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ELEVEN:
Conclusions
In the eyes of
posterity it will
inevitably seem that, in
safeguarding our freedom, we
destroyed it; that the vast
clandestine apparatus we built up
to probe our enemies' resources
and intentions only served in the
end to confuse our own purposes;
that the practice of deceiving
others for the good of the state
led infallibly to our deceiving
ourselves; and that the vast army
of intelligence personnel built up
to execute these purposes were
soon caught up in the web of their
own sick fantasies, with
disastrous consequences
to them and us.
-- MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE
May 1966
IT is a
multi-purpose, clandestine arm of power . . . more than
an intelligence or counterintelligence organization. It is an instrument
for subversion, manipulation, and violence, for the secret intervention
in the affairs of other countries." Allen Dulles wrote those
words about the KGB in 1963 so that Americans would better
understand the nature of the Soviet security service. His description
was a correct one, but he could-just as accurately-have used
the same terms to describe his own CIA. He did not, of course, because
the U.S. leaders of Dulles' generation generally tried to impute
the worst possible methods and motives to the forces of international
communism, while casting the "defensive actions of the
free world" as honest and democratic. Both sides, however, resorted
to ruthless tactics. Neither was reluctant to employ trickery, deceit,
or, in Dulles' phrase, "subversion, manipulation, and violence."
They both operated clandestinely, concealing their activities not
so much from the "opposition" (they couldn't) as from their own
peoples. Secrecy itself became a way of life, and it could not be
challenged without fear of a charge that one was unpatriotic or
unmindful of the "national security."
In the dark days of the Cold War the communist threat was real
to most Americans. Sincere men believed that the enemy's dirtiest
tricks must be countered. Fire was to be fought with fire, and
America's small elite corps of intelligence professionals claimed
they knew how to do this. The public and the country's leaders were
willing to go along, if not always enthusiastically, at least without
serious opposition. Consequently, clandestine operatives from the
United States as well as the Soviet Union were turned loose in
virtually every nation in the world. Each side won secret victories,
but the overall results were decidedly mixed. For its part, the CIA
played some role in forestalling a communist takeover of Western
Conclusions • 371
Europe, but the agency's record in the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere
in the world left much to be desired.
When the CIA's invaders were defeated in 1961 on the beaches
of the Bay of Pigs, it should have been a signal to the country that
something was wrong-both with the CIA and the government that
directed the secret agency's activities. It should have been clear
that events in the Third World could (and should) no longer be
easily and blatantly manipulated by Washington. It should have
been obvious that the times were rapidly changing; that the fears,
following on the heels of World War II, that the "communist monolith"
was on the verge of dominating the "free world" were invalid.
It should have been apparent to the American public that the CIA
was living in the past.
Columnist Tom Braden, a former high-ranking CIA covert expert,
reflecting on the latter-day life of the CIA, wrote in January
1973: "Josef Stalin's decision to attempt conquest of Western
Europe by manipulation, the use of fronts and the purchasing of
loyalty turned the Agency into a house of dirty tricks. It was
necessary.
Absolutely necessary, in my view. But it lasted long after the
necessity was gone."
Yet after the initial public outcry over the Cuban fiasco, the personnel
shake-up at the agency and the high-level reviews of its performance
ordered by President Kennedy had little effect. The CIA
went back to operating essentially the same way it had for the
previous decade, again with at least the tacit acceptance of the
American public. Not until the Indochinese war shocked and outraged
a significant part of the population were CIA's tactics, such
as secret subsidies, clandestine armies, and covert coups, seriously
called into question. Now Watergate has brought the issue of an
inadequately controlled secret intelligence agency home to us. The
clandestine techniques developed over a quarter-century of Cold
War have, at last, been dramatically displayed for the people of this
country, and the potential danger of a CIA which functions solely
at the command of the President has been demonstrated to the
public.
372 THE C I A AND THE C U L T 0 FIN TEL L I G ENe E
The CIA has a momentum of its own, and its operatives continue
to ply their trade behind their curtain of secrecy. They do not
want to give up their covert activities, their dirty tricks. They
believe
in these methods and they rather enjoy the game. Of course, without
a presidential mandate they would have to stop, but the country
has not had a chief executive since the agency's inception who has
not believed in the fundamental need and rightness of CIA intervention
in the internal affairs of other nations. When a President
has perceived American interests to be threatened in some faraway
land, he has usually been willing to try to change the course of
events by sending in the CIA. That these covert interventions often
are ineffective, counterproductive, or damaging to the national interest
has not prevented Presidents from attempting them.
(
DELETED
) Kissinger and Nixon were concerned with what
they believe to be a legitimate end-preventing a Marxist from
being elected President of Chile-and the means employed mattered
little to them, as long as secrecy could be maintained.
