PREFACE

An attempt has been made in the following pages to put before the public, particularly the non-Indian public, and that section of the Indian public which is not obsessed by its adherence to any particular party slogans, the case for Indian freedom. The whole problem has been envisaged not from this or that political angle that we have among us at present, but from the objective angle of a nationalist Indian, whose one desire is to see India play her destined part as a great and peace-loving country in the national and the international spheres. Partisans professing one set of uncompromising views or the other may not agree with some of the things said in these pages. But I hope and believe that an overwhelming body of public opinion, which is still nation-minded and universally unorganized, will be caught therein. I am certain to publish these thoughts.

Lahore
15-5-1945.
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CHAPTER I

India and the World Order

The principal intention and purpose of the following pages is to illustrate and emphasize the point that India's freedom is not only an imperative necessity, absolutely speaking, but that it should constitute an integral part of the peace plans of the United Nations. I want to emphasize and impress the viewpoint that it is an indispensable preliminary to post-war world reconstruction on a satisfactory and enduring basis. It may sound strange and paradoxical in the context of Great Britain's past policy towards India; but this idea finds clear expression in the statement made by Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, in the House of Lords on February 19, 1946, on the British Government's decision to dispatch a Cabinet Mission to India. "In view of the paramount importance not only to India and to the British Commonwealth but to the peace of the world of a successful outcome of the discussions with the leaders of Indian opinion, the British Government have decided. . ." To the foreigner the problems of India and India herself are a
maze of complexities in which minorities, special interests, internal differences and so on form an endless, confusing and incoherent procession. But it will be clear on a little deeper consideration that most, if not all, of these complexities and difficulties are the interested propagandist's fantasies and given a will on one side and goodwill on the other they will dissipate and dissolve like mist before sunshine.

In considering the problem of India we must consider it in relation to the general situation appertaining to the establishment of a lasting and permanent peace based on a democratic world order. This proposition is accepted in all parts of the world in which the yearning for freedom is prevalent, in which the light of liberty shines undimmed and which appreciate the consideration that the contrary position would entail the reversion of the world as a whole to a state of semi-elemental barbarism. The Axis nations grandiloquently proclaimed their war aims and peace objectives as the establishment of what they called a "World Order" and "Co-prosperity Spheres." But that these terms were devoid of any significance which could hearten men and inspire in them hope of a bright future, and were mere nomenclature designed either to dupe the unwary and the gullible or to force others who were helpless and down-trodden into acceptance of a political philosophy, in the rejection of which they had
no choice or from which they had no escape, was not only amply borne out by hard experience but supported by incontestable evidence. A large section of the people in three continents had too distressing an experience of Hitler and his assurances, of Nippon and Company and their sweet promises to be imposed upon by anything they put forward as their aims. The allusions of the Axis New Order and of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere adumbrated by Japan were, therefore, overwhelmingly rejected as veritable spider's webs. To prevent German Nazism and Japanese Militarism from achieving their heart's desires and thus forcing the world to recede some centuries behind the clock was an imperative, undeniable desideratum. Before this need, all other considerations and controversies paled into insignificance.

But the Allied Nations, which set themselves resolutely to the task of the extinction of the Axis designs, should now ask themselves the question: what of the future? Was it enough merely to propound one negative idea that the Axis New Order, if it had been allowed to be established, would have involved the extinction of the torch of human freedom and the obliteration of all the ideals of life and conduct which humanity considers noble and exalted? To a certain extent, but to a certain extent only, it was helpful to perseveringly din into the world's ears that the defeat of the Axis was in itself the sole and
pre-eminent objective of the Allies. But while it perhaps partially satisfied public opinion when the war was in progress, it simply cannot supply the whole of the moral and psychological momentum that peace now demands.

Rightly did Mr. Churchill maintain that the second World War was not merely a war between nations as the first world war. It was more of a revolution than a war, he pointed out; “a revolutionary war waged by Hitler and his totalitarian war machine against all other nations and the free world in which we have lived so as to make them military, political and economic satellites in a totalitarian world empire.” It was basically and principally a war between two ideas and ideals, two systems of political philosophy, two ways of life. Victory therein meant victory for those who stand for the democratic system and the democratic way of life which is definitely superior and better in its scope and content and more beneficial in its results than the Fascist and the Nazi systems with their supreme contempt for human freedom and individual rights. It is essential that something decisively positive, something unambiguously purposeful, clearly adequate, effective and inherently attractive and morally grand should now be done so that the detestation felt for the totalitarian conception of things, will be canalised and the moral indignation of the world against Nazi and Japanese rapacities will lead to a full
realization, by contrast, of the value of the
democratic ideal and way of living.

If there is one factor more important and
essential than the winning of the war, it is the
winning of the peace, the laying down of the
foundations of a democratic World Order, in con-
trast to the Axis "World Order", in which political freedom for small as well as big
nations will be assured, economic disparities
among people and economic inequalities among
countries will be ironed out as much as possible,
social justice will prevail and man will be able
to speak to man as well as nation to nation not in
a spirit of inferiority or superiority, dependence or
hegemony, but each person and each nation can
function as entities contributing individually to
the sum total of human happiness. We do not
now want the predominance of any particular
"ism" but we must strive for the common "ism"
of humanity and human happiness and human
progress.

It is possible that all this may sound
fantastic and utopian and though the ideal may
be accepted, the hurdles in the way may prove
insurmountable. There are indeed long-stand-
ing prejudices, old-time prepossessions, establish-
ed modes of thought and life among nations and
their leaders which have to be overcome before
the picture envisaged can take real shape. But
let it not be forgotten that men have been cease-
lessly striving towards these very ends through
the centuries. They have fought wars, sacrificed themselves in thousands and millions for attaining these lofty ends and aims. If there have been disappointments and failures, and if to-day we are still far from attaining the conditions in which these ideals are translated into practice, that is attributable partly to the selfishness of the few who had been in charge of men's affairs everywhere in the past and partly to the fact that mankind itself as a whole had not yet been sufficiently developed and advanced in its moral stature to demand the fulfilment of those ideals, though it is continuously impressed by their ennobling character.

Hope now centres on the United Nations Organisation and the machinery for world security political, economic and otherwise, that has been set up under the San Francisco Charter. The opening paragraphs of the Charter may be quoted to indicate the purposes for which the U. N. O. has been brought into existence and the objectives that inspired the formulation of the document. It says:

"We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and value of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations, large and small, and to establish condi-
tions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in greater freedom, and for these ends to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain internal peace and security, and by the accepting of principles and the institution of methods insure that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest, and by the employment of international machinery for the promotion of economic and social advancement of all peoples have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.”

The United Nations Organisation’s constitution is not free from defects; we may have occasion to refer to some of them in the following pages. But its establishment represents the stern realisation by the world’s statesmen of the essential evils of war and the need for elimination of the conditions which provoke them.

The termination of the war has, however, not eliminated the prospect of vital differences between war-time allies like Britain and U.S.A. and Russia. But their extensiveness can be minimized and the world taken many steps along the road to the realization of humanity’s cherished hopes if those who are now in charge of the destinies and policies of nations do not allow
narrow-minded prejudices, personal or class or national ambitions to predominate over humanity's vital interests and swamp them. They should be unambiguously clear in their mind as to what it is they are striving for and what it is the world is anxious for. Humanity is anxious for peace and not war: that proposition is incontestable. It is not anxious, however, for a condition of technical warlessness coupled with the continuance of a state of inequality among nations, freedomlessness for certain countries, superior and inferior nations and superior and inferior races of men, in short, the perpetuation of conditions in which wars become inevitable. A peace settlement in which this state of affairs will not cease to be will be as bad as, if not worse than, a state of war and conflict and decimation. It will be as bad as that because it is a state of affairs which inheres a perpetual potential danger of war and, what is worse from certain points of view, a perpetual state of dissatisfaction, incipient revolution, and psychological unsettlement among large sections of the world's population, which rendered the term 'peace' a mockery. It is, therefore, essential to be clear in our minds what we are striving for and what are the conditions necessary for success in such striving. We must be resolutely opposed to war and all that it implies in this atomic age and not merely hanker in vain for what may prove to be a peaceless peace with the atom bomb and not international goodwill.
as the foundation for it. The U. N. O. inheres the fervent hopes and aspirations of a war-torn humanity. Its successful functioning can alone provide an effective guarantee against the danger of future wars of aggression.

If on the other hand the leaders of the United Nations like Truman, Mr. Attlee and M. Stalin fail to rise to expectations in this regard, it will be a catastrophe which will have incalculably deleterious consequences, which should, therefore, be scrupulously avoided, if necessary by world public opinion, the voice of the common people, asserting itself with all the strength that it can muster. If the leaders of nations refuse to appreciate the all-important, vital considerations that the needs of post-war reconstruction present before them, they will be committing a crime on humanity for which there can be precious little penitence or prospect of condonation by the present or the future generations.

The imperative and insistent questions that arise in this connection were never more emphatically and unambiguously asked than by the late Mr. Wendell Willkie, who, some time before his unfortunate death, undertook a tour of the Middle East and China at the instance of President Roosevelt. "How shall we determine what we want to win in the next peace? And how shall we prepare to win it during the war," he asked in the course of an article in the New York Herald Forum, later incorporated in
his now famous book "One World." The questions were addressed mainly to those who maintained that the fighting of the war must be left exclusively to experts and that laymen should not dabble in matters involving high military strategy. Undoubtedly, warfare in modern, as much as in ancient, times is the concern principally of strategists and commanders. But if wars are planned and fought by experts, war and peace are made by politicians and laymen. It was indubitable that the principles on which the foundations of peace could be securely laid were conditional on the prior victory in the war of the United Nations. The implications of this fundamental, almost elementary-looking, proposition, however, involve automatically the acceptance of the inevitable conclusion that the greatest possible care, attention and thought will have to be devoted not only to the evolution of those principles as incorporated in the U. N. O. Charter but to their effective and sincere implementation. It must be remembered constantly and continuously that the 'war to end war' which was the description given to the 1914-18 armageddon, actually turned out to be a war for the outbreak of another war on a vaster scale, that it was the insufferable blunderings of politicians, the cupidity of narrow-minded nationalists, the regrettable absence of a broad vision and a big heart in those who had to implement the Versailles Peace Treaty, as well as the callous disregard in practice of the high and
noble objectives, which should have been unerringly and undeviatingly adhered to by those who had the management of international assemblies like the League of Nations in their hands, that were responsible for the rise of the phenomenon of Dictator Hitler and his maniacal pursuit of territorial aggrandisement and inhuman racial vendettas now happily destroyed. Those who fought and won World War No. I sacrificed precious lives for the sake of unexceptionable ideals. But those who made the peace and administered it had little compunction in literally transforming those very sacrifices into footholds for the realization of personal or national ambitions and had callously permitted things to deteriorate to a level where humanity was constrained to pass through the gruelling and horrible experiences of World War No. II.

The fact was that among the European statesmen, during the period following the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, robust idealism and earnest and purposeful broadmindedness were but skin-deep. They accepted the principle of and helped to establish the League of Nations; but they failed to discover the key to the secret of its successful functioning. They had an indistinct vision of an international order for which they aspired but they allowed the immediate and more alluring prospects of national security to obscure and obliterate that grand vision. They had vague and ill-digested
notions of a world order based on collective security, international peace and disarmament. But in actual practice the ideal of collective security degenerated into an anxious hugging of the narrow conception of national security; international peace deteriorated into a process of buying time and again a humiliating peace at the hands of recalcitrants like Hitler who never made a fetish of peace but feverishly prepared for war; and disarmament meant nothing more than vindictive deprivation of armaments of the vanquished nations to the point of making them utterly desperate and forcing them to indulge in clandestine rearmament, which ultimately found the victors napping and caught them in its deadly coils. It was all a despicable history of historical opportunities missed, misused or abused.

All these are admittedly profound and large-scale blunders which European statesmen posing as leaders of a ‘New Order’ committed, in the inter-war period, some consciously and other unconsciously. But probably it is not entirely their fault if they committed them. After all they were, to a large extent, the instruments of the national will and public opinion of the countries which they represented and the national will and public opinion of European countries in the third and fourth decades of the present century were not adequately developed to appreciate the far-reaching significance of and the great need for high principles on which the superstructure of a true
international order ought to be constructed. The idea of international co-operation based on the sacrifice of something of national sovereignty for achieving it implicit in the League of Nations was beyond the understanding of the common man or even of the common run of statesmen, and, therefore, it proved in effect to be much in advance of the times in which it originated. The instinct prone to international peace and collective security was there; but the will and the moral capacity necessary to concretise it in deeds were lacking. The League of Nations, therefore, became a structure in stone disembodied of its moving and guiding spirit. Herein we have the clearest possible explanation of both the cause of its failure and the effect of that failure was the thunderous outbreak of the armageddon which lasted from 1939-1945. Now again the men's moral and spiritual consciences have been stirred to their depths and among the political philosophers and thinkers in Britain, America and the European countries a widespread appreciation is prevalent of the pre-eminent need for preventing the newly created United Nations Organisation sharing the sad fate of the League.

We hope that while the political philosopher is wide awake, the politician will not again prove to be the fly in the ointment. At the San Francisco Conference and of the first session of the U.N.O. Assembly held in London, the statesmen and representatives of nations who came
together to strengthen the foundations of the peace structure have shown a manifest determination to see that the new peace organisation does not go the way of the League. Mr. C. R. Attlee’s opening and closing addresses to the United Nations Assembly are couched in the language of resolute idealism, and his stress on the need for not permitting circumstances to supervene which will involve world humanity in another world war represents the unspoken wish of millions of human beings.

The incapacity of the European statesmen in the inter-war period to live up to the ideals which inspired the League’s formation was the main cause for the debacle that overtook that body. But it was not the sole cause for the unfortunate result. European nations like Britain, France and Russia, which held a dominant position in the League’s counsels and in the direction of its affairs, also showed little disposition to transform it into a really comprehensive world organisation. That would have meant a challenge to their own conception of national sovereignty and they would not have it. To the Asiatic and African countries in particular, the League represented a mere idea and a vague one at that. It was to them an institution in the fortunes of which they could claim very little share and in the functioning of which they evinced precious little effective interest, except as contributors to its finances or as appendages of
one or other of the big European nations. India had been, for purposes of outward form, an original member of the League of Nations; so also was China. But paradoxically enough an original member of the League like India is in reality only a 'subordinate' member of the British Empire and, therefore, incapacitated from making any independent decision or taking an independent line of her own on the questions that came up for discussion before it. India's representatives to the League of Nations Assembly were the nominees of the Secretary of State for India and the British Government and their function in League meetings was more or less confined to raising their hands in support of Britain's point of view whenever fundamental questions came up for review or discussion. The international position accorded to India, even when she was recognized as an original member of the League, was thus wholly inconsistent with her internal political status of dependence on Britain and within the British Empire scheme. Her inherent capacity to influence or promote decisions was almost nil. China's position in pre-war international councils might have been slightly better than India's but not very much more influential or important and she was more tolerated than respected, but that role she of course completely reversed by virtue of her enormous sacrifices and by her sheer, uncompromising and determined resistance to Japanese aggression for nearly ten years.
A professedly international organization like the League, from the councils of which the then powerful nations like the United States and Germany had excluded themselves and in which huge continents like Asia and Africa were forced to occupy but an insignificant status, automatically bred the germs of its own failure and disintegration. In the years immediately following the first World War, Europe and European interests occupied the first thoughts of the European and British statesmen and constituted the pivot and the fulcrum round which their outlooks revolved. To the lack of an idealistic outlook on their part was added the lack of a sincere comprehensive and genuine world outlook. The League became automatically an institution devoid of a life-giving, dynamic motive force and energy; and its failure inheres both a moral and a lesson for the U. N. O. It is that no true international order can be evolved without a true and purposeful international psyche and no international organization can pretend to function as such which does not comprehend all the countries of the world on a basis of equality and freedom. It is no inordinate or excessive claim made on behalf of India if I maintain that it an imperative necessity that she should be an independent, equal and honoured member of the international security organization and not merely a dependency of Great Britain, in order that she may take a leading hand, which she incontest-
ably can, in keeping that body on the straight path and impart to it not only strength and vitality in the execution of its policies but the touch of genuine idealism which is still so lamentably lacking.

In the constitution of the United Nations Organisation, some of the outstanding and patent drawbacks which contributed to the failure of the League have been sought to be removed and a bridge constructed between the paramount function of building up a secure and lasting peace entrusted to it and the practical effective steps that it can take in that process. It is one of the most important guarantees for its not becoming a mere tool in the hands of European statesmen and political leaders and for ensuring it a comprehensive international character that 51 United Nations are members of it, that the U.S.A. has taken the lead not only in ushering it into existence but is taking a prominent part in the deliberations not only of the General Assembly but of its subordinate bodies like the Economic and Social Security Council, the Trusteeship Council and so on, and that in the first session of the Assembly the pace was set for the settlement of extremely controversial issues not by burking but by submitting them to public discussion.

Thus while the foundation has been well and truly laid for the successful working of the international organisation, it will be foolish to
disguise from ourselves the fact that the superstructure of peace has still to be constructed. In this process, hurdles and impediments have to be overcome, national jealousies and ideals have to be surmounted and sacrifice of certain old and obsolete political notions has to be acquiesced in. The emergence of Russia as a dominant European Power is one of the results of the second World War which is bound to exercise a profound influence on the course of events and on efforts at preserving European and world peace. Russia's ideological affiliations being what they are, she will have to be dealt with not only as one single powerful nation but as the representative of a number of nations subscribing to the particular political and economic ideology that the Soviet State stands for. Then again the emergence of the atomic bomb as a military and of atomic energy as an economic factor had already produced an enormous psychological effect on the world public opinion even as it introduced some vital changes in the balance of military power among the nations. The future of world peace is now indissolubly interlinked with the atomic power and the methods of its control and utilisation for peace or war. The discovery of the atomic bomb and the methods of sharing atomic power secrets could have been the rocks on which the slender barque of international peace was in danger of foundering. It is only by an assertion of the sturdy common sense and the force of world public opinion that the
methods of controlling atom secrets has been entrusted to a committee of the U. N. O.

