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The fatal error of Washington authorities in this matter was to
undertake a world campaign and world responsibilities without first
making provision for the security of the United States, which was their
prime constitutional obligation.
18. *Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed and
whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for a Japanese
attack, attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and military
administration requires taking note of the fact that they were
designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington all of whom
were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selection of
subordinates for particular positions of responsibility in the armed
forces of the United States*.
This conclusion is self-evident, especially in view of all that goes
before, and needs no comment.
19. *The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent
responsibilities: (1) The responsibility in Washington in respect of its
intimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread intelligence
information, direction of affairs, and constitutional duty to plan the
defense of the United States; (2) the responsibility cast upon the
commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and the fleet
essential to the defense of the territory of the United States to do
those things appropriate to the defense of the fleet and outpost.
Washington authorities failed in (1) and the commanding officers of
Hawaii failed in (2)*.
In the discharge of these responsibilities neither the high authorities
in Washington nor the commanders in Hawaii acted upon the assumption or
belief that Hawaii could or would be the point of any hostile attack.
Therefore, in discharging their respective responsibilities neither the
Washington authorities nor the field commanders interpreted those
responsibilities in the terms of danger to Hawaii. Many of the failures
of performance can be attributed to this cardinal fact. The question
presented to this committee is: "Were they justified in such an
assumption or belief ?" And the answer is emphatically, "No."
Evidence set forth in this report in detail is ample to show that in the
period approximately from May 1940 to December 7, 1941, the high
authorities at Washington assumed so much of the direction of affairs at
Hawaii as to remove many of the basic responsibilities from the
commanders in the field. The result was to reduce the discretion of the
commanders in the field by those things which they were ordered to do by
directions from Washington and not to do certain things unless they were
so ordered from Washington. Another result of this practice was to lull
the commanders in the field into awaiting instructions from Washington.
Being charged with the responsibility attaching to the highest command
in Washington and having taken so much of the responsibility and
direction of affairs away from the commanders in the field, the high
authorities in Washington themselves failed in the performance of their
responsibilities, as the evidence in the conclusions of this report
clearly shows.
Nevertheless the commanders in the field were left with sufficient
responsibility which they were under obligation to discharge as field
commanders of the major outpost in the Pacific defense of the United
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
States. There is adequate and sufficient evidence to show that they
failed to discharge that responsibility.
While great emphasis and analysis has been made of such warning messages
sent to Admiral Kimmel as those of November 24, 1941 November 27,1941,
and November 28, 1941 (see Conclusion No. 13), attention should be
directed to many other messages reflecting the nature of the diplomatic
and naval relations between Japan and the United States immediately
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Among these is the message of December 3, 1941, sent from the Washington
Office of Naval Operations for action to Admiral Kimmel. This message
informed him that Japanese diplomatic posts at Hongkong, Singapore,
Batavia, Manila, Washington and London had been instructed "to destroy
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn confidential and
secret documents". A second message on the same day sent from Washington
to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet and marked as information to
Admiral Kimmel gave further data on destruction of code machines and
secret documents at various places including "all but one copy of other
systems" at Washington.
On December 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was informed by
Washington Naval Operations that Guam was to destroy all secret and
confidential publications, retaining only minimum secret code channels
for essential communications and was to be ready instantly to destroy
all classified matter retained.
While none of these messages placed Hawaii at the prime center of
danger, they certainly reflected the last critical stages in diplomatic
relations. It is well known in diplomatic and military circles that
destruction of codes, code machines, and secret documents is usually the
last step before breaking off relations between governments. War does
not necessarily have to follow, but it may follow either simultaneously
or close on the heels of the destruction of codes. Other messages and
events, supplemented by daily reports of the crisis in Honolulu
newspapers, should have raised the significance of the information in
the hands of Admiral Kimmel. Yet he testified that he "didn't consider
that of any vital importance." (Tr. Vol. 39, p. 7477.)
General Short did not receive copies of these messages sent from
Washington Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel regarding the destruction
of codes. Admiral Kimmel had the express responsibility, as part of his
duty to effect liaison with General Short, to communicate this vital
information to General Short. He failed to do so.
Admiral Kimmel should have been aware of the meaning of code destruction
and of the Japanese reputation for surprise action. He should have been
vigilant. He owed this to his position as commander of the fleet which
was closely related to the scene of expected hostilities.
Admiral Kimmel failed in the performance of this obligation.
While General Short did not receive the information from Admiral Kimmel
that the Japanese were destroying codes and secret papers, he did have
partial notice about these developments. At a staff conference on the
morning of December 6, in the presence of the Chief of Staff for General
Short, Col. George W. Bicknell had reported that Japanese consuls were
burning their papers (Exhibit 148). General Fielder testified that he
was present at the staff conference and informed General Short that the
Japanese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers (Exhibit
148).
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555
Before the Roberts Commission General Short testified that he did not
know that these consular records were being burned (Roberts Commission
Record, p. 1620). Later, before our Joint Committee, he corrected this
earlier testimony to say that he had been advised on the morning of
December 6 that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers (Tr. Vol. 45,
pp. 8398, 8399). The evidence on this point is not decisive and it is
certainly an open question, not determined by the testimony, whether he
also knew that the codes were being destroyed.
