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Book 4
1
Let us speak next of liberality. It seems to be the mean with regard to
wealth; for the liberal man is praised not in respect of military
matters, nor of those in respect of which the temperate man is praised,
nor of judicial decisions, but with regard to the giving and taking of
wealth, and especially in respect of giving. Now by 'wealth' we mean all
the things whose value is measured by money. Further, prodigality and
meanness are excesses and defects with regard to wealth; and meanness we
always impute to those who care more than they ought for wealth, but we
sometimes apply the word 'prodigality' in a complex sense; for we call
those men prodigals who are incontinent and spend money on
self-indulgence. Hence also they are thought the poorest characters; for
they combine more vices than one. Therefore the application of the word
to them is not its proper use; for a 'prodigal' means a man who has a
single evil quality, that of wasting his substance; since a prodigal is
one who is being ruined by his own fault, and the wasting of substance
is thought to be a sort of ruining of oneself, life being held to depend
on possession of substance.
This, then, is the sense in which we take the word 'prodigality'. Now
the things that have a use may be used either well or badly; and riches
is a useful thing; and everything is used best by the man who has the
virtue concerned with it; riches, therefore, will be used best by the
man who has the virtue concerned with wealth; and this is the liberal
man. Now spending and giving seem to be the using of wealth; taking and
keeping rather the possession of it. Hence it is more the mark of the
liberal man to give to the right people than to take from the right
sources and not to take from the wrong. For it is more characteristic of
virtue to do good than to have good done to one, and more characteristic
to do what is noble than not to do what is base; and it is not hard to
see that giving implies doing good and doing what is noble, and taking
implies having good done to one or not acting basely. And gratitude is
felt towards him who gives, not towards him who does not take, and
praise also is bestowed more on him. It is easier, also, not to take
than to give; for men are apter to give away their own too little than
to take what is another's. Givers, too, are called liberal; but those
who do not take are not praised for liberality but rather for justice;
while those who take are hardly praised at all. And the liberal are
almost the most loved of all virtuous characters, since they are useful;
and this depends on their giving.
Now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble.
Therefore the liberal man, like other virtuous men, will give for the
sake of the noble, and rightly; for he will give to the right people,
the right amounts, and at the right time, with all the other
qualifications that accompany right giving; and that too with pleasure
or without pain; for that which is virtuous is pleasant or free from
pain-least of all will it be painful. But he who gives to the wrong
people or not for the sake of the noble but for some other cause, will
be called not liberal but by some other name. Nor is he liberal who
gives with pain; for he would prefer the wealth to the noble act, and
this is not characteristic of a liberal man. But no more will the
liberal man take from wrong sources; for such taking is not
characteristic of the man who sets no store by wealth. Nor will he be a
ready asker; for it is not characteristic of a man who confers benefits
to accept them lightly. But he will take from the right sources, e.g.
from his own possessions, not as something noble but as a necessity,
that he may have something to give. Nor will he neglect his own
property, since he wishes by means of this to help others. And he will
refrain from giving to anybody and everybody, that he may have something
to give to the right people, at the right time, and where it is noble to
do so. It is highly characteristic of a liberal man also to go to excess
in giving, so that he leaves too little for himself; for it is the
nature of a liberal man not to look to himself. The term 'liberality' is
used relatively to a man's substance; for liberality resides not in the
multitude of the gifts but in the state of character of the giver, and
this is relative to the giver's substance. There is therefore nothing to
prevent the man who gives less from being the more liberal man, if he
has less to give those are thought to be more liberal who have not made
their wealth but inherited it; for in the first place they have no
experience of want, and secondly all men are fonder of their own
productions, as are parents and poets. It is not easy for the liberal
man to be rich, since he is not apt either at taking or at keeping, but
at giving away, and does not value wealth for its own sake but as a
means to giving. Hence comes the charge that is brought against fortune,
that those who deserve riches most get it least. But it is not
unreasonable that it should turn out so; for he cannot have wealth, any
more than anything else, if he does not take pains to have it. Yet he
will not give to the wrong people nor at the wrong time, and so on; for
he would no longer be acting in accordance with liberality, and if he
spent on these objects he would have nothing to spend on the right
objects. For, as has been said, he is liberal who spends according to
his substance and on the right objects; and he who exceeds is prodigal.
