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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE CUBAN OPERATION AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

H. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

1.  The WH/4 Branch had not only the responsibility for the Cuban project but also the normal area duties of a geographical unit in the Clandestine Services.  Besides being considered a task force with the mission of overturning the Castro government, it also had the Headquarters desk responsibility for Cuba, including support of Havana Station and Santiago Base until the break in diplomatic relations.

2.  This arrangement required WH/4's intelligence (FI) section to collect intelligence on Cuba not only for the task force, with its special requirements, but also for the entire U.S. intelligence community, with its diverse and long-range needs.

3.  The section was plagued with personnel shortages from the start, but as long as the U.S. Embassy in Havana remained open, thus assuring communications, it received and processed a good yield of intelligence from Cuba, chiefly on political, economic, and Community Party matters.  Late in 1960 the section was directed to place emphasis on military information, but it found that its agents in Cuba lacked access to high-level military sources.

4.  The FI section transmitted copies of all the reports it processed to the paramilitary section as well as to the rest of its regular intelligence customers.

The Net in Havana

5.  The section devoted considerable effort to supporting Havana Station in preparing its agents for stay-behind roles in the event of a break in diplomatic relations.  When the embassy finally closed on 3 January 1961 the station had a single net for positive intelligence.  It comprised some 27 persons, 15 of whom were reporting agents and the rest radio operators, cutouts and couriers.  The principal agents and one of the radio operators were U.S. citizens and thus had doubtful status after the break in relations.

6.  In September 1960 as the military invasion concept was beginning to gain ascendancy in project planning, the chief of the project created a G-2 unit.  But instead of placing this unit directly under himself as a project-wide unit and making its chief a member of his immediate staff, he put it in the paramilitary section under the aggressive Marine Corps colonel who became the paramilitary unit chief at about that time.

7.  As chief of this low-echelon intelligence unit, whose analyses were to have important influence on an action vitally affecting national security and prestige, WH/4 brought in an officer of undoubted ability but of limited experience in paramilitary and FI operations.  It was a grave error to place this G-2 unit in such a subordinate position in the project, and this error produced the serious consequences described below.

Function of G-2 Unit

8.  The paramilitary G-2 unit consisted of four officers and several secretaries.  Its principal function was to prepare intelligence annexes to the successive invasion plans.  Its sources of information included, in addition to the FI section's reports, photographic intelligence, cartographic intelligence, Special Intelligence, armed services reports, and messages received from the paramilitary section's own agents in Cuba.  Reports from the armed services were procured rapidly through direct informal liaison rather than through the usual slower channels.

9.  In various ways the functioning of the regular FI section, which was directly under the project chief, was adversely affected by the paramilitary G-2 unit.

10.  The PM unit absorbed the available personnel.  The chief of the FI section was not invited to attend WH/4 staff meetings, and for security reasons, he never had access to WH/4's war room.  During the final weeks the FI section was not permitted to examine the PM section's incoming operational cables for possible positive intelligence content.  The FI section chief did not have a clearance for photographic intelligence.

Lack of Liaison

11.  There was no close liaison between the two sections, and this resulted in some duplication in preparation of reports requested by the DD/P, because neither section would learn of the requests made of the other.  Until the end of 1960 the two sections were housed in different buildings.

12.  The most serious consequence of the third-echelon position of this G-2 unit was that it concentrated in the hands of the unit chief the dual function of receiving all the information available from Government-wide sources, including that from the agents of his own paramilitary section, and of interpreting all these data for the purpose of supplying intelligence support to the various invasion plans.

13.  Interpretation of intelligence affecting the strike force aspect of the operation was thus entrusted to officers who were so deeply engaged in preparations for the invasion that their judgments could not have been expected to be altogether objective.  This circumstance undoubtedly had a strong influence on the process by which WH/4 arrived at the conclusion that the landing of the strike force could and would trigger an uprising among the Cuban populace.  This conclusion, in turn, became an essential element in the decision to proceed with the operation, as it took the place of the original concept, no longer maintainable, that the invasion was to be undertaken in support of existing and effective guerrilla forces.

14.  Irrespective of the validity of that conclusion, it is clear that the interpretative analysis should have been made not by the persons who were working day and night to prepare the invasion but by an objective and disinterested senior interpretation specialist from the Agency's FI Staff or from its Office of Current Intelligence.

Intelligence Support Vacuum

15.  Another serious error in the field of intelligence support was that Miami Base received almost no intelligence support from the Headquarters G-2 section.  This may be attributed to the facts that the paramilitary chief was almost completely preoccupied with the strike force preparations and that his subordinate G-2 was not given project-wide responsibilities and to the rigid security restrictions under which the paramilitary section was expected to operate, as well as to the general confusion in the organizational position of the Miami Base.

16.  This serious support vacuum at Miami was compounded because the base, in spite of its large size and the fact that it was deeply engaged in its own operations in Cuba, had no intelligence support section.  There was no single officer or unit charged with responsibility for interpreting the considerable amount of intelligence derived directly from base sources and from Special Intelligence.

17.  Furthermore no photographic intelligence was available to Miami Base, which had no officer with a clearance entitling him to receive it.  There was substantially no intelligence support covering the Cuban beach areas or the political situation inside Cuba.  There was no analysis or interpretation of Special Intelligence, and there was no mechanism to call critical material to anyone's attention.

18.  The result of this highly defective state of affairs was that individual Miami case officers were forced to rely upon their own interpretation of the separate intelligence reports, instead of having this material interpreted for them by specialists.  They were not given a number of other items of operational intelligence which were in existence in the G-2 unit of the paramilitary section at Headquarters.

I.  THE POLITICAL FRONT AND THE RELATION OF CUBANS TO THE PROJECT

1.  The Cuban opposition front, as conceived by the Agency in consultation with the State Department, was to have the following characteristics:

a.  Full restoration of the 1940 Cuban constitution.

b.  Return to the basic principles of the revolution, as enunciated in the 1958 Caracas Declaration.

c.  Pro-Western and strongly anti-Communist orientation.

d.  Political complexion ranging from a little to the right of center to somewhat left of center.

e.  Ability to muster the broadest possible support from the Cuban population.

2.  The functions of such a front organization were conceived to be:

a.  A cover for covert action against the Castro regime.

b.  A catalyst and a rallying point for anti-Castro groups variously reported to number 178, 184, or 211.

c.  A possible nucleus for a provisional government of Cuba following Castro's downfall.