The evidence as to General Short's knowledge of the burning of papers
and the destruction of codes is therefore much less clear and precise
than in the ease of Admiral Kimmel. As a contributing fact or in the
circumstances bearing upon General Short's failure to be prepared to
meet the Japanese attack, this evidence must be discounted.
The contribution of the Hawaiian commanders to the Pearl Harbor disaster
was the failure of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute measures
designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to effect state of
readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at and, and to
employ every facility at their command in preparing for the Japanese
attack, even though these facilities were inadequate. The attack came as
an astounding, bewildering, and catastrophic surprise to the commanders
at Hawaii. They realized that air attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at
least a possibility. Specifically, they failed
(a) To appreciate fully the character of their responsibilities as
commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and Commander in Chief of
the Pacific Fleet, even though such warnings as they had received from
Washington had been inadequate. They failed to carry out the principle
of command by mutual cooperation.
(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and tighten
up their defenses.
(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each with the
operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security and
to exchange fully all significant intelligence.
(d) To institute reconnaissance with such limited forces at their
disposal on a basis expected to detect an attack from without
(e) Their radar was in an experimental stage and vital information
revealed by it was improperly evaluated; their planes were grouped wing
to wing on the field; a large number of officers and men were not at
their posts; their ammunition was not immediately at hand for action.
(f) To effect a state of readiness throughout their commands consonant
with the character of the warnings sent them and designed to meet an
attack from without.
(g) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command,
which, although limited, were adequate at least to minimize the force of
the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.
(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence available at Hawaii
affecting the performance of their duties as outpost commanders.
(h) The significance of Japanese submarines sighted early on the morning
of December 6, was not properly weighed and information
556
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about such submarines was not diligently transmitted to responsible,
authorities for action.
The commanding officers in Hawaii had a particular responsibility for
the defense of the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier. This
responsibility they failed to discharge. The failure of the Washington
authorities to perform their responsibilities provides extenuating
circumstances for the failures of these commanders in the field.
These failures in Washington were:
(a) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel
and General Short adequate information of diplomatic negotiations and of
intercepted diplomatic intelligence which, if communicated to them,
would have informed them of the imminent menace of a Japanese attack in
time for them to fully alert and prepare the defense of Pearl Harbor.
(b) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel
and General Short such vital intercepted Japanese intelligence
information as the "bomb plot" messages and the "dead-line messages"
which, if so communicated, would have served as specific warnings of
impending hostile attack. In particular, the "bomb plot" messages
directly concerned the safety of the fleet and security of the naval
base at Pearl Harbor (and at no other place) and if communicated to the
Hawaiian commanders would have informed them of specific Japanese
designs affecting Pearl Harbor in time for them to alert and prepare
their defense.
(c) By conflicting and imprecise messages and orders high Washington
authorities created such a condition of confusion relative to what the
Hawaiian commanders were to do and were not to do about alerting and
preparing for defense at Pearl Harbor, as to remove from such commanders
that clear responsibility which would have otherwise attached to them by
reason of their positions.
(d) High Washington authorities positively misled the commanders at
Hawaii by indicating in messages sent to Hawaii the probability that
Japanese hostile actions were likely to take place at points in the
Southwestern Pacific without mentioning the danger of attack at Hawaii.
From their superior information of Japanese designs and intentions the
high Washington authorities were in a better position to evaluate
Japanese actions than were the Hawaiian commanders. Having directed the
attention of the Hawaiian commanders to probable Japanese action at
points other than Pearl Harbor, the high Washington authorities misled
the Hawaiian commanders and so contributed to their unpreparedness in
the defense of Pearl Harbor.
(e) High Washington authorities took over so much of the detailed
direction of affairs respecting operations of the Pacific Fleet and of
the Hawaiian naval base as to limit narrowly the discretion and freedom
allowed to the Hawaiian commanders. Having thus weakened the individual
obligations of the Hawaiian commanders and having failed correspondingly
to provide them with clear and adequate orders, high Washington
authorities reduced the responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders in the
defense of Pearl Harbor.
(f) Having failed to provide the Hawaiian commanders with sufficient,
adequate, and appropriate materiel and equipment for the defense of
Hawaii, high Washington authorities compelled the Hawaiian commanders to
make choices of action jeopardizing their defense
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
557
which they would not have made on their own responsibility had they had
the needed materiel and equipment; and this failure in Washington was a
strong factor in the failure of the defense at Hawaii.
(g) The responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders was further reduced by
explicit orders from Washington not to do anything to alarm the civil
population and that the high authorities in Washington: desired Japan to
commit the first overt act.
(h) Having assumed so much of the detailed direction of affairs relating
to Hawaiian defense, Washington authorities had the obligation to
correct all wrongful decisions at Hawaii which had been made in response
to Washington orders. A crucial decision of this kind was made by
General Short when he alerted his command only against sabotage in
response to orders in the message of November 27, 1941. With superior
knowledge of impending danger and having the immediate obligation to
correct General Short's error of judgment, Washington authorities,
particularly Gen. George C. Marshall and Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, did not
do so but permitted General Short to assume that he had done all that
had been required of him. This error, as later proved, left the defenses
at Hawaii particularly vulnerable to external attack.
