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PART 1
ONE: The Cult of
Intelligence
But this
secrecy ... has become
a god in this country, and those
people who have secrets travel
in a kind of fraternity ... and
they will not speak to anyone else.
-- SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT
Chairman, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee
November 1971
There exists in
our nation today a powerful and dangerous
secret cult -- the cult of intelligence.
Its holy men are
the clandestine professionals of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Its patrons and protectors are the highest
officials of the federal government. Its membership, extending far
beyond governmental circles, reaches into the power centers of
industry, commerce, finance, and labor. Its friends are many in
the areas of important public influence-the academic world and
the communications media. The cult of intelligence is a secret
fraternity of the American political aristocracy.
The purpose of the cult is to further the foreign policies of the
U.S. government by covert and usually illegal means, while at the
same time containing the spread of its avowed enemy, communism.
Traditionally, the cult's hope has been to foster a world order in
which America would reign supreme, the unchallenged international
leader. Today, however, that dream stands tarnished by time and
frequent failures. Thus, the cult's objectives are now less grandiose,
but no less disturbing. It seeks largely to advance America's
selfappointed
role as the dominant arbiter of social, economic, and
political change in the awakening regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. And its worldwide war against communism has to some
extent been reduced to a covert struggle to maintain a self-serving
stability in the Third World, using whatever clandestine methods
are available. For the cult of intelligence, fostering "stability" may
in one country mean reluctant and passive acquiescence to evolutionary
change; in another country, the active maintenance of the
status quo; in yet another, a determined effort to reverse popular
trends toward independence and democracy. The cult attempts
that which it believes it can accomplish and which-in the event
of failure or exposure-the U.S. government can plausibly deny.
The Cult of Intelligence 5
The CIA is both the center and the primary instrument of the
cult of intelligence. It engages in espionage and counterespionage,
in propaganda and disinformation (the deliberate circulation of
false information), in psychological warfare and paramilitary
activities.
It penetrates and manipulates private institutions, and
creates its own organizations (called "proprietaries") when necessary.
It recruits agents and mercenaries; it bribes and blackmails
foreign officials to carry out its most unsavory tasks. It does whatever
is required to achieve its goals, without any consideration of the
ethics involved or the moral consequences of its actions. As the
secret-action arm of American foreign policy, the CIA's most potent
weapon is its covert intervention in the internal affairs of countries
the U.S. government wishes to control or influence.
Romanticized by myths, the operations of the CIA are also
beclouded by false images and shielded by official deceptions. Its
practices are hidden behind arcane and antiquated legalisms which
prevent the public and even Congress from knowing what the
mysterious agency is doing-or why. This the cult of intelligence
justifies with dramatic assertions that the CIA's purpose is to preserve
the "national security," that its actions are in response to
the needs of the nation's defense. No one-in an age in which
secrecy is the definitional operative of security-need know more
than that.
The cult is intent upon conducting the foreign affairs of the
U.S. government without the awareness or participation of the
people. It recognizes no role for a questioning legislature or an
investigative press. Its adherents believe that only they have the
right and the obligation to decide what is necessary to satisfy the
national needs. Although it pursues outmoded international policies
and unattainable ends, the cult of intelligence demands that it not
be held accountable for its actions by the people it professes to
serve. It is a privileged, as well as secret, charge. In their minds,
those who belong to the cult of intelligence have been ordained,
and their service is immune from public scrutiny.
The "clandestine mentality" is a mind-set that thrives on secrecy
and deception. It encourages professional amorality-the belief
6 THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
that righteous goals can be achieved through the use of unprincipled
and normally unacceptable means. Thus, the cult's leaders must
tenaciously guard their official actions from public view. To do
otherwise would restrict their ability to act independently; it would
permit the American people to pass judgment on not only the
utility of their policies, but the ethics of those policies as well.
With
the cooperation of an acquiescent, ill-informed Congress, and the
encouragement and assistance of a series of Presidents, the cult has
built a wall of laws and executive orders around the CIA and
itself, a wall that has blocked effective public scrutiny.
When necessary, the members of the cult of intelligence, including
our Presidents (who are always aware of, generally approve of,
and often actually initiate the CIA's major undertakings), have
lied to protect the CIA and to hide their own responsibility for its
operations. The Eisenhower administration lied to the American
people about the CIA's involvement in the Guatemalan coup d'etat
in 1954, about the agency's support of the unsuccessful rebellion in
Indonesia in 1958, and about Francis Gary Powers' 1960 U-2 mission.
The Kennedy administration lied about the CIA's role in the
abortive invasion of Cuba in 1961, admitting its involvement only
after the operation had failed disastrously. The Johnson administration
lied about the extent of most U.S. government commitments in
Vietnam and Laos, and all of the CIA's. And the Nixon administration
publicly lied about the agency's attempt to fix the Chilean election
in 1970. For adherents to the cult of intelligence, hypocrisy and
deception, like secrecy, have become standard techniques for preventing
public awareness of the CIA's clandestine operations, and
governmental accountability for them. And these men who ask
that they be regarded as honorable men, true patriots, will, when
caught in their own webs of deceit, even assert that the government
has an inherent right to lie to its people.