Hence we do not call despots prodigal; for it is thought not easy for
them to give and spend beyond the amount of their possessions.
Liberality, then, being a mean with regard to giving and taking of
wealth, the liberal man will both give and spend the right amounts and
on the right objects, alike in small things and in great, and that with
pleasure; he will also take the right amounts and from the right
sources. For, the virtue being a mean with regard to both, he will do
both as he ought; since this sort of taking accompanies proper giving,
and that which is not of this sort is contrary to it, and accordingly
the giving and taking that accompany each other are present together in
the same man, while the contrary kinds evidently are not. But if he
happens to spend in a manner contrary to what is right and noble, he
will be pained, but moderately and as he ought; for it is the mark of
virtue both to be pleased and to be pained at the right objects and in
the right way. Further, the liberal man is easy to deal with in money
matters; for he can be got the better of, since he sets no store by
money, and is more annoyed if he has not spent something that he ought
than pained if he has spent something that he ought not, and does not
agree with the saying of Simonides.
The prodigal errs in these respects also; for he is neither pleased nor
pained at the right things or in the right way; this will be more
evident as we go on. We have said that prodigality and meanness are
excesses and deficiencies, and in two things, in giving and in taking;
for we include spending under giving. Now prodigality exceeds in giving
and not taking, while meanness falls short in giving, and exceeds in
taking, except in small things.
The characteristics of prodigality are not often combined; for it is not
easy to give to all if you take from none; private persons soon exhaust
their substance with giving, and it is to these that the name of
prodigals is applied- though a man of this sort would seem to be in no
small degree better than a mean man. For he is easily cured both by age
and by poverty, and thus he may move towards the middle state. For he
has the characteristics of the liberal man, since he both gives and
refrains from taking, though he does neither of these in the right
manner or well. Therefore if he were brought to do so by habituation or
in some other way, he would be liberal; for he will then give to the
right people, and will not take from the wrong sources. This is why he
is thought to have not a bad character; it is not the mark of a wicked
or ignoble man to go to excess in giving and not taking, but only of a
foolish one. The man who is prodigal in this way is thought much better
than the mean man both for the aforesaid reasons and because he benefits
many while the other benefits no one, not even himself.
But most prodigal people, as has been said, also take from the wrong
sources, and are in this respect mean. They become apt to take because
they wish to spend and cannot do this easily; for their possessions soon
run short. Thus they are forced to provide means from some other source.
At the same time, because they care nothing for honour, they take
recklessly and from any source; for they have an appetite for giving,
and they do not mind how or from what source. Hence also their giving is
not liberal; for it is not noble, nor does it aim at nobility, nor is it
done in the right way; sometimes they make rich those who should be
poor, and will give nothing to people of respectable character, and much
to flatterers or those who provide them with some other pleasure. Hence
also most of them are self-indulgent; for they spend lightly and waste
money on their indulgences, and incline towards pleasures because they
do not live with a view to what is noble.
The prodigal man, then, turns into what we have described if he is left
untutored, but if he is treated with care he will arrive at the
intermediate and right state. But meanness is both incurable (for old
age and every disability is thought to make men mean) and more innate in
men than prodigality; for most men are fonder of getting money than of
giving. It also extends widely, and is multiform, since there seem to be
many kinds of meanness.
For it consists in two things, deficiency in giving and excess in
taking, and is not found complete in all men but is sometimes divided;
some men go to excess in taking, others fall short in giving. Those who
are called by such names as 'miserly', 'close', 'stingy', all fall short
in giving, but do not covet the possessions of others nor wish to get
them. In some this is due to a sort of honesty and avoidance of what is
disgraceful (for some seem, or at least profess, to hoard their money
for this reason, that they may not some day be forced to do something
disgraceful; to this class belong the cheeseparer and every one of the
sort; he is so called from his excess of unwillingness to give
anything); while others again keep their hands off the property of
others from fear, on the ground that it is not easy, if one takes the
property of others oneself, to avoid having one's own taken by them;
they are therefore content neither to take nor to give.