3.  The terms of reference thus excluded followers of the former dictator, Fulgencio Batista.  They also excluded extreme leftists.

4.  Exclusion of the Batistianos and other ultra-conservatives caused one kind of problem.  Many of the exiles had been Batista followers.  Many of them were rich and had assets, such as boats and followers, which could be used.  Some had military experience.  Some of them had American friends who were influential enough to urge their claims to consideration upon the White House.

The Leftist Fringe

5.  Exclusion of the far-left fringe caused another kind of problem.  It was hard to tell how far left some persons were.  And some of those whose political acceptability were questionable nevertheless claimed such substantial following inside Cuba that it was difficult to ignore them.

6.  In forming the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) the Agency focused its attention principally on personalities and groups who had either participated in Castro's government or supported his revolution but had become disillusioned and gone into opposition.

7.  In early 1959 the Havana Station was already assessing a wide variety of anti-Castro personalities with whom it was in contact.  In mid-1959 a station agent was exploring the possibility of covert support to the Montecristi Movement of Justo Asencio Carrillo Hernandez.

8.  In the mid-1950s the Montecristi group had been active against Batista, who exiled Carrillo.  He returned after the revolution to take an important banking post but found Castro's Communist tendencies intolerable and went into opposition again.  His group is described as liberal and progressive but rejecting any accommodation with Communism.

The Organizing Committee

9.  Carrillo was one of several Cuban figures whom the Agency induced to defect in late 1959 or the early months of 1960.  Others were Manuel Francisco Artime Buesa, Jose Ignacio Rasco Bermudez, and Manuel Antonio Varona Loredo.  It was these four who, after long negotiations, formed the organizing committee of the FRD in May 1960.

10.  Artime, who is still under 30, joined Castro's movement as an anti-Batista student.  Under instructions from the Catholic Church he organized a group of 4,000 Catholic Action students to gain the farmers' help against Batista.  The view has been expressed that he was the Jesuits' penetration of the 26 July Movement.  Castro gave him a high post in National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) from which he resigned after ten months to form the Movement to Recover the Revolution (MRR), composed in part of his former Catholic Action followers.  This exile opposition group provided a large proportion of the recruits for the strike force.

11.  Rasco, a college and university classmate of Castro's, is a lawyer and history professor, described as a nice young intellectual without much talent for action.  In the fall of 1959 he became the first president of the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), an anti-Communist Catholic group which Castro drove underground in April 1960 at which time Rasco fled the country.

12.  Varona's career in government and in opposition politics goes back to the 1920s.  During the regime of President Prio Socarras he held several important posts, including that of prime minister, and was responsible for anti-Communist politics and measures.  He collaborated with Castro until the Community pattern of the new regime became evident, coming to the U.S. in April 1960.  Before leaving Havana he had presented a plan for Castro's overthrow, including a unified opposition and U.S. aid for developing propaganda and military capabilities.

The Political Spectrum

13.  Varona was representative of the older opposition parties (Autentico and Ortodoxo) which had survived both Batista and Castro and which were roughly in the middle of the political spectrum.  Artime's group also occupied a centrist position, but its membership was drawn from the younger generation of Cubans.  Carrillo and Rasco appeared to be a little left and a little right of center, respectively.

14.  Thus the original group of organizers represented a fairly broad range of political views.  They were joined in June 1960 by Aureliano Sanchez Arango who claimed leadership of the AAA group, the initials possibly representing Associacion de Amigos de Aureliano.  Both Sanchez Arango and Varona claimed to have considerable following in the Cuban labor field.  Sanchez Arango and his followers appeared to have some general knowledge of the use of clandestine techniques.

15.  These five associated themselves in issuing a manifesto at Mexico City on 22 June 1960.  This document called upon Cubans, other Latin Americans and the world at large to help the FRD overthrow Castro's dictatorship.  The FRD pledged itself to establish a representative democratic government with full civil liberties under the 1940 Cuban constitution.  It pledged free general elections within 18 months of establishment of a provisional government.  It proposed to ban the Community party and institute a program of social and economic progress for all classes of Cubans.

16.  Varona's maturity and experience led to his selection as coordinator, in effect, general manager, of the FRD.  This immediately precipitated the resignation of Sanchez Arango and in turn led to the beginning of a problem in establishing and maintaining FRD unity which the project never fully solved.

Change in Policy

17.  The FRD had originally been conceived as the channel through which all of the project's aid to the Cuban cause would flow.  However, Sanchez Arango's walkout threatened a loss of assets and capabilities which the project wanted to preserve.  The result was expressed as follows in a briefing prepared by WH/4 for CINCLANT in November 1960:

"In October we made a change in operational policy.  Heretofore we had kept our efforts centered on the FRD; however, we will now consider requests for paramilitary aid from any anti-Castro (and non-Batista) group, inside or outside Cuba, which can show it has a capability for paramilitary action against the Castro regime.  We feel that the combination of our controlled paramilitary action under the FRD aegis and the lesser-controlled operations of other Cuban revolutionaries will bring about a considerable acceleration of active anti-Castro expressions within Cuba.  We will, in any event, have the lever of support as a mechanism for influencing the ultimate emergence of one individual or group as the primary figure in the anti-Castro community."

18.  Because of the gregariousness of Cuban exiles, the project was unable to prevent this change in policy from becoming known to the FRD executive committee.  When the Bender Group, now generally understood by Cubans and many others to represent the CIA, began responding to requests from and giving support to defectors from the FRD and to groups which the FRD considered politically unacceptable, the organization which was supposed to be a world-wide symbol of Cuban freedom and which was being groomed as the nucleus of the next government of Cuba naturally felt that its prestige had been undermined.

Diffusion of Effort

19.  This complicated relations between project case officers and the FRD leaders.  It also appears to have resulted in some diffusion of effort in the attempts at clandestine infiltration of arms and paramilitary leaders into Cuba.  It seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity, sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting effortss.

