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THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS -- AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1941-1945 |
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[b]APPENDIX A
Easter at Bermuda[/b]
The most intriguing document left by the Bermuda Conference was the transcript of a frank discussion held on Easter Sunday, April 25, by the full American delegation. No British were present. By then the conference had made its decisions; but not until then did the American chairman, Harold Dodds, call in all the American technical experts for a thorough airing of the issues. Finally, George Backer, who was well informed about the extermination and refugee situations, was asked for his views. "We have never seen your comments," said Dodds, "and I would like to have you take the floor and begin from the beginning." For the rest of the morning and through a special evening session, the American delegates for the first time saw beyond the confines of State Department and Foreign Office thinking. [1]
As Backer spoke, a genuine dialogue emerged. Dodds, and to a lesser extent Lucas and Bloom, began to perceive the problem in terms of people rather than bureaucratic processes. For a time, they seemed to search for solutions instead of rationalizations for inaction. [i] At the end of the morning session, Dodds remarked, "I have received a lot of knowledge here this morning." But it came too late. The conference's decisions were not reopened.
Backer exposed the State Department's insistence that the Jewish plight receive no special emphasis as no more than a device for avoiding the extermination issue. He pointed out that the conference's discus sions about non-Jewish refugees had shown that they were already being cared for by Britain or the United States or their own governments. "In so far as this conference is concerned," Backer asserted, "it would never have been necessary to call it" to help non-Jewish refugees.
Because it ruled out all plans for. mass rescue of Jews, Backer continued, the conference had dealt with little more than the 5,000 refugees in Spain. He warned that solving that comparatively small problem would not be enough to keep the conference from being judged a failure. "I would say that at least 125,000 people have got to be taken out of eastern Europe if this Conference is to yield a result." He argued for approaches to the Axis through neutral channels for the removal of at least part of the captive Jews. He was most deeply concerned about the children:
In response, Lucas reverted to the State Department and Foreign Office view, arguing that a large-scale exodus of Jews posed a great danger. He revealed in confidence the British delegation's belief that if approaches to Germany to release Jews were "pressed too much that that is exactly what might happen." Lucas hypothesized that Hitler might use the opportunity to interfere with the Allied war effort by pushing 100,000 Jews across some border or by announcing to the Allies that he would deposit 100,000 at a certain port on a certain day, saying, "You bring your ships and supplies to take 100,000 away on such and such a date." If the United Nations had made approaches for the release of Jews, they would be obligated to find a way to remove and care for them. To do that, declared Lucas, "you would have to stop this man's war."
Backer maintained that Hitler could not require immediate evacuation and that the Allies could manage, over time, to move the 100,000 out. Lucas then fell back on the tight shipping situation, asserting that the interference with shipping required by such a project could "prolong this War to the end that we might lose 100,000 boys." Twice more within a brief time, Lucas insisted that mass rescue could cost the lives of large numbers of American fighting men.
Lucas's arguments against any large-scale rescue were exaggerated and thin. But Backer could not rebut them effectively. The Easter sessions were doubly tragic. They injected new information and a new perspective into the conference, but only after its decisions had solidified. And when the delegates at last appeared ready for serious consideration of the Jewish leaders' proposals, those who had developed them and could have elucidated and defended them were not available for consultation. Exclusion of such men as Stephen Wise and Joseph Proskauer helped insure the failure of the Bermuda Conference. [ii]
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[b]Notes:[/b]
[i] When George Warren, another technical expert, evaluated the conference afterward, he remarked that he had been "shocked by the strong resistance [to rescue action] of individual members at the Conference." [2]
[ii] Lucas's arguments were vulnerable on several counts:
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