(i) In the critical hours from the afternoon of December 6 to 10:30 a.
m. on December 7, Washington authorities failed to take the instant
action called for by their special knowledge of Japanese messages on
those days which would have placed the Hawaiian commanders on the
specific alert for probable danger to Hawaii.
The conclusion that "everybody" in the chain of authority "from the
higher officials here in Washington down through the lieutenant who
disregarded the radar message at Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning,
December 7, just muffed the situation, let the Japs outsmart them," was
expressed by Representative Clark in the form of a question put to
Admiral Kimmel (Tr., Vol. 39, p. 7331). Admiral Kimmel replied: "I think
you should draw those conclusions, sir, rather than me." Mr. Clark then
said "That is all I have, Mr. Chairman."
The word "muffed" is colloquial and rhetorical, not precisely
descriptive; and the word "situation" is as vague as it is general. But
Representative Clark's idea translated into plain English fairly
describes events and actions from November 25 to December T. "Everybody
from the higher officials here in Washington down through the
lieutenant" at Pearl Harbor failed to take many actions that in the very
nature of things were to be expected of him, failed to discharge
obligations necessarily attached to his office, and must bear a share of
the responsibility for the catastrophe according to the extent of his
powers and duties.
In extenuation of failures on the part of high authorities in Washington
two statements were often made by witnesses who appeared before the
Committee. First, it is easy to see *now* the mistakes and failures made
by high authorities but this is merely "hindsight." Second, those high
authorities were busy men carrying heavy burdens in their respective
offices burdens so heavy that many failures on their part must be
excused.
Undoubtedly, hindsight is often easier and better than foresight. But
the exercise of prudence and foresight with reference to knowledge in
his possession is a bounden duty imposed on every high authority
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the Government of the United States by the powers and obligations of
his office. For every failure to exercise prudence and foresight with
reference to knowledge in his possession he must bear a corresponding
burden of responsibility for the consequences that flow from that
failure. By virtue of his office he is presumed to have special
competence and knowledge; to act upon his special knowledge, and to be
informed and alert in the discharge of his duties in the situation
before him.
The introduction of hindsight in extenuation of responsibility is,
therefore, irrelevant to the determination of responsibility for the
catastrophe at Pearl Harbor.
The question before this Committee is: What did high authorities in
Washington know about Japanese designs and intentions; what decisions
did they make on the basis of their knowledge; and what actions did they
take to safeguard the security of the American outposts?
With regard to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, they were certainly
carrying heavy burdens in preparing the armed forces of the United
States for war; in making war plans; in building up an Army and Navy
(which they knew were not yet ready for war), and in struggling for a
postponement of the war until the Army and Navy were better prepared to
cope with the foe. With regard to the President, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, it may be said
Justly that they were carrying heavy burdens also. But all these
officials, as Secretary Stimson's diary demonstrates, spent many days
before December 7 in general discussions which led to no decisions. This
they did at a time when they possessed special knowledge of Japanese
designs and were acquainted with their own intentions and resolves and
certainly had the leisure to do the one obvious duty dictated by common
sense that is draw up a brief plan for telling the outpost commanders
just what to do in a certain contingency on receipt of orders from
Washington.
That contingency was a Japanese attack on American possessions
somewhere. Secretary Stimson records that "the question (during those
days) was how we (the President, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson,
Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark) should maneuver
them (the Japanese) into the position of firing the first shot without
allowing too much damage to ourselves." In any event, inasmuch as the
President decided against appealing to Congress for a declaration of war
on Japan, they were all waiting for the Japanese to fire the first shot!
And in those circumstances it was their duty to prepare definite plans
and procedures for action in meeting that attack.
This is exactly what they did not do at any time before December 7. They
had plans for action or actions by the armed forces of the United States
*if* Congress declared war or *if* by some process the United States got
into or entered the war. War plans (for example, Rainbow No. 5 which was
WPL-6) were to go into operation only after war had begun and were not
intended for preparation in meeting surprise attack.
They prepared no plan giving the outpost commanders instructions about
the measures they were to take in preparing for and meeting a Japanese
attack on American possessions when and if it came. This plan could have
been drawn up in a few hours at most and set down
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
559
in two or three typewritten pages at most. With modifications
appropriate to the various outposts this plan could have been sent to
the respective commanders by couriers or swifter means of communication.
And a procedure could have been adopted for instructing the commanders
by one word in code, or a few words, to put plans for meeting Japanese
attack into effect. No such plan was drawn up or at all events no such
plan was sent to the commanders. No procedure for giving them the code
word or words for action under any plan or procedure was ever adopted by
the authorities in Washington whose official duty it was to prepare,
with all the resources at their command, for meeting the Japanese attack
which they privately recognized as an imminent menace.
Of particular infractions of duty in Washington, which were numerous and
are written large in the evidence before the Committee, a few
illustrations may be given in summary form:
Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull were in a substantial measure
responsible for the confusion that resulted in equivocal form of the so-
called warning message to General Short on November 27.
Secretary Stimson called up Secretary Hull early in the morning of
November 27 and Secretary Hull declared positively:
"I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and
Knox the Army and the Navy."
Secretary Stimson then called up President Roosevelt and the President
gave him "a little different view." But from the President, that day,
Secretary Stimson got the President's approval
"that we should send the final alert namely that he (General Short along
with other Commanders) should be on the qui vive for any attack."