Others again exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and from any
source, e.g. those who ply sordid trades, pimps and all such people, and
those who lend small sums and at high rates. For all of these take more
than they ought and from wrong sources. What is common to them is
evidently sordid love of gain; they all put up with a bad name for the
sake of gain, and little gain at that. For those who make great gains
but from wrong sources, and not the right gains, e.g. despots when they
sack cities and spoil temples, we do not call mean but rather wicked,
impious, and unjust. But the gamester and the footpad (and the
highwayman) belong to the class of the mean, since they have a sordid
love of gain. For it is for gain that both of them ply their craft and
endure the disgrace of it, and the one faces the greatest dangers for
the sake of the booty, while the other makes gain from his friends, to
whom he ought to be giving. Both, then, since they are willing to make
gain from wrong sources, are sordid lovers of gain; therefore all such
forms of taking are mean.
And it is natural that meanness is described as the contrary of
liberality; for not only is it a greater evil than prodigality, but men
err more often in this direction than in the way of prodigality as we
have described it.
So much, then, for liberality and the opposed vices.
2
It would seem proper to discuss magnificence next. For this also seems
to be a virtue concerned with wealth; but it does not like liberality
extend to all the actions that are concerned with wealth, but only to
those that involve expenditure; and in these it surpasses liberality in
scale. For, as the name itself suggests, it is a fitting expenditure
involving largeness of scale. But the scale is relative; for the expense
of equipping a trireme is not the same as that of heading a sacred
embassy. It is what is fitting, then, in relation to the agent, and to
the circumstances and the object. The man who in small or middling
things spends according to the merits of the case is not called
magnificent (e.g. the man who can say 'many a gift I gave the
wanderer'), but only the man who does so in great things. For the
magnificent man is liberal, but the liberal man is not necessarily
magnificent. The deficiency of this state of character is called
niggardliness, the excess vulgarity, lack of taste, and the like, which
do not go to excess in the amount spent on right objects, but by showy
expenditure in the wrong circumstances and the wrong manner; we shall
speak of these vices later.
The magnificent man is like an artist; for he can see what is fitting
and spend large sums tastefully. For, as we said at the beginning, a
state of character is determined by its activities and by its objects.
Now the expenses of the magnificent man are large and fitting. Such,
therefore, are also his results; for thus there will be a great
expenditure and one that is fitting to its result. Therefore the result
should be worthy of the expense, and the expense should be worthy of the
result, or should even exceed it. And the magnificent man will spend
such sums for honour's sake; for this is common to the virtues. And
further he will do so gladly and lavishly; for nice calculation is a
niggardly thing. And he will consider how the result can be made most
beautiful and most becoming rather than for how much it can be produced
and how it can be produced most cheaply. It is necessary, then, that the
magnificent man be also liberal. For the liberal man also will spend
what he ought and as he ought; and it is in these matters that the
greatness implied in the name of the magnificent man-his bigness, as it
were-is manifested, since liberality is concerned with these matters;
and at an equal expense he will produce a more magnificent work of art.
For a possession and a work of art have not the same excellence. The
most valuable possession is that which is worth most, e.g. gold, but the
most valuable work of art is that which is great and beautiful (for the
contemplation of such a work inspires admiration, and so does
magnificence); and a work has an excellence-viz. magnificence-which
involves magnitude. Magnificence is an attribute of expenditures of the
kind which we call honourable, e.g. those connected with the gods-votive
offerings, buildings, and sacrifices-and similarly with any form of
religious worship, and all those that are proper objects of
public-spirited ambition, as when people think they ought to equip a
chorus or a trireme, or entertain the city, in a brilliant way. But in
all cases, as has been said, we have regard to the agent as well and ask
who he is and what means he has; for the expenditure should be worthy of
his means, and suit not only the result but also the producer. Hence a
poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means with which to
spend large sums fittingly; and he who tries is a fool, since he spends
beyond what can be expected of him and what is proper, but it is right
expenditure that is virtuous. But great expenditure is becoming to those
who have suitable means to start with, acquired by their own efforts or
from ancestors or connexions, and to people of high birth or reputation,
and so on; for all these things bring with them greatness and prestige.
