanran's interpretation and Wuen from the *shanwai* interpretated in a manner that came much closer to the Huayan interpretation. Ouyang, who rejected the notion of a monistic approach to the problem of the relationship between suchness and the phenomenal world, dissregarded the inner disagreements within the Tiantai school in order to reject the doctrinal foundation of Chinese Buddhism altogether. See furthe Gong Jun, *The Awakening of Faith and Sinification of Buddhism* [《大乘起信論》與佛學中國化] (Wen jin chu ban she, 1995, 158-163.

attention to the "branches," he elaborated much more on the "root" of the problem i.e. the problematic nature of the *Awakening of Faith* doctrine.

3.6 Conclusions

This chapter focused on the problems Ouyang identified within Chinese Buddhism. As we saw in the second chapter, the Buddhist tradition was a key to addressing Ouyang's existential concerns and his path of salvation. However, it was not an easy path. One needed to be careful when seeking the "right understanding" of Buddhist teaching, and to be systematic in the study of what Buddhism "really" means. The way to understand the path was through a critical study of the Buddhist texts, which was what the Chinese tradition has failed to do.

According to Ouyang, Chinese have a disadvantage when approaching Buddhism, since they are exposed to Buddhism through translations, a large part of which are of poor quality. Luckily, Chinese also have reliable translations of texts that expose the path as reflected in the Indian heyday of Buddhism, such as the texts in Xuanzang's corpus. Through study of those texts, with the later commentaries of reliable commentators, they can gain access to "real" Buddhism.

The problem of Chinese Buddhism was that it did not take the path described above. According to Ouyang, shortly after Xuanzang translated the texts, his teaching was forgotten, the Yogācāra School declined, and many commentaries disappeared. Two dangerous developments followed: (1) the total rejection of scriptures in the Chan tradition in a way that led to a "decline in the true meaning of the Buddhadharma."; (2) the wrong understanding and misguided interpretation

of the teaching, as happened in the case of the philosophical schools of East Asian Buddhism, namely the Tiantai and Huayan Schools.

We have also seen that the above two paths in Chinese Buddhism were so ingrained in the way Chinese understood Buddhism that even in the Ming, when Buddhists felt that their traditions reached stagnation and attempted to revive it with the teaching of the Yogācāra, it was too little, too late. By that time, texts were missing, transmission of the teaching was cut off, and there was no way to understand the orthodox meaning of the tradition. In addition, the Ming revivalists' motives were not always genuine, and as happened in the twentieth century with monks such as Taixu, the Ming Yogācārins only wished to use Yogācāra in order to reaffirm their own understanding of Buddhism.

This chapter, therefore, is merely a pointer to the root of the problem, having dealt as it did with Ouyang's critique of what he considered deviations from the true teaching. What unified those cases of deviation was a reliance on fundamental doctrine that constitutes the root problem. The treatment of this root of the problem will be the main theme of the next chapter.

Chapter Four: Ouyang Jingwu's Critique of the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna*

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter outlined Ouyang's sharp yet unsystematic critique of mainstream Chinese Buddhism, especially that of the Chan, Tiantai and Huayan Schools. We saw that his critique attempted to correct the flaws that he identified in Buddhism and that his critique targeted specific elements within each tradition, such as misleading meditation techniques, faulty interpretation of the Buddhist teaching and the rejection of scriptural authority. His critique, however, unsystematic as it is cannot fully account for the harsh language that he used when describing what he saw as these schools' flaws and poor spiritual achievements. If he indeed considered the Huayan and Tiantai schools as accountable for the decline of Buddhism why was it that he never outlined a syste matic critique of their teachings and practices? Why was Ouyang so sketchy when leveling criticism toward these schools?

In this chapter, I would like to suggest that in Ouyang's critique, the problem of the Chinese schools stemmed from a more fundamental reason, that is, a problematic doctrine that deeply influenced these schools. Scholastic Buddhists, beginning with Ouyang, associated the origin of this "flawed" teaching with a series of texts which were highly regarded in the Chinese tradition such as the **Vajrasamādhi sūtra* (Ch. 金剛三昧經, *Jingang sanmei jing*)[1] and the **Śūraṃgama sūtra*

[1] T.9.273.0365c24- 0374b28.

(Ch. 首楞嚴經, *Shou lengyan jing*).[2] There was one text in particular, however, which was the subject of critique by many scholars in Ouyang's day, including Ouyang himself. This was the text of the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna* (大乘起信論, *Dasheng qixin lun*).[3]

Indeed, since its appearance in the sixth century, the *Awakening of Faith* has been a text as influential as it was controversial. During the Tang dynasty, the *Awakening of Faith* enjoyed growing popularity in Huayan circles, alongside some early skepticism about the provenance of the text. However, after the Song dynasty, its influence spread beyond the Huayan School and its teaching dominated the doctrines of all major schools of Chinese Buddhism, specifically those of the Huayan, Tiantai and Chan which Ouyang later criticized.

In this chapter, I will focus on the place of the *Awakening of Faith* in the history of modern East Asian Buddhism, putting a special emphasis on the emergence of the debate regarding its authenticity in China and on Ouyang's role in this debate. This debate was at the heart of the attempt to question mainstream East Asian Buddhism in the modern period. It would be impossible to treat all of the people involved with their different emphases and opinions and also maintain our focus on Ouyang. Instead, I will here deal only with the dimensions of the text and its teaching which were at the center of the debate and the criticism of Ouyang and other important modern critics.

[2] T.19.945.0141b21-0155b04.
[3] The *Awakening of Faith* exists in two "translations". One, which is attributed to Paramārtha T.32.1666.0575a03-0583b17; The other, which is later, is attributed to Śikṣānanda, T.32.1667.0583b21-0591c22.

I will begin by giving a brief historical outline of the debate's emergence in Japan and China. I will then outline Ouyang's position and his major critique and emphasize its pioneering role in this debate (a debate, in many ways, still going on today). After gaining a better understanding of Ouyang's criticism of the *Awakening of Faith*, I will show how his most famous disciple, Lü Cheng, carried this debate forward. I will then concluded with some examples of other voices, most of them apologists who tried to defend the *Awakening of Faith* and other apocryphal texts against the surging wave of scholastic critiques.

4.2 The problem of authentic or real religion

In his book *Shouting Fire* Alan Dershowitz says "[O]nce [the state] says religion is to be preferred over nonreligion, [it has] to define what religion means. You then have to define what is true religion and what is real religion."[4] As we will see in this chapter, the question, "What is real religion?" occupied Ouyang and his followers as well. Specifically they asked: What is true Buddhism? can one distinguish true Buddhism from false?

The history and ramifications of this question are widely discussed among scholars of Religious Studies religious thinkers. For our purpose suffice it is to say that this question is often known in the field of religious studies as the search for the *sine qua non* or essence of religion.[5] One of the candidates for the status of

[4] Alan Dershowitz, *Shouting Fire: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age* (Boston: Little Brown, 2002), 211.

[5] This search for the essence of religion, followed by the critique of this quest, are two of the most dominant inquiries in the history of the study of religion. For more see Walter H. Capps, *Religious Studies: The Making of the Discipline* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), especially his chapter on the

"essence" found most persuasive by modern religious thinkers and scholars offered was *religious experience.* Beginning with Enlightenment apologists, such as Fredrick Schleiermacher in the late eighteenth century and continuing with influential twentieth century scholars of religions and theologians, such as Rudolf Otto (who was influenced by Schleiermacher), William James and others, religion came to be understood as consisting of a core experience of the noumena, as a distinct and purer experience compared to those which are culturally dependent.[6]

The view that religious or mystical experience is the essence of a tradition found a strong hold also among scholars of Buddhism and Buddhists alike, such as the prominent Kyōto School thinker Nishida Kitarō, the Zen apostle to the West, D.T. Suzuki, and scholars like Edward Conze,[7] C. A. Rhys Davids etc. As we saw above, Ouyang did not share such a conviction. As Robert Sharf noted: "The authority of exegetes such as Kamalaśīla, Buddhaghosa, and Chih-i lay, not in their access to exalted spiritual states, but in their mastery of, and rigorous adherence to, sacred scriptures."[8] Sharf's comment certainly hold true for Ouyang's criticisms as well, stemming as they did from the Confucian tradition, which criticized the Ming dynasty Confucians for their over-emphasis on "exalted spiritual states", rather than a close study of scriptures.

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essence of religion. See also Jonathan Z. Smith, "Religion, Religions, Religious," in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, ed. Mark. C. Taylor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 269-184.

[6] Robert Sharf, "Experience," in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, ed. Mark. C. Taylor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 97.

[7] See, for example, Edward Conze, *Buddhism: Its Essence and Development* (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1951).

[8] Robert Sharf, Experience, 99.

For Ouyang, as for other exegetes, real Buddhism is found not in experience, but rather in a careful study of the system of thought as outlined in canonical Buddhist texts. Ouyang said: "The doctrine (理) evolves and is deducted from the teaching (教) and does not part from its source (宗). It cannot be based relying on intuition."[9] It is therefore imperative to have a thorough command of these texts in order to get the system right. The problem, as we saw, was that, in Ouyang's view, Buddhists in China considered inauthentic scriptures to be the perfect Buddhist teaching. When one follows an inauthentic and flawed teaching, one inevitably will follow a wrong path. This was exactly the problem he perceived in the *Awakening of Faith*.

4.3 The *Awakening of Faith* and its importance

4.3.1 The text – early reception and early doubts

Traditionally, the *Awakening of Faith* is attributed to Aśvaghoṣa, the second century Sanskrit poet and supposed exponent of Mahāyāna, who is most famous for the poetic biography of Buddha Śākyamuni, the *Buddhacarita.* Aśvaghoṣa's fame led to the attribution of several other works to him. One of them was the *Awakening of Faith,* which according to tradition, was translated twice into Chinese: first by Paramārtha in 554 CE, and second by Śikṣānanda, during the Tang dynasty in 695-700 CE. Most scholars today agree that the text is neither an Indian text nor a text translated by Parāmārtha and Śikṣānanda. However, the identity of the true author

[9] Ouyang Jingwu, "Keynote Speech in a Conference at the Inner Studies Institute [支內學院研究灰會開會辭]." *Neixue neikan* 1, 7.

of the text, and whether it was a Chinese composition or an edited work parts of which may be of a Sanskritic origin, is still debated.[10]

Doubts regarding the text began shortly after the text appeared in China. Buddhist texts were not translated in a systematic manner into Chinese. Instead, the translation of particular texts was influenced by the availability of Indic manuscripts, the presence of eminent translators, and a favorable political climate. There were no guidelines to determine which texts to translate and how to prioritize the translation work. The result was an influx of texts without the necessary context to understand them or the means to place them within the Buddhist teaching as a whole. In order to fill this lacuna, Chinese monks started to catalogue the available Buddhist texts throughout the empire in an attempt to see the forest created by the numerous but very scattered trees that were available.

In one of the first of these catalogues, the *Zongjing mulu* 衆經目錄 (also known as the *Fajinglu* 法經錄,[11] after his head compiler Fajing), the *Awakening of Faith* appears in the category of suspicious scriptures (疑惑).[12] Another interesting example is from a text called *The Essentials Writings on the Three Treatises and Profound Commentaries* (三論玄疏文義要) [13] written by Chinkai (珍海 1091-1152), a Japanese

[10] Ishii Kosei, "Trends in Modern Day Research on the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna* in Japan, China, and Korea." Paper presented in the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Religion, November, 2005.

[11] T55. 2146.55.115a-150a.

[12] See T55.2146.142a15-16. The author of the *fajinglu* explains that people say that it was a translation done by Paramārtha but when surveying Paramārtha's corpus the *Awakening of Faith* is not among them "人云真諦譯勘真諦錄無此論故入疑." This explanation led many modern scholars in Japan to argue that the text only doubts the fact that Paramārtha translated the text but not the fact that it was written by Aśvaghoṣa, or that it had an Indian provenance.

monk. Chinkai quotes from Huijun's (慧均) *The Profound Meaning of the Four Commentaries* (四論玄義) in two places, where Huijun raises doubts regarding the attribution of the *Awakening of Faith* to Aśvaghoṣa. Unfortunately, the rendition that is included in the canon today does not include the two citations and it is unclear on which text Chinkai relied on.[14]

Despite these early doubts, during the Tang, many influential monks, such as Fazang, Zongmi and others subscribed to the text's teaching. In the aftermath of emperor Wuzong's persecution of 845 CE, the decline of the Cien/Faxiang School, and the rise to hegemony of the Chan School (especially among elite circles), the *Awakening of Faith*'s teaching became so popular that questions regarding its teaching and authenticity were marginalized.

4.3.2 Major commentaries throughout the centuries

It is hard to underestimate the importance of the *Awakening of Faith* in the history of Chinese Buddhism. It found an attentive audience shortly after its appearance in China, which further developed its teaching. Associated with this text are an impressive sets of commentaries, which number more than 150. These commentaries expounded the sutra's teaching and turned it into a foundational text, respected by all major Chinese Buddhist schools. The text's far-reaching status

[13] T.70.2299.

[14] See Lü Cheng, "Critical Examination of the Awakening of Faith [大乘起信論攷證]." In *Collected Writings of Lü Cheng's Buddhist Writings* [呂澂佛學論著選集] (Jinan: Qilu Shushe Press, 1991), 303-4 for the Chinkai case and other earlier examples of problems with the *Awakening of Faith.*

and acceptance as a foundational text became the context for the attack on the text and its teaching by Ouyang and other modern East Asian scholastic Buddhists.

The earliest commentary on the *Awakening of Faith* was Tanyan's 曇延 (516-588) *Dasheng qixin lun yishu*大乘起信論義疏.[15] Tanyan's commentary was followed by, among others, three commentaries known as the three great commentaries on the *Awakening of Faith*, namely, (慧遠 523-592) *Dasheng qixinlun yishu* 大乘起信論義疏;[16] Wonhyo's(元曉617-?) *Qixin lun shu* 起信論疏,[17] and Fazang's (法藏 643-712) *Dasheng qixin lun yiji* 大乘起信論義記.[18] Commentators from throughout East Asia continued to interpret the *Awakening of Faith* in later periods. Notable were the two commentaries written during the Ming dynasty by two of the most renowned monks of the period. These are Hanshan Deqing's (憨山德清1546-1623) *Qixin lun zhijie* 起信論直解,[19] and Ouyi Zhixu's (藕益智旭1599-1656) *Dasheng qixin lun liegangshu* 大乘起信論裂網疏.[20]

Two well-known modern commentaries are those of Yinshun (1906-2005), the *Dasheng qixin lun jiangji* 大乘起信論講記 and Yuanying's (1878–1953) *Dasheng*

[15] X71.528-56.

[16] T44.1843.

[17] T44.1844.

[18] T44.1846 Fazang's commentary, perhaps more than the other commentaries, shaped the way the text was understood in East Asia.

[19] T45.766.

[20] T44.1850.

qixin lun jiangyi 大乘起信論講義. I will further discuss the defenders of the text below after presenting the objections of modern Buddhist scholastics.[21]

4.4 The *Awakening of Faith* in the twentieth century

The teaching and the authenticity of the *Awakening of Faith* stood at the center of one of the most heated Buddhist debates throughout the twentieth century across East Asia and China in particular. Because the *Awakening of Faith*'s teaching had became so axiomatic among Chinese Buddhists, questioning the text became tantamount to questioning Chinese and East Asian Buddhism in its totality.

It is curious that the *Awakening of Faith* controversy erupted in China after so many years of consensus regarding its centrality and authenticity. There are several potential answers to this question, all of which are related to developments in twentieth century Buddhism. In China, these developments included: the growing popularity of the Faxiang or Yogācāra teaching, which rejected the inherent enlightenment teaching dominant in the *Awakening of Faith*, the growing impact of lay Buddhists, who were less committed to the monastic party-line, and the globalization of Buddhism which exposed Chinese Buddhists to other forms of Buddhism on an unprecedented scale, and which presented Chinese Buddhism as just one form of Buddhism among other choices.

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[21] For an historical survey of *Qixin lun* commentaries, see Mochizuki Shinkō 望月信亨, Daijōkishinron *no kenkyū* [大乘起信論之研究] (Tōkyō: Kanao Bun'endō, 1922), 201-346, and Kashiwagi Hirō 柏木弘雄, *Daijōkishinron no kenkyū:* Daijōkishiron *no seiritsu ni kansuru shitsuryōron teki kenkyū* [大乘起信論の研究: 大乘起信論の成立に關する資料論的研究] (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1981), 23-48.

4.5 The debate over the *Awakening of Faith* in Japan

A major cause for the debates over the *Awakening of Faith* in China was the influence of similar debates that took place in Japan. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan exerted a tremendous impact on China in almost every aspect of life, social, political, economic and intellectual. Japan became a Mecca for many Chinese who took the modernization of China to be the country's highest priority. The younger generation of Chinese intellectuals flocked to Japanese universities to learn how this nation, which until recently they had looked down upon as semi-barbarian, succeeded in such a short time in transforming itself into a modern country while at the same time maintaining its traditional and unique culture. This energetic group of young people was determined to transform their own culture in addition to acquiring new knowledge. The cultural upheavals back home became a powerful force that helped to create and propagate radical ideas and proposed solutions to China's predicament.

Like other Chinese in Japan, Chinese Buddhists admired the example of their Japanese Buddhist colleagues, for they successfully transformed Buddhism in Japan from a persecuted religion into the hallmark of Japanese culture. For centuries, Confucian scholars attacked Buddhists as heresy. In the Meiji era, Japanese Buddhists also came under attack by other dominant powers, such as Christian missionaries and propagators of Western culture. Buddhism, in other words, became an impediment to Japan's progress.

As in Japan in the early Meiji period, Buddhists in China, like other religions, was considered an impediment to modernity. The miraculous transformation of

Japanese Buddhism was therefore of great interest to Buddhists in China. How was it possible for Japanese Buddhists to have transformed a symbol of spiritual decadence (Japanese: *daraku*) and anachronistic tradition into the hallmark of modernity and Japanese spirit? In addition, how had they managed to go beyond the boundaries of Asia and promote Buddhism as a global religion, in which Japanese Buddhism was envisioned as the spearhead of a new spirituality for the modern age?[22]

In his book *Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan*, James Ketelaar outlines three major areas that Buddhist reformers identified as most damaging to the reputation and cause of Buddhists in Japan, and how these reformers responded to these attacks.[23]These are:

1. The perceived socio-economic uselessness of priests and temples;
2. The foreign character of Buddhism, which had negatively influenced Japanese culture, filling it with superstitious and other-worldly traits derived from Indian culture;
3. Its mythological and unscientific presentation of history.

Ketelaar explains that Japanese Buddhist reformers responded by repackaging their traditions as "New Buddhism" (*shin bukkyō*). In so doing, they attempted to respond to the specific criticisms leveled against them. Against the allegation of uselessness, possibly inspired by Christian missionaries, Buddhist

[22] See for example the case of the Chicago Parliament of the World's Religions in 1893, see Judith Snodgrass, *Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and the Columbian exposition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), especially pages 1-15 and 172-197.

[23] James E. Ketelaar. *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 132-35.

reformers promoted the transformation of their temples into centers of social-action. Hospitals and clinics were established, as well as centers for short-term support in times of need for the general population, schools, hotels etc. In addition, these reformers initiated campaigns addressing a wide range of social and political issues, such as the promotion of public health concerns, and anti-abortion and anti-capital punishment campaigns. Later, they also supported Japanese military campaigns.

These campaigns and social activities fostered a sense of Buddhism as an inseparable dimension of the Japanese social fabric, and by that Buddhists responded to the supposed foreignness of the Buddhist tradition. Ketelaar explains: "So entrenched were Buddhist institutions in every aspect of Japanese 'civilization' by the end of the nineteenth century that the earlier critique of an 'other-worldly' Buddhism was no longer applicable.[24] As for the third dimension, response came in the form of the establishment of Buddhist academies and universities that were, and continue to be, at the forefront of Buddhist Studies research. As we will see in the case of the *Awakening of Faith* controversy, arguments employed by both sides reflected a new level of sophistication and mastery of philological and historical tools available at that time.

4.5.1 The debate surrounding the *Awakening of Faith* in Japan

In Japan, both the critics of Buddhism as well as the Buddhist reformers held up the *Awakening of Faith* in support of their views, precisely because of the text's

[24] James E. Ketelaar. *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan*, 133.

importance to the tradition and because the doctrines it espouses had become what many consider the hallmark of East Asian Buddhism.[25]

The beginning of the modern study of Buddhism is often dated to 1879 when Hara Tanzan, a Buddhist scholar and Zen priest, taught a course called "Lectures on Buddhist Texts" at the Imperial University.[26] The key text that he chose for the course was the *Awakening of Faith*, which he saw as a core text and which allowed a discussion of Buddhism in a modern manner with a focus on psychology and "Experiential (*Jikken*) Buddhism". The course became widely known and attracted dignitaries from the university including the president of the university, Katō Hiroyuki.

The choice of text as the key text should not surprise us. One of the strategies the reformers of Buddhism adopted was to adopt what Ketelaar called "trans-sectarian" Buddhist culture. This occurs when reformers identify sectarianism as a weak spot that prevents Buddhists from responding effectively to external attacks. One of the key figures behind this movement was Takada Dōken, who was the editor of the newspaper *Tzūzoku Bukkyō Shinbun* (*The Common man's Buddhist Newspaper*) and of *Tsū-Bukkyō anshin* (*The Salvation of United Buddhism*). For people like Takada and other advocators of trans-sectarian there was a need for a

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[25] What follows is but an outline of an important debate that engulfed many scholars in late nineteenth and twentieth century Japan. My goal here is to give the background to the emergence of the Chinese intellectual response, particularly Ouyang's response to the *Awakening of Faith* problem. For more on Buddhism at that time see Ketelaar. *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan* and Snodgrass, 2005. For the debate itself, see Gong Jun, *The Awakening of Faith and Sinification of Buddhism*, Mochizuki Shinkō, Daijōkishinron *no kenkyū*, and Kashiwagi Hirō, *Daijōkishinron no kenkyū.*

[26] See Ishii, Trends in Modern Day Research on the *Awakening of Faith;* and Sengaku Mayeda and Junzō Tanizawa, "Studies on Indian Philosophy in Japan 1963-1987," *Philosophy East and West*, 41, No. 4 (1991), 529.

doctrine and texts which would stand beyond any sectarian boundaries. The texts of Shinran, Hōnen, Dōgen or Nichiren were all too closely associated with particular schools and it was the *Awakening of Faith* that provided the solution they were looking for. As Takeda and others argue the "'fundamental essence' (*kompongi*) that can penetrates every sect of both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna teaching is most perfectly articulated in the *Awakening of Faith*."[27]

The success of the course and the interest it aroused in the *Awakening of Faith* soon led to the first criticisms against the text and against Buddhism from adversaries of Buddhism. For example, in his *New Discourse on Buddhism* (*Butsudō shinron*), Takahashi Gorō, a scholar of Biblical and Christian studies, blamed Buddhism and the *Awakening of Faith* in particular with being irrational. This critique was soon met with the refutation of Oda Tokunō, a prominent scholar of Buddhism.

