510
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
temporary agreement, sometimes called a modus vivendi (below conclusion
19) and presented to Japan his memorandum of that date, the Secretary
recognized, and said, that there was then "practically no possibility of
an agreement being achieved with Japan." Having reached this conclusion,
the Secretary, according to his account of what happened, declared on
November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this
Government, "that the matter of safeguarding our national security was
in the hands of the Army and Navy." (Peace and War, 1943, p. 144.) This
was presumptively a warning to the War Department and the Navy
Department to make ready for war. Accepting it as such the two
Departments sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel messages which, the
Departments claimed, ordered the commanders to put into effect a due
alert for war a possible Japanese attack (but see conclusion 13).
The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the
Secretary of the Navy were, therefore, certainly bound by the duties of
their respective offices to be on the alert day and night after November
26, 1941, for the receipt of any word or message from Japan and for the
receipt of any intercepts or other information respecting Japanese
designs and intentions that were indicative of a breach of relations and
war. They were also bound by their duties to alert and to keep on the
alert for sudden attack their immediate subordinates and the outpost
commanders having duties in connection with war operations.
2. *By November 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had reached
the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such a point as to
convince them that "the people would back us up in case we struck at
Japan down there (in the Far East)." They then took under consideration
"what the tactics would be." (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415.) Unless Japan
yielded to diplomatic representations on the part of the United States,
there were three choices on tactics before the President and the
Cabinet: They could wait until Japan attacked; they could strike without
a declaration of war by Congress; or the President could lay the issue
of peace or war before Congress. (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415 ff.*)
The proposal of an appeal to Congress was not new. So high was the war
tension in August 1941, that Prime Minister Churchill, recognizing the
constitutional inability of President Roosevelt to declare war, proposed
that the President seek authority from Congress to act on certain
conditions. The Prime Minister's proposal contained in his draft of
parallel communications to Japan read:
"If any third power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in
consequence of such counter measures or in their support of them the
President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to
give aid to such power. (Welles, memorandum of conversation, August 10,
1941.)"
The proposal to incorporate in the American communication to the
Japanese Government an announcement of this intention to appeal to
Congress was not accepted by President Roosevelt.
Sometime after November 7, 1941, when the President and his Cabinet
unanimously agreed that "the country" would back them up in case they
struck at Japan in the Far East, high administration authorities
discussed the tactics of an appeal by President Roosevelt to Congress in
a special message laying before it the serious danger that was
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
511
threatening the United States and its interests in the Far East. The
officers of the State Department, the Secretary of War, and the
Secretary of the Navy took part in drafting the proposed message for the
resident and their draft when completed was accompanied by a Memorandum
for the President," dated November 29, 1941, initialed by Secretary Hull
(Ex. 19; 161). In a note sending this draft message to the President,
Mr. Hull wrote:
"I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress *until the
last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostilities*. [Ex. 19,
italics supplied.]"
The decision against laying the issue before Congress left to the
administration authorities only the tactics of renewing negotiations
with Japan (which as to substantive issues had come to an end on
November 26) or the tactics of waiting on Japanese decisions and
actions.
Mr. Roosevelt chose to wait until December 7, 1941, rather than place
this grave issue before Congress. This seems clear from the testimony as
late as the night before the attack as follows:
Commander Schulz said that when he delivered the 13-part message to the
President on the night of December 6:
"Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going
to come at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could
not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The
President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are
a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and this
much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record."
"The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that
record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait
until it came (Tr., Vol. 63, p. 12442-3)."
3. *So imminent was war on November 25 that the President, in a
conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Know, Secretary Stimson,
General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, "brought up the event that we were
likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (December 1);
and the members of the conference discussed the question "How we should
maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position of firing the first shot
without allowing too much danger to ourselves" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418).
In the diplomatic documents, exhibits, and testimony before the
Committee there is a wealth of evidence which underwrites the statement
that the tactics of maneuvering the Japanese into "the position of
firing the first shot" were followed by high authorities in Washington
after November 2S, 1941. Examples of such tactics are afforded by
(a) Secretary Hull's decision, with the approval of President Roosevelt,
to discard the proposal for a temporary agreement with Japan without
notifying the Secretary of War or the British and Australian
representatives in Washington who had collaborated in working out a
draft of a memorandum with a view to reaching such an agreement if
possible (conclusion 19).
(b) The substitution for the proposed modus vivendi of the note of
November 26 to Japan, which, as Secretary Hull knew and said at the
moment, practically put an end to negotiations with Japan and passed
over to the Army and Navy the burden of safeguarding the security of the
United States.
512 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary Stimson quoted his diary for November 26 as follows:
"* * * Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about
made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I
passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing
over to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. * * * I
called Hull up this morning to tell him [of Chiang Kai-shek's objections
to the modus vivendi as set forth in a letter to T. V. Soong and shown
by him to Mr. Stimson] and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. * *
* He replied as I have said above that he had made up his mind to give
up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese
that he had no further action to propose. * * * (Tr. Vol. 70 p. 14420.)"
(c) The rejection of appeals made to President Roosevelt by General
Marshall and Admiral Stark on November 5 and also later on November 97,
1911, for a delay in bringing about a breach with Japan appeals based on
their belief that the Army and Navy were not then ready for a war with
Japan.
(d) The orders of the Secretary of War to the effect that General
Marshall and Admiral Stark should not put into their memorandum
appealing for delay, signed November 27, anything that could be
"construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to
reopen the conversations" (Tr. Vol. 20, p. 3325, and below, especially
conclusion 19).
