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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE CUBAN OPERATION AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS |
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b. Cuba is in economic difficulties but the Communist Bloc will almost certainly take whatever steps are necessary to forestall any decisive intensification of these troubles. Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the collapse or the significant weakening of the Castro regime. c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained Cuban pilots of known political reliability. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away it will become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open. 3. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT: Cuba will, of course, never present a direct military threat to the United States and it is unlikely that Cuba would attempt open invasion of any other Latin American country since the U.S. could and almost certainly would enter the conflict on the side of the invaded country. Nevertheless, as Castro further stabilizes his regime, obtains more sophisticated weapons, and further trains the militia, Cuba will provide an effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operations and expansion of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Arms, money, organizational and other support can be provided from Cuba to dissident leaders and groups throughout Latin America in order to create political instability, encourage Communism, weaken the prestige of the U.S., and foster the inevitable popular support that Castro's continuance of power will engender. A National Estimate states: "For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. More importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communists with a friendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and with a highly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of the United States." 4. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION: For reasons which require no elaboration the overt use of U.S. military forces to mount an invasion of Cuba has been excluded as a practical alternative. Broadly defined the following three possible alternative courses of action remain for consideration: a. Intensification of economic and political pressures coupled with continued covert support of sabotage and minor guerrilla actions but excluding substantial commitment of the Cuban opposition's paramilitary force. b. Employment of the paramilitary force but in a manner which would not have the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside. c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose. These alternatives are discussed in the following paragraphs. 5. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE: There is little that can be done to impose real political and economic pressure on the Castro regime and no such course of action now under serious consideration seems likely to bring about its overthrow. a. A true blockade of Cuba enforced by the United States would involve technical acts of war and has now been dismissed as infeasible. b. Action to halt arms shipments from Cuba into any other part of the hemisphere would be cumbersome and easily evaded if air transport were employed. While undoubtedly of some value it is difficult to see that the institution of such measures would either impose severe pressure on the Castro regime or effectively insulate the rest of the hemisphere from it. Castro's principal tools of subversion are people, ideology, the force of example and money. The flow of these items cannot be dammed up. c. Further economic sanctions are theoretically possible but can quite readily be offset by an increase of trade with the Bloc. d. In any event, it is estimated that the prospects for effective international action are poor. 6. THE MIDDLE COURSE: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary force gradually to an assembly point in suitable terrain, hopefully avoiding major encounters in the process and committing it to extensive guerrilla action. This course of action would have the advantage of rending unnecessary a single major landing which could be described as an invasion. The infiltration phase would take on the coloration of efforts by small groups of Cubans to join an already existing resistance movement. Unfortunately, it has been found to be infeasible on military grounds. Basically the reasons (explained more fully in the attachment) are: a. It is considered militarily infeasible to infiltrate in small units a force of this size to a single area where it could assemble, receive supplies, and engage in coordinated military action. Such an operation would have to be done over a period of time and the loss of the element of surprise after initial infiltrations would permit the government forces to frustrate further reinforcements to the same area. b. Military units significantly smaller than the battalion presently undergoing unit training would fall short of the "minimum critical mass" required to given any significant likelihood of success. Smaller scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings of wide-spread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces. c. Actually, the least costly and most efficient way to infiltrate the force into a terrain suitable for protracted and powerful guerrilla operations would be by a single landing of the whole force as currently planned and its retirement from the landing point into the chosen redoubt. 7. A LANDING IN FORCE: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of the plan for a landing by the Cuban opposition. They have concluded that "this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success" (That is of detonating a major and ultimately successful revolt against Castro) and that, if ultimate success is not achieved there is every likelihood that the landing can be the means of establishing in favorable terrain a powerful guerrilla force which could be sustained almost indefinitely. The latter outcome would not be (and need not appear as) a serious defeat. It would be the means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime and would be a continuing demonstration of inability of the regime to establish order. It could create an opportunity for an OAS intervention to impose a cease-fire and hold elections. a. Any evaluation of the chances of success of the assault force should be realistic about the fighting qualities of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia are not fighters by instinct or background and are not militiamen by their own choice. Their training has been slight and they have never been exposed to actual fire (particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack. Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that if the tide shifts against the regime, the chances are strong that substantial numbers will desert or change sides. b. There is no doubt that the paramilitary force would be widely assumed to be U.S. supported. Nevertheless, this conclusion would be difficult to prove and the scale of its activity would not be inconsistent with the potentialities for support by private Cuban and American groups rather than by the U.S. Government. It must be emphasized, moreover, that this enterprise would have nothing in common (as would the use of U.S. military forces) with the Russian suppression of Hungary or the Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. This would be a force of dissident Cubans with Cuban political and military leadership. c. There would be adverse political repercussions to a landing in force but it is not clear how serious these would be. Most Latin American Governments would at least privately approve of unobtrusive U.S. support for such an opposition move, especially if the political coloration of the opposition were left-of-center. The reaction of the rest of the free world, it is estimated, would be minimal in the case of unobtrusive U.S. support for such an attempt. It might produce a good deal of cynicism throughout the world about the U.S. role but if quickly successful little lasting reaction. Generally speaking it is believed that the political cost would be low in the event of a fairly quick success. The political dangers flowing from long continued large scale guerrilla warfare would be greater but there are diplomatic preparations that could be made to forestall extreme adverse reactions in this contingency. 8. DISSOLUTION OF THE MILITARY FORCE: A decision not to use the paramilitary force must consider the problem of dissolution, since its dissolution will surely be the only alternative if it is not used within the next four to six weeks. It is hoped that at least one hundred volunteers could be retained for infiltration in small teams but it is doubtful whether more than this number would be available or useful for this type of activity. a. There is no doubt that dissolution in and of itself will be a blow to U.S. prestige as it will be interpreted in many Latin American countries and elsewhere as evidence of the U.S. inability to take decisive action with regard to Castro. David will again have defeated Goliath. Anti-U.S. regimes like that of Trujillo would gain strength while pro-U.S. Betancourt would undoubtedly suffer. Surely Ydigoras, who has been an exceedingly strong ally, would also be placed in a very difficult position for his support of a disbanded effort. It must be remembered in this connection that there are sectors of Latin American opinion which criticize the U.S. for not dealing sufficiently forcefully with the Castro regime. In fact, one reason why many Latin American governments are holding back in opposing Castro is because they feel that sooner or later the U.S. will be compelled to take strong measures. b. The resettlement of the military force will unavoidably cause practical problems. Its members will be angry, disillusioned and aggressive with the inevitable result that they will provide honey for the press bees and the U.S. will have to face the resulting indignities and embarrassments. Perhaps more important, however, will be the loss of good relations with the opposition Cuban leaders. To date almost all non-Batista, non-Communist political leaders have been encouraged or offered help in fighting Castro. An abandonment of the military force will be considered by them as a withdrawal of all practical support. In view of the breadth of the political spectrum involved, this will cause some difficulties for the future since it is hard to imagine any acceptable post-Castro leadership that will not include some of the exiles dealt with during the past year. 9. CONCLUSIONS: a. Castro's position is daily getting stronger and will soon be consolidated to the point that his overthrow will only be possible by drastic, politically undesirable actions such as an all-out embargo or an overt use of military force. b. A failure to remove Castro by external action will lead in the near future to the elimination of all internal and external Cuban opposition of any effective nature. Moreover, the continuance of the Castro regime will be a substantial victory for the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will use Cuba as a base for increased activity throughout the Western Hemisphere, thereby accentuating political instability and weakening U.S. prestige and influence. c. The Cuban paramilitary force, if used, has a good chance of overthrowing Castro or at the very least causing a damaging civil war without requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt action against Cuba. Whatever embarrassment the alleged (though deniable) U.S. support may cause, it may well be considerably less than that resulting from the continuation of the Castro regime or from the more drastic and more attributable actions necessary to accomplish the result at a later date. d. Even though the best estimate of likely Soviet reaction to a successful movement against Castro indicates problems to the U.S. arising from the removal or substantial weakening of the Castro regime, Soviet propaganda and political moves will still be much less prejudicial to the long-range interests of the U.S. than would the results of a failure to remove Castro. APPENDIX - A A. CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION BY SEA OR SMALL GROUPS (UP TO 50 MEN) 1. The only areas of Cuba with mountainous terrain of sufficient extent and ruggedness for guerrilla operations are the Sierra Escambray of La Villas Province in Central Cuba and the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province at the eastern extremity of the island. The Sierra de les Organos of Western Cuba do not encompass sufficient area and are not rugged enough to sustain guerrilla operations against strong opposition. Of the two areas with adequate terrain, only the Sierra Escambray is truly suitable for our purposes, since the mountains in Eastern Cuba are too distant from air bases in Latin America available to CIA for air logistical support operations. Primary reliance would have to be placed on this method of supply for guerrilla forces. 