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Site Map INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK -- REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK |
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on territories of the Netherlands. In the interest of peace His Majesty's Governments feel it incumbent upon them, however, to remove any uncertainty which may exist as regards their attitude in the event of attack on Thailand. "His Majesty's Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the contrary, preservation of full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malay and His Majesty's Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound therefore to warn the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do so at her own peril and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appropriate measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will rest with Japan (tr. 13738-13740)." It would seem clear that the foregoing draft is the draft warning to Japan "concurred in" by the Australian Minister for External Affairs in his telegram to the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, which was dispatched from Canberra the evening of December 7 (tr. 14,631-14,632). In connection with these documents, it will be recalled that the Marshall-Stark joint memorandum of November 27 to President Roosevelt had recommended that "prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined; "*in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war*; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken; "*steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning (ex. 17).*" It will be also recalled that on Sunday, November 30 (Washington time), the State Department had received through Ambassador Winant a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt in which the Prime Minister, while stating that he realized the President's "constitutional difficulties," begged the President to consider at such moment as the President should judge right "which may be very near," the President should not tell Japan "that any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress or words to that effect." The Prime Minister had said that this was the one important method that remained "unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries," and that Great Britain would "make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24). There is thus evidence before the Committee that by the late afternoon of December 6 the President had determined upon a procedure which contemplated that his message to Emperor Hirohito, as the first step (which he took despite the views of those of his advisors who felt that it would have little effect), would be followed, as recommended by General Marshall and Admiral Stark and previously discussed at length with his principal Cabinet advisors, and as urged by Prime Minister Churchill, by a warning to Japan by the United States Government, with similar warnings by the Governments of Great Britain and the Netherlands. The warning recommended by General Marshall and Admiral Stark was to be given "in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand," and by late Saturday afternoon the progress of the Japanese naval force around Cambodia Point had PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 431 made such an advance an imminent probability. While both General Marshall (tr. 13809) and Admiral Stark (tr. 13760) testified that to the best of their recollection they were not consulted regarding the President's procedure outlined in the Australian message quoted above, that procedure followed the recommendation made in their joint memorandum of November 27 to the President so far as a warning to Japan was concerned. In this connection it should be noted that according to Secretary Stimson, President Roosevelt planned to give his warning to Japan in his proposed message to Congress. He said: "The final view was that an additional warning to Japan should be given (tr. 14482). * * * * * * * "The President was in fact during the early part of December engaged in preparing an address to Congress which would incorporate such a warning, and was also considering a special telegram to the Emperor. Before the address to the Congress was delivered, however, the Japanese struck on December 7th (tr. 14478). "The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and through the address to Congress to give the Japanese a final warning (tr. 14487)." Both the State Department, with respect to its files, and Miss Tully as custodian of the President's files, were requested by the Committee to furnish it with all information and documents relating to the proposed British warning and the telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs mentioned above (tr. 14628-14629; 14632-14633). The State Department searched its files twice and after the second search advised the Committee that no material relevant to those documents had been found (tr. 14629). Miss Tully advised the Committee that a further search of President Roosevelt's files had not disclosed any additional documents or memoranda regarding the documents in question. Regarding the message from the Australian Minister at Washington to Canberra, Miss Tully reported that she believed that "he and the late President discussed the subject but, of course, no record was ever made of such conversations" (tr. 14634). The preceding day, perhaps at the meeting of his Cabinet, President Roosevelt had requested Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox to compile for him the information available in their respective Departments concerning Japanese air, ground, and naval forces in French Indochina and adjacent areas. A memorandum dated December 5, 1941, based on Office of Naval Intelligence estimates, was transmitted by Secretary Knox to Secretary Hull with a covering, undated memorandum signed by the Secretary stating that the figures attached were those concerning which he had just talked with Secretary Hull on the telephone (ex. 175). A similar memorandum, dated December 6, and prepared by the Military Intelligence Division, was transmitted by Secretary Stimson to Secretary Hull on the same day with a covering letter in which Secretary Stimson