The debate above, however, was only the prelude to the first major debate surrounding the text, which followed soon after. The reason for the rise of the controversy was the thesis of Kimura Takataro, who was a Japanese nationalist with a broad Western education. His thesis focused on a critique against the *Awakening of Faith* as fundamentally different from Western thought and Buddhism in general, and therefore as something that was unnecessary for Japan in the present historical moment. Kimura's attack was followed by others, who defended Buddhism and the *Awakening of Faith*. Many of them later rose to be among the pioneers of Buddhist

[27] James E. Ketelaar. *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan*, 186.

Studies in Japan: Ogiwara Unrai, Sakaino Kōyō, Furukawa Rōsen, Yoshitani Kakuju and Murakami Senshō.

It was also around this time that the *Awakening of Faith* was translated into English for the first time by Daisetsu Teitarō Suzuki, who chose to translate the Śikṣānanda edition of the text,[28] as a part of a Japanese Buddhist effort -- and to a certain extent a Chinese effort by figures such as Yang Wenhui -- to propagate Mahāyāna Buddhism in the West. Western Buddhist scholars at that time largely viewed the Mahāyāna as a later corruption of the earlier and ostensibly pure Theravāda teachings.[29] The Chicago World's Parliament of Religion held in 1893 presented Japanese participant with a key opportunity to propagate what they saw as the true spirit of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

However, with the growing professionalisation of Buddhist scholars in Japan, even national pride and the relative success of the text abroad did not stop the outbreak of a second, more rigorous, wave of controversy, which began with Mochizuki Shinkō's (望月信亨, 1869-1948) argument that the *Awakening of Faith* was of Chinese provenance. The results of his research were published later in his famous Mochizuki Shinkō 望月信亨, *Studies of the Awakening of Faith* (*Daijō kishinron no kenkyū* 大乘起信論之研究) in 1922.

Mochizuki was not the first to argue along these lines in modern Japan. Already in July, 1901 Murakami Senshō (村上專精 1851-1929) had sparked another,

[28] Seven years later, in 1907, Richard Timothy, a missionary, who lived at that time in China and cooperated with Yang Wenhui, published his own translation, which was mired in Christianized equivalents for Buddhism terms, e.g. "God" for "Thusness".

[29] For more see Ketelaar. *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan*, especially chapter 4 and 5 and Snodgrass, *Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West*, 203-209.

closely related, controversy, when he published his own contribution to the trans-sectarian movement's first volume of the *Bukkyō tōitsu ron* (*The Treatise of Unifying Buddhism*). In this work he argued, among other things, that the Mahāyāna scriptures are not the Buddha's words (Skt: *buddhavācana,* Jap: *bussetsu*). Whalen Lai plausibly argues that Murakami's approach, and later also Mochizuki's, should be understood in the context of the quest for the historical Jesus, which had captured the attention of scholars in Europe at that time.[30] Related or not, the two quests, for the true Jesus and for the true words of the Buddha's, were both very controversial. Mochizuki's assertion that the *Awakening of Faith* was not an Indian text sparked considerable discussion.

In 1922, the same year that Ouyang voiced his opposition to the text and when Liang Qichao published his own book on the *Awakening of Faith*, Mochizuki presented his approach systematically in his *Studies in the* Awakening of Faith. The controversy erupted into full bloom, with both sides arguing about the validity of the other side's arguments. As expected, Mochizuki was backed by Murakami, while on the more conservative side stood scholars such as Hadani Ryōtai (羽溪了諦 1883-1974) and Tokiwa Daijō (常盤大定 1870-1945). Scholars from both sides argued about the nature of the earlier doubts: the attribution to Aśvaghoṣa and Paramārtha; problems related to the language of the text; and the identities of the translator/s or the author/s, if the author was not Aśvaghoṣa and the translator was not Paramārtha.

[30] Whalen Lai, The Search for the Historical Sakyamuni in Light of the Historical Jesus." *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 2 (1982): 79.

Despite the fact that most scholars in the West accept Mochizuki's assertion, i.e. that the *Awakening of Faith* is indeed of Chinese origin, the debate has never ended in Japan, and continues to engage contemporary scholars of Indian and East Asian Buddhism.

4.6 The Chinese debate over the *Awakening of Faith*

Inspired by their Japanese colleagues, by internal growing tendencies toward a more scholarly study of Buddhism and with a growing understanding of Western methods of inquiry, Chinese Buddhists turned their attention to the authenticity of Buddhist texts as well. However, unlike their Japanese counterparts, Chinese Buddhists, while not ignoring the question of authorship, were more concerned with the philosophical and doctrinal teachings of the *Awakening of Faith* and their compatibility with what they understood as the authentic Buddhist teaching. Surveying the full scope of the traditional interpretation of the *Awakening of Faith* and the modern debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, in this section of this chapter, I will focus on Ouyang's contribution to this debate, as the first to identify and raise these concerns in China. To contextualize the significance of Ouyang's position and in order to better understand the extent to which it snowballed into something much bigger, I will also mention briefly Zhang Taiyan and Lü Cheng's contribution to the debate,[31] and apologists such as Liang

[31] For the sake of maintaining our focus on Ouyang and avoid repetition of the arguments, I have omitted an important voice in this debate, that of Ouyang's disciple, Wang Enyang (王恩洋 1897-1964). For Wang's essays on the *Awakening of Faith*, see Zhang Mantao (ed.). *Investigating the Awakening of Faith and the Śūraṃgama Sūtra* [大乘起信論與楞嚴經考辨] (Taibei: Da sheng wen hua chu ban she, 1978).

Qichao, Taixu and Tang Dayuan.[32] As in the case of the Japanese material just surveyed, this will by comprise means an exhaustive discussion. Rather, through it, I hope to provide the background necessary for appreciating this group's basic argument, and Ouyang's special place within this group.

4.6.1 Zhang Taiyan – the initiator of the debate over the *Awakening of Faith* in China

In 1915, the famous intellectual and nationalist, Zhang Taiyan, poked the first hole in the wall of certainty surrounding the *Awakening of Faith* with the publication of his *Debating the Awakening of Faith* (大乘起信論辯). In his very short essay, Zhang treated both historical and doctrinal aspects of the problem. Basically, he argued that while historically it is an authentic Indian text, there remained major doctrinal problems and contradictions that should be taken into account.

With regard to questions of authentication, Zhang Taiyan argued along the same lines as Ouyang would seven years later. Zhang does not say in his essay if he is reacting to doubts he encountered in Japan regarding the text, but from the tone of the essay it seems very plausible, especially taking into account the fact that he returned from five years in Japan right after the 1911 revolution.

For Zhang the text was indeed of Indian provenance and was written by Aśvaghoṣa. He opens his article by acknowledging that the *Fajinglu* catalogue places

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[32] As the controversy surrounding the *Awakening of Faith* is of crucial importance to modern and contemporary Buddhism in China, I intend to study this debate in details in future research. For a fuller account of the debate, see Wang Enyang, *The Debate Whether the Awakening of Faith Is Genuine or Not* [大乘起信論眞偽辯] (Taibei: Jian kang shu ju, 1956) and Zhang Mantao (ed.). *Investigating the Awakening of Faith and the Śūraṃgama Sūtra*.

the *Awakening of Faith* among the suspicious scriptures, and that the attribution to Aśvaghoṣa was not mentioned in Yijing's 691 CE, *Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan* (南海寄歸內法傳, T54.2125 records from his travels in India and South Asia), nor in Kumārajīva's *Biography of the Bodhisattva Aśvaghoṣa* (Ch: 馬鳴菩薩傳, T50.2046), nor even in Fazang's writings. Daoxuan's *Xu gaoseng zhuan* (Ch: 續高僧傳, T50.2060) mentioned that there was no Sanskrit manuscript of the text available in the Tang (i.e. in the time of Daoxuan, the biographies' compiler). It was Fei Changfang in *Lidai sanbaoji* (歷代三寶紀, T49.2034), a contemporary of Fajing, who attributed the translation of the text to Paramārtha. For Zhang Taiyan, the fact that the text has two translations clearly indicates the existence of an original work, even if the original is missing. The reason the text was included in the category of suspicious scriptures in the *Fajinglu* does not refer to the texts' authenticity, but to suspicious regarding the true identity of translators.[33]

Doctrinally, the situation is slightly more complicated. Although Zhang was generally sympathetic to the doctrine of the *Awakening of Faith* and found it to be doctrinally similar to Vasubandhu and Asaṅga's point of view, he did acknowledged that they differ in terminology.[34] In addition to the difference in vocabulary and terminology, Zhang also points out that there is a fundamental contradiction in the

[33] 此但疑其譯人，非是疑其本論。See Zhang Taiyan, "Debating the Awakening of Faith [大乘起信論辯]." In Wang Enyang (et al), *Debating Whether the Awakening of Faith is True or False* (Taibei: Jiankang shuju, 1956), 1.

[34] According to Zhang, the explanation lies in the fact that *Awakening of Faith* is a pre-Nagārjuna text (see Zhang Taiyan, Debating the Awakening of Faith, 3). Comparing the *Awakening of Faith* with other text ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa such as the *Buddhacarita,* Zhang claims that the *Awakening of Faith* establishes that the theory of *tathāgatagarbha* has a meaning that is profound but it does not have the poetic quality [of the *Buddhacarita*]. 起信論立如來藏，義既精深，非詩歌比。See Ibid., 1.

analogy of the ocean that is found in the *Awakening of Faith*. According to this well-known analogy, mind and ignorance are likened to the ocean its waves. The mind on its own is as quiet like a still ocean. Defiled thoughts, which are likened to the waves, are not the true nature of the mind, as they only arise when the winds of ignorance stir them. According to Zhang, this is a dualism that contradicts the monism that the text is trying to promote.[35]

Although, historically Zhang was the first to discuss the problematic nature of the *Awakening of Faith,* his essay did not receive much attention at the time. It took seven more years for the debate to reach a much wider audience in China, a development caused to a large extent by Ouyang Jingwu's publication of the *Expositions and Discussions of Vijñāptimātra* in 1922, in which Ouyang outlined his analysis of and critique against the text.

4.6.2 Ouyang Jingwu and the *Awakening of Faith*

Ouyang holds a unique place in the history of the debate over the *Awakening of Faith* in China. Applying evidential research methods, such as historical and philological analysis, Ouyang noticed discrepancies between the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith* and orthodox Yogācāra texts such as the *Yogācrābhūmi śāstra* and the *Cheng weishi lun.* Although Zhang Taiyan was the first who wrote abut the *Awakening of Faith* in the context of the modern critique, it was Ouyang who turned the *Awakening of Faith* to the focus of debate over the nature and validity of

[35] See Gong, Jun. *The Awakening of Faith and Sinification of Buddhism*, 193.

Buddhism, as it developed in East Asia. This development -- no doubt closely related to critiques against the *Awakening of Faith* in Japan – had a far-reaching effect on Chinese Buddhist orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Ouyang's views in regard to the *Awakening of Faith* were severely criticized in more conservative circles and among Chinese Buddhists and were celebrated by his students and pushed forward to an even more radical conclusion.

Ouyang's direct critique against the *Awakening of Faith* appeared in his *Expositions and Discussions of Vijñāptimātra,* in his discussion on the notion of correct knowledge (Skt. *samyagjñāna* Ch. 正智) as a part of the five *dharmas* scheme. This scheme played an important role in the solution to the problem that Ouyang outlined, which hinges upon the correct understanding on the nature of those five *dharmas*.

What does he mean by correct knowledge in the five *dharmas* scheme? Ouyang opened his discussion with a quotation from the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra* (the formula appears first in the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*), which explains the meaning of the five. According to the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Yogācārabhūmi,* the five *dharmas* are: (1) signs or Appearances (Skt. *nimitta,* Ch. 相), which the *Yogācārabhūmi* explains as all the things (Skt. *vastu* Ch. 處事) that discourses and theories (言談) are based on (安足[36]);[37] (2) names (Skt. *nāma,* Ch. 名), which further describe verbalizations and categorizations in addition to that of the *nimitta*; (3) discriminatory conceptions or ideas (Skt. *saṃkalpa,* Ch. 分別), which includes both the *citta* and *caittas* associated

[36] Literally, rest one foot on.

[37] 《瑜伽師地論》卷72：「何等為相。謂若略說所有言談安足處事」T30.1579.696a2.

with the all phenomenal world,[38]or the contaminated (*sāsrava*) *cittas*; (4) correct knowledge (Skt. *samyagjñāna,* Ch. 正智), which includes both mundane and supramundane knowledge, and experiential wisdom (如量智), as well as wisdom of the principles (如理智); (5) suchness (Skt. *tathata,* Ch. 真如), which is the state in which the principle of no-self is revealed, the holy teaching is actualized, and which differs from all the [things] that discourses and theories are based on.[39]

Ouyang then proceeds to talk about correct knowledge, which he saw as a crucial term that was distorted by the *Awakening of Faith*. For Ouyang, correct knowledge is that knowledge which perceives the object (能緣) and can function as a cause (能生). *Tathatā* or Suchness, on the other hand, "cannot be seeds, perfumer, or perfumed; it has nothing to do with such matters."[40] Here, Ouyang already breaks away from one of the most influential doctrines in East Asian schools of Buddhism, that which saw the "mind as suchness" (心真如) and the "mind that arises and ceases" (心生滅) as two manifestations of one and the same mind, such that they are in fact identical, two sides of the same coin.[41] For Ouyang, the two realms were

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[38] Literally all the mind and mind associates of activities of the three worlds (三界行中所有心心所).

[39] 五法者何？相、名、分別、正智、真如是也。云何為相？謂若略說所有言談安足處事。云何為名？謂即於相所有增語。云何為分別？謂三界行中所有心心所（有漏心法）。云何為正智？（無漏心法）即是世出世間如量如理之智云何為真如？即是法無我所顯，聖智所行，非一切言談安足處事 (Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1378)
The explanation is mostly a direct quote from the *Yogācārabhūmi* T30.1579.0696.a01-07. Ouyang gives a general account here of what the five *dharmas* are, and does not include the *Yogācārabhūmi*'s more detailed analysis of correct knowledge. He adds that the notion of correct knowledge is also identifiable with two kinds of wisdom: wisdom as experienced (literally as *pramāṇa*) and wisdom according to principle（如量如理之智）.

[40] 真如體義，不可說種，能熏、所熏，都無其事 (Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1378).

irrecoverably isolated from one another. Suchness is beyond language and discursive thought and is called suchness is merely a "forced terminology expedient" (強名). Ouyang utilizes the formula of substance and function (*ti* 體 and *yong* 用) to further explicate his idea. This language, as we will see below, has a long history in China and Ouyang used it in response to traditions later prevalent among Buddhists commentators in East Asia, who insisted that the two are inseparable. For Ouyang the substance equals suchness and the function equals correct knowledge. Ouyang understood the substance to be completely separated from function; the unattainable substance is manifested by the function (correct knowledge). In Ouyang's words, the correct knowledge reveals (顯) the substance, but it is impossible to "see" (視) suchness directly, since its meaning is concealed (遮).[42]

The second problem is that Buddhist thinkers, who followed the wrong interpretation of the *Awakening of Faith*, saw suchness as giving rise to the myriad dharmas. This is, according to Ouyang, a pitiful mistake that stems directly from the teachings of the *Awakening of Faith.*[43] The position that suchness gives rise to dharmas met with resistance from most scholastic Buddhists from Ouyang's milieu, and was subject to elaborate refutations by Ouyang's successors.

As a scholastic, who was aware of the "Westernized" scholarly method popular in Japan and was trained in evidential research methods, Ouyang then turned to the history of the text to seek the historical context for such a flaw.

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[41] See T32n1666.0576a05-09.

[42] See Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1379. We will have more to say about the complicated way in which Ouyang understood the relationship between substance and function in the next chapter.

[43] 以真如受熏緣起萬法之說. Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1379.

Historically speaking Ouyang's position is less radical than some. It was in line with Zhang Taiyan's position and was soon rejected even by his own students such as Liang Qichao and Lü Cheng. Ouyang accepted the Indic origin of the text and its attribution to Aśvaghoṣa. But he qualified this acceptance with the observation that Aśvaghoṣa was originally a follower of the Hīnayāna, and he understood the *Awakening of Faith* as a product of Aśvaghoṣa's earlier Hīnayāna thinking. Ouyang then analyzed the history of sectarian Buddhism and reached the conclusion that "Aśvaghoṣas's position is similar to that of the Vibhajyavādins.[44] According to Ouyang, "the Vibhajyavādins (分別論者) did not establish the notion of inherent seeds (法爾種). [They claim that] the mind is originally pure. When the mind is separated from defilements, its substance (*ti* 體) is pure and serves as the cause for the undefiled (無漏), just as milk can become ghee because there is [already] the nature of ghee in milk. Thus, they (i.e. the Vibhajyavādins) take the substance [of the mind] as the function [of the mind]. [If] substance is mixed [with the nature of its function], then the function is lost."[45]

Ouyang went on, in this same essay to attack the terminology used by the *Awakening of Faith.* The text, according to Ouyang, does not establish its argument

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[44] Ouyang was not the first who pointed out similarities between the supposed teachings of the Vibhajyavādins and the later Pure Mind teachings. This similarity was already pointed out by Xuanzang in the *Cheng weishi lun*. See T 31.1585.0008c20: "The Vibhajyavādins hold the theory that because the nature of the mind is pure and that the mind is defiled by adventitious afflictions (*āgantuka kleśāḥ*), it is called defiled. When the mind is separated from [those afflictions] it becomes uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) again, and therefore the uncontaminated dharmas are produced by causes. 分別論者雖作是說心性本淨客塵煩惱所染污故名為雜染. 離煩惱時轉成無漏故無漏法非無因生。

[45] See Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1382 "分別論者無法爾種，心性本淨，離煩惱時即體清淨為無漏因，如乳變酪，乳有酪性，是則以體為用，體性既淆，用性亦失."

based on the notion of seeds,[46] either defiled or pure. Instead it relies on an unfounded (不成) notion of function that arises from permeation (熏習起用). Here, Ouyang specified two problems with the *Awakening of Faith.* The first, as we will see below, is the author's understanding (or lack thereof) of the notion of permeation and the second is his disregard of the theory of seeds.

Ouyang's contention in regard to the notion of permeation is that if we take the *Awakening of Faith*'s understanding of the term, then the metaphor of the seeds -- - and it is important to keep in mind that it is a metaphor only -- loses its meaning. We should therefore define our terms clearly. What, then, is permeation? He says:

> "Permeation" (Skt. *vāsanā* Ch. 熏習) [takes its] meaning [from an] analogy to a garment in the ordinary world, which in fact has no fragrance [of its own], but which takes on the perfume of an incense when it is "smoked" ["perfumes"="permeated", *xun*] with the incense. In the case of garment and incense in the ordinary world, we can only speak of "perfumation" ["permeation"] [when they are present] at the same time and in the same place; [thus, similarly,] purity and defilement cannot mutually infuse one another, and in fact, ignorance and correct wisdom cannot be established at the same time. (...) If one is talking about inconceivable permeation that is different from the above [example of the garment]: then the permeation of the perfume of a worldly [garment] cannot serve as a [proper] example (Skt. *dṛṣṭānta* Ch. 同喻). [Only if] the two (i.e. the garment and the perfume) are [originally] separated and later are connected, can the meaning of permeation [be established.][47]

The other problem Ouyang identifies in the *Awakening of Faith* is that it does not address the seeds theory. He discusses this problem as follows:

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[46] This notion of seeds, which obviously was important for Ouyang, will be one of the major critiques leveled against him and the Yogācāra teaching by his disciple, Xiong Shili when the latter turned against Ouyang's teaching and created his own idiosyncratic system.

[47]熏習義者，如世間衣服實無於香，以香熏習則有香气。世間衣香，同時同處而說熏習；淨染不相容，正智無明，實不並立，即不得熏。若別說不思議熏者，則世間香熏非其同喻。又兩物相離，使之相合則有熏義。 See Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1383.

The mistake of the *Awakening of Faith* does not stop with the fallacy of not establishing the notion of permeation but also concerns not establishing the notions of correct knowledge and uncontaminated seeds. As a result, in terms of principle, the sense of function is lost; it is mistaken concerning the notion of function (用). In terms of [the Buddha's] teaching, it contradicts the teachings of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*. It (i.e. the *Awakening of Faith*) also talks about the three subtle and six coarse marks as strung together (sequentially).[48] As a result, in terms of principle, it is mistaken concerning the notion of difference [between the subtle and the coarse marks] and violates the teaching of the *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra.* The five *dharmas* in the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra,* which are discussed in terms of suchness and correct knowledge, emerge together. In the *Awakening of Faith*, there are no uncontaminated seeds, and suchness is able, on its own, to transcend defilements and become pure, which conflates correct knowledge and suchness into the same thing. This is an error [in understanding both] the substance as well as the function. The *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra* discusses the eight consciousnesses "horizontally" (i.e. treats them as independent of each other); hence they are able to operate simultaneously, since they [take each other as] simultaneous bases (Skt. *sahabahūtāśraya* Ch. 俱有依). Furthermore, each consciousness has [its own] seeds. The seeds give rise to (similar seeds) but do not hinder their mutual flourishing, since both the direct (Skt. *hetu pratyaya* Ch.因緣) and auxiliary (Skt. *adhipati pratyaya* Ch.增上緣) causes operate as simultaneous bases. The *Awakening of Faith* [,by contrast,] discusses the eight consciousnesses "vertically." The three subtle and six coarse marks arise sequentially [and yet it appears] as if (幾似) they all belong to the same kind of consciousness, so no differentiation can be established (by this reasoning)"[49]

Ouyang then concludes,

Investigated from both an historical and a doctrinal perspective, the *Awakening of Faith*'s teaching is generally similar to that of the

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[48] In the *Awakening of Faith* the six coarse marks are resulted from the third subtle mark see T 32.1666.0577a07-20. The three marks according to the *Awakening of Faith* are: (1) the mark of karma resulted from ignorance (無明業相) (2) the mark of the subjective perceiver (能見相) and (3) the mark of the objective world (境界相).