Primarily, then, the magnificent man is of this sort, and magnificence
is shown in expenditures of this sort, as has been said; for these are
the greatest and most honourable. Of private occasions of expenditure
the most suitable are those that take place once for all, e.g. a wedding
or anything of the kind, or anything that interests the whole city or
the people of position in it, and also the receiving of foreign guests
and the sending of them on their way, and gifts and counter-gifts; for
the magnificent man spends not on himself but on public objects, and
gifts bear some resemblance to votive offerings. A magnificent man will
also furnish his house suitably to his wealth (for even a house is a
sort of public ornament), and will spend by preference on those works
that are lasting (for these are the most beautiful), and on every class
of things he will spend what is becoming; for the same things are not
suitable for gods and for men, nor in a temple and in a tomb. And since
each expenditure may be great of its kind, and what is most magnificent
absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, but what is
magnificent here is what is great in these circumstances, and greatness
in the work differs from greatness in the expense (for the most
beautiful ball or bottle is magnificent as a gift to a child, but the
price of it is small and mean),-therefore it is characteristic of the
magnificent man, whatever kind of result he is producing, to produce it
magnificently (for such a result is not easily surpassed) and to make it
worthy of the expenditure.
Such, then, is the magnificent man; the man who goes to excess and is
vulgar exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right. For
on small objects of expenditure he spends much and displays a tasteless
showiness; e.g. he gives a club dinner on the scale of a wedding
banquet, and when he provides the chorus for a comedy he brings them on
to the stage in purple, as they do at Megara. And all such things he
will do not for honour's sake but to show off his wealth, and because he
thinks he is admired for these things, and where he ought to spend much
he spends little and where little, much. The niggardly man on the other
hand will fall short in everything, and after spending the greatest sums
will spoil the beauty of the result for a trifle, and whatever he is
doing he will hesitate and consider how he may spend least, and lament
even that, and think he is doing everything on a bigger scale than he
ought.
These states of character, then, are vices; yet they do not bring
disgrace because they are neither harmful to one's neighbour nor very
unseemly.
3
Pride seems even from its name to be concerned with great things; what
sort of great things, is the first question we must try to answer. It
makes no difference whether we consider the state of character or the
man characterized by it. Now the man is thought to be proud who thinks
himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them; for he who does so
beyond his deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is foolish or silly.
The proud man, then, is the man we have described. For he who is worthy
of little and thinks himself worthy of little is temperate, but not
proud; for pride implies greatness, as beauty implies a goodsized body,
and little people may be neat and well-proportioned but cannot be
beautiful. On the other hand, he who thinks himself worthy of great
things, being unworthy of them, is vain; though not every one who thinks
himself worthy of more than he really is worthy of in vain. The man who
thinks himself worthy of worthy of less than he is really worthy of is
unduly humble, whether his deserts be great or moderate, or his deserts
be small but his claims yet smaller. And the man whose deserts are great
would seem most unduly humble; for what would he have done if they had
been less? The proud man, then, is an extreme in respect of the
greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness of them;
for he claims what is accordance with his merits, while the others go to
excess or fall short.
If, then, he deserves and claims great things, and above all the great
things, he will be concerned with one thing in particular. Desert is
relative to external goods; and the greatest of these, we should say, is
that which we render to the gods, and which people of position most aim
at, and which is the prize appointed for the noblest deeds; and this is
honour; that is surely the greatest of external goods. Honours and
dishonours, therefore, are the objects with respect to which the proud
man is as he should be. And even apart from argument it is with honour
that proud men appear to be concerned; for it is honour that they
chiefly claim, but in accordance with their deserts. The unduly humble
man falls short both in comparison with his own merits and in comparison
with the proud man's claims. The vain man goes to excess in comparison
with his own merits, but does not exceed the proud man's claims.
Now the proud man, since he deserves most, must be good in the highest
degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the best man most.
Therefore the truly proud man must be good. And greatness in every
virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud man. And it would be
most unbecoming for a proud man to fly from danger, swinging his arms by
his sides, or to wrong another; for to what end should he do disgraceful
acts, he to whom nothing is great? If we consider him point by point we
shall see the utter absurdity of a proud man who is not good. Nor,
again, would he be worthy of honour if he were bad; for honour is the
prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered. Pride, then,
seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater,
and it is not found without them. Therefore it is hard to be truly
proud; for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character.
It is chiefly with honours and dishonours, then, that the proud man is
concerned; and at honours that are great and conferred by good men he
will be moderately Pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own or
even less than his own; for there can be no honour that is worthy of
perfect virtue, yet he will at any rate accept it since they have
nothing greater to bestow on him; but honour from casual people and on
trifling grounds he will utterly despise, since it is not this that he
deserves, and dishonour too, since in his case it cannot be just. In the
first place, then, as has been said, the proud man is concerned with
honours; yet he will also bear himself with moderation towards wealth
and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and
will be neither over-joyed by good fortune nor over-pained by evil. For
not even towards honour does he bear himself as if it were a very great
thing. Power and wealth are desirable for the sake of honour (at least
those who have them wish to get honour by means of them); and for him to
whom even honour is a little thing the others must be so too. Hence
proud men are thought to be disdainful.
