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THE DIALOGUE IN HELL BETWEEN MACHIAVELLI AND MONTESQUIEU -- TRANSLATION

Second Part

Eighth Dialogue

Machiavelli; Hypothetically, let me take the most difficult case, a state constituted as a republic. With a monarchy, the task would be much too easy. I choose  a republic, because with such a form of government, I will encounter what  seems an insurmountable obstacle as far as ideas, mores, and laws go. Is such a  case all right with you? Give me a state of any size, large or small. I assume if to  be endowed with all the institutions that guarantee liberty. But I want to put to  you this one question. Do you think the ruling power is beyond subversion or  what is today known as a coup d'etat? 

Montesquieu; Certainly not. But at least you will agree with me that such an enterprise would be singularly difficult in contemporary political societies as  presently organized.

Machiavelli: Why? Aren't such societies, like all societies throughout history, a prey to factions? Isn't civil war latent in all societies, subject to parties and rival  claimants to power?

Montesquieu: I admit the possibility. But it won't take too much to keep you from drawing the wrong conclusions. Nowadays usurpers face great dangers and  are repugnant to modern mores. They do not succeed very frequently and certainly don't have the significance you appear to want to lend them. Changing  who governs does not lead to a change in institutions. A pretender may disturb  the state. O.K. And I grant that his party may triumph. But power is in other  hands. That's all. Public right and the institutional basis of power stay intact.  That is the crucial thing for me.

Machiavelli: Can you really be so deluded?

Montesquieu: Show me the contrary.

Machiavelli; Do you grant that an armed enterprise directed against established authority might momentarily be successful?

Montesquieu; Yes.

Machiavelli; You have to appreciate exactly where I stand at this moment. For the time being, I have suppressed all power other than my own. The institutions  still left standing present no real obstacle to me. It's all pure form. In ~ct, my  will would face no real resistance. The Romans coined such a beautiful term for  the extralegal position I hold -- dictatorship -- connoting both power and energy .  That is to say that at this moment I can do as I wish. I am legislator, executive,  judge, and as head of the army, I'm firmly in the saddle, so to speak.

Keep this in mind. In the circumstances, my triumph was due to the support of a faction. That means that this could only have been brought off in response  to ongoing internal strife. Let me venture to pinpoint its causes: either a conflict  between the aristocracy and the people or between the people and the propertied  classes. This is the deepest and perhaps most salient source of social discord. It  manifests itself in a cacophony of ideas and opinions, from contradictory pres  sure groups and interests, as happens in all states where liberty is momentarily  unleashed. Political elements of all kinds make their class interest felt. Present are remnants of previously victorious but now vanquished parties, unbridled ambitions, burning greed, implacable hatreds. There are men of every opinion  and doctrine-those that would restore former regimes, demagogues, anarchists,  and utopians, all acting out of devotion to their cause and equally at work in  trying to overthrow the existing order. What are we to conclude from such a situation? Two things. First, the country feels a great need for tranquillity and  will refuse nothing to whatever power can provide it. Second, given these  partisan divisions, there is no real locus of power or rather only one-the  people.

I am a former pretender, now victorious. Assume that I have a great historical name capable of capturing the imagination of the masses. Like Pisistratus,  Caesar, even Nero, I find my support in the people. That is as elementary as the  ARC's for every usurper. With them is found the blind power that enables the  usurper to do anything with impunity and authority , using a name to cover everything. See how the people really care about your legal fictions and your constitutional guarantees!

At the center of factional dispute, I have induced silence. And now I'll show you what I will do.

Perhaps you remember the rules I set down in The Prince regarding the preservation of conquered territories. The usurper of a state is in a position analogous to that of a conqueror. He is forced to remake everything, to dissolve the  state, to destroy the city, and to change the customary practices of right and  wrong.

That is the goal. But in modern times, you can only get there by indirect routes and roundabout ways, by employing clever schemes, and eschewing violence, as much as possible. I won't destroy institutions directly; rather, one by  one, I will secretly tamper with each of their mechanisms. In this way I will by  turns rig the operation of the judicial branch, voting, the press, individual  liberties, and education.

Beyond constitutional law, I would pass a whole new set of ordinary laws that would not expressly abrogate old ones but would first blunt their influence and then completely overshadow them. These are my general ideas. Now you  will see in detail how I would put them into practice.

Montesquieu: If only you were still in the gardens of Rucellai, Machiavelli, discoursing on such lofty precepts. How regrettable that posterity can't hear you!

Machiavelli: Rest assured. All this is in The Prince, for those who know how to read.

Montesquieu: All right. It's the day after your coup d'etat. What are you going to do now?

Machiavelli: One big thing, then one very little thing.

Montesquieu: How about the big one first?