specifically referred to the President's request of "yesterday" (ex. 175). The information contained in the memoranda, together with information received in the State Department from American diplomatic and consular sources, was combined in the State Department in a "Memorandum for the President," dated December 6, as follows: 432 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "Japanese Forces and Recent Increase in Japanese Military Material and Equipment in Indochina "According to information reported by our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon, received by them from French military sources in Indochina and not confirmed it is estimated that there are at present in northern Indochina (Tongking) 25,000 Japanese troops and 80,000 in southern Indochina, making a total of 105,000, and that there are at the outside some 450 Japanese planes in Indochina. According to a statement made December 4 by the Governor General of Indochina to our Consul at Hanoi, there are approximately 70,000 Japanese troops in Indochina, a little less than 30,000 being in Tongking and the balance in the south. The estimate of 105,000 is considered to be approximately correct by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department. "According to the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, 21 transports were sighted in Camranh Bay on December 2 by an air patrol from Manila, 12 submarines were sighted at sea northeast of Saigon proceeding south and nine of these submarines are now in Camranh Bay with other naval units including several destroyers. Our Consul at Hanoi reported on December 5 information from a reportedly reliable source that there were in Camranh Bay 30 transports carrying an estimated division of troops. Our Consul at Tsingtao reported on December 1 that for the preceding ten days an average of about three transports had left Tsingtao daily loaded with troops in summer uniforms. "An official of the French Foreign Office at Vichy stated to an officer of our Embassy on December 3 that the Japanese recently had been sending large amounts of military equipment and material into Indochina. According to our Consul at Hanoi Japanese military equipment recently landed in Indochina includes, as estimated by French military sources, 3,400 trucks and tractors, 600 automobiles, 500 motorcycles, 260 tanks (categories unspecified), 300 cannon, 2,000 machine guns, 1,300 submachine guns, 2,100 pack horses and a large number of bicycles. "The marked increase in Japanese troops in Indochina reportedly began November 21 with the arrival of 21 troop and supply ships at Saigon, the landing of 20,000 troops there, the transfer of 10,000 troops from northern Indochina southward and the subsequent landing of additional troops at both Saigon and Haiphong, those landed at the latter place proceeding southward by train. "At nearby Hainan Island there are estimated by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department to be some 30,000 Japanese troops and an unknown number of planes. Pursuit planes as well as bombers can fly from Hainan Island to northern Indochina, either direct or via Waichow Island off Pakhoi, Kwantung Province of China (ex. 175)." Secretary Hull testified that he was most invariably at home in the evening "working on Departmental matters," and that while it was possible he might be mistaken, it was his best recollection that he was "at home on the night of December 6, 1941" (tr. 14,315-14,317). The record before the Committee shows that at 8:45 o'clock that evening Secretary Hull had a telephone conversations with Secretary Knox, lasting not over 2 minutes (ex. 58; tr. 1168). While Secretary Hull's records indicate that he called Secretary Knox (tr. 1168), the records of the While House switchboard operators indicate that Secretary Knox called Secretary Hull that evening at 8:45 p. m., between two calls to Secretary Stimson made by Secretary Knox at 8:30 and 8:47 p. m. (Ex. 58). It is not clear from the record [1] before the Com- [1] Captain Kramer testified that before delivering copies of the first 13 parts to the White House, to Secretary Knox, and to Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson (then Director of Naval Intelligence), he telephoned the several persons to whom he customarily made deliveries of intercepted Japanese messages, and that he commenced these phone calls at about a quarter of 9 (tr. 10446-10450). He testified that he did not begin deliveries that evening until after 9 a. m., and that he did not reach Secretary Knox's apartment until after 9:15 p. m. (tr. 10451). He further testified that Secretary Knox read the lengthy 13 parts before making any telephone calls (tr. 14454). On the basis of this testimony, Secretary Knox s phone calls could not have been made before 9:30 p. m., whereas the actual records made at the time show that the first of Secretary Knox's three calls to Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull was made an hour earlier at 8:30 p. m., and that his telephone conversation with Secretary Hull occurred at 8:45 p. m. (Ex. 58; tr. 1168). This evidence leaves two major alternatives (1) Captain Kramer's memory with respect to times that evening was faulty and the times he gave should all be moved back at least an hour, making his arrival at Secretary Knox's apartment prior to 8:30 p. m. Under such circumstances it would have been possible for Secretary Knox's reading of the 13-part message to have been the immediate reason for arranging the meeting of the three Secretaries the next morning, provided it is also assumed that the meeting was not arranged during the several conversations among the three Secretaries earlier that Saturday; and (2) Captain Kramer's memory PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 433 mittee whether or not Secretary Knox's three telephone calls through the White House switchboard were the calls, "apparently to Mr. Hull and Mr. Stimson" according to Captain Kramer (tr. 10676), made by Secretary Knox after he received and read that evening the first 13 parts (Annex E attached hereto) of the intercepted message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura containing the Japanese Government's reply to the United States note of November 26. Secretary