The goods of fortune also are thought to contribute towards pride. For
men who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are those who
enjoy power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and
everything that has a superiority in something good is held in greater
honour. Hence even such things make men prouder; for they are honoured
by some for having them; but in truth the good man alone is to be
honoured; he, however, who has both advantages is thought the more
worthy of honour. But those who without virtue have such goods are
neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to the name of
'proud'; for these things imply perfect virtue. Disdainful and insolent,
however, even those who have such goods become. For without virtue it is
not easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune; and, being unable to
bear them, and thinking themselves superior to others, they despise
others and themselves do what they please. They imitate the proud man
without being like him, and this they do where they can; so they do not
act virtuously, but they do despise others. For the proud man despises
justly (since he thinks truly), but the many do so at random.
He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger, because
he honours few things; but he will face great dangers, and when he is in
danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that there are conditions on
which life is not worth having. And he is the sort of man to confer
benefits, but he is ashamed of receiving them; for the one is the mark
of a superior, the other of an inferior. And he is apt to confer greater
benefits in return; for thus the original benefactor besides being paid
will incur a debt to him, and will be the gainer by the transaction.
They seem also to remember any service they have done, but not those
they have received (for he who receives a service is inferior to him who
has done it, but the proud man wishes to be superior), and to hear of
the former with pleasure, of the latter with displeasure; this, it
seems, is why Thetis did not mention to Zeus the services she had done
him, and why the Spartans did not recount their services to the
Athenians, but those they had received. It is a mark of the proud man
also to ask for nothing or scarcely anything, but to give help readily,
and to be dignified towards people who enjoy high position and good
fortune, but unassuming towards those of the middle class; for it is a
difficult and lofty thing to be superior to the former, but easy to be
so to the latter, and a lofty bearing over the former is no mark of
ill-breeding, but among humble people it is as vulgar as a display of
strength against the weak. Again, it is characteristic of the proud man
not to aim at the things commonly held in honour, or the things in which
others excel; to be sluggish and to hold back except where great honour
or a great work is at stake, and to be a man of few deeds, but of great
and notable ones. He must also be open in his hate and in his love (for
to conceal one's feelings, i.e. to care less for truth than for what
people will think, is a coward's part), and must speak and act openly;
for he is free of speech because he is contemptuous, and he is given to
telling the truth, except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar. He must
be unable to make his life revolve round another, unless it be a friend;
for this is slavish, and for this reason all flatterers are servile and
people lacking in self-respect are flatterers. Nor is he given to
admiration; for nothing to him is great. Nor is he mindful of wrongs;
for it is not the part of a proud man to have a long memory, especially
for wrongs, but rather to overlook them. Nor is he a gossip; for he will
speak neither about himself nor about another, since he cares not to be
praised nor for others to be blamed; nor again is he given to praise;
and for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker, even about his
enemies, except from haughtiness. With regard to necessary or small
matters he is least of all me given to lamentation or the asking of
favours; for it is the part of one who takes such matters seriously to
behave so with respect to them. He is one who will possess beautiful and
profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones; for this is
more proper to a character that suffices to itself.
Further, a slow step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep voice,
and a level utterance; for the man who takes few things seriously is not
likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks nothing great to be
excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry
and excitement.
Such, then, is the proud man; the man who falls short of him is unduly
humble, and the man who goes beyond him is vain. Now even these are not
thought to be bad (for they are not malicious), but only mistaken. For
the unduly humble man, being worthy of good things, robs himself of what
he deserves, and to have something bad about him from the fact that he
does not think himself worthy of good things, and seems also not to know
himself; else he would have desired the things he was worthy of, since
these were good. Yet such people are not thought to be fools, but rather
unduly retiring. Such a reputation, however, seems actually to make them
worse; for each class of people aims at what corresponds to its worth,
and these people stand back even from noble actions and undertakings,
deeming themselves unworthy, and from external goods no less. Vain
people, on the other hand, are fools and ignorant of themselves, and
that manifestly; for, not being worthy of them, they attempt honourable
undertakings, and then are found out; and they adorn themselves with
clothing and outward show and such things, and wish their strokes of
good fortune to be made public, and speak about them as if they would be
honoured for them. But undue humility is more opposed to pride than
vanity is; for it is both commoner and worse.