According to Secretary Hull, the tactics of waiting for the Japanese to
fire the first shot was, in a measure, forced upon the Administration by
the attachment of a large part of the American people to neutrality as
expressed in the neutrality legislation of Congress and by their
opposition to involvement in war in the Far East as well as elsewhere.
This view Secretary Hull expressed in his statement to the Committee
(Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1096 ff.) and it is set forth more fully by other
documents before the Committee, particularly the State Department's
publication: *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-41*,
especially chapter 1.
In this chapter the State Department explains that the President and
Secretary Hull were hampered in the pursuit of the foreign policy they
had "clearly" decided upon at a date not fixed by the Secretary on
account of the opposition by "much of public opinion" in the United
States. In this chapter the State Department also explains that
"Our foreign policy during the decade under consideration (1931-41)
necessarily had to move within the framework of a gradual evolution of
public opinion in the United States away from the idea of isolation
expressed in "neutrality" legislation. * * * The pages (in the volume)
which follow show the slow march of the United States from an attitude
of illusory aloofness toward world-wide forces endangering America to a
position in the forefront of the United Nations that are now (l943)
making common cause against an attempt at world conquest unparalleled
alike in boldness of conception and in brutality of operation."
It is a serious question whether the President and his advisers were
justified in making the conclusions that the country would support them
for war; and whether actions taken by them upon their own opinion
without placing the matter before Congress was in violation of their
responsibilities under the Constitution and laws of the land. (See
Conclusion 2.)
4. *Having considered, without agreeing upon the proposition,, that a
message on the war situation should be sent to Congress, the President
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
513
and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of
the Navy pursued, from November 25 to December 7, the tactics of waiting
for the firing of "the first shot" by the Japanese.*
Nothing that indicates any easing of the tension between the United
States and Japan appears in the records of the exchanges with the
Japanese representatives in Washington between November 27 and December
6, inclusive. On the contrary, relations were rapidly deteriorating
(Foreign Relations: 11, pp. 772-784).
It was the general opinion among Washington authorities that the
question was no longer "would Japan attack," but "when and where."
On November 28, President Roosevelt said to Secretary Stimson that he
could see only three alternatives before him in the situation: "first,
to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum
again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at
once" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14423)
As late as December 2, President Roosevelt seemed to be still
considering the subject of a message to Congress. Secretary Stimson
recorded on that day: The President "is quite settled, I think, that he
will make a message to the Congress and will, perhaps, back that up with
a speech to the country" (ibid., p. 14427). On December 2, he was also
considering the possibility of a message to the Japanese Emperor (ibid.,
p. 14427).
With these possibilities of tactics before him, the President fully
abandoned the three projects: another ultimatum, fighting at once,
sending a message to Congress. He only turned to the fourth possibility
sending an appeal to the Japanese Emperor after it was too late; that
is, after 9 p. m. on the night of December 6, when the White House had
been alerted that the Japanese answer to our note of November 26 was
coming in and being decoded and his naval aide was on special duty to
receive and deliver it to him. Hence, in such respects, he adhered to
his first alternative, that of waiting for Japanese action.
5. *The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organization
for working in such close cooperation during the days immediately prior
to the Japanese attack on December 7 that they had every opportunity to
make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the
imminence of war went to the Hawaiian Commanders.*
For the purpose of taking concerted actions in fulfillment of the duties
imposed upon them, authorities in Washington formed two groups or
organizations with a view to coordinating the operations of the civil
and military branches of the executive department. If these groups were
so loosely constituted as not to deserve the name of organizations, this
was due to a failure on the part of the members to make them effective
bodies for the discharge of their coordinating responsibilities.
The first of these two groups consisted of the Secretary of State,
Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the
Chief of Naval Operations. Sometimes it was called colloquially the "War
Council."
The second group included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary
of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations, and occasionally commanding general of Air Force,
General Arnold. This group was sometimes colloquially called the "War
Cabinet."
514
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The use of these terms "War Council" and "War Cabinet" while the country
was still at peace seems to indicate that high civil and military
authorities in Washington were thinking in terms of war and should have
been more alert to the probable events of war such as an attack upon our
most important outpost and fleet in the Pacific.
Each of these groups or organizations
"was a sort of clearinghouse for information, a gathering place for
discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the
scene *would know what was going on and would have information to guide
him in making his own decisions* that were more or less independent, but
at the same time somewhat dependent on the action of other members of
the group. (Italics supplied.) (Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, p.
219.)"
If it be argued that these groups were loosely constituted and met
irregularly and informally and hence were not organizations in the
strict sense of the term [they met once a week at least and had other
irregular and additional meetings], it remains a fact that they existed
for the purposes described. Furthermore, if, owing to their loose
constitution, they did not discharge their duties efficiently, it also
remains a fact that the President had the power, and the corresponding
duty, to transform either or both of these groups into positive
organizations with positive obligations in respect of exchanging
information, making decisions, coordinating the civil and military
branches of the executive department, and framing orders to outpost
commanders. (See Conclusion No. 16.)
At all events, these groups had every opportunity to make sure that
identical and precise instructions warranted by the imminence of war
went out to the Hawaiian commanders and the President had the power and
duty to see that this was done directly or through the agency of these
groups, especially the second the "War Cabinet."
6. *Through the Army and Navy intelligence services extensive
information was secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs, by
intercepted and decoded Japanese secret messages, which indicated the
growing danger of war and increasingly after November 26 the imminence
of a Japanese attack.*
With extraordinary skill, zeal, and watchfulness the intelligence
services of the Army Signal Corps and Navy Office of Naval
Communications broke Japanese codes and intercepted messages between the
Japanese Government and its spies and agents and ambassadors in all
parts of the world and supplied the high authorities in Washington
reliable secret information respecting Japanese designs, decisions, and
operations at home, in the United States, and in other countries.