Knox gave instructions that the first 13 parts of that message, together with any additional intercepted messages that might become available during the night, should be brought to him at the meeting at 10 o'clock the next morning at the State Department which had been arranged with Secretaries Hull and Stimson (tr. 10676-10677). Captain Kramer, who delivered the 13 parts to Secretary Knox that evening, testified that the Secretary agreed with the conclusion he had placed on it, "that it aimed toward a conclusion of negotiations" (tr. 10676), and that nothing was said by the Secretary with respect to taking any action on the message (tr. 10454-10455). There is no evidence before the Committee that Secretary Hull saw the intercepted Japanese message containing the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply before Sunday. Secretary Hull testified that he could not "recall definitely the exact time" when he first saw that message (tr. 14299). Regarding the so-called "pilot message" which preceded it, Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, who was in charge of the delivery of "magic" to the Secretary of State, testified before the Committee that the "pilot" message, which was sent by the Japanese Foreign Minister to Ambassador Nomura on December 6 (Japan time) and was translated and available in Washington the afternoon of December 6 (Washington time), was distributed to the Secretary of State around 3 p. m. That afternoon (tr. 12049-12050). That message (#901) was as follows: "1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English). "2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being. "3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions (ex. 1, pp. 238-239)." Colonel Bratton's testimony in this regard is uncontradicted, and it is therefore reasonable to conclude, since deliveries of "magic" were made directly to the Secretary of State's office, that Secretary Hull [Footnote 1 continued from previous page] with respect to times that evening was correct. Under such circumstances it must follow that the meeting of the three Secretaries the next morning had been arranged before Secretary Knox knew of or saw the 13 part message, unless the assumption is also made that Secretary Knox made a second series of calls after 9:30 p. m. to Secretary Hull and Secretary Stimson that were not made through the White House switchboard and, in the ease of Secretary Hull, went unrecorded. In this general connection, Secretary Hull testified. "As r recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 was the result of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and myself. It might have been suggested in the first instance by any one or two of us three. According to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew out of a desire to continue our discussion of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indo China" (tr. 14318). The log of the duty officer at the Navy Department that Saturday evening contains an entry showing that *at 8 p. m.* Secretary Stimson's aide telephoned that Secretary Stimson desired certain specified information regarding American, British, Dutch, Japanese, and Russian naval vessels in the Pacific before 9 a. m., the next morning, that Secretary Knox, among others, was consulted in regard to this, and that Secretary Knox directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 10 a. m. The next morning (tr. 13946-13947, ex. 162). This would seem to indicate that the meeting of the three Secretaries had been arranged prior to 8 p. m. On Saturday, December 6. 434 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK saw the "pilot" message that afternoon before leaving the State Department. In the case of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message, however, the evidence before the Committee as to whether or not the first 13 parts were delivered to the State Department before the morning of December 7 (Washington time) is contradictory [1] and as stated above there is no evidence before the Committee that the first 13 parts were seen by Secretary Hull Saturday evening, December 6 (Washington time). The evidence before the Committee is uncontradicted, however, that the first 13 parts were delivered to President Roosevelt a little after 9:30 o'clock the evening of December 6 (Washington time). At that time, the President and Mr. Harry Hopkins, who was one of the guests at the White House dinner party, were in the President's study on the second floor of the White House. Commander Schultz, an assistant to Admiral Beardall, naval aide to the President, who personally handed the intercepted messages to the President, testified that he gained the impression the President was expecting them, and that the President read the messages and then handed them to Mr. Hopkins, who was pacing back and forth slowly. His testimony continued: "Commander SCHULZ. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance "This means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces; that is, their deployment and- "Mr. RlCHARDSON. Can you regal what either of them said? "Commander SCHULZ. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first that since war was imminent, that the Japanese intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for them- "The CHAIRMAN. When all was what? "Commander SCHULZ. When all was most opportune for them. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces had already landed there and there were implications of where they should move next. "The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their withdrawal. "Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people." [1] Colonel Bratton testified that the last of the 13 parts came into his office some time between 9 and 10 o'clock that night and that he was in his office when the last of the 13 parts came in (tr. 12049). He further testified that he personally delivered the 13 parts to the night duty officer at the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that night telling the duty officer that it was a "highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned" and that it should be sent out to Secretary Hull's quarters which he was assured would be done (tr. 12052-12053). This testimony is directly contrary to the affidavit of Col. Clyde Dusenberry, then Colonel Bratton's chief assistant in the Clausen investigation. In his affidavit Colonel Dusenberry stated that he specifically recalled the intercepted message in question and that "It started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning *to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen parts* and *I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept* about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department *as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State*. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas D. Handy who upon reading it said to me: "This means war " or words to that effect. *None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941* because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night" (Clausen, p. 50). Colonel Dusenberry's statements in his affidavit are in accord with the testimony of Gen. Sherman Miles, then Chief Of the Military Intelligence Division and the superior officer of Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenberry, who stated that Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson and the others on the War Department's "magic" distribution list received on December 6 all intercepted Japanese messages that were translated that day up to midnight "*except the first 13 parts of the 14-part message*" (tr. 4123-4124). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 435 Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record." "The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came. "During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might begin was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come. "Mr. RlCHARDSON. Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read? "Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater. "Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was it from what was said there that you draw the conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported? "Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the National Theater was mentioned in my presence, and the President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when in the theater, where, I believe, the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and that if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused, and the President did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case. "Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said about telephoning anybody else except Stark? "Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; there was not (tr. 12436-12444)." Captain Krick, who testified that he was at the National Theater that evening with Admiral Stark, recalled that when he and Admiral Stark returned to the latter's home, one of Admiral Stark's servants advised the admiral that there had been a White House call during the evening (tr. 14757). According to Captain Krick's testimony, Admiral Stark retired immediately to his study on the second floor where he had a White House phone (tr. 14755). He returned between 5 and 10 minutes later, and told Captain Krick that "conditions in the Pacific were serious; that was the substance of it, that conditions with Japan were in a critical state, something of that sort (tr. 14757)." Captain Krick testified that while he could not recall that Admiral Stark had said upon his return, "I have talked with the President of the United States", he had "heard, of course, the statement of the servant that there had been a White House call, and the Admiral retired immediately, and he may have stated that he was going to call the White House; but I have the distinct impression that the conversation was with the White House (tr. 14758)." There is no evidence before the Committee of any other action taken by President Roosevelt the night of December 6 (Washington time). A report that the Japanese Embassy in Washington had burned its codes and ciphers the preceding evening was received in the State Department from the Navy Department on December 6 (Washington time) (ex. 174). Intercepted Japanese messages which were translated in Washington that day, in addition to the first 13 parts of the 14-part message, included a message dated December 3 (Japan time) instructing the Japanese Embassy in Washington to keep its "hidden word" code lists "until the last moment" (ex. 1, p. 226); a message 436 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK requesting Ambassador Nomura to have certain Embassy officials "leave (Washington) by plane within the next couple of days" (ex. 1, p. 234); Ambassador Nomura's report on his and Ambassador Kurusu's meeting with Secretary Hull the day before; and a message dated December 3 from the Japanese Ambassador in Rome to Foreign Minister Togo reporting on his conference that day with Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano (ex. 1, pp. 228-229). In the latter report the Ambassador stated that at the conference he had described the developments in the Japanese- American negotiations as set out in message No. 986 from Foreign Minister Togo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin (which was translated and available in Washington on December 1 (Washington time) as has already been described). During the course of the conference in Rome, the Japanese Ambassador asked Mussolini and Ciano, if Japan should declare war on the United States and Great Britain, "would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point" (ex. 1, p. 229)." The fourteenth and final part of the intercepted Japanese message containing the text of the Japanese Government's reply to the United States' note of November 26 was translated and available in Washington the next morning, Sunday, December 7 (Washington time). The record before the Committee shows that it was delivered to President Roosevelt in his bedroom at the White House about 10 o'clock that morning by Admiral Beardall, the President's naval aide (tr. 14010; 14033). Admiral Beardall testified that when the President had read it and such other messages as accompanied it in the delivery pouch, he turned to the admiral and remarked that it looked as if the Japanese were going to break off negotiations (tr. 14011; 14034). While Captain