Machiavelli: Taking over power after a violent coup is not enough. In general, factions do not readily accept their defeat. An accurate reading of the usurper  has yet to be made. A test of wills will follow. There will be armed uprisings  against him. The moment has come to subject the entire city to a kind of terror  that causes the most intrepid souls to shrink back.

Montesquieu: What are you up to? You told me that your rule repudiates blood baths.

Machiavelli: There is no place here for false humanity. Society is menaced. We've arrived at a point where its defense is legitimate. What looks like an excess of harshness and even cruelty will prevent new bloodletting down the line.  You needn't ask about the details. Terror must enter their souls so that fear softens their characters.

Montesquieu: Yes, I remember what you said in The Prince when you recount how Borgia staged his cynical execution in Cesena. [ll You are ever the same.

Machiavelli: No, no, as you'll see later. I only act this way out of necessity. It pains me.

Montesquieu: Then who will actually spill this blood?

Machiavelli: The army-that great arbiter of justice, whose hand never dishonors its victims! There are two things of the greatest consequence that follow  from the army's handling of repression. One, it will find itself forever alienated  from the civilian population that it so indiscriminately punished. Two, it will  bind its fate to the fate of its leader with indissoluble ties.

Montesquieu: And you don't think that you'll be implicated in all this bloodletting?

Machiavelli: No. In any case, the people see the sovereign as above such things. The excesses of soldiers are not always easily contained. The generals and ministers who carried out my orders will be held responsible. I can assure you they  will be fanatically devoted to me, for they know full well what would await  them after me.

Montesquieu: So that's your first act as sovereign! Now shall we see the second?

Machiavelli: I don't know whether you have fully appreciated in politics how much power lies in little things. After doing what I just told you I'd do, I'd issue  a great quantity of new currency, and upon each coin my image would be  stamped.

Montesquieu: But given far graver affairs of state that you have to sort out, this would be frivolous.

Machiavelli: You think so? That's because you never held power. Having the human profile stamped upon coins is the clearest sign of power. At first, the  proud will be consumed with anger, rot people will get used to it. The very  enemies who oppose my power will be forced to. carry my portrait around in  their purses. It is quite certain that little by little everyone will eventually learn  to smile upon those features that are everywhere stamped on the material tokens of their joy. From the day that my image appears on coins, I am king.

Montesquieu: These are rather novel conceits, I confess. But haven't you foF- gotten that modern peoples are inclined to give themselves constitutions that  guarantee their rights? Given that the origin of your power is force, plus the  measures you said you would immediately take, you still find yourself in the  presence of a fundamental charter whose principles, regulations, and provisions  are completely contrary to your maxims of government.

Machiavelli: I'll enact another constitution. That's all.

Montesquieu: And you don't think that will raise other difficulties?

Machiavelli: What difficulty could there be? For the time being, there is no other will, no other power than mine, and the popular element of the regime serves as  the basis of my action.

Montesquieu: That's true. However, I have one reservation. According to what you have just told me, I imagine that your constitution will not be a monument  to liberty. Do you think a single crisis, a single display of timely violence, is sufficient to rob a nation of all its rights, all its achievements, all its institutions, all  the principles under which it has been accustomed to live?

Machiavelli: Please! Not so fast. As I told you a moment ago, peoples, like men, are more impressed by appearances than reality. This notion lights the way in  politics and I would scrupulously adhere to it. Please tell me the principles you  prize most highly and I'll show you that they don't inconvenience me as much  as you think.

Montesquieu: What are you going to do with them?

Machiavelli: Don't be timid. Name them.

Montesquieu: I admit my reluctance.

Machiavelli: Very well. I will remind you of them myself. No doubt, you would have mentioned the principle of the separation of powers, freedom of speech and  the press, religious liberty , and personal rights. You might also have mentioned the right of association, equality before the law, the inviolability of personal  property and the home, the right to petition, no taxation without representation,  punishments proportionate to crimes, the prohibition against ex post facto laws.  Is this enough or do you want still more?

Montesquieu: I think it's more than enough, Machiavelli, to encumber your government.

Machiavelli: That's where you're wrong, so much so that I see no problem with proclaiming these principles myself. If you want, I will even put them into the  preamble of my constitution.

Montesquieu: You have already shown that you are a great magician.

Machiavelli: Nothing to do with magic-only political savoir faire.

Montesquieu: Having inscribed these principles at the head of your constitution, how can you avoid putting them into practice?

Machiavelli: Ah! Let's be precise. I told you that I would proclaim these principles but I did not tell you that I would inscribe them, nor even that I would expressly enumerate them.

Montesquieu: What do you mean?