And, lastly, we can visualise now a greater and more realistic appreciation among the leaders of public opinion that in the stresses and strains of the present-day world, in a world confronted with the overpowering shadow of the atomic bomb, there must be, firstly, the abandonment of the practice of secret diplomacy and, secondly, at least a partial sacrifice of the ideal of national sovereignty and its merger in the international sovereignty of the world peace organisation for the common good. It is specially gratifying to hear a Tory spokesman in England like Mr. Anthony Eden advocating the sacrifice of national sovereignty and Mr. Bevin, the Labour Foreign Secretary, approving of it. As for open diplomacy, it is the fundamental raison de être of an international organisation for peace and world security that it should eliminate the proneness to bilateral agreements, treaties and alliances among the member states, who should conduct all such negotiations for alliances or treaties through the instrumentality of the U. N. O.
CHAPTER II

India and the Atlantic Charter

Visualising the position from the standpoint of a nationalist Indian without any particular bias or prepossessions, I must express the conviction that the attitude of Britain to India's demand for freedom fails to convince India that she can wax enthusiastic over the Allied victory in the war. This is not mere sentiment but a fact built on the foundation of solid and irrefutable facts and considerations. As soon as the war broke out India was declared a belligerent as a matter of course because she is a dependency of Great Britain. It is well known that this automatically imposed belligerency had been a sore point with Indian nationalist opinion since then and had been regarded as an outrage on India's self-respect. It was, however, a coincidence, a welcome coincidence nevertheless, that her national ideals accorded and were compatible with the ideals for which the United Nations professed to be engaged in the war. It was also a welcome coincidence that, as the war progressed and developed, it developed in such a way, especially subsequent to the Japanese
declaration of hostilities, that the preservation of her national integrity and security became progressively more and more intertwined and more and more irrevocably bound up with the fortunes of the United Nations. Her sympathies with war-torn and hard-pressed China and with Indonesia and Indo-China which are struggling for independence against European imperialism are very real and very sincere. India does not indeed belong to that category of countries which are to be placed under the trusteeship of the European nations. She occupies a status which may be difficult to classify and fit into any of the existing categories of countries. She is called a dependency of Great Britain, on the road to self-Government. Her sovereign equality with other members of the United Nations Organisation is a fiction in reality, but she is an original member of the U. N. O., as she was of the League of Nations. The extremely anomalous constitutional status of India cannot, however, continue and though it is primarily an Indo-British problem it is equally a United Nations' problem too in the sense that India's internal independence is inconsistent with the position of sovereign equality enjoyed by the other member states and with the preliminary condition governing membership of the U. N. O., that she should be “able”—though of course she is “willing”—to carry out the obligations thereby imposed.

As against these impelling considerations
must be set the regrettable fact of her continued political subordination to Britain and the latter's attitude of irresponsiveness to her clearly and unequivocally expressed national aspirations. The war was professedly fought for the liberation of all the dictator-ridden countries in European —vide Mr. Churchill's statement on the Atlantic Charter's application to India—but India must consent to be dealt with according to the sweet will of Britain herself and solely on the latter's own responsibility. The war may be fought for ensuring the economic independence, political freedom and national security of European countries; but India must await the pleasure of Britain for securing for herself the advantage and benefit of these very fundamental conceptions. That has been the plain meaning of the interpretation put on the applicability of the much discussed but, according to the late President Roosevelt, non-existent Atlantic Charter to India by Mr. Churchill, which he did not consider it necessary to modify so long as he was Prime Minister of Britain and even after his co-signatory's subsequent statement, that its ideals and principles applied to the whole of humanity. The essential incompatibility between profession and practice is in no other case more expressively and more vividly evident than in the manner in which Mr. Churchill handled during his regime at Downing Street India's claim vis-a-vis the fundamental principle that every country must have the right to choose her own
form of Government.

Mr. Churchill was the first Minister of the British Crown invested with almost dictatorial authority to devise measures and formulate policies which would encompass Hitler's and Japan's defeat. But evidently he was over-obsessed by the feeling with regard to Indians that they, as a nation could not be entrusted with any genuine responsibility for the administration of their country during war time because presumably certain sections of them had, for purely political reasons, displayed opposition to war efforts in the then existing circumstances. He, however, failed to appreciate the essential, probably the central, factor in anti-Axis strategy, that the principles of the Atlantic Charter should be made applicable to India and that conciliation was essential. The Allies undoubtedly were victorious over Germany and Japan; but Britain by her consistent refusal of India's claims during the war period had generated a deep feeling, which is presumably ineradicable, that there can be no heart-to-heart Indo-British co-operation at any time and that there can be no compromise on the "Quit India" issue or, in other words, complete independence.

It presages no good to Britain's national honour and does little credit to her international morality if after the Allied victory over the Axis Powers her peace aim has to be comprehended
as one of preserving British Imperialism unimpaired. The term 'Imperialism' leaves a perfectly bad odour in the mouth in whatever sense or context it is used and so long as the war lasted Mr. Churchill's statements regarding India were essentially an imperialist's statements in defence of the doctrine of Imperialism. If any British politician justifies that attitude on the ground that British policy towards her colonies or dependencies is actuated by wholly altruistic motives, it will cut precious little ice in the fifth decade of the twentieth century. The theory of one nation or people holding the trusteeship of or the mandate for other peoples and countries for the purpose of utilizing that trusteeship for the economic advancement and political progress of the latter has been blown sky-high as a result of the war. Trusteeship is neither wanted by the peoples for whose benefit it is supposedly intended nor can it be exercised satisfactorily by those who profess to exercise it for the benefit of others. To attempt to defend that theory and its practice will, therefore, be fundamentally to invite the ridicule that its underlying principle is to justify exploitation. The discussions at the San Francisco Conference on the Trusteeship Clauses of the World Charter provided an indubitable exhibition of the temper of the peoples of some of the so-called dependent and "colonial" areas. Britain and America, France and the Netherlands, are the most important among the United Nations possessing
colonies and dependencies. On them rests the grave moral responsibility of giving a lead in this matter of far-reaching significance to future world reconstruction by emancipating from political dependence and economic exploitation those territories which they hold under subjection, political or economic. Thus alone can they prove true to the principles of the so-called Atlantic Charter in the economic sphere.

The Trusteeship chapter of the Charter of the United Nations has, however, been so formulated that while conceding the principle that it is among the objectives of the Trusteeship system “to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement”, in practice it renders the consent of the mandatory or Trustee state essential and imperative prior to any alteration in the terms of the agreement. At the same time even the limited benefit that the Charter confers on the Trust territory of being ultimately declared as self-governing is taken away by Article 79 which says that “the terms of trusteeship for each territory
to be placed under the Trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a member of the United Nations”, and Article 82 which says that “there may be designated in any Trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas, which may include part or all of the Trust territory to which the agreement applies without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements (made under Article 43).” The implications of these articles in brief are that first of all for bringing any mandated territory under the Trusteeship system, the consent of the mandatory is indispensable, and may or may not be forthcoming; and that for any territory deemed “strategic,” the Trusteeship system does not provide much ground for consolation because of the prospect of its continued retention under trusteeship for the very reason that it is strategic. At the same time, however, there will be nothing to prevent the exploitation of the trust territory by the Administering authority, with the tacit approval and acquiescence of the General Assembly of the U.N.O. to ensure under Article 84 that the former “shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security”. “To this end,” says the Article, “the Administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out its obligations
towards the Security Council... as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the Trust territory.” The Trust territory will thus be constrained to play the part of a perpetual kamadhenu and like a kamadhenu has to give off its best uncomplainingly and with the best possible face.

The most important defect of the Trusteeship system evolved at San Francisco is that there is no time-limit set for the termination of the Trusteeship by an Administering authority and that the General Assembly’s supervision of the working of the system is calculated to be ineffective, in spite of the safeguards provided, because the Trusteeship Council itself will be composed of some of the Big Powers, who generally dominate the General Assembly also.

The proclaimed views of Mr. Churchill, as the Chief Minister of the Crown, with regard to the Atlantic Charter and India’s participation in its benefits, ill-accorded with Britain’s professed claim that she has promised dominion status with right of secession to India, as well as the right to frame her own constitution. They were incompatible with Mr. Amery’s oft-repeated assertion that India would be in a position to enjoy after the war as much freedom as Britain herself within the framework of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They were not on all fours too with the statement in the King’s speech at the opening of Parliament in November, 1942.
that "my Government in the United Kingdom have declared to the Princes and the peoples of India their desire to see India assume full freedom and independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations on the basis of a constitution framed by Indians themselves immediately after the termination of the hostilities." The defeat of Mr. Churchill's Government and his exit from the Prime Ministership was, therefore, a good riddance. The installation of a Labour Government in the place of the Tory Government was a fact of great significance so far as Britain was concerned; whether it will be so with regard to India too, remains to be seen.

The most important need is the adjustment of performance to promise, the concretisation of assurances into definite acts of policy, not to elevate distrust and dichardism into elements of state policy, which betrays a complete forgetfulness of Britain's own past relations with the American Colonies, South Africa, Canada and lastly Ireland. In this respect, however, there have been snags. The most conspicuous of these was picturesquely expressed by Mahatma Gandhi when he characterised the British War Cabinet's offer to India, brought over here by Sir Stafford Cripps in March, 1942, which, paradoxically enough, was both withdrawn and held the field, as a 'post-dated cheque.' Another important snag was that the so-called offer of independence (the phrase is never "independence" but either Dominion Status or self-government) with the
right of secession after the termination of hostilities contained in the Cripps’ offer and repeated for the last time in September, 1945, is not an unqualified and absolute one but is hamstringed by a number of conditions which act as checks and counter-checks, whether deliberately or unwittingly introduced, to prevent a united front by Indians, and which require to be preliminarily fulfilled before it can become effective in its implementation. One of the most crucial of these conditions is agreement among the diverse interests and communities in India, which is obviously impossible of achievement in the face of the encouragement to disagreement contained therein.

If one can visualize the picture of India that will emerge after all those conditions are worked out into practical effect, he will find rising before his mind’s eye a perfect mosaic of bewildering incoherence, in which India, as we know it and as it had existed since the beginning of history, will probably be unrecognizable. If the Cripps’ scheme or something on those lines is implemented, she will probably be divided into a number of communal, territorial zones mutually antagonistic to one another. Ulsters in the form of Indian States will persist and communal divergences will exacerbate and the country would become a complete stranger to political peace and harmonious progress. Dominion Status with right of secession was assured in that scheme, but that
section of Indians, who are followers of the Congress—and it is now the dominant section among politically-minded Indians—will not obviously touch Dominion Status, even with the right of secession, with a pair of tongs. Even those in India who believe that India would derive some advantages, economic and military, by hitching her star to the wagon of the British Commonwealth are distressed not only by the limitations interpolated in the British declaration about India's future but by the tragic events in India since August, 1942—in fact since September, 1939—and have little faith that association with the Commonwealth is possible for an India, whose body had been scarred by blows delivered against her honour, prestige, unity and economic interests by the British Government under Mr. Churchill. Whether and when this country would be in a position to reap the practical benefits of attaining even the status of a dominion in the face of these restrictions and impeding conditions is also difficult to divine for there is nothing definite or unambiguous about it. It is sad to contemplate that long before the offer is transformed into a concrete and practical reality, the British Government by their policy have created that psychological predisposition among large sections of Indians in favour of the exercise of the right of secession implicit therein.

Thus unless requisite measures are taken by
the British Government, which will convince India that the political, economic and other advantages she is likely to acquire by remaining within the British Empire structure will not be outweighed by the economic and other advantages derivable from secession, apart from the fact that it will be consistent with her national honour and self-respect, the contingency of secession will be transformed into an inescapable probability. This makes it imperative that the psychological and political conditions favourable to proneness to secession from the Commonwealth should be eliminated with the utmost expedition—a thing which the British Government alone can accomplish. Minorities, the Services, the Princes and the British commercial interests, constitute a combination of factors, which, in that Government’s estimation, impose limitations on immediate transfer of power to an Indian Government which, they maintain, will be resisted by one or the other of those interests and thus lead to anarchy. The essential reality, however, is that these interests will present insuperable obstacles so long as British policy is nebulous and lacking in vigour, which can result only from a determination to settle the problem. They will automatically adjust themselves to the different conditions that will supervene if sincerity and resoluteness invest the Government’s attitude. Indians’ national patriotism, to the extent that it is delimited by loyalty to sectional or communal interests or by communal intransigence, will assert itself the
moment Britain's empire-retaining ambition is tempered by a genuine willingness to implement the assurance of freedom, irrespective of the absence of cent. per cent. internal agreement.

Thus the key to India's freedom lies essentially in Britain's hands. Immediately the decision to surrender the key is made, Indian parties and communities will inevitably realise the necessity for concerted efforts to get together to safeguard and protect the house the door to which has thus been opened. The fact is that Britain cannot keep the key tightly within her grip and yet maintain that she is prepared and even anxious to give it up. It is elementary human psychology which has to be applied on a national scale that there will be no incentive to Indian parties to unite and settle things among themselves so long as there is no prospect of their being able to exercise effective control over the country's affairs. The plum of power, on the other hand, when it is within reach, will indeed prove too irresistible an attraction to them to relinquish. British statesmen, whether they are people like Mr. Churchill or they are like Mr. Attlee and Lord Pethick Lawrence, should realise once for all that the argument about Britain's willingness to transfer power remaining unrecognised because of Indians' cussedness in not grasping that offer and their not being united in grasping it cuts precious little ice with Indians now. It only irritates and exasperates and crystallises into anti-British feel-
ing on a wider and still wider scale.

Clause One of the Atlantic Charter is to be regarded as the expression of a pious, if also a generous, wish so far as Britain or the U.S.A. is concerned. Clause Three of that Charter, however, embodies a positive constructive ideal: it embodies the ideal and hope of freedom for the world which principally justifies its being characterized as a Charter for World Freedom. The clause proclaims the desire of the signatories "to respect the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." The words 'all peoples' occurring here are significantly and abundantly clear and do not lend themselves to a variety of interpretations or even the two different interpretations such as those which Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt put upon them with regard to its application to India. They are capable of one single construction which is that 'all peoples' stands for 'all peoples' and no amount of quibbling can restrict its application only to the peoples of Europe or America. The value of the two clauses of the Charter referred to will be nullified if the British and the American nations put up a barbed wire fence around what they have acquired and are prepared further to surcharge it with electric current to enable them to hold on inflexibly to it; and if they do the latter it will be morally indefensible for them to maintain that they have formulated
a set of principles for world reconstruction. The war will have been fought in vain and the long procession of human sacrifices that passed before him between September 1939 and August 1945 will have lost all their supreme emotional and psychological appeal if that were so. The Atlantic Charter will not be worth anything if the signatories, one of whom had since died, formulated it with so many mental reservations. It is evident, however, that it was not the case and that the Charter was meant to be what its language, as published, connotes and conveys. It was the disparity between profession and practice in regard to India that had evoked the well-known jibe from M. Molotov at the San Francisco Conference: "We have in this conference a delegation from India. But India is not an independent country. We all understand that a time will come when the voice of an independent India will be heard."

The conception of Dominion Status assured to India, it is argued, is a rapidly changing conception, with no finality as regards the extent of the power transferred to or exercised or exercisable by the self-governing Dominions. With the passing of the Statute of Westminster, they have acquired the right of cutting themselves away from Great Britain and while they remain associated with her, the only cementing link between them and Britain is the Crown. The Crown, however, can be an effective link
only so long as it is recognized as such by the Dominions, but it cannot be considered an unbreakable link. The recent war had served clearly to indicate that dominions like Canada and Australia might regard it as propitious and indispensable to their interests to exercise the right of freedom of action to the extent of aligning themselves for strategical and military purposes intimately with the United States instead of continuing their exclusive dependence on Britain. The stresses and demands of national defence in the last global conflict had demonstrably proved that, while Britain could not adequately discharge her obligations to the Dominions in that regard, some of them could have those obligations and demands fulfilled better and more effectively by collaboration with the U.S.A., for instance.

Collaboration in the matter of Defence will necessarily be accompanied by collaboration in the matter of trade, tariffs, economic relations and so on. If Canada and Australia and New Zealand adopt an independent policy after the war, inevitably a new conception of Dominion Status will spring into existence in which the Dominions will be retaining but a nominal political connection and association with Britain while developing new regional security and trade connections and associations with other powerful nations. When they do so, India cannot be expected to tie herself up with Britain.
Unto that end India will have to prepare steadily and unflinchingly from now onwards by making herself self-sufficient and self-supporting in regard to her own defence and security and by rapid strides creating conditions in which she can enter into such other regional arrangements as the situation calls for. It is a process which Britain herself cannot impugn in the face of stern facts and realities, the sternest of them being the presence in India during the war of large contingents of Americans and Chinese, besides British troops, ostensibly to ensure her defence against Japanese aggression. Once India is free in the genuine sense, ordinarily speaking, she may desire to continue her friendly association with Great Britain in the economic, cultural and other spheres, unless she is compelled by circumstances unforeseeable at the present moment to cut off the British connection altogether. She would, like Canada or Australia, enter into closer collaboration with the Asiatic bloc of countries, without detriment to her association with Great Britain.

As a last word, it must be said that India's mind is now made up on the question of national independence; she will have nothing less than that. If the British Labour Government's statement of September 19, 1945, reiterated on February 1946, however, means that they will seek the most expeditious way of implementing the assurance of self-government, by setting up
a representative constituent assembly to formulate a framework of self-government for India, undeterred by threats of communal revolt or other obstructions, and if they conclude a treaty of union and friendship with India as an equal, it is just possible that even now the demand for immediate dissociation and complete cutting off of all association with Britain, will not be pressed to its logical conclusion. That is the only way in which Britain can do something to compensate India for the humiliation caused to her by Mr. Churchill’s denial of the application of the Atlantic Charter to this country. The future is in the laps of gods and of the Cabinet Mission of Three.
CHAPTER III

Problem of the Minorities

I am one of those Indians who had not hesitated to advocate that India should wholeheartedly participate in war effort and co-operate with the United Nations in crushing the Axis Powers. But when I did so, I had before me the vision of the bright future of my country—a future in which Indians will be free and independent, in which Indians manage their own affairs, Indian interests in all vital matters will prevail unquestionably, in which poverty and privation will have disappeared from India, and education and enlightenment are widespread, in which Indians will not be found grovelling obsequiously before foreigners but will be able to hold their heads proudly aloft and foreigners who now dominate her destinies will themselves have voluntarily abandoned their superior attitude and realized that their place in India is as fellow-citizens with Indians or not at all. It is this vision that stimulated and encouraged me to advise my countrymen to assist to the maximum possible extent in the prosecution of the war because without an Allied victory therein,
the vision had no chance of becoming a reality. A similar future is visualized for this country by every true patriotic son of the soil, whether he supported for some other valid reasons or was opposed to war effort.

Throughout the duration of the war, India's expectations of constitutional changes which would have enthused and energised Indians to vigorous participation in war effort did not materialise, thanks to the reactionary anti-Indian attitude of the Churchill-Amery-Linlithgow combine. A really serious attempt in that direction was that represented by the Cripps offer of March-April 1942, which, unfortunately, was a still-born affair.