[49]起信之失，猶不止熏習不成而已，其不立正智無漏種子也，則於理失用義，於教違楞伽；其以三細六麤連貫而說也，則於理失差別，於教違深密。楞伽五法，真如正智並舉而談。起信無漏無種，真如自能離染成淨，乃合正智真如為一，失體亦復失用也。深密平說八識，故八識可以同時而轉，以是俱有依故；又識各有種，種生現行不妨相並故，因緣增上二用俱有故。起信論豎說八識，三細六麤次第而起，幾似一類意識，八種差別遂不可立矣。 see Ouyang Jingwu, Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra*, 1384.

> Vibhajyavādins in the respects [I have discussed]. Examined from the perspective of the correct principle of the highest teaching [i.e., Buddhism], the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith* is not completely accurate as those [other teachings I have discussed]. Those who carefully seek the Buddhadharma ought to carefully determine the rights and wrongs of the *Awakening of Faith*. But for more than a thousand years, it has been esteemed as the highest treasure; inferior people keep discussing it and, in doing so, mistake a fish's eye for a pearl. It has confused people for a long time. Indeed, it is absolutely necessary that the right discernment be made! [50]

Several points are worth noting here. Ouyang's critique is both historical and doctrinal in nature. Going over his text, we can get a glimpse of his method, which includes historical verification, doctrinal analysis and careful attention to terminology.

His style is dialectical and follows the śāstric literature that he promoted. He relies on Buddhist logic, and uses traditional arguments based on scriptural proofs (Skt. *āgama pramāṇa* Ch. 聖教量) and logic (Skt. *yukti* Ch. 理). Buddhist logic never established a solid foot in China. Its practice almost disappeared completely in post-Tang China and, with the exception of a short attempt to revive it in the Ming.[51] It only regained importance among scholastic circles during the twentieth century. Here again, Ouyang had a pioneering role in the promotion of the importance of Buddhist logic for intellectual discourse.

Although Ouyang was very likely aware of the debates regarding the provenance of the text in Japan,[52] he was less concerned with the origin of the text

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[50]從史實與理論觀之，起信與分別論大體相同也如彼； 以至教正理勘之，起信立說之不盡當也又如此；凡善求佛法者自宜慎加揀擇，明其是非。然而千餘年來，奉為至寶，末流議論，魚目混珠，惑人已久，此誠不可不一辨也； see ibid., 1384.

[51] See Wu Jiang, Buddhist Logic and Apologetics in Seventeenth-Century China.

than he was with its philosophical and doctrinal problems. As stated above, Ouyang accepted the authorship of Aśvaghoṣa,[53] but related the main historical problem to the fact that Aśvaghoṣa was not a Mahāyāna follower. Ouyang identified Aśvaghoṣa's views as closer to those expressed by other early Buddhist schools, especially these of the so-called Vibhajyavāda School. Rhetorically speaking, accusing the author of the text that was held as the "highest teaching" by Buddhists in China for the last millennium of being an adherent of the "Hīnayāna" was polemical enough. But Ouyang went further and called into question the doctrinal core of the text as well.

Doctrinally, Ouyang accused the author of the text of blurring the difference between correct knowledge and suchness. While Ouyang saw the two as separate the author of the *Awakening of Faith* saw them as similar. We have here two markedly different visions of Buddhist enlightenment and the way to attain it. For Ouyang, suchness is beyond grasp but is revealed through its function, which is correct knowledge. The *Awakening of Faith*, as Ouyang understood it, mixed the substance with the function in a way that turns suchness into a causative factor that gives rise to phenomena.

Ouyang also had a problem with terminology that was uncritically adopted from Yogācāra texts. The seeds theory was ignored in the *Awakening of Faith*, and gave way to a discussion of an abstract version of permeation (function that arises

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[52] Both Liang Qichao and Lü Cheng refer to the Japanese debates in their writings. It seems to me unlikely that Ouyang, who spent a few years in Japan before writing this critique, was not aware of developments there.

[53] Since he never argued about the translator, it seems that he had no problem, at least at that point, with the attribution of the translation to Paramārtha.

from permeation 熏習起用). In the *Awakening of Faith*, the metaphor of permeation loses its impact, as Ouyang explained the metaphor is contingent on the total separation of the "garment" (the mind) and the "perfume" (external causes and conditions). If there is no real distinction between substance *qua* suchness and function *qua* correct knowledge, function has no real role since substance (= suchness) can purify itself.

4.6.2.1 Ouyang's solution: substance and function must be separated

One of Ouyang's major solutions to the problem of the *Awakening of Faith* was to argue for a complete separation of function and substance. Here it is important to note that the *Awakening of Faith* itself does not talk about a dualism of substance 體 and function 用, but introduces the notion of characteristics 相 as the "problem." Its model is more complex than a clear separation of substance and function.

This, however, did not prevent the emergence of a very early tradition that saw the major message of the *Awakening of Faith* as lying in the unification of the realm of suchness and the phenomenal world. This view, widespread in East Asian Buddhism, was greatly indebted to Huayan thinkers, who propagated this vision using the notions of principle (理) and phenomena (事),[54]but it also appeared – although less dominantly in Tiantai writings. The view of non-dualism of substance and function continued through some circles within the Chan[55] period and it was

[54] See Charles Muller, *The Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment: Korean Buddhism's Guide to Meditation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 12.

against this vision that Ouyang outlined his theory of the separation of substance and function.[56]

Ouyang's theory of substance and function can be found in texts such as his prefaces to the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the "Tattvārtha" chapter of the *Yogācārabhūmi.* In all of those texts, Ouyang repeats and reiterates in different ways that, substance and function should not be mixed. The most extensive treatment is, again, in his *Expositions and Discussions of Vijñāptimātra*. Beyond the fact that this text also outlined the flaws Ouyang found in the *Awakening of Faith,* one can see that this was an important point for him, since it was the first observation out of the ten he makes here.

Ouyang argued that the unconditioned (Skt. *asaṃskṛta* Ch. 無為) dharmas are the substance while the conditioned (Skt. *saṃskṛta* Ch. 有為) *dharmas* are the function (this is in a general way to say the same thing as just discussed above, i.e. that suchness is substance while correct knowledge is function. Another way that Ouyang puts it is that "no arising and ceasing" is substance while "arising and ceasing" is function; or permanence is substance and "alteration of cause and effect" (因果轉變, Skt. *pariṇāma*) is function. Although both ordinary people and Buddhas and Bodhisattvas operate in the world, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas have

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[55] See Jana Benicka, "(Huayan-like) Notions of Inseparability (or Unity) of Essence and its Function (or Principle and Phenomena) in Some Commentaries on 'Five Positions' of Chan Master Dongshan Liangjie." In Imre Hamar (ed.) *Reflecting Mirrors: Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007), 243-251.

[56] Ouyang's theory later attracted much criticism, and inspired works that reintroduced the theory of the unity of essence and function. Most influential among them in Xiong Shili's *Discourse of Essence and Function* (體用論). For more, see Ng, Yu-Kwan, "Xiong Shili's Metaphysical Theory About the Non-Separability of Substance and Function," in *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination,* ed John Makeham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 219-252.

their basis in permanence, which is substance. Their action is merely to assist sentient beings.

I will now move to Ouyang's major disciple, Lü Cheng, who is arguably the most famous critique of the position and provenance of the *Awakening of Faith*.

4.7 Lü Cheng: The scholarly analysis

Lü Cheng's attack on the *Awakening of Faith* was a step forward in its rigor and thoroughness. Lü published several works on the *Awakening of Faith*, and dedicated a substantial part of the famous letters he exchanged with Xiong Shili to discussing the historical and doctrinal flaws of the *Awakening of Faith* and other texts he considered apocryphal. Among the works he wrote on the *Awakening of Faith* are: (1) *The Awakening of Faith and the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* (起信與楞伽); (2) *The Awakening of Faith and Chan: A Study in the Historical Background of the Awakening of Faith* (起信與禪 — 對於大乘起信論來歷的探討); (3) *Debating the Fundamental Problem of Buddhism: The Correspondence of Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili* (辯佛學根本問題 -- 呂澂，熊十力往復函稿); (4) and, most comprehensively, *A Critical Examination of the Awakening of Faith* (大乘起信論攷證). Even more than Ouyang, Lü Cheng saw the *Awakening of Faith* as one among a series of spurious texts that were doctrinally similar, and which emerged around the time of the Tang dynasty. All these texts shared, what Lü Cheng called "the theory of true mind and original enlightenment" (真心本覺說). For Lü Cheng, this theory had a crucial impact on the development of the Chan, Tiantai and Huayan Schools in the Tang.

Lü's main arguments are complex and deserve separate treatment. Here I merely wish to outline the direction in which he both depended upon and altered Ouyang's critique, historically and doctrinally. In his historical analysis Lü repeated the reasoning of the sources mentioned above, which raised doubts concerning the *Awakening of Faith* when it first appeared in China. He also contended that most contemporary Japanese scholars did not accept the text was a Chinese composition and believed that it was an Indian text from the fourth or fifth centuries (i.e. during the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu), while he held that the text was of Chinese origin.[57]

Doctrinally, Lü linked the position of the *Awakening of Faith* to the teachings of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*. Lü observed that there are three different translations of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* — an early one by Bodhiruci, and two later ones by Gunabhadra and Śikṣānanda. According to Lü, the Sanskrit version of the *sūtra* resembles the later two, while the *Awakening of Faith* shows a close affinity to Bodhiruci's earlier translation.[58] Key to Lü's contentions is the fact that Bodhiruci's translation is full of conceptual flaws, which found their way into the *Awakening of Faith* as well. Lü ruled out the possibility that Bodhiruci relied on a different version

[57] See Lü Cheng, "The Awakening of Faith and Chan: A Study in the Historical Background of the Awakening of Faith. [起信與禪： 對於大乘起信論來歷的探討]," in *Investigating the Awakening of Faith and the Śūraṃgama Sūtra* [大乘起信論與楞嚴經考辨], ed Zhang Mantao (Taibei: Da sheng wen hua chu ban she, 1978), 300.

[58] Unlike Ouyang, Lü Cheng was among the first Buddhist scholastics in China to apply a rich array of linguistic tools. As a part of his scholastic skill set, Lü could read Sanskrit and Tibetan and in addition to his knowledge of English and French.

of the text, and argued that the deviation from the Sanskrit can be traced to problems in Bodhiruci's translation.[59]

Before moving on to discuss the *Awakening of Faith*'s impact on the development of the thought of the Chan School, Lü argued that the *Awakening of Faith* main doctrinal focus is in the notion of "arising from the *tathāgatagarbha*" (如來藏緣起).[60]Where did this idea originate? Lü acknowledged that the roots of the idea can be found in the original Sanskrit version of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*. The *Laṅkāvatāra* is not the only text that presents the idea of the purity of the mind. Other texts -- such as the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa sūtra* – also advocate the same position relying on the Mahāyāna commitment that all sentient beings will eventually attain Buddhahood.[61] In Bodhiruci's translation, such earlier notions were unified with the conclusion that the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna* mean essentially the same thing but differ only in terminology. The *Awakening of Faith* further develops this idea. According to Lü, the developments reflect a direct influence of Bodhiruci's distortion. Lü noted that the author of the *Awakening of Faith* argues that the *ālayavijñāna* is closely related to the *tathāgatagarbha* with the explanation that "the arising and ceasing mind means that based on the *tathāgatagarbha* there is the mind of arising and ceasing. The so-called 'neither

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[59] See Lü Cheng, The Awakening of Faith and Chan, 301.

[60] See, for example,T44.1846.243.b27-28, X21.368.132.b7-11 and later in Zixuan, a later Song dynasty Huayan thinker T44.1848.308.a17-18.

[61] Lü Cheng does not connect his premise and the conclusion but it is traditionally understood, according to this position, that since all sentient beings will eventually attain Buddhahood, there must be an innate potential to attain Buddhahoood. This innate "Buddha seed" is necessarily free of defilements, hence pure. Therefore, according to this position, the universality of Buddhahood necessitated the existence of Buddha nature in all sentient beings.

arises nor ceases' is neither different nor the same as the arising and ceasing. This is called *ālayavijñāna.*"[62]

Lü cited other examples to prove the link between the *Awakening of Faith* and the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra.* But rather than dwell on these, let me turn now to Lü's response to this position, which he outlined in a fascinating correspondent with Ouyang's former disciple and Confucian reformer Xiong Shili. In response to Xiong's comments Lü argues, "Your views are based on the concept Nature as Awakened (*xingjue* 性覺) (which is the opposite of Nature as Quiescence *xingji* 性寂[63]). [This concept] sings the same tune as the apocryphal Chinese *sūtras* and *śāstras.* How can anyone judge Buddhism according to that?"[64] Lü explains that the first position, Nature as Awakened, is the same as the position outlined in the *Awakening of Faith* and other popular apocryphal *sūtras* that argue that the defiled phenomenon arise from the pure mind because of external ignorance, not intrinsic to the mind.

Lü explains,

> In the theory based on the former [i.e. "Nature as Quiescence"] the emphasis is on reliance on the perceptual object as the conditioning object (Skt. *ālambana pratyaya* Ch. 所緣緣), while in the theory based upon the latter [i.e. "Nature as Awakened"] the emphasis is on reliance on seeds as a direct cause (Skt. *hetu pratyaya* Ch. 因緣). What is regarded [by these two theories as]

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[62]《大乘起信論》卷1：「心生滅者。依如來藏故有生滅心。所謂不生不滅與生滅和合非一非異。名為阿梨耶識。」(T32.1666.576b7-9).

[63] Comment in the original text.

[64]尊論完全從性覺〔與性寂相反)立說，與中土一切偽經、偽論同一鼻孔出氣，安得據以衡量佛法? Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili. "Debating the Fundamental Problem of Buddhism: Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili's Letters Correspondence. [辯佛學根本問題 — 呂澂，熊十力往復函稿]" *Zhongguo Zhexue*, 11 (1984): 169.

> subjective and objective is entirely different, and therefore their function is different. In the one, [liberation is a state] radically new, in the other, [it is a] return to the origin, and thus it is possible to say that they are opposite.[65]

Here Lü uses convoluted technical language to simply say that the model favored by the apocryphal texts so popular in China relies on the subjective and internal while the other model, endorsed by Lü allowed for an objective quiescent reality detached from the subjective.

Lü continues,

> When I say that [the two models] are opposite, and only call "Nature as Awakened" as non-genuine. I based myself on the tenets of Indian Buddhism; [in which], the doctrine of inherent purity of the mind was the foundation of Buddhism; "Nature as Quiescence" is the accurate interpretation of the inherent purity of the mind. (It is spoken of as "quiescence" because of the ineffability of the inner realization of false discrimination, which is originally devoid of the dualistic grasping[66]). The notion of "Nature as Awakened" is also derived from the original purity of the mind, but it is an interpretation that lacks true understanding, [this is a notion which] has no verification in the noble teaching, and merely results from erroneous transmission.[67]

Here, again, Lü explains to Xiong that there is a consensus around the importance of the notion of pure-mind in Mahāyāna Buddhism but the *Awakening of Faith* and other apocryphal texts understood it incorrectly. It is Nature as Quiescence that is the true and accurate meaning of pure-mind.[68]

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[65] 由前立論，乃重視所緣境界依，由后立論，乃重視因緣種子依。 能所異位，功行全殊。一則革新，一則返本，故謂之相反也。 Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili. Debating the Fundamental Problem of Buddhism, 171.

[66] The grasper and the grasped.

[67]說相反而獨以性覺為偽者，由西方教義証之，心性本淨一義，為佛學本源，性寂乃心性本淨之正解(虛妄分別之內証離言性，原非二取，故 云寂也)。性覺亦從心性本淨來，而望文生義，聖教無征，訛傳而已。 Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili. Debating the Fundamental Problem of Buddhism, 171.

Lü then concludes, "The chance that erroneously transmitted teaching will coincide with the truth is equal to the chance that a blind turtle will meet a hole in a [floating] log.[69] This is one of the most agreeable principles in the world. The apocryphal texts in China began with texts such as the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna*, *Sutra on the Divination of the Effect of Good and Evil Actions*, the *Vajrasamādhi sūtra*, the *Sūtra of Complete Awakening* and the **Śūraṃgama sūtra*. They all came down to us from ancient time; all the erroneous views derive from them. When their poisonous influence has its impact, they confused the subject with the object, so much so that if one is searching for purity it is to no avail. If there is no way to discriminate the transformed mind [from the ordinary one] then, naturally, the teaching will rest in its degenerative state."[70]

As is evident from the examples above, Chinese intellectuals, alongside their research into the origin and authenticity of the text, questioned the form of Buddhism that evolved in China, the coherence of its doctrine and its loyalty to and diviation from Indian origins. For them, the *Awakening of Faith* was emblematic of

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[68] As we already saw above Lü Cheng consider the transmission through Bodhiruci's translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* as erroneous not because they talked about pure-mind but because in the way it was interpreted.

[69] A well-known metaphor for something that is very rare, most often refers to how rare it is to be born as a human. See for example 《雜阿含經》卷15：「爾時。世尊告諸比丘。譬如大地悉成大海。有一盲龜壽無量劫。百年一出其頭。海中有浮木。止有一孔。漂流海浪。隨風東西。盲龜百年一出其頭。當得遇此孔不。阿難白佛。不能。世尊。所以者何。此盲龜若至海東。浮木隨風。或至海西。南．北四維圍遶亦爾。不必相得。佛告阿難。盲龜浮木。雖復差違。或復相得。愚癡凡夫漂流五趣。暫復人身。甚難於彼。」(T02.99.108c7-15).

[70]訛傳之說而謂能巧合於真理，則盲龜木孔應為世間最相契者矣。中土偽書由《起信》而《佔察》，而《金剛三昧》，而《圓覺》，而《楞嚴》，一 脈相承，無不從此訛傳而出。 流毒所至，混同能所，致趨淨而無門。不辨轉依，遂終安於墮落 。 Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili. Debating the Fundamental Problem of Buddhism, 171.

the way Chinese Buddhist relied on dubious and fake scriptures and based on such a foundation had developed a problematic and distorted doctrine.

Naturally, these new voices, which came from first-rate Buddhist authorities such as Ouyang Jingwu and Lü Cheng troubled those who cherished the *Awakening of Faith* as the pinnacle of Buddhism. Below are a few representative voices among Chinese Buddhist apologetics, who defended the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith* as one of the finest expressions of the Chinese Buddhist tradition.

4.8 Defenders of the faith – opposing views

4.8.1 Liang Qichao: a supporter with qualifications

The first "defender", Liang Qichao, is surprising and interesting. While an Ouyang's follower, Liang utilized an idiosyncratic approach which led him to disagree with most of Ouyang's conclusion. Liang had his own illustrious intellectual career and although he admired Ouyang and, like him, was greatly inspired by Buddhism, his thought went beyond the boundaries of the Buddhist tradition. Liang showed great respect to the text as a masterpiece of Chinese creativity and spirituality, and at the same time accepted the Japanese cutting-edge critique of the day with regard to the text's provenance and problematic attribution to Paramārtha.

Liang opens his long essay on the *Textual Research on the Awakening of Faith* (大乘起信論考證), with an acknowledgment and bibliographical review of recent Japanese contributions to research on the text. Liang mentions in particular the contribution of Mochizuki and Murakami and Matsumoto Bunzaburō (松本文三郎

1869-1944). At the same time Liang also says, "the *Awakening of Faith* had an enormous value in [East Asian] intellectual world."[71]Liang quots Matsumoto who said, "Schopenhauer once highly praised the Upanishads and said that they are the 'highest product of human wisdom,' [yet] the *Awakening of Faith* is beyond compare [in its depth]."[72]

Liang is not impressed with the questions concerning its Indian provenance. On the contrary, the fact that the Japanese scholars had surmised that the *Awakening of Faith* that is likely a Chinese product was a source of national pride and happiness. He said, "In the past, it was believed by all that the *Awakening of Faith* was written by a great Indian sage. Then one day, evidence was found that it was a product of one of our ancestors, [when I learned about it] my happiness and joy were beyond words. I am not going to discuss whether this treatise fits well with the Buddha's intention or whether this treatise explains the ultimate metaphysical truth but [I will argue that] what is important about this text is that it collects and harmonized the best part of the various Buddhist schools in order to accomplish the highest development of Buddhist doctrine."[73]

Liang's approach in a way is the reverse view of that of Ouyang's. While Ouyang accepted the authenticity of the text but rejected its philosophy, Liang

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[71] Liang Qichao, "Textual Research of the Awakening of Faith [大乘起信論考證]." In Wang Enyang et al, *Debating The Genuineness or Fakeness of the Awakening of Faith* [大乘起信論眞偽辯]. Taibei: Jiankang shuju, 1956, 6.

[72] Liang Qichao, Textual Research of the Awakening of Faith, 6.

[73] 本論是否吻合佛意且勿論，是否能闡宇宙唯一的真理更勿論，要之在各派佛學中能擷其菁英而調和之，以完成佛教教理最高的發展 。 see Liang Qichao, Textual Research of the Awakening of Faith, 6.

Qichao rejected its authenticity but celebrated its doctrine. For him the *Awakening of Faith* is a fine text that should contribute to the formulation of the perfect Buddhist teaching, and if it is of Chinese provenance and not Indian that is a source of pride rather then a source of embarrassment.

4.8.2 Taixu: defender of the orthodoxy

One of the major voices defending the orthodoxy of the *Awakening of Faith* and other texts dubbed apocryphal by Buddhist scholastics was that of the reformer monk Taixu, arguably the most outspoken and among the famous monks in the ROC years. Both in his lifetime and in scholarship Taixu's image is that of a radical whose plans for reform were so far-reaching that many believed that should he succeed he would transform Buddhism into something that "would no longer be Buddhism."[74] This may be true from the institutional perspective of the Chinese Saṅga reforms, but it was not accurate with regards to the Buddhist doctrine. As we will see below, Taixu's approach was intended to strengthen Chinese Buddhist orthodoxy. Taixu's major contribution to Chinese Buddhism was the idea that the propagation of Chinese Buddhism in the modern period must be conducted in a scholastic mode, which means grounded in texts.

This is precisely why Taixu is such an important voice in the debates concerning the *Awakening of* Faith, since he was one of those who defended the text's doctrine. Another important reasons is that Taixu reacted directly to Ouyang's critique. Taixu wrote his text shortly after Ouyang's and before Lü and

[74] Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China,* 71.

others expanded Ouyang's argument against the *Awakening of Faith*. Taixu's text is called *Comprehensive Exposition and Discussion of the Buddhadharma* [佛法總抉擇談]. Taixu stated that his essay is an attempt to serve as an addendum to Ouyang's essay *Expositions and Discussions of Vijñāptimātra* [唯識抉擇談]. He opens his essay explaining that just as Kuiji added a chapter to his *Essay on the Dharma Garden and Teaching Grove* [法苑義林章] further explaining his *Exegesis on the Cheng weishi lun* [成唯識論料簡], in the same way, Taixu wishes to add his own text to that of Ouyang. Taixu read Ouyang's essay and was impressed. He states that he agrees with most of what Ouyang presented. However, he felt that this important essay is written from a Yogācāra perspective. Taixu argues that it is his role in his essay to show how to integrate Ouyang's original essay with the Buddhist teaching as a whole.[75]

Both Ouyang and Taixu shared the view that modern Buddhism should be studied systematically and critically. But, despite the fact that he used scholastic methods as well, he was much less skilled and knowledgeable in applying them. As we will see in the analysis of his text, he often used texts and technical terms uncritically and freely infused them with new meanings that better fit his rhetorical and theoretical goals.