The justification for the "right to lie" is that secrecy in covert
operations is necessary to prevent U.S. policies and actions from
coming to the attention of the "enemy"-or, in the parlance of
the clandestine trade, the "opposition." If the opposition is oblivious
to the CIA's operations, the argument runs, then it cannot
The Cult of Intelligence • 7
respond and the CIA activities stand a good chance of succeeding.
Nonetheless, in many instances the opposition knows exactly what
covert operations are being targeted against it, and it takes
counteraction
when possible. The U-2 overflights and, later, those of the
photographic satellites were, and are, as well known to the Soviets
and the Chinese as Soviet overhead reconnaissance of the United
States is to the CIA; there is no way, when engaging in operations
of this magnitude, to keep them secret from the opposition. It, too,
employs a professional intelligence service. In fact, from 1952 to
1964, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet KGB electronically
intercepted even the most secret messages routed through the code
room of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. This breach in secrecy, however,
apparently caused little damage to U.S. national security, nor
did the Soviet government collapse because the CIA had for years
secretly intercepted the private conversations of the top Russian
leaders as they talked over their limousine radio-telephones. Both
sides knew more than enough to cancel out the effect of any leaks.
The fact is that in this country, secrecy and deception in intelligence
operations are as much to keep the Congress and the public from
learning what their government is doing as to shield these activities
from the opposition. The intelligence establishment operates as it
does to maintain freedom of action and avoid accountability.
A good part of the CIA's power position is dependent upon its
careful mythologizing and glorification of the exploits of the
clandestine
profession. Sometimes this even entails fostering a sort of
perverse public admiration for the covert practices of the opposition
intelligence services-to frighten the public and thereby justify
the actions of the CIA. Whatever the method, the selling of the
intelligence business is designed to have us admire it as some sort
of mysterious, often magical, profession capable of accomplishing
terribly difficult, if not miraculous, deeds. Like most myths, the
intrigues and successes of the CIA over the years have been more
imaginary than real. What is real, unfortunately, is the willingness
of both the public and adherents of the cult to believe the fictions
that permeate the intelligence business.
8 THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
The original mission of the CIA was to coordinate the intelligence-
collection programs of the various governmental departments
and agencies, and to produce the reports and studies required by
the national leadership in conducting the affairs of U.S. foreign
policy. This was President Truman's view when he requested that
Congress establish the secret intelligence agency by passing the
National Security Act of 1947. But General William "Wild Bill"
Donovan, Allen Dulles, and other veterans of the wartime Office
of Strategic Services-a virtually unregulated body, both romantic
and daring, tailor-made to the fondest dreams of the covert operator-
thought differently. They saw the emergency agency as the
clandestine instrument by which Washington could achieve foreignpolicy
goals not attainable through diplomacy. They believed that
the mantle of world leadership had been passed by the British to
the Americans, and that their own secret service must take up
where the British left off. Thus, they lobbied Congress for the power
to conduct covert operations.
That Truman attempted to create an overt intelligence organization,
one which would emphasize the gathering and analysis of
information rather than secret operations, was commendable. That
he thought he could control the advocates of covert action was, in
retrospect, a gross miscalculation. Congress, in an atmosphere of
Cold War tension, allowed itself to be persuaded by the intelligence
professionals. With the passage of the National Security Act
of 1947 it allowed the new agency special exemptions from the
normal congressional reviewing process, and these exemptions were
expanded two years later by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949. Of the greatest and most far-reaching consequence was the
provision in the 1947 law that permitted the CIA to "perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence ... as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct." From those few
innocuous words the CIA has been able, over the years, to develop
a secret charter based on NSC directives and presidental executive
orders, a charter almost completely at variance with the apparent
intent of the law that established the agency. This vague phrase
has provided the CIA with freedom to engage in covert action, the
The Cult of Intelligence • 9
right to intervene secretly in the internal affairs of other nations.
It has done so usually with the express approval of the White
House, but almost always without the consent of Congress, and
virtually never with the knowledge of the American public.
Knowing nothing has meant that the public does not even realize
how frequently the CIA has failed. In the field of classical espionage,
the CIA's Clandestine Services have been singularly unsuccessful
in their attempts to penetrate or spy on the major targets.
The Penkovsky case in the early 1960s, the only espionage operation
against the Soviets that the agency can point to with pride,
was a fortuitous windfall which British Intelligence made possible
for the CIA. The loudly heralded Berlin tunnel operation of the
mid-1950s-actually a huge telephone wiretap-produced literally
tons of trivia and gossip, but provided little in the way of highgrade
secret information that could be used by the agency's intelligence
analysts. The operation's true value was the embarrassment
it caused the KGB and the favorable publicity it generated for the
CIA. Against China, there have been no agent-related espionage
successes whatever.