2. The Government of Cuba (GOC) has concentrated large forces of army and militia in both Las Villas and Oriente Provinces. Estimates of troop strength in Las Villas have varied recently from 17,000 to as high as 60,000 men, while up to 12,000 men are believed to be stationed in Oriente. 3. While of dubious efficiency and morale, the militia, by sheer weight of numbers has been able to surround and eliminate small groups of insurgents. A landing by 27 men of the Masferrer Group in Oriente, for example, was pursued and eliminated by 2,000 militia. A similar group of insurgents in Western Cuba, was attacked and destroyed by six battalions of army and militia (about 3,000 men). 4. A build-up of force in a given area by infiltration of small groups would require a series of night landings in the same general vicinity. Discovery of the initial landing by GOC forces would be almost a certainty, since security posts are located at all possible landing areas. Even if the initial landing were successful, the GOC could be expected to move troops and naval patrol craft to the area making further landings difficult if not impossible. Any small force landed, experience has shown, will be rapidly engaged by forces vastly superior in numbers. Therefore, it is considered unlikely that small groups landing on successive occasions would succeed in joining forces later. A series of surrounded pockets of resistance would be the result. 5. Repeated approaches to the Cuban coast by vessels large enough to land up to 50 men would probably provoke attack by the Cuban Navy and/or Air Force, either of which is capable of destroying any vessels which could be used by CIA for these purposes. 6. In the Sierra Escambray, which is the only area of Cuba in which true guerrilla operations are now being conducted, ill-equipped and untrained groups of up to 200 to 300 men have been hard pressed to survive and have been unable to conduct effective operations. The only worthwhile accomplishment of these bands has been to serve as a symbol of resistance. Smaller groups, even though better trained and equipped, could not be expected to be effective. 7. There are very few sites on the south coast of the Sierra Escambray where small boats can be landed. These are found principally at the mouths of rivers and are all guarded by militia posts armed with machine guns. A small group landing at such a point by shuttling from a larger vessel in small boats would probably receive heavy casualties. 8. Small-scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings and widespread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces. These conditions must be produced before the Castro Government can be overthrown by any means short of overt intervention by United States armed forces.. As long as the armed forces respond to Castro's orders, he can maintain himself in power indefinitely. The history of all police-type states bears out this conclusion. 9. The CIA Cuban Assault Force, composed entirely of volunteers, has been trained for action as a compact, heavily armed, hard-hitting military unit, and the troops are aware of the combat power which they possess as a unit. They have been indoctrinated in the military principle of mass and instructed that dispersion of force lends to defeat in detail. They will be quick to recognize the disadvantages of the infiltration concept, and it is unlikely that all would volunteer for piecemeal commitment to military action in Cuba. The troops can be used in combat only on a voluntary basis. The Government of the United States exercises no legal command or disciplinary authority over them. CONCLUSIONS: 1. This course of action would result in large scale loss of life, both through military action against forces vastly superior in numbers and as a result of drum-head justice and firing squad execution of those captured. 2. This alternative could achieve no effective military or psychological results. COPY 11 March 61 PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA 1. Status of Preparatory Action: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion: the organization of a broadly-based opposition to the Castro regime; a major propaganda campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers. A decision should shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment or disposition of assets that have been created. The status of the more important activities is as follows: a. Political: Over a period of nearly a year, the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democratico), which was created in the hope that it would become the organizational embodiment of a unified opposition to Castro, has proved to be highly useful as a cover and administrative mechanism but important political elements refused to join it. Accordingly, a major effort was undertaken three weeks ago to form a more broadly-based revolutionary council which would include the FRD, and which could lead to the setting up of a provisional government. Considerable progress has been made in negotiations with the principal Cuban leaders in which great efforts have been made to permit the Cubans to chart their own course. It is expected that the desired result will be accomplished shortly. What is emerging from these negotiations is a provisional government with a center to left-of-center political orientation, and a political platform embodying most of the originally stated goals of the 26 July movement. It is believed that this will command the support of a very large majority of anti-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the more conservative groups. b. Military: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness. (1) A reinforced battalion with a present strength of 850 which will be brought up to a strength of approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more infantry company to be used primarily for logistic purposes and as a reserve. (2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment of the battalion. (3) An airforce of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C-54s and 5 C-46s. (4) Shipping including 2 100-ton ships, 5 1500-ton ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCOs and 4 LCVPs. A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above. c. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to have them remain in the country beyond early April. The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult. 2. The Situation in Cuba: We estimate that time is against us. The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In the absence of greatly increased external pressure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective. a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up. b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. It is making good use of the militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed. c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a more sizeable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles. 3. Possible Courses of Action: Four alternative courses of action involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are: a. Employment of the paramilitary force in a manner which would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside. b. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing with tactical air support, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose. c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two successive operations: First, the landing of one company without air support in a remote area in which it could sustain itself for some days (hopefully indefinitely), and second, the landing of the main force forty-eight hours later in a widely different location in the same manner as in paragraph 3.b. above. d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible region where it would be expected to keep control of a beachhead for a long period of time to permit installation and recognition of a provisional government and a gradual build-up of military strength. 4. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks. a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced in amphibious operations.) b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar, 75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial ammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualties could not be evacuated. c. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact. 5. A Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for at least non-governmental logistic support. a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be be repulsed with substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and the display of professional competence and of determination on the part of the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessful in thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the contiguous mountain area and continue operations as a powerful guerrilla force. b. This course of action has a better chance than any other of leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime because it holds the possibility of administering a demoralizing shock. c. If this operation were not successful in setting off widespread revolt, freedom of action of the U.S. would be preserved because there is an alternative outcome which would neither require U.S. intervention nor constitute a serious defeat; i.e., guerrilla action could be continued on a sizeable scale in favorable terrain. This would be a means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime. 6. A Diversionary Landing: As a variant of the above plan, it would be feasible to conduct a diversionary landing with a force of about 160 men in an inaccessible area as a prelude to a landing of the main assault force. The initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. At least a part of the provisional government would go in with the diversionary landing and presumably the establishment of the provisional government on Cuban soil would thereupon be announced. The subsequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined in paragraph 5 preceding. a. This course of action might have certain political advantages in that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could plausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help. b. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary landing would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack thus enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit. 7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U.S. after a decent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead. a. A major political advantage of this course of action would be that the initial assault might be conducted in such a way as to involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of professional military organization than the landing in force discussed above, especially so as there is every likelihood that the initial landing would be virtually unopposed by land forces. Recognition could provide a suitable political and legal basis for a protracted build-up after the initial assault. b. Such an operation would, however, require tactical air support sufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Air Force. If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could include seizure of an air strip, the necessary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. There is, however, no location which both contains a useable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land as to permit protection of a slow build-up. c. This type of operation by the very fact of being clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or three. 8. Conclusions: a. The Castro regime will not fall of its own weight. In the absence of external action against it, the gradual weakening of internal Cuban opposition must be expected. b. Within a matter of months the capabilities of Castro's military forces will probably increase to such a degree that the overthrow of his regime, from within or without the country, by the Cuban opposition will be most unlikely. c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has a good chance of overthrowing Castro, or of causing a damaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to overt action against Cuba. d. Among the alternative course of action here reviewed, an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing offers the best chance of achieving the desired result. DD/P:RMB:djm:bp&gb 15 March 1961 REVISED CUBAN OPERATION 1. Political Requirements: The plan for a Cuban operation and the variants thereof presented on 11 March were considered to be politically objectionable on the ground that the contemplated operation would not have the appearance of an infiltration of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution but rather that of a small-scale World War II type of amphibious assault. In undertaking to develop alternative plans and to judge their political acceptability, it has been necessary to infer from the comments made on the earlier plan the characteristics which a new plan should possess in