If Britain's offer of freedom to India after the war contained in the Cripps declaration had been ridiculed by Mahatma Gandhi as a 'post-dated cheque,' the most effective counter-blast to that characterization that Britain could have thought of was to demonstrate that it was a cheque which India was in a position immediately to cash at least in part. Thus alone could the seal of faith, confidence, trust and co-operation have been imprinted most authoritatively on India's effective participation in the war and would have laid the foundation for permanent, friendly Indo-British relations and co-operation. Thus could India have been induced to remain a contented and happy and useful member of the British Commonwealth, imparting its strength
and vitality and deriving strength and vitality from it in turn. Thus alone could the demand in India for secession from the British Empire, which, rightly or wrongly, is a vigorous and live demand embodied in the suggestive phrase "Quit India" have been neutralised.

But the opportunity was sadly and consciously missed by Britain. We had at the last moment the 1945 Simla Conference proposals postulating transfer of power to an Indian Government, untrammelled by external vetoes and inhibitions. The failure of that conference is in a way a failure of the British Government's policy of continued conciliation of communal intransigence by the favourite Churchill-Amery panacea of internal agreement among Indian parties and a clear illustration that the Indian problem or deadlock is primarily a British Government problem which can be solved only by resolute British action.

This was followed by the general elections in England and the defeat of the Tory Party followed by the installation in office of a Labour Government under Mr. Attlee's leadership, while at the India Office, Mr. Amery, the very incarnation of reactionary diehardism as he showed himself to be, was replaced by Lord Pethick-Lawrence. The Labour Government made a declaration on September 19, 1945, in which they tried to retrieve the continued and persistent war-time blunder of the Churchill Govern-
ment of shelving the Indian issue by envisaging certain steps for the speedy realisation of self-government by India. As integral parts of the declaration we had the holding of general elections to Central and Provincial Legislatures in India followed by the establishment of an Executive Council representative of the political parties and the setting up of a constitution-making body to frame a constitution for India. It was a wise move—the holding of the general elections to Legislative Assemblies which had become wholly unrepresentative of war-time changes in public opinion. But the Muslim League which since the resignation of the Congress ministries towards the end of 1939 had a clear and unimpeded field for itself to propagate the Hindu atrocities propaganda, systematically worked up feeling in favour of the division of India into two separate states—one Hindu and one Muslim—and the establishment of Pakistan, culminating in the Lahore Resolution on the subject.

The story of the other associated developments is now too recent a matter of history to need detailed recapitulation in a book like this. Suffice it to say that the Pakistan issue is very much with us now, and while it has acquired an enormous propaganda value from the League point of view it has, naturally, produced vigorous opposition from the Hindus, the Sikhs, the nationalist Muslims and others
who cannot blind themselves to the dangers implicit in dividing India. The fundamental and relevant consideration here is that without any precise definition of Pakistan, without a clear exposition and elucidation of the implications of division, with everything in the nature of the details of the proposed Pakistan left completely vague and unsettled, it was made the central issue by the League in the general elections.

On the other hand the Congress, the other political organisation which fought the elections on a country-wide basis as a closely-knit party, put forward prominently the issue of “Quit India” or India’s independence. The Congress has swept the polls on that issue throughout the country, whether in Hindu-majority or Muslim-majority provinces. An overwhelming majority of the Muslim seats were no doubt won by the League on the Pakistan issue in Sind, and the Punjab; but in the N.-W. F. Province, and Assam, the two principal outposts of the N.-W. and N.-E. Pakistan states, Congress parties which stood by the Congress policy of independence for a united India and against Pakistan have been successful with majorities enough to constitute provincial ministries. In the Punjab too, though the League won the vast majority of Muslim seats, firstly, the methods by which it won them cannot justify or warrant the claim that the voters voted for
Pakistan and not for the Quran or for the slogan of "Islam in Danger"; and secondly, the formation of a ministry by the League Party alone or in coalition with others was out of the question. A closer analysis of the election reveals, therefore, that the Muslim League’s demand for outright division on the basis of these results for a British Government declaration in favour of two independent states in India, and the setting up of two constituent assemblies to formulate two separate constitutions—one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan—is evidently a tall order. It involves shock tactics to which the British Cabinet Mission consisting of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A. V. Alexander, cannot legitimately give in.

We have surely our internal problems—our communal problem, for instance—which we have to tackle decisively and finally but amicably before internal peace, progress and national independence can be a reality. Indians are not, and cannot be impervious to the existence of these problems and do not want to burke or minimise them and British politicians definitely compromise their reputation for statesmanlike and sympathetic handling of the Indian situation when they attempt to rub in the consideration of their existence as an insurmountable obstacle to the unambiguous declaration of freedom and transfer of power to Indians.

Hindu-Muslim differences even in their crys-
tallised form of the demand for Pakistan will be adjusted in a friendly spirit when the breeze of freedom begins to blow over the Indian soil, when alone the adjustment and reconciliation of those differences will be recognized as worthwhile and imperative by the disputants. Briti- shers, however, have the responsibility to assist in the process by a sincere and earnest implementation of their declarations of freedom. Their assistance will be warmly welcomed if forthcoming in an ungrudging and non-patronizing spirit and as a spontaneous recognition of their inherent responsibility in that regard. To our regret, however, that had not been the spirit which has so far actuated British attempts at eliminating the communal canker. It is an entirely unhelpful, 'divide and rule' spirit that has actuated them. Let it be agreed that the Communal Award is a monument or signpost of our communal irreconcilability; but it is not also an indication of Britain's solicitousness for Indian unity or progress. It only demonstrated the latter's eagerness to further widen our communal differences and to trade on them for her own political advantage. Mr. Amery as the high-priest of this spirit during his India Office regime, showed himself a resounding success. His policy and his speeches constituted a clever camouflage for his anxiety to vouchsafe the minority communal interests a permanent veto over Indian progress and they had been outstanding successes in promoting and stereotyping Muslim
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League recalcitrance. It will be the great and unenviable responsibility of the Lord Pethick-Lawrence mission to remove by their sympathetic but firm handling of the Pakistan issue the bad legacy left by the Tory Government.

It is not as if any Indian nationalist who believes in the great destiny of his country is anxious to deprive the Muslims of any portion of their legitimate rights or to be a party to the suppression of their language or culture or racial individuality. It is a myth which is sedulously cultivated to create an argument favourable to the separate nation theory and to a particular slogan, namely, Pakistan based on that theory, when Mr. Jinnah and his League colleagues proclaim that under a single Central Indian Government, constituted on a democratic basis, the Muslims will be reduced to the status of perpetual helots and slaves. Nothing is further from the thought of any sane or responsible Hindu or Congress leader than to provide grist to the Jinnah grievance mill by gratuitously disregarding legitimate Muslim political or other demands or to exploit their minority position to their everlasting detriment and disadvantage. Safeguards in a sufficient measure can be provided for the Muslim community as well as for other minority communities in the constitutional framework in the moulding of which Muslims, through their representatives on the constituent assembly will undoubtedly have an
effective voice. And as to the adequacy and nature of such safeguards, the Muslims themselves can be the judges at the time of actually drafting the constitution while disputed points, if necessary, can be referred to international arbitration or settled through some other mutually agreed procedure. All these imperative considerations are so well understood and clearly acknowledged and expressly stated several times by Hindu leaders, both of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha persuasions, that it is superfluous to repeat them. Gandhiji had gone as far as any Congress leader could go when he accepted the principle of division of India to meet the League demand only to find that Mr. Jinnah would have an immediate 16 annas Pakistan or nothing. The Congress resolution of August 1942, subsequently reiterated at Bombay in 1945, incorporates the proposition that the provincial units in an all-India Constitution will have the largest measure of autonomy consistent with the safety and defence of the country and the need for the discharge of some common functions by a Central Government and that there can be realignment of provincial boundaries.

But the consideration referred to might be reiterated just to demonstrate that Muslim League apprehensions about Hindu domination are entirely without foundation. I repeat them to demonstrate the unwarrantedness of the demand for the division of India into communal
zones or into independent communal states, which in so far as it means an exhibition of the cloven foot, by Indians, will only fill British diehards and would-be grabbers of Indian territory with jubilation. I repeat them to show that the argument about the unsuitability and the dangerous implications from the Muslim point of view of a common Central Government for the whole of India holds little or no water. On the other hand a common Central Government is an integral factor and an indispensable desideratum for the preservation of India's integrity and independence in a world still pervaded with the spirit of aggression. To any powerful nation intent upon territorial aggrandizement absence of a strong, powerful central authority in India claiming the maximum allegiance and loyalty of all the component elements and units, will be an invitation to indulge in its cupidity and India's long history affords more than one striking illustration of the validity of this statement. India parcelled out into two or more states will be incapable of resisting such aggression, particularly in view of the prospect of the different states that may be formed being actuated by conflicting communal loyalties, impeding their energetic co-operation with one another in the event of division enforced by shock tactics.

A fundamental point is that theocratic states are an anachronism in modern times
whatever may have been their justification in the later Middle Ages. Only those nations are strong and powerful and are capable of raising their heads aloft whose component populations are prepared to substitute the principle of a dynamic loyalty to a common political ideology and common economic progress for the principle of communal or tribal loyalty. No patriotic Indian can contemplate the prospect that division of the country involves with any degree of satisfaction even as he cannot contemplate with equanimity the substitution of one hegemony over the country by another, the latter of which might be, presumptively, far worse than the former. Much less can he contemplate such division when both Hindus and Muslims labour under a common tutelage, the grip of which shows no signs of resiling and which will naturally and inevitably attempt to exploit division to maintain its hold. It is not suspicion of British intentions that induces this conclusion. It is realisation of the fact that the instinct of self-preservation will obstruct assertion of any altruistic intentions unless forced by circumstances.

My principal thesis, therefore, is that freedom will prove an automatic solvent of all India's problems which appear so formidable and forbidding at present. Communities like the Muslims, entities like the Indian States, and interests like the British commercial interests
and the Civil Services will realise, once the deadening influence of British control is withdrawn, that they have to adjust their viewpoints to fit into the overpowering and omnipotent factor of Indian national interests. It is an inspiring and ennobling thing and at the same time a wholly gratifying feature of the situation that smaller minority communities like the Indian Christians and the Parsis have on many occasions unequivocally and unhesitatingly proclaimed their loyalty to the ideal of a united and undivided India and resolutely discon­tenanced the claim for special protection and special electorates, which have been the pro­genitors of the separationist tendencies and of the demand for independent states within the larger state of India. The Indian Muslims numbering about ninety millions, though scattered over the country, are a vastly bigger and more numerous community than any other minority community and are in a definite­ly stronger position to defend their rights against potential encroachment or infringement if attempted at any time. I am sure that once the bright star of freedom dawns on the Indian horizon, the fundamental patriotism of the Muslim community and their loyalty to the common motherland will assert themselves and that they will realise, what is stern and obvious reality even now to all thinking Indians, Hindus and Muslims alike, that the scheme of Independent Muslim States in the north-east and north-
west of India is politically unnecessary, economically and financially unsound, militarily untenable and from the standpoint of solving the communal problem ineffective and useless. A redistribution of provincial boundaries is indubitably needed as much as a concession to the principle of communal and cultural homogeneity of the provincial units as a matter of administrative necessity when the new constitution for India is devised. But a horizontal division of India as a concession to the clamour for communal states, which may (or may not) eventually turn out to be nothing better than a concession to the principle of extra-territorial loyalty, must be clearly ruled out as an infamous proposal.

The objections to the Pakistan proposal are thus convincing and overwhelming even as the arguments in favour of it are unconvincing and lacking in practical force. A proposal like that cannot be accepted and implemented to placate even the strong religious sentiment of the Muslims while there is on the other hand the equally strong sentiment of Hindus and Sikhs against it which can be opposed to it. It is arguable that the elections to the provincial and central Legislatures held from December 1945 to March 1946 have shown that the Muslim masses in the Muslim majority areas have accorded to Pakistan their overwhelming, if not unanimous, support. The success of the League candidates in these elections in the Punjab and Sind will be
readily conceded; but the League will have to concede on its side that in two other Muslim majority areas, areas which in fact constitute the outposts of the Pakistan States, the N.-W. F. Province and the Assam, the League had lost ground to the Congress. The elections do not, therefore, prove anything conclusively, even if we leave out of consideration the fact not so well-known that in the Punjab and the N.-W. F. P., as probably in the other provinces, the League exploited to the maximum possible extent the religious fanaticism of the Muslim masses and systematically instilled the fear complex into their minds.

It was a shrewd and independent British observer like Mr. H. N. Brailsford, the well-known Journalist, who wrote _apropos_ of the League propaganda in the Frontier as follows: “It (the League) never discusses the details of Pakistan as an economic and political structure. Its local record is bad; for its ministry...was notoriously corrupt. So it argues with all the power of its lungs that Islam is in danger. To counteract this appeal, one of the leading Muslim divines is touring the province on behalf of Congress.” It is only too well-known how League propagandists invited “Divine Displeasure” on any Muslim voter who voted against the League candidates and how the propaganda reached enormous dimensions necessitating the issue of a serious warning to those
indulging in it. What the League could not do by elucidating the economic and other aspects of Pakistan it tried to make up by appealing to religious bigotry.”

I am a Hindu; I am bred up on the idea and all my education and culture have taught me that India from immemorial times has been one single geographical unit and has been regarded for centuries as such by every ruler, including the Muslims, who had made this country their home. Lord Linlithgow, in December 1942, in the course of his speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Calcutta, stressed this obvious fact, though he did not directly discontinue the Pakistan cry. Similarly Lord Wavell, as Viceroy, stated in his speech to the same body that one could not ignore geography and nature. To me the scheme that India should be vivisected into a number of communal states, independent of another, is understandable, inexplicable and abhorrent. But then I know that the same feeling still sustains and inspires a very large number of my Muslim countrymen also. I have talked to many of them, and while naturally they feel strongly and vehemently on the point that their political and other rights should be safeguarded, they too view with grave doubt and misgiving the demand for independent Muslim states, which instead of laying the ghost of the communal problem, which is indubitably our most difficult problem, raises
innumerable other complicated issues and minor communal problems, which can possibly be settled only by resort to extreme remedies like a fratricidal civil war. It should do the hearts of all of us good to recall here the forthright confession of faith in the ideal of a united India by so thoughtful and distinguished a Muslim as Sir Mirza Ismail in his addresses to the Patna and Dacca University Convocations in 1942. “To me India, one nation, is a most inspiring thought and a most reasonable one,” he maintained in his Patna address, while at Dacca he illustrated the geographical indivisibility of the country by emphasising the fact that provincial boundaries do not prove barriers to close interprovincial contacts and interdependence. He reiterated his view subsequently at the Aligarh University convocation also and in his address to the Indian Political Science Conference held in Jaipur in December, 1944. I may also recall here the characterisation by another thoughtful Muslim, Nawab Yar Jung Bahadur, Finance Minister of Hyderabad, of the Pakistan theory as “absurd.” The fact is that political, communal and regional peace in India will be completely destroyed for some decades at least if the economic unity so essential to the promotion of peace and prosperity of the people will be disrupted and internecine strife will be substituted for internal goodwill and co-operation by endeavours at an artificial dismemberment of the geographical, political and cultural factors per-
ennially and consistently making for the
country's unity and strength.

Then again when Mr. Jinnah claims that
Pakistan is the justest solution for our commu­
nal problems he is merely begging the question.
There are and must be a number of other
methods in which the problem can much more
satisfactorily be resolved than by insisting on a
remedy which is calculated to engender furious
internal strife before it can be an accomplished
proposition and which is calculated to perpetuate
that strife in an intensified form if ever it is
accomplished. British administrators and Bri­
tish policy in India for nearly a century and a
half strove incessantly for India's unity and I
consider it as one of the gratifying heritages of
British rule, among a number of not so very
gratifying ones, which it has bequeathed to
India. It used to be distressing in the extreme,
therefore, when a Secretary of State like Mr.
Amery speaking in Mr. Jinnah's voice non­
chalantly used to proclaim the infamous doctrine
that Britain would rather see divided and free
than that she would keep her various elements
chafing against Britain. He had in that one
sentence repudiated a hundred and fifty years of
indefatigable British effort in this country in an
ttempt to adopt the line of least resistance and
prevented India from advancing to her destiny
by surrendering to an extreme communal de­
mund. The unity of India or India united and
free is an unalterable article of faith with every true Indian nationalist, Hindu or Muslim. India divided, which Mr. Jinnah and the League demand, and divided and free which Mr. Amery apparently preferred, is, on the other hand, a contradiction in terms, a paradoxical statement pregnant with the element of impracticability. It remains to be seen now how far Lord Linlithgow’s and Lord Wavell’s assertions about India’s geographical and natural unity will be effective in neutralising the League’s intensifying propaganda for Pakistan and whether the Labour Government mission, now in India, will fall into the same error as that of Mr. Amery of justifying and sanctifying the “Divide and Quit” demand.

I repeat my assertion that India divided cannot be free for long; it is a disruptionist’s panacea which inheres not only its own refutation, but a great danger to India’s security in an atom-bomb era. In any case Mr. Jinnah and his friends cannot maintain in one breath that Islam is a great democratic religion, which it is in fact, and in another propound and propagate the un-Islamic idea that democracy is unsuited to this country and that Muslims cannot consent to a common central Government for the whole of India in which they will play and are bound to play a not inconspicuous or insignificant role.

Among the untried solutions of the commu-
nal problem in India (untried because it was progressively abandoned ever since the Minto-Morley Reforms, which first introduced the electoral system on any large scale in India) we have the scheme of joint electorates, which are calculated not only to foster a feeling of common citizenship, cutting across communal and religious affiliations, but also to promote a sense of communal national patriotism. The swing-back to joint electorates will entail the country's living down of the last thirty-eight years of her history, during which Muslim separatism has been studiously and consistently encouraged by a series of concessions to the principle of separate electorates and special treatment of minorities and so on. That it has proved a veritable Frankenstein monster is evident from the recent vociferous claim for separate electorates, independent state-hood for the scheduled castes and for the burying of the Poona Pact written in the ink of sacrifice and suffering of a noble saint like Mahatma Gandhi, advanced by Dr. Ambedkar on behalf of the former.