In this essay, Taixu applies his free wheeling approach to the theory of the three natures, which he explains, "although it is a [theoretical] device of the

[75] Taixu, "Comprehensive Exposition and Discussion of the Buddhadharma [佛法總抉擇談]," in Wang Enyang et al., *Debating The Genuineness or Fakeness of the Awakening of Faith* [大乘起信論眞偽辯] (Taibei: Jiankang shuju, 1956), 612.

Yogācāra School, in fact all the five vehicles rely on this concept."[76] For Taixu, the three natures can signify the different teachings of Buddhism, which vary qualitatively. The first nature is the imagined nature (Skt. *parikalpita svabhāva* Ch. 遍計所執自性）, which Taixu glosses according to the Chinese translation as the nature that discriminates and is mistakenly attached everywhere (能周遍計度而倒執者).[77] The second nature is the dependent nature (Skt. *paratantra svabhāva* Ch. 依他起自性), which is all the dharmas that arise, dependently on one another. The third is the perfect nature (Skt. *pariniṣpanna svabhāva* Ch. 圓成實自性), which is "the nature in which all dharmas have the essence of completeness, accomplishment and true reality, it has nothing which is lacking or in surplus, nothing is corrupted and it is without delusions.[78] While in the Yogācāra literature these three natures are often applied to different modes of perceiving reality, Taixu takes them as a scale according to which he judges the different Buddhist teachings. What is relevant here is that he places the Yogācāra teaching in the second category of dependent nature while the *Awakening of Faith* teaching receives the honor of being among the *sūtras and śāstras* that represent perfect nature (Others in this category include the Lotus and Huayan *sūtras* and the *Ratnagotravibhāga śāstra*).

[76] Taixu, Comprehensive Exposition and Discussion of the Buddhadharma, 612.

[77] Ibid., 613.

[78] 一切法圓滿成就真實之體，以無欠餘、不變壞、離虛妄為自性者 。 Ibid., 613.

I will not treat here less related observations Taixu made in regard to the way the three natures theory is applied to other Buddhist schools and teachings. More relevant is his reply to Ouyang's contentions, with which he does not agree. One of his objections is that Ouyang used the segment in the text, which discusses the relations between the *ālayavijñāna* and the *tathāgatagarbha* as proof that the *Awakening of Faith* is flawed. Taixu states that, for Ouyang, this quote from the *Awakening of Faith* resembles the Sāṃkhya's notions of *puruṣa* (神我) and *prakṛti* (自性).[79]For Taixu, this association is not implied in the *Awakening of Faith* but is an interpretation commentators have made since the Tang.

However, this was not the only problems Ouyang identified. As we saw earlier, the conflation of mind and suchness was another proof that the *Awakening of Faith* is doctrinally different from authentic Buddhism. In this respect, Taixu responds with an interpretation which seems to be identical to earlier commentators' interpretation. Taixu wrote, "In the *Awakening of Faith*, both the supramundane (*lokōttara*) and mundane (*laukika*) and all dharmas are not separate from the mind. Therefore, established discourses and theories in respect to the mind, are not different from established discourses and theories in respect to all dharmas. All dharmas shared the same essence of the mind, which is suchness; this is the essence of Mahāyāna."[80]

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[79] The primordial self and the primordial material nature in the Sāṃkhya system. This allusion to Sāṁkhya does not appear in Ouyang's writing and as Taixu acknowledged he heard it elsewhere and did not see it in Ouyang's Expositions and Discussions of *Vijñāptimātra.*

[80] 起信論以世出世間一切法皆不離心，故就心建言，實無異就一切法建言也。一切法共通之本體，則真如也，即所謂大乘體。 Taixu, Summarizing the Exposition and Discussion of the Buddhadharma, 616.

Taixu's approach is traditional, both in content and in form. By repeating East Asian Buddhist conventional understanding of the fundamentals of Mahāyāna, he clearly misunderstands or simply ignores Ouyang's critique and argues by reiterating the same position that Ouyang rejected (that the mind and suchness are similar). He is innovative in his attempt to arm traditional East Asian views with Yogācāra vocabulary (in this case the three natures theory), but ultimately he does not deviate from the traditional position.

4.8.3 Tang Dayuan – philosophy vs. philology

I would like to conclude the discussion of the apologetics with Tang Dayuan's (唐大圓 1890-1941) critique of the historical and philological method. Tang was Yinguang and Taixu's disciple and was associated with Taixu's Wuhan Buddhist Institute that rivaled Ouyang's Inner Studies Institute. He was also the editor of *Haichaoyin* (海潮音), arguably the most influential Buddhist journal in the ROC. Although an avid reader of Yogācāra thought, he remained a supporter of the *Awakening of Faith* and traditional East Asian orthodoxy. He wrote three different essays defending the *Awakening of Faith*: (1) *Dispelling Doubts Regarding the Awakening of Faith* [起信論解惑] (2) *Correct Explanation of Suchness* [真如正詮] (3) *An Honest Assessment of* [*Wang Enyang's*] *Exegesis of the Awakening of Faith* [起信論料簡之忠告].[81]

When asked when debates concerning the *Awakening of Faith* had ensued, Tang Dayuan replied that the instigator was Ouyang but he added that his main

[81] All essays can be found in Zhang Mantao, *Investigating the Awakening of Faith and the *Śūraṃgama Sūtra.*

opponent was Ouyang's disciple, Wang Enyang, who also wrote extensively against the orthodoxy of various apocryphal texts.

Beyond the doctrinal problems partially outlined by Taixu, Tang Dayuan called attention to another flaw in the attack of Ouyang and his associates against the *Awakening of Faith.* For Tang, was the methodology these scholars used i.e. philology and history or evidential research was problematic. When asked why he did not use evidential research method, Tang replied,

> Evidential research methods can only tell us that there was no real Aśvaghoṣa and that the *Awakening of Faith* is an apocryphal text. It does not go beyond an investigation by a scriptural expert. It is similar to the demise of the theory suggested by Zhang Wumin (?) and others who doubted the *Lotus sūtra*. Those [using these methods] to explain the Buddhist teachings can be disregarded with a smile. Their analysis relies on Yogācāra [teaching], and they are trying to dispel different aspects of the *Awakening of Faith*'s fundamental theory of 'the arising [of phenomena] conditioned by suchness.' If [phenomena] do not arise from suchness, then neither the dharma-body nor the *tathāgatagarbha* can be established. [In this case even when] seeing [sentient beings] drowning in the sea of suffering the Buddhas would not be able to save them."[82]

Tang summarizes his critique by quoting Zhuangzi "'what starts out being sincere usually ends up being deceitful,'[83]is it not a shame."[84]

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[82] 考証隻就歷史說馬鳴無其人，與起信偽作，不過經生考據氣習，如往日張五民等疑法華已亡說，稍解佛理者，一笑置之而已。至料簡依據唯識，破起信真如緣起根本諸義，若真如不緣起，則法身如來藏等俱不成立，眼見眾生長溺苦海，諸佛不能救度 。see Tang Dayong, Dispelling Doubt Over the *Awakening of Faith* [起信論解惑]. edited by Zhang Mantao, *Investigating the Awakening of Faith and the Śūraṃgama Sūtra* [大乘起信論與楞嚴經考辨] (Taibei: Da sheng wen hua chu ban she, 1978), 147.

[83] Translated by Burton Watson see http://www.terebess.hu/english/chuangtzu.html#4

[84] 莊子曰：其作始也簡，其將畢也必巨。可不慎歟 。 Tang Dayong, Dispelling Doubt Over the *Awakening of Faith*, 145.

The quote from the Zhuangzi reveals the precocious nature of the path Ouyang charted for himself. Tang Dayuan, and Taixu, who considered themselves Yogācārins, felt that Ouyang's erudition took him a little too far down a slippery slope that might result in undermining basic Mahāyāna tenants.

In the closing paragraph of Tang's *Dispelling Doubts Regarding the Awakening of Faith*, at the end of a lengthy questions and answers section, a poignant question is put forth: "You hold Ouyang in high esteem in regard to the Yogācāra teaching and you often wrote him letters asking questions. Wang [Enyang] sent you his writings and you corresponded with him, and [in addition] your relationship is intimate. Now, in your *Dispelling Doubts Regarding the Awakening of Faith* you borrow much from Ouyang the teacher and his disciples while at the same time, dispute them. Don't you worry that when they see this that they will eternally feel resentment toward you?" Tang's answer is, "If Ouyang had have not penetrated the teaching of non-self, it could have evoked feelings of ill-will. In that case, I would also not dare to disclose what I think and point to his mistakes. [But] Ouyang and his students actually penetrated the teaching of non-self. So, when they see what I have written, they will laugh earnestly and say 'this is a truly accomplished kid' (真孺子可教), and will also recognize it as a friendly collaborative [debate]. Since you consider Ouyang and his disciple to be ordinary human beings, you are worry in vain. But since I consider them to be Bodhisattvas, I therefore dare to express my views with zest and gusto."[85]

[85] 問曰：居士於相宗素傾服歐陽先生，且常通函問道，王君既贈以所著，復與筆札往來，感情方密，今作解惑，多就歐陽師徒辯難，似不稍假借者，彼師徒見之，寧保終無芥蒂耶？曰：歐

4.9 Summary

This chapter is dedicated to one of the major debates in modern Chinese Buddhism, ignited by the polemical style and uncompromising critical approach of Ouyang Jingwu. Ouyang was the first major Buddhist intellectual in China to challenge the East Asian Buddhist consensus which formed around the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith,* a text that symbolized for so many East Asian Buddhists the most succinct and perfect pronouncement of the perfect teaching of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Ouyang's authority as a pundit of Buddhist scholasticism and his reliance on historical analysis and logic and textual evidence created an urgent need to further investigate the problems he outlined be some, while defending the orthodox positions expressed in the *Awakening of Faith* by others.

Ouyang found the *Awakening of Faith* to be the fundamental problem in Chinese Buddhism. His investigation into Chinese Buddhist problematiques led him to identify flaws in the different Buddhist schools. The problems he brought forth were only a derivative and symptomatic of a deeper cause. This cause was the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith* and the way this text was interpreted by later Buddhists in China. Judged by the reactions to his essay, Ouyang touched a sensitive nerve that many Chinese Buddhists felt was a threat to the existence of Chinese

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陽師徒若非通達無我法者，則對大圓所言必動瞋恚，且大圓亦不敢好盡言以招人過，歐陽師徒而果通達無我法矣，則見大圓所言，將亦宛爾而笑曰：是真孺子可教也。是亦以友輔仁也。子以凡夫待歐陽氏之師徒，故為過慮，吾以菩薩待歐陽氏之師徒，故敢暢所欲言。 Tang Dayong, Dispelling Doubt Over the *Awakening of Faith*, 149.

Buddhism as a whole. It is precisely for this reason that the debate became so important in Ouyang's day and why this topic continues to be debated even today.[86]

[86] See for example Tang Zhongmao, *An Examination of the Modern Natrue of the Debate over 'Original Enlightenment' in Buddhism* [佛教本覺思想論證的現代性考察] (Shanghai: Shanghai shiji press, 2006). Or Zhou Guihua, *Consciousness Only, the Mind-Nature and Tathāgatagarbha* [唯识、心性与如来藏] (Beijing: Beijing Zongjiaowenhua Press, 2006).

Chapter Five -- Redefining the terms of Chinese Buddhism: Ouyang Jingwu and the two paradigms theory

5.1 Introduction:

In the previous chapters we saw that Ouyang identified key doctrinal problems with the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith,* which for him led to doctrinal distortions in all East Asian schools, especially that of Tiantai and Huayan. For Ouyang, these distortions even affected later attempts to revive the Yogācāra teaching in the Ming dynasty. Ming Yogācāra scholars could not understand Yogācāra teachings properly since (1) they were biased on interpretations of Buddhism, tainted by the teaching of *Awakening of Faith* and later East Asian developments; (2) many essential commentaries were retrieved from Japan only in the twentieth century. However, this was about to change with Ouyang, who utilized evidential research and his scholastic training to seriously study Yogācāra on its own terms.

At the heart of this chapter is Ouyang's concerns regarding Chan's disregard for the Buddhist canon and its anti-intellectual tendencies, which, he believed, led to the decline of the Buddhadharma. This chapter will outline an idiosyncratic hermeneutics in which Ouyang established two complementary paradigms. He used these paradigms to re-categorize the Buddhist traditions and reclaim the importance of the study of Buddhist texts. As we will see below, Ouyang's theory was somewhat confusing and rather counterintuitive for many Chinese Buddhists, as well as very controversial. At the same time, this theory established Ouyang as an

independent and authoritative Buddhist thinker even by those who did not accept his theory.

Let us begin with the origins of Ouyang's theory. In his short biography for his teacher, Lü Cheng presents us with the biographical context: "[In 1915] Ouyang's beloved daughter, Ouyang Lan, died at the Jinjing kejingchu (i.e., Yang Wenhui's printery, which Ouyang directed). He grieved and mourned, and deepened his understanding of the Yogācāra teaching, and often did not stop studying it until dawn. Gradually, through time, it dawned on him that *faxiang* and *weishi* are fundamentally different and that they should not be mixed."[1]

What does Ouyang mean by *weishi* and *faxiang* and why was it so important to differentiate these two Buddhist terms? What was at stake in this differentiation and why did it spark such a debate?

5.2 Historical context

Although historically these two terms—*weishi* (Skt. *vijñāptimātra* 唯識) and *faxiang* (法相 **dharmalakṣaṇa*)—became the most common names for the Yogācāra School in East Asia (唯識宗 and 法相宗),[2] Ouyang understood them as two complementary paradigms of Buddhism that had a key role in the development of

[1] Lü Cheng, A Brief Biography of My Teacher Mr. Ouyang, 355.

[2] Other names were: The school who is in accordance with reason 應理宗, or the "School of Perfect Reality" 圓實宗; the "School of the Middle Path" 中道宗. The most common name was the Cien School 慈恩宗, named after the temple where Xuanzang lived and worked later in life as did Kuiji, his disciple.

Mahāyāna Buddhism.[3] Indeed, the two terms had a long history already before they became names for specific schools.

The term *faxiang* frequently appears throughout the Buddhist canon, as early as the *āgamas/nikāyas.*[4] Noa Ronkin, in her analysis of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga,* an early *Abhidhamma* work that appears in *Khuddaka-nikāya,* explains the notion of *dhamma-lakkhaṇas* (Skt. *dharmalakṣṇa*, Ch. *faxiang*) as the "concept referring to the common features of the conditioned *dhammas* in their totality rather than to the individuality or actual existence of any given *dhamma.*"[5] Yet, it seems to me that at least in Chinese the term *faxiang*, which appears also in late Abhidharma and Mahāyāna literature,[6] was not used as a specific technical term.[7] Its exact range of meaning is varied and context-dependant and it often translates different Sanskrit compounds or words (e.g., *dharma* or *dharma-nimitta* etc.).[8]

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[3] For reasons of convenience I will use the capital letter to refer to Faxiang or Weishi as Buddhist schools of thought and the lower case to denote them as doctrinal paradigms.

[4] See, for example, the *Fenbieguanfa jing* (T01.0026.0695a14-21) or the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* (T01.0007.0195c06-196a15).

[5] Noa Ronkin, *Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition*, Routledgecurzon Critical Studies in Buddhism (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 90. For a full discussion see pp. 86-91.

[6] For example, in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā sūtra*, the *Madhyamaka śāstra* and many others.

[7] This non-technical usage of the term *faxiang* was pointed out to me by Dan Lusthaus. This understanding of the *faxiang* is confirmed in my own readings of at least the two texts that I have looked at (i.e. *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga*). Clearly, a more careful research into other texts is needed in order to accurately determine the reasoning behind the various usages of the word *faxiang* in the Chinese translations, a project which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

[8] For example, in the *Abhidharmakośa* the term *dharmalakṣaṇaṃ* appears once according to the Hirakawa's index (T29.1558.1b10). The term appears at the opening verse, explaining the meaning the term Abhidharma as directed either toward (*abhi*) nirvāṇa or toward the characteristics of dharmas. At least in other two occurrences in the *Kośa*, in places where Vasubandhu uses *dharma* in the Sanskrit text, Xuanzang's translation is *faxiang* (T29.1558.1b24 and T29.1558.10c15-16). Paramārtha translated the term merely as *zhenfa* or, te the second instance only *dharma* (i.e. true *dharma* T29.1559.162a23-24 and T29.1559.170c04-05).

The notion of *weishi* (*vijñaptimātra*), which is more technical in nature, was used in the Yogācāra literature to describe the way sentient beings perceive the phenomenal world as representations (Skt.*vijñapti* Ch. *shi*) only (Skt. *mātra* Ch. *wei*). Although *weishi* traditionally denoted the Yogācāra School, the term *faxiang* was never used to designate the Yogācāra School before the Tang dynasty (618-906). During the Tang, the term *faxiang* was appropriated as a derogatory term for those who insisted on analyzing the characteristics of *dharmas* instead of investigating their real nature (法性). It is most likely connected with the opposition to the Yogācāra teaching of Xuanzang (玄奘 602-664) by monks such as Fazang (法藏643-712)[9] or Chengguan (澄觀738-83).

One fundamental doctrinal difference between the Huayan and the Yogācāra schools is the centrality of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, or Buddha Nature theory.[10]

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[9] See, for example, Fazang's distinction of the 4 main doctrinal schools in Buddhism in his commentary on the *Lankāvatra Sūtra* T.1790.39.426b29-426c08: (1) The school of the existing characteristics *qua* Hīnayāna Buddhism有相宗 (2) The School of non-existing characteristics *qua* Madhyamaka 無相宗 (3) The School of Characteristics of dharma *qua* Yogācāra法相宗 and (4) the school of Characteristics of reality *qua tathāgatagarbha* teaching on which Huayan is based實相宗. But, according to Yoshizu, Fazang first coins the term Faxiang School in his Records of the Principal Meaning of the Twelve Schools 二十門論宗致義記. (See Yoshizu, Yoshihide [吉津 宜英]. "The Reexamination of the Sect Name "Hossoshu" ["Hosso-Shu" To iu shūmei no saikentō「法相宗」という宗名の再検討]." In: *Buddhist Thought and History of Buddhist Culture* [Bukkyō shiso bunkashi ronso 佛教思想文化史論叢], edited by the Committee for the Commemoration of Professor Watanabe Takao's Sixtieth Birthday [Watanabe Takao kyōju kanreki kinen: (渡邊隆生教授還暦記念] (Kyoto: Nagata bunshōdō, 1997), 475.

[10] *Tathāgatagarbha* theory did not represent a distinctive Buddhist School like *Madhyamaka* or *Yogācāra,* but rather what Robert Gimello calls "a qualification or clarification" of orthodox Mahāyāna teaching. The origins of the teaching can be traced back to texts such as the *Lankāvatāra sūtra, the Ratnagotravibhāga*., the *Śrīmālādevi sūtra* and the Awakening of Faith. In its core the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching emphasizes the Buddha nature or the essence of Buddhahood, as something which is found in each and every sentient being and is equal to thusness. This essence of Buddhahood is the pure, true nature of sentient beings. It is also what guarantees the potential of each one of us to attain Buddhahood if we only realize that the defilements are adventitious to our true nature and can be removed. As mentioned in chapter four, this teaching was the *sin qua non* of Chinese Buddhist orthodoxy and one of the main targets of critique in Ouyang circle.

For most Buddhists in China, the Buddha Nature theory was the epitome of Buddhist compassion, yet for adherents of Xuanzang's Yogācāra School it was an amalgamation of doctrinal mistakes. In his article "The Meaning of 'Mind-Only' (Wei-Hsin): An Analysis of a Sinitic Mahayana Phenomenon", Whalen Lai explains, "Tiantai, Huayan, Jingtu (Pure Land), all accepted the association of mind with the universality of Buddha-nature. This association was so axiomatic that the Faxiang school had the misfortune of being labeled as crypto-Mahāyāna or pro-Hīnayāna for disclaiming the universality of the Buddha-nature and speaking of a deluded *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse-consciousness). No Indian Buddhists would have thought of calling Yogācāra a Hīnayāna school."[11]

With time, the derogatory connotation faded and, perhaps influenced by the adoption of the name Faxiang as the name of the school in Japan (Jp. *Hossō*), the tradition began to self-identify itself as the *Faxiang* School during the late Imperial. During the Ming dynasty, Faxiang remained the most common name for Xuanzang's school.

5.3 What did Ouyang *not* mean in his theory?

Why, then, did Ouyang differentiate between two terms that historically *both* referred to the Yogācāra School? Before moving to answer the above question, it is important to stress what Ouyang did not mean to do with the two paradigms theory. Despite later accusations (e.g., see the section below on his debate with Taixu) Ouyang did not attempt to revive the Tang dynasty debates between Huayan

[11] Whalen Lai, "The Meaning of 'Mind-Only' (Wei-Hsin): An Analysis of a Sinitic Mahayana Phenomenon." *Philosophy East and West* 27, no. 1 (1977): 65-6.

thinkers and the Yogācārins regarding the nature vs. characteristics of *dharmas* (*faxing* 法性 vs. *faxiang* 法相). The main reason for this historical debate was the claim made by Huayan thinkers, such as Fazang and later Chengguan, that whereas the Huayan teaching focuses on the [true] nature of *dharmas qua faxing,* the *Faxiang* school puts the emphasis on the characteristics of *dharmas qua faxiang*[12] In other words, in order to distinguish itself from its rival schools, the young Huayan tradition claimed that unlike the Xuanzang circle—which refused to talk about the essence and focused only on the attributes--the Huayan teaching was more advanced in that it penetrates the heart of the Buddha's teaching.

In addition, Ouyang's two paradigms theory did not try to distinguish between the two kinds of Yogācāra Schools in East Asian Buddhism (i.e., the old school of Paramārtha and the new school of Xuanzang).[13] While Ouyang acknowledged the separation of the two historical schools, his understanding of the two paradigms (i.e., *faxiang* and *weishi*) was mostly doctrinal in nature. In his reference to historical developments he merely differentiated between the historical layers of the Indian Yogācāra texts themselves.