order to be politically acceptable. They would appear to be the following: a. An Unspectacular Landing: The initial landing should be as unspectacular as possible and should have neither immediately prior nor concurrent tactical air support. It should conform as closely as possible to the typical pattern of the landings of small groups intended to establish themselves or to join others in terrain suited for guerrilla operations. In the absence of air support and in order to fit the pattern, it should probably be at night. TS #176622 b. A Base for Tactical Air Operations: It was emphasized that ultimate success of the operation will require tactical air operations leading to the establishment of the control of the air over Cuba. In order to fit the pattern of revolution, these operations should be conducted from an air base within territory held by opposition forces. Since it is impracticable to undertake construction of an air base in the rainy season and before any air support is available, the territory seized in the original landing must include an air strip that can support tactical operations. c. Slower Tempo: The operation should be so designed that there could be an appreciable period of build up after the initial landing before major offensive action was undertaken. This would allow for a minimum decent interval between the establishment and the recognition by the U.S. of a provisional government and would fit more closely the pattern of a typical revolution. d. Guerrilla Warfare Alternative: Ideally, the terrain should not only be protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attack from land but also suitable for guerrilla warfare in the event that an organized perimeter could not be held. 2. Alternative Areas: Five different areas, three of them on the mainland of Cuba and two on islands off the coast, were studied carefully to determine whether they would permit an TS #176622 operation fitting the above conditions. One of the areas appears to be eminently suited for the operation. All the others had to be rejected either because of unfavorable geography (notably the absence of a suitable air strip) or heavy concentrations of enemy forces, or both. The area selected is located at the head of a well protected deep water estuary on the south coast of Cuba. It is almost surrounded by swamps impenetrable to infantry in any numbers and entirely impenetrable to vehicles, except along two narrow and easily defended approaches. Although strategically isolated by these terrain features, the area is near the center of the island and the presence of an opposition force there will soon become known to the entire population of Cuba and constitute a serious threat to the regime. The beachhead area contains one and possibly two air strips adequate to handle B-26's. There are several good landing beaches. It is of interest that this area has been the scene of resistance activities and of outright guerrilla warfare for over a hundred years. 3. Phases of the Operation: a. The operation will begin with a night landing. There are no known enemy forces (even police) in the objective area and it is anticipated that the landing can be carried out with few if any casualties and with no serious TS #176622 combat. As many supplies as possible will be unloaded over the beaches but the ships will put to sea in time to be well offshore by dawn. The whole beachhead area including the air strips will be immediately occupied and approach routes defended. No tanks will be brought ashore in the initial landing. It is believed that this operation can be accomplished quite unobtrusively and that the Castro regime will have little idea of the size of the force involved. b. The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro Air Force. Concurrently C-46's will move in with gas in drums, minimal maintenance equipment, and maintenance personnel. As rapidly as possible, the whole tactical air operation will be based in the beachhead but initially only enough aircraft will be based there plausibly to account for all observable activity over the island. c. In the third phase, as soon as there is adequate protection for shipping from enemy air attack, ships will move back into the beach to discharge supplies and equipment (including tanks). It must be presumed that counter TS #176622 attacks against the beachhead will be undertaken within 24 to 48 hours of the landing but the perimeter can easily be held against attacks along the most direct approach routes. The terrain may well prevent any sizeable attacks (providing the enemy air force has been rendered ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to attempt to break out of the beachhead. d. The timing and direction of such offensive action will depend upon the course of events in the island. At least three directions of break out are possible. Because of the canalization of the approaches to the beachhead from the interior, a break out will require close support by tactical air to be successful unless enemy forces are thoroughly disorganized. The opposition force will have the option, however, of undertaking an amphibious assault with tactical air support against a different objective area if it should seem desirable. 4. Political Action: The beachhead area proposed to be occupied is both large enough and safe enough so that it should be entirely feasible to install the provisional government there as soon as aircraft can land safely. Once installed, the tempo of the operation will permit the U.S. Government to extend TS #176622 recognition after a decent interval and thus to prepare the way for more open and more extensive logistical support if this should be necessary. 5. Military Advantages: a. This is a safer military operation than the daylight landing in force originally proposed. The landing itself is more likely to be unopposed or very lightly opposed and the beachhead perimeter could be more easily held. b. There are no known communications facilities in the immediate target area. This circumstance, coupled with the plan for a night landing, increases the chance of achieving surprise. c. By comparison with any of the known inaccessible parts of the Oriente Province the objective area is closer to rear bases for air and sea logistical support. d. The plan has the disadvantage that the build up of force can be only gradual since there is virtually no local population from which to recruit additional troops and volunteers from other parts of Cuba will be able to infiltrate into the area only gradually. 