Nevertheless the gradual reintroduction of joint electorates is an effort worth making by all Indian nationalists at the forthcoming constitution-making body under favourable conditions with multi-member electoral constituencies and proportional representation. It is a reform, the difficulties besetting the path of resurrecting which are worth facing and eliminating. If,
however, the constitution-making body finds it to be an impossible proposition, other alternatives may be tried. One of these is the substitution of a suitable system of representative Government in place of the scheme of responsible Government on the British model, which however, is regarded in India as the ideal form of Government, under which alone democracy will flourish. The sentimental attachment we all possess for the responsible system will have to be re-examined in the light of the peculiar nature of the Indian problem and we may have to make compromises if and where found necessary. So long as a genuine spirit of democracy, in the sense that all governments must ultimately derive their inspiration, strength and power from the governed and depend on the consent of the latter is not sacrificed and its outward form of responsible government is not hugged to, so long as national freedom is guaranteed and ensured, so long as India's unity is preserved and disintegrating tendencies are neutralised and suppressed, compromises and adjustments on details are not only inevitable but are to be regarded as essential. Let us be perfectly clear on the point that the supreme need is the maintenance of Indian integrity combined with effective protection of the rights of every community. If we are clear on that, it follows that it is impossible to agree to the demand that for the preservation of unity and for common progress we should first of all acquiesce in the
principle of division and dismemberment of India. It is a paradox which is difficult to comprehend and is on a par with the paradox which was widely current in international circles in the pre-war years—that for the preservation of peace nations must be heavily armed. The armaments race that this plea justified led inexorably to war and did not succeed in preserving the peace. Exactly in the same way, the disruption of Indian unity by establishing a number of independent states within the country is inherent with the danger of further disruption just as the separate electorates principle introduced as a stop-gap arrangement under the Minto-Morley reforms led only to accentuated demand for separation and further separation, culminating in the Pakistan demand. The need, therefore, is undeviatingly to adhere to fundamental principles, leaving the door open for adjustments in details. Compromise is an essential and inescapable ingredient of politics. If in spite of these supremely important considerations, Mr. Jinnah and the League continue to demand outright division, it is difficult to contemplate the consequences thereof. In the ultimate resort it may be that it is only as at present inconceivable contingency of a Hindu-Muslim civil war, if the British decide to wash their hands of the affair, that can settle the issue. Or if the British are not so foolish or generous as to do that, it will involve an indefinite continuance of their domination over India. In either case, the
responsibility for what happens will be on the heads of those who have stood in the way of an amicable settlement, and who have thereby impeded the attainment by India of her rightful place as an independent nation in the comity of nations.

With regard to the responsible Government principle itself, it is imperative to remember that even in Great Britain, during the period of stress represented by the war, an actual breakdown in the parliamentary system was avoided through the Englishman’s well-known capacity for political compromise, which made him realise that the executive should be a composite one and that it should be left with as large a measure of initiative as possible consistent only with its obligations to the electorates represented in Parliament. It is impossible to see why there cannot be a similar spirit of compromise in India in the national interests.

An all-India Federation, which will include within its embrace the British Indian provinces as well as Indian States and which will provide for a common Central Government to discharge certain essential common functions, therefore, obviously the most appropriate form of constitution for a country like India. Within the framework of the all-India constitutional structure adjustments can be made which will safeguard all legitimate and reasonable demands of all interests and parties. It should be possible,
if negotiations are carried on, on the plane of realities and with a view to discover solutions to the differences between the various communities and interests, to find out such solutions which will obviate the pitfalls of the League demand for a literal practisation of the ideal of self-determination. A very satisfactory and adequate solution may be a scheme involving (1) an immediate readjustment of provincial boundaries by a Boundary Commission so as to make the provincial units conform to linguistic, communal, and cultural divisions. Thus for example, the Punjab will be divided into a Muslim Punjab, comprising the western districts where the Muslims are in a majority, while the eastern districts will be constituted into a separate province which will be a sort of composite province where Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims will be in almost equal proportions; (2) the formation of legislative lists in such a way that the provinces will have the maximum possible authority in all matters directly affecting the life and well-being of the masses and the limitation of the Central Government list to only essential common functions connected with Defence, Communication, Foreign Relations, Trade and Commerce, coinage and currency, (3) the establishment of a convention by which the Premiership at the centre will be occupied by a Hindu and Muslim and a member of the other minority community by rotation and (4) more extensive use of the committee system, as in the U. S. A.
Congress for securing unanimity in regard to legislative measures and to ensure cordial relations between the legislative and the Executive, and (5) the inclusion in the list of Fundamental Rights clauses intended to guarantee protection to the culture, religion and script of the various communities, particularly of the minorities and making a statutory provision that any measure affecting these rights of the minorities can be brought in or become a law only with the vote of a three-fourth majority of the members belonging to that community or interest.

With India's unity safeguarded, rival, communal and other claims can thus be amply provided for, whereas with these claims pressed to the point of disruption, India, as such, will surely disappear; and the land become a perpetual arena for the play of centrifugal forces constantly endangering the security and independence of the different states into which she has been cut up. Unity in diversity has been India's foremost contribution to world's philosophical thought; let us not lightly abandon that heritage in pursuit of the strange dogma of diversity as a preclude to unity. On the other hand freedom and democracy are India's most indubitable requisites. With freedom assured, the details of the methods of enjoying that freedom and the division of power among the various interests thereunder will be worked out by negotiation and discussion among Indians as
a matter of inescapable necessity. Democracy as a mode of living is not a strange thing for India, and if departure from the structure of democratic institutions in the West, particularly Britain, is essential to suit indigenous conditions, Indian genius will supply the remedies therefor. The British Government and the British Parliament can make a great contribution to the solution of India's problem, which has now crystallised into a problem of her division or unity, for on independence there is unanimity. It is a problem which constitutes a vital, supreme test of British professions and intentions. Within the next few months, it will be known if they have passed the test or failed.
Next to the communal problem we have the problem of British commercial interests and of the civil services, the latter of which in particular may choose to play the role of last ditchers in the matter of interposing impediments to the realisation of India's political aspirations. The civil services do not always come out into the open. They constitute, however, the power working from behind the screen, the invisible arguments behind the steely reactionarism of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery. They sustain the latter and are in turn sustained by them. So far as India's progress towards self-government and freedom is concerned, they are likely to play the part of the last refuge of diehardism. The most closely knit official corporation in the world, the members of the Indian Civil Service constitute a caste by themselves whose faith is inflexibly pinned on big emoluments, unconscionable privileges, entrenchment of routine and silent obstruction to progressive reform. If self-government in India has made some strides in the past, it is largely in spite of the civil services, while
they are adepts in defeating in its details what has been accepted and endorsed in principle. In the Secretary of State, to whom alone they owe any genuine allegiance, they have a tower of strength, a loyal and steadfast supporter of their cause and an instrument for the fulfilment of their demands and their favourite theories in regard to administrative policies.

Keeping themselves within the shadow of that functionary's protecting wings, the civil services had successfully stared the popular ministries in the Indian provinces in the face and nullified the ends and purposes of liberal measures of legislation by liberal administration of the reliefs provided thereby. The fact that some of the Congress ministers showered encomiums on good work of the civil servants does not detract from the essential correctness of the diagnosis made above. It is true that there is a proportion of Indian members of the civil service who regard that they owe a greater loyalty to their country and some British members who feel the same towards the country they serve, but it does not necessarily extenuate the greater loyalty a larger proportion, particularly of the latter, owe to an outside authority. To the services, therefore, the continuance of the status quo in India or in the alternative as insignificant modifications in the present constitutional administrative system as possible is a consummation devoutly to be wished for. The
Government of India Act of 1935 is a constitutional instrument which, from the Indian nationalist standpoint, is a mosaic of special powers and reservations of essential authority plus safeguards for this, that and the other interest. Among the safeguards incorporated therein, the most comprehensive and the most deleterious from the point of view of India's self-government, are those for safeguarding the position and prospects of the services. And while they afford protection to the existing rights of the latter, they restrict in the same measure the effective control which popular ministers and legislatures can exercise over them.

Let it be stated here clearly and definitely that among responsible sections of public opinion in India there is strong opposition to a continuance of rights and emoluments of the existing members of the Imperial services, they cannot agree that these rights will continue under a self-governing constitution which should have the right to modify the service conditions to suit the altered circumstances. The Indian legislature's right to alter these rights to the country's advantage in future cannot be restricted and in any way essential modifications in the methods of recruitment or conditions of service cannot wait till the members of the so-called Imperial services are prepared voluntarily to shed their privileged position and status. In a free India, recruitment to the I.C.S. and I.P.S. in England
must cease and not only will these services or their equivalents be manned more or less exclusively by Indians but they will have cheerfully to reconcile themselves to the prospect of an indigenous Government's supervision and control. It is just possible that we may not have all-India services of this description under self-government, because the provincial governments which will be autonomous in a real sense would probably prefer to evolve their own methods of recruitment and conditions of service for their administrative services. In any case the safeguards incorporated in the Government of India Act of 1935 for the services will have to go lock, stock and barrel under a self-governing constitution, because they are so blatantly incompatible with the free working of such a constitution. A civil service has indeed an important place in a country's administrative structure; but democratic self-government is patiently incompatible with the existence of a civil service which virtually dominates the Government of the day instead of being an instrument of its policies, which is its real function and role. In two directions a change in the existing position is desiderated under a free Indian constitution: first, all the administrative services should be recruited in India herself as the result of open competition held under the auspices of an Indian Public Service Commission and secondly, a revision in the scales of pay of the all-India services should be made so as to bring them into con-
formity with the general economic conditions of the masses and the capacity of the Indian finances to bear them without detriment to the progress of the people. I am sure that there will never be a dearth of sufficient number of Indians of the requisite calibre who will be prepared to shoulder the responsibility for the country’s administration on emoluments which thus bear a better and closer approximation to the economic condition of India than what is the case now.

Similarly to the British commercial interests, India may be prepared to concede a position of honourable existence, etc., with a very pertinent and very reasonable condition that that any concession to them does not cut across the rights and the promotion of Indian commercial interests. For the former to expect or demand special or privileged treatment in a free India which will be prejudicial to Indian national interests or will involve the sacrifice of the latter would be to demand and expect the inconceivable. There is a limit to a country’s, as to an individual’s, altruism and in the case of India that limit has been reached so far as accommodating British commercial interests is concerned. To the extent that the latter desire to function in India and co-operate with Indians in building up their country’s economic and industrial future their co-operation will be welcome. Indeed it is possible that India will
require the aid of British capital and the assistance of technical personnel in building up her own economic and industrial structure; but that will be on India's own terms and not *vice versa*. There can be co-operation and assistance but not domination or even partnership which amounts to domination. It follows from this that British interests will have to accept the inevitability of the need for their throwing in their lot with Indians and collaborating with them on terms of equality. If they can by their attitude and conduct ensure for themselves a secure place in the country's heart, by providing demonstrable evidence of their good-will towards this country, it will be mutually advantageous and profitable. It will indeed be a permanent factor in promoting the economic stability and self-sufficiency of the British Commonwealth in the present post-war era with economic competition becoming so intense between the bigger Powers like Britain and the U.S.A. India eagerly awaits the British Government's decision regarding the repayment of India's sterling balances, and on that decision will largely depend the prospects of friendly Indo-British collaboration in the economic and commercial spheres. Too much sentiment is mixed up with too little of proneness to financial justice towards India in the consideration of the sterling balances question. Freedom from want, so far as India is concerned, is inter-linked with rapid industrialisation and expeditious progress of her post-war reconstruction.
plans. But industrialisation and execution of these reconstruction plans are in their turn linked in a large measure with the release of her sterling accumulations and their utilisation to secure supplies of essential machinery and equipment from the United States and the United Kingdom. There can be neither scaling down nor repudiation of these balances consistently with financial fair-dealing with India. It is a matter connected with India's economic freedom or Swaraj, which is as, if not more, important than political freedom or Swaraj. The unanimous demand of public opinion in India in this respect has constrained Government to announce that negotiations for the utilisation of sterling balances will be unfettered by any extraneous considerations.

Side by side the Commercial Discrimination clauses of the Government of India Act of 1935 also require to be abrogated. The retention of these clauses, which were the results of a concession to British interests which made a deed set to have them accepted at the Round Table Conferences, in a self-governing constitution for India will involve serious impairment to the freedom of the future Government of India to order the commercial and fiscal policies of the country in the national interests. We are sure that the British interests will make a similar deed set during the forthcoming constitutional discussions to ensure the continuance of these
clauses. Such efforts will only create exasperation and annoyance, since any foreign interests in India, British or other, can have a place in the future India only on the basis of goodwill and on the same terms on which they have a place in any other country which enjoys freedom.

Lastly we have the complicated problem of the Indian Princes to settle if Indian unity and political stability are to be permanently ensured. Let us acknowledge the basic consideration that in the scheme of an all-India Federation, of which a common Central Government for the whole country is an integral need, the Princes must find a place and cannot be ignored. A first class difficulty is, however, likely to be encountered in reconciling the imperative requirements of a free and democratic constitution with the treaty rights and sanads by which the Princes' relations with the Paramount Power are determined and on the recognition and guaranteeing of which the Princes are insistent. The latter’s case in relation to Indian freedom was presented in a brief but comprehensive compass by H. H. the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar in an address before the East India Association of London on December 3, 1942, when the speaker declared that “basically our demands have always been the same: first the maintenance of the treaty rights under the aegis of the Crown, and secondly, effective and sufficient safeguards.”
The Jam Saheb agreed that "we have at least the same ideal as other patriotic Indians of a united India, but we equally well hold that we, as Princes, have an historical and individual contribution to make to it just as the other great elements in the political picture." More progressive and healthy sentiments have been expressed by H.H. the Nawab of Bhopal, who occupies a similar position of Chancellor of the Princes Chamber at present in his address to the Chamber on January 17, 1946. “With the approach of the time when India's constitutional future will be finally decided, the Indian Princes are naturally anxious to know what position they will occupy in the picture of that future. They have repeatedly affirmed through their spokesmen that they are as fully anxious as anyone else to see that India occupies a high and honourable place in the comity of nations and that they, as an order, will not place any obstructions in the progress of India to her goal of freedom and greatness.” To that extent the Princes' attitude is highly commendable; but even so it is obviously a negative attitude. What India expects of them is a positive contribution to the solution of the Indian problem, a positive declaration of their preparedness to participate in the formation and functioning of an all-India Federation or an all-India Union. The recent statement of the representative Princes like the Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharajah of Bikaner and others provide an ample indication that
they are fully aware of their obligations and responsibilities in this vital matter and that while they await the evolution of the picture of the future constitution, they will play their patriotic part in facilitating the formulation of a constitution in which freedom will be reconciled with national unity, when the time arrives for it. In the meantime it is necessary to emphasize two considerations. First, the principle must be recognised and implemented that any changes in their traditional relations with the Crown or with other authorities will be instituted in consultation with the States. Secondly, the Princes on their side should move with the times and introduce constitutional reforms actively associating their subjects with the Government of their territories and undertake economic and other reforms which will improve the standard of living of the states’ peoples. The first condition has been conceded to the states in the course of Lord Wavell’s speech to the Princes Chamber on January 17, 1946, and it is for the Princes collectively and individually to implement the growing and legitimate demand for self-government within their States. The so-called Chamber of States Peoples adopted by the Princes Chamber on January 18, 1946 is an important document which is illustrative of the progressive forces at work in the Princely Order. The Chamber can beneficially utilise its authority and influence to see that this charter of rights is proclaimed and implemented by the
Ruler of every Indian State. But that is only preliminary and the first step in the direction of progressivism demanded of the Princes. It must be followed up by the setting up of popular legislative and representative if not responsible governments in every considerable state, if possible by the time the constitution-framing body is set up to frame the future Indian constitution.

There is no gainsaying the fact that Indian India has a contribution to make to the future Indian progress and that some of the States are repositories of Indian traditions and culture in a more distinctive sense than British Indian territories. The wholesale abolition of the Indian States is, therefore, an unthinkable proposition. But equally unthinkable is the proposition that the States' administrations can remain perpetually in the position of benevolent autocracies and that States' subjects can be constrained to remain non-participants in the governance of their own affairs. The Princes too cannot undeviatingly adhere to their treaty rights and sanads in their original form and refuse to accept reasonable and necessary modifications and alterations in them to suit the demands of the changing times. They are, as has been pointed out above perfectly willing to accept essential changes, while from time to time changes and alterations in the Paramount Power-Princes' relations had taken place either through interpretation of treaties by the Political Department or by usage or other-
wise the recent assurance by Lord Wavell that they could be connected in any proposed changes must be reassuring to them.

Unsustainable also is the indictment that the Princes are impervious to the need for introducing constitutional reforms within their respective States, which are intended, in varying degrees, to associate their subjects with the Government. Mysore, Baroda, Bikaner, Kashmir, Travancore, Cochin, Gwalior, Jaipur, Dewas Senior and Junior, are among some of the States which have representative Legislative Assemblies functioning within their territories for a number of years. Hyderabad, the biggest Indian State, has also fallen in line already with a scheme of constitutional reforms in which functional representation forms an important feature. The Reform Movement can definitely be more rapid in the case of some States and the reforms actually introduced can be more liberal in the case of others. Nevertheless the trend of events is in itself unmistakable and constitutes a favourable augury for British and Indian India’s healthy and purposeful co-operation in the future. If everything goes well it is possible to regard the States as potential supporters of an all-India Federation, in spite of all that has happened in the past one decade and which had resulted in the Federal part of the 1935 Act being kept in abeyance.

Those States which have remained indiffer-
ent so far to the claims and demands for progressive reforms will also find it exceedingly difficult to resist the time spirit, even if they may be inclined to delay the acceptance of the same. With British India enjoying freedom and the benefits and advantages of democratic institutions, the Princes firstly, cannot indefinitely refrain from throwing in their lot with the rest of the country; and secondly, they cannot stem the tide of freedom ideas from overstepping territorial boundaries and compelling them to accept larger and bigger changes. Ideas and thought-currents cannot be obstructed from jumping over frontiers, and even where the frontiers are those of independent nations, they have a natural tendency to penetrate through them. In the case of India, of which the States form geographically integral units, impediments attempted to be placed in the way will be still less potent. Ulsterism or a policy of isolation will be an impossible and impracticable one for the States to adopt. The fundamental and vital mistake of Congress policy vis-a-vis the States in the past had been that Congress or a dynamic section of it showed itself anxious to force the pace of reform instead of enabling the time-factor to enforce changes, which outside pressure might be incapable of accomplishing. Meanwhile constitutional agitation within the States should continue either as a corrective to the Princes' reactionaryism or as an inducement to further and larger reforms where reforms have
already been promulgated.

It may be asserted without contradiction that the vast majority of the Princes will not be insuperable obstacles either to the unity or the freedom of India. Their patriotism is unquestionable according to their own protestations and the historical traditions to which they are professedly attached should be respected wherever possible. Even if all the States do not come into a self-governing all-India Union immediately it is constituted, they are bound to come in later, when they realise the definite and undoubted advantages in doing so, advantages which they cannot forego particularly in the matter of Defence and other common services. Suitable provisions can therefore be incorporated in the future constitution to facilitate their doing so. It is not beyond the range of probability that the Paramount Power, to whom they now look for protection against reformist agitation and are prone to look up to for guidance in many cases, will itself have to agree that the protection that it can vouchsafe to them will become progressively insignificant, unless of course it is prepared to countenance the contingency of engaging itself in continuous conflict with the Government of a free India over Princes' rights and treaties. That is an unthinkable proposition even as it will be an untenable and unworkable arrangement, in practice and the Princes will discover that allegiance to an extraneous Paramount Power will place both
parties in an anomalous position, involving as it will the exercise by British Crown of dyarchic function partly as Paramount Power and partly working as a government responsible to the Indian Legislature. But I am sure the Princes' love of their motherland and statesmanlike instincts will assert themselves long before any of these contingencies arise and they are not likely to continue to depend on what may prove to be a broken reed.