Kramer testified that he made a second delivery of "magic" to the White House that morning, at about 11 o'clock, Admiral Beardall testified that he had no recollection of delivering any other "magic" messages to the President (tr. 14034), or of seeing the President again, until after he received word at home about 2 o'clock that afternoon of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 14015). Secretary Hull testified that he had no record of nor did he recall "having seen or having talked with the President between 9:30 p. m. on December 6, 1941 and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to my best recollection, I was available during all that period (tr. 14319)." He testified that on Saturday and Sunday up to the time of the Japanese attack he "was in constant contact * * * with officers of the State Department and of the Army and Navy * * *. It would be impossible to recall the details of all the conversations which took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-scale military movement from the jumping-off place in Southern Indo-China was very much in the minds of all of us who were called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to ascertain the full significance of those military movements their probable destination, etc. (Tr. 14319-14321)." That Sunday morning Secretaries Knox and Stimson met with Secretary Hull at the State Department. Secretary Hull testified that, according to his best recollection, the subject of that conference "was in line with our increasingly frequent conferences over the telephone or in person as the dangers and the threatened outbreak in Japan increased. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 437 "For instance, on the day just before we had received all of this information from our consuls and from a British dispatch that this Japanese armada had left its jumping-off point and was sailing toward the Kra Isthmus and * * * Prime Minster Tojo had made a speech * * * a little before this. But that, along with these actual movements, especially these movements, was the occasion, the chief occasion, I think of our conference. * * * * * "Senator LUCAS. In the conversations that you had with Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson on Sunday morning of the 7th was there anything said in that conversation about the likelihood of Japan attacking Pearl Harbor? "Mr. HULL. Nothing. As you understand, the attack was then on apparently. The fleet was moving toward the Kra Peninsula, which would greatly endanger the situation. "Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman; I could not get your last answer Will you read it, please? "Mr. HULL. I said the attack was under way, according to the dispatches on the sixth. This fleet was moving, not up north in the Bay of Siam or Thailand, but it was, so far as my impression extended, moving toward the Kra Isthmus, which was probably a threat all the way down toward Singapore, down the peninsula, and not far from Malaya (tr. 1605-16O6)." The record before the Committee shows that all 14 parts (Annex E) of the intercepted Japanese message containing the Japanese reply to the. United States note of November 26 were delivered to Secretary Knox at the State Department a few minutes before the meeting of the three Secretaries (tr. 10468), and that the intercepted message in which Foreign Minister Togo directed Ambassador Nomura to deliver the Japanese reply to Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. that day (ex. 1, p. 248) was handed to one of Secretary Hull's private secretaries at about 10:45 o'clock (tr. 10473). These deliveries were made by Captain Kramer, who testified that at the time of the second delivery he mentioned to Mr. Hull's private secretary the tie-up between 1 p. m. Washington time and "the scheme that had been developing for the past week or so in the Southwest Pacific with reference to Malaya and the Era Peninsula" (tr. 10472). A further indication of the matters discussed at the conference of the three Secretaries at the State Department that Sunday morning is a memorandum entitled "Location of U. S. Naval Forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of 7 December 1941" in evidence before the Committee (ex. 176). In the upper right hand corner of this memorandum appears the following handwritten note: "SECNAV (2), 1000", meaning, apparently, two copies for the Secretary of the Navy at 10 o'clock. This note, considered in conjunction with the log of the duty officer at the Navy Department the preceding evening (ex. 162), leaves little doubt that the memorandum was prepared expressly for the conference at the State Department that morning. The memorandum listed the major ships of the United States, Japanese, British, Dutch, and Russian fleets in the Pacific Ocean by name, and the destroyers and submarines in those fleets by number, giving their location "as of 7 Dec. 1941". The Japanese cruisers and destroyers referred to in the Hart message to the Navy Department and the Winant telegrams to the State Department the day before were listed as "off southern Indochina." The bulk of the Japanese Navy was listed as in the two major Japanese naval stations at Kure and Sasebo on the main Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu. Included among the Japanese ships listed by name as in those two Japanese naval stations that morning were all of the ships which, it is now known, were at that very moment less than 300 miles north 438 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK of the Hawaiian Islands in the act of launching their bombers and torpedo planes for the Japanese attack on the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Secretary Stimson's notes for that day, which appear to have been written the following day, describe in greater detail the meeting of the three Secretaries. "Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. The main thing is to hold the main people who are interested in the Far East together the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. Hull was to see the Japanese envoys at one o'clock but they were delayed in keeping the appointment and did not come until later as it turned out, till 2:00 o'clock or after. * * * The messages which we have been