6. Political Acceptability: The proposal here outlined fits the three conditions stated in paragraph 1 above for the political acceptability of a paramilitary operation. The landing TS #176622 is unspectacular; no tactical air support will be provided until an air base of sorts is active within the beachhead area; the tempo of the operation is as desired; and the terrain is such as to minimize the risk of defeat and maximize the options open to the opposition force. a. It may be objected that the undertaking of tactical air operations so promptly after the landing is inconsistent with the pattern of a revolution. But most Latin American revolutions in recent years have used aircraft and it is only natural that they would be used in this case as soon as the opposition had secured control of an air strip. Wherever in the island a paramilitary operation is attempted and whatever its tempo, command of the air will sooner or later have to be established, and aircraft will have to be flown into a beachhead to enable this to be done. Sooner or later, then, it is bound to be revealed that the opposition in Cuba has friends outside who are able and willing to supply it with obsolescent combat aircraft. This revelation will be neither surprising nor out of keeping with traditional practice. b. An alternative way to handle this problem would be to make a few strafing runs against the Castro Air Force some days before the landing and apparently as an opposition act unrelated to any other military moves. TS #176622 7. Conclusion: The operation here outlined, despite the revision of concept to meet the political requirements stated above, will still have a political cost. The study over the past several months of many possible paramilitary operations makes perfectly clear, however, that it is impossible to introduce into Cuba and commit to action military resources that will have a good chance of setting in motion the overthrow of the regime without paying some price in terms of accusations by the Communists and possible criticism by others. It is believed that the plan here outlined goes as far as possible in the direction of minimizing the political cost without impairing its soundness and chance of success as a military operation. The alternative would appear to be the demobilization of the paramilitary force and the return of its members to the United States. It is, of course, well understood that this course of action too involves certain risks. 12 April 1961 CUBAN OPERATION 1. Orientation and Concept: The present concept of the operation being mounted to overthrow Castro is that it should have the appearance of a growing and increasingly effective internal resistance, helped by the activities of defected Cuban aircraft and by the infiltration (over a period of time and at several places) of weapons and small groups of men. External support should appear to be organized and controlled by the Revolutionary Council under Miro Cardona as the successor to a number of separate groups. To support this picture and to minimize emphasis on invasion, the following steps have been taken: a. The public statements of Cardona have emphasized that the overthrow of Castro was the responsibility of the Cubans, that it must be performed mainly by the Cubans in Cuba rather than from outside, and that he and his colleagues are organizing this external support free of control by or official help from the U.S. Government. b. The plans for air operations have been modified to provide for operations on a limited scale on D-2 and again on D-Day itself instead of placing reliance on a larger strike coordinated with the landings on D-Day. c. Shortly after the first air strike on D-2 & B-26 with Cuban pilot will land at Miami airport seeking asylum. He will state that he defected with two other B-26 pilots and aircraft and that they strafed aircraft on the ground before departing. d. A preliminary diversionary landing of true guerrilla type will be made in Oriente Province on D-2. The main D-Day landings will be made by three groups at locations spaced some distance apart on the coast. These will be followed about one week later by a further guerrilla type landing in Pinar del Rio (at the western end of the island). c. Ships carrying the main forces leave the staging base at staggered times. (The first one sailed on Tuesday morning.) They will follow independent courses to a rendezvous for the final run-in. Until nearly dusk on D-1 they would appear to air observation to be pursuing unrelated courses so there will be no appearance of a convoy. f. All the landings will be at night. At least in the first 24 hours, supply activity over the beaches will be at night. There will be no obtrusive "beachhead" to be seen by aircraft. Most troops will be deployed promptly to positions inland. 2. The Time Table of the plan is as follows:
3. Diversion or Cancellation: It would now be infeasible to halt the staging and embarkation of the troops. In the event of a decision to modify the operational plan or to cancel the operation, ships will be diverted at sea, either to Vieques Island or to ports in the U.S. If cancellation is directed, the troops and ships' officers will be told that the reason for the diversion is that all details of the operation, including time and place of intended landings, had been blown to the Castro regime and that under these circumstances the landings would be suicidal. This explanation would be adhered to after the demobilization of the force in the U.S. The U.S. Government could take the position that this enterprise had been undertaken by the Cubans without U.S. Governmental support, that it had failed because of their poor security, and that the U.S. could not refuse to grant asylum to the Cuban volunteers. If by reason of either new intelligence or policy considerations it is necessary to effect a major change in the operational plan, it will be necessary to divert to Vieques Island so that officers of the brigade and ships' captains can be assembled and briefed on the new plan. (The advantages of this location are its security together with the opportunity for the troops to be ashore briefly after some days on board ship.) 4. Naval Protection: The ships carrying the main force will receive unobtrusive Naval protection up to the time they enter Cuban territorial waters. If they are attacked they will be protected by U.S. Naval vessels but following such an intervention they would be escorted to a U.S. port and the force would be demobilized. 