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[12]For an outline of Chengguan's list of ten differences between Faxiang and Faxing see his commentary on the Huayan sūtra T35.1735.511a02. The disagreements between the Huayan thinkers and the Faxiang thinkers are too broad to be treated here in length for more see Robert Gimello, *Chih-Yen, 602-668 and the Foundations of Hua-Yen Buddhism* 1976 (especially chapter 4), Yoshizu, Yoshihide "The Reexamination of the Sect Name "Hossoshu," 1997 and Dan Lusthaus *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 372 and 386-7.

[13] For more see Ueda Yoshifumi, "Two Streams of Yogacara Thought," *philosophy East and West* 17 (1967): 166-65.

5.4. Ouyang's two paradigms theory

Having outlined the historical background and the problems of the two terms "*faxiang*" and "*weishi*," it is time now to focus on Ouyang employment of those two terms.

5.4.1 Ouyang's writings about the *faxiang-weishi* paradigms

In his late forties, Ouyang became a prolific writer. He began by publishing commentaries on *Abhidharma* works such as *Satyasiddhi śāstra* (成實論) and, in 1916, the *Abhidharmakośa (*俱舍論), which he identified as a foundational work for later developments in Yogācāra. During the same year, Ouyang also began publishing his commentaries on the Yogācāra śāstras. In these commentaries we find early formulations of his *faxiang* and *weishi* paradigms theory. First, he published his preface to Sthiramati's commentary on Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (雜集論述記敘) and a short joint preface to the *Treatise on the One Hundred Dharmas* and the *Pañca skandha prakaraṇa* (百法無蘊論敘).

By then, Ouyang had already identified the two paradigms within the Yogācāra tradition. He differentiated between *faxiang*, which is more Abhidharmic in nature and *weishi*, which promulgates a new kind of discourse, and which deals with the old problems of Buddhism with a new language and philosophical framework. His preface to the *Treatise on the One Hundred Dharmas* and the *Pañca skandha prakaraṇa* (百法無蘊論敘) was his earliest account of this differentiation.

In the spring of 1917, a year after the publication of his preface to the *Treatise on the One Hundred Dharmas* and *Pañca skandhas* śāstras, Ouyang published his

preface to the **Buddhabhūmi sūtra śāstra* (佛地經論叙), which was followed by a monumental preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra* (瑜伽師地論敘), which was published later that spring. New insights were added in his preface to the "Tattvārtha" chapter of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (瑜伽真實品敘), which he published in 1921. Another small piece entitled *Distinguishing between Weishi and Faxiang* (辨法相唯識) was published in 1938, as a part of a collection of essays called *Miscellaneous Writings of the Inner Studies* Institute (內學雜著). The fact that *Distinguishing between Weishi and Faxiang* was published in 1938, just five years before Ouyang's death and more than twenty years after the inception of the theory, is an indication of its importance. He has been deliberating on it throughout his career.

5.5. Ouyang's treatment of the two paradigms in his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra* (瑜伽師地論敘)

Ouyang most thorough and encompassing treatment of the two paradigms theory appeared in his 1917 preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi.* Ouyang initially found ten crucial differences between the two paradigms and later added in his preface to the "Tattvārtha" chapter an additional six examples, which he considered as an addendum to the ten differences. Since this is a summary of everything he previously had said, I have included a full translation of the ten differences as well as the six examples. Before moving to the text itself, a word of caution is necessary.

5.5.1 Systematic ambiguities in Ouyang's preface

Despite the progress Ouyang had made toward a more rigorous study of Buddhism in China, the way he developed the two paradigms theory in his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi* was cursory and far from systematic. This was partially because of the limitation of the medium in which Ouyang chose to develop his ideas. As noted in the previous chapters, Ouyang usually did not write commentaries or philosophical works. Instead, he wrote prefaces that he added to the texts he published. In these short prefaces Ouyang offered his outline of the intellectual and historical context and major themes discussed in the text.

In his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Ouyang employed allusions to various texts and a technical language in order to explain the *faxiang* and *weishi* paradigms. To further clarify his theory, Ouyang used traditional formulas with long and complicated histories, such as principle and phenomena (理and 事); essence and function (體 and用); extended and limited (開 and 約). His use of these loaded terms, without clearly indicating precisely which of those terms' many historical meanings he was referring to, created difficulties in understanding what he meant to say. As we can see from the translation below, this lack of clarify often leaves the reader faced with a congeries of abstruse and ambiguous statements. In order to clarify what I think Ouyang meant, I have added references to original texts or quotes from other works by Ouyang as a part of the translation.

5.5.2 The two paradigms are essentially one teaching

Before examining Ouyang's exposition of what differentiates the two paradigms, it is also important to emphasize a qualification that Ouyang himself repeatedly stressed. In his preface to the Sthiramati commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccauya,* Ouyang says, "*Weishi* and *faxiang* are ultimately equal, but when Asaṅga wanted to express one dimension of them, he wrote the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* - this is the gate of *faxiang*."[14] In the preface to the "Tattvārtha" chapter he added,

> if [we judge] this śāstra from the perspective of the perfect voice [of the Buddha] (圓音),[15] there is only one teaching; how can it be narrowed or expanded? How can it be half or full? If [we judge] this *śāstra* from the perspective of responding to different capacities (機感), the *weishi* [principle] is the short and convenient expression [of the teaching] and its outline, while the *faxiang* [principle] responds to all [capacities] and omits nothing.[16]

In other words, despite the different voices within the tradition, in the final judgment Ouyang thought that they were still within one unified tradition that communicates the same message using two different approaches.

5.5.3 The structure of Ouyang's preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra*

The preface of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is relatively long. It is divided into four sections:

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[14] Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface to Sthiramati's *Commentary* on Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* [雜集論述集敘]." In *Internal and External Studies of Ouyang Jingwu* [竟無內外學] (Jiangjin: Zhina neixue yuan, 1942), 2.

[15] See Foguang dacidian, 5403.

[16] Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface to the *tattvārtha* Chapter of the *Yogācārabhūmi* [瑜伽真實品敘]," In *Internal and External Studies of Ouyang Jingwu* [竟無內外學] (Jiangjin: Zhina neixue yuan, 1942), 4.

1. An outline of the five main parts of the *Yogācārabhūmi,* including the seventeen stages and what each of them means (五分).[17]
2. A description of the ten essential themes discussed in the śāstra (十要).[18]
3. A discussion of the 10 "branches" (十支) or concomitant texts of the Yogācāra tradition and how they relate to the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra.*
4. A discussion of the different lineages of the traditions (十系).

The meaning of the *faxiang* and *weishi* paradigms, and the differenence between them, is one of the most important themes in the commentary. They are treated most extensively in the second section (the first two essential aspects), but also in the third and fourth sections, as a part of the discussion on the textual and historical traditions of the two paradigms.

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[17] The five sections are: (1) Section of the major stages (本地分). (2) The section of explanation of the stages, called The section on analysis (决擇分 *Viniścaya*) (3) The section that explains the meaning of the sūtras and śāstras is called the explanation division (釋分) (4) The section that explains the meaning and give synonyms (異門分 *paryāya-saṃgrahinī*) (5) The section that explains the important points in the *tripiṭaka* is called the division of the doctrinal points (事分).

[18] The ten essentials themes of the text are: 1) the principle of *weishi* 唯識義2) the principle of *faxiang* 法相義3) the principle of the universality and excellence 平等殊勝義 or the teaching of the śravakas and the Bodhisattvas 4) the principle of being associated 相應義 (*samprayukta*), which here means the excellent action associated with *prajñā* 5) the principle of foundation 依義, which states that everything that arise have "other" cause and condition as its base 6) the principle of function 用義 where he listed major categories other than suchness, such as correct knowledge, atoms, antidotes etc. 7) the principle of gradualism 漸義, where he lists practices related to gradual practice such as (十三住); the length of time and the eons it takes a Bodhisattva to become a Buddha etc. 8) The principle of *agotra* 無種姓義9) The principle of synonyms 異門義 10) the scriptural base [of the tradition] 依經義。

5.6 Translation

一、唯識義者：

(1) The meaning of *weishi* (*Vijñāptimātra*):

眾生執我，蘊、處、界三，方便解救，遂執法實，心外有境；救以二空，又復惡取；是故唯言遣心外有境，識言遣破有執之空，而存破空執之有，具此二義，立唯識宗。

Sentient beings cling to the notion of self. The *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhatūs* designed to save [those beings], [but] then they cling to *dharmas* as real, [and posited] a real object outside of the mind. This was rectified by the notion of the two kinds of emptiness, but that again led to wrongful grasping [the notion of emptiness].[19] Therefore, the word "only" dispels the notion that an object exists outside the mind and the word "consciousness" dispels emptiness that negate existence, and preserve emptiness exists to negate attachment.[20] These two principles are the basis of the *weishi* paradigm.

以有為空若無，以空為有亦去，証真觀位，非有非空。若執實有諸識可唯，亦是所執，長夜淪

If the notion of existence as empty does not exist, then the notion of emptiness as exist is also discarded. True contemplation[21] has neither existence nor emptiness. If one is attached to the

[19] For further discussion of this point in the *tattvārtha* chapter, see T30.1579.0488.22-28.

[20] In other words, the notion of "consciousness" serves as a middle path between attachment to dharmas as real, which has emptiness as thier antidote and attachment to the notion of emptiness.

[21] Literally, the stage of contemplation 觀位. According to Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha bhāṣya*, the stage of vision is "in the stage of vision of Consciousness Only, the stage of consciousness only is the three non-nature suchnesses (i.e. the three natures). This is because these suchnesses are not scattered in regard to the objects of knowledge" T.31.1595.207c17-18.

迷。然此宗義，雖對治二，而心外有境，趨重偏多。一切山河，相分現影，他心神變，並是疏緣；以心觀心，入無分別，乃是親緣。

notion of that consciousnesses as real, and only [those consciousnesses] are said to exist it is also a form of clinging, and similar to falling into a delusory state in a long night. But despite the fact that these two principles are antidotes (*pratipakṣa*) for the two [erroneous views mentioned above], [if someone still holds] the [third erroneous view], that there is an external object, it will lead to mistakes. All the mountains and rivers (i.e. the physical world), the perceptual image of the objective aspect (Skt. *nimitta bhāga*), the miraculous power of reading others minds all are remote condition (*ālambana*). Observing the mind with the mind, and entering the stage of non-discrimination, this is [what is called] an immediate condition.[22]

諸修唯識觀人，應知有漏諸相，皆依三性之所，悉轉八識之能。又復應知：多聞熏習，無漏種生，尋思意言，得如實智，歷次五位, 無功用行，而后金剛道盡，異熟皆空，唯識之果，於斯遂証。

All those who practice the contemplation of *weishi* must know that the characteristics of the contaminated (Skt. *sāsrava)* [*dharmas*] all alike rely on the three natures being the passive [objects] and all alike develop (轉) out of the eight consciousness as the active [cognizing subjects]. And in addition, they should know from perfumation by hearing (Skt. *bahuśrutavāsanā*) [the Dharma],

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[22] According to the Yogācāra texts such as the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Cheng weishi lun*, there are 4 kinds of conditions. The third of which is called the 'objective support as condition' (Skt. *ālambana-pratyaya* Chn. 所緣緣). The third kind of condition is again subdivided into the remote and immediate conditions (疏緣/親緣). Xuanzang explains in the *Cheng weishi lun*, "The dharma, which is not separated from the perceiving consciousness and which the *darśanabhaga* contemplates and takes as its supporting basis, is the immediate *ālambana-pratyaya*. The *dharmas* which, although separated from the perceiving consciousness, is the archetype capable of producing, within this consciousness, the image whereupon the *darśanabhaga* supports itself and which it perceives, is the remote *ālambana-pratyaya.* See Wei Tat, *Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun: Doctrine of Mere Consciousness* (Hong Kong: Ch'eng Wei-shih lun Publication Committee, 1973), 543.

[23] The *vajra samādhi* is attained at the eighth Bodhisattva stage, and it is the highest level of absorption meditation where all defilements are destroyed. Ouyang, therefore, refers to the attainments of the highest stages of the path.

uncontaminated seeds arise; [and then with further] reflection and inner mental discourse (*mano-jalpa*) [on the Dharma one heard], true wisdom is achieved. [Finally one], attains the knowledge of things as they are (Skt. *yathā bhūta jñāna*), traverses effortlessly the sequential five stages, practices without effort, exhausts the diamond [*samādhi*] path,[23] and all karmic ripenings (*vaipākika-phala*); the fruit of *weishi* is thereupon realized.

然此無分別義、后得並行，非唯根本，但任運緣說無分別。如是諸義，〈五識意地〉及諸〈抉擇〉，應善披尋。是為略說唯識義。

Now, the meaning of discriminatory [knowledge] (Skt. *nirvikalpa jñāna*), is that which operates with acquired [knowledge] (*pṛṣṭhalabdha jñāna*), it is not only [refer to] the fundamental [wisdom] (*mūlajñāna*) but non discrimination only means a spontaneous [cognition] of the objective support (*ālambana*). One must look carefully into the meaning of all these principles in the first six stages and the *Viniścaya* sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. This, in a nutshell, is the meaning the *weishi* paradigm.

The crux of the Ouyang's understanding of the *weishi* paradigm is laid out in the passage above. For Ouyang, the *weishi* paradigm is a corrective to views shared by Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, including Mahāyāna Buddhists. In Ouyang's view, the *weishi* paradigm first serves to correct non-Buddhists and Buddhists of the

two lesser vehicles, who are attached to the notion of existence, which includes the notion of external object as real (the notion of "*wei*" or "only" in the compound *weishi*). In other words, it is a critique of realism.[24] But the *weishi* paradigm also goes a step further and, anticipating the attachment to the notion of "emptiness" itself, warns us to keep in mind the "emptiness of the notion of emptiness." In sum, with his *weishi* paradigm, Ouyang sought to correct two erroneous views: the view of nihilism (無) as well as the view of essentialism (有) with its existence of external perceptual objects (*viṣayas,* 心外有境).

第二、法相義者：

世尊於第三時，說顯了相，無上無容，別有遍計施設性、依他分別性、圓成真實性。復有五法：相、名、分別、正智、如如。論師據此，立非有非空中道義教，名法相宗。遍計是空而非是有，依、圓是有而非是空。依他攝四：相、名、分別及與正智，圓成攝一：所緣真如。是則詮表一切，皆屬依他。

(2) The Meaning of the *Faxiang* [paradigm]

During the third turning of the wheel, the World Honored One preached the clear meaning of the the unexcelled, and uncontainable characteristics[25] (Skt. *lakṣaṇa-pratisaṃvedin*), and distinguish among them into the nature of imaginary designations, the nature of discrimination based on other-dependency, and the nature of perfect reality. In addition, there are the five *dharmas*: appearances of phenomena 相; their names 名; deluded conception分

[24] Interestingly, Ouyang is likely glossing the word "only" based on the opening verse of the *Viṃśatikā kārikā vṛtti* where Vasubandhu says, "唯遮外境不遣相應" (T31.1590.0074b29) or "the word 'only' negates external object [but] does not dispel the corresponding [associates]." The second part of the sentence in Xuanzang's text is likely an interpretation of Xuanzang and does not correspond to the Sanskrit text, which glosses "only" as "rejection [of the external object]" (*mātramityartha pratiṣedhārthaṃ*) See Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor* (Delhi: Motilal Banasidass Press, 1995), 413.

[25] See *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra* T16.0676.697b04-09 and again in the *Yogācārbhūmi śāstra* T30.1579.0723a08-11.

別; correct knowledge 正智; and suchness 如如. Based on that, the *Śāstra*-teachers established the teaching of the middle path of neither existence nor emptiness, and its name is the *faxiang* paradigm. The imaginary nature is empty and does not exist, while the dependent and perfect natures exist and are not empty. The –other-dependent includes four *dharmas*, namely the appearances of phenomena; their names; discriminating [mind] and correct wisdom. The perfect includes [only] one -- suchness as [cognative] object. These [between them] explain everything, (and) all belongs to the other-dependent nature.

許有雜亂識，遂有如是事。所謂六善巧事，三雜染事，三界事，五位事，十度事，十地事，三十七菩提分事，二十七賢聖事，十八不共佛法事，諸如是事，無量無邊。然復應知：諸如是事，有而不真，惟是虛妄，猶如幻夢、光影、谷響；又復應知：諸如是事，雖是虛妄，然有相在，而非是無。若能如是觀諸實相，能所二取，增損二見，自然消殞，於彼不轉。是故法爾塵剎，法爾寂靜，法爾功德，法爾涅槃。是故諸修法相觀人，莫不於法方便善巧。是故善巧義是般若義。如是諸義，〈菩薩地〉及諸〈抉擇〉，應善披尋。是為略說法相宗義。

If one allows his consciousness to be in a state of disarray, then the following phenomena will follow. The so-called six skillful acts, three defiled acts and three realms, the five ranks, the ten perfections, the ten stages, the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment, the twenty seven kinds of wise people, the eighteen kinds of qualities unique to a Buddha, all phenomena like these are infinite and endless. But one must understand, all the phenomena mentioned above exist but are not real; they are only imaginary, like an illusory dream, shadow, and an echo in the valley. In addition, one should know that all the phenomena mentioned above, despite the fact that they are imaginary, still exist in appearance and are [thus] not entirely inexistent. If one see the various characteristics of reality in this manner, the two kinds of grasping (i.e. grasper and grasped), and the two views of essentialism and nihilism will naturally be eliminated, and will no longer function there. Therefore, the nature of *dharmas* (*dharmatā*) is as fields (*kṣetra*) numerous as grains of dust;

> *dharmatā* is quiescence, *dharmatā* is merits, *dharmtā* is *nirvāṇa*. All those who engage in the *faxiang* contemplative practices, none is not skilled in regard to the Dharma. Thus, skillfulness (*kauśalya*) means *prajñā*. In the same way, meanings of [other terms] in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and all the *Viniścaya*'s section should be carefully examined. This, in a nutshell, is what is meant by the *faxiang* doctrinal paradigm.

Here we see that the *faxiang* paradigm, by contrast to the *weishi* paradigm, is all-inclusive; it is the entirety of the Buddhist teaching and the summary of the entire metaphysical structure of reality. It is allegedly based on the Buddha's insights from his third turning of the wheel of Dharma, presented in an Abhidharmic style of discourse, through the Yogācāric lenses of theories of the three and the five *dharmas*. According to Ouyang, it was during Buddha's third and final turning of the Dharma wheel when he proclaimed that all *dharmas* are included in the categories of the three natures and the five *dharmas*. Those categories have only provisional existence. They exist but they are not real, or *tattva* (有而不真).[26] Despite the fact that they are like a dream or mirage (幻夢), their do appear to exist (雖是虛妄，然有相在) and the right way to understand them is not as inexistent (非是無) but as skillful means (方便善巧). After thus

[26] This is the nature of anything that has other-dependent nature (see *Madhyāntavibhāga* T31.1600.468c23-c28).

laying the crux of the two paradigms, Ouyang expands his explanation with ten further clarifications, to which he later adds an additional six. He begins:

復次於唯識、法相二宗，相對互觀，其義始顯。略有十義：	Moreover, it is only when *weishi* and *faxiang* are juxtaposed one next to the other, that their [respective] tenets become clear. Briefly, they have 10 tenets.
一者、對治外小心外有境義，建立唯識義；對治初大惡取空義，建立法相義。	(1) As an antidote against the views of the non-Buddhists and the Hīnayānists, that an external object exists outside the mind the tenet of *weishi*, is established. As an antidote to tenets of first low-level Mahāyānists [who misapprehend] the notion of emptiness, the tenet of *faxiang* is established.

The first clarification reiterats the crux of the two principles and specifies the particular audiences each one of the principles is targeting. *Weishi* is useful for Mahāyāna Buddhists, who wish to avoid the errors of the non-Buddhists and Hīnayanists, who accept that something exists outside the mind. The *faxiang* principle is designed to serve as a roadmap for those Mahāyāna followers, who are advanced enough to realize the principle of emptiness but fail to grasp the "emptiness of the notion of emptiness." However, by nature, the *faxiang* principle is more universal (齊被), and can even be applied to the two lesser vehicles (二乘) and to *agotra* (無姓) beings as well, while the *weishi* principle is specifically designed for an audience of Mahāyāna followers and beings in the indeterminate *gotras* (不

定),[27] most of whom are on the Bodhisattva path (see also point one in his commentary on the "Tattvārtha" chapter). The fruits of *faxiang* are respectively the more "personal" *nirvāṇas*,[28] both with and without remainder (有餘涅槃 / 無餘涅槃), and the fruits of the *weishi* are limited to Mahāyāna—that is, *nirvāṇa* with no abode 無住涅槃 (see below point six in his preface to the "Tattvārtha" chapter).

二者、若欲造大乘法釋，應由三相而造：一、由說緣起；二、由說從緣所生法相；三、由說語義，是故由緣起義建立唯識義，由緣生義建立法相義。

(2) If one wants to explain the teaching of the Mahāyāna, one has to do so on the basis of three features, i.e. (a) from the explanation of Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*); (b) from the explanation of the characteristics of the *dharmas* that arise from conditions (*pratītyasamutpanna*) (c) from the explanation of language and meanings.[29] Thus, the tenets of *weishi* are established on the basis of the tenet of dependent Origination, while the tenets of *faxiang* are established based on the tenet of arising by conditionality.

In the second clarification, Ouyang differentiates between *weishi* as the underlying principle and *faxiang* as the action itself. Here the differentiation is between *weishi qua pratītyasamutpāda* and *faxiang qua pratītyasamutpanna*. We can see

[27] These categories, according to Kuiji, are based on the Yogācāra teaching of the five lineages (1) the Bodhisattvas (2) the Pratyeka Buddhas (3) Śrāvakas (4) the non-determinated and (5) those with no linage. See Kuiji's commentary on the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論述記卷1：「依瑜伽等有五種姓。一菩薩。二獨覺。三聲聞。四不定。五無姓。」 T43.1830.230.a14-15

[28] "Personal" in the sense of the kinds of *nirvāṇa,* which liberate only the individual. Unlike the "*nirvāṇa* of non-abiding", where the liberated being reenters the saṃsāric world out of compassion.