Although there were delays in the translations of many intercepts, the
intelligence services had furnished to those high authorities a large
number of Japanese messages which clearly indicated the growing resolve
of the Japanese Government on war before December 7, 1941.
Incidentally, it was a matter of great imprudence for the State and War
Department to permit so large a number (200) of Japanese consular
representatives at so important a naval base as Hawaii. Much of the
espionage involved in the intercepts emanated from this consular group m
Hawaii.
Four volumes laid before the Committee contain hundreds of these
messages including in some cases comment and interpretations:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
515
(l) *Pearl Harbor: Intercepted Diplomatic messages*. Ex. 1 (253 pp.);
(2) *Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship
Movements*, etc. (of the United States) (mimeograph, Ex. 2); and
(3) *Army Pearl Harbor Board: Top Secret Testimony, Report, and Official
Memoranda* (mimeograph).
(4) *The Navy Court of Inquiry Top Secret Testimony and Report*.
No person has any intellectual or moral right to pass judgment on the
question of responsibility for Pearl Harbor who has not read, compared,
studied, and interpreted all of these documents.
With regard to the volume, nature, and details of the information
respecting Japanese designs and operations supplied by the Army and Navy
intelligence services to high authorities in Washington, see below.
(Conclusion 20.)
The President and the other officials receiving the intercepted messages
in Washington prior to December 7, 1941, considered it likely hat Japan
would attack the United States. At a meeting of the President and his
so-called War Council on November 25, 1941, according to Mr. Stimson's
notes, the President stated: "That we were likely to be attacked perhaps
(as soon as) next Monday" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418)."
There was abundant evidence in the intercepted messages that Japan
intended to attack the United States. Japan had fixed a dead-line date
of November 25 [ex. I, p. 100], extended to November 29 [ex. I, p. 165]
for reaching diplomatic agreement with the United States. There were at
least six Japanese messages emphasizing this dead line. If the dead-line
date passed without agreement, the Japanese Government advised her
Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are automatically going to happen."
The necessity for agreement by the dead-line date was stressed by Japan
in these terms: "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a
few days"; "We gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die"
(exhibit 1, p. 137, 93). On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced
"dead-line" date, the United States Government delivered to Japan a
diplomatic note, which the intercepted messages revealed Japan
considered to be a "humiliating proposal," impossible of acceptance
(exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted diplomatic messages further
revealed that Japan expected to "rupture" negotiations with the United
States when she replied to the American note of November 26 (exhibit 1,
p. 204).
To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, Japan
instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing
negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for delivery (exhibit
1, p. 208). A message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador in
Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and translated by the Navy
in Washington on December 1 (exhibit 1, p. 204). In this message the
Japanese Ambassador was instructed to
"immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
and confidentially communicate to them a summary of developments * * *.
*Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through
some clash of arms and add the time of the breaking out of this war may
come quicker than anyone dreams*. (Italic supplied.)
The President regarded this message as of such interest that he retained
a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the
516
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
intercepted messages (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10887). On December 2, 1941,
elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted dealing in precise
detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals
in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the United States"
(exhibit 1, p. 198).
The probability that the Pacific Fleet would be attacked at Pearl Harbor
was clear from the "bomb plot" available in Washington as early as
October 9, 1941, and related Japanese messages. It will aid in obtaining
a clear understanding of these important messages if the principal
intercepted communications are set forth in full. They are:
From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
September 24, 1941
#83
Strictly secret.
Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible:
1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-
areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C. East Loch.
Area D. Middle Loch.
Area E. West Loch. And the communicating water routes.
2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in the docks. (Designate types and classes briefly.
If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)
ARMY 23260
Trans. 10/9/41 (S)
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Washington
September 29, 1941.
Circular #041
Honolulu to Tokyo #178
Re your #083*
(Strictly secret)
The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location
vessels:
1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message
Washington #48**): KS.
2. Navy Dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): KT.
3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.
4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be
differentiated by A and B respectively.)
Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.
* Not available
** Available dated 21 August
JD-1 5730 23312
(D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
November 15, 1941.
#111
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make
your ships in harbor report irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.
Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to
maintain secrecy.
JD 1: 6991 25644
(Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 517
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu November 18, 1941
#113
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein:
Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,[a] and the Areas Adjacent thereto.
(Make your investigation with great secrecy.)
ARMY 25773
Trans 12.5.41 (S)
[a] Probably means Mamala May.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 20, 1941
#111 Strictly secret
Please investigate comprehensively the fleet bases in the neighborhood
of the Hawaiian military reservation.
ARMY 25694 JD 7029
Trans. 12-4-41 (S)
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
November 29, 1941
#122
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future
will you also report even where there are no movements.
JD-1: 7086 25823
(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
November 18, 1941.
#222.
1. The warship at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in
my #219 [a] on that day.
Area A [b] A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker
left port.
Area C [c]-Three warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier
Enterprise, or some other vessel, was in area C. Two heavy cruisers of
the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks KS.
Four merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D [d].
3. At 10 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, eight destroyers were
observed entering the harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single
file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour,
they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the harbor through
area B to the buoys in area C, to which they were moored, they changed
course five times, each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was 1
hour; however; one of these destroyers entered area A after passing the
water reservoir on the eastern side.
Relayed to-.
ARMY 25817
Trans 12-6-41.