Secretary Stimson and General Gerow started the draft of the warning
message with the words: "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated."
Secretary Stimson, after a conversation with Secretary Hull over the
telephone, altered this definite statement to read:
"Negotiations with Japan *appear* to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
*might* come back to continue,"
thus introducing confusion into a sentence of crucial importance.
(Stimson, Diary: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, pp. 120 ff.)
General Marshall and General Gerow admitted to the Committee that they
made a mistake in failing to reply to General Short's report to the War
Department on November 27, that he put into effect the alert against
sabotage. This reply referred to the message of November 27 by number so
there could be no mistake as to what it answered. It was in reply to the
words of the message to Short on November 27 and the words "report
measures taken." They also assumed full responsibility for that mistake
(Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3126-3164).
General Marshall could not recall that he had made, after November 27,
any inquiries as to the measures taken by General Short in Hawaii (Tr.,
Vol. 17, p. 2905). In other words, he apparently had no information
about the steps taken for the defense of Pearl Harbor during the ten
critical days of mounting war tension, when Washington authorities were,
through intercepts of Japanese messages, becoming increasingly certain
about Japan's steps toward war, except General Short was alerted to
sabotage and had liaison with the Navy. Alerted
560
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to sabotage meant the planes were bunched on the field and in no
position to take to the air quickly.
Responsible officers in the War Department told the Committee they
failed to reach General Marshall after the receipt of the first thirteen
parts of the Japanese memorandum had been intercepted late in the
afternoon of December 6. General Marshall testified that he had an
orderly at his home to receive calls when he was away at night and hence
he could have been reached (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 2941). He also testified
that he was unaware of any effort to locate him at his home or elsewhere
by messenger or telephone during the evening of December 6 or the
morning of December 7 until he was taking his shower after a ride in the
park.
Secretary Stimson interfered with efforts of General Marshall and
General Gerow to postpone the breach with Japan until the Army and Navy
were ready to meet a Japanese attack with better prospects of success.
The Secretary insisted that in asking for the delay no recommendation
should be made to the President advising a reopening of conversations
with the Japanese representatives. In fact, conversations had not been
formally closed on November 26 (Tr., Vol. 20, p. 3325; Vol. 22, p. 3668-
69).
Secretary Hull made "several general statements" to General Marshall on
diplomatic matters but did not read to him or give him a copy of the
November 26 memorandum to Japan in advance of delivery (Tr., Vol. 19, p.
3076). Secretary Hull gave confused and conflicting statements to
Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark
and, so far as the evidence before the Committee goes, Secretary Hull
did not at any time tell them definitely that relations with Japan were
ipso facto ruptured, as he had learned from intercepted Japanese
messages. In other words, Secretary Hull's words and actions during the
last few weeks of tension added to the uncertainty that reigned in the
War and Navy Departments. Despite all his conferences with
representatives of the two Departments, he went ahead changing his plans
and notions without giving them information respecting his crucial
decisions.
It was with sufficient reason that Admiral Stark, on November 2S, wrote
a letter to Admiral Kimmel, saying:
"I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I
will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I know is that we
may do most anything, and that the only thing to be prepared for; or we
may do nothing I think it more likely to be anything (Tr., Vol. 36, p.
6713)."
This letter reached Admiral Kimmel on December 3, adding to the
confusion already created by the war-warning message of November 27.
This message to Admiral Kimmel differed in one respect from the message
sent by the War Department to General Short: it stated definitely that
"the negotiations with Japan * * * have ended." But not content with
that, the Navy Department, two days later, sent to Admiral Kimmel
another dispatch quoting the War Department's message to General Short
as follows:
"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only the barest
possibility of resumption (Tr., Vol. 36, p. 6729)."
After stating in its message of November 27 that "Japan is expected to
make an aggressive move within the next few days," the Navy De-
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
561
partment immediately added: "An amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is possibly
indicated * * *." Since there was not a line in the message about a
possible expedition against Hawaii, these words, according to legal and
common-sense usage, warranted Admiral Kimmel in concluding that an
attack on Pearl Harbor was not expected by the Navy Department and that
he was not to expect such an attack.
In explaining to Representative Keefe how he expected Admiral Kimmel to
expect an attack on Pearl Harbor in view of the fact that the Navy
Department's message mentioned only points in the Far East as possible
points of attack, Admiral Stark gave probably the best explanation
available to him:
"That is true, but the attack we envisaged down there we stated that the
makeup and so forth of this amphibious expedition (in the Far East), not
a raiding force or a carrier force, but an amphibious expedition and the
points of that amphibious expedition might be so and so. There was no
question, there had not been in my mind at any time, of an amphibious
expedition against the Hawaiian Island * * * (Tr., Vol. 35, p. 6521)."
Of the many instances showing failures of Washington authorities to
cooperate and keep one another duly informed when such acts of duty were
vital to the interests of the United States, none was more fateful than
actions on the so-called modus vivendi proposed by Japan on November 20,
1941.
Item 1 of the Japanese proposal read:
"Both the Governments of Japan and the United states undertake not to
make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern
and Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where
Japanese troops are stationed."
Item 2 read:
"The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan
and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific
area."