[29] This is a quotation from the *mahāyānasaṃgraha,* see T31.1594.0141b06-07.

an earlier formulation of the same argument in Ouyang's 1916 preface to Vasubandhu's One Hundred *Dharmas* and *Pañca skandha śāstras*:

> Regarding the *weishi* paradigm, which was established by the reason of Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), one enters this path through [the principle of] fundamental wisdom (*mūlajñāna*) encompassing the acquired wisdom (*pṛṣṭhalabdha jñāna*), with a meditative contemplation on consciousness-only and through the four kinds of [thorough] investigation (*catasraḥ paryeṣaṇāḥ*). Regarding the Principle of *faxiang*, which was established by that which arises out of condition (*pratītyasamutpanna*), one enters this path through subsequent wisdom encompassing the fundamental wisdom, with all characteristics of teachings having the nature of dream, and with the six skilful means[30] serving as the as the entrance to the path.[31]

While *weishi* is the principle of *pratītyasamutpāda*, *faxiang* is the process itself, or the functional aspect of the theory i.e. *pratītyasamutpanna.*[32] In addition, while the fundamental wisdom (*mūlajñāna*) is the underlying principle of *weishi*, the more active principle of acquired wisdom (*pṛṣṭhalabdha jñāna*) is the foundation of the *faxiang* paradigm. This point is repeated even more explicitly in the eighth clarification, where Ouyang distinguishes between principle (理) and

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[30] Refers to the five *skandhas*, six *indriyas* twelve *āyatanas,* eighteen dhatūs, on the four noble truths, what is appropriate and what is not (*sthānāsthāna*) and on dependent Origination. See 《瑜伽師地論》卷3：「又復應知蘊善巧攝。界善巧攝。處善巧攝。緣起善巧攝。處非處善巧攝。根善巧攝。」T30.1579.294a19-20) and in Dunlun's commentary on the *Yogācārabhūmi* 《瑜伽論記》卷14：「六種善巧等者。謂蘊・界・處・處非處・緣起・根」 T42.1828. 622.b4-5. See it also discussed in the *Yogācārabhūmi* fascicle 57

[31] "約緣起理建立唯識宗。 以根本攝後得。以唯有識為觀行。以四 尋思為入道。約緣生理建立法相宗。以後得攝根本。以如幻有詮教相。以六善巧入道。 " Ouyang Jingwu, Preface to Sthiramati's *Commentary* on Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, 1.

[32] While in the Sanskrit the grammatical function of the differentiation between a noun (*utpāda*) and past passive participle (*utpanna*), this is less obvious in the Chinese. The way Ouyang choose to differentiate the two is to argue that *pratītyasamutpāda* is understood through meditation on the principal categories *pratītyasamutpanna,* through acting, through skilful means, and through understanding the imaginary nature of the phenomenal world.

phenomena (事); and again, in the ninth clarification below, where a list of seven suchnesses is given. The practical suchnesses are equated with the *faxiang* while those which describe the ultimate suchnesses are equated with *weishi*.

三者、觀行瑜伽歸無所得，境事瑜伽廣論性相，是故約觀心門建立唯識義，約教相門建立法相義。

(3) [There are two dimensions]. That of yoga of meditation, which culminating in [the state of] non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), [and] the yoga of things (*vastu*) which nature and characteristics are extensively discussed. Therefore, the tenets of *weishi* are established on the basis of mind contemplation, while the tenets of *faxiang* are established on the basis of learning.

Here, Ouyang juxtaposes the path of mind contemplation (觀心門) or practice, which is *weishi* vs. the path of learning (教相門), which is *faxiang*.

四者、八識能變，三性所變，是故能變義是唯識義，所變義是法相義。

(4) The eighth consciousness is the agent of change, and the three natures, are what change. Therefore that which is the agent of change is *weishi*, that which is changed is *faxiang*

Ouyang here continues the theme he had already begun discussing in his earlier definition of the two paradigms. As we saw, *weishi* relies on the *ālayvijñāna* as

its foundation and the *faxiang* relies on "all *dharmas*" (*sarvadharma*), which are analyzed as the three natures and the five *dharmas*, and in their true form are suchness (see seventh clarification). Here, Ouyang elaborates on the relationship between the *weishi* principle *qua ālayavijñāna* and the *faxiang* principle *qua* the three natures or five *dharmas*. The relationship is that of an active agent (能) i.e. *weishi*, which acts upon the passive (所) *faxiang* principle. In other words, it is the *ālayavijñāna* that set in motion (轉) all *dharmas.*

五者、有為、無為，一切諸法，約歸一識，所謂識自性故，識所緣故，識助伴故，識分位故，識清淨故；又，復以一識心開為萬法，所謂五蘊、十二處、十八界、二十二根、四諦等，是故約義是唯識義，開義是法相義。

(5) All *dharmas*, whether conditioned or unconditioned go back to one consciousness. And this is why they are said to have consciousness as their self-nature, to take consciousness as the objective support (*ālambana*), to have consciousness as their concomitant, and to have consciousness as depended,[33] and consciousness as pure. Furthermore, one consciousness or mind develops to become the myriad *dharmas* [i.e.] the so-called twelve *āyatanās*, eighteen *dhatūs*, the twenty-two faculties (*indriyas*), and the four noble truths etc. Therefore, the unified aspect is expressed by the tenet of *weishi,* while the complex aspect is expressed by the tenet of *faxiang*.

六者、精察唯識，才一識生，而自性、所依、所緣、助伴、作業五相、因果交相系屬，才一識生，四識互發；又復精察法相，雖萬法生，而各稱其位，法爾如幻，就彼如幻，任運善巧，宛若為一；是故開義是唯識義，約義是法相義。

(6) If one carefully investigates *weishi*, then [in it], only one consciousness arises, but through the mutual ties of causation between them comprised by the five characteristics, [namely] which are self-nature, the basis, the objective support, being a concomitant, and the activity. When the single consciousness arises the [other] four consciousnesses arise in

[33] 分位 – Soothill defines it as a dependent state, which depends on time and spatial conditions.

> concert [with it]. On the other hand, if one carefully investigates the *faxiang* [paradigm], then [in it], although the myriad *dharmas* arise, each has its own proper position; they are in their true nature [*dhramatā*] like a mirage; with regard to their being like a mirage they naturally and skillfully [appear] as they are one. In this sense, the complex aspect of it is expressed in the tenets of the *weishi* while the unified aspect of it is expressed in the tenets of the *faxiang*.

Ouyang uses the hermeneutical categories of unified and complex aspects to point out that the *ālayavijñāna* is the foundation of *weishi,* while the myriad *dharmas* as traditionally divided into *skandhas, āyatanās,* and *dhatūs*, represent the *faxiang* paradigm.

Ouyang had already elaborated on this point in his early writings. Whereas in the **Pañca skandha prakaraṇa* the myriad *dharmas* are analyzed according to the five *skandhas*, in the *Treatise of the One Hundred Dharmas* the one mind is said to control the hundred categories of *dharmas*. The first kind of analysis is associated with the *faxiang* paradigm (i.e., it is based on categories such as *skandhas* and later also *āyatanas* or *dhatūs*), while the second is associated with the *weishi* paradigm (i.e., it is based on the category of *ālayavijñāna*).

In his preface to Sthiramati's *Abidharmasamuccaya bhāṣya*, Ouyang reiterates this point

> *Weishi* uses consciousness to encompass the *skandhas,* while the *skandhas* are also consciousness. Defiled or pure [*dharmas*] are both [encompassed] by the eighth [consciousness] and undefiled [*dharmas*] are stored there as well. *Faxiang* uses the *skandhas* to encompass consciousness, but consciousness is

also a *skandha. Skandhas* do not encompass the unconditioned *dharmas* but they are encompassed in the *dhatūs.*"[34]

In other words, although under the *weishi* paradigm everything is included in the overarching and all-inclusive mind, under the *faxiang* paradigm everything is included under the Abhidharmic categories of *skandhas, āyatanas* and *dhatūs.*

Both Dashengguang and Kuiji, in their commentaries on the *Treatise on the One Hundred Dharmas,* agreed that when Vasubandhu talks about the most excellent *dharmas* (一切最勝)[35], he refers to the *dharmas* of the mind (which in turn are divided into the eight consciousnesses with the eighth consciousness as the foundational consciousness), and the rest are only subordinated to them.[36] This subordination of all *dharmas* to the *dharmas* of the mind is attributed by Ouyang to the *weishi* paradigm. In regard to the *faxiang* paradigm, as in the *Abhidharma* literature, there is a focus on the mind but no subordination of the *dharmas* to the *dharmas* of the mind, and they appear to be equally important. In Ouyang's words, "When the *dharmas* are all equals it is called *faxiang*; when all *dharmas* return to the one [consciousness] it is called *weishi*."[37]

七者、了別義是唯識義，如如義是法相義。	(7) The aspect of discerning is the characteristic of the tenet of *weishi,* while the aspect of suchness is the characteristic of the tenet of *faxiang*.

[34] Ouyang Jingwu, Preface to Sthiramati's *Commentary* on Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, 2.

[35] See T31.1614.855b18.

[36] See T44.1837.53b11-14 and T44.1836.47b06-08.

[37]是法平等曰法相，萬法統一曰唯識 Ouyang Jingwu, "Distinguishing between Weishi to Faxiang [辨唯識法相] in Miscellaneous Writings [內學雜著]," In *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集], (Taibei: Xinwengfeng Press, 1976), 1529.

八者、理義是唯識義，事義是法相義。	(8) The aspect of principle (理) is *weishi*, while the aspect of phenomena (事) is *faxiang*

In the seventh example, Ouyang equates the tenet of *weishi* with the notion of discernment. This might be surprising at first, since *weishi* is also associated, in the following eight clarification, with the principle (li 理), which in Huayan context replaces the notion of emptiness, and would therefore seem to fit better with suchness –to which discernment is opposed in the seventh clarification. There are two ways that this seeming contradiction can be interpreted.

First, Ouyang refers here to the fact that the *weishi* is associated with *ālayavijñāna*, which is discriminatory in nature. *Faxiang* on the other hand, is associated with suchness (*ruru* 如如), since all *dharmas* are suchness in their real nature (and *faxiang* equals all *dharmas*). Another interpretation is to understand discernment, or representation (了別), as representation or consciousness only (= 唯識),[38] whereas 如如, most often translated as suchness would be taken as "this and that" (Skt. *yathā tathā*). In this case, the sixth example should be translated as "discerning the object is the meaning of *weishi*, whereas the object as this and that [dharmas] is the meaning of the *faxiang.*

九者、流轉真如、實相真如、唯識	(9) Suchness of the manifested

[38] This is how it was interpreted, for example, in the *Saṃdhimirmocana Sūtra:* 了別真如。謂一切行唯是識性。 See T16. 676.699c23.

真如義是唯識義，安立真如、邪行真如、清淨真如、正行真如義是法相義。

phenomena (*pravṛtti*), the suchness of reality or true marks (*lakṣaṇa*), and the suchness of consciousness-only (*vijñapti*) are the meaning of *weishi*. suchness of establishment (*sanniveśa*), suchness of wrong conduct (*mithyapratipatti*), suchness of purity (*viśuddhi*), and suchness of correct practice (*samyakpratipatti*), are the meaning of *Faxiang*.

The seven kinds of suchnesses appear in several texts of the Yogācāra tradition. One can find them as early as the *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra,* when the Buddha explains that the suchness of all the defiled and pure *dharmas* (一切染淨法中所有真如) is sevenfold.[39] As the *sūtra* explains, the first three suchnesses denotes the three marks of existence: the suchness of constant manifestation of phenomena (impermanence), the suchness of true mark[40] (the notion of no-self) and the last one, the suchness of *weishi*,[41] i.e. the notion that everything is a representation of consciousness. The latter four suchnesses correspond to the four noble truths.[42]

十者、古阿毗達磨言境多標三法，今論言境，獨標五識身地、意地，

(10) The old *Abhidharma* [texts] often discuss the perceptual object (*viṣaya*)in

[39] See T16.676.699c19-25.

[40] While in the *Saṃdhimirmocana* the character for true is omitted (xiang instead of shixiang), Ouyang adds it based on both the *Buddhabhūmi* and the Yogācārabhūmi.

[41] The *Saṃdhimirmocana Sūtra* gives a different term 了別真如, but explain it similarly way as 唯識真如。

[42] 四者安立真如。謂我所說諸苦聖諦。五者邪行真如。 謂我所說諸集聖諦。六者清淨真如。謂我所說諸滅聖諦。七者正行真如。謂我所說諸道聖諦。 see T16. 676.699c23-25.

是故今義是唯識義，古義是法相義。

terms of the three *dharmas* [*skandhas*, *āyatanās* and *dhatūs*], while the later commentaries discuss the perceptual objects in terms of the [investigation of] the five bodily consciousnesses *bhūmi.* Therefore, the newer ones are *weishi* and the older ones are *faxiang*.

是為略說二宗互相為對義。

This is, in brief, the meaning of the two branches when they are juxtaposed one next to the other.

The six additional examples in the preface for the "Tattvārtha" chapter:

As mentioned above, in his preface to the "Tattvārtha" chapter, Ouyang added six examples of how the *weishi* and *faxiang* paradigms differ in addition to the ten themes he outlined in the preface to the *Yogācārabūmi*

譬如被機。唯識被二不定及大。法相齊被二乘無性，

(1) For example, when assisting [people with different capacities]; the tenet of *weishi* assists both [those of] the undecided [vehicle][43] and [those of] the great [vehicle]. [Whereas] the *faxiang* principle is intended to help all, [including] the two [lesser] vehicles and those who are *agotra*.

Both here and in the third example below, Ouyang reiterates the contrast between the universal application of the *faxiang* paradigm and the narrower, later developed *weishi* paradigm.

[43] As noted above, undecided in the sense of not yet decided which vehicle they belong to.

譬如正智。唯識雖淨。唯是相應而非即智。法相家言依他具二。一妄分別是心心所。一即正智。

(2) For example, correct knowledge. Although the notion of *weishi* is pure, it is [only] associated [with this correct knowledge] and is not [in itself correct] knowledge. The *faxiang* adherents say there are two kinds of dependent natures. One is [associated with] wrong discrimination, which is *citta* and *caittas*, and the second is correct knowledge.

As we already saw in the fourth chapter, the notion of correct knowledge is one of the five *dharmas* mentioned in the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra,* and corresponds to the knowledge of things as they really are. Ouyang stated that although *weishi* is pure, it is not correct knowledge. In other words, although it is a subtler paradigm, it is still not "things as they are", but merely an expedient means for advanced practitioners. For *faxiang* adherents, correct knowledge is one of the two kinds of dependent natures. The one is illusory or *parikalpita* (*svabhāva)* and the other is the correct knowledge which sees reality as it is (the perfect nature or *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva.*)[44]

譬如論議。唯識有五不判。法相即無不談。

(3) For example, the discussion on the doctrine. In the *weishi* [paradigm] they have five *śāstras* that they do not discuss. [45] In the *faxiang* they discuss them all.

[44] See the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* T16.672.598a06-7. The verse says "the discrimination of name and form is the mark of the two natures, the suchness of correct knowledge is the perfect nature" (名相分別 二自性相, 正智真如是圓成性).

[45] Literally, does not judge. I am not sure what exactly Ouyang means here and what differentiate *pan* 判 from *tan* 談. The way I interpret it is that the *weishi* followers do not pass judgment on the text associated with the *weishi* paradigm, which they see as authoritative. It suggests that other texts are not considered as authoritative among *weishi* Buddhists but are among *faxiang* Buddhists.

譬如三世。唯識談種。即一現在托過未種變似三時。而實一現。法相談相。果相所對便談過去。因相所對便說未來。三法展轉而實現在。

(4) For example, the three times. When the *weishi* [Buddhists] discuss the notion of seeds, [they say that] the present [seed] carries the seeds of the past and future and it appears as three [separate] times, but in fact only the present seed is real. When the *faxiang* [Buddhists] talk about characteristics, they discuss the past as that which opposes the characteristics of the effect (i.e. future), and on the future as that which opposes the characteristics of the cause. The three *dharmas* [of past, present and future] are successively unfolded but in fact they are all really the present.

Both *weishi* and *faxiang* Buddhists would agree that only the present exists, but the way they account for it and the categories they use are different. The *weishi* followers use the notion of seeds. The momentary appearance of seeds in the present relies on the past, and the alteration of the seeds creates the illusion that there are three times. But, in fact, the seeds exist only in the present. The *faxiang* followers use the category of characteristics (相). For them, the characteristics of cause (因相) and the characteristics of the effect (果相) constantly evolve and give the impression that all three times exist when, in fact, only the present exists.

譬如六根。唯識數分。最後判言，若人果位，六根互用。法相家言。法相不可亂。非耳能視。非目能聽。種與種相網。執破者無畛限。目挾耳種而現行而實耳聞。耳挾目種而發現而實目見。

(5) For example, the six sense organs. In the final judgment, some among the *weishi* Buddhists say that if one enters into the stage of realization, the six sense organs function interchangeably. The *faxiang* Buddhists say that the function of the sense organs cannot be confused with one another. The ear cannot see and the eye cannot hear. The different types are tied together, while those who break attachment [to emptiness] (i.e. the *weishi* people) have no boundaries. The eye acts by appropriates the ear type, but in fact it is the ear that hears. The ear acts by appropriates the eye type, but in fact it is the eye that sees.

The fifth example describes the way the six sense organs operate at the stage of fruition. In this stage, it is said that the sense organs can work interchangeably.[46]The way in which followers of the two paradigms account for that is different as well. The *weishi* followers would argue that the sense organs are indeed working simultaneously, which means that a being at a higher stage of the path can hear with his eyes or see with his ears. The *faxiang* followers reject the *weishi* view and argue that this is not so, and that in fact, what happens is that one sense organ appropriates the other (挾). Although the eye appropriates the ear, it is still the ear that hears and the eye that sees.

[46] There are several texts discussing the interchangeable work of the sense organs e.g. *Mahāyāna sūtrālaṃkāra:* 一一根皆能互用一切境界 (T31.1604.605.a4-5) or the *Cheng weishi lun:* 若得自在諸根互用 (T31.1585.26a25-26). I have yet to locate the exact origin of these two opinions as described by Ouyang.

譬如涅槃。唯識無住。但對般若自性涅槃。而俱簡小。法相普被。有餘無餘以為其果，瑜伽地中即以標目。

(6) For example, in the case of *nirvāṇa*. *Weishi* [is focused on] the [*nirvāṇa* of] non-abiding (*apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*), which, in respect of *prajña,* is only inferior in comparison to innate *nirvāṇa*. *Faxiang* is universally to all and has *nirvāṇa* with reminder and without remainder as its goals. These two the goals in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*

5.7 What is Ouyang trying to tell us?

Reading the points of difference between these two texts alone can be perplexing at first. What was Ouyang's goal? Why did he select these specific categories and not others? Some of them seem contradictory, so how do they fit together? What did Ouyang try to tell us?

If I understand Ouyang correctly, the summary of his argument is already stated at the beginning. According to Ouyang, Buddhism has a highly developed, systematic sotereological path that serves as the foundation for all Buddhists from all vehicles. However, this path -- to use the well-known Chan dictum -- is not the moon but the finger pointing to the moon. In other words, it exists as a designation (*prajñapti-sat*) and "exist, but is not real or (*tattva,* 有而不真)." This idea is represented by what Ouyant termed the *faxiang* paradigm. The *weishi* paradigm, on the other hand, is a newer discourse that complements and cannot replace the underlying *faxiang* metaphysics. Ouyang's objective in outlining the meaning of the *weishi* is to point out potential cognitive obstacles that advanced practitioners might be exposed to in advance stages of the path.

When assessing these sixteen points, it is clear that Ouyang did not intend to create a one-dimensional, simplified distinction between two kinds of Buddhism. For him, the two paradigms are multifaceted and involve doctrinal and textual dimensions pertaining to the core of Yogācāra *qua* Buddhist philosophy. The main aspects of the two paradigms that he repeatedly reiterates are

1. *Faxiang* is more universal and serves as the vehicle for all kinds of sentient beings and Buddhists from various vehicles. The *weishi* is narrower in scope and is relevant mainly for Bodhisattvas or those on the Mahāyāna path.
2. Where the *faxiang* paradigm relies on an Abhidharmic mode of analysis, *weishi* uses a new discourse, which is focused on the primacy of mind *qua ālayavijñāna* and the former categories as subordinated to the mind.
3. *Faxiang* relies on the entire Yogācāra corpus and is older, historically speaking. *Weishi* is a later development that relied on later treatises
4. *Faxiang* is more doctrinal in its approach, whereas *weishi* focuses on practice or action and gives attention to cognitive processes.

5.8 Different textual foundation for each paradigm

Ouynag considered *faxiang* and *weishi* as products of different lineages and historical milestones in the development of the Yogācāra tradition. His first treatment of this textual analysis appeared as early as the 1916 preface to the *One Hundred Dharmas* and *Pañca Skandhas śāstras*, in which he explains:

> The 17 stages of the *Yogācārabhūmi* encompass the two paradigms and establish one foundation [for the teaching]. That [paradigm] which was further elaborated (抉擇) in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha śāstra*, in accordance with the *Analyzing Yoga śāstra* (分別瑜伽論),

> expanded on in the *Vimśatikā* and the *Triṃsikā*, and originated in the *Treatise on the One Hundred Dharmas,* is the *weishi* paradigm, which developed into the [aforementioned] five branches (五支 i.e. the five texts). That which is singled out in the *Abhidharmasammucaya,* in accordance with the *Madhyāntavibhāga,* and expanded in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya vyākhyā* of Sthiramati, originated in the *Pañca skandhaka prakaraṇa*, is the *faxiang* paradigm, which developed into the [aforementioned] three branches.[47]

Later, Ouyang further developed this idea in his commentary on the *Yogācārabhūmi* (especially the tenth example and the section on the ten branches 十支) and in his "Tattvārtha" commentary (example number 3). In this analysis, the textual backbone of the *weishi* paradigm is composed of the following: 1) *Treatise of the One Hundred Dharmas*; 2) *Mahāyānasaṃgraha śāstra*; 3) *Vimśatikā*; 4) *Triṃsikā*; 5) *Chengweishilun*; 6) *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra śāstra*; and 7) Asaṅga's **Ārya śāsana prakaraṇa* (顯揚聖教論). The textual backbone of the *faxiang* paradigm is composed of 1) **Pañca skandha prakaraṇa* 2) *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and 3) *Madhyāntavibhāga.* Naturally, there are more treatises discussing the *weishi* paradigm, since all the texts Ouyang mentioned are Mahāyāna texts, from the Yogācāra tradition, and therefore less Abhidharmic in nature. However, this does not mean that Ouyang considered the *faxiang* principle any less important.[48]

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[47] Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface to the *Mahāyāna śatadharmā-prakāśamukha śāstra* and the *pañca-skandha-prakaraṇa* [百法無蘊論敘]." In *Inner and Outer Studies of Ouyang Jingwu* [竟無内外學] (Jiangjin: Zhina neixue yuan, 1942),1.

