HEWITT INQUIRY

under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off  the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes  a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the  Combined Air Force destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one  division of battleships also may be assigned the major capital ship  strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the  carriers.

"The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment including  landing boats in considerable numbers. Activities in the Mandates under  naval control consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel  aircraft munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen  engineers etc."

(2) Admiral Kimmel's sources of information after the "war warning."

The ComFOURTEEN communication intelligence unit continued the practice,  which had been followed for some time past, of preparing daily  communications intelligence summaries for submission to Admiral Kimmel  via Lt. Comdr. Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Photostatic  copies of the communication intelligence summaries from 14 October to 14  December 1941, [112] constitute Exhibit 22 of this investigation.  Lieutenant Commander Layton, who presented these summaries to Admiral  Kimmel, also prepared daily intelligence reports which were distributed  to various members of CincPac's staff. The intelligence memoranda were  not given to the Admiral or Chief of Staff because they saw the basic  material upon which the reports were based. The intelligence reports by  Layton for the period 6 October to 2 December 1941 constitute Exhibit  26. None was prepared after December 2nd, according to Layton.

The daily communication intelligence summaries together with the  dispatches received by Admiral Kimmel from other organizations during  the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, constituted the only sources  of information which he had during that period concerning the location  and movements of Japanese naval forces.

(3) Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the "war warning."

The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the Japanese  force, which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Tankan Bay,  Etorofu Island and, in radio silence, proceeded undetected toward Pearl  Harbor. The Japanese force, which included three of a Japan's Carrier  Divisions, CarDiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA; CarDiv 2, HIRYU, SORYU; CarDiv 5,  SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; BatDiv 3, first section, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; CruDiv 8,  CHIKUMA; and other lighter vessels, cruised for ten days to a point 200  miles north of Oahu, where the planes were launched for the attack on  Pearl Harbor.

It will be recalled that the November 24th dispatch from CNO in part had  stated that the diplomatic situation and statements of the Japanese  Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicated  that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack  on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility. The "war warning" of the  27th had stated that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the  next few days and that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and  the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition  against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

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The information which Admiral Kimmel subsequently received as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was as follows:

28 November 1941:

The Naval Attache at Shanghai reported in his dispatch 270855 the  sightings by the master of a foreign vessel, which had left Hong Kong en  route to Shanghai, of many transports proceeding south singly or in  small groups.

[113] The November 27th ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary delivered  on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little  below normal, due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the  Tokvo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid- watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers, Bako, Sama and Saigon were active  as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity  which sent five dispatches to he major commanders. The direction finder  activity was very high. Is to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there  was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area.  The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of  general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The  Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third  Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there  was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander,  it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense  forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further information  on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander  Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning air forces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in  the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that  "Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed  by Admiral Kimmel.

It appears, therefore, that as of this time the ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and Washington radio intelligence units were of the opinion that the  major portion of the Japanese carriers were in "home waters;" that  ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that a carrier unit was in the Marshalls,  and that ComSIXTEEN expected CarDiv 3 to operate in the Mandates. The  evidence disclosed that the term "home waters" was understood  differently by the Far Eastern Section of OWI, which prepared the 1  December 1941 ONI estimate, and by the Fleet Intelligence Officer,  Pacific Fleet. Captain McCollum testified that the term meant the normal  cruising grounds of the Japanese Fleet, roughly west of the 180 meridian  of longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa, and included the  Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians. Captain Layton, the Fleet  Intelligence Officer, testified that "home waters" meant to him, and was  understood by Admiral Kimmel to mean, the drill grounds of the Inland  Sea and approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay  Area; in general the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, but  not including northern Japan and the Kuriles, to a point about 60 miles  east of Japan.

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29 November 1941:

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th  (Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent  by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

"[114] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical  purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government  might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action  unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities  cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit  the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as  restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense  X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such  reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these  measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil  population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate  message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities  in the United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the  tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit  dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential  officers"

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the  Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as  then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It  stated further:

"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply  to Japan in case hostilities occur"

On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information  CincAF, and stated:

"Following received by British consul from usually reliable source X  Japanese will attack Krakow [sic] Isthmus from sea on one December  without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and  Singapore X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main  landing to be made at Songkhola X (Singora)"

ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav,  CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a  light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship, Southern Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon  area.

OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPac, ComSIXTEEN,  ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from  Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously    [115] Orange troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking  up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops had landed and that  10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during the same period; that  the total troops in South Indo-China totaled 70,000. It observed that  there was an estimate of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It  reported that many trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies  to the interior. It observed that this movement is of large proportions  and indicates hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also  forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated  November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly  railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently  augmented and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed  artillery are anti-tank guns; that the Japanese had

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recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the coast of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500.  These boats were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated  November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable  information that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that  around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum,  Nippon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would  advance on Thailand; that great increased troop landings and movements  were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000 men have landed.  On November 25th and 26th. 1,500 would go south by special train; that  in Tongking there were approximately 25,000 Jap troops and at Gillam  there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th Hanoi,  was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong mayor had  advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester  all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to  all warehouses by noon November 25th.

The ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered the  29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to  and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were very  heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence  net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed  to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this  command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet  commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to indicate  that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S.  Naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet,  it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its  units. As to the Third Fleet there was little activity from its units  save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said  to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet  originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively  for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in  Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity.  This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

[116] The ComSIXTEEN communication intelligence unit sent a dispatch on  the 29th noting various recent developments from radio intelligence such  as various encrypted addresses noted in the preceding two days traffic,  that various additional units now appeared to be associated with the  "first section" (South China area), referred to in ComSIXTEEN's November  26th dispatch, that the Hiyei (which in fact was en route to Pearl  Harbor) and Kongo appeared to be associated definitely with the "first  section," but no movement from the Takao area had been noted, and, that  the Cinc Combined Fleet was to leave the Kure zone that day, the Sasebo  zone on December 1st, and enter the Bako zone on the 2nd.

30 November 1941:

On 30 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to  CincPac for information (Exhibit 76, Naval Court), which advised in  part:

"Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra by overseas  expedition . . . desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on  three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X . . ."

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A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77,  Naval Court) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were  no contacts and the information were all negative.

The communication intelligence summary of the 29th delivered this day  stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the  traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic  was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence  sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders both ashore and  afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long  messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally  reporting to Tokyo radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This  station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction  finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with  much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AlNav, and the  naval general staff addressed  Commanders, Second Fleets Third Fleet,  Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been  addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address  was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he  had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this  had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was  intentional in making positively known the existence of an air fleet.  Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units  were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second  Fleet, including Cardiv 3, and the Third Fleet.

Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships but their  assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the  Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication  with [117] the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The Cinc  Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area.  There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at  Chichyima [sic] the previous day, and also some traffic from the  Commander in Chief, China Fleet.

1 December 1941:

A copy of a dispatch by CNO to CincAF, 301709, was received by CincPac,  referring to the previous dispatch which had directed an air search on  the line Manila to Camranh Bay, directing that a report be made daily  even if the information were all negative (Exhibit 77, Naval Court).

A dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December 1941, was also received  referring to a Thailand-Japanese intrigue aimed at forcing the British  to attack Thai as a counter-move to a Japanese landing in Kota Bharu,  whereupon Thai would declare war and ask Japanese help.

A dispatch of 1 December from ComSIXTEEN advised of radio intelligence  information indicating that various units under Cinc Third Fleet were in  the Takao area and that Cinc Second Fleet had shifted from Kure to  Sasebo apparently en route to South China waters.

The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on  December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the  past few days, that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing  old dates. No reason could be given for the re- ransmission of these  messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had  prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches  originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard  was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined  Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets  were in Kure. In the same message, the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was  not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was  at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his  usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces, but also  included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members  of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As  to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the  location of the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, which gives the strong  impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be   still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of  Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus his known progress from the  Empire to Chichijime [sic] to Saipan made his destination obviously the  Marshalls; also that since one of his large units arrived in the  Marshalls some time ago, that unit could not agree with ComSIXTEEN that  there was not a submarine concentration in that area. "Every evidence  points to a concentration, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines  there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the  Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the  Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication  summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War  Plans Officer.

[118] A dispatch was received from ComSIXTEEN, addressed to OpNav,  information CincAF, CincPac, and ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a  reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight.

2 December 1941:

On 2 December 1941, ComSIXTEEN reported that Cinc Second and Cinc Third  Fleets were in the Takao area, and, that broadcasts to fleet units were  being sent to Takao or Bako in addition to Tokyo. Also reported was the  fact that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had requested permission to  destroy codes.

CincAF also reported that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on  a southerly course in the South China Sea between Camranh Bay and the  Philippines. Also that three submarines were sighted 070 from Saigon,  180 miles, heading south, and that twenty-one transports, with air  patrol overhead, were at Camranh Bay.

A report from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the  arrival of 14,000 troops sailing from there the week ending the 22nd.

The communication intelligence summary for the previous day stated  generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly  at 0000 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a  period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November  1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month

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indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active  operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to  the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of  dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the  Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of  traffic prior to 0000 1 December indicated that an effort was made to  deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change  of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that, or the large number of  old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it  appear as if nothing unusual were pending. It should be noted that the  sentence in the above summary reading "The fact that service calls  lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in  preparing for active operations on a large scale" was underscored in red  pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton  testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by  Admiral Kimmel at the time.