In the "bomb plot" message of September 24, 1941, the Japanese
Government gave detailed instructions to its consul general in Hawaii as
to the character of report it required concerning vessels in Pearl
Harbor. Pearl Harbor was to be divided into five subareas. An
alphabetical symbol was given each area. The Japanese Government
instructed the consul:
"With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate type and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there
are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)
[a] Available, dated November 14. Code under study.
[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
[c] East Loch.
[d] Middle Loch.
518
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 9,1941
(exhibit 2, p. 12)
On September 29, 1941, the Japanese consul in Hawaii replied to his
government. He established a system of symbols to be used in designating
the location of vessels at key points in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch was
decoded and translated in Washington on October L0, 1941.
On November 15,18,20, and 29 the Japanese Government urgently called for
information about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 2, p.
13-15). On November 15 the Japanese consul in Honolulu was directed to
make his "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a
week (exhibit 2, p. 13). The reports were to give vessel locations in
specific areas of the harbor, using the symbols established in September
(exhibit 2, p. 15). The greatest secrecy was enjoined because relations
between Japan and the United States were described as "most critical."
On November 18 the Japanese consul general reported to Tokyo the
locations of the ships in the various subareas of Pearl Harbor, giving
minute descriptions of the courses, speed, and distances apart of
destroyers entering the harbor (exhibit 2, p. 14). On November 29
reports were requested even though there were no movements of ships.
These despatches were intercepted, decoded, and translated in Washington
on December 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1941.
The "bomb plot" message, and those messages relating to Pearl Harbor
which followed it, meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl
Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack. No other American harbor was
divided into subareas by Japan. And no other American harbor had such a
large share of the fleet to protect.
In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or more
vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the "bomb plot" message
Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain the general
whereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in port. With the
"bomb plot" message Japan inaugurated a new policy directed to Pearl
Harbor and to no other place, in which information was no longer sought
merely as to the general whereabouts of the fleet. But as to the
presence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the
period immediately preceding the attack Japan required such reports even
when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. The
reports which Japan thus sought and received had a useful purpose only
in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. These
reports were not just the work of enthusiastic local spies gathering
meticulous details in an excess of zeal. They were the product of
instructions emanating from the Government of Japan in Tokyo. Officers
of the high command in Washington have admitted before us that the "bomb
plot" message, if correctly evaluated, meant an attack on ships of the
Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 3026; Vol. 23, p. 4014;
Vol. 27, p. 4874; Vol. 12, p. 2100-2102; Vol. 59, p. 11313-11314; Vol.
35, p. 6390, 6394; Vol. 30, p. 5378).
On October 9th, 1941 (ex. 2, p. 12), Lieutenant Commander Kramer of
Naval Intelligence in Washington promptly distributed the Pearl Harbor
"bomb plot" message to the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval
Communications, the Director of War Plans, and the
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
519
Director of Naval Intelligence (Tr., Vol. 59 p. 11209). It bore the
location "interesting message" on a gist or flag (Tr., Vol. 59, p.
11207). It was accompanied by a summary of its contents as follows:
"Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided
into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations (Tr., Vol.
69, p. 11207)."
Military Intelligence through Colonel Bratton delivered the "bomb plot"
message to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the chief of
the War Plans Division (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12083). The message was
discussed several times by Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern
Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff,
with his opposite numbers in the Navy Department (Tr., Vol. 62, p.
12105). They discussed possible significance of the message, as
implicating a plan for an air attack on ships
520
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
base that Washington authorities were not justified in keeping to
themselves or in evaluating it in any manner which would dilute or
generalize the significance of the messages in their original form.
Washington authorities failed in this, a prime responsibility in their
relations with the outpost commanders.
In the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Japan made no effort to
conceal the movements or presence of her naval forces in South East Asia
(Tr., Vol. 3, p. 453). The movements of her troops in Indo-China at that
time were the subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States
and Japan (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol.
II, p. 779). Yet the intercepts showed that some Japanese plan went into
effect automatically on November 29, from which Japan hoped to divert
American suspicion by a pretext of continued negotiations. The Pearl
Harbor "bomb plot" messages gave some hint of what might follow
"automatically."
Only the President and his top advisers in Washington had this
information. Other messages intercepted later were even more revealing.
These were the intercepted Japanese messages distributed in Washington
on Saturday afternoon and evening, December 6, and several hours before
the blow fell on Sunday morning, December 7. These were:
1. The "Pilot message." This was a message from Japan to her Ambassadors
in Washington advising them that the Japanese reply to the American note
of November 26 was ready and being sent to them in 14 parts; that it was
to be treated with great secrecy pending instructions as to the time of
its delivery; and that the time for its delivery was to be fixed in a
separate message (Exhibit 1, p. 238).
2. The first 13 parts of the Japanese reply. This included all but the
last paragraph of the Japanese note handed to the Secretary of State on
December 7 (Exhibit 1, pp. 239-244).
3. The fourteenth and last paragraph of the Japanese reply, and the
message to the Japanese Ambassadors which fixed the time for delivery of
the Japanese note as 1 p. m Washington time, December 7 (Exhibit 1, p.
248).
Full details of the timing and significance of these messages, how they
were handled, and what was done about them is discussed in conclusion
20.
It is sufficient to say here that prior to December 7, 1941, a great
volume of secret information obtained by American and other intelligence
services from intercepted Japanese messages was available in Washington
with which to gage the designs, intentions, and operations of Japan
relative to the United States. This information was distributed to high
authorities in Washington and practically none of it was passed on to
the commanders in Hawaii although it bore directly on their
responsibilities in the defense of their outpost.
7. *Army and Navy information which indicated growing imminence of war
was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of national
preparedness for meeting an attack, among others, the President, the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations*.