Pride, then, is concerned with honour on the grand scale, as has been
said.
4
There seems to be in the sphere of honour also, as was said in our first
remarks on the subject, a virtue which would appear to be related to
pride as liberality is to magnificence. For neither of these has
anything to do with the grand scale, but both dispose us as is right
with regard to middling and unimportant objects; as in getting and
giving of wealth there is a mean and an excess and defect, so too honour
may be desired more than is right, or less, or from the right sources
and in the right way. We blame both the ambitious man as am at honour
more than is right and from wrong sources, and the unambitious man as
not willing to be honoured even for noble reasons. But sometimes we
praise the ambitious man as being manly and a lover of what is noble,
and the unambitious man as being moderate and self-controlled, as we
said in our first treatment of the subject. Evidently, since 'fond of
such and such an object' has more than one meaning, we do not assign the
term 'ambition' or 'love of honour' always to the same thing, but when
we praise the quality we think of the man who loves honour more than
most people, and when we blame it we think of him who loves it more than
is right. The mean being without a name, the extremes seem to dispute
for its place as though that were vacant by default. But where there is
excess and defect, there is also an intermediate; now men desire honour
both more than they should and less; therefore it is possible also to do
so as one should; at all events this is the state of character that is
praised, being an unnamed mean in respect of honour. Relatively to
ambition it seems to be unambitiousness, and relatively to
unambitiousness it seems to be ambition, while relatively to both
severally it seems in a sense to be both together. This appears to be
true of the other virtues also. But in this case the extremes seem to be
contradictories because the mean has not received a name.
5
Good temper is a mean with respect to anger; the middle state being
unnamed, and the extremes almost without a name as well, we place good
temper in the middle position, though it inclines towards the
deficiency, which is without a name. The excess might called a sort of
'irascibility'. For the passion is anger, while its causes are many and
diverse.
The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and,
further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is
praised. This will be the good-tempered man, then, since good temper is
praised. For the good-tempered man tends to be unperturbed and not to be
led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, at the things, and for
the length of time, that the rule dictates; but he is thought to err
rather in the direction of deficiency; for the good-tempered man is not
revengeful, but rather tends to make allowances.
The deficiency, whether it is a sort of 'inirascibility' or whatever it
is, is blamed. For those who are not angry at the things they should be
angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in
the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons; for such a
man is thought not to feel things nor to be pained by them, and, since
he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself; and to
endure being insulted and put up with insult to one's friends is
slavish.
The excess can be manifested in all the points that have been named (for
one can be angry with the wrong persons, at the wrong things, more than
is right, too quickly, or too long); yet all are not found in the same
person. Indeed they could not; for evil destroys even itself, and if it
is complete becomes unbearable. Now hot-tempered people get angry
quickly and with the wrong persons and at the wrong things and more than
is right, but their anger ceases quickly-which is the best point about
them. This happens to them because they do not restrain their anger but
retaliate openly owing to their quickness of temper, and then their
anger ceases. By reason of excess choleric people are quick-tempered and
ready to be angry with everything and on every occasion; whence their
name. Sulky people are hard to appease, and retain their anger long; for
they repress their passion. But it ceases when they retaliate; for
revenge relieves them of their anger, producing in them pleasure instead
of pain. If this does not happen they retain their burden; for owing to
its not being obvious no one even reasons with them, and to digest one's
anger in oneself takes time. Such people are most troublesome to
themselves and to their dearest friends. We call had-tempered those who
are angry at the wrong things, more than is right, and longer, and
cannot be appeased until they inflict vengeance or punishment.
To good temper we oppose the excess rather than the defect; for not only
is it commoner since revenge is the more human), but bad-tempered people
are worse to live with.