The summary further stated as to the First Fleet "nothing to indicate  that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to  the Second Fleet, it was stated "This fleet is believed proceeding from  the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China;"  Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic;  consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up  Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report  except that the [119] same associations of Second Third Fleets and  Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continued. As  to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to  Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a  large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area  eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it  was stated "No change." As to carriers, it was said "No change." This  summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

In accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, prepared a memorandum for the Admiral dealing with  the location of the Japanese Fleet. This memorandum was prepared,  according to Layton, on the evening of 1 December and was submitted by  him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum is  Exhibit 23. The memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which,  Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to  submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, and which reflected the  later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the  night of December 1st-2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations  which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This  memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the  location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to  him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.

Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units  of the Orange (Japanese) were "*thought*" to be located as listed in the  memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of  the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six  battleships, "(?)", and other units. He listed

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the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then  corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure- Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.

In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief, China Fleet, the Shanghai base force, and an air group.

In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons  and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force with  numerous air groups and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted  carrier with 36 planes). He estimated hat the Commander in Chief, Second  Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to  indicate that he was at Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and  with "Cardiv 4-two CV and four DD; Cardiv 3 two-CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3- less HARUNA 3 BB (maybe 2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain  cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.

In the Hainon-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the  South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In  the French Indo-China area, he located the Commander in Chief of an  Expeditionary Fleet with various ships including 21 transports and some  base forces among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an  air group [120] and task force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the  Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air  group. At Saipan, he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine  force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force.  In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier  "KORYU? plus plane guards", and several submarine squadrons and base  force.

Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of  Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en  route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941,  during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and  commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier  Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on  this point as follows:

"Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you  said as best you recall it?

"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You don't now where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I  replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do  not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty  confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as  sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially  with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could  be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that  effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or  words to that effect . . .

"Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me,  arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye  when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion  about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or  jocular one?

"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said,  "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but  if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area  since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be  refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and  it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you mean to  say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In  other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their  exact location.

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"Mr. SONNETT.  He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information  about those carriers?

"[121] Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do  not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a  statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where  they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

3 December 1941:

It will be recalled that on December 3rd dispatches were sent by CNO to  CincPac and others advising that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts  at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had  been ordered to destroy the "purple" machine and most of the codes and  ciphers.

Layton testified that at the time Admiral Kimmel asked him what the  "purple machine" was; that he did not know and made inquiry; that he  advised Admiral Kimmel that it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical  coding machine; that he did not then know whether or not the Japanese  consul at Hawaii had such a machine; and, that he subsequently learned  that the Japanese consul there did not have such a machine.

The communication intelligence summary delivered on the 3rd, covering  the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic  was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major  parts of the Japanese Fleet. There was instances where the same dispatch  was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast  and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had  previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting  traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered  at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one  indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several  instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It  was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed  that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has  left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good  communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was  further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this  office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now  in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai  radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was  originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was  pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high  precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As  to the First Fleet, it was stated that despite the lack of positive  identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that  "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a  split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may  be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing  indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third  Fleets, and apparently in company, while another combined fleet call  appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the  Second Fleet, it was stated "No units have stood out prominently in    [122] the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new  identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large  part of 

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the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said  there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the  association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.

Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete lack of  information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat  promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls  have been partially identified since the change on the first of December  and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier  traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

4 December 1941:

On 4 December 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21, Naval Court) to  NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN and  ComSIXTEEN for information stating:

"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other  classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special  intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for  essential communications with CinCAF CincPAC ComFOURTEEN ComSIXTEEN and  Opnav X be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all  classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained."

ComSIXTEEN advised, in a dispatch received on December 4th, that seven transports had been sighted of Saigon on 15 November 1941, and on the  20th a seaplane carrier northeast of Amoy.

The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised, in a dispatch received 4  December, that several large liners had been carrying supplies and  personnel to the Carolines, that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit and  that certain islands were being specially developed.

The Naval Attach, Tokyo, advised in a dispatch received this day that a  transport loaded with aircraft and another with naval personnel had left  Yokohama on 27 November 1941.

The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated under the  heading "General," that traffic volume was normal with receiving  conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much  detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate  calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these  units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief  of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the  Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo  intelligence originated nine [123] dispatches to the same addresses. It  was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in  Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it  was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway,  but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also  stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands  but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no  information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

5 December 1941:

There were no dispatches of an intelligence nature received by CincPac. The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated that in  general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving

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