The "magic" intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential and
the policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated by a
desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
521
were being broken. Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted
messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary of
War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the
Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to the
Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the
War Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the State
Department; and to the President's naval aide for transmittal to the
President. By agreement between the Army and Navy in Washington, the
Army was responsible for distribution of magic within the War Department
and to the State Department; the Navy for distribution within the Navy
Department and to the White House.
The President requested the original raw messages in English examining
them personally and on December 6 had his naval aide on special night
duty to receive and deliver them to him.
The dissemination of magic materials did not include the commanders at
Hawaii, but on a few occasions material derived therefrom was dispatched
by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. The War Department did not
send the magic to the field. A large amount of other intelligence
obtained from various sources within and without the country was not
sent to either of the commanders in Hawaii.
8. *Judging by the military and naval history of Japan, high authorities
in Washington and the commanders in Hawaii had good grounds for
expecting that in starting war the Japanese Government would make a
surprise attack on the United States*.
There is no evidence in the record before the Committee that President
Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and/or Secretary Knox
expected at any time prior to December 7 a formal declaration of war on
the United States by Japan in case the diplomatic negotiations came to a
break. Indeed, all the evidence bearing on expectations in Washington as
to Japan's probable methods of making war point to the belief of the
Administration that Japan would begin with a surprise attack.
For example, Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at a meeting
of "high officials," when he stated that the matter of safeguarding our
national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy, "expressed his
judgment that any plans for our military defense would include the
assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a
central point in their strategy, and also might attack at various points
simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of
coordination for purposes thereof" (Peace and War, 1943, p. 144).
Speaking to Ambassador Halifax on November 29, Secretary Hull said that
it would be a
"serious mistake * * * to make plans of resistance without including the
possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element
of surprise * * * that the Japanese recognize that their course of
unlimited conquest * * * is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost
boldness and risk. (Peace and War, 1943, pp. 144-145)."
Ambassador Grew reported to Hull on November 3
"Japan may resort with dangerous and dramatic suddenness to measures
which night make inevitable war with the United States. (Peace and War,
p. 775.)"
9. *Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other
information respecting Japanese designs and operations in the hands of
522
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the United States authorities warranted those authorities in excluding
from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders the
probability of an attack on Hawaii. On the contrary, there is evidence
to the effect that such an attack was, in terms of strategy, necessary
from the Japanese point of view and in fact highly probable, and that
President Roosevelt was taking the probability into account before
December 7*.
The fleet was stationed at Pearl Harbor in a large measure, if not
entirely, for the purpose of exercising a deterring effect on the
aggressive propensities of the Japanese Government during the diplomatic
negotiations and of making the Government more likely to yield to the
diplomatic representations of the United States in matters of policy.
This was done contrary to the advice of the Commander in Chief of the U.
S. Fleet, Admiral Richardson (who was removed because of protest on that
issue), and with which Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval
Operations agreed. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 916). The fleet could produce this
effect only as an instrument of war that constituted a potential threat
to the Japanese; that is, a powerful instrument which could be used
effectively to strike Japanese armed forces if they moved too far
southward in the direction of British, Dutch, and/or American
possessions in that region.
Having determined to move far southward and having moved far on the way
early in December toward that region, the Japanese were warned by every
principle of sound naval strategy to destroy, if possible, the American
fleet at Hawaii on their left flank.
As Prime Minister Churchill said, in an address to the House of Commons
on January 27, 1942, with reference to the Atlantic Conference and
British strategic decisions as time went on after that Conference:
"It must also be remembered that over the whole Pacific scene brooded
the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It
seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of
the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the
Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great
American Fleet."
President Roosevelt recognized this strategic consideration as shown by
his message to Chiang Kai-shek as follows:
"Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard
to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented,
with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable
way possible. * * *
"Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval
defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily
increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along
the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-china,
are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are
the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their
territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department message, approved
by President Roosevelt and transmitted through Ambassador Hu Shih to
Chiang Kai-shek)."
High authorities in Washington definitely knew from a message received
from Ambassador Winant in London at 10:40 a. m. December 6, 1941
(Washington time) that two large Japanese forces had been seen sailing
toward the Kra Peninsula and were distant only fourteen hours in time
(Ex. 21). Washington authorities should have known, therefore, that this
would bring the strategic principle of what to do
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
523
bout Hawaii into immediate military calculations. They took no steps to
alert Hawaii.
The Japanese were fully aware of this strategic principle in December
1941, as their attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated.
During the weeks preceding December 7, what was the attitude of high
authorities in Washington with regard to the probability of Japanese
action against Pearl Harbor in accordance with this strategic principle?
Some of those high authorities thought that the Japanese would not take
the risk of such an attack. Indeed those authorities were seriously
lacking in information respecting the progress and state of Japanese
military and naval preparedness and equipment, and they were unaware of
the degree to which the Japanese were equipped to attack the American
fleet and military installations at Pearl Harbor. The State Department
seemed to labor under the impression that the United States could defeat
Japan in a few weeks. (See also Secretary Knox Annual Navy Report of
June 30, 1941, released December 6, 1911.) Judging by the testimony and
documents before the Committee, most of the high authorities in
Washington, especially after the Atlantic conference in August 1941, so
concentrated their attention on American-British-Australian-Dutch plans
for combined actions against the Japanese in southeastern Asia that they
failed to give sufficient, if any, careful consideration to the
strategic principle which enjoined the Japanese to destroy, if they
could, the American fleet at Hawaii on their left flank before advancing
too deeply into southeastern waters.