The new CIA Director, William Colby, has indicated on the
public record that he intends to keep the agency functioning largely
as it has in the past (while pledging to shun future "Watergates").
When Senator Harold Hughes asked him where the line should be
drawn between the use of CIA paramilitary warriors and the regular
U.S. armed forces, Colby replied that the dividing line should
be "at the point in which the United States acknowledges involvement
in such activities." Senator Hughes specifically put this answer
into perspective when he said on August 1, 1973, "Mr. Colby
believes that CIA-run military operations are perfectly acceptable
as long as they can be concealed."
Colby's-and the CIA's and the Nixon administration's-view
that "deniability" somehow allows the United States a free hand
Conclusions 373
for covert intervention abroad (and at home) is an anachronistic
hangover from the Cold War. Perhaps such actions could once
have been justified when the future of the country was seemingly at
stake, but no such threat now looms on the horizon. The only
two foreign powers with the potential to threaten the United States
-the Soviet Union and China-have long ceased to be meaningful
targets of CIA secret operations. Instead, the agency works
mainly in the Third World, in nations that pose no possible threat
to American security (
DELETED
) The CIA is not defending our national security. It
seeks rather to maintain the status quo, to hold back the cultural
clock, in areas that are of little or no significance to the American
people. These efforts are often doomed to failure. In fact, at least
since 1961, the CIA has lost many more battles than it has won,
even by its own standards. Furthermore, the very fact that the
United States operates an active CIA around the world has done
incalculable harm to the nation's international position. Not only
have millions of people abroad been alienated by the CIA's activities,
but so have been a large number of Americans, especially
young people.
The time has come for the United States to stand openly behind
its actions overseas, to lead by example rather than manipulation.
The changeover might disturb those government officials who
believe in the inherent right of the United States to exercise its
power everywhere, clandestinely when that seems necessary; but in
the long run non-interference and forthrightness would enhance
America's international prestige and position.
Even in an era when the public is conditioned to ever expanding
and ever more expensive government activities, the $6 billion
yearly cost of American intelligence represents a significant slice of
the national treasure. The government spends more money on the
various forms of spying than it does on the war against crime and
drugs, community development and housing, mass transportation
systems, and even the country's overt international programs carried
out by the State Department, the USIA, and the AID combined.
Yet, unlike other federal activities, information on the intelligence
374 THE C I A AND THE C U L T 0 FIN TEL L I G ENe E
community-how much money is being spent and where the money
goes-is systematically withheld from the American people and
all but a handful of Congressmen. Behind this wall of secrecy
(which exists as much to conceal waste and inefficiency as to
protect "national security") intelligence has grown far beyond the
needs of the nation.
The time has come to demysticize the intelligence profession, to
disabuse Americans of the ideas that clandestine agents somehow
make the world a safer place to live in, that excessive secrecy is
necessary to protect the national security. These notions simply are
not true; the CIA and the other intelligence agencies have merely
used them to build their own covert empire. The U.S. intelligence
community performs a vital service in keeping track of and analyzing
the military capability and strengths of the Soviet Union and
China, but its other functions-the CIA's dirty tricks and classical
espionage-are, on the whole, a liability for the country, on both
practical and moral grounds.
But because of bureaucratic tribalism, vested interests, and the
enormous size of the intelligence community, internal reform never
makes more than a marginal dent in the community's operations.
The people in charge like things essentially as they are, and they
have never been subjected to the kind of intense outside pressure
which leads to change in our society. Presidents, furthermore, have
not wanted to greatly disturb the existing system because they have
always wanted more, if not better, intelligence; because they were
afraid of opening up the secret world of intelligence to public
scrutiny; because they did not want to risk losing their personal
action arm for intervention abroad.
The Congress, which has the constitutional power and, indeed,
the responsibility to monitor the CIA and U.S. intelligence, has
almost totally failed to exercise meaningful control. Intelligence
has always been the sacred shibboleth which could not be disturbed
without damaging the "national security," and, despite loud
protests from a few outspoken critics, neither legislative house has
been willing to question seriously the scope or the size of intelligence
activities. Yet, if there is to be any real, meaningful change
in the intelligence community, it must come from Congress, and,
Conclusions • 375
judging from past experience, Congress will act only if prodded
by public opinion. The Watergate affair has, to some extent, played
such a role, and the full review of the CIA's secret charter promised
by Senate Armed Services chairman John Stennis should be the first
step in limiting the CIA's covert operations and cutting down the
duplication and inefficiency of the rest of the community.