5. Defections: Every effort is being made to induce the defection of individuals of military and political significance. At the present time contact has been established by and through Cuban agents and anti-Castro Cuban groups with some thirty-one specific military and police officers, including _____ and the _____ and the _____. An approach is being made to _____. There are, of course, in addition many others rumored to be disaffected but to whom no channel of approach is available. The objective of these efforts is not to induce immediate defections but to prepare the individuals for appropriate action in place after D-Day. 6. Internal Resistance Movements: On the latest estimate there are nearly 7,000 insurgents responsive to some degree of control through agents with whom communications are currently active. About 3,000 of these are in Havana itself, over 2,000 in Oriente, about 700 in Las Villas in central Cuba. For the most part, the individual groups are small and very inadequately armed. Air drops are currently suspended because available aircraft are tied up in the movement of troops from their training area to the staging base. After D-Day when it is hoped that the effectiveness of the Castro air force will be greatly reduced, it is planned to supply these groups by daytime air drops. Every effort will be made to coordinate their operations with those of the landing parties. Efforts will be made also to sabotage or destroy by air attack the microwave links on which Castro's communication system depends. The objective is of course to create a revolutionary situation, initially perhaps in Oriente and Las Villas Provinces, and then spreading to all parts of the island. 7. Propaganda and Communications: Currently medium and short wave broadcasting in opposition to Castro is being carried on from seven stations in addition to Radio Swan. Antennae modifications of the latter have increased its effective power in Cuba and it is believed that there is now good medium wave reception of Swan everywhere except in Havana itself where it can still be effectively jammed. The number of hours of broadcasting per day will be increased beginning immediately from about 25 to almost 75 soon after D-Day. The combination of multiple long and short wave stations which will then be in use, supplemented by three boats which carry broadcasting equipment (two short wave and one medium wave) will assure heavy coverage of all parts of the island virtually at all times. Radio programs will avoid any reference to an invasion but will call for up-rising and will of course announce defections and carry news of all revolutionary action. Soon after D-Day a small radio transmitter will be put in operation on Cuban soil. 8. The Political Leadership: As of the present moment, the six members of Cardona's Revolutionary Council, notably including Ray, have reaffirmed their membership. Although no specific portfolios have been confirmed, the following possibilities are currently under discussion: Varona, Defense; Ray, Gobernacion (Interior); Carrillio, Finance; Hevia, State; Maceo, Public Health. The political leaders have not yet been briefed on the military plan but they will be informed at each phase of military operations. Advance consultation with the political leaders is considered unacceptably dangerous on security grounds and although last minute briefings will be resented, it is believed that the political leaders will want to take credit for and assume control as quickly as possible over these major operations against Castro. The present plan is that one of them (Artime) will go into Cuba with the main force, others will follow as soon as possible after D-Day and they will announce the establishment of a Provisional Government on Cuban soil. 9. Command: Military command will be exercised in the name of the Revolutionary Council and later of the Provisional Government. In fact, however, the CIA staff constitutes the general staff of the operation and the Agency controls both logistics support and communications. Accordingly, in the early stages at least, the functions of a general headquarters will be exercised from the Agency with the Cuban brigade commander exercising field command over the units that land on D-Day. COPY 20 November 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McCone SUBJECT: Survey of the Cuban Operation 1. Presented herewith is a 150-page survey of the Cuban operation, together with the most important basic documents on the operation which are included in the five annexes. In this report we have not attempted to go into an exhaustive step by step inspection of every action in the operation. Nor have we tried to assess individual performance, although our inspection left us with very definite views. Rather, we have tried to find out what went wrong, and why, and to present the facts and conclusions as briefly as possible. This report has been double-spaced for ease in reading. The ten recommendations for corrective action start on page 148. 2. In conducting this survey we reviewed all of the basic files and documents, including all of the material prepared by the Agency for General Maxwell Taylor's Committee, as well as the minutes of that Committee which were made available to us. In addition, we conducted extensive interviews with all of the principal officers on the project from the DD/P on down, and made detailed memoranda for our files on all of these discussions; e.g., my meeting with the top three officers of the Branch reviewing the operation the week after the landing failed is reported in some 70 pages. Thus, while the analysis and conclusions presented herewith regarding the operation are those of the Inspector General, the bases for these conclusions are extensively documented in the files. 3. This, in my opinion, is a fair report even though highly critical. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA's inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency's weaknesses reflected in this report. Consequently, I will make no additional distribution of this report until you indicate whom you wish to have copies. In this connection, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has requested a copy in time for Mr. Coyne to give a brief report on it at their December 9 meeting. I will await your wishes in this regard. /s/ Lyman