Nevertheless the possibility, indeed the probability, of a Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor had entered into the calculations of high
authorities in Washington and the commanders at Pearl Harbor for years,
months, and days before December 7, 1941.
The whole raison d' etre of the powerful naval and military
installations in Hawaii, as publicly announced, was *defense against a
Japanese attack*. (See testimony of Mr. Grew for discussion of this
point (Tr. 7 Vol. 9, p. 1586.) Preparations for defense against attack
necessarily implied the possibility of an attack.
American war plans and maneuvers in the Hawaiian area for years prior to
December 7, 1941, took into full account the probability of a Japanese
attack by air. (See Martin-Bellinger report, Ex. 44.)
None of the Army and Navy witnesses before the committee admitted they
had neglected the possibility or the probability of a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor during the period prior to December. On the contrary, they
testified that they had consistently reckoned with the possibility, even
when they minimized the probability. (Tr., for example, Vol. 12, p.
2111, Vol. 13, pp. 2162, 2167, 2172, 2173, Vol. 14, p. 2341.)
Intercepts of Japanese messages made by the Army and Navy intelligence
services showed high authorities in Washington that the Japanese
Government had ordered its agents in Hawaii to report on American
military and naval installations and ship movements in that region. They
also required reports on "lack of movements." For example, September 24,
1941, it ordered an agent to subdivide the waters of Pearl Harbor into
five subareas, as well as to report on ship movements there. Prior to
and after this date Japanese agents were,
524
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
up to the Japanese attack, reporting on ship movements, installations,
and other matters of military and naval significance to the Japanese
government. (Japanese messages concerning Military installations, Ship
movements, etc., pp. 2-29. See conclusion 6.)
It is true that owing to neglect or delays in Washington some of these
messages were not translated prior to December 7, 1941, but enough
messages had been translated to provide copious information to high
authorities in Washington. Delays in translations were not due to lack
of congressional appropriations (General Marshall, Tr., Vol. 19, p.
3149).
Witnesses before the Committee, it may be noted, in extenuation of their
lack of emphasis on the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor, called
attention to the fact that Japanese agents were also reporting on the
military and naval installations of the United States at Panama, the
Philippines, the west coast, and other points. But to men, competent,
careful, and watchful, men alert on their all-around and indivisible
responsibility, this fact provided no excuse whatever for minimizing the
probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor any more than at any other
American outpost. Nor does it excuse the failure of Washington
authorities to note that far greater detail was being asked for by the
Japanese about Hawaii at a time when Japanese movements in the
Southeastern Pacific had to contend with the strategic position of
Hawaii where the real American striking force, the fleet, rested.
A full review of the testimony and documents before the Committee
confirms the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board (p. 107);
after its survey of relevant facts: "We must therefore conclude that the
responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Staff in Washington, down to the generals and admirals in Hawaii, *all
expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor* (that is December 7, 1941)."
As a general statement, when testifying *after* the Pearl Harbor attack,
they did not expect it. Apparently the only person who was not surprised
was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson. Who testified: "Well, I was not
surprised!"
10. *The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands of
the President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion at
least 10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a few
days was so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and, having
reached this conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy, was under obligation to instruct the Secretary of War and
Secretary of the Navy to make sure that the outpost commanders put their
armed forces on an all-out alert for war*.
Besides the knowledge of Japanese designs and operations which the
President and the Secretary of State acquired from their diplomatic
negotiations with Japan, they also had the knowledge of Japanese designs
and operations made available to them by the Army and Navy intelligence
services. This additional knowledge could only serve to fortify the
conviction already reached as early as November 25, namely, that a
Japanese attack was near at hand or to use President Roosevelt's own
words, "we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as Monday"
(December 1). (See above, conclusion 3.)
The nature of the additional information placed at the disposal of the
President and Secretary of State by the Army and Navy Intelligence
Service is indicated by the citations of Army and Navy intercepts of
Japanese messages. (See conclusion 20.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
525
Through intercept of Japanese messages extending over many months prior
to December 7, 1941, translated and laid before high authorities in
Washington by the Army and Navy Intelligence Services, these Washington
authorities learned that Japanese spies and agents, directed by the
Japanese Government, were collecting and transmitting to Tokyo an
immense amount of exact and detailed information respecting the military
and naval installations and the state of preparedness in the Hawaiian
Islands, as well as elsewhere, but more detailed in relation to Hawaii
than elsewhere. (See conclusion 6.)
As early as September 24, 1941, Washington authorities knew that
Japanese agents in Hawaii were instructed to divide the waters of Pearl
Harbor into five subareas and later to report to Tokyo regularly on
ships in the Harbor, ship movements and also to report even though there
were no ship movements. These and other Japanese messages requested
information also on military installations, and American preparedness
materiel, defensive practices, including air reconnaissance, and other
matters of vital importance to Japanese armed forces in case they made
an attack on Pearl Harbor. (See conclusion 6.) Owing to inexcusable
delays on the part of Army and Navy authorities in Washington in
translating the intercepts of Japanese messages, many of the most
critical and important messages intercepted on and after November 24,
1941, were unavailable for general distribution among high authorities
in Washington before the Japanese blow fell at Pearl Harbor on the
morning of December 7.
From a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated and translated on
November 28, authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese
Government regarded the American note of November 26 as "a humiliating
proposal," and that "Japan cannot use it as a basis for negotiations."
They further learned from this same Tokyo message that the Japanese
answer would be sent to the Japanese ambassadors in Washington in two or
three days, "*after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured."
[Italics supplied.]