Machiavelli: I would stay away from any specification of rights. I would merely declare to the people my recognition and support for the great principles of  modern right.

Montesquieu: The significance of this escapes me.

Machiavelli: You will see how important it is. If I were to spell out these rights, my freedom to act would be restricted by those so specified. And I don't want  that. By not specifying them, I appear to grant them all, and yet I grant none  explicitly. This will later allow me to make an exception of those I may judge  dangerous.

Montesquieu: I understand.

Machiavelli: Moreover, strictly speaking, some of these principles belong to the domain of political and constitutional right and others under civil rights. Herein  is a distinction that must always guide the exercise of absolute power. People are  most attached to their civil rights. These I will not touch, if possible. In this way, at least one part of my program will be fulfilled.

Montesquieu: And what about political rights?

Machiavelli: In The Prince, I set down a maxim, the truth of which is still relevant. "If the prince leaves the people's possessions and honor alone, they will  always be content. Then he has only to worry about the pretensions of a small  number of malcontents against whom he will easily prevail." That is my answer  to your question.

Montesquieu: Strictly speaking, your response is not wholly satisfying. Someone could claim that political rights are also possessions, that respect for them is  crucial to the people's sense of honor, and that interfering with them is tantamount to interfering with their possessions (S well as their sense of dignity.  Someone might additionally claim that respect for both civil and political rights  is mutually dependent. If the citizens are today deprived of political liberty , what  guarantee is there tomorrow that they will not be deprived of individual liberty?  If their liberty is assailed today, that tomorrow their property will not come under attack?

Machiavelli: You seem to have gotten yourself a bit worked up over your argument. But I think you will also come to see how exaggerated its importance is.  You seem to think that modern peoples thirst for liberty. Can you imagine a time when the people no longer desire liberty? Is it possible for princes to be more  passionately committed to it than the people? The societies that you've de  scribed are so incredibly lax that individuals live only in the narrow sphere of  their egoism and material interests. If you asked most people, you'd find the  same response everywhere. "What does politics have to do with me? What does  liberty matter to me? Aren't all governments the same? Doesn't a government  have to defend itself?"

Moreover, note well that it is not only the people who speak this way. It is the middle class, industrialists, the educated, the rich, the men of letters-all those who are in a position to appreciate your lofty doctrines of public right.  They will thank me. They will cry out that I have saved them, and that the people are mere children, incapable of directing their own lives. Hey, nations have a  kind of hidden love for vigorous and powerful geniuses as long as they demonstrate skillful deception. With respect to all those violent acts marked by duplicity, admiration will outweigh condemnation and people will say: "It's not right,  but so what? It's shrewd, well calculated, and smoothly executed."

Montesquieu: Are you about to return to a discussion of the essence of your doctrines?

Machiavelli: No. We're now ready for their application and I would have been farther along if you hadn't caused me to digress. Let's continue.

Ninth Dialogue

Montesquieu: You were speaking of the day after you established a constitution without the consent of the nation.

Machiavelli: Just a minute now. I never said that I would go so far in offending traditional opinion. I am fully aware of its power.

Montesquieu: Really?

Machiavelli: I'm quite serious.

Montesquieu: Do you expect to unite the nation behind the new modes and orders you are proposing?

Machiavelli: Certainly. Does that surprise you? I will go you one better. I will start by having my coup against the state ratified by popular vote. In a carefully  crafted message to the people, I will show that we were in a crisis situation. I  have totally broken with the past to save them. I want what they want. People  are free to condemn or vindicate me by their vote.

Montesquieu: Free under the threat of terror and armed force.

Machiavelli: I will be acclaimed.

Montesquieu: I believe it so.

Machiavelli: I have turned the popular vote into an instrument of my power and it will become the very foundation of my government. I will expand suffrage by abolishing the poll tax and class-based qualifications. With this simple step, the  groundwork of absolutism will be laid.

Montesquieu: Yes. And at the same time you move to destroy the solidarity among families, debase the vote, and cancel out more enlightened voices with  the weight of numbers that are turned into a blind power subject to your will.  Mach iavelli: What I achieve represents real progress to which all the peoples of Europe today aspire. I bring about universal suffrage as Washington did in the  United States. It will be put into play right away when I submit my constitution  to its authority .

Montesquieu: What! Are you going to have it debated in constituent assemblies or ratifying conventions?

Machiavelli: Oh! I beg you. Leave your eighteenth century ideas out of it. They are already dated.

Montesquieu: Very well. Will the ratification of your constitution be debated? How will its main articles be discussed?

Machiavelli: But I don't intend them to be discussed at all. I believe I've already told you that.

Montesquieu: I'm only pointing out the implications of principles you were eger to adopt. You spoke of the United States of America. I don't know if you are  a new Washington, but what is certain is that the present Constitution of the  United States was discussed, deliberated, and voted upon by the representatives of the nation.