Congress should require the various intelligence agencies to keep
it informed of the information collected. This kind of data should
be routinely supplied to the legislative branch so it can properly
carry out its foreign-policy functions and vote funds for the national
defense. If the same information can be given to foreign
governments and selectively leaked to the press by administrations
in search of votes on military-spending issues, then there is no
"security" reason why it must be denied to the Congress. The
Soviets know that U.S. spy satellites observe their country and that
other electronic devices monitor their activities; it makes little sense
to classify the intelligence gathered "higher than top secret." No one
is asking that technical details such as how the cameras work be
given to the Congress or made public-but the excessive secrecy
which surrounds the finished intelligence product could certainly
be eased without in any way limiting the nation's ability to collect
raw intelligence data by technical means.
As for the CIA proper, Congress should take action to limit the
agency to the role originally set out for it in the National Security
Act of 1947-namely, the CIA should concern itself exclusively
with coordinating and evaluating intelligence. At the minimum, if
clandestine activities must be continued by the U,S. government, the
operational part of the CIA should be separated from the noncovert
components. In the analytical and technical field the agency
can make its most important contribution to the national security,
but these functions have been neglected and at times distorted by
the clandestine operatives who have almost always been in control
of the CIA. Intelligence should not be presented to the nation's
policy-makers by the same men who are trying to justify clandestine
operations. The temptation to use field information selectively and
to evaluate information to serve operational interests can be
irresistible
to the most honest men-let alone to the clandestine operatives.
376 THE C I A AND THE C U L T 0 FIN TEL L I G ENe E
However, the best solution would be not simply to separate the
Clandestine Services from the rest of the CIA, but to abolish them
completely. The few clandestine functions which still serve a useful
purpose could be transferred to other government departments, but,
for the most part, such activities should be eliminated. This would
deprive the government of its arsenal of dirty tricks, but the republic
could easily sustain the loss-and be the better for it.
The Clandestine Services' espionage operations using human
agents have already been made obsolete by the technical collection
systems which, along with open sources, supply the United States
government with almost all the information it needs on the military
strength and deployments of the Soviet Union and China. The
truly valuable technical systems-the satellites and electronic listening
devices-should be maintained, although without the present
duplication and bureaucratic inefficiency. Since Oleg Penkovsky's
arrest by Soviet authorities in 1962, there has been no CIA spy
who has supplied the United States with important information
about any communist power, and it is difficult to justify the
expenditure
of over $1 billion in the last decade for classical espionage
simply on the hope that another Penkovsky will someday offer
himself up as a CIA agent. Assuming that the CIA's most valuable
agents will continue to be volunteers-"walk-ins" and defectorsa
small office attached to the State Department and embassy contacts
could be established to receive the information supplied by
these sources.
While the CIA has been much more successful in penetrating
the governments of the Third World and some of America's allies,
the information received is simply not that important and can be
duplicated to some extent through diplomatic and open sources.
While it might be interesting to know about the inner workings of
a particular Latin American, Asian, or African country, this
intelligence
has little practical use if the CIA has no intention of
manipulating the local power structure.
The Clandestine Services' counterespionage functions should be
taken over by the FBI. Protecting the United States against foreign
spies is supposed to be the bureau's function anyway, and the
incessant game-playing with foreign intelligence services-the
provConclusions
377
ocations, deceptions, and double agents-would quickly become
a relic of the past if the CIA were not involved in its own covert
operations. Playing chess with the taxpayers' money against the
KGB is unquestionably a fascinating exercise for clandestine operatives,
but one that can properly be handled by the internal-security
agency of the United States, the FBI.
As for the CIA's paramilitary tasks, they have no place in an
intelligence agency, no place in a democratic society. Under the
Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war, and the
United States should never again become involved in armed conflict
without full congressional approval and public knowledge. If
"American advisors" are needed to assist another country legitimately,
they can be supplied by the Pentagon. The other forms of
covert action-propaganda, subversion, manipulation of governments-
should simply be discontinued. These are more often than
not counterproductive and, even when successful, contrary to the
most basic American ideals. The CIA's proprietary companies
should be shut down or sold off. The agency would have little use
for one of the largest aircraft networks in the world if it were not
constantly intervening in foreign countries. The proprietaries, with
their unregulated profits, potential conflicts of interest, and doubtful
business practices, should in no case be allowed to continue
operations.
The other countries of the world have a fundamental right not
to have any outside power interfere in their internal affairs. The
United States, which solemnly pledged to uphold this right when
it ratified the United Nations charter, should now honor it. The
mechanisms used to intervene overseas ignore and undermine
American constitutional processes and pose a threat to the democratic
system at home. The United States is surely strong enough
as a nation to be able to climb out of the gutter and conduct its
foreign policy in accordance with the ideals that the country was
founded upon.
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