From a message from Tokyo to Berlin, dated November 30 and translated
December 1, high authorities in Washington learned that the American
note of November 26 was considered by the Japanese Government as
"insulting" and that it was impossible for the Japanese Government to
find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations, and that, in
the Japanese Government's opinion, the United States regarded Japan,
along with Germany and Italy as an enemy.
From a message from Tokyo to Berlin, dated November 30 and translated
December 1, high authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese
Government regarded negotiations with the United States as "ruptured
broken," and that the Japanese Government had stated that "the time of
the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."
Although the knowledge gained from these and other items of information
was sufficient to warn high authorities in Washington that Japan was on
the verge of starting hostilities, reference should be made in this
connection to the so-called "winds" messages concerning which there had
been much dispute and no little mystery. The story, though long, may be
abbreviated here.
526
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Otis Sadtler testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that
about November 20, 1941, a Japanese message was intercepted notifying
nationals that another message was to come indicating whether war, if
launched, would be against the United States, Great Britain, or Russia
or any combination of them. The first message stated that the second or
"activating" message to come would indicate by reference to the
directions of the winds and weather the names of the countries against
which war would be started. The Army Pearl Harbor Board also had
evidence to the effect that the second or "activating" message from
Japan had come and that it meant "War with England, War with America,
Peace with Russia." According to the Board's report:
"This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and
cannot be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was
collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts commission.
Copies were in existence in various places but they have all disappeared
(Top secret p. 8)."
The evidence before this Committee bearing on the interception of the
activating message from Tokyo and on the contention that it indicated
hostilities between Japan and the Anglo-American combination covers
hundreds of pages. Admittedly the evidence is confusing and conflicting,
but after reviewing it; Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, deputy to Admiral
Harold Stark, testified before the Hart Inquiry to questions 68 and 69:
"68. Q. During November or December '41 were you cognizant of a special
code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform
their nationals concerning against what nations they would make
aggressive movements by means of a partial weather report?
"A. Yes; I do recall such messages.
"69. Q. Do you recall having seen on or about 4 December the broadcast
directive thus given indicating that the Japanese were about to attack
both Britain and the United States?
"A. Yes."
Admiral Ingersoll, Deputy to Admiral Harold Stark at Washington, and
Admiral Turner, Navy operations officer at Washington, both stated they
did not know until 1945 about the allegation that there had been no wind
execute message. Even if the wind execute message they saw was a false
one they believed it true at the time and should have acted accordingly.
If, however, the receipt of the activating "winds" message be wholly
discounted, such discounting in no way affects the other items of
unmistakable evidence which demonstrates that high authorities in
Washington had sufficient knowledge of Japanese designs to convince them
before the attack that war with Japan was an imminent certainty.
From a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated December 2 and translated
December 3, high authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese
Government had ordered its Washington Embassy to destroy all codes
except one and all secret documents. (One code machine was to be kept
for use in the final negotiations which ended in the rupture of
relations on December 7.)
From a message dated December 6 and translated on December 6, sometime
in the afternoon, Washington authorities learned that the Japanese
Government had notified the Japanese Embassy in Washington that a
memorandum for the United States would be sent in 14 parts and to be
prepared to present it the memorandum that would make a rupture in
relations with the United States.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
527
Messages serving as guides to procedure in the matter of this 14-part
message follow:
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
(Urgent Very Important)
#907 To be handled in Government Code
Re my #902. [a]
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at
1:00 p. m., on the 7th, your time.
Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
Army 25850
[a] S.I.S. #25843 text of Japanese reply.
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
#904
Re my #902
There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the
aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.
Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.
Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
Army 25844
JD: 7144
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
(Extremely Urgent)
#910
After deciphering part 14 of my #902 a and also #907 b, #908 c and 909
d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine
codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.
Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
The "pilot message" was filed in Tokyo at 6:56 *a. m*. Washington time
December 6; it was intercepted by the Navy by 7:20 a. m. Washington time
December 6, and forwarded to the Navy Department. It was sent by the
Navy to the Army for decryption and translation about noon, Washington
time, on December 6 (exhibit 41). It was decrypted, translated, and
distributed about 3 p. m., Washington time, by the Army, to Mr. Hull,
Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, the Chief of the Far Plans Division,
General Gerow, and the Chief of Military Intelligence, General Miles
(Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12050). In the Navy Department the Director of Naval
Intelligence Admiral Wilkinson received the so-called "pilot message"
prior to 6 p. m., Washington time, on December 6 (Tr., Vol. 26, p.
4658). He had previously told his subordinates to be on the lookout for
the Japanese reply and felt sure that he gave instructions that the
"pilot message" was to be delivered to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 26, p.
4662). Admiral Turner, Chief of the War Plans Division in the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, received the "pilot message" in the
evening of December 6 (Tr., Vol.
528
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
30, pp. 5440-5442). Admiral Stark and General Marshall each denies that
on December 6 he had knowledge of the "pilot message" (Tr., Vol. 21, p.
3473, and Vol. 32, p. 5813). We find on the testimony of General Miles
and Colonel Bratton that the "pilot message" was delivered to General
Marshall during the afternoon of December 6, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 21, pp.
3589-3590, and Vol. 62, pp. 12019-12050).
In late afternoon or early evening of December 6, American Naval
Communications intercepted, decoded, and translated the first 13 parts
of this memorandum from the Japanese Government to the State Department
the answer to the United States note to Japan on November 26. The
translation of these 13 parts was presented to President Roosevelt
between 9 and 10 o'clock that evening. After he had read the 13 parts,
the President said in substance, "This means war."
The evidence indicated that the first 13 parts were read on the evening
of December 6 by, particularly, the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins,
Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson,
Admiral Beardall, General Miles, Captain Kramer, and Colonel Bratton.