20.  The composite political complexion of the FRD shifted a little to the right in August 1960 with the joining of Ricardo Rafael Sardinia, who headed an organization called the Movimiento Institucional Democratico (MID)

21.  A source of friction between the FRD and its project sponsors was the effort to induce it to set up its headquarters outside the U.S.  The Cuban leaders were finally persuaded by financial leverage to move to Mexico City where the Mexican Government had agreed to be hospitable.  Housing and office space were arranged for the executive committee members and their families and for a project case officer and his secretary. _____ in Mexico City was reactivated for support duties, such as _____ and the move was made.

22.  However, the Mexican Government appears not to have kept its word, and the Cubans were subjected to surveillance and other harassment.  Within a few weeks it became evident that the situation was intolerable, and everybody moved back to Miami, which is where the Cubans wanted to be in the first place.

The Bender Group

23.  The man responsible for laying the groundwork of the FRD, arranging a long series of meetings among the Cubans, and persuading them to merge their differences and issue a joint manifesto, was the chief of the project's political section.  He was known to the Cubans and inevitably to the press as "Frank Bender."  The Bender Group, for reasons of plausible denial, purported to be composed of U.S. businessmen who wanted to help overthrow Castro.  The Cubans do not seem to have cared whether this was true or not, but the guise irritated them because they wanted to be in direct touch with the U.S. Government at the highest level possible.

24.  Bender's linguistic accomplishments did not include Spanish and this may have diluted his effectiveness in dealing with Cubans.

25. After the FRD was launched the handling of purely FRD affairs in Mexico City and later in Miami was turned over to a case officer with fluent Spanish and long experience in Latin American affairs.

26.  However, Bender continued to be identified with the project.  The FRD leaders' antagonism toward the Bender Group was sharpened when, at the time of the change in operational policy noted above, WH/4 assigned Bender the responsibility of dealing with Cuban individuals and groups outside of the FRD framework.

The Rubio Padilla Group

27.  One of the outside groups the project continued to work with was the Action Movement for Recovery (MAR), headed by Juan Rubio Padilla.  Use of this conservative group of rich landlords was strongly advocated by William D. Pawley, an influential Miami businessman.  A paper prepared by WH/4 for the Director of Central Intelligence's use in briefing Senator Kennedy in July 1960 stated MAR's claims to a widespread resistance organization needing only arms and ammunition and order to go into action and called the MAR relationship a most encouraging development.

28.  However, Rubio was too conservative for the FRD's taste, and the MAR was never incorporated into the FRD.

29.  An organization which resisted incorporation in the FRD until March 1960 and which meanwhile had a stormy relationship with the Bender Group was the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), headed by Manuel Antonio Ray Rivero.  Ray had been Castro's minister of public works until he lost his job to a Communist.  He arrived in this country in November 1960 and agreed to accept assistance from the Bender Group but wished to maintain his freedom of choice.  The project's unilateral use of Ray resulted in some successful maritime operations.

30.  Bender's efforts to get Ray to join the FRD produced strained relations, but in December Ray agreed to accept military aid through the FRD.  Ray's program appeared to be identical with Castro's but without Communism and without hostility to the United States.  Ray became less intransigent as time went on and in February and March 1960 was participating in talks with Bender and Varona on the formation of the Revolutionary Council which he ultimately joined.  There seems to be no substance to allegations in the press that Ray was ignored.  In fact, his unsubstantiated claims to wide underground resources are said to have been received uncritically by some project personnel.

Contact with Batistianos

31.  Another allegations which gained some currency was that the project was supporting and otherwise using former associates and supporters of Batista.  At one point WH/4 did have contact with one ex-Batista leader, Sanchez Mosquerra, and gave some support to his group, but this effort was soon called off.  There were also attempts by Batistianos to penetrate the project's military effort, but these were resisted.  The FRD's own intelligence section was active in attempting to screen out Batistianos.  The strike force contained some members of the former Cuban Constitutional Army, which existed under Batista, but these were recruited as soldiers not as politicians.

32.  The brigade officers seem to have been clean of the Batista taint.  However, the FRD, for whom they were supposedly fighting, justly complained that it had had no hand in their selection.

33.  Jose Miro Cardona, a distinguished lawyer who turned to politics late in his career, was the first Cuban prime minister after the Castro revolution, was later ambassador to Spain, and was ambassador-designate to the United States when he broke with Castro, took asylum in the Argentine Embassy, and was eventually granted safe conduct to this country (in October 1960) where he became the FRD's secretary-general for public relations.

34.  Under the guidance of Bender he became a strong force for unity in the FRD during its most difficult period, the virtual political interregnum before the inauguration of President Kennedy.  Miro was influential in bringing Ray into the Revolutionary Council which was formed on 20 March with Miro as chairman.

Visit to Training Camp

35.  Miro, with other Council members, visited the strike force in Guatemala on 29 March in a much-needed effort to spur troop morale.  There had been far too little contact between the FRD and the soldiers being trained in its name.  Artime, Varona, and Antonio Jaime Maceo Mackle had been there in February in an attempt to calm mutinous spirits.  The last previous visit had been made in the fall of 1960 by Col. Eduardo Martin Elena, head of the FRD's military staff and a former constitutional Army officer.  Martin Elena antagonized the trainees, and with the beginning of straight military training under a U.S. Army officer, who had no interest in Cuban politics, a ban was placed on visits to the camp by Cuban politicians.

36.  This was probably a mistake and an unreasonable interference in the Cubans' management of their own affairs.  Controlled contact between the FRD and the troops could have done much to improve the morale and motivation of the troops and make the training job easier.  There was nobody in the Guatemala camp who could answer the political questions of the trainees, who were all volunteers and deserved to know what kind of a future they were preparing to fight for.  Furthermore, the FRD needed a chance to develop the loyalty of the troops who were presumably to install and protect its leaders on Cuban soil as members of a provisional government.

37.  This was one example of a high-handed attitude toward Cubans that became more and more evident as the project progressed.  Cubans were the basic ingredient for a successful operation and, although the aim of having the exiles direct activities was probably idealistic and unattainable, nevertheless the Agency should have been able to organize them for maximum participation and to handle them properly to get  the job done.

An American Operation

38.  But with the Americans running the military effort, running Radio Swan, and doing unilateral recruiting, the operation became purely an American one in the exile Cuban mind, and in the public mind as well.  In by-passing the Cubans the Agency was weakening its own cover.