Machiavelli: For goodness sake. Let's not confuse times, places, and peoples. We are in Europe. My constitution is presented en bloc. It is accepted en bloc.

Montesquieu: But such a step doesn't fool anyone in the least. Voting under these conditions, how can the people know what they are doing and to what ex-  tent they are bound?

Machiavelli: And where have you ever seen a constitution truly worthy of its name and truly lasting that has ever been the product of popular deliberation? A  constitution must issue, fully elaborated, from the head of a single man or it is  only a work doomed to disappear. It will necessarily bear the mark of all the  petty opinions that presided at its drafting and lack consistency, coherence, and  practical force.

Once again, a constitution can only be the work of a single man. Things have never happened otherwise, as the histories of all the founders of empire testify-  Sesostris, Solon, Lycurgus, Charlemagne, Frederick II, Peter the First, for example.

Montesquieu: You are about to expound upon a chapter from one of your disciples.

Machiavelli: Who?

Montesquieu: Joseph de Maistre. Some general points you make are not without merit but I find them inapplicable here. Listening to you,Ihave the impression  of someone who is about to lead a people out of chaos and the extremely benighted times that marked their origins. You don't seem to remember that according to our working hypothesis, the nation has reached the pinnacle of civilization, public right is well established, and well-ordered institutions are  functioning.

Machiavelli: I'm not saying anything different. However, you will see that I don't need utterly to destroy your institutions to reach my goal. All I need to do  is modify their organizational structure and to change their relations to each  other.

Montesquieu: Explain.

Machiavelli: A little while ago you gave me a discourse on constitutional Jaw. I intend to put it to use. Moreover, contrary to what might be generally thought in  Europe, I am not completely unacquainted with all these ideas of seesaw politics. You could find some of them in my discourses on Titus Livy. But let's return to the matter at hand. A moment ago you remarked, reasonalJy enough, that  government powers in the parliamentary states of Europe were almost every-  where similarly distributed. The government consists of bodies whose interrelations are regulated by constitutional procedures.

Therein, we inevitably find a cabinet, a Senate, a legislative body, a Council of State, and a court of appeal. They may operate under different names but they  have virtually the same functions. I will spare you all needless elaboration of the  respective mechanisms of these powers whose workings you have deciphered  better than me. It is obvious that each of them corresponds to an essential function of government. Notice that it is the function I consider essential, not the institution. Thus, there must be an executive power, a conserving power, a law-making power, a regulatory power-of this there is no doubt.

Montesquieu: But if I understand you, these various powers are really one in your eyes and you are going to give them all to one man by doing away with  public institutions.

Machiavelli: Once again, you're wrong. It could not be done without danger, especially in your country, given the fanatical support that reigns there for what  you call the principles of '89. But please listen to me carefully. In statics, moving the fulcrum causes a change in the direction of the forces. In mechanics, changing the location of a spring causes a change in the machine's movement.  And yet, it appears to be the same apparatus, the same mechanism. Likewise in  physiology, character traits manifest themselves as a function of internal organs.  If the organ's functioning is altered, the character changes. And so, the various  institutions that we have just mentioned perform functions in the governmental  structure similar to vital organs in the human body. I will tamper with internal  chemistry. External features will not be touched but the political complexion of  the state will change, nonetheless. Do you see what I'm getting at? 

Montesquieu: It's not that difficult. You needn't be so circumspect. You keep the names but the thing itself is gutted. That is what Augustus did in Rome when  he destroyed the Republic. There continued to be a consulate, praetorship, censorship, tribunate, as always, but there were no longer consuls, praetors, censors,  or tribunes.

Machiavelli: You have to admit that worse models could be chosen. Anything is possible in politics if public prejudices are flattered and respect for appearances  is maintained.

Montesquieu: Let's not lapse back into generalities. Get to work. I'm following you.

Machiavelli: Don't forget that each thing I do is grounded in certain personal convictions. As I see it, your parliamentary governments are only schools for  quarreling, centers of sterile conflict that sap the creative energy of nations,  doomed to impotence by public debate and the press. Consequently, I feel no  remorse. I proceed from an elevated point of view and my goal justifies my  deeds.

I substitute practical reason for abstract theory and follow the experience of the ages and the examples of men of genius who have done great things using  the same means. I begin by restoring the vital conditions of power.

My first reform immediately impinges upon the claim you made for ministerial responsibility. In centralized countries, like yours, for example, public opinion instinctively holds the chief of state responsible for everything, good as well  as bad. To inscribe at the beginning of your charter that the sovereign is not responsible is to contradict what public sentiment holds true and to promulgate a  fiction that will never survive the noise of revolution.