Kirkpatrick COPY TS: 173040/Add. 24 November 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Report on the Cuban Operation 1. The report on the Cuban Operation, as is true of all Inspector General reports, was prepared under my personal direction and worked on by myself and my deputy, Mr. David McLean, as well as the three officers who did the principal collecting of information and preparation of the text: Messrs. _____, _____ and _____. The final editing was done by myself personally and the report represents the views of the Inspector General. 2. In preparing the report we had access to all of the material prepared by this Agency and submitted to the Taylor Committee, as well as the minutes of the Taylor Committee meetings, and a chance to see their final conclusions and recommendations. In addition to this we had all of the documentary material available in the WH Division, WH-4, and other staffs and divisions of the Agency who had cognizance of or prepared material for WH-4. These particularly included ONE, OCI and Staff D of the DD/P. 3. As is noted particularly in our report, we did not go outside of the agency in any respect and tried to confine our inspection to only internal agency matters, except where reference had to be made to outside actions that affected the operation. In interviewing persons connected with this operation, we talked initially to three of the top officers in the operation, commencing with Mr. Esterline and Colonel Hawkins, and having our initial lengthy discussions with them within a week of the operation. We interviewed all of the appropriate supervisors in the DD/P, starting with the DD/P himself and including the A/DDP/A, Chief, WH, Chief WH-4, and some 130 other officers and employees directly involved in the operation. We kept extensive notes and material of all of these discussions which are documented in our files. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick cc: DDCI COPY 28 November 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD General Cabell called Mr. Kirkpatrick to state that the fact of the IG's report on Cuba should be restricted on a must-need-to-know basis. No copies other than those that have been distributed to Mr. McCone, Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Colonel King, and Mr. Esterline will be distributed without authority of the DCI or DDCI. This restriction also specifically applies to distribution to the President's Board of Intelligence Advisors, and Mr. Kirkpatrick so informed 27 November. General Cabell has discussed holding this report tightly with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell, and the latter is to pass on the guidance to Colonel King and Mr. Esterline. (Accomplished per report to DDCI 27 November.) /a/ CPC 5. MEMORANDUM FOR THE DCI FROM IG, SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE CUBAN OPERATION; 1 DECEMBER 1961 COPY 1 December 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Report on the Cuban Operation 1. In our conversation on Friday morning, the first of December, you mentioned your concern that the Inspector General's Report on the Cuban Operation, taken alone, might give an erroneous impression as to the extent CIA is responsible for the failure of the operation. In my opinion the failure of the operation should be charged in order to the following factors. a. An over-all lack of recognition on the part of the U.S. Government as to the magnitude of the operation required to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime. b. The failure on the part of the U.S. Government to plan for all contingencies at the time of the Cuban operation including the necessity for using regular U.S. military forces in the event that the exiled Cubans could not do the job themselves. c. The failure on the part of the U.S. Government to be willing to commit to the Cuban operation, as planned and executed, those necessary resources required for its success. /s/ Lyman
Kirkpatrick COPY 15 December 1961 SUBJECT: The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation To comment on the subject report in detail would result in a paper approaching in length, that of the survey itself. Such a commentary would have to deal in depth with the aim of the survey, its scope, and the method used in compiling it. Such a commentary would, at a large number of pages, be required to note inaccuracies, omissions, distortions, unsupported allegations, and many erroneous conclusions. A detailed inquiry on the Cuban operation on elements other than clandestine tradecraft, has already been completed by the group headed by General Taylor. General Taylor's report was based on testimony by all the principal officers involved in the Cuban operation. The Inspector General's report is not based on complete testimony; some of its conclusions are in conflict with General Taylor's conclusions. It is not clear what purpose the Inspector General's report is intended to serve. If it is intended primarily as an evaluation of the Agency's role, it is deficient. Neither Mr. Dulles nor I was consulted in the preparation of the Inspector General's report. As a result, there are many unnecessary inaccuracies. The report tries to do both too much and too little. On the one hand, it attempts to describe the processes of national security policy-making as though this were a process in logical deduction like working problem in geometry. According to the Inspector General's account, firm propositions should be laid down in writing and in advance from which correct conclusions as to proper actions must inevitably be drawn. In this respect the report goes far beyond an analysis of the Agency's role, and it is not accurate. It tries to do too much. On the other hand, the report treats the preparations for the April landings as if these were the only activities directed against Castro and his influence throughout the hemisphere and the world. It chooses to ignore all other facets of the Agency's intelligence collection and covert actions program which preceded, accompanied, and have followed the landings in April of 1961. Thus, it does too little. The report misses objectivity by a wide margin. In unfriendly hands, it can become a weapon unjustifiably to attack the entire mission, organization, and functioning of the Agency. It fails to cite the specific achievements of persons associated with the operation and presents a picture of unmitigated and almost willful bumbling and disaster. In its present form, this is not a useful report for anyone inside or outside the Agency. If complete analysis beyond that already accomplished by General Taylor and his group is still required, then a new kind of report is called for, -- a report with clear terms of reference based on complete testimony. Such a report could concentrate on clandestine tradecraft, an asset for which the Agency remains uniquely responsible. /s/ C.P. Cabell
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