In the meantime the Princely Order has some internal problems of its own to settle in order that its part in the constitutional, political and administrative future of India may be really effective. In the first place, there is the problem of the numerous small states, which have limited financial resources and whose administrations cannot possibly come up to modern standards at any time if left to themselves. It is imperative that either these states should be abolished as separate units or that they should be amalgamated with British Indian territory after a reasonable settlement of the claims of their rulers. Other States, which are small but which are nonetheless not small enough to provide a civilised system of administration and ensure reasonable standards of living for their subjects, must consent to an immediate pooling of their resources among themselves to ensure that these conditions are reached. In the second place, the financial and
of the States, which had so far remained uneffect-
ed by modern trends, will have to be revised, with a view to enable their Government to pro-
ceed with the execution of nation-building, de-
velopment and reconstruction programmes. It is an indispensable need of a free India that all parts thereof should progress economically on a uniform basis or at least should strive to attain such uniformity.

A very important point that needs emphasis is that freedom from want, one of the late Pre-
sident Roosevelt's now famous Four Freedoms, is India's greatest and most pressing need. Poli-
tical freedom that Indians demand is not an end in itself; it is mainly a means to the procure-
ment of economic freedom which in her pre-
sent political state, she has inconspicuously little. Political freedom is fundamental to India because it will invest an Indian Govern-
ment with authority in the formulation of economic, industrial and fiscal policies in the interests solely of the Indian population, because it alone facilitates their formulating adequate, large-scale measures on a planned basis for the banishment of poverty, low standards of living, disease, filth and dirt from the land and enables India to develop into a strong and healthy nation. When we shed the shackles of our political dependence, we, as a nation, will un-
doubtedly achieve spiritual satisfaction. But we as a nation can attain physical and mental
satisfaction only when poverty and want, which stalk the land and strike any foreigner coming to this country straight in the eye, as they did the members of the British Parliamentary Delegation who visited India in January 1946, are banished therefrom. It is a regrettable and miserable confession to make, but it is a fact that this country is a striking example of the continuous paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty, which Europe and other Western nations experience only at exceptional periods of intense depression. Her vast agricultural economy can produce enough food to sustain her population, even though it is unfortunately growing at an alarming pace in recent decades. It is true that that economy broke down during the period of war and that natural calamities as well as human exploitation had resulted in a widespread famine in 1943, and that the ghost of famine continues to haunt the country given in the year of grace 1946. But for any country to enjoy the fruits of real wealth and real prosperity, it is indispensable in this age not only that the balance between her agricultural and industrial economies must be evenly struck but that both industrial and agricultural development should take the fullest advantage of the scientific and technical improvements and researches that have taken place in recent years. It is unfortunate that so far comparatively little effort has been made to apply modern scientific research to Indian agriculture so as to increase the yield of agricultural
produce and to make two blades of grass grow where only one was growing before. It is unfortunate too that Indian industrialization has been the painfully, almost exasperatingly, slow process it has been. British altruism towards Indian industrialization stops short at enabling it to attain only such degree of development as will not interfere with the interests of British industries themselves and India's tariff policies, notwithstanding the fiscal autonomy which she is supposed to enjoy, have invariably been influenced, if not actually shaped, by the India Office and the Secretary of State, not always in the country's interests.

Political freedom is, therefore, the *sine qua non* of economic freedom and is the sole method by which the present subordination of India's welfare, perceptible, or imperceptible, to Britain's can be avoided. It is unenlightened self-interest on the part of Britain that permits this subordination to be woven into her policy towards India's economic progress; and it provides the most telling explanation of India's present incredible poverty and a justification for the relaxation of Britain's grip on this country's affairs. It is a demand the inherent justification for which should have fully impressed itself on British commercial and political circles; for an India industrially advanced and economically better off, can be a more beneficial market for British goods and a politically free
India is more likely than not to agree to continuance of economic, trade and commercial relations with Britain which would be mutually advantageous. The Grady Mission’s report, for instance, constitutes a sad commentary on the vast but wasted opportunities in India’s industrialization during the war and also an indication of the immense industrial potentialities she possesses, which could have been canalised into purposeful and profitable channels. India’s war-time prosperity was consequently of a very insignificant nature compared with the industrial boom which prevailed in the United States and Britain during that period. But whatever may have happened in the past, India will not tolerate the continuance of these conditions any longer. Her economic tariff and industrial policies must be formulated and administered by her own people in their own interests, and she must be in a position to ensure that the masses of her population are safeguarded in their enjoyment of the Freedom from Want which is their most imperative desideratum. Post-War Reconstruction plans of various descriptions and formulated by various Governmental authorities are now holding the field, and it is gratifying that we have at last an acknowledgment of the imperativeness of economic development and reconstruction taking priority over other things. A period of social upheaval such as we have now, is the best period for inducing an appreciation of the need for stabilising social security and the
plans that are formulated require co-ordination by a National Government in the interests of the Nation as a whole. A National Government or a Government which is free to act for the Indian masses thus occupies the pivotal place in the reforms that the Indian situation now demands.
CHAPTER V

America and India's Freedom

In the determination of the structure of the post-war world and in the formulation of policies which constitute the foundation of that structure and its functioning the United States of America's position is one of supreme pre-eminence. Alike by the unique position she holds among the United Nations and by the ideals and the view-points by which her policy was inspired prior to her becoming an active belligerent in December 1941, alike by the fact that she occupied a front-rank position as the 'Arsenal of the Democracies' and as the major partner in the Allied Nations which brought about the defeat of the Axis and by the fact that her national leaders, irrespective of political denominations acknowledge in an unstinted and forthright manner the need for holding aloft the banner of democracy, freedom and human personality, the United States has established itself as the undisputed leader of the United Nations. The relations between the United States of America and Britain have recently been further strengthened by the close liaison maintained by
their military General staffs on the one hand and by the anxiety to preserve the secret of the atom-bomb which they share with each other. The United States has also definitely thrown her influence and prestige on the side of the evolution of a world order and her active participation, through her accredited representatives, in the San Francisco Conference and in the deliberations of the United Nations Organisation and its subsidiary bodies is proof positive of the widespread recognition in that country and by its present administration of the significance of playing an active part in the promotion and preservation of peace.

It is in view of these considerations that India looks to America for an unqualified appreciation of her viewpoint, her demand for freedom and her national aspirations. It is in view of them too that the British Government are apparently so anxious to cultivate American opinion and secure American approbation to their policy in India. An irresistible conclusion to be drawn from the unceasing and uninterrupted flow of British propaganda into the United States in connection with India is that Britain's conscience is not immune from qualms on that score. American doubts and interrogations about India are becoming more and more insistent. The late Mr. Willkie's pointed references to the questionings he heard in the East about America's attitude to Indian freedom did
upset the equilibrium of the British statesmen and Mr. Churchill's assertion about Britain holding on to what she has, was regarded as being directly provoked by Mr. Willkie's statement referred to.

To castigate Mr. Willkie or other Americans like Mr. Phillips for making the statements about India which they did, as some Britishers do and as some backwoodsmen among Americans themselves are doing is, however, really to emphasise and give point to the argument that "by our silence on India we have already drawn heavily on our reservoir of goodwill in the East." Mr. Willkie was perfectly right and justified in saying that India's was the one question that confronted him on his round-the-world flight and that perceptually rose with a huge interrogation mark from Cairo to Chungking, from the land of the Phoenix to the land of Confucious the Wise. "India is our problem," asserted Mr. Willkie; "the Indian problem is the United Nations' problem," declared Mr. Phillips. Indians wholeheartedly concur and feel that the need for India's freedom should be recognised by the wise men of the West as it is by the wise men of the East, as the principal fundamental part of the United Nations' strategy for winning the peace now that war had been won.

It is essential that in the United States the realization of the supreme consideration that India's freedom is indispensable for the preser-
vation of the peace in the Pacific region if not the whole world should intensify. At present a tremendous volume of propaganda is going on in that country on behalf of the British Government, compared to which the presentation of India's case in the correct perspective and from the nationalist Indian viewpoint amounts to but a feeble endeavour. By India's case, I mean what the words actually convey and not her case from any particular political angle like the Congress or the League angle. Mr. Louis Fischer, Mr. Edgar Snow, Mr. Drew Pearson, Miss Pearl Buck among others, besides Indians and Indian organisations interested in India's freedom have been energetically putting forward facts and emphasizing realities. The work done in this connection by Mrs. Pandit at the time of the San Francisco Conference and for some time subsequently is really praiseworthy. But such work must be continuous and unremitting; for there is a huge flood of anti-Indian propaganda flowing from the British Information service sources and swamping the United States which has to be countered even as there is a lot of ignorance still among the American public, as Miss Pearl Buck's articles in the Indian press showed, which has to be dispelled. We require more men of the type of Mr. Louis Fischer from among the Americans themselves, who will state India's case and state it with restraint and dignity and impartiality. Nationalist India does not of course want her
view-point to be distorted by either overstatement or under-statement. There is no need to resort to exaggerations and to paint the picture in lurid colours even as there is no useful purpose served by interested persons putting it in an inconspicuously low key. After all the point should not be lost sight of that India’s anxiety is not gratuitously to lower Britain in the world’s estimation or to gain a mere argumentative advantage over her, but more especially to secure a correct appreciation of her legitimate national aspirations. She wants Britain to play fair towards her, to assure her in practice the freedom which she has assured us in theory, to quicken the pace of the fulfilment of her own declarations and more than all to carry out her professed intention to entrust Indians with real authority in the management of their affairs which will provide an unerring indication of her good intentions towards India. She, in brief, expects Britain to act in such a way that the British Empire with the big ‘E’ will in fact be transformed into a Commonwealth of Nations, in which India will occupy as honoured and as significant a place as either Australia or Canada or South Africa, if she does not actually elect to go out of it.

The one outstanding question, therefore, is where does America stand in this matter? How far are the American Government and her President Mr. Truman prepared to go in impressing on their British ally and the British Govern-
ment across the Atlantic that they should tackle
the Indian problem in right earnest and declare
India a free and independent nation, free to
evolve her own policies with regard to world
peace and order. It is quite evident that
President Truman has his own national pro-
blems to tackle and it is true also that the
United States Government have their own pro-
blems of post-war peace and internal reconstruc-
tion to deal with and that they cannot be ex-
pected to give any thought to an extraneous
problem like the Indian one. Moreover, it
would be unusual if they are to concern them-
selves directly in a matter which is, technically,
an issue between India and Britain alone. All
intelligent Indians realise these important limi-
tations; and they do not expect that either the
President of the U. S. A. or her Government
will be in a position to take any direct interest
in the settlement of the issue of India's freedom.
But a point of view, which is probably not so
fully recognised, is that the United States has
a direct interest firstly, in the defence and security
of the Pacific and Indian ocean regions, in
regard to which a free India can play an effec-
tive and distinctive role, and secondly, that
the United States, as a great industrial country
which requires an expanding overseas market
for her goods, is interested in seeing a huge
country like India free and prosperous, in the
context that a free and prosperous India will be
a potentially huge buyer of American goods and
services. Indian public opinion is remarkably pro-American, and if the American Government can take any heed in furthering the cause of India's freedom, they will be doing so not only for India's sake but for the sake of the U. S. A. herself.

Let the U. S. A., her Government, and people, in considering the Indian standpoint and in deciding what should be their own attitude vis-a-vis that standpoint, constantly bear in mind the objectives for which and the circumstances which they have been forced into the war. For more than two years, between 1939 and 1941, the U. S. A., was an interested looker-on, while Europe fought her battles against the Teutonic hordes, while France collapsed and the blitzkrieg against Britain was at its fiercest, while the Germans deliberately attacked Russia and involved themselves in an inextricable mess, which clearly proved to be the beginning of their ultimate and unconditional collapse. American opinion was overwhelmingly isolationist; the Munroe Doctrine was eagerly hugged to as a last refuge by a Nation immensely reluctant to enter directly into the conflict but perpetually apprehending Axis subversive designs within their own territories and on the American continent; and her administration was eagerly searching for a via media between direct intervention, extension of help to Democracies and continued isolationism. Between July 1940 and the disaster at Pearl
Harbour on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt’s utterances revealed a firm and undeviating adherence to democratic ideals and intense horror of totalitarianism, the hard and constant struggle he had to put up to prevent isolationism from gaining ascendancy, to educate public opinion about the immense onrushing danger of an Axis attack upon America’s integrity and prepare the ground for the eventuality in which the United States might find herself directly involved in the war but all the time making the supremest endeavour to keep the democratic forces well supplied with the sinews of war under the now well-known scheme of “Lend-Lease.” Underneath all the concrete measures taken by Mr. Roosevelt and supplying their most dynamic motive force was a flaming trust in the democratic way of life, in democracy itself and in the power and the efficacy of democracy to survive. “In the face of the great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy,” he declared in his speech on January 20, 1940, on the occasion of his inauguration as President for the third term. “For this we must muster the spirit of America and the faith of America. We do not retreat. We are not content to stand still.” Similar sentiments were expressed by Mr. Roosevelt oftentimes subsequently.

Things moved rapidly after Japan’s declara-
tion of war and her treacherous blow against
the unwary American fleet at Pearl Harbour.
American isolationism found itself isolated al-
most overnight and the United States became as
directly, completely and deeply involved in war
as either Britain or Russia. Her responsibility
was two-fold: not only had she to feed the demo-
cratic war machine in three continents as she
had been doing previously but keep her own
Army, Navy and Air forces fully and continu-
ously supplied with machinery and equipment.
The destruction of the Axis forces, their com-
plete annihilation became not only an ideal to
be promoted by rendering assistance to others
but an objective to be directly and adequately
and indefatigably pursued by herself through
the sacrifice of her own man-hood. It was a
colossal task which she undertook not only in a
spirit of service to others but as a fundamental
factor in her own survival and self-preservation.

The immediate and all-engrossing task be-
fore the U.S.A., the central objective and pur-
pose of her endeavours being accomplished as
a result of the defeat of the Axis, she is now
confronted with the equally or perhaps more
important objective, namely, the implementa-
tion of the principles of the new World Order
in which the Four Freedoms which President
Roosevelt enunciated and which have since con-
stituted the basic underlying principles of
America's post-war policy and aims could be
realized to the maximum possible extent.
Freedom from Want, Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Exploitation and Freedom of Worship—they are noble conceptions all and immensely inspiring as ideals for which man will dare fight and die or, more correctly, fight to live for and enjoy. Whether the Atlantic Charter exists or not as a concrete document duly signed, these principles which are based on the proclaimed clauses of that Charter will not lose their validity for humanity aspiring for peace and real progress.

If these aims and aspirations are to be fulfilled and the Four Freedoms established throughout the world as the bases of the World Charter of Freedom, the United States will have to accept the implication of the statement of Mr. Willkie that to win the peace three things seem necessary: “First, we must plan for peace on a global basis; second, the world must be free economically and politically, for nations and for man, that peace may exist in it; thirdly, that America must play an active, constructive part freeing it and keeping the peace.” It is necessary to reckon with the possibility that not all these aims and ideals can be attained unreservedly and completely in the near future in this essentially imperfect and un-ideal world. It is probable that disappointments and failures will block the path of the reformer and render achievement incommensurate with aspiration and endeavour incommensurate with idealism.
What happened after the 1914-18 Great War is a stern and painful reminder to us of this grave and inherent danger. Nevertheless if even partial success in these directions, the end of which is a better world than the one in which we live now, is to be attained, the aspiration must be clear-cut, the ideal inspiring and the endeavour resolute and unwavering. The United States admittedly failed to rise up to expectations at the end of the first world war mainly because she went into it less for the achievement of any specific high aim or objective or in pursuit of a great cause which could inspire men, but more as the result of a passing phase of revenge for some 'inhuman' acts perpetrated by Germany. More correctly speaking, she drifted into it almost unawares, partly rushed off her feet by propaganda and partly out of indignation at Germany's brutalities. When victory was gained she retired—perhaps over-precipitately—into her isolationist shell. She repudiated her own President and commitments and plans in pursuance of the illusion that thereby she could keep herself perpetually aloof from what were designated as 'European entanglements.' President Wilson returned to his country to confront a hostile Congress which overturned his League of Nations apple-cart and voted in favour of U.S.A.'s non-participation in the functioning of that body and in the moulding of its fortunes.

The League had proved a regrettable failure
for other reasons too, besides American non-co-operation, but that was at least one of the principal reasons that contributed to the debacle that overtook it. In any case, it did not fail because of anything notably deficient in the ideals which inspired those who conceived and founded it, which would justify the conclusion that it involved a reflection on the ennobling character of those basic ideals. It failed to a very large extent because the bigger European nations, which should have regarded themselves as the guardians and watchdogs of its success, utilized its machinery and its prestige for the fulfilment of their selfish national ends and conveniently gave the go-by to the fundamental principles which it was intended to serve and promote. From 1934 to 1939, the history of the League was a history of the progressive departure of its member-States from the ideals of maintaining collective security and prevention of aggression, of which Manchuria, Abyssinia, Finland, and Austria and Czechoslovakia, provide distressing examples.

It now rests on the United States, in co-operation with other Allied nations, to build up the security organisation envisaged in the San Francisco Charter, so that instead of its deteriorating into a mere tombstone for high ideals, it will energize itself into an efficient instrument for the realization of international peace, for the preservation of collective security and for the
prevention of unprovoked aggression and totalitarian wars.

The World Charter formulated at San Francisco is not free from defects. But its various principles, even as the principles of the League of Nations, are liable to be defeated in practice in the formulation of the Peace Treaties, which has yet to be done, the vanquished nations are treated with such utmost severity as at Versailles, if the Big Three, the United States, Russia and Britain, cannot adjust their points of view, if ideological divergences between Communist Russia, which has emerged as a most powerful European Power, on the one hand and the Anglo-American semi-socialist democracies on the other remain incapable of peaceful and amicable adjustment. The Allied treatment of Germany and Japan, so far as can be visualised from present tendencies, is based on the fundamental principle that the German and Japanese population, particularly the youth, must be systematically educated out of their traditionally inculcated militarist tendencies and psychology by the indoctrination of democratic ideals and mentality and an appreciation of the excellences of a democratic way of life. That is a necessary procedure to adopt; but how long will this process continue and when the present Allied military occupation over these two countries will terminate are important questions. As regards Anglo-American-Russian relations, the
strains and stresses are already becoming apparent on their surface and while pessimists have already begun to speak of a Third World War as an unavoidable sequel to them, the representatives of the three Powers are putting a brave face over them. If a real, international mind, emancipate from the notions of domination of one country over the other, of the victors wreaking vengeance on the vanquished and thus engendering a spirit of counter-vengeance in the latter and free, too, from intensive and violent competitive nationalism on the part of the different countries now engaged in building up the shattered world come to prevail among the peoples and the Governments of the United Nations, that alone can be the most effective guarantee for the success of the U.N.O. It was General Smuts who pointed out that the conception of the United Nations that come into being in response to the stress of war conditions was a happy augury in that it provided a secure and solid foundation for future cooperation in furtherance of the ideals of the world security organisation. It is of the utmost importance that that ideal should hold permanently.