What we have said in our earlier treatment of the subject is plain also
from what we are now saying; viz. that it is not easy to define how,
with whom, at what, and how long one should be angry, and at what point
right action ceases and wrong begins. For the man who strays a little
from the path, either towards the more or towards the less, is not
blamed; since sometimes we praise those who exhibit the deficiency, and
call them good-tempered, and sometimes we call angry people manly, as
being capable of ruling. How far, therefore, and how a man must stray
before he becomes blameworthy, it is not easy to state in words; for the
decision depends on the particular facts and on perception. But so much
at least is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy- that in virtue
of which we are angry with the right people, at the right things, in the
right way, and so on, while the excesses and defects are blameworthy-
slightly so if they are present in a low degree, more if in a higher
degree, and very much if in a high degree. Evidently, then, we must
cling to the middle state.- Enough of the states relative to anger.
6
In gatherings of men, in social life and the interchange of words and
deeds, some men are thought to be obsequious, viz. those who to give
pleasure praise everything and never oppose, but think it their duty 'to
give no pain to the people they meet'; while those who, on the contrary,
oppose everything and care not a whit about giving pain are called
churlish and contentious. That the states we have named are culpable is
plain enough, and that the middle state is laudable- that in virtue of
which a man will put up with, and will resent, the right things and in
the right way; but no name has been assigned to it, though it most
resembles friendship. For the man who corresponds to this middle state
is very much what, with affection added, we call a good friend. But the
state in question differs from friendship in that it implies no passion
or affection for one's associates; since it is not by reason of loving
or hating that such a man takes everything in the right way, but by
being a man of a certain kind. For he will behave so alike towards those
he knows and those he does not know, towards intimates and those who are
not so, except that in each of these cases he will behave as is
befitting; for it is not proper to have the same care for intimates and
for strangers, nor again is it the same conditions that make it right to
give pain to them. Now we have said generally that he will associate
with people in the right way; but it is by reference to what is
honourable and expedient that he will aim at not giving pain or at
contributing pleasure. For he seems to be concerned with the pleasures
and pains of social life; and wherever it is not honourable, or is
harmful, for him to contribute pleasure, he will refuse, and will choose
rather to give pain; also if his acquiescence in another's action would
bring disgrace, and that in a high degree, or injury, on that other,
while his opposition brings a little pain, he will not acquiesce but
will decline. He will associate differently with people in high station
and with ordinary people, with closer and more distant acquaintances,
and so too with regard to all other differences, rendering to each class
what is befitting, and while for its own sake he chooses to contribute
pleasure, and avoids the giving of pain, he will be guided by the
consequences, if these are greater, i.e. honour and expediency. For the
sake of a great future pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains.
The man who attains the mean, then, is such as we have described, but
has not received a name; of those who contribute pleasure, the man who
aims at being pleasant with no ulterior object is obsequious, but the
man who does so in order that he may get some advantage in the direction
of money or the things that money buys is a flatterer; while the man who
quarrels with everything is, as has been said, churlish and contentious.
And the extremes seem to be contradictory to each other because the mean
is without a name.
7
The mean opposed to boastfulness is found in almost the same sphere; and
this also is without a name. It will be no bad plan to describe these
states as well; for we shall both know the facts about character better
if we go through them in detail, and we shall be convinced that the
virtues are means if we see this to be so in all cases. In the field of
social life those who make the giving of pleasure or pain their object
in associating with others have been described; let us now describe
those who pursue truth or falsehood alike in words and deeds and in the
claims they put forward. The boastful man, then, is thought to be apt to
claim the things that bring glory, when he has not got them, or to claim
more of them than he has, and the mock-modest man on the other hand to
disclaim what he has or belittle it, while the man who observes the mean
is one who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful both in life
and in word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. Now each
of these courses may be adopted either with or without an object. But
each man speaks and acts and lives in accordance with his character, if
he is not acting for some ulterior object. And falsehood is in itself
mean and culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise. Thus the
truthful man is another case of a man who, being in the mean, is worthy
of praise, and both forms of untruthful man are culpable, and
particularly the boastful man.
Let us discuss them both, but first of all the truthful man. We are not
speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i.e. in the
things that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong to
another virtue), but the man who in the matters in which nothing of this
sort is at stake is true both in word and in life because his character
is such. But such a man would seem to be as a matter of fact equitable.
For the man who loves truth, and is truthful where nothing is at stake,
will still more be truthful where something is at stake; he will avoid
falsehood as something base, seeing that he avoided it even for its own
sake; and such a man is worthy of praise. He inclines rather to
understate the truth; for this seems in better taste because
exaggerations are wearisome.