getting through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages which are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work on our papers about. The observer thought these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indo China, or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula, or probably Malaya. The British were very much excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that we must fight if the British fought (tr. 14428-14429)." The statement dictated by Secretary Hull as referred to in Secretary Stimson's notes, follows: "PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENT BY HULL "(See Record, December 7) "The Japanese Government, dominated by the military fire-eaters, is deliberately proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out its long proclaimed purpose to acquire military control over one-half of the world with nearly one-half its population. This inevitably means Japanese control of islands, continents, and seas from the Indies back near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples would be governed militarily, politically, economically, socially, and morally by the worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman, and semi- slavery methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the people in China and Hitler on the peoples of some fifteen conquered nations of Europe. This would virtually drive and force all free and peaceful peoples off the high seas. "At this moment of serious, threatened, and imminent danger, it is manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area must be commenced within the South Sea area at such times and places as in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within sufficient time and at such strategic points as would make it most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily determined that the Pacific area can be successfully defended. "More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world movement to conquer and destroy, with Hitler moving across one-half of the world and the Government of Japan under the military group moving across the other half of the world by closely synchronizing their efforts and collaborating and cooperating whenever to their individual or their mutual advantage. "This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worth while. Self-defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation of each and all of our civilized institutions (tr. 14433-14434)." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 439 Secretary Knox's statement was as follows: "SUGGESTION BY KNOX "(See Record, December 7) "1. We are tied up inextricably with the British in the present world situation. "2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of Malaya will automatically not only wreck her far eastern position but jeopardize her entire effort. "3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are almost certain to lose theirs. "4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their positions we are almost certain to be next, being then practically Japanese-surrounded. "5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be stated any threat to any one of the three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be ready jointly to let together and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or somebody may be left out on a limb). "6. I think the Japanese should be told that any movement in a direction that threatens the United States will be met by force. The President will want to reserve to himself just how to define this. The following are suggestions to shoot at: Any movement into Thailand; or any movement into Thailand west of 100 east and South of 10 North this in accordance with the recommendations of the British and Dutch and United States military authorities in the Far East; or any movement against British, Dutch, United States, Free French, or Portuguese territory in the Pacific area (tr. 14435-14436)." After the meeting at the State Department, Secretary Stimson went to his home for lunch (tr. 14428). Secretary Knox returned to the Navy Department. Both his aide, Admiral Beatty, and his confidential assistant, Major Dillon, testified that he arrived there from he State Department probably about 11:30 o'clock, possibly a little later (tr. 10239, 10253, 10260). Secretary Hull remained at the State Department. At about noon the Japanese Embassy telephoned the State Department and asked for an appointment for Ambassador Nomura with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. that afternoon. Somewhat later the Embassy telephoned again and requested that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 p. m., as Ambassador Nomura was not quite ready (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 786). That morning the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, Mr. W. G. Hayter, called at the State Department on an official of the Far Eastern Division. In response to an inquiry whether there was any news, Mr. Hayter is reported to have said "after some hesitation, that the British Minister in Thailand had sent a message to the (British) Foreign Office, which began "For God's sake" and which was endorsed by the Thai Foreign Minister requesting that British armed forces *not* move into Thailand" (ex. 169, item 34). [Italics in original.]" At 1:50 o'clock that afternoon the Navy Department received the following dispatch from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H.: "Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not drill (tr. 14204)." When this message was brought to Secretary Knox, he was talking with Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, in Major Dillon's office, who testified that after reading the message, the Secretary exclaimed: "My God, this can't be true, this must mean the Philippines" (tr. 10262). Secretary Stimson recorded in his notes for that day that "just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on he telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, "Have you heard the news?" said, "Well, I have heard the telegrams which have come in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh no, I don't mean that. They have 440
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