The international mind postulated regarded is an essential prelude to effective international action to maintain world peace and a guarantee against the repetition of world-shocking armageddons. Would-be aggressors in the future
should find in the International Police Force organized under the auspices of the world organization and the forces that the Security Council of the U. N. O. can mobilise in case of aggression, a weapon of offence whose striking power they would find irresistible. Let us hope too, in spite of persistent indications pointing to a somewhat contrary conclusion, that the close collaboration among the United Nations particularly among the Big Powers, will continue uninterrupted, and will be a factor in the establishment of a World Federal Union, about which so much is being said and written, particularly in the United States, now-a-days. A World Union of this kind is likely to remain an idealist’s unrealizable dream at least so long as nationalism remains a vigorous and vibrant political force. But not in the least impracticable should be close international co-operation to attain specific objectives in the interests of the whole of humanity and for ensuring certain fundamental ideals such as world peace, national freedom and international justice. These ideals need not be impracticable mainly because they do not aim at a root and branch extinction of national boundaries or national ideals but can be based on the recognition of national internal sovereignty, though involving sacrifices of external sovereignty.

That the United States’ part in leading the world along the path of these high aims will
a great and notable one appears to be inherent in her present position and a part of her future destiny. That role she will, however, be able to play by not shirking stark, unignorable political and other realities as she did in 1919, but by appreciating and facing them with all the courage, determination and statesmanship that she can muster and that inspired President Roosevelt's and recently President Truman's periodic utterances. India will be an interested spectator of the manner in which, and the degree to which, President Truman will discharge that colossal responsibility with special reference to the problem of dependent countries like India and colonial possessions of the European nations. One of the outstanding ways in which he can do so will be by setting his seal on the considered opinion of enlightened publicists and sections of public opinion in that country that India's freedom is a United Nations problem and that its immediate establishment from the standpoint of high moral and ethical as well as military considerations is as much the United Nations concern as Britain's, that in fact it is the concern of all freedom-loving, democracy-enjoying humanity.

For this there must be increasing realization on the part of the U. S. Government that the primary fact that President Roosevelt enunciated the Four Freedoms imposes on his successor, as head of the American administra-
tion, the inescapable responsibility of seeing that they are translated into concrete programmes of action. As ex-Vice President Wallace pointed out in his widely publicized speech at the second Free World Congress, held in New York in 1942: "every freedom, every privilege has its price, its corresponding duty, without which it cannot be enjoyed." Among these duties, Mr. Wallace mentioned as an outstanding one the duty to build a peace, just, charitable and enduring, and he explained his view of that duty further by declaring that "those who write the peace must think of the whole world." "The peace must mean a better standard of living for the common man, not merely in the United States and England, but also in India, Russia, China, and Latin America - not merely in the United Nations but also in Germany and Italy and Japan." Quite rightly put, from which follows the inexorable conclusion that the political freedom of these countries mentioned, especially of India, which are not free at present, is an essential preliminary to their purposeful participation in the writing of the peace, the peace of the just and the free, and to take steps which would guarantee to their people the enjoyment of a decent standard of living denied to them at present.

Britain has a Beveridge Scheme of far-reaching import for ensuring post-war social security including guarantee of employment and
old age pensions and so on and the U. S. A. has a similar plan for the American population. The Beveridge Scheme is an elaborate endeavour at harmonizing and integrating economic individualism with State control of the economic structure and machinery to promote equitable opportunities for all. It is a scheme which is wholly in accord with the British genius for introducing social and economic changes of a far-reaching character without affecting the basic structure of the society. Committees representing the various Allied countries are also preflecting plans for co-ordination of relief of distress and reconstruction work of areas decimated by Hitler’s hordes. Indians may as well ask: where is a social security plan for India, for the economic uplift of her teeming poverty-ridden population and what is the reason why the official plans are lacking in comprehensiveness and vigour? Undoubtedly we have a number of plans for post-war reconstruction of Indian economy, notable among them being the Bombay Plan but have we anything approximating to a comprehensive plan of the type of the Beveridge one? Public opinion in the United States of America may as well ask—as the Indian public have been asking repeatedly—whether Britain would perform the act of financial justice to India by releasing the sterling balances which have accumulated to India’s credit for her industrialization process and when? Can world prosperity be ensured after the war with only
half the world advancing along the road to social security and economic Swaraj while the other half is grovelling in poverty and economic degradation? The clamant cry of the Indian population for Freedom from Want, as I pointed out, is intimately connected with the existence of conditions capable of ensuring such freedom. Vice President Wallace's thesis will fall to the ground if these conditions are not fulfilled.

The question may pertinently be raised by American friends: why does India expect that the problems of her political freedom and economic prosperity should receive the kind of earnest attention at the hands of the United States, as is desired?

The answer is that a free India and her whole-hearted co-operation are essential to the successful fulfilment of the peace aims of the United Nations, particularly of the United States, for the success of the cause of democracy and freedom and justice after the war and the prevention of future wars. Considerable confusion is possible when the argument that India's freedom has been assured by Britain in the Cripps' Declaration and in the Wavell Declaration of September, 1945 if read in juxtaposition with the argument that that assurance is conditional upon the fulfilment of some other conditions like complete internal agreement and that the reconstruction of the Central Government
should wait on the participation therein of parties which make a virtue of intransigence. This later is mainly a creation of British policy, as Gandhiji has emphasized recently and it is for them to lay the ghost which they have raised.

An Anglo-American bloc against forces of Bolshevik socialism represented by Soviet Russia, which may not have at present any aggressive designs, but which is certainly very much on the guard against a combination of capitalist forces, is being slowly but surely being evolved in the post-war period. It is none of our business to indulge in prognostications against the possible repercussions of this alignment of forces that is in progress. But if at a future date a show-down occurs between the two opposing forces, then the most World-shattering armageddon will be the outcome. The race for atomic power and possession of atomic secrets is significant in this context. We can only most earnestly hope and pray that before the contingency here envisaged occurs, a satisfactory solution of the problem of internationalising the atom secrets will have been arrived at.

For and on behalf of the United States of America, a series of advertisements used to appear in the Indian newspapers some four years back emphasizing the part which that country had been playing in the present war and suggestively referring to her national aims and objectives. Presumably they were propa-
ganda advertisements, but they cannot be considered as being divorced from, in fact they should be regarded as being closely related to, the springs of thought that pervaded the American population at the moment. One of these advertisements contained the statement that “America is pledged to recognize and support the political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of China.” It also proclaimed that the expeditionary forces of the United States were in India to defend the future of Asia and fight against ‘Asia for the Japanese.’ In another of these we read these forces were in India to ‘help repel and crush the armies of invaders who seek to destroy freedom throughout the world.’ The assurance regarding China inhered an inspiring thought which evoked much warm appreciation in India as it did in China and that assurance is being fulfilled in the sense that the U. S. A. is helping in the consolidation of that country. Equally inspiring was the assurance that the United States was actuated by the determination to defend Asia against falling a victim to the Japanese intentions of domination over that continent. But then in India these naturally and inevitably gave rise to the question: what about the U. S. A., underwriting the post-war political independence of India in requital of the splendid services rendered by Indian army in the defeat of Japan and Germany The 150 years old constitution of the United States de-
clared another of these advertisements referred to, contains a charter of freedom of all mankind, and that their (then) President had declared the extension of these fundamental liberties to all men as the bases of the American peoples’ war aims. Should these worthy sentiments, and should the slogan “America fight for freedom” with which everyone of the advertisements concluded, remain mere empty slogans, the immaterial declarations of pious intentions so far as India is concerned the question arises? For whose freedom did America fight if it did not include the freedom of India also?

This is a testing period for the United States in many ways. Will she come out of the test that faces her with flying colours and will it be demonstrated that the Government and people of that country possess the determination and resoluteness which will enable her to play the leader in the establishment of a better world, in which freedom and justice would prevail not only in the territories on either side of the Atlantic but everywhere else? These questions clamour for an answer. President Truman who had succeeded as President of the Republic at a critical time in American history has a heavy responsibility in this regard, for whether it be for good or for evil, the reconstruction of a shattered world, the inculcation of hope and cheer in the peoples of various nations that they will not once again become victims of war and
the destructive forces that it throws up, devolves upon the President of the United States along with the heads of the Governments of the two other Big Powers, Russia and Great Britain, a great and important responsibility. The United Nations Organization depends for its success on a combination of the forces represented by these Big Powers, and while we witness a recognition of this great role that the U. S. A. will have to play in the promotion of peace and freedom throughout the world in the statements and speeches of Mr. Truman, Mr. Brynes and other top-rank American officials and politicians, we would also like to glean therein a similar recognition accorded to the imperative fact that all the efforts to render the U. N. O. an effective force for the purposes for which it has been set up will be useless if they do not enlist in that task the co-operation of a free and independent India and China.

The declaration about Philippine independence after liberation from Japanese occupation was an act of high idealism on the part of the President. He can impress upon Mr. Churchill that a similar declaration by Britain about India is urgently called for.
CHAPTER VI

India's Interest in China's Problem

Between China and India the connecting cultural and other bonds are exceedingly close. Cultural, commercial and spiritual intercourse between the two countries has followed in an uninterrupted stream ever since the fourth century B.C., if not earlier. That the two countries constitute, territorially, nearly half the continent of Asia and have more than half the population of that continent is a phenomenon that lends point to the proximity of interests between them. At the present day, as much as in the past, the similarity and correspondence between the political, economic and other problems which face them bear a somewhat remarkable similarity. To both, economic and industrial reconstruction are vital needs; both need vigorous and sustained measures by their Governments and leaders for the establishment of internal unity and integration of policies so that they will enjoy the position in international counsels which is rightfully theirs by virtue of their size, population and strategic position. India gave China a conspicuously enlightening
religious doctrine preached by the Buddha and China is repaying that debt by imparting to us some illuminating lessons in heroic determination and steadfastness in destroying the forces of aggression and evil. For nearly two hundred years India has been subject to foreign rule with all its deleterious political and economic consequences, while China, though not directly under foreign rule, had suffered under sinister foreign influences for the best part of a century. Her recent history, in spite of the now widely-advertised Kuomintang-Communist divergencies which are fanned into the flames of civil war of Bolshevik influences is an inspiring endeavour to rebuild the structure of a united and free China combined with an epic effort to prevent a militarist and totalitarian Japan (and now other extraneous forces) from strangulating her consciousness of national integrity.

It is beyond the scope of these pages to refer in detail to the long-drawn agony suffered by China since her first contact with Western influences, which found a soft ground for permeation as a result of her internally disorganized condition. It is only necessary to recall that after the Revolution of 1911, which brought to an end a once glorious but latterly ramshackle and derelict and decrepit Chinese Empire, Sun Yat Sen, the father of the Revolution, whose memory is cherished with immense admiration by the Chinese people, adumbrated a 3-point
programme for free China based on Nationalism, Democracy and Social Justice. It is these three high principles that have since then served as beaconlights guiding and inspiring the Chinese Nationalist Movement. In the promotion of this movement, in rescuing China from the grip of internecine strife between ardent nationalism represented by the Kuomintang Party and the violently internationalist and to some extent disintegrating forces of Communism, in unifying the country, in organizing a united front of the conflicting forces for the defence of the country against aggression and in establishing a central Government at Nanking, which later on under the stress of military necessity had to be shifted to Chungking, and utilizing its machinery as an instrument for consolidating and reconstructing the Chinese nation on modern and rationalistic lines, the most notable part had been played and is still being played by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In the meantime a rejuvenated and modernized Japan began to set evil eyes on and cast evil glances at China. Manchuria was occupied by her in 1931 and a puppet State established therein. In 1937 was delivered a more terrible blow by Japan aimed at the very heart of China, the ultimate objective of which was to annex the important northern provinces, including the valuable oil-fields of Shansi, and to extend her economic influence over the rest of China and reduce it into a Japanese colony. For more than eight years, under the inspiring
leadership of the Generalissimo, who, it is agreed even by his Communist critics themselves, symbolizes and embodies China's will to unity, freedom and national independence to a determined and dogged invader, that country had passed through something approaching hell. Her spirit, however, remained undimmed and she remains unconquered and will remain, God willing, unconquerable.

The heroic and, for more than four years, between 1937 and 1941, single-handed and unequal struggle which China put up against a foe, who was her definite superior in mechanical equipment and modern weapons of warfare, and which exhibited an almost unparalleled capacity for barbarity and ruthlessness in attaining her ends, engendered the most widespread sympathy and admiration for China and her cause in this country. The outbreak of war in the Far East in December, 1941, however, brought about a turn of the tide for the better. Japan's wanton aggression in the Pacific, commencing with the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour, followed rapidly by the loss of precious British and American possessions in the Far East, induced a realization in Britain and the U. S. A. that, while in Japan they had a common enemy, in China they possessed an ally possessing immense reserves of strength who should be cultivated, assisted and consolidated in every possible way. China, which was giving a
most gallant and stiff fight to Japan since 1937, came to be acknowledged as an asset of inestimable value to the Anglo-Saxon and the Allied cause generally. Common adversity had made them bed-fellows of China, which they were once disposed to despise or regard as a country fit only to be exploited and doped. The Burma Road, the main artery for the flow of the life-blood of supplies to China which was closed in July 1940, in disregard of the military interests of China, and without any satisfactory explanation therefor, was reopened in October 1940, and machinery and equipment began to be dispatched to her till that avenue had been closed once again following the Japanese occupation of Burma. The entire strategy of the United Nations was subsequently devoted to the reopening of the Burma Road which was successfully accomplished after what must be regarded as superhuman efforts.

During the past three years or more the alliance between America and Britain on the one hand and China on the other had become firmer and firmer. She was recognized as one of the A.B.C.D. Powers and accorded the status of equality among the Big Four of the United Nations. A further important link in the chain of collaboration between them was forged with the voluntary abdication by Britain and America, in October, 1942, of the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by them in the con-
cessional ports and in the international settlements on the Chinese mainland and the Treaty concluded in that behalf in January 1943. Though a belated acknowledgment of the inalienable sovereignty of China, this act on the part of the Allied Nations can be regarded also as an indication of their eagerness to make necessary concessions to the deeply-cherished feelings and sentiments of a nation which had made and continues to make an enormous contribution to the common pool of the Allied resources in the war, to resist against aggression, and now to the promotion of peace.

Assistance to China completely to rehabilitate her shattered and disrupted economy, to consolidate the whole of the Chinese territory under one strong Central Government capable of restoring order and assisting in the progress and the prosperity of the land, and further to enable her to establish a stable peace and democratic world order, is of the utmost importance. It was a military desideratum during the war but now it is a great and immense moral obligation which the Allied Nations have to discharge. While China's admission as a member of the Security Council is a tribute to her military potential and her contribution to the common victory, the firm stand which she took for liberal principles and ideals at the San Francisco Conference is a tribute to her ancient traditions of peace.
A rehabilitated and revitalised China may take some years to attain. In the meantime China must have internal peace, which can emerge only if Chiang Kai-Shek's authority is established throughout the country, and if ideological conflicts between Communists and Nationalists are eliminated and the truce between them becomes effective. The United States in particular is interested in ensuring that China emerges united and strong from her present, post-war travail, and if her territorial liberation from aggression is quickly followed up by economic reconstruction. It is justifying that American financial credits have been placed at the disposal of China for this purpose.
CHAPTER VII

PROSPECTS OF ASIATIC FEDERATION

I have referred at length to China and the friendly and amicable relations between India and that country because they are of incalculable significance in the context of the future. "Europe for the Europeans" and "Europe and European Problems First" are slogans and attitudes of mind prevalent in Europe at present which inevitably give rise to counter-slogans of "Asia for the Asiatics" and "Asiatic Problems and Needs First." So long as the former are indulged in, the latter cannot be avoided. And not only are they unavoidable but in them are unfortunately inherent the seeds of future conflict, which those who harp on them, do not apparently adequately visualise. If co-operation in the task of world reconstruction between East and West, between the brown and the black and the yellow races on the one hand and the white races on the other is to be systematically promoted, if a future world war is not to assume the character of a conflict of races as the last one was a conflict of ideologies and the first world war was a conflict of rival nationalisms, the root-causes of the
prospective danger must be exterminated. British or American statesmen are not contributing to this great objective of making the world safe for humanity by encouraging the belief that Europe and America matter to them more than Asia or that there is any underlying conflict imperceptible for the present, between Europe and Asia, and that Asia should continue to be an exploiting ground for the Western nations in perpetuity.

This aspect of the situation is of vast interest to the Indian people and to the people of China. The feelings of perfect and whole-hearted sympathy that exist among them are calculated, in the atmosphere of cordiality engendered by unity of ideas and ideals in a period of common distress now and in a period of common endeavour for peace, to flower into a movement whose crowning consummation will probably be an Asiatic Federation. The position of Japan in such a scheme, although she is an Asiatic nation, is indeed difficult to determine at present. She has to be educated out of her former militaristic and totalitarian ideology and more, as a nation, to appreciate the value and importance of a democratic way of life and democratic principles of Government. How long she will take to achieve this objective on a national scale only the future can decide. The slogan of “Asia for the Asiatics” is not one of which anyone need be ashamed, though we must regard it as an example of Japan’s mendaciousness to utilise it for establishing and
justifying her brown domination over fellow-Asiatics.