Owing to the practice of making decisions by war cabinets, councils,
joint committees, and individuals, official responsibility of each man
was so blurred that each man became indifferent to his own individual
responsibility. A good example of this is Admiral Turner's assumption
that so long as Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox
had seen the 13-part message, "I did not believe it was my function to
take any action." No one took action that night; all waited for the next
day. [1]
When Mr. Knox received the message he called Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull
and arranged a conference with them for Sunday morning at 10 a. m. (Tr.,
Vol. 56, pp. 10675-10681). Mr. Stimson asked the Navy Department on
Saturday evening to furnish him by 9 a. m. Sunday morning the following
information:
"Compilation of men-of-war in Far East: British, American, Japanese,
Dutch, Russian; *also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific
Fleet*, with locations, with a *list* of American men-of-war in the
Atlantic without locations (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13,988; italics inserted)."
Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted
about this request. The Secretary of the Navy directed that
[1] On many occasions the obligation of an officer was weakened by
intermeddling of superiors. President Roosevelt, himself, often directed
detailed operations for which field commanders were responsible. An
example of this occurred in connection with an order on December 2,
1941, which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander in Chief
of the Asiatic Fleet, commencing as follows:
"President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and
within 2 days if possible after receipt this despatch" (exhibit 37, p.
39).
The President's directions were that the Commander in Chief of the
Asiatic Fleet was to charter three small vessels to form a "defensive
information patrol." The minimum requirements to establish these ships
as United States men of war would suffice in manning them. These
requirements were command by a naval officer and the mounting of a small
gun and one machine gun. The employment of Filipino crews with the
minimum number naval ratings was authorized. The ships were to observe
and report by radio Japanese movements to the West China Sea and Gulf of
Siam. The President prescribed the point at which each vessel was to be
stationed. One vessel was to be stationed between Hainan and Hue, one
between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques, one off Pointe De Camau
(exhibit 37, p. 39). All these points were clearly in the path of the
Japanese advance down the coast of Indochina, and toward the Gulf of
Siam. The Navy Department did not originate this plan (Tr., Vol. 60, p.
11351) The Navy Department would not have directed it to be done unless
the President had specifically ordered it (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351)
Admiral Hart was already conducting reconnaissance off that coast by
planes from Manila (Tr., Vol. 60 p. 11350). So far as the Navy
Department was concerned, sufficient information was being received from
this air reconnaissance (Tr., Vol. 60 p. 11351). Had the Japanese fired
upon any one of these three small vessels, it would have constituted an
overt act on the part of Japan (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11352). Interferences
such as these by superior officers, however, permitted by the line of
authority, breed indifference to responsibility on the part of the
officer who is superseded.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
529
the information be compiled and delivered prior to 10 o'clock Sunday,
December 7, (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13989). This was done. The compilation
showed that practically all the ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl
Harbor (Exhibit 176, p. 2).
In the early morning of December 7, 1941, about 5 a. m. Washington time,
the message fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 p.
m., Washington time, was available in the Navy Department in Washington
(Tr., Vol. 56, pp. 10694-10701). This was 8 1/2 hours before the attack
on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark and his principal subordinates have
testified before us that they had knowledge of this message about 10:30
a. m. (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4675; Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148; Vol. 55, p.
10469). This was 5 1/2 hours after it had been received in the Navy
Department. It was about 3 hours before the attack.
The relation of 1 p. m. Washington time to early morning in Hawaii was
pointed out to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148, 9154-9156,
9236-9254; Vol. 26, pp. 4679, 4685). It meant dawn in Hawaii the
strategic time at which to launch an attack. Admiral Stark was urged by
the Director of Naval Intelligence to send a warning to the fleet (Tr.,
Vol. 26, p. 4673). The chief intelligence officers of the Army had the
"1 p. m. message" by 9 a. m. Washington time, immediately appreciated
its significance, but did not succeed in bringing to General Marshall's
attention until nearly several hours later (Tr., Vol. 62, pp. 12077-
12078, 12079-12081). Marshall was horseback riding in Virginia. No
action was taken by the Army until he saw and read the 1 p. m. message
and related intercepts, at which time he sent a message to General Short
which went over commercial facilities and was received after the Pearl
Harbor attack (Tr., Vol. 18, pp. 2935-2939, Vol. 45, p. 8396). Admiral
Stark took no action on this information except to agree to the
inclusion in the belated Army message of instructions to General Short
to advise Admiral Kimmel of its contents (Tr., Vol. 32, pp. 5814-5816).
Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox had the 1 p. m. message at their
conference about 10:30 a. M. Washington time, December 7 (Tr., Vol. 55,
p. 10473). The relation of Washington time to time in Hawaii and the
Philippines was brought to their attention (Tr., Vol. 5, pp. 10473-
10475). Mr. Stimson's notes describing the Sunday morning conference
state:
"Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to
Hull and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time
back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox
and I arranged conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole
matter over. Hull very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry
and we are all wondering where the blow will strike (Tr., Vol. 70, p.
14428)."
The 1 p. m. message was delivered to the White House about 10:30 m.
Sunday, December 7, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10476).
On the morning of December 7, before 8 o'clock, Navy Intelligence had
ready for high authorities of the United States Government a translation
of its intercept of the fourteenth and final part of the Japanese
memorandum.
The fact that General Marshall decided on the basis of the intercepts of
Japanese messages made available on or before 11:25 o'clock on the
morning of December 7, to send an urgent war warning to the outpost
commanders is itself evidence that, despite previous messages to outpost
commanders, Washington authorities recognized that their
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