Fortunately for the United States, however, the CIA's technical
experts, working with their counterparts in the Pentagon and in
the private sector, have been able over the years to develop a wide
array of electronic methods for collecting much useful information
on the U.S.S.R. and China. From these collection systems, supplemented
by material accumulated through diplomatic channels
and open sources (newspapers, magazines, and so on), the analysts
in the CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community have
been able to keep abreast of developments within the communist
powers.
The CIA's Clandestine Services have fared better in the area
of counterespionage than in classical espionage. But here, too, the
gains have been largely fortuitous. Most of the successes were not
scored by spies, but secured through the good offices of defectors
who, in return for safety, provided whatever information they
possessed. And one must subtract from even these limited achieveIO
THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
ments the misinformation passed on by "deceptions"--double
agents sent out or "surfaced" by the opposition to defect to, and
confuse, the CIA.
In its favorite field of operational endeavor, covert action, the
agency has enjoyed its greatest degree of success, but its blunders
and failures have caused much embarrassment to the United States.
Clearly, the CIA played a key role in keeping Western Europe
free of communism in the early Cold War period, although it sadly
erred in its attempts to roll back the Iron and Bamboo curtains in
the late 1940s and in the 1950s. And it did perform successfully,
if questionably, in the effort to contain the spr::ad of communism
elsewhere in the world. Some of its "victories," however, have
since come back to haunt the U.S. government. One cannot help
but wonder now if it might not have been wiser for the CIA not
to have intervened in Guatemala or Cuba or Chile, not to have
played its clandestine role in Iran or elsewhere in the Middle East,
not to have become so deeply involved in the affairs of Southeast
Asia, particularly Indochina. But the agency did, and our nation
will have to live with the consequences of those actions.
When its clandestine activities are criticized, the CIA's leadership
often points with disingenuous pride to the work of the intelligence
analysts. But here, too, the agency's record is spotty. Its many
errors in estimating Soviet and Chinese strategic military capabilities
and intentions have been a constant source of aggravation to
government officials. Often, however, it has accurately judged the
dangers and consequences of U.S. involvement in the Third World,
especially Southeast Asia and Latin America. Ironically, the clandestine
operatives who control the agency rely little on the views
of the analysts within their own organization, and the White House
staff functionaries tend to be equally heedless of the analysts'
warnings.
And since the CIA's secret intelligence is largely retained
within the executive branch, there is of course no opportunity for
Congress or others to use these warnings to question the policies
of the administration and the covert practices of the CIA.
Occasionally, clandestine operations backfire spectacularly in
public-the U-2 shootdown and the Bay of Pigs invasion, for example-
and, further, investigations by journalists and uncowed
The Cult of Intelligence I I
members of Congress have in these instances given the public some
idea of what the CIA actually does. Most recently, investigation
of the Watergate scandal has revealed some of the CIA's covert
activities within the United States, providing a frightening view of
the methods which the agency has employed for years overseas.
The assistance given the White House "plumbers" by the CIA
and the attempts to involve the agency in the cover-up have pointed
up the dangers posed to American democracy by an inadequately
controlled secret intelligence organization. As the opportunities
for covert action abroad dwindle and are thwarted, those with
careers based in clandestine methods are increasingly tempted to
turn their talents inward against the citizens of the very nation they
profess to serve. Nurtured in the adversary setting of the Cold
War, shielded by secrecy, and spurred on by patriotism that views
dissent as a threat to the national security, the clandestine operatives
of the CIA have the capability, the resources, the experience-and
the inclination-to ply their skills increasingly on the domestic
scene.
There can be no doubt that the gathering of intelligence is a necessary
function of modern government. It makes a significant contribution
to national security, and it is vital to the conduct of
foreign affairs. Without an effective program to collect information
and to analyze the capabilities and possible intentions of other
major powers, the United States could neither have confidently
negotiated
nor could now abide by the S.A.L.T. agreements or achieve
any measure of true detente with its international rivals. The proven
benefits of intelligence are not in question. Rather, it is the illegal
and unethical clandestine operations carried out under the guise of
intelligence and the dubious purposes to which they are often put
by our government that are questionable-both on moral grounds
and in terms of practical benefit to the nation.
The issue at hand is a simple one of purpose. Should the CIA
function in the way it was originally intended to-as a coordinating
agency responsible for gathering, evaluating, and preparing foreign
intelligence of use to governmental policy-makers-or should it be
permitted to function as it has done over the years-as an opera12
THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
tional arm, a secret instrument of the Presidency and a handful of
powerful men, wholly independent of public accountability, whose
chief purpose is interference in the domestic affairs of other nations
(and perhaps our own) by means of penetration agents, propaganda,
covert paramilitary interventions, and an array of other
dirty tricks?
The aim of this book is to provide the American people with the
inside information which they need-and to which they without
question have the right-to understand the significance of this
issue and the importance of dealing with it.
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