Wholly apart from the merits or demerits of these and other items in the
Japanese proposal of November 20, here was an opportunity at least to
prolong "the breathing spell" for which General Marshall and Admiral
Stark were pleading in their efforts to strengthen the armed forces of
the United States for war. On November 5, General Marshall and Admiral
Stark presented a strong plea to the President begging for time in which
to make the Army and Navy ready for war. While the Japanese proposal for
a modus vivendi was under consideration by the President and Secretary
Hull, General Marshall and Admiral Stark prepared another plea for the
postponement of the breach with Japan so that the Army and Navy could be
made stronger in striking or defensive power. They did not ask for any
surrender of American principles; they merely called for delay.
The Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi offered an opportunity to stop
for a few weeks the advance of Japanese armed forces into the
Southeastern and Southern area the advance which, according to American
war plans, made in cooperation with British and Dutch officers, provided
for American action against Japan or American participation in a war
against Japan. It is true that President Roosevelt had not committed the
United States officially to these plans but, according to the testimony
of Admiral Stark, "the President except officially, approved of" the
basic principles of these plans. (Tr., Vol.
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
35, pp. 6370-72.) American official War Plan WPL-46 was based on them.
Whether written in binding agreements or not, American, British, and
Dutch authorities acted in concert just as if binding pacts had been
made. The Japanese, as Washington clearly learned from the intercepts,
also acted upon the assumption that American, British, and Dutch
agreements for concerted action existed.
President Roosevelt evidently deemed it both feasible and desirable to
reach some kind of modus vivendi with Japan with a view to a possible
settlement in general or in any event a prolongation of negotiations
with Japan until American armed forces were better prepared for war.
Proof of this was found in a penciled memorandum written by the
President for the Secretary of State "not dated but probably written
shortly after November 20, 1941," that is, after the receipt of the
Japanese proposal (Exhibit 18).
President Roosevelt's memorandum for Secretary Hull with regard to the
possible terms of the modus vivendi with Japan read:
"6 MONTHS
"1. U. S. to resume economic relations some oil and rice now more later.
"2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or
any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).
"3. Japan not to invoke tripartite pact even if the U. S. gets into
European war.
"4. U. S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to
take no part in their conversation.
* *
* *
* *
*
"Later in Pacific agreements."
Besides the President's instructions or suggestions, Secretary Hull had
before him the "outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the
United States and Japan," which had been carefully prepared by Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. Henry Morgenthau's "outline"
with a covering note, dated November 19, 1941, was presented to
Secretary Hull, initialled M. M. H. (Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs). The covering note informed Secretary
Hull that all the senior officers of the Division concurred with Mr.
Hamilton in the view that "the proposal is the most constructive one I
have seen." Mr. Hamilton urged Secretary Hull to give most careful
consideration to the proposal promptly, and suggested that the Secretary
make copies of the proposed "outline" available to Admiral Stark and
General Marshall and arrange to confer with them as soon as they had had
an opportunity to examine the "outline" (Exhibits 18; 168).
With the President's instructions or suggestions and Secretary
Morgenthau's "outline" before him, Secretary Hull considered the terms
of a possible agreement with Japan as the basis of a general settlement
or an indefinite continuation of negotiations in connection with the
Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi. This is no place to give a fifty-
page summary of the record of the events connected with Secretary Hull's
operations. Nor is it necessary to discuss the merits of the case. But
the following recital of facts illustrates the confusion and lack of
cooperation that prevailed in Administration circles.
Secretary Hull drafted a memorandum for at least a kind of truce with
Japan.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
563
Secretary Hull discussed his proposals with British, Dutch, and
Australian representatives in Washington.
Secretary Hull had a conference on the proposals with Secretary Stimson
and Secretary Knox at his office on November 25. Of this conference
Secretary Stimson noted in his Diary:
"Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce, which he was
going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately
safeguarded all our interests, I thought as I read it, but I don't think
there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so
drastic. (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14417)."
The next day, November 26, Secretary Hull told Secretary Stimson over
the telephone that he had about made up his mind not to give the
proposal for the three months' truce to the Japanese but "to kick the
whole thing over." Under pressure coming from Chiang Kai-shek, Winston
Churchill and others, relative to the modus vivendi Secretary Hull
refrained from making an independent decision on this important step and
it appears he was led to decide it without thought of the military
capacities necessary to back up our diplomatic position. On that day,
November 26, Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt,
kicked the whole thing over and sent to the Japanese the now famous
memorandum which Japan treated as an ultimatum. In taking this action
Secretary Hull gave no advance notice to General Marshall and Admiral
Stark, who were then preparing their second careful memorandum to the
President begging for a postponement of war with Japan until the Army
and Navy could make better preparation for waging it. Moreover, it
should be noted that Secretary Hull did not give to the British and
Australian representatives any advance information about his sudden
decision "to kick the whole thing over."
When Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt, made this
decision on November 26 and handed his memorandum to the Japanese
ambassadors on November 26, he was practically certain that the Japanese
government would reject his proposals and that a break in relations
would be a highly probable consequence of his action.