In any case, even if Japan is left out of the picture for the time being, an Asiatic Federation need not be regarded as beyond the bounds of possibility with China and India taking a leading part in its establishment, particularly when European Colonial Powers persist in dominating over Asiatic territories and refuse to recognise their right to independence. It is a fact which must be prominently noted by European countries like the Netherlands and France and Britain that the resurgent and ebullient nationalisms of Oriental countries cannot be subdued or crushed or forced to lie low, cannot be cribbed, crabbed and confined to their own shells, in the face of the self-centred predilections and policies of the European and Occidental nations. It was Mr. Amery who once said that there was no distinct entity like Asia and that India in particular had more in common with the British Empire than any other Asiatic country. The Indonesian revolution, the revolution in Indo-China, the spirit of revolt that is aboard in India are signposts in the march of the Asiatic countries hitherto held under feet by European Powers to their goal of freedom. They are also unignorable and inexorable warnings to the latter that no longer can Asiatic peoples be held under subjection by them for their economic benefit and political advantage. Britain unfortunately is the greatest sinner in this respect, for not
only does she not quit India in the sense of creating a self-governing state of India, but has been actively assisting in the continuance of European domination over Indonesia and Indo-China. Soviet comment on this aspect of Britain's policy will not of course be welcomed by the latter; but it is only legitimate comment that the Soviet Journal *New Times* makes when it wrote that "using its armed forces and its international weight, Britain is hindering the liberation of the Indonesian people from suppression by Dutch imperialism, which is economically and politically so tightly connected with Britain."

There is a close and imperceptible liaison between all imperialisms which works in so many subtle ways, the common end and object being of course to continue the exploitation of the subject countries and peoples. When there is liaison army of the exploiters it will inevitably lead to a liaison among the exploited. And as it so happens, as almost all exploiting nations are European nations and all the exploited territories are Asiatic territories, the movement for the creation of an Asiatic bloc of countries to free themselves from their exploiters and thereafter to preserve their freedom against being destroyed by powerful nations is an inevitable and natural corollary. It is in this context that the ideal of an Asiatic Federation assumes immense significance and importance.
India’s adherence to the British or Commonwealth scheme is essentially conditional on the treatment which she will receive at Britain’s hands. Recent events in this country—the I.N.A. movement, the strikes in the fighting forces—provide irrefutable evidence that Britain’s relations with India require rapid re-examination and reorientation.

In the promotion of an Asiatic Federation China will naturally assume the leadership and a free India will inevitably join her in working for that consummation. The outstanding consideration to bear in mind is that China cannot be impervious to the need that, along with her own outstanding and equal place among nations, and the maintenance of her territorial integrity by the restoration to her of Manchuria and other Japanese-occupied portions of China, India’s freedom and equality should also be assured though her voice may not be raised in this respect until she is herself wholly united, adequately strong and able to hold her own against other Powers. Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek’s and Madame Chiang’s visit to India in February, 1942, evoked an outburst of spontaneous enthusiasm for the Chinese cause on the part of the Indian people of all sections which is not diminished by the recent attempts to discredit the Generalissimo by painting him as a semi-dictator and not as the leader of a democratic China because he refused to accommodate the Communists in all their demands. The
two visitors created an immense impression on the Indian public and by their contact with prominent Indians have laid the foundation for a deep and abiding friendship between the two countries. Marshal Chiang's last statement before leaving India contained words of profound and far-sighted wisdom and sound advice to Britain which, however, seems to have been lost so far on those directing British policy towards the country. "I sincerely hope and I confidently believe," he said, "that our ally, Great Britain, without waiting for any demands on the part of the people of India, will, as speedily as possible, give them real political power so that they may be in a position further to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realise that their participation in the war is not merely an aid to the anti-aggressive nations for securing victory but also a turning point in their struggle for India's freedom. From an objective point of view I am of opinion that this would be the wisest policy which will redound to the credit of the British Empire."

China needed Allied assistance in an increasing measure during and now after the war even as the Allies needed China's continued co-operation and active help in vanquishing the common enemy. So long as this position lasts China's voice cannot be ignored by Britain or America. In the post-war reconstruction she will have a tremendous say, (reference has already been made to her admission into the world Security
Council) as one of the Big Five. Rightly had the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang decided too that the problem of post-war reconstruction of China be undertaken simultaneously with the effective prosecution of the war. And, if one reads the signs aright, she can be depended upon to utilise her important position in the counsels of the United Nations, to press for a genuine international peace settlement in which economic and political domination of one nation by another will cease; and work for a position of absolute and perfect equality of the Asiatic nations with European and Western nations and for the universal application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Fighting the war as she did for the preservation of her own freedom and national integrity and independence and in defence of the essential values of her ancient civilization, she is bound to insist on the fulfilment of these conditions as the preconditions of a better world order. As Mr. Roxby has said in his pamphlet "China" (Oxford University Press) "potentially China is one of the greatest of the world democracies and it is difficult to overestimate the significance of its future role." In reality, a more straightforward, clear-cut, unambiguous statement of the Chinese viewpoint than that contained in Marshal Chiang's message to the Forum organised by the New York "Herald Tribune", nearly three years back is difficult to come across. "China has no desire
to replace the Western imperialism or to introduce isolationism of its own or of anyone else," he declared. "We hold that we must advance from the narrow idea of exclusive alliances and regional blocs, which in the end make for bigger and more bitter wars, to an effective organisation for world unity. Unless real world co-operation replaces both isolationism and imperialism in a new interdependent world of free nations, there will be no lasting security for you (the U.S.A.) or for us." These words breathe a lofty idealism, display a keen sense of realities and reveal an analysis of the basic malady of the world and remedy which will effectively cure it.

China does not countenance the United Nations exploiting their victory for sustaining either British or any other imperialism of any complexion; neither will India. They will refuse equally stoutly to be parties to the principle of complete isolationism of nations as opposed to a virile internationalism, which is the best and most effective safeguard for a virile as different from a debased nationalism. They also demand that the future world order should be broad-based essentially on the foundation of purposeful co-operation among nations, which only equality of opportunity and freedom from extraneous thraldom for all countries and peoples can assure. World security, lasting, real, and effective, can be the result only of the fulfilment of this condition; otherwise the founda-
tion will be laid not for world security but for the outbreak of a more devastating war on the one hand and for soul-killing political and economic exploitation of some countries by the others on the other. Chiang Kai-Shek as the leader of China, in spite of the disruptive forces that still operate there, will do everything possible and necessary to remove the edge of the criticisms of his policy by his critics by making essential changes in the administrative structure of China which will broaden the Kuomintang Government on the democratic principles. If the agreement arrived at between the Chinese Government and the Communists fructifies in co-operation, the prospect of a united, strong China in the near future will become a reality.

Apart from the immense and encouraging possibility of China presenting a solid phalanx of opposition to an attempt on the part of any nation or a combination of them endeavouring to dominate world politics for selfish ends she is eminently fitted by her present status among the Asiatic countries to assume the leadership in promoting the Pan-Asiatic Federation as proposed above. In view of the fact that the Asiatic nations unerringly place before themselves the ideal of international peace and national freedom and that they continuously work in the common cause of peace and human progress, and not domination and exploitation, as their guiding motive, an Asiatic Federation should
welcomed as a potential powerful bulwark for a lasting and just peace. In any case a combination of the free peoples of Asia, Chinese, Indians, Siamese, Afghans, Burmans and Tibetans will be the one answer which European Powers and America will receive if, at this time, they do not discard theories of racial superiority and colour bar, which constitute the worst manifestations of man’s injustice to man and nation’s to nation, abandon the ideals of territorial aggression over weaker countries, and act up to the high principles which they profess. Otherwise too, a World Commonwealth, on which men’s visions are being increasingly focussed, presupposes some kind of regional federal organisations in different continents which will serve as the bases therefor and of which it will constitute the apex. An Asiatic Federation can be such a regional organisation and from that standpoint should commend itself to all advocates of a world organisation. It may or not be that this vision of an Asiatic Federation will become a reality in the near future. But there is no doubt that the leaders of thought in India and elsewhere envisage it clearly and we must be grateful to Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru for his systematic effort to propagate this ideal and emphasise its necessity. In his Convocation Address at the Calcutta University on March 9, 1946, he for instance, exhorted his audience to “have a vision of a new India and Asia and a new world before you.” “Asia was gradually coming
back to her own after a long foreign domination,” he further said, “and in this new Asia, India would play a very important part. In terms of nascent Asia, India would inevitably play, situated as she was, an important role in Asia—the Far East, Central Asia and South-East Asia.” “Asia is on the march” is a proper inscription for a signpost facing the European Powers, whether it be Britain, Russia or France or Holland and it should warn them in time against persistence in the pursuit of ill-conceived ambitions of either retaining their hold on the Asiatic countries or extending their sphere of influence over them.

India is genuinely gratified by the enormous and lively interest that her problems and her future destiny have stimulated in other Asiatic countries in general and in China in particular. “Should freedom be denied to either China or India, there could be no real peace in the world,” declared Generalissimo Chiang in his farewell message to India’s people on February 21, 1942, and thereby contributed to the cementing of the 2000-year old intercourse between the two countries. Mr. Willkie in his “One World” quoted “the wisest man in China” as saying that “when the aspiration of India for freedom was put aside to some future date, it was not Great Britain that suffered in public esteem in the Far East, it was the United States.” At one and the same time it illustrates the passionate feeling that prevails
in China about India’s freedom and contains also a strong though indirect remonstrance to Britain that India’s freedom should be an important plank in the post-war plan for peace. While the people of India would closely watch the events in China and earnestly hope that the Kuomintang-Communist agreement would bear ample fruit, they welcome China’s support to her unity and freedom and for purposeful co-operation between the two countries in various fields of human endeavour. Indo-Chinese co-operation, I repeat, is one of the pillars on which the world peace structure so largely rests. Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador to London, has only expressed the views of a large section of Chinese and Indians when he said in an interview recently that “China is looking forward to increased and closer relations with India.”

The moral justification, the practical necessity and the fundamental correctness of India’s demand for independence not only on merits but in the world context are unquestionable. And what is morally justified and essential cannot be politically unsound or impracticable. It will be a disastrous confession of moral bankruptcy if this consideration is disregarded by Great Britain.
CHAPTER VIII

Post-War World and India's Status

Before I conclude this booklet it is only necessary to emphasize or rather re-emphasize that in the majestic procession of events and the overwhelming nature of the situation created by the successful termination of the war for the Allies is embedded a supreme opportunity for the United Nations, and their leaders, which they can utilize either for transforming the world into a better, a safer and more secure place to live in or switch it back to a condition wherein security for nations as well as individuals will be absent, where one part of humanity will live either in perpetual thraldom and slavery or another in perpetual fear and want and haunted by the spectre of war. The firmest foundation for peace and security can be laid only on the basis of a true, unselfish internationalism. It is my conviction that national boundaries need not be swept away or national independence destroyed to attain this kind of internationalism. Nations as such can exist and national rights and independence maintained though the idea of national sovereignty, absolute and unqualified, is going and will go more rapidly as the spirit of inter-
nationalism and a world state grows. We cannot get round, at least not yet, the imperative fact that national pride and national ideals are an integral part of the being of many of us and that in most countries the people are not prepared to abandon them completely. The incipient spirit of nationalism in large portions of the world and in some big countries like China and India demands an opportunity for purposeful expression even while they are prepared to co-operate in the evolution of a new world order. It is, however, equally imperative that nationalism should not be permitted to be a vicious force for the evolution and practice of perverted theories of national or racial superiority. It must be based essentially on democratic foundations and equality and opportunity for all—individuals as well as nations. Nationalism of the brand for which India and Indian traditions stand from time immemorial, which is based essentially on the principle of freedom for the individual and the principle of "live and let live", is what the world stands in need of now. It must be the brand which will prove an effective factor in the advancement of the true spirit and purpose of internationalism itself. What India stands for in this regard has been explained in his usual striking and picturesque language by India's great philosopher-educationalist Sir S. Radhakrishnan, in the course of his speech at the Benares Hindu University Convocation in November, 1942. He said:
"India never stood for national and cultural isolation. Her spiritual heights rest on a basis that embraces all humanity. Wherever men love reason, shun darkness, turn towards light, praise virtue, despise meanness, hate vulgarity, kindle sheer beauty, wherever minds are sensitive, hearts generous, spirits free, there is India. Let us adopt that loyalty to humanity instead of a sectional devotion to one part of the human race."

The exhortation which Sir S. Radhakrishnan addressed to the youth of his country and his countrymen in general can as well be the exhortation which could be addressed to the United Nations and particularly to their leader states, the U.S.A., Britain, Russia and China. The world order to which they should set their hands, and which should be systematically inculcated in the peoples of the world everywhere, and particularly those of Germany and Japan, whose reconstruction has been undertaken as their special responsibility by the victorious Allies should be broad-based on the principles of national and cultural synthesis and co-operation, not cultural isolation or political domination of one country over another. They should enthrone the principle of loyalty to humanity as a whole in preference to the diminutive and lesser ideal of sectional or racial glorification.

As a preliminary and as an earnest of their willingness and preparedness to adhere to and
promote these high ideals, which during the war period they were professing with perfervidness, the Big Powers should accomplish certain things immediately.

The first and foremost obligation that rests on them is to adopt a new attitude vis-a-vis the colonies and the dependencies which will approximate to and accord with the principles incorporated in the World Charter. It is fundamentally and ethically an unconvincing idea that you can reconstruct a twentieth century world with minds impregnated with nineteenth century conceptions of diplomacy and colonial imperialism, because it is an idea which is based on the untenable principle of the world being kept half free and half slave. The shedding of this latter kind of mentality is indispensable for the realization of the former ideal. But there is distressingly little evidence that among the governing classes in England whether they be Conservatives or Labourites, there is much heart-searching on this score. On the other hand there is self-satisfaction, self-deception, self-praise and self-emulation in an abundant measure in the pronouncements of Labour politicians like Mr. Bevin and Mr. Herbert Morrison as there used to be in those of Lord Cranborne or Mr. Churchill. The good old idea of the inviolability of the British Empire is as much a part of the former’s political philosophy as it is of the latter. The doctrine of trusteeship, as pointed out earlier in these pages,
is however a thoroughly discredited doctrine in the present age, whatever may have been its justification in the nineteenth century; and un-regenerate diehards resurrect it in times of stress and utilize it as an argument to slave their imperialistic consciences. Trusteeship, in any form exercised, does not bless the trustee, nor does it bless the subject of the trust; it hardens and corrodes the souls of both. Trusteeship has so far been synonymous mainly with economic exploitation of the virgin soils and natural resources of the trust territories interspersed with the periodical adumbration of liberal intentions and mild and harmless doses of self-government, the extent and the pace of which, it used to be claimed, are invariably determinable by the trustee himself. In any case not one of the countries under British trusteeship, namely, East and West Africa, Ceylon, Malta and Fiji can be regarded as areas appropriate to the continued application of the principle of political spoon-feeding inherent in trusteeship, while what happened in Malaya, Singapore and Burma, in 1942, affords disconcerting illustration of the manner in which the self-assumed trusteeship over those regions was exercised by Britain. On the other hand the contention that continued trusteeship is essential for the welfare of the people of the countries mentioned, constitutes a condemnation of British policy and not a commendation thereof. No claim to enlightened safeguarding of the interests of the area which she
had taken under trust can be advanced by Britain, if after decades of such trusteeship an area is still economically impoverished and regarded as politically incapable of managing its own affairs. No wonder at the last Pacific Relations Conference and at the United Nations Conference the view was vigorously expressed that subject peoples regard the professions of the trustees with grave suspicion. The further plea advanced that trusteeship promotes good government of the colonies also holds precious little water. It cuts across the principle pregnant with profound wisdom and statesmanship enunciated nearly half a century ago by Sir Campbell Bannerman, that "good government can in no case be considered a substitute for self-government." The new principles of trusteeship and colonial administration evolved at San Francisco and incorporated in the San Francisco Charter are of course more liberal than those which guided this subject in pre-war years. But their implementation is very much in the hands of the Big Powers, who interpret the provisions regarding trusteeship and mandates in a manner advantageous to themselves. The severely businesslike constructions placed on these provisions indicate that high purpose and idealism are sadly lacking in the outlook of colonial powers like Britain, France and the Netherlands, and colonial possessions and trust territories are only pawns in the game of power politics. It rests with the U. N. O. to make these pro-
visions effective; but the U. N. O. is itself at the mercy of the Big Powers and can become strong only to the extent that they permit it to become strong. It is a vicious circle, which must be broken and, let us hope, will be broken by the very pressure of circumstances.

The United Nations should adopt a policy with reference to the enemy countries which will not be blackened by traces of vindictiveness and eagerness to warp and destroy the latter's national souls. Towards the enemy countries, the policy should indubitably be one of demolishing completely the foundations on which their political structures had been erected, not the destruction of their national souls or their national identity and inculcating on them the spirit of democracy and democratic way of life. While resuscitating and renovating the suppressed and down-trodden spirit of the common people, by infusing in them hope and confidence in the future of their own inalienable freedom as individuals and in the security and independence of their countries, by means of education, propaganda and sympathetic handling of their economic and other problems, they should be induced to cultivate a new angle of vision, to abhor the vicious, soul-killing nature of the totalitarian tyranny which they had to submit to. Vindictiveness, on the other hand, reminiscent of the attempt to fix the war guilt solely on Germany after the 1914-18 war, breeds hatred, vengeance, despair and frustration in a
proud and self-conscious people like the Germans, the inevitable and inescapable sequel to which will be accentuation of the international ill-will which it is our supreme task to extirpate.

Dismemberment of Germany, sterilization of the German population, distribution of the Germans over widely scattered areas and so on are some of the remedies suggested to prevent Germany from resorting to any future unprovoked aggression and provoking another world war in another quarter of a century. Occupation of Japan and parcelling it out among the United Nations, destruction of her industrial potential and abolition of the institution of Emperorship are some of the proposals adumbrated in respect of Japan. The fundamental question is whether these remedies if carried out on a spirit of vengeance will successfully destroy the root causes of German and Japanese potentialities for aggression in future.

Indians, as a nation, whether Hindus or Muslims, are not motivated or actuated by feelings of national or individual hatred, towards others and they do not believe that any nation or people as a whole can be or is so utterly sadistic, so utterly cruel, so utterly impregnated with the ideal of aggrandizement and making war as to be un reformable by peaceful means or by being subjected to the right kind of education and training. Germany and Japan have waged an unrelenting war in pursuit of their totalitarian policies, a large number of German and Japan-
ese soldiers have clearly resorted to the most despicable sadistic practices while dealing with their prisoners of war or with the conquered peoples. But their psychology in this respect is not separable from their training, education and the militaristic and racial superiority ideas, unceasingly driven into their ears from their childhood or over long years. They are in most, if not all, cases the unsuspecting victims of their environment and their training and must be capable of being remoulded into a different kind of people by systematic efforts at their reformation and by sustained endeavours to inculcate into and educate them in the art of peace. It may be a difficult, and probably prolonged, experiment, but an experiment which is worth trying by the Governments of the occupying Powers. The angle from which the average Indian looks at this problem is indeed different from the angle from which the average Westerner looks at it. If Germany under Hitler or the Japanese addicted to the Emperor-worship ideal had proved themselves to be inhuman barbarians according to ordinary moral or political conceptions, the Allied nations need not emulate them by imparting to their policy vis-a-vis the conquered countries a vengeance complex. Even barbarians can be educated and turned into refined human beings by proper treatment and the Germans, and Japanese are not barbarians. India's contribution to the policy in this regard, to the extent that she has any say on it, will be
one based on her immemorial traditions of aishite and love. In the long run the latter is the only policy that can succeed.