39.  The official attitude which produced this situation is reflected in the project's progress reports.  In November a report noted that the Agency had "plenty of flexibility to choose the Cuban group we would eventually sanction as a provisional government."  A January report indicated that the Agency, rather than the Cubans, was making the plans and decisions:  "We have charted five different lists of proposed assignments for any future provisional government of Cuba and are compiling biographic data on those Cubans who might be utilized by us in forming a future Cuban government."

40.  The crowning incident which publicly demonstrated the insignificant role of the Cuban leaders and the contempt in which they were held occurred at the time of the invasion.  Isolated in a Miami safe house, "voluntarily" but under strong persuasion, the Revolutionary Council members awaited the outcome of a military operation which they had not planned and knew little about while Agency-written bulletins were issued to the world in their name.

41.  They had not been puppets in the early days of the project.  Some of the Cubans had drawn up detailed operational plans for resistance in areas of Cuba that they knew intimately; others provided cover and support.  One wealthy exile even voluntarily went through the assessment routine at Useppa Island along with the young trainees.  They had reason to feel that the project was in the nature of a joint venture, at least.

The Military Emphasis

42.  But when the project began to shift from a clandestine operation to a military operation, Cuban advice and participation no longer seemed necessary.  Cubans who up to about November 1960 had been close to some of the plans and operations were cut out.  To the military officers on loan to the project, the problem was a military one, and their attitude was "to hell with the Revolutionary Council and the political side."

43.  The paramilitary and the political action sections of WH/4 were not in effective touch with each other; in effect, they treated their tasks as unrelated, and this was reflected in the field.  The diminished relationships with the Cuban leaders were a measure of the extent to which people in the project became carried away by a military operation.

44.  The effective utilization of Cubans and cooperation with them was also hampered to some extent because many of the project officers had never been to Cuba, did not speak Spanish, and made judgments of the Cubans on very slim knowledge.  (A notable exception was the propaganda section, which was well qualified in this respect.)  They considered the Cubans untrustworthy and difficult to work with.  Members of the Revolutionary Council have been described to the inspectors as "idiots" and members of the brigade as "yellow-bellied."

45.  However, many staff employees in the project realized that the Cubans would have to be dealt with realistically and allowances made for their differences and weaknesses.  In some instances, case officers achieved quite remarkable rapport with the Cubans they were handling.  These officers were ones who had had considerable experience in dealing with foreign nationals in various parts of the world, and the results showed it.

Dealing with Cubans

46.  Some military officers on loan to the project were less successful in dealing with Cubans.  They simply gave military orders to these foreign nationals and expected to be obeyed.

47.  Some of the contract employees, such as ships' officers, treated the Cubans like dirt.  This led to revolts, mutinies, and other troubles.  Some very able Cubans withdrew from the project because of the way they were treated.

48.  The inspecting team has received a definite impression that this operation took on a life of its own, that a number of the people involved became so wrapped up in the operation as such that they lost sight of ultimate goals.

49.  There is a substantial question whether any operation can be truly successful when the attitudes toward the other people are so unfavorable.  There does not seem to be much excuse for not being able to work with Cubans.  If this nationality is so difficult, how can the Agency possibly succeed with the natives of Black Africa or Southeast Asia?

50.  The Agency, and for that matter, the American nation is not likely to win many people away from Communism if the Americans treat other nationals with condescension or contempt, ignore the contributions and the knowledge which they can bring to bear, and generally treat them as incompetent children whom the Americans are going to rescue for reasons of their own.

J.  CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS -- AIR

1.  The first attempt at a clandestine air drop over Cuba took place on 28 September 1960.  (By coincidence this was the same night as the first maritime operation.)  A 100-man arms pack was dropped for an agent rated as having considerable potential as a resistance leader.  The crew missed the drop zone by seven miles and dropped the weapons on a dam.  Castro forces scooped them up, ringed the area, caught the agent and later shot him.  The airplane got lost on the way back to Guatemala and landed in Mexico.  It is still there.

2.  This operation might have indicated an unpromising future for air drops.  In fact, its failure was influential in persuading the chiefs of the project of the futility of trying to build up an internal resistance organization by clandestine means, and within the next few weeks the operational emphasis was beginning its fateful swing toward the overt strike-force concept.  To this extent the portent of failure was heeded, but it did not suffice either to halt the air drops or to ensure arrangements for their success.  The attempts went on and on with results that were mostly ludicrous or tragic or both.

3.  On 26 December 1960, Headquarters received word that a Cuban agent, who had been given Agency training in this country, wanted an air drop of not more than 1,500 pounds of demolition and sabotage materiel and weapons.  He clearly specified the layout and the location of the drop zone, and also the amounts and kinds of materiel desired.  WH/4 cabled this requirement to the air base in Guatemala, where all the flights originated.  However, the Development Projects Division (DPD) then cabled Guatemala that arms and ammunition would be dropped with food to make a maximum load, also 200 pounds of leaflets for a drop elsewhere.  This cable was not coordinated with WH/4, which sent a message to the agent the following day stating that a cargo drop would take place as requested and that the weight would be 1,500 pounds.

Rice and Beans

4.  A drop was made on 31 December.  The 15-man reception team received, not only 1,500 pounds of materiel which was different from the original request because the specific items could not be packed in waterproof containers in time, but also 800 pounds of beans, 800 pounds of rice and 160 pounds of lard.

5.  This was the only drop to this Cuban agent.  He was so vexed with the drop that he came out of Cuba specifically to make a complaint and to cancel a succeeding drop which had been planned.  He stated that he would not accept another drop, no matter what the cargo was.  He pointed out that the Agency had endangered his safety by dropping cargo which he had not asked for, did not need, and could not handle.  Furthermore, the aircraft had stayed in the vicinity too long, had flown with its landing lights on, had circled around and made numerous U-turns and even dropped propaganda leaflets on his property.  He decided the Agency lacked the professional competence to make clandestine air drops.

6.  This operation was recorded as "successful" by the Agency because cargo was actually delivered to the people it was meant for.  There were four such "successes" in all, out of 30 missions flown up to 21 April 1961.  (The Fiscal Year 1961 budget called for 105 air drops.)  The first of these took place on 30 December after numerous attempts beginning in mid-October.  There were 13 unsuccessful attempts during January and February.  The third success took place on 3 March, when three agents were dropped (previous attempts to drop them had been made on 7 February and 27 February ).  The fourth successful drop was on 29 March.