For this statement there is sufficient evidence from Secretary Hull
himself. In his account of the meeting with the Japanese
representatives, when he presented the memorandum to them, Secretary
Hull reported that, after reading the document, Mr. Kurusu said "that
when this proposal of the United States was reported to the Japanese
Government, that Government would be likely to 'throw up its hands';
that this response to the Japanese proposal (the so-called modus vivendi
proposal from Tokyo) could be interpreted as tantamount to the end of
the negotiations." So certain was Secretary Hull of the coming breach
that, according to his account, he declared on November 25 and November
28 at a meeting of "high officials" that "the matter of safeguarding our
national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy" (Peace and War,
1931-1941, [1943, p. 144]). Some exchanges with the Japanese occurred
after November 27, 1941, but none of these exchanges altered in any
respect the situation created by Secretary Hull's memorandum of November
26 to Japan.
If Secretary Hull or any other high authority in Washington had any
doubt whether the Japanese would treat the memorandum of November 26 to
Japan as an ultimatum, that doubt must have been
564
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
entirely cleared up 2 days later. On November 28, the Army intercepted a
message from Tokyo to the two Japanese Ambassadors in Washington which
expressed the views of the Japanese Government on Secretary Hull's
document. The Japanese message characterized it as "this humiliating
proposal" and as "quite unexpected and extremely I regrettable." The
Japanese message also informed the Ambassadors that the reply of the
Japanese Government would come in 2 or 3 days and that "the negotiations
will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable." Washington also knew
that the deadline had been fixed for November 29, and that after that
"things would automatically happen." The Japanese Ambassadors were
instructed not to give the impression that "the negotiations are broken
off" and told: "From now on do the best you can."
In short, on November 28, 1941, Washington authorities had available to
them definite and conclusive information that the breach with Japan was
near at hand and that the reply from Tokyo would signalize that breach.
More definitely than the first 13 parts of the Japanese message
intercepted on the evening of December 6, this notice from Tokyo to its
representatives in Washington on November 28 meant a rupture of
relations with the United States. If the 13 parts meant war to the
President, the Japanese message on November 28 also meant war. Hawaii
knew nothing of these intercepts of December 6 and 7 until after the
attack.
These instances of failure on the part of high authorities in Washington
to perform acts of duty and judgment required by their respective
offices, and many others that could be cited, merely point to the
greatest failure of all, namely, the failure of those authorities to
organize for the war they regarded as immediately imminent. Here the
conclusions reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to the War
Department apply to the whole executive department of which it was a
part:
"A few men, without organization in a true sense, were attempting to
conduct large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions
that should have been the result of carefully directed commands, instead
of actions taken by conference. We were preparing for war by the
conference method. We were directing such preparations by the conference
method; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method,
and arriving at their content by compromise instead of by command * * *
(Report, pp. 12-13)."
To this comment, the Army Pearl Harbor Board should have added that
powerful individuals among these authorities were reaching decisions on
their own motion and taking actions of a dangerous nature on their own
motion, despite all the conferring, talking, and compromising, were
proceeding as if there was no organization in the Government of the
United States that was charged with preparing for and waging war.
Nor is this confusion and pulling at cross purposes to be explained away
by any such vague assertion as the Army Pearl Harbor Board offered:
"that it was a product of the time and conditions due to the transition
from peace to war in a democracy." Failures to perform duties
commensurate with the powers vested in officials by the Constitution and
the law cannot be justified by appeals to any overriding requirements of
democracy. Provisions for organizing the executive department and the
supreme command of the armed forces of the United States were
incorporated in the Constitution and the laws, and
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
565
adequate powers to *organize and unify for operating purposes* all
subsidiary agencies were vested in the President of the United States.
(See Conclusion 16.)
Going down the line along the chain of authority to the commanders in
Hawaii, it must be said that General Short and Admiral Kimmel were as
negligent in certain respects as their superiors in Washington. They
were aware that a Japanese attack at some point was impending and,
despite any general expectation that the attack would come in the Far
East, they were under obligations to be intently on guard themselves.
But they failed to affect the close cooperation, especially between
December 3 and December 7, that was required by their special knowledge
and official duties. Each of them showed an unwarranted indifference to
what the other was doing in the way of scanning the horizon, watching
for signs of trouble, and preparing for the worst. Finally, they failed
to make the best and most efficient disposition and use of the material
they possessed in the discharge of grave responsibilities imposed on
them.
20. *In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting the
American outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6 and Sunday
morning, December 7, the President of the United States failed to take
that quick and instant executive action which was required by the
occasion and by the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship
rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the
establishment of the Republic to our own times*.
Before noon on Saturday of December 6, 1941, the President was aware
that a situation had been established which, by a unanimous decision of
himself and his War Cabinet reached 8 days before, made an American-
Japanese war a matter of a very few hours. He and his Secretaries of
State, War, and Navy, and his Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval
Operations, had discussed on November 28 the presence of a Japanese
expeditionary force at sea. It was their decision that if this
expeditionary force got around the southern point of Indo-China, it
would be a terrific blow to the British, Dutch, and Americans. "This
must not be allowed." It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the
Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight and if the British fought we
would have to fight. "And it now seems clear that if this expedition
were allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain
of disastrous events would be set on foot * * *" (Tr. Col. [sic] 70, p.
14, 425). At 10:40 on the morning of December 6, the State Department
was advised by Ambassador Winant that the British had sighted a Japanese
task force in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam headed for the Kra
Peninsula or Thailand. The Japanese had passed the southern point of
Indo-China.