[48] Cheng Gongrang argues that the difference in the quantity of texts between the two paradigms is due to the lack of Chinese interest in *faxiang*-like texts. However, Xuanzang seemed to genuinely attempt to translate texts he deemed important for the understanding of Indian Buddhism. I think that the problem was not lack of texts, but the fact that Ouyang included only texts from the Yogācāra tradition. Those Yogācāra texts are more likely to discuss the *ālayavijñāna* as the center of the teaching than to focus on the dharmic foundation of reality.

5.9 Textual sources for the Two Paradigms Theory

Ouyang's thought was grounded first and foremost in Buddhist texts. As such, it is important to examine the origin of his two paradigms theory and in the textual tradition by which he justified it. Thus far, I have yet to locate any writing in which Ouyang specifically outlined the origins of this theory. However, from implicit and explicit statements in his early commentaries, it seems that his idiosyncratic approach originated from classical Yogācāra texts, such as the *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra,* the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* and the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra*.

The fourth chapter of the *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra* is entitled "on the characteristics of all *dharmas* (一切法相品)." In this chapter, Buddha Maitreya is giving guidance to a group of Bodhisattvas. The main purpose of the chapter is to clarify the real essence of all *dharmas*, based on the theory of three natures. The sixth chapter, which is entitled *Analyzing Yoga* (分別瑜伽品), opens with a focus on the practice of *śamatha* (concentration) and *vipaśyanā* (insight). Later, the nature of all things as mentally constructed;[49] the *ālayavijñāna* or *ādānavijñāna*,[50] and the empty nature of emptiness,[51] are all described. All these elements appear as the foundation for Ouyang's distinction between *faxiang* and *weishi*.

In the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra it* is also says:

> But this [transformation of the base] does not correspond with the views held by practitioners of the two vehicles (i.e., Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), and non-Buddhists, because those [practitioners] only know [the principle of] no-self (人無我性), and the particular characteristics

[49] T.16n676.0698a29-b02.

[50] T.16n676.0702b25.

[51] T.16n676.0701a08-28.

> (Skt. *svalakṣaṇa* Ch. zixiang 自相) and the general characteristics (Skt. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* Ch. gongxiang 共相) of *skandhas*, *dhātus*, and *āyatanas*. When one can see the *tathāgatagarbha,* the self-nature and the selflessness of all *dharmas,* then, gradually, one by one, all the operating [consciousnesses] (Skt. *pravṛttivijñāna* Ch. zhuanshi 轉識) will cease. Then those practitioners will not act according to the erroneous views of non-Buddhists.[52]

For the non-Mahāyāna schools, reality is analyzed into *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, and *dhatūs*, whereas the "right view," at least according to the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, is depended on an understanding of true emptiness, which includes an understanding of the *tathāgatagarbha.* This division between understandings based on *skandhas* etc. vs. understanding of emptiness is, again, a feature that Ouyang would employ later in his analysis of *weishi* and *faxiang.*

The *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* then adds that the three natures must be understood as included within the five *dharmas*:

> Again, Mahāmati said: Are the three Svabhāvas to be regarded as included in the five Dharmas, or as having their own characteristics complete in themselves? The Blessed One said: The three natures, the eight *vijñānas*, and the two kinds of selflessnesses are all included [in the five *dharmas*].[53]

As we saw above, the three natures and the five *dharmas* were the hallmark of the *faxiang* paradigm. Ouyang seems to have borrowed them from the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* and accepted the inclusion of the former in the latter.

The "Tattvārtha" chapter of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, a text on which Ouyang commented and which was formative in the development of his theory, begins with the following distinctions:

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[52] T16n672.0619c15-18.

[53] T16.0672.0620b25-27 adapted from Suzuki Daisetz Teitaro, *The Lankavatara Sutra; a Mahayana Text*, Eastern Buddhist Library (London: G. Routledge and Sons ltd., 1932), 228.

> What does the "meaning[54] of reality" (*tattvārtha*) mean? In brief, there are two kinds [of realities]. The first is existence based on *bhūtatā* (真實性), or things as they truly are; and the second is existence based on the completness [of phenomena], or the nature of all *dharmas*. In this manner, one must know that all *dharmas*, both in their truth or in their completeness, are always called the "meaning of reality."[55]

It was this kind of vision of reality that planted the seeds for Ouyang's two paradigms theory.

5.10 The Importance of *faxiang*

Despite the prevalence of *panjiao* doxograpical tradition in China and the tendency to evaluate the different teachings qualitatively, Ouyang did not intend to create a *panjiao* system with his theory.[56]Instead, Ouyang described two paradigms that are equally essential to our understanding of the Buddhist teaching. Each paradigm illuminates different doctrinal points, and targets different beings with different capacities. Ouyang, unlike Fazang and others, used the term *faxiang zong* in an approving way in his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. There, relying on the *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra,* Ouyang equates the *faxiang* teaching to the third turning of the wheel, which according to the *sūtra*, is the definitive teaching that does not require further clarifications (Skt. *nītārtha* Ch. 了義, *liaoyi*).

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[54] Janice Willis chose to translate the word of *artha* (Ch: 義) as knowledge. I think that her choice can be justified but for the limited translation that we have here I chose the more common translation of 'meaning', since I think that is how Ouyang understood it in his discussion about the *artha* of *faxiang* and *weishi.* See Janice Willis, *On Knowing Reality: The Tattvartha Chapter of Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 37-38.

[55] T30.1579.0486b09-b12.

[56] Toward the end of his life his teaching did gravitated toward *panjiao* like evaluation of the Buddhist tradition.

As Ouyang explained, these *dharmas*, which are discussed under the *faxiang* paradigm, are indeed not true (真) but their characteristics exist (有相在). They are excellent skillful means that are crucial for the Buddhist path. Analyzing the characteristics of *dharmas* is not second-rate Buddhism, as Huayan thinkers during the Tang argued, but leads to the fruits of the Buddhist path. As Ouyang said in the passage quoted above from his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, "If one can see reality in this way (i.e., according to the *faxiang* paradigm), the two kinds of grasping (i.e., grasper and grasped), and the two views of essentialism and nihilism will naturally be eliminated." *Faxiang* is not a beginner's path nor a secondary path, but instead an essential one for our complete understanding of the Buddha's message.

5.10.1 The *faxiang* paradigm as a tool of criticism

In many ways, the *faxiang* paradigm was a part of Ouyang's critique of Chinese Buddhism, and more specifically of the "vague and unsystematic" Chinese thought (see chapter three, page 86) -- the mindset that rushes to achieve the goal without knowing the way, or that is interested in investigating the sublime realms of liberation without having a good grasp on the metaphysical map that leads one there. Once the *faxiang* foundation was reduced to a mere introductory teaching, it was easy to be led astray to erroneous paths, such as that of Tiantai and Huayan.

Of the three texts that Ouyang categorized as *faxiang* texts, it was the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* that received his greatest attention. According to his account in the preface to Sthiramati's commentary, he devoted five years, from 1914 to 1919 to learn the text and its system. His disciple Lü Cheng and others assisted him, and

he also received funds specifically donated to this project by Kuai Ruomu. This is an indication of the importance of *faxiang* in Ouyang's thought. Throughout his writings, he never subordinated the *faxiang* paradigm to the later *weishi*; *faxiang* was always juxtaposed with the *weishi* paradigm as a genuine and foundational contribution on its own right. Ouyang stressed that the lack of serious study of this aspect of Buddhism in China is the crux of the problem; therefore, the reforms of Chinese Buddhism must begin with a serious consideration of the *faxiang* teaching.

In a letter that he wrote his friend, Zhang Xingyan,[57] Ouyang explained why the negative connotation of the "*faxiang zong*" is unjustified. For Ouyang, *faxiang* as a doctrinal paradigm is broader in meaning than the *Faxiang* School. The Faxiang School, despite Kuiji's claim, did not represent the culmination of the Yogācāra teaching, but was only a later development of the *weishi* paradigm and not the universal and expanded teaching of the *faxiang* paradigm.[58] Ouyang used the same term, *faxiang zong* in a novel way that was different from that used by his opponents.

[57] Zhang Xingyan, a revolutionary and one of the editors of the well known newspaper *Subao*.

[58] See Ouyang Jingwu, "A Letter to Zhang Xingyan [與章行嚴書]," in *Collected Writings of Master Ouyang* [歐陽大師遺集] (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1976), 1543. This qualification does not diminish Ouyang's appreciation to the contribution of Kuiji. In his preface to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Ouyang praises Kuiji, he said, "Of those interested in elaborating on the various teachings, and who wish to explain the essential *śāstras*, and to comment on the one hundred volumes [of the *Yogācārabhūmi*], despite the fact that only half exist-- only our teacher Kuiji came close to accomplishing this. He mixed the old and the new in his [commentary to the] *Cheng weishi lun*; he recorded the teacher's teaching in his Garden of Teaching and Forest of Principles (*Fayuanyi linzhang*), he established his own teaching and propagated very well the *hetuvidya* among the five kinds (*gotra*) of beings. Then he reached his prime with his commentaries on the *Nyāyapraveśa*, the Lotus sūtra and the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which were as vast as the Eastern Sea. He left us most valuable treasures; his research showed us that there is a path. Can we not but admire him?"

5.11 Opposing the two paradigms theory: Taixu and Yinshun's responses

Ouyang's two paradigms theory was shocking to many of his contemporaries. While Ouyang's followers and some intellectuals found it inspiring, many others found it disturbing and saw it as a misrepresentation of Buddhism. Even Yogācāra enthusiasts, such as Zhang Taiyan, were skeptical at first. Zhang recounted, "[Ouyang said,] '*Weishi* and *faxiang* were thought to be one thing since the Tang, but in fact the universal and partial, big and small vehicles are included in them.' At first, I was surprised at [Ouyang's] words, but after giving it careful thought I was satisfied. His thought is unique throughout the ages."[59]

One of Ouyang's main adversaries on this point, as in the cases discussed in the previous chapters, was the reformer monk Taixu. I will focus mainly on Taixu due to the comprehensiveness of his criticism. I will also treat the idiosyncratic voice of his well-known disciple, Yinshun (印順 1906-2005).

Taixu's vision included a return to the glorious past of Chinese Buddhism and a revival of the eight schools of Chinese Buddhism. This, he believed, would rescue Buddhism from the state of its alleged decline. Taixu utilized modern philosophical language to clarify Buddhist doctrinal and philosophical positions. He hoped to prove that Buddhism was not a "religion" in the Western sense, but a philosophy, and thus achieve his goal of modernizing Buddhism. Taixu shared Ouyang's scholastic approach, but whereas Ouyang used it to criticize traditional

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[59] 『唯識法相唐以來並為一宗，其實通局，大小殊焉。』余初驚怪其言，審思釋然，謂其識足以獨步千祀也。see Zhang Taiyan, "The Origins of the China Inner Studies Institute [支那內學院緣起]." In *Zhongguo zhixue* 6 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1981).

Chinese Buddhism and replace it with the "authentic" one, Taixu's goal was to use a modern critical method to affirm the greatness of the Chinese Buddhist tradition. This is precisely the reason why the debates between Ouyang and Taixu are so interesting and informative. These debates provide a vivid glimpse into the variety of Buddhist responses to the dramatic changes of the modern era. The traditional discourse was not sufficient anymore, with its lack of sophistication, knowledge of historical background, and critical study of the Buddhist texts. Here we have two thinkers whose conclusions and approaches are radically different and whose debates were conducted in a level of sophistication, comprehensiveness, and intensity rarely seen in the history of Buddhism in later Imperial China. The debate surrounding the *weishi* and *faxiang* paradigms is but one example of those philosophical and doctrinal exchanges.

5.11.1 Taixu's critique

Taixu responded to Ouyang's two paradigms theory soon after Ouyang published his early version of the theory, and on other occasions throughout his career. He wrote many articles repudiating Ouyang's views, four of which are of particular importance.[60]

The first response was a short article in his journal *Haichaoyin* (海潮音), which he published in 1922, entitled *Doubts Regarding Layman [Ouyang] Jingwu's Theory* (竟無居士學說質疑). In this article, Taixu responded to Ouyang's commentary on the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the Tattvārtha chapter and focused his

[60] All are included in Taixu's Complete Works (太虛全書, Taixu quanshu vol. 9).

critique on the differentiation between *faxiang* and *weishi* paradigms and the notion of three vehicles for one teaching.

The second, a more systematic critique, was given as a talk at a conference in Lushan in 1925 and later published in *Haichaoyin*. The lecture he delivered was a direct answer to Ouyang's two paradigms theory and its title was: *Discussing [the Idea] that Faxiang Must Follow Weishi* (論法相必宗唯識). In this lecture, Taixu focused his critique on a few problems he found in Ouyang's writings on the two paradigms theory, such as doctrinal observations Ouyang had made, and Ouyang's classification of scriptures.

In 1927, Taixu published a "sequel" article, *Discussing Further [the Idea] that Faxiang Must Follow Weishi* (再論法相必宗唯識), in which he addressed the same topic. In 1946, a year prior to his death, Taixu wrote an article about Ouyang's 1938 essay entitled *Reading the 'Distinguishing between Weishi and Faxiang'* ("閱 '辨法相唯識'").

5.11.1.1 Taixu's critique of the relationship between *faxiang* and *weishi*

Taixu stated his main argument very clearly in the beginning of his essay, *Discussing [the Idea] that Faxiang Must Follow weishi* He said:

> The teaching of 'there is only consciousness' (識所唯法 weisuoshi) is nothing more than *faxiang*. Therefore, what is called *faxiang* includes within itself *weishi* (i.e., consciousness-only). When discussing *weishi*, *faxiang* is contained within it. There were no other opinions about this matter since Xuanzang. In the modern time [however], there are those who distinguish between *faxiang* and *weishi* [as if] they were two doctrinal paradigms, and conclude that there is a huge gap between them. This is an unfounded (徒生)

and trivial side issue (支節), which does not correspond to the holy teaching. Therefore, in establishing our own teaching (自宗 zizong) we will deliberate [on this view].[61]

In the same essay Taixu also criticized Ouyang's differentiation of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *pratītyasamutpanna* (see pages 172-173). Taixu quoted Ouyang, who argued that the relationship between the two is that of cause and effect: *pratītyasamutpāda* functions as a cause, while *pratītyasamutpanna* is the realization of the fruit.[62] For Taixu, This differentiation is impossible. He argued that, in fact, according to the Yogācāra teaching, the seeds appear as cause and effect, they are, at the same time neither different not the same (不即不離). Taixu explained, "'that which is Conditionally arise means all *dharmas* that conditionally arise. Investigating and elucidating the conditions for all arising *dharmas* is the display of the *weishi* principle."[63]

The second differentiation Taixu criticized was the differentiation between fundamental wisdom and acquired wisdom. Taixu argued that fundamental wisdom (*qua weishi*) cannot be differentiated from acquired wisdom (*qua faxiang*), as Ouyang suggested. Since inherited wisdom includes acquired wisdom, and acquired wisdom makes inherited wisdom evident, it is clear that they are only one *zong* and not two.

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[61] 識所唯法，法相而已。是故稱法相即括唯識，談唯識即攝法相。此義也，奘基以還，無異議者；近人別法相與唯識為二宗，判若鴻溝，徒生支節，無當聖言。 TXQS, 1460.

[62] Taixu opened his discussion with a typo, misquoting Ouyang's preface to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* commentary. He mistakenly replaced 原 which means originated with 緣, which means condition, therefore the sentence which originally meant that "originally when we talk about its cause we mean the characteristics of the seeds" read as, "when we condition its cause we mean the characteristics of the seeds" see Ouyang Jingwu, Preface to Sthiramati's *Commentary* on Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, 2-3.

[63] See TXQS, Vol. 9, 1463. "緣之所起，即從緣所生之一切法，究明一切法能起之緣，即唯識之理顯。"

In the same essay, Taixu presented his view that *weishi* is a practice, which actualizes and leads to the fruit of the path, as opposed to the *faxiang*, which is merely the theoretical knowledge. According to Ouyang, *weishi* is the entrance to the path through the four kinds of [thorough] investigation (四尋思).[64] In contrast, to *faxiang*, which is entering the path through the six skillful means (六善巧). Relying on the "Tattvārtha" chapter, Taixu argued that while the four investigations (i.e., *weishi*) can lead to seeing the path, or in other words, are the practices that lead to the fruit, the six skillful means are only means to understand the principle (理) of the path through the doctrine (但是依教入理之道).

Both Ouyang and Taixu seem to agree upon some sort of differentiation, namely that *weishi* equals practice and *faxiang* equals theory, but they differ on the nature of the differentiation. Whereas Ouyang held that practice and theory belong to different paradigms, Taixu argued that only practice can actualize the theory, therefore they cannot be separated into two independent aspects, but *faxiang* must be subordinated to (in Taixu's words follow) *weishi*.

5.11.1.2 Classification of scriptures

Taixu also criticized Ouyang's classification of the scriptures. He used the example of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha śāstra,* which Ouyang considered to be a part of the *weishi* paradigm texts. For Taixu, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* includes both paradigms *faxiang* and *weishi*. Whereas the first chapter in the śāstra focused on the

[64] For further explanation see Asaṅga's treatment in his *Abhidharmasammucaya* T31.1605.687.a22-b1.

basis or *ālayavijñāna* (i.e., *weishi*), the second chapter focused on the characteristics and explained the three natures (i.e., *faxiang*).

5.11.1.3 The notion of *zong*

In his 1922 essay, Taixu's critique also targeted Ouyang's understanding of the notion of *zong*. As we have already seen, Ouyang's characterization of *zong* as a doctrinal paradigm stands in contrast to the common understanding of the term as religious or philosophical "school." Taixu's argument is that Ouyang is not sensitive enough to the array of meanings that the term carries.[65]

Taixu made reference to the way Ouyang divided his Inner Studies Institute University into three different Buddhist *zongs,* (here in both senses of schools and principles but Taixu focused on the notion of paradigm). The three are (1) the nature of dharma or *faxing zong* (法性),[66] (2) *faxiang* zong, and (3) Esoteric Buddhism or *zhenyan zong* (真言). According to Taixu, who paraphrased Kuiji, the definition for *zong* is "the major and most distinguished principle" (崇尊主要之義). Taixu argued that in the case of *faxiang* the "major and most distinguished principle" is that *dharmas* do not go anywhere (無往) and that they lack characteristics (非法相), and therefore it is not possible to treat *faxiang* by itself as a doctrinal paradigm.

According to Taixu, neither the *faxiang* nor *zhenyan* qualify as a "*zong*". The only one among the three Ouyang mentioned that does quality as a "*zong*" is

[65] As I already indicated, I would like to suggest that Ouyang was well aware of the several layers of meaning, which he purposely chose to force his audience to rethink their traditional views on the topic.

[66] While Taixu followed the traditional Chinese ascription of *faxing* to the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching, Ouyang thought of the *faxing* as the teaching of the Madhyamaka School.

faxing.[67] *Faxiang* is only an explanation (說明), a convenient name for all *dharmas*, while *faxing* is all *dharmas'* doctrinal paradigm. In this sense, *weishi* is equal to *faxing*. Therefore, the two, *weishi* and *faxiang*, have different functions, but they are not different nor are they two separate doctrinal paradigms.

In sum, Taixu considered Ouyang's usage of the notion of *zong* as a problem. First, Ouyang was not sensitive enough to the common usage of the term among contemporaries Buddhists who understood if as a 'school of thought,' especially when refereeing to the *faxiang zong* and *weishi zong*. Using a relatively marginalized meaning of 'principle' or 'paradigm' creates confusion for most of his readers. Second, if Taixu follows Ouyang's definition than it is clear that the notion of *faxing* must be understood as *zong* and not *faxiang*. By that Taixu reiterates the traditional Chinese Buddhist view that understood *faxing* to be the essence while *faxiang* was a secondary or provisional explanation.

5.11.1.4 Blurring the boundaries between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna

Another important way that Taixu thought Ouyang had erred was blurring the clear boundaries between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Ouyang reacted, in fact, to a wider trend which had already begun among Buddhist enthusiasts in Europe and other Asian Buddhist intellectuals, who showed a great respect to pristine Buddhism and were suspicious toward later Mahāyāna development. Though apologetics in East Asia defended Mahāyāna as a doctrinally and historically valid development in Buddhism, many of them did reevaluate their position on the

[67] See, TXQS, vol. 9, 1454-60.

āgamas and *Abhidharma* literature. As a result, East Asia saw a revival of interest not only in Yocācāra but also a revival of interest in Buddhist logic, the *Abhidharmakośa*, other *Abhidharma* works, and, of course, the *āgamas*. Both Ouyang and Taixu were a part of this trend, but while for Ouyang, reevaluating the early Buddhist tradition yielded a critique and a reassessment of the Buddhist tradition in China, for Taixu they reaffirmed the Buddhist convictions that he already held.

Take for example the Ouyang's division of the three teachings of *faxing* (again for Ouyang, *faxing* meant the Madhyamaka teaching and not *tathāgatagarbha* as it was often the case in East Asian discourse), *faxiang*, and *zhenyan* discussed above. Taixu's main problem with Ouyang's classification is his inclusion of the *Abhidharmakośa*'s teaching under the rubric of *faxiang*, together with Huayan and *weishi*. For Taixu, this amounts to sneaking Hīnayāna through the backdoor and undermining the Mahāyāna project, similar critique that the Yogācāra opponents in the Tang dynasty had of the Yogācāra teaching.

In his critique, Taixu had to make sure that the traditional boundaries between the two vehicles remained intact. In his *Discussing [the idea] that Faxiang Must Follow Weishi*, Taixu concluded that both the five *dharmas* and the three natures are established only after the Bodhisattva's attainment of emptiness, he said:

> The five *dharmas* and the three [natures'] characteristics are only established in the stage after the attainment of the Bodhisattva's emptiness. But are the *Abhidharma* of the two vehicles sufficient in order to attain the skilful means of the stage after the attainment of the Bodhisattva's emptiness? Having scanned through the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and the *Abhidharmakośa,* [I realized] that both do not include this principle.[68]

[68] 五法也，三相也，皆菩薩空後安立。然二乘之阿毗達磨，足證此空後所施設乎？縱覽婆沙、俱舍，都無是理。 TXQS, vol.9, 1463.

5.11.1.5 Taixu's alternative

What was Taixu's alternative? Taixu, in fact, returned to the traditional Chinese Buddhist view. For him, Mahāyāna's doctrinal paradigm (*zong*) is subdivided into 3 kinds, each of which is represented by a Chinese Buddhist School (denoted by the same Chinese character, *zong*).

(1) Those who speak of conditioned *dharmas* (多說有為法), have *weishi* as their doctrinal paradigm. They are also represented by the *Weishi* School.