The Successful Drops

7.  Except for the rice-and-beans drop, the successful drops were all to an agent who had been trained in air reception procedures by staff personnel at Headquarters.

8.  The three cargo drops known to be successful were all made in the Pinar del Rio Province.  In other words, practically all the supplies went to one small area of western Cuba.  Small amounts are thought to have been received in Camaguey and Oriente, but none in Matanzas or Havana.  Ten missions were flown into the Escambray at the request of an agent who had no training in air reception.  Twice the cargo was not dropped because the drop zone was not located, and once the plane turned back because of bad weather.  On the seven occasions cargo was dropped, it was either totally or in large part recovered by the Castro forces.  Three times cargo was dropped blind, three times in the wrong place, and once on the drop zone when the reception committee was not there.

9.  In all, about 151,000 pounds of arms, ammunition and equipment were transported by air.  Not more than 69,000 pounds of this was actually dropped; the rest was returned to base.  Of this 69,000 pounds, at least 46,000 pounds were captured by Castro forces, who recovered all or a large part of ten drops, compared with our agents, who recovered three.  In other words, out of 75 tons which were air-lifted, paramilitary agents actually got about twelve (about enough to arm 300 men, figuring 7,500 pounds to a hundred-man pack).

10.  Except for the one team, there were no clandestine personnel drops made or even attempted during the entire project.

Lack of Procedure

11.  The agents on the ground did not have a standard procedure for air reception (most of them had not been trained).  The location of drop zones were variously and insufficiently described by coordinates, sketches, or azimuths.  In two operations the requesting agents did not even have maps of their areas.  In one of these WH/4 headquarters, DPD and Miami Base each arrived at a different set of coordinates from the reference points given.  In another case the coordinates given for a drop zone were in the ocean.  Reception parties proposed to mark the drop zone with various bizarre and impractical patterns, such as:  two red lights and one white light about 15 feet apart moving clockwise; an arrow 50 meters long with lights at two-meter intervals; lights in the form of a straight line with a sign in the middle lit up with Christmas lights (on this one, the crew at one point mistakenly identified cars on a road as the drop-zone signal); two crosses side by side; a triangle of three lights with a fourth light in the center.  In some areas there were so many small lights in the vicinity that no pattern could be located.  For one drop the agents made four proposals in rapid succession:  no lights, a nine-man cross, a line of five bonfires, a 60-meter line of colored flashlights.

12.  The standard light patterns taught by paramilitary instructors and generally accepted as best, were (a) an "L" of 4 lights; (b) a "T" of 5 lights; and (c) a cross of 6 lights.  All lights should be 15 to 25 yards apart, with one light different from the others.

13.  The Cuban air crews must share the blame for the failures, as must their trainers.  Policy did not allow American observers to go along on the missions to correct the errors.  Pilot discipline was lacking and instructions were not followed in numerous instances.

14.  For example, one air crew, under specific orders to abort the mission if the drop zone was missed on the initial run and not to search for it or circle around, made four passes four miles away, according to the ground report (which added, "Pilots drunk or crazy.").

15.  Another crew commander, under orders not to drop unless the T pattern was positively identified, elected to drop without seeing the T because he had a "positive feeling" that he was over the drop zone.  Another aircraft remained in the drop zone area 41 minutes before dropping cargo.

Headquarters Direction

16.  The Headquarters direction of these air drops left much to be desired.  DPD, which controlled the crews and planes, never had a representative physically assigned to WH/4, and the two activities were operating in a divided command situation on the basis of mutual cooperation rather than generally accepted management practice and military command principles.

17.  Daily consultation proved impossible although there was a requirement of it.  There was trouble on cover stories, on funding, on security, and on cables, among other things.  It was difficult to determine where the responsibilities of one component ended and those of the other began.

18.  The WH/4 paramilitary chief recommended that the DPD unit be assigned to the chief of the task force for integration within his staff.  But no action was ever taken, and the situation remained as described for the duration of the project.

19.  WH/4 and DPD did not even agree on doctrine and techniques.  In addition, all flight plans had to be personally reviewed and approved by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) and by the 5412 Special Group.  The requests for air drops came from Cuba by radio, secret writing or telephone to Miami and then were forwarded to WH/4 headquarters, which then put in an operational request to DPD, which in turn directed the Guatemala air base to mount the flight after approval had been given by DDCI.  DPD could and did release its own cables, without coordination.

20.  This cumbersome system was complicated even more by the scarcity of agent radio operators inside Cuba.  Some of the arrangements had to be made by secret writing, which was not only slow but contributed to misunderstanding.  Necessary last-minute changes of plan by the reception groups or air crews could not be communicated to each other.

Example of Confusion

21.  The drop finally accomplished on 30 December is an outstanding example of the confusion that prevailed.

22.  WH/4 informed Havana that the drop would be made from 400 feet.  DPD told the Guatemala base that the drop would be at 1,000 feet.  Guatemala, on the other hand, felt that 600 feet would be best.  WH/4 informed the agents that the aircraft definitely would make only one pass over the drop zone.  But DPD authorized one 360° turn in order to make the drop good if the drop zone was not located on the initial run.  (Actually, the crew made three passes.)  This drop then failed (on 5 December) because the reception group understood that the plane would make only one pass, and turned off the lights when the plane came back for a second try.  There was also confusion over the time of the drop and the number of bundles.  The difficulties in arriving at an understanding among all parties concerned were so great that this operation, first planned for 22 October, was re-scheduled for 13 November, run on 5 December without dropping, then scheduled for 19 December.  Then this had to be changed to 25 December and finally to 30 December.

23.  For another operation WH/4 told Guatemala that the cargo should weigh 6,000 pounds, but DPD told Guatemala it could not be more than 4,000 or 5,000 pounds.  The DPD message was not coordinated with SH/4, as Guatemala then pointed out.

24.  Some of the techniques used by DPD were highly questionable.  In one instance DPD told Guatemala that in the event the drop-zone lights were not seen by the crew the pilot should nevertheless drop his cargo on the drop zone as determined by dead reckoning.  As it turned out, the reception group had dispersed after an encounter with a Cuban army patrol and was unable to be at the drop zone.  The Castro forces then picked up at least half of the bundles dropped.

Supplies for Castro

25.  In another case 1,600 pounds of food and materiel were dropped blind (in the dark of the moon) on each of four hilltops to a group which was known to be in such a precarious position that it was not able to stay in place long enough to lay out a drop zone.  Again, the Castro forces got most of the load.