In testifying before the Joint Committee as to the significance of this
information Under Secretary Welles said:
"I should say that the chances had diminished from one in a thousand to
one in a million that war could then be avoided (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1324)."
No word of this situation went to the American commanders at Pearl
Harbor.
Although the War Cabinet, as early as November 28, had anticipated the
situation of noon of December 6 as making war inevitable, the Chief of
Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations not only did not
566
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
advise the commanders in the field as to this situation, but also
exhibited so little concern approximately 20 hours later that the Chief
of Staff went horseback riding on the morning of December 7 and the
Chief of Naval Operations, having spent the evening at a theater, got to
his office late on the morning of the 7th. Each of these officers knew
on the morning of December 7 that a Pacific war would start within a few
hours and, by their own judgment and that of the President, that such
war must involve the United States. In the light of the situation known
to them and to the president and his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
on the morning of December 7, and in view of the decisions reached in
anticipation of such a situation, an alert should have been sent to
Hawaii prior to the alert sent by commercial able by General Marshall on
December 7 at 11:50 a. m., which alert did not reach the Hawaiian
commanders prior to the attack the November 27 and all prior alerts
having been confusing, misleading, and imprecise.
Before 10 o'clock on the evening of December 6, 1941, President
Roosevelt had reached a great decision as to the immediate imminence of
the war which he had long expected. He had then finished reading the
first 13 parts of the intercepted memorandum which was to be presented
to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador and special agent on the
next day, and had said to his aide, Harry Hopkins, in substance, "This
means war." In reply to a comment by Mr. Hopkins, the President had also
indicated that the United States could not strike the first blow for the
purpose of preventing any sort of surprise (Tr., Vol. 63, pp. 12441-
12443).
The President's evaluation of the intelligence before him as to the
probable day, hour, and place of the coming Japanese attack is nowhere
in the evidence before this Committee. But, given all the information
that had come to him during the preceding days, he had every reason for
assuming that the day and hour could not be far off (conclusions 3 and
10). The place on which the first Japanese blow would fall was within
the territory and possessions of the United State where outpost
commanders were on guard.
Between 10 o'clock on the evening of December 6 and the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor 16 hours were to pass. The President had at his disposal
at least 15 hours in which to inform those outpost commanders of
impending danger, to add new and urgent warning to the indefinite
warnings that had been sent out during previous days and weeks.
The President's acquaintance with the nature of warfare, and it was by
no means elementary, must have convinced him that the consequences of
the first magnitude would flow from the success or failure of the United
States armed forces in meeting the Japanese attack when it came.
Unqualified success on the part of the American forces could wreck
Japanese war plans and cripple Japanese armed forces. Disaster to the
armed forces of the United States could, and probably would, prolong the
war for months or years, with all that was entailed in American blood
and treasure.
In this situation, having decided about 10 p. m. December 6, that the
intercepted message meant war, the most imperative duty that confronted
the President was that of alerting his immediate subordinates in
Washington and, either directly or through them, the outpost commanders.
This duty was imposed upon him by the circumstances and
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
567
by the obligations of his office as Chief Executive and Commander in
Chief of the armed forces of the United States in peace and war. Of all
the men in the branches of civil and military administration responsible
for the security and defense of the United States, the President alone
was endowed with ultimate power under the Constitution and the laws.
Means of swift communication were at his elbow. Willing aides civil and
military and naval were at his beck and call
The most powerful men next to the President in authority men bound to
obey his orders and serve without stint, were not far from the
President's side; and anyone of them, if so instructed, could have found
and alerted all the others. Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary
Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark were nearby. They could be
reached quickly by means of communication at the President's command.
Indeed, Capt. Alwin D. Kramer, who had carried the 13-part intercept to
the White House for delivery to President Roosevelt by Commander Schulz
(Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10665 ff.; Vol. 63, p. 12437), immediately turned his
attention to the task of alerting the President's chief subordinates.
Captain Kramer tried to reach Admiral Stark by telephone and failed; he
likewise failed to reach Admiral Turner (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10149; Vol.
56, pp. 10667-10673).
Thereupon Captain Kramer telephoned to Secretary Knox, found him at
home, and took to Secretary Knox the intercepted message and other
documents. After the receipt of the papers, Secretary Knox, realizing at
once their significant nature, called up Secretary Hull and Secretary
Stimson and arranged with them for a meeting at the State Department on
Sunday morning at 10 o'clock. Having completed this arrangement
Secretary Knox instructed Captain Kramer to bring all the important
messages in question to the State Department at 10 o'clock Sunday
morning (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10467). Thus, as Captain Kramer testified, on
Saturday night he had reached the top man in the White House and the top
man in the Navy (Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10681).
According to the testimony of Col. Rufus Bratton, chief of the Far
Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, of the War Department,
the 13-part message was sent to the State Department on Saturday night.
Colonel Bratton stated:
"So I, realizing that the Secretary of State was primarily interested in
this message, it being a diplomatic one and it being a reply to a
message that he had gent to the Japanese Government, gathered up his
folder, put it in the pouch, locked the pouch, and personally delivered
it to the night duty officer in the State Department sometime after 10
o'clock that night. I told the night duty officer whose name I have
forgotten, that this was a highly important message as far as the
Secretary of State was concerned, and that I would like to have it sent
out to his quarters. He assured me that he would do so. I left it with
him, securing from him a receipt for what I had given him (Tr., Vol. 62,
pp. 12052-12053)."