I begin by striking out of my constitution the principle of ministerial responsibility. The sovereign that my constitution establishes will have sole responsibility before the people.

Montesquieu: No beating about the bush here.

Machiavelli: As you explained your parliamentary system, the representatives of the nation draft the bills alone or with the executive. Well, that is the source of  the gravest abuses. In such a scheme, a deputy can take the place of the government at any time and propose poorly researched and badly considered bills. Why with parliamentary initiation of bills, the lower chamber could overthrow the  government whenever it wanted. I strike parliamentary initiative from my constitution. The sovereign alone may propose laws.

Montesquieu: If your intention is to arrive at absolute power, I see you are taking the best route. In a state where the initiation of laws belongs only to the sovereign, he becomes the sole legislator to a great degree. But before you go any  further down that road, I want to raise one objection. You want to establish  yourself upon rock, but I see you building on sand.

Machiavelli: How so?

Montesquieu: Haven't you taken universal manhood suffrage as the basis of your power?

Machiavelli: Certainly.

Montesquieu: Then you are only the agent of the people, in whom alone true sovereignty resides, and serve at its pleasure. You thought that you could make  this principle serve your authority. But don't you see that you can be overthrown  whenever the people so desire? Moreover, you declared that you alone are responsible. Do you expect to rule like an angel? :;rry as you will but you will still  be blamed for everything bad that might happen and you will disappear at the  first crisis. 

Machiavelli: You 're getting ahead of yourself. Your objection is a bit premature. But I will answer you now, since you are forcing the issue. You are quite mistaken if you think I haven't anticipated this objection. If my power is threatened,  it could only be because of factions. I am protected against them by two basic  prerogatives that I have placed in my constitution: the right of appeal to the people and the right to place the country in a state of emergency. l am head of the  army. All coercive power is in my hands. The first sign of insurrection would  find my bayonets taking the measure of the resistance. And I would find at the  polls a new consecration of my authority.

Montesquieu: Your arguments are unassailable. But, I beg you, let's return to the legislative body that you've installed. I still see some complications. You have taken away parliamentary initiative from this Assembly. But it still retains the  right to vote on bills that you propose there. Certainly you don't intend that this  right be exercised, do you?

Machiavelli: You are more untrusting than I am. I swear I don't see anything inconvenient in this. With only myself able to propose laws, I don't have to fear  any threat to my power. I hold the key to the tabernacle. Besides, as I said be-  fore, it is part of my plan to allow institutions to exist in appearance. But I have  to say that I don't intend to allow the Assembly what you call the right of  amendment. Obviously, to allow the exercise of such a power would enable the  legislator to change the purpose and spirit of any of my laws. The law doesn't  exist that can not be diverted from its original purpose and made susceptible to a variety of interpretations. The law is accepted or rejected-no other alternative.

Montesquieu: But that's all that's needed to overthrow you. This could be accomplished if the Assembly were to systematically reject all your bills or merely  refuse to vote taxes.

Machiavelli: You know perfectly well that things can't happen that way. Any chamber whatsoever that would so boldly shackle the course of public affairs  would commit suicide. Besides, l have a thousand ways to neutralize the power  of such an Assembly. I could reduce the number of representatives by half,  thereby halving the political passions I would have to contend with. I could re-  serve to myself the right to name the presiding officers in the legislative bodies.  Instead of permanent sessions, I could reduce the tenure of the Assembly to a  few months. Above all, I could do something of very great importance that, I'm  told, is already being put into practice. I would abolish the unpaid status of legislative service. I would have the deputies receive an emolument. Their service  should be salaried to some extent. I regard this innovation as the surest way of  attaching the representatives of the nation to my power. I don't need to elaborate. Its usefulness is fairly self- evident. I might add that as head of the executive branch, I have the right to convoke and to dissolve the legislative body and,  in cases of dissolution, I would wait a long time before convoking a new one. I  perfectly well understand that it would be dangerous if the legislative Assembly  remained independent of my power. But rest assured. We will soon encounter  other practices that will tie it to me. Are you satisfied with these constitutional  details? Do you want more?

Montesquieu: That is hardly necessary. You can now proceed to the organization of the Senate.

Machiavelli: I see that you have clearly understood that it represents the principal element in my designs, the keystone of my constitution.

Montesquieu: I really don't know what else you need to do because from this point on I regard you as complete master of the state.

Machiavelli: So you say. But in reality, sovereignty could not be established on such frail foundations. At the side of the sovereign must be found bodies of individuals that remain impressive by virtue of brilliant titles, respectability, and  the personal illustriousness of those who compose them. It is not good for the sovereign himself to be constantly active, always to reveal his hand. He must be  able, when necessary, to hide his acts under the authority of great magistracies  that surround the throne.