26.  In still another, DPD told Guatemala that turns were allowed if the plane was not lined up on the initial run over the drop zone.  The agents reported that the plane passed over twice without dropping and that this alerted the Castro army to attack the resistance group and to disperse it.

27.  Once two planes were sent over the drop zone half an hour apart and allowed to make two passes each.  Not surprisingly, 200 militia searched the area the next day and seized the cargo.  The drop altitude for another operation was set at 4,000 feet.  The pilot reported he had hit the drop zone from 3,500 feet, even though unable to recognize the marker, but there is evidence that the enemy got at least half the drop.

28.  One aircraft received heavy fire and was damaged.  Its crew thus learned the hard way that dropping leaflets first had helped to alert the area and recommended that in the future the cargo be dropped first.  Miami Base pointed out to Headquarters that it was a mistake to drop heavy weapons before a group had a known capability of using them or had specifically requested them.

29.  For a long time the results of the drops, as reported by the ground elements, were not forwarded to the air crews, who got no critiques but continued to report successes when in fact they were missing the drop zone by many kilometers.

Handling an Emergency

30.  The handling of an emergency also left something to be desired.  One of the planes had to land in Jamaica.  The commander's phone call to an emergency number in Guatemala produced the reply, "Never heard of you."  _____ first heard of this landing from _____, who had assumed (wrongly) that _____ had been advised by Headquarters.

31.  In January 1961 Division D of the Agency's FI Staff made a study which raised pertinent questions about the air drops.  The project's paramilitary staff made a study in March and concluded that the Cuban crews did not have sufficient experience or supervised training in clandestine paramilitary air operations to meet the project objectives and that they were too undisciplined to obey instructions or to make correct reports.  This study recommended that contract American aircraft commanders be used, but it did not receive the approval of the paramilitary chief and went no further.

32.  DPD also made an analysis in March and recommended certain overdue corrective action such as obtaining agent reports of drop results for prompt dispatch to the air base in Guatemala, critiques for each mission regarding compliance with instructions, elimination of blind drops, and better identification of drop zones.  DPD cabled Guatemala on 7 March that an analysis of the mission results to date would be forwarded shortly to be used as a basis for refinement of tactics and improvement of coordination with the reception teams.  And at the end of March a check pilot was included for the first time in a mission crew.  He noted discrepancies in pilot procedure and crew coordination.

Tardy Corrective Action

33.  These corrective actions came too late.  The seeming inability to support resistance elements augmented the growing reliance being placed on the idea of an amphibious strike force to accomplish the objective; then, as the strike idea took over more and more, interest in clandestine drops decreased among officers in charge of the project.  On or about 28 March a policy decision was made that there would be no more clandestine drops until after the amphibious assault.  Inasmuch as the WH/4 case officers handling these drops were not informed as to the strike plan or the date, this posed a problem for them because 19 drops to specific drop zones were requested between 22 March and 19 April, and it was necessary to stall off the requests with such messages as:

"Don't give up hope.  We'll drop as soon as we can."

"Regret unable mount BERTA.  Definitely planning support your operation.  Beg you understand our problems."

But the agents had their own problems during this time:

Unjust to delay operation so much ... This is not a game."

"How Long will I have to wait for the drop.  The lives of peasants and students depend on you."

"Dear Allies:  Arms urgent.  We made a commitment.  We have complied.  You have not.  If you have decided to abandon us, answer."

"We are risking hundreds of peasant families.  If you cannot supply us we will have to ... demobilize.  Your responsibility.  We thought you were since."

"All groups demoralized ... They consider themselves deceived because of failure of shipment of arms and money according to promise."

Perhaps the situation was best summed up by this agent message:

"Impossible to fight ... Either the drops increase or we die ... Men without arms or equipment.  God help us."

34.  The Inspector General reluctantly concludes that the agent who was showered with rice and beans was entirely correct in his finding that the Agency showed no professional competence in its attempts at clandestine air drops into Cuba.  Furthermore, these attempts in their over-all effect probably hurt the resistance more than they helped.

K.  CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS -- MARITIME

1.  WH/4 Branch had two separate maritime problems.  It needed to transport men and supplies clandestinely to the coast of Cuba by small boats, and it needed ships to transport and support an amphibious landing of a military force, more or less overtly.  This section of the report will be mostly concerned with small boat operations.

2.  The WH Division had no assets in being; there was no Agency element comparable to DPD to call on; and for obscure reasons the Navy was not asked to provide the help it might have.  WH/4 had to start with nothing; there seemed to be very little maritime know-how within the Agency.

3.  The original operational plan called for building up a substantial resistance organization, which could be done only if supplies and people were delivered to the right places.  During the critical period March-December 1960, WH/4 had one boat, the "Metusa Time," a 54-foot pleasure cruiser which was lent to the Agency by6 a friend.  Two maritime operations officers, more or less under deep cover, labored from March to October to outfit this boat and train its crew.

4.  The boat went on its first mission on 28 September, offloading 300 pounds of cargo and picking up two exfiltrees.  By January it had made five additional trips and transported about five tons, but only one infiltree.  It had another successful operation in March 1961 and another in April.

_______ Boats

5.  In November and December there were six other successful small boat operations conducted with boats owned by various Cubans.  The arrangements were made by individual case officers at Miami (there being no maritime section) and mainly in response to requests by the owners.  No memoranda of understanding were made and the agreements as to supporting, equipping, and funding these Cuban boats were exceedingly loose, thus causing many problems later.

6.  A Cuban would say, "Give me a tank of gas and a machine gun, and you can use our boat and we will help run it."  After the operation he was likely to come back and say that the boat needed all sorts of equipment which had been damaged by the operation, and many claims were built up in this way.

7.  Although more than twenty of these boats were offered to case officers, most of them were too small and too limited in range to be of much use.  Furthermore, the bad weather which lasted from december into March made small boat operations impossible at a time when they were badly needed.  In January 1961 there was not a single successful operation.

_____ Boats

8.  By December the need for some ______ boats was becoming obvious.  The "Sea Gull" (see below) was picked up by Headquarters about this time.  It turned out to be a complete "lemon;" one of the most experienced employees in small boats spent most of his time from December to June trying to get it to run, and it never did participate in an infiltration or exfiltration operation.  Also, about December a 75-foot yacht, the "Wasp," ______.  It had a 17-knot speed and a 600-mile range and ran its first successful mission on 15 February.