The effects of the policy that the Allied Control Council in Tokyo and the newly-appointed Far-Eastern Control Commission sitting in Washington are following with respect to Japan now even as the effects of the various directives that Gen. MacArthur as the Allied Supreme Commander, had issued to the Japanese Government and people ever since the Allied control was established, are as yet difficult to evaluate. The Japanese Emperor Hirohito, however, seems to have reconciled himself fully to the role of a titular head of the State as evidenced by his renunciation of the claim of divine origin. The education of the Japanese people in the ideals and practice of democracy, the eradication of the militaristic and autocratic traditions from the country’s administrative system, the elimination of all those elements in Japan’s national life which have contributed to the promotion of totalitarian and militaristic tendencies—all these processes are proceeding apace. We can only hope that in the course of a decade, if not less, the Japanese nation will emerge as a leading country again—but this time a leader not in the sense of a war-mongering nation but a leader of democratic thought and ideals. Similary let us hope that the German people will be educated out of their age-old militaristic ideals and their stupid ideas
about race superiority and so on. At the same
time, it is necessary to guard against the occupy­
ing nations attempting to indoctrinate the
German people within their respective zones
with their own particular ideological concep­
tions.

The next big problem that remains to be
tackled by the Allied nations and by one of
them in particular, namely, Great Britain, is that
of India. The justice, relevancy and impor­
tance of India's demand for immediate transfer
of power to her own leaders and complete free­
dom from extraneous control are impossible to
ignore. I will emphasize once again that what
is essential is that the recognition of the justice
of the demand must be concretized without
delay as an important part of the United
Nations' peace plans. In the first Great War,
Indian armies fought side by side with the Allied
armies in different theatres of war and made an
enormous contribution to a glorious victory.
Their sacrifices, however, did not succeed in
securing a commensurate measure of freedom
for their country. The Montague-Chelmsford
Reforms formulated in the wake of that war
inhered a very inadequate recognition of India's
contribution to victory in World War No. I
while the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy came as an
extremely unpalatable reminder of the subordi­
nate position of India.

Subsequent events in India have not de­
monstrated that Britain's attitude to Indian freedom has changed in any considerable measure. The Government of India Act of 1935 is indubitably a complicated and comprehensive measure of legislation; but so far as its integral merits as a charter of freedom for India are concerned, it really withheld more than it conceded in the shape of real power. One part of it relating to Federation was suspended owing to the compelling nature of the opposition to it from various parties for various reasons and the other part relating to provincial autonomy had to experience rough weather in seven provinces after a trial of only two-and-a-half years. The Cripps' Mission came later, bringing a draft Declaration on behalf of the British War Cabinet, whose single good feature embodying an assurance of the country's post-war independence was more than counterbalanced by the insistent refusal of the then British Government to demonstrate their earnestness in that regard by acquiescing in imperative war-time political changes and by the incorporation therein of the disintegrating principle of provincial secession. World War No. II found India eager and anxious to maximise her contribution to Axis vanquishment but was denied an adequate opportunity of doing so. Indian soldiers, airmen and sailors fought as gallantly, as valiantly and as steadfastly as those of any other Allied nations, if not better, but for what cause most of them are unable to say. Their achievements have been monumentalized.
in the unqualified tributes paid to them by Commanders and Generals of the British race as well as by others and even the description of a "mercenary" army given to it by Mr. William Phillips was an indictment more of the way in which the Indian fighting forces have been recruited and less of their personal heroism or bravery. Educated young Indians as well as Indian peasants and workers had enlisted in ever-increasing numbers in the fighting forces and demonstrated the inherent absurdity of the contention that Indians would not be able to defend their country if the British troops were withdrawn.

Apart from the achievements of the regular Army, there was the attempt to organise an "Indian National Army" by Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose for the purpose of wresting independence from British hands which came within an ace of success. Controversy will continue to rage for some time to come whether organisation of the "I.N.A." was a legitimate, legal procedure, in so far as it involved transference by the fighting forces of their allegiance from one oath to that of another. But the circumstances, so far revealed, in which that Army was organised make it clear that the men had more or less been exempted from their oath at the surrender of Singapore and Malaya, while as far as the motive inspiring the move was concerned, it was unexceptionable.
Fifteen years ago at the Round Table Conferences there was furious controversy even over the acceptance of the principle that India's defence should be increasingly the concern of Indians themselves. Since then and especially since the outbreak of the recent war, we have travelled many miles ahead and the achievements of the Indian fighting men therein are so striking that none can dare dispute hereafter the Indians' capacity to defend their country's independence. In any case that argument cannot be advanced by any British politician to counter India's demand for freedom.

Not only unqualified acceptance of India's right to manage her own affairs but actual, practical steps in that direction is the only method by which India's sacrifices for the common cause can be adequately requited. The demand made by the Indian National Congress on behalf of India in regard to the country's freedom, must, therefore, be interpreted as complementary to and as an extension of the unspoken demand for the same purpose made by Indian fighting men from different parts of the country and belonging to different communities through their heroic deeds on the fields of battle. As a matter of fact, among these latter the fire of patriotism burns as brightly and as greatly as among the politically-minded sections. There is among them as keen and unbounded a desire
for their country's independence from extraneous control as among the generality of the civilian population and the unity that prevails among them transcends all communal bounds contrary to the position in the political sphere.

Unmistakable indications of the patriotic fire that smoulders in the ranks of the members of the fighting forces are provided by the "strikes" (technically described as "mutiny") of the Indian naval ratings, the personnel of the R.I.A.F. and even some of those belonging to the Indian Army that took place in the beginning of the year, and by the widespread sympathy by the I.N.A. trials among the fighting services.

From an unexpected quarter—namely the Prime Minister of Great Britain Mr. C. R. Attlee—comes an acknowledgment of this rising tide of nationalism among Indians of all classes and Indian personnel of the fighting services. In his speech in the India Debate held on March 15, 1946, Mr. Attlee said, "To-day I think the national idea has spread right through not the least perhaps among some of those soldiers who had done such wonderful service in the War." This spirit is both a portent and a warning; it is a portent of ominous significance to the future and it is a warning that unless the spirit is recognised and respected and canalised in an effective and adequate manner, by placing the Indian fighting forces under a Government of their own countrymen, it will assume a violent anti-European sphere.
There is another vital factor which aggravates India's suspicions of Britain's intentions instead of reassuring her. It involves incalculable injury to Britain's reputation for moral candour and her prestige for political honesty if the impression, which gained ground in the latter part of the war, that she offered some terms of political settlement to India when the war situation was discouraging for her or when the enemy action was imminent or threatened against India in the beginning of 1942 and withdrew them as soon as the situation improved and the danger receded. Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India with his ill-fated offer when a Japanese invasion of India was generally supposed to be in the offing and when the United Nations' military fortunes reached a low ebb in the Far East with the conquest of Malaya and the capitulation of Singapore. But by a coincidence the negotiations broke down and the offer was withdrawn when the Japanese fleet sustained a reverse in the Bay of Bengal and the air attacks over Colombo proved a costly adventure for Japan which neutralized and permanently crippled her capacity for undertaking any invasion of India.

Now we have another offer to India at a time when the international horizon is clouded with inter-Power suspicions and wrangles which may at any time produce a conflagration. Russia's plans and intentions are uncertain and the United Nations' Organisation is still too un-
effective an organ for organising effective international action to prevent aggression. The Russian "bogey" is again being bandied about in connection with India's security. In these uncertain and troublous times, Britain's holding on to the Churchillian doctrine of non-liquidation of the Empire, necessarily involving British domination over India is a policy fraught with serious implications from every point of view. Whether the Attlee Government's offer to India is made with an eye to these implications or in full and unqualified recognition of the justness of India's demand, it is just timely and none too early. What I desire to impress is that the present offer cannot or should not be permitted to share the fate of the 1942 one but must be determinedly made a success in the best interests of every one. It was good that it is recognised that "the temperature of 1946 is not the temperature of 1920, 1930 or even 1942. The slogans of earlier days are discarded. Some words that seemed at that time to Indians to express the height of their aspirations are now set on one side and other words and ideas thrust forward" (Mr. Attlee's speech referred to above). It should literally be the last attempt to settle the Indian problem and settle it finally. There cannot be any other settlement that can answer this description than the graceful recognition of India's independence followed by a settlement of all outstanding questions pertaining to Indo-British relations on the basis of a treaty of friendship.
We regard it as of pre-eminent importance that India should have been represented in her own right at the San Francisco Conference and should be so represented at the Council table around which would congregate the representatives of the United Nations to negotiate and formulate the terms of peace. The Rt. Hon’ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastri had then assiduously publicized and propagated this point of view and served in a large measure to focus public attention thereon. India’s representatives at the Peace Conference cannot be allowed to play the part of gramophone records registering the desires and the will of an extraneous authority like the Secretary of State for India and the British Government, and incapacitated by reason of the political subordination of their country from making any specific and independent contribution to the evolution of the peace structure. They must be the chosen representatives of the Indian people and they must be in a position to speak out, without fear or favour and with a genuine understanding of the great issues at stake the real mind and express the real will of the Indian people. Mass murder on an unprecedented scale even for such mass murder which modern wars involve particularly the use of such enormously destructive weapons like the atom bomb is patently repugnant to all the moral conceptions and humanitarian ideals that India holds dear.
It is impossible for human progress in the real sense of the term to be a sustained and continuous process when every quarter of a century what has been achieved in the previous interval of peace is destroyed by the forces of hell and retrogression let loose. All religions abhor this process of man’s scientific and inventive genius being prostituted for the obliteration of man himself. Christ preached peace, goodwill, and purposeful love among God’s creation; but that Christian civilization has regrettably departed to such an extent from Christ’s preachings of peace and goodwill among men that it elevates destructive war to the position of the principal method of settling man’s disputes with man and nation’s disputes with nation and is the most damaging and distressing indictment of that civilization. Hindu philosophy has from time immemorial induced a feeling of hatefulness towards war for the sake of war among the followers of that religion. Islam too preaches peace and goodwill, and permeated with these teachings, Indian representatives can place before the world, provided they are afforded a satisfactory opportunity, the lofty principles of human brotherhood, respect for the individual as individual and justice, which are the essential ingredients of permanent peace. An independence-enjoying India alone can make this contribution to world peace and to save the world civilisation from complete destruction.
To the promotion of international peace the most practical and most conspicuous contribution that India can be depended upon to make will be the principle of non-violence which in terms of avoidance of future wars means the substitution of arbitration and negotiation as the means of settling international disputes instead of resorting to wars. Apparently violence is inherent in the law of nature and war in general and modern war in particular provides gruesome evidence of the manner in which that law of destruction manifests itself from time to time in international affairs. Elimination of aggressive wars which is a primary factor in cementing international co-operation in the future, can be an accomplished fact when, firstly, the root causes of war are destroyed, and, secondly, when we reach a stage where violence and war as methods of reconciling international antagonisms are substituted by non-violence and settlement by negotiation. At present the real significance of non-violence as a factor in human relations is vitiated by large sections of people in the world, regarding it from the wrong perspective and by the somewhat misleading notions entertained of its implications in that respect. One of these notions is that it justifies and involves abject and humiliating surrender of peace-loving nations to international brigandism on the one hand and pacifism of the extreme on the other variety, which may have its roots in national cowardice. That is a wholly wrong
approach to a great principle. The more appropriate way of looking at it is to consider non-violence not as justifying a nerveless and doctrinaire pacifism but as a dynamic vital principle of conduct which demands that men should strive for peace and promotion of goodwill by neutralizing the aggressive intentions of dictators and totalitarian powers and that international disarmament and collective security should be the basis of peace. Let international justice prevail; let all nations feel that they are equal to one another; let the root causes of territorial cupidities among nations be eradicated and directly you have non-violence in action as a preservative of peace. And since non-violence of this character will be broad-based on respect for law, righteous and just law, it will be realized that it is also the best method for establishing international law on a sound basis and preventing gratuitous violations of its obligations by power-pride or militaristically-minded nations. It is indubitable that one of the guarantees for the preservation of peace is respect for law on the part of nations even as respect for law among individuals is the guarantee for social security and peace and law necessarily courting justice. For enforcing this respect to the Rule of Law the establishment of the International Court of Justice, envisaged in the world charter, with sufficient sanctions behind it, is essential. Into the peace structure should, therefore, be woven the constitution of this legal machinery which
can effectively maintain the principle of Rule of Law among nations.

A systematic cultivation of the attitude of non-violence of the nature mentioned is what the world as a whole needs most, so as to lend point to the tremendous revulsion of feeling that is engendered in men's minds by the hates, the discords and more than all by the distress and the destruction that the war has produced, culminating in the incalculable loss of life and destruction caused by the use of the atom bomb on two Japanese cities. India as the spiritual home of the non-violence ideal has a nearly 5000-year old history behind her; world famous teachers like the Buddha and Mahavira transformed non-violence into a bed-rock principle of the religions they founded and propagated. In the present century, Mahatma Gandhi, the prophet of Indian nationalism, has re-emphasized and renovated that doctrine and has spent almost a life-time in unceasing efforts to inculcate its significance and beneficialness in the conduct of man's affairs. To ascertain the exact extent of the success of his preachings in this regard is a difficult process at present, but the profound psychological effect it has produced on large sections of the Indian population, including even those who are not directly the Mahatma's disciples in politics, constitute a distinguishing feature of Indian public life during the last two-and-a-half decades. These years of India's
political history bear ample and convincing testimony to the influence that the ideal of non-violence has exerted on people's thoughts and modes of life, though it is possible that it could easily have been greater if its underlying implications for the day-to-day conduct of individuals as much as for the struggle we are waging for Swaraj had been more keenly appreciated.

It must be admitted that the ideal is susceptible not merely of a limited or parochial application but possesses a larger, even, universal significance. In the consideration of the problems of permanent peace and post-war reconstruction a firm adherence to non-violence will produce wholly satisfactory and salutary results if its importance is realised. Ceaselessly humanity has been striving to attain conditions in which human concord, brotherhood and goodwill among men will predominantly prevail. But its efforts to attain these conditions have so far proved elusive and illusory. Scientific progress while tending to promote human happiness has been exploited also to aggravate human misery, for attaining destructive than constructive ends. It is a tremendous task to switch men's minds from thoughts of violence, greed and conflict to thoughts of peace, self-sufficiency and love of fellow-men which is the essential preliminary to the elimination of Hitlerism and Hitlers for all times. It will be India's
duty and her privilege to emphasize these considerations and to secure their acceptance at the Peace Conference. It may be that the switch-over is difficult to accomplish, that non-violence and all that it implies may not prove attractive to large sections of the peoples of the world, whose history and traditions do not enable them to practice it. It may be that national greed, national hatred, national pride and prejudices will always get the better of the higher principles of human goodwill, international selflessness and so on. But an ideal does not lose its value because that value is not immediately realised or adequately appreciated. India will hold on to her traditional ideal and will persistently preach it, until by sheer force of circumstances, humanity everywhere aligns itself on its side.

India's case for freedom which I have attempted to present in the foregoing pages is an irrefutable and irresistible one from any angle, national or international, military or economic, peace or war. We are obviously at the final stages of the decision of the case and the British Cabinet Mission, which is now in this country, is expected to be the agency which is to set the machinery in motion which will facilitate the establishment of an Indian union and the conclusion of a treaty between Britain and India transforming to India the right to rule herself, to enjoy the fruits of self-government. The British Parliament and Government are
apparently in a "Quit India" mood and so far as Mr. Attlee was speaking as the Prime Minister of Britain his speech in the House of Commons on March 15, 1946, must be regarded as an acknowledgment of the obvious fact that India can no longer be kept under subjection. He was not inclined to play the American game of stressing internal differences; he did not make a fetish of the Dominion Status ideal but explained that the choice between Dominion Status within the British Commonwealth and Independence outside it was for India to make; he was not prepared to permit the argument of special interests and minorities to be elevated into a position in which they can impose a veto on the country’s progress.

If this relinquishing mood persists, and if Britain proceeds to the discharge of her imperative obligations towards the country in a spirit of honest service and sincere desire to allow a great country of 400 million people to enjoy their freedom, then there will be ample justification for the New York Herald Tribune’s comment that the "British Prime Minister has offered to give up the brightest and most cherished Jewel of the British Empire." What is more important is that the "brightest Jewel" thus given up will be the most potent factor on the side of collective security and progress, i.e., the ideal of a world state and that it will mean on the one hand the ringing down of the curtain
on the colonial age and on the other the most hopeful portent for other territories still under colonial domination. And, what is equally important, as the Herald Tribune says it will "make possible more whole-hearted co-operation between the American and the British Commonwealth than could have existed otherwise."

We hope and pray, therefore, that the mood persists and will not vanish under the stress and strain of seeming obstruction and obstreperousness of one section of opinion or the other, one community or minority or the other. In every country on the threshold of transfer of power and exercise of self-government, some interests there will always be who will try to play the role of obstructionists. But the very element of power for greater participation in which the obstruction is intended should induce these interests to abandon their obstruction when it is found that they are depriving themselves thereby of the share in power.

India's independence does not mean India's isolation from the wider international currents of thought. On the other hand it will mean her greater, more intensive and more purposeful participation in world affairs and the shaping of policies which contribute to world peace and world democracy. This consideration it is necessary to stress in view of the controversy regarding Dominion Status versus independence that is likely to assume greater prominence
during the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly which is envisaged. Britain probably apprehends that an Independent India will elect to deviate from her present British associations and that she will thereby lose a most valuable and prized possession without any corresponding requital. But let Britain rest assured that while India no longer appreciates or will remain satisfied with Dominion Status and will certainly elect for going itself out of the commonwealth she will prefer to align herself as an independent country with Britain to aligning herself with any other country, provided Britain and British democracy demonstrably show themselves friendly to Indian democracy and India.

In conclusion let me say that India has a great destiny to fulfil in the future, even as she is the heir to a great heritage from the past. Her present condition is an interlude which is just one of those unhappy interludes in her long history. As Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, whose vision of India's future is much clearer and more realistic than many of his fellow-countrymen's and whose outlook on that future discloses a vigour, freshness and richness of thought which very few other Indians possess, asserts in his series of articles entitled "The Discovery of India," "India would find herself again." She will become revitalised, rejuvenated, renovated with the release of her enormous reserves of potential power and energy that lie latent among her
400 millions of people. "India," Pt. Nehru says, "cannot play a secondary part in the world. She will either count for a great deal or not count at all." She must, however, count for a great deal and it is to enable her to do this that India must have freedom and have it immediately.