Montesquieu: It is easy to see that this is the r0.le for which the Senate and Council of State are destined.

Machiavelli: Nothing escapes you.

Montesquieu: You speak of the throne. I see that you are king, while a moment ago we were in a republic. This is quite a leap.

Machiavelli: It's beneath the illustrious French publicist to ask me to pause over such petty details. When I have all power in my hands, the exact time that I proclaim myself king is but a matter of expediency. Before or after having promulgated my constitution-it doesn't matter- I will be king.

Montesquieu: Let's assume what you say is true for the moment. We need to re- turn to the organization of the Senate to see if what you say can possibly be  borne out.

Tenth Dialogue

Machiavelli: Given the exhaustive studies you had to make in order to write your memorable work on The Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their  Decline, you could not have failed to notice the role that the Senate played in  relation to the Emperors, beginning with the reign of Augustus.

Montesquieu: If you will allow me to say so, this is a matter that historical research has not yet completely clarified. This much is certain. Until the last days  of the Republic, the Roman Senate was an autonomous institution vested with  great privileges and having independent powers. That was the secret of its influence, the reason why its political traditions took such deep hold, and how great-  ness would be stamped onto the Republic. But from Augustus on, the Senate  was nothing more than a tool in the hands of the emperors. Yet, it is not clear  how they proceeded finally in stripping it of its power .

Machiavelli: My motive in returning you to this period of the Empire is not to clarify this point in history. This question doesn't interest me. All I wanted to  say is that the Senate, as I see it, should playa political role vis-a-vis the prince  analogous to that of the Roman Senate in the times that followed the fall of the  Republic.

Montesquieu: All right. But in that epoch laws were no longer voted on in the popular forums, but were made by decree of senatus consultum. Is that what you  want?

Machiavelli: Not at all. That would hardly be in conformity with modem principles of constitutional right.

Montesquieu: Your scruples in this regard deserve profound gratitude!

Machiavelli: I have no need of such procedures in order to decree what seems to me necessary. You understand that I fill in the details of legislation. In addition,  my decrees have the force of law.

Montesquieu: It's true that you had forgotten to mention this point, though it is hardly insignificant. But then I don't see why you keep a Senate.

Machiavelli: Playing an exalted role in the constitutional system, its direct intervention should be reserved for grave situations only, for example, if it were necessary to amend the organic law or if sovereignty were threatened.

Montesquieu: You speak ever more like a prophet. You relish setting the stage for what's to come.

Machiavelli: Up to now, the constitutions your modem disciples have given the people fixated on the idea of foreseeing every eventuality and regulating everything in advance. I am not prone to such an error. I would not want to confine  myself within strict boundaries. I would only spell out what is impossible to  leave uncertain. I would have a fairly large opening for change. Then, in serious  crises, there might be some other alternative to the disastrous expedient of revolution.

Montesquieu: These words shine with prudence.

Machiavelli: And as for the power of the Senate, I would put in my constitution the following provision. "The Senate shall act by senatus consultum in all matters that have not been specifically provided for in the constitution and which are necessary for its continued existence. It shall define the meaning of articles  of the constitution that are open to various interpretations. It will have the power  of judicial review to determine the constitutionality of all acts referred to it by  the government or though grievances filed as petitions by the people. It may  draft measures in the national interest. It may propose amendments to the constitution which will be enacted by senatus consultum."

Montesquieu: All this is quite nice. We have here a truly Roman Senate. I'll make only a few comments on your constitution. I gather it will be written in a  vague and ambiguous language since you say that you will be able to predetermine the meaning of constitutional provisions.

Machiavelli: No. But everything must be anticipated.

Montesquieu:  I thought your principle in such matters was the opposite, to avoid trying to anticipate and regulate every contingency.

Machiavelli: My illustrious interlocutor has not haunted the palace of Themis without profit nor has he donned the cap of president of a court of justice in  vain. My words have had no other meaning than this: it is necessary to anticipate  what is essential.

Montesquieu: Pray tell, I beg you, does your Senate, interpreter and guardian of the fundamental law, have any power of its own?

Machiavelli: Certainly not.

Montesquieu: Anything the Senate does will actually be done by you?

Machiavelli: I'm not saying anything different.

Montesquieu: It will be you, not the Senate, who actually interprets the constitution, reverses precedent, and overturns law.

Machiavelli: I don't claim to deny these things.

Montesquieu: Then that means that you reserve for yourself the right to undo what you have done, to take away what you have given, and to change your constitution for better or worse or even make it disappear altogether if you judge it  necessary.  I will not prejudge the intentions or motive that might lead you to act  in various circumstances. I only ask you where one may find even the weakest  safeguards for citizens in the vast field of arbitrary power. Above all, how could  they ever be brought to endure such a situation?