He who claims more than he has with no ulterior object is a contemptible
sort of fellow (otherwise he would not have delighted in falsehood), but
seems futile rather than bad; but if he does it for an object, he who
does it for the sake of reputation or honour is (for a boaster) not very
much to be blamed, but he who does it for money, or the things that lead
to money, is an uglier character (it is not the capacity that makes the
boaster, but the purpose; for it is in virtue of his state of character
and by being a man of a certain kind that he is boaster); as one man is
a liar because he enjoys the lie itself, and another because he desires
reputation or gain. Now those who boast for the sake of reputation claim
such qualities as will praise or congratulation, but those whose object
is gain claim qualities which are of value to one's neighbours and one's
lack of which is not easily detected, e.g. the powers of a seer, a sage,
or a physician. For this reason it is such things as these that most
people claim and boast about; for in them the above-mentioned qualities
are found.
Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive in
character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid
parade; and here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they
disclaim, as Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and
obvious qualities are called humbugs and are more contemptible; and
sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like the Spartan dress; for
both excess and great deficiency are boastful. But those who use
understatement with moderation and understate about matters that do not
very much force themselves on our notice seem attractive. And it is the
boaster that seems to be opposed to the truthful man; for he is the
worse character.
8
Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is included
leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of intercourse
which is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying- and again listening
to- what one should and as one should. The kind of people one is
speaking or listening to will also make a difference. Evidently here
also there is both an excess and a deficiency as compared with the mean.
Those who carry humour to excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons,
striving after humour at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh
than at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of
their fun; while those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up
with those who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished. But those
who joke in a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort
of readiness to turn this way and that; for such sallies are thought to
be movements of the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their
movements, so too are characters. The ridiculous side of things is not
far to seek, however, and most people delight more than they should in
amusement and in jest only. And so even buffoons are called ready-witted
because they are found attractive; but that they differ from the
ready-witted man, and to no small extent, is clear from what has been
said.
To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a tactful man
to say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred man; for
there are some things that it befits such a man to say and to hear by
way of jest, and the well-bred man's jesting differs from that of a
vulgar man, and the joking of an educated man from that of an
uneducated. One may see this even from the old and the new comedies; to
the authors of the former indecency of language was amusing, to those of
the latter innuendo is more so; and these differ in no small degree in
respect of propriety. Now should we define the man who jokes well by his
saying what is not unbecoming to a well-bred man, or by his not giving
pain, or even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is the latter
definition, at any rate, itself indefinite, since different things are
hateful or pleasant to different people? The kind of jokes he will
listen to will be the same; for the kind he can put up with are also the
kind he seems to make. There are, then, jokes he will not make; for the
jest is a sort of abuse, and there are things that lawgivers forbid us
to abuse; and they should, perhaps, have forbidden us even to make a
jest of such. The refined and well-bred man, therefore, will be as we
have described, being as it were a law to himself.
Such, then, is the man who observes the mean, whether he be called
tactful or ready-witted. The buffoon, on the other hand, is the slave of
his sense of humour, and spares neither himself nor others if he can
raise a laugh, and says things none of which a man of refinement would
say, and to some of which he would not even listen. The boor, again, is
useless for such social intercourse; for he contributes nothing and
finds fault with everything. But relaxation and amusement are thought to
be a necessary element in life.
The means in life that have been described, then, are three in number,
and are all concerned with an interchange of words and deeds of some
kind. They differ, however, in that one is concerned with truth; and the
other two with pleasantness. Of those concerned with pleasure, one is
displayed in jests, the other in the general social intercourse of life.
9
Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling
than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear
of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of
danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death
turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions,
which is thought to be characteristic of feeling rather than of a state
of character.
The feeling is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we
think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they
live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by
shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling, but an
older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of
disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this
sense. For the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of a good
man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not
be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth and others
only according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither
class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace should be felt);
and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful
action. To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such an
action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is
for voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the good man will never
voluntarily do bad actions. But shame may be said to be conditionally a
good thing; if a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced; but
the virtues are not subject to such a qualification. And if
shamelessness-not to be ashamed of doing base actions-is bad, that does
not make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions. Continence too is
not virtue, but a mixed sort of state; this will be shown later. Now,
however, let us discuss justice.
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