Thus it is evident that about 10 o'clock Saturday night President
Roosevelt could have reached Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and
Secretary Knox in a few minutes, had he chosen to do so.
What about General Marshall and Admiral Stark, to whom the President
under the law could go directly with orders for operations? If not at
home, they should have been in places known to their orderlies or
assistants, for the War and Navy Departments had been alerted, lights
were burning all night in offices of those Departments; and
568
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
responsible officers were there waiting for news and orders. News of the
intercepted Japanese messages had been delivered to Army authorities
about nine o'clock that night before it had been delivered to Secretary
Knox, head of the Navy Department (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10765).
The White House was alerted. The President's naval aid was standing by
at the White House on the evening of December 6.
Within less than an hour President Roosevelt, convinced that the 13-part
message meant war, could have brought to his side one or more of the
four men immediately responsible for war action under his direction,
could have taken council with them, and could decide upon the orders
necessary to alert all the outpost commanders before midnight.
In this situation with these powers and obligations entrusted to him,
what did the President do? Recognizing the gravity of the hour and the
occasion, he was moved to act at first. He tried to reach by telephone,
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and at the first attempt
failed. Apparently it was reported to the President that Admiral Stark
was at a theater. What then? According to the testimony of Commander
Schulz, who had brought the 13-part message to the President's room in
the White House, the President said in the presences of the commander,
that he did not want to cause any undue alarm by having Admiral Stark
paged or otherwise notified in the theater, "because he (the President)
could get him (Admiral Stark) within perhaps another half hour" (Tr.,
Vol. 63, pp. 12443-44).
Apparently the President did communicate with Admiral Stark later that
evening. But the evidence before the Committee is indirect, for Admiral
Stark's mind seems to be a complete blank as to his whereabouts and
doings on the evening of December 6, 1941. When he testified before the
Committee at its regular hearings, the admiral was under the firm
impression that he did not talk with the President over the telephone on
that evening, but then confessed that he might be mistaken. Later
however, at a special session of the Committee on May 31, 1946, Admiral
Stark testified that a friend, Capt. H. D. Krick, had recently given him
some information on the point. Captain Krick had informed Admiral Stark
that they had been together on the evening of December 6, 1941 and that
the admiral had been in communication with the President over the
telephone. But this recent information did not refresh the admiral's
memory, for he declared at the special session of the Committee that he
still had "no recollection whatever of any events of that evening" (Tr.,
Vol. 71, p. 14723 ff.).
With regard to anything that passed between the President and Admiral
Stark that evening, assuming that Captain Krick's memory is good, the
record before this Committee is as empty as Admiral Stark's mind.
What did the President do on Sunday morning between his rising hour and
about 1:25 p. m. (Eastern standard time, 7:55 Honolulu time) when the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began?
During this lapse of hours, additional news of Japanese designs was in
Washington.
About 5 o'clock in the morning of December 7, the fourteenth part of the
Japanese message reached the Navy Department. Although it could have
been decoded in less than half an hour, that
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
569
operation was delayed in the office and this fourteenth part did not
come into the hands of Captain Kramer until about 7:30 a. m. Another
inexplicable delay occurred. Captain Kramer did not deliver this message
to the White House until 10 or 15 minutes before 10 on Sunday morning
(Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10718). But 2 hours or more then remained in which to
put the outpost commanders of full defensive war alert.
On or about 10:30 on Sunday morning, two other highly informative
messages were delivered at the White House (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10743 ff.).
The first was the intercepted Japanese government message instructing
the Japanese ambassador to deliver the fourteen-part reply to the
Secretary of State at 1 P. m. December 7 (Washington time).
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941.
#904
Re my #902
There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the
aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.
Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.
Army 25844
JD: 7144
Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
The second was a message from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in
Washington, marked "extremely urgent." It ordered Japanese agents, after
deciphering the fourteenth part, the notice as to delivery, at 1
o'clock, and two other messages to destroy at once the remaining cipher
machines and all machine codes (Ex. 1, pp. 248-249) A notice that
carried a war warning to high authorities in Washington.
Meanwhile General Marshall, who testified that he did not see President
Roosevelt between November 28 and the afternoon of December, reached his
post in the War Department. Before him lay the final 14-part message and
the message stating that the delivery to Secretary Hull was to be at 1
o'clock. On the basis of this and other information, in his possession,
General Marshall concluded that war was at hand, that the hour "one
o'clock" was indicative of "some very definite action" by the Japanese
at 1 o'clock, and that a new and definite warning message should go to
General Short the message that did not reach General Short until the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was over (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 2926 ff.)
During the hours from 10 o'clock Saturday night to 11 o'clock Sunday
morning, President Roosevelt had at his command not only the latest
intercepts and his own knowledge of diplomatic negotiations with Great
Britain and Japan but also special knowledge that had come to him
*before* the evening of December 6; for example:
(1) The message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin telling
him to see Hitler and Ribbentrop and
"say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through
some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war
may come quicker an anyone dreams (Ex. 1, p. 204)."
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