Machiavelli:  I see I've hit a sensitive nerve in you again. Rest assured. I would not bring about any change in the fundamental principles of my constitution  without submitting these amendments to the approval of the people through  popular vote in a referendum.

Montesquieu: But you would still be the judge of whether or not the amendment you propose is of such fundamental importance that it must be submitted to the  people for their approval. However, you concede that amendments are to be ratified by a plebiscite and not made by a decree or senatus consultum. Will your  constitutional amendments be publicly debated? Will they be submitted to conventions for deliberations?

Machiavelli: Decidedly not. If ever conventions were allowed to debate constitutional provisions, nothing could prevent the people from taking hold of the  whole constitution and exercising their right to pass everything under review.  The next day there would be revolution in the streets.

Montesquieu: At least you are consistent. So these constitutional amendments are presented as a whole, accepted as a whole?

Machiavelli: Indeed. In no other way.

Montesquieu: Well, I think we can now proceed to the organization of the Council of State.

Machiavelli: You really do direct the discussion of such matters skillfully, in the exacting manner of a presiding judge in a sovereign court. I forgot to tell you that I salary the Senate as I did the legislature.

Montesquieu: That's understood.

Machiavelli: I needn't add that I also reserve the right to nominate the president and vice-president of this august body. Concerning the Council of State, I will be briefer. Modem institutions offer such powerful tools for centralizing policy  making that it is almost impossible to make use of them without exercising sovereign authority. 

According to principles you yourself laid down, what in fact is the Council of State? It represents the interests of state and, through its rule-making prerogatives, brings a considerable amount of power into the hands of the prince. Its  powers are quasi-discretionary and its regulations can substitute for actual laws,  when so desired.

I am told that the Council of State in your country is, in addition, invested with a special prerogative even more extraordinary. Yet, I am told on good authority that on questions before ordinary courts it can lay claim, by right of review, to all litigation that it deems to have an administrative character. Thus, to  summarize briefly, what I find so extraordinary in this prerogative is that the  courts are relieved of their jurisdiction when faced with an administrative writ  removing the case and referring it to the Council of State for decision.

Now, once again, what is the Council of State? Has it power of its own? Is it independent of the sovereign? Not at all. It is only a drafting committee. When the Council of State issues a rule, it is at the behest of the sovereign. When it  judges a case, it follows the sovereign's will, or, as you say nowadays, the administration's. The administration is both party and judge in its own case. Do  you know anything more formidable than that? Do you think that it takes a lot to establish absolute power in states where everything is so well organized under an institution like this?

Montesquieu: I must admit that your comments are apropos. But, granting that, the Council of State is an excellent institution in itself. Nothing could be easier for its proper functioning than to insulate it from political pressure. Undoubtedly, this is not what you will do.

Machiavelli: Indeed. I will preserve political control wherever I find it. I will restore it wherever it is lacking by strengthening the political ties that I consider indispensable.

You see, we haven't been idling along. There you have it. I have just presented you my constitution in finished form.

Montesquieu: Already?

Machiavelli: A small number of artfully arranged mechanisms are sufficient to change completely how power operates. This part of my plan is complete. 

Montesquieu: I thought that you would address yourself to the court of appeals.

Machiavelli: It would be better to postpone what I have to say about it.

Montesquieu: It's true that if we add up all the powers in your hands, you might feel some satisfaction.

Let's summarize: You make law, first-by proposals to the legislature; second-by decrees; third-by senatus consultum; fourth- through rules; fifth-by writ of Council of State; sixth-by ministerial regulations; seventh-and finally-by coup d'etats. 

Machiavelli: You don't seem to be aware that the most difficult task still remains.

Montesquieu: I really doubt it.

Machiavelli: Then you haven't taken sufficient notice of the fact that my constitution was silent concerning a bunch of traditional rights that would be incompatible with the new order I have just founded. For example, freedom of the press, the right of association, judicial independence, voting, the right of electing  municipal officers by commune, the right to form a militia and many other  things that will have to disappear or be changed radically.

Montesquieu: But haven't you implicitly recognized all these rights by formally recognizing those principles from which they are derived?

Machiavelli: I told you I recognize no principle or right in particular. Moreover, the measures that I will adopt are only exceptions to the rule.

Montesquieu: That's right. Exceptions that prove the rule.

Machiavelli: To succeed I must choose my moment well, for a missed opportunity may ruin everything. In The Prince I penned a maxim that could serve as a  rule of thumb. "The usurper of a state must carry out all the harsh deeds security  requires all at once so that he will not have to come back to them. Later, he will  no longer be able to oppose his subjects either in good or bad times. If you have  to act in bad times, once fortune is opposed to you, you're no longer in a posi-  tion to do it. If in good times, your subjects will not tolerate a change they believe to be coerced."