(2) Those who speak of uncontaminated actions (多說無漏行), which is the uncontaminated wisdom of emptiness, have prajñā as their paradigm. They are represented by the Sanlun School in China.

(3) Those who speak of unconditioned *dharmas* (多說無為法) have suchness as their doctrinal paradigm. The doctrinal paradigm of suchness is also called the doctrinal paradigm of *faxing* and *dharmadhatū*. They are subdivided into two: (a) suchness in its wholeness, which is represented by the Tiantai and Chan Schools and (b) undefiled suchness, which itself is subdivided into two: (b1) the characteristics of suchness, which is represented by the Huayan School, and (b2) the function of suchness, which is represented by the Esoteric School

Following is a map of Taixu's alternative outlined above:



5.11.2 Yinshun's analysis

Taixu was not the only one who was critical of Ouyang's teaching in general and of the two paradigms theory in particular. Another prominent critic was Yinshun, Taixu's disciple. His critique, as his teaching as a whole, took a different direction from that of his teacher.

Yinshun's treatment of the topic appeared in the fourth volume of his Huayu collection (華雨集). Yinshun opened his discussion by arguing that this new debate was initiated only in the Republican period. Even at this early stage of his career, Yinshun appeared to have distanced himself from his teacher's position. Where Taixu saw the *faxiang* vs. *weishi* debate as a continuation of the debate of old,

Yinshun recognized that it was a new debate and that Ouyang had a *sui generis* theory in mind.

> Yinshun than moved to review Ouyang and Taixu's positions, he said:
>
> After this problem (i.e., the two paradigms theory) was raised, it brought about Taixu's opposition. [Taixu] argued that *faxiang* and *weishi* are inseparable and that *faxiang* must return to the paradigm of *weishi*. One advocated separation while the other advocated unity. This is a significant discussion with a considerable impact on Buddhist thought since the Republican period... [These two doctrinal paradigm] at the end, are they separate of unified?[69]

Yinshun's reply was, "I think that *faxiang* and *weishi*, these two words, are not necessarily conflicting and not necessarily the same."[70] Whereas Ouyang and Taixu's debate was doctrinal, Yinshun argued from historical perspective. For him, *faxiang* analysis of *dharmas* according to *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhatūs*, was an idiosyncratic feature of the Sthaviravāda *Abhidharma*, and was already omitted in the *Abhidharmakośa*. In later *Abhidharma* literature it was used as an explanation alongside other formulas. The analysis of *citta* and *caitta*, which Ouyang associated with the *weishi* doctrinal paradigm, appeared already in early *Abhidharma* texts, such as the *Prakaraṇa pāda* (品類足論), which divided the *dharmas* according to matter (*rūpa*), mind (*citta*), mind associates (*caittas*), *dharmas* not associated with mind (*citta-viprayuktaḥsaṃskāraḥ*), and unconditioned *dharmas* (*asaṃskṛta*).

In Yogācāra thought, the meaning of this division was altered from the *Abhidharmic* context. Both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu consistently used the fivefold

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[69] 問題提出後，即引起太虛大師的反對：主張法相唯識不可分，法相必歸宗於唯識。一主分，一主合，這是很有意義的討論。民國以來，在佛教思想上有較大貢獻的，要算歐陽氏的內學院和大師的佛學院，但在研究的主張上便有此不同，這到底是該分嗎？合嗎？ Yinshun, *Miaoyuji*, Vol.4, 237.

[70] Ibid.

formula but "poured new wines into the old bottles" (舊瓶裝新酒). In this scheme, the mind and the mind associates had prime importance. The mind became the crux of the doctrine, and the one which all others were dependant on. Therefore, Yinshun found that Ouyang's explanation made sense, since these are two different visions of the Buddhist teaching; one was simply older than the other. At the same time, Taixu's opposition also has merit because *weishi* indeed developed through the so called *faxiang* analysis, and therefore *faxiang* indeed followed *weishi*.

Yinshun's solution to the debate was unique and, in a way, a middle ground between the two extreme opinions. He argued that, "from the complete view of the Buddhist position, I would like to make one point: *weishi* always must be *faxiang*, but *faxiang* is not necessarily *weishi*".[71] In that sense Yinshun was closer to Ouyang. Both acknowledged that there were two approaches within Yogācāra *qua* Buddhism, one is more universal and includes the other (i.e., *faxiang*) and the second is a later development and more limited is scope (i.e., *weishi*). The difference between the two thinkers is clarified in the conclusion Ouyang and Yinshun drew from this differentiation. For Ouyang, the two paradigms were a chance to reaffirm the importance of the earlier, more universal, and more complete approach to the path, an approach that gave a metaphysical foundation to Buddhist practice. No sotereological achievement can be reached without a thorough understanding of the *faxiang* doctrinal paradigm. This was the essence of Buddha's third turning of the wheel and this was what every Buddhist on the path must realize. Yinshun, who was ready to acknowledge the existence of the two paradigms, did not accept the

[71] Yinshun, *Miaoyuji*, Vol.4, 237.

importance of *faxiang* as equal to that of *weishi*. By following Ouyang's conclusion, Yinshun knew that he was joining Ouyang's critique of Chinese Buddhism and was not willing to go this far.

For Yinshun, the fact that *faxiang* was broader and more universal did not mean that it was more foundational. On the contrary, it meant that the mature Mahāyāna's *weishi* approach was an evolution that corrected a great lacuna (大有漏罅) in the original *faxiang* thought. In this regard, Yinshun accepted Taixu's criticism. Buddha's explanation of *faxiang* is merely "commonsensical" (常識的), and its objective is epistemological. The goal of his description is to attain the nature of dharma (*faxing*) through *faxiang*. This is the real goal of the Buddha and not the *faxiang* that clings to the existence of an essence of the self (Skt. *ātma-bhāva* Ch. 自體).

For Yinshun, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu avoided this trap. They understood that commonsensical view cannot exhaust the Buddha's meaning (不能盡見佛意), but their understanding is also problematic. The problem with the Yogācāra position is that by arguing that everything is the manifestation of the mind they affirm the absolute nature (絕對性) and the superiority (優越性) of the mind. Yinshun's ultimate solution is to follow the Madhyamaka path of "dependent Origination of the interdependency of mind and matter which lack self-nature" (心色相待的無性緣起論).

5.12 Ouyang's Theory: the wider implications

Taixu summarized his *Discussing [the Idea] that Faxiang Must Follow Weishi* with the following critique:

> Modern people (i.e., Ouyang Jingwu) do not understand the doctrinal characteristics of the *dharamas* [which follow the paradigm],[72] nor do they understand the doctrinal paradigm [which is followed by the *dharmas*].[73] Those people devote themselves to seeking and investigating names and appearances by analyzing [those names and characteristics] again and again. They are so obsessed with designatory labels that the teaching of *weishi* and the teaching of *faxiang* become separated as the states of Chu and Han. They are so obsessed with the designatory labels that old teaching and new teaching are divided as the heaven and the earth. This [mistake] needs to be corrected in order to avoid treading the old path of dispute between the *Faxing* and *Faxiang* Schools.[74] This was my subtle intention in giving this lecture.[75]

As Yinshun's example demonstrates, the *faxiang* vs. *weishi* debate was not limited to Taixu and Ouyang. It was wider in scope and involved people from two of the most important Buddhist centers of the ROC, Taixu's Wuhan Buddhist seminary and Ouyang's Inner Studies Institute. This debate was a part of an ongoing polemical exchange between these two centers, an exchange that reflected the two major approaches to Buddhist reform in Republican China.

This debate was more than a mere discussion about this specific doctrinal point. As discussed above, Ouyang used his new theory to propagate his revisionist understanding of Buddhism and to criticize mainstream Chinese Buddhism. Taixu

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[72] Literally the characteristics of teaching which can follow (能宗之教相earlier Taixu defined it as dharmas, or *faxiang* see TXQS, vol.9, 1463.)

[73] Literally that which can be followed (i.e.. the weishi principle).

[75] 近人不明能宗之教相，與所宗之宗趣，務於名相求精，承流不返，分而又分，浸假而唯識與法相裂為楚漢！浸假而唯識古學今學判若霄壤！不可不有以正之，以免蹈性相爭執之故轍！此余講此之微意也。TXQS, vol. 9, 1470.

understood Ouyang's project and the potential far reaching consequences it embodied. These consequences went beyond doctrinal disagreement, and included a shift in the doctrinal foundation of Chinese Buddhism, the questioning of the monastic authority on doctrinal matters, an implicit criticism about the monastic community for leading the Buddhist teaching astray to an erroneous path, and a usage of a new level of discourse that would leave the traditional discourse unequipped to deal with neither the new Buddhist critique and the new intellectual trends impacted by western influence.

Taixu's project was apologetic in nature and his aim was to protect the Chinese Buddhist teaching. It is true that he is considered by many to be a reformer but as we saw above, his reforms were more concerned with form than with content. It was Ouyang whose ideas to change Buddhism were more far reaching. For such a change, even a reformer like Taixu was not ready.

Chapter Six: Conclusions

6.1. Major conclusions

One of the major goals of this dissertation is to bring to center stage the contribution of Buddhism to modern Chinese intellectual history. It may have been understandable to Overlook the Buddhist contribution up until the 1980s. After all, from the time of the establishment of the PRC until the beginning of the reforms in the '80s, Buddhism and other religions had a marginal impact on the unfolding history of modern China. But the situation rapidly changed after the end of the Cultural Revolution era and with the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in the late '70's, when Buddhism and religions in general enjoyed a rapid revitalization.[1] From our current standpoint in history, we cannot ignore those emerging trends. Marxism is no longer the only guiding intellectual force in China. Intellectuals today are searching for new meanings in their old traditions of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, and many are looking at the early twentieth century thinkers and those who succeeded them as their intellectual role models and spiritual ancestors.

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[1] In three different field trips in China, I witnessed first-hand the revival of Buddhism (although my trips were far from constituting a systematic study of the revival of institutional Buddhism). In 1993, most of the temples that I visited were either inactive, or were opened mostly for touristic purposes. In 1997, I saw many newly rebuilt functioning temples in the earlier phases of their reconstruction. In 2002 I visited many newly built temples and new Buddhist seminaries with many novices who filled their halls. In addition, in 1997 I met with a few of the most respected old monks that served as abbots; whereas in 2002 I saw growing numbers of young abbots, a mark of the generational shift. This was also an indication of the political turmoil of the recent decades, which had created a gap of one generation of Buddhist leaders. At this time, the generation who were born during or right after the culture revolution took the lead.

There are other good reasons why a modern historian of religion should study Buddhism as a part of a general assessment of intellectual and historical developments in modern China. As is evident in this dissertation, Buddhism inspired many leading intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century, and even without its contemporary significance, it is important to study the contribution of Buddhism to the emergence of modern Chinese and East Asian thought. Modern developments such as the New-Confucian movement or the Kyōto School are much indebted to Buddhist thought, which was an essential factor in the formation of their own thought.

This dissertation is limited to one of the many faces of modern Buddhism: a group of Buddhist intellectuals that I named scholastic Buddhists. From the perspective of Buddhist thought, a study of the scholastic movement in China is important because it was one of the most sophisticated and systematic attempts to study the Buddhist tradition, and to adapt it to what Buddhist scholastics felt were modern demands. As Wing-tsit Chan claimed (see page 34), Scholastic Buddhists in the early twentieth century were at the cutting edge of innovation in Chinese Buddhist thought, and were also a source for self-criticism to mainstream Buddhism. These critical tendencies led to some of the most fascinating debates in the modern intellectual history in China, some of which are also treated in this dissertation. These debates challenged the way Buddhism developed in modern China, on a scale unprecedented in the history of late Imperial China, and they also reached novel and far-reaching conclusions about the authenticity of East Asian

Buddhism. These debates are far from being obsolete and are still echoed in current debates and publications.

Of these scholastics, my dissertation has focused on Ouyang Jingwu, as the most noticeable, charismatic and polemical thinker among early twentieth Buddhist scholastics. Ouyang was a teacher to influential scholastic Buddhists and other prominent scholars of his time. His provocative thought prompted several non-Buddhist thinkers, such as Xiong Shili, and to a certain extent Mou Zongsan, to respond to his challenges through their own system of thought. Ouyang made an important contribution to the study of Yogācāra philosophy in China, a tradition that had a large impact on the emergence of East Asian Buddhist thought and which had not been studied thoroughly since the tenth century. Ouyang increased the wealth of published Buddhist texts available to the public. By writing prefaces to the texts he published, Ouyang was able to communicate his unique system of thought and to voice his critiques in regard to some developments within Chinese Buddhism, which he deemed problematic. Ouyang's contributions to Chinese Buddhism was also apparent in the realm of Buddhist education, with his novel approach to the formation of his research institution, and with his emphasis on the study of Indian Buddhism and the study of other languages, such as Sanskrit and Tibetan.

In this dissertation I chose to examine Ouyang's contribution to Buddhist doctrinal renewal and reevaluation. I depicted Ouyang's critique of what he perceived as the superficial and unsystematic ways of "Chinese thought," which resulted in Chan's antinomianism and its disregard of the Buddhist canon, and in

the "flawed" teachings of the Tiantai and Huayan schools. I also offered a glimpse into his innovative system of thought through his unique two paradigms theory.

Ouyang criticized the teachings of Tiantai and Huayan, but never systematically treated the way in which these schools deviated from what he understood to be genuine Buddhism. Instead, he accused them of introducing erroneous teachings, and maintained that these schools' major thinkers attained lower spiritual levels. He did so without differentiating between Tiantai and Huayan, and without paying attention to nuances within each tradition. This suggested to me that, for Ouyang, the problem had other origins. When I read Ouyang's writing from his more critical phase (1915-1925), the answer quickly emerged. Ouyang felt that the core of the problem lay at the foundation of East Asian Buddhism, which deviated from what he considered the authentic Indian teaching. This differentiation between what constitutes the authentic teaching vs. what is non-genuine became one of the hallmarks of Ouyang's teaching.

What became the epitome of this "deviation" was the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith,* a text that exerted significant influence over the development of Buddhist thought in East Asia.[2] Ouyang was not the only one who raised doubts about the *Awakening of Faith* during the early part of the twentieth century. As we saw in Chapter four, there were precedents in Japan, which probably triggered Ouyang's critique of the text. However, unlike his Japanese counterparts, Ouyang

[2] This category of non-genuine texts was later expanded by Lü Cheng and other scholars of his generation and included texts such as the *Śūraṃgama sūtra,* the *Yuanjue jing* (*Sūtra of Complete Awakening*) and others.

was not concerned with questions of authorship or translation. What made him suspicious of the text was its doctrine.

At the heart of Ouyang's critique of the *Awakening of Faith* was what he understood as a complete collapse of the boundaries between correct knowledge and suchness. For Ouyang, the notion of correct knowledge played an important role in the Bodhisattva's realization. Claiming that it is one with suchness, and that suchness is inherent in the mind, would render the Bodhisattva's achievement meaningless.

In his discussion, Ouyang used the formula of substance and function, which he equated with the notions of suchness and correct knowledge, respectively. His solution to the *Awakening of Faith*'s approach was to insist that the authentic Indian tradition kept substance and function (or suchness and correct knowledge) entirely separate. The separation of substance and function was a controversial solution that negated long held views among many East Asian Buddhists and non-Buddhist alike. Consequently, it was not surprising that this theory, like other theories Ouyang proposed, triggered vehement criticism from traditional Chinese Buddhists.

Another problem that derived from the collapse of the boundaries of substance and the function was the status of the idea, orthodox in the East Asian tradition, that substance, which is suchness, gives rise to the myriad dharmas. The idea that suchness could actually give rise to defiled phenomena violates the total separation of suchness and the phenomenal world. Yet this principle, Ouyang and

his disciples argued, lies at the foundation of the Huayan and Tiantai teachings, and this was the major cause for Ouyang's disapproval of their teaching and practice.

Huayan and Tiantai were not the only schools attacked by Ouyang. Along with others, he also criticized the anti-intellectual and anti-scriptural approach prevalent among Chan Buddhists. This concern was among the factors contributing to Ouyang's theory of two paradigms, which infused new meanings into the categories of *weishi zong* and *faxiang zong,* previously used as synonyms for the Yogācāra School in East Asia. Ouyang understood these two paradigms as representative of two aspects of Buddhist doctrine, which differ in their methods, genres of writing, and the points in history at which they emerged. Through this novel interpretation, Ouyang wished to emphasize the importance of the systematic study of the Buddhist doctrine as an underlying necessity for the achievement of the soteriological goals of Buddhism. Defining *faxiang,* which was more doctrinal in its approach, as equally important as *weishi*, which was more practice-oriented, would correct the anti-intellectual biases of schools like Chan.

This theory is but one example of the innovativeness and radical nature of Ouyan's teachings during this phase of his career. Ouyang, together with other Buddhist scholastics of his day, impacted on a new generation of Buddhist intellectuals who were destined to spearhead Buddhist Studies in China, including figures like Tang Yongtong, Lü Cheng, and Wang Enyang. Some (e.g. Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili) used their scholastic Buddhist training to infuse new life into the Confucian teaching and were the founders of the influential contemporary New Confucian movement.

On the other hand, traditional Buddhists and other, more traditional, intellectuals in China saw Ouyang as a divisive and radical thinker, not a charismatic and inspiring figure. For them, Ouyang's theories were not to be entertained if Chinese Buddhism was to survive in the modern period. One opponent of Ouyang's scholasticism who was often discussed in this dissertation is the reformer monk Taixu. Both Taixu and Ouyang directed well-established Buddhist academies, that of Wuhan and the Inner Studies Institute respectively; both of them were Yang Wenhui's students; and both recognized and preached the need to reform Buddhism. However, as we saw, their visions of what those reforms should constitute were diametrically opposed. While Ouyang saw East Asian Buddhism as corrupt and in dire need of realigning itself with the authentic teaching of Indian Buddhism, Taixu held that alignment with the authentic tradition would be achieved through a return to the glorious past of East Asian Buddhism, which captured the essence of Buddhism's message. In other words, while Ouyang proposed to use what is authentic to rethink the tradition, Taixu wished to use the tradition as a benchmark to establish what is authentic.

Ouyang Jingwu was born during the final years of pre-modern China, and lived most of his late life in post-imperial China. He is a case study of an intellectual in a period of transitions. Ouyang and other intellectuals of this transitional period tried to understand their new reality by turning to resources in their own culture. In Ouyang's case, it was the teaching of the Yogācāra School, with which he hoped to correct the old in order to make it ready to face the new.

Scholastic Buddhists are often discussed in secondary literature in the context of the "impact of the West." They are seen either as a result of Western dominance, or? as a part of conscious or unconscious acceptance of major principles in Western thought, directly or via Japan. While we saw that this was indeed an important part of the picture, the Western impact does not account for the whole story. It is important to remember also that Ouyang was a product of the traditional Chinese education. His approach to Yogācāra was impacted less by Western orientalist methods and concerns than it was by the philological and historical methods of the Confucian evidential research practices, which he applied to the study of Buddhist texts. While many Western orientalist and some Asian leaders wished to return to the authentic teaching of the historical Buddha, Ouyang was not concerned with the "origin" per se, but with what he considered authentic. For Ouyang, authentic Buddhism constituted the Buddhism that began in the *āgamas* and reached its peak with the Yogācāra phase of the Buddhist teaching.

6.2 Avenues for further research

I view this dissertation as only a first stage in the study of this complicated and influential figure. There are many other dimensions of his career yet to be explored - for example, his Confucian teaching, and the way he viewed the relationship between Confucianism and Buddhism as his thought developed over the years. Of special interest is the way he appropriated each tradition to meet the different challenges he faced, both personal and national.

Another possible avenue for further research is Ouyang's break with the Chinese intellectual tendency to harmonize intellectual discords and divergent opinions. In his early phase, Ouyang was not shy from criticizing intellectual conventions and argued for a need to replace them with new understandings of both Confucianism and Buddhism. Yet in the later phases of his life, Ouyang returned to a more syncretic worldview, with an emphasis on *nirvāṇa* and liberation. He even created his own *panjiao,* and was less engaged with expounding the "authentic" teaching as a corrective measure for problems in the tradition. To use Ouyang's terminology, it seems that while the younger Ouyang emphasized the *faxiang* paradigm, the older Ouyang returned to the *weishi.* It would be interesting to ask what were the changes that characterized Ouyang's later thought, and how this later phase of his career can be reconciled with his earlier thought.

Finally, Ouyang Jingwu's is by no means the only story in the scholastic movement. There are others who were active as scholars of Yogācāra, Buddhist logic and Abidharma in Ouyang's day, and there are students who kept the tradition alive, even in times when it ceased to be the intellectual vogue. Just like the New-Confucian movement, the scholastic Buddhists had their second generation after Ouyang Jingwu and Han Qingjing, among them Lü Cheng, Wang Enyang and the slightly younger Han Jingqing - figures who are ignored almost completely, even in China. In addition, we also need to ask: What was the nature of the scholastic Buddhism as a movement? These are all fertile grounds for further research, in order to better understand the contribution of the scholastic Buddhists and their significance for the study of Buddhist doctrine, their role in institutional

innovations, and their contribution to the larger intellectual scene in China through the debates in which they were engaged.

6.3 Ouyang and Scholastic Buddhism Still Matter

The scholastic Buddhists' impact on East Asia is no longer as evident as it was in Ouyang's day. Still, I will argue, there are many who see Ouyang and his followers as their teachers or sources of inspiration. The heirs of the early ROC scholastics are still active, and the debates are still going on. In Hong Kong, Lou Shixian (羅時憲 1914-1993)[3] and his disciple Li Runsheng (李潤生 1936-), the founders of the Dharmalaksana Society (佛教法相學會), propagated Yogācāra thought and traced their linage to Ouyang Jingwu and others of his generation. The number of books dedicated to Yogācāra thought that are published in Chinese today, together with the large number of websites[4] dedicated to the study of modern Yogācāra, attest to the contemporary relevance of Ouyang work. Young scholars continued to be inspired by him and by scholastic Buddhism, while others, reacting also the critique of Japanese critical Buddhists or *Hihan bukkyō* movement, continue to debate their conclusions and methods. These contemporary debates are present manifestations of the debates of prior generations. Scholastic Buddhism, as a phenomenon that began in the early twentieth century, is still a largely unexplored area that is awaiting attentive study. This dissertation

[3] Lou took his vows with Taixu but either studied with Ouyang Jingwu or with Lü Cheng, or at least was influenced by their teaching. He continued to write mainly on Yogācāra throughout his life.

[4] See for example, www.neixue.cn or www.xianfengfoxue.com.

was a humble beginning, which hopefully will follow by other more comprehensive works on this movement, its relevance for contemporary Chinese thought, and its place in the general intellectual history of China and of Buddhism at large.

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