9.  About February the "Tejana" also became operational.  This was a 110-foot yacht which became available through a Cuban contact of a case officer.  The arrangements made by the case officer with the Cuban owner were so vague that payment of bills incurred was a continuing problem.  However, the "Tejana," in four operations in March, infiltrated 19,000 pounds, as compared with 12,700 pounds which had been infiltrated from September up to February by all available boats.

10.  The statistics compiled by WH/4 and by Miami Base on the small boat operations are somewhat confused and inconsistent.  However, the general picture is clear.  The small boat operations succeeded in getting about 76 people into Cuba clandestinely.  Most of these were taken in during March.  Up to the middle of February only ten had been successfully infiltrated by this means, the first being in mid-November.

11.  In the matter of arms, ammunition and other supplies to the resistance, the boat operations were not an outstanding success.  From September to the time of the strike about 70,000 pounds were successfully infiltrated.  This was about three times as much as was put in by air drops.  The total amount of supplies put into Cuba by air and boat operations amounted to about 93,000 pounds (46-1/2 tons); this would be about enough to equip 1,250 men.

Limited Area

12.  There was one successful boat operation in September; two in October; three in November; six in December, none in January; six in February; thirteen in March; and two in April.  Up to February only six and a half tons were sent in.

13.  One should not get the idea that these supplies were uniformly distributed throughout Cuba.  Most of them were placed in one small area, the north coast of Cuba close to Havana.  The small boats did not have the range to go farther.

14.  In almost all cases the supplies were transferred to a Cuban boat or an offshore key rather than deposited on the shores of Cuba itself.  In the fall, boat operations were restricted by policy to offshore rendezvous.  By January Miami had begun to plan beach landing operations as a means of overcoming the unreliability of Cuban-based boats.  At this time Miami Base did not even have aerial photos of the north coast of Cuba.

15.  Of the 33 missions rated as successful only 27 could be considered entirely so since the cargo on the other operations was later recovered by the Castro government or the success was only partial.  The reception committees did not seem to have had much training in maritime reception procedures.

16.  In sum, a small amount of materiel was put into the Havana area in the period September -December by some ill-suited small boats.  Then by using the "Wasp and the "Tejana" a substantially larger amount of supplies was put in during February and March as well as some people, but to a limited area only.  At this point the "Barbara J" and the "Blagar" (former LCIs) were used because of their longer range and larger size; however, for various reason they were also unsuccessful in placing anything on the south coast except at the westernmost part.

Lack of a Plan

17.  Officers who worked on these operations reported that there was no effective project plan for using small boats to deliver men and equipment to forces inside Cuba who were best suited to use them to build up a powerful underground movement against Castro.  According to these officers, WH/4 did not plan small boat operations; the case officers simply responded to requests by individual Cubans and groups.  One officer remarked that the Cubans were running the operations.

18.  Of all the attempts made to land men and supplies in Cuba clandestinely by water some of the most notable were made by the "Barbara J," a surplus LCI which the Agency bought in October 1960.  It was intended that this craft would serve as a mother ship for small boat operations and also provide a long-range lift capability.

19.  After a shakedown voyage in December, featured by a mutiny, the ship was scheduled for clandestine maritime infiltration of three paramilitary teams into Cuba.  Initially there was some confusion as to who was running the operation since Miami had been handling small boat operations and had made the rendezvous plans for this one, but Headquarters had responsibility for the "Barbara J."  WH/4 then sent the chief of its maritime section to Miami to coordinate, to brief the captain, and to dispatch the boat on its mission on 16 January.

20.  The "Barbara J" put into Vieques Island on 31 January 1961 after having been unsuccessful in putting anybody ashore in Cuba.  The crew's morale continued to deteriorate.  Some refused to take direct orders, attempts to discipline the men were ineffective, the engineers refused to stand watch, and all of the crew wanted to return to Miami and resign.  Also, nine of the ten agents did not wish to stay on the ship for another mission.

A Sit-down Strike

21.  On 4 February the "Barbara J" sailed from Vieques for a rendezvous on the south coast of Cuba, 24 crew members having been left on a Vieques beach, where they staged a sit-down and a hunger strike.  On 9 February the "Barbara J" reported that the contact had not shown up at the rendezvous point.

22.  After trying again on 10 February, the captain of the "Barbara J" cabled:  "Take a message to Garcia:  The reluctant heroes in fishing boat again conspicuous by their absence."  On 11 February he sent another odd cable:  "Last message to Garcia:  Your fishing boat still manifesting extreme shyness.  Suggest next operation send in varsity."  On 13 February he sent:  "Cruised without making contact.  Picked up small target on radar, tracked it down, and scared hell out of some fishermen who wanted no part of us."

23.  The case officer and the team leaders had a different story.  They stated that when the "Barbara J" arrived at the rendezvous point it was approached by a small boat that came at the right time and gave the correct signals, but that as the boat came alongside the captain of the "Barbara J" ordered two floodlights turned on the boat which apparently scared it away.  On 18 February the reception party sent a message that their boat had been at the right place at the right time and that a patrol boat had showed up.  The "Barbara J" arrived at _____ on 14 February without having received arrival instructions.  On 15 February Miami sent a message saying that it was setting up facilities at Key West to receive the "Barbara J."  Upon landing in Key West the ten paramilitary agents, having been on this trip for a month after spending two months in a safe house, were ready to resign and it took a considerable amount of persuasion to get them to stay with the program.  They were then sent to New Orleans for holding.

Earning a Citation

24.  Several officers who were associated with the captain of the "Barbara J," a contract employee acquired from Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), have testified to his drinking on duty, his bullying the Cubans, and his disregard for security.  Drew Pearson wrote about the drunken American LCI skipper who scared away Cuban underground leaders with his ship's floodlights, and who threatened to abandon a sabotage team.  On 21 March the project's paramilitary chief relieved the captain of his command and requested that he be terminated.  However, the captain was retained on duty and eventually received full pay and a bonus for a six-month contract period in the amount of $14,698.

25.  WH/4 Branch initiated action to get the captain commended by his parent service for outstanding performance.  In July 1961 he was cited "for completing an assignment involving extreme hazards in an outstanding manner, and displaying exceptional skill and courage" and given the Navy Superior Civilian Service Award -- the highest honorary civilian award within the authority of the MSTS commander.

26.  The branch had never taken action either to clear him or to convict him of serious charges, and the high commendation he received casts doubt not only on the validity of other WH/4 recommendations for merit citations but also on the quality of personnel management in the project.

Peculiar Organization

27.  The organization for controlling clandestine maritime operations was peculiar.  The forward operating base in Miami had the responsibility for small boat operations but could not run any without Headquarters approval.  It was seldom that Headquarters had any query or refused to give approval.

28.  But the Miami Base did not have the equipment and experience that were needed.  For a long time the docking facilities were inadequate.  The desirability of having a base at Key West was recognized as early as November 1960, but this base was not established until mid-February.  It was insufficiently staffed and had a great many cover, security and administrative problems on which it received little assistance.  At first it was under the direction of the Miami paramilitary section; eventually it was placed under the chief of the Miami Base.

29.  The small staff at Key West not only supported small boat operations; it also had to take whatever action was necessary when disabled black flights came in to the local Naval air station since DPD had no representative in the area.  Each unsuccessful maritime operation doubled the work.  Boats coming back to a safe haven loaded with arms and explosives, usually crewed by Cubans and sometimes disabled in various ways, had to be unloaded again by whoever was available among paramilitary case officers and security and support people.  A few staff employees worked almost around the clock for a month loading and unloading cargo without benefit of even a forklift.  Many tons were so handled.

30.  It is clear that there was no over-all policy in regard to the small boats.  There was no clear directive as to whether to acquire short-range, speedy boats or long-range, slower boats; whether to use fishing craft and crews or special-purpose boats built specifically for our use.  There was no policy on the use of a mother craft.  There was no control over the amount of money spent on these small boats and their outfitting.

The Maritime Unit

31.  WH/4 Headquarters had a staff employee whose job was small boat coordinator.  This meant, in effect, checking proposed operations with the intelligence section, extending approvals and keeping records.  WH/4 also had a separate maritime unit which handled the technical side of the small boats, approved funds for them, and arranged for personnel for them, but had nothing to do with their operations.

32.  This maritime unit also had the responsibility for acquiring and fitting out the larger ships such as the "Barbara J," the "Blagar," the three LCUs and the ships used in the strike.  This unit also had the responsibility for training underwater demolition teams, directing raiding operations, and overseeing the Vieques Base.

33.  The lack of equipment, the shortage of experienced personnel, the press of time and the problems of coordination are shown by the experience which the maritime unit had with the acquisition and outfitting of the LCIs and the LCUs.  The press of time hardly allowed for advertising for specific types of craft or soliciting competitive bids.  The two LCIs (the "Barbara J" and the "Blagar") were purchased from a private corporation in Miami for $70,000.  About $253,000 was then spent in modifying, repairing and outfitting them.

34.  This work, which extended over a period of several months, was directed by officers from Headquarters during short temporary duty tours in the Miami area.  The day-to-day supervision of the work was under several Navy chief petty officers (borrowed from the Agency's Office of Training) who had no contact with Miami Base, no authority to spend money or give orders, and no channel to procure parts and equipment.  The technical and training abilities of these Navy chiefs were grossly misused by the project; much of their time was spent at stevedore or deckhand labor.

Training on LCUs

35.  _____, three LCUs were bought directly from the Navy in September 1960 at $125,000 each.  Supposedly in operating condition, these craft had been stripped and were in such bad shape that they could hardly be moved from the dock.  The dozen or so Agency employees who went to Little Creek to get them into operational condition were so busy with repairs that there was little time left for learnign how to operate the craft, even though some members of the group were not familiar with LCUs, the engineers did not all know engineering and the skippers did not all know navigation.  This group got the LCUs to Vieques Island somehow and proceeded to train the Cuban crews, which, however, were given no training in night landing and very little in navigation.

36.  In all, about $1,400,000 was spent on boats and ships, and the total cost of the maritime phases of the project was about $2,679,000.  Wages were a considerable item.  For example, ship's masters on contract were budgeted at $2,500 a month, cooks at $1,000.  There seemed to be a general failure at the top to realize how much boats cost to run and to keep in repair.  The arrangement whereby officers in Headquarters tried to control the expenditures being made in Florida to repair and operate boats which were urgently needed was highly impractical.  The high cost of boats in this project is well illustrated by the dismal case of the "Sea Gull."

Case of the "Sea Gull"

37.  _____.  It had previously been used to service offshore oil-drilling rigs and was estimated to have a fair market value of $74,500.

38.  The request for approval _____ was signed for the chief of the project by a special assistant in the FI section (acting for the acting chief!) and approved by the Deputy Chief of WH Division (acting for his chief).  It was _____ christened the "Sea Gull" and transported to Miami, where it broke down 500 yards from the pier on its first trial run.  On 6 January 1961 it was estimated that repairs and modifications would cost $10,000; by 30 January, the estimate had grown to $32,000; by 22 February, to $40,000, and on 24 February, the shipyard doing the work submitted a bill for $65,000!   In all, the "Sea Gull" cost:

39.  The "Sea Gull" was not ready to be used until the last week of March; at this time it was commandeered (along with the "Wasp") by a headquarters unit which was staging a deception operation in connection with the amphibious strike, over the strong protests of Miami Base, which never got to use the boat on an infiltration operation.

40.  The lack of qualified personnel, the confusion of responsibility, the lack of planning, and the skyrocketing costs in the maritime activity led to a high-level request for the assignment of a qualified senior Naval officer to the project.  When a captain reported, no one seemed to know what to do with him and, after he briefly visited Miami and Key West bases, he was assigned to the naval side of the strike planning at Headquarters.  He is reported to have been not entirely happy with his brief Agency tour.  In any event he was another example of poor handling of people in this project, and he was not given a chance to solve the problem of maritime operations.

41.  It is apparent that the Agency had very little capability for maritime operations even of a clandestine nature.  It lacked trained personnel, boats, bases, doctrine, and organization.  The employees who worked in this sadly slighted activity were well aware of this, and morale was not high.  As one of them said, "The lowest kind of operations officer is a paramilitary operations officer, and the lowest kind of PM officer is a maritime operations officer."

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