On the very next day after my constitution takes effect, I will issue a series of decrees with the force of law that will do away with these liberties and rights,  whose exercise may prove dangerous, in a single stroke. 

Montesquieu: Indeed, you've chosen your moment well. The country is still terrorized by your coup d'etat. As for your constitution, nothing will be denied  you, since you could take everything. As for your decrees, there is nothing to  grant you, since you ask for nothing and take everything.

Machiavelli: You do have a way with words.

Montesquieu: You'll admit, however, that my words come more easily than your actions. Despite your strong hand and your steady eye, I confess to having some  trouble believing that the country will not rise up with a second coup d'etat,  awaiting you in the wings.

Machiavelli: The country will willingly close its eyes, for according to my working hypothesis, it is tired of strife and longs to settle down, like the desert  sands after the shower that follows a storm.

Montesquieu: What beautiful metaphors. It's too much!

Machiavelli: But I hasten to assure you that the liberties I suppress I shall formally promise to restore after factional strife has been quieted.

Montesquieu: I suspect that we will wait forever.

Machiavelli: It's possible.

Montesquieu: It's certain, for your maxims allow the prince to break his word when it's in his interest.

Machiavelli: Don't jump to conclusions. You will see how I'll make use of this promise. Soon, I will take it upon myself to pass for the most liberal man in my  kingdom.

Montesquieu: Now that's a surprise for which I am unprepared. But in the mean- time, you directly suppress all liberties.

Machiavelli: "Directly" is not in the statesman's vocabulary. I directly suppress nothing. Here the fox's mantle must cover the lion's skin. What's the use of political maneuvering if it can't attain the desired goal by devious ways, when  straight ones are inadequate? The form of my system is now in place. Its animating forces have been readied. Nothing remains but to set it in motion. But to do  this I must have a delicate hand. It is here that prudence is recommended to the  prince in putting into place all the artifices of government and legislation.

Montesquieu: I see the argument is entering a new phase. I am ready to hear you out.

Eleventh Dialogue

Machiavelli: You very reasonably observed in The Spirit of the Laws that liberty is a word to which many different meanings are attached. I am told that the following proposition can be found in your book. "Liberty is the right to do what the laws permit." [2l The definition is apt and I strongly agree with it. And I can  assure you that my laws will permit only what is necessary. Their essential spirit will soon become clear. Where would you like to begin?

Montesquieu: I would not be averse to seeing how you will protect yourself from the press.

Machiavelli: Indeed, you have put your finger on the most delicate part of my task. I have in mind a plan for handling this problem whose design is both momentous and subtle. Fortunately, here I have a little elbowroom. I cut and prune with confidence so that my acts will not provoke any reaction.

Montesquieu: Why? Pray tell.

Machiavelli: In most parliamentary systems, the press has a knack of making itself hated. Why? Because it always finds itself in the service of violent, selfish,  narrow passions. It is adversarial by nature. It is venal, unjust, without magnanimity and patriotism. Finally, and above all, the role it plays can never be made  clear to the great mass of men.

Montesquieu: Oh, if you're looking for grievances against the press, it doesn't take too much to find a great many of them. But if you are asking about its  proper role, that's another thing. Quite simply, it prevents the exercise of arbitrary power. It forces the depositories of public authority to govern constitutionally. It obliges them to be honest, restrained and respectful of constitutional  practices in relations among themselves and with others. Finally, to make a long story short, it gives to anyone who is oppressed the means to voice one's grievances and be heard. Much can be pardoned in an institution that, despite so  many abuses, serves so many crucial purposes.

Machiavelli: Yes, I am familiar with such theoretical claims on its behalf, but try to make them understood by the masses. Consider the number of those who  really care about the press's fortunes and you'll see what I mean.

Montesquieu: So you might as well go on to how in practice you will muzzle it. I believe that's the appropriate word.

Machiavelli: That's it. Moreover, it's not only journalism that I intend to control.

Montesquieu: All printing then.

Machiavelli: You're resorting to irony.

Montesquieu: Next, I suspect that even irony will be censored, given the curbs you'll bring to free expression.

Machiavelli: There's no defense against such refined wit. But you understand quite well that it wouldn't be worth the effort to escape the attacks of the press if  I had to suffer those in books.

Montesquieu: AlI right, let's begin with the press.

Machiavelli: Any notion about suppressing newspapers purely and simply would be very imprudent. It is always dangerous to violate popular sentiments.  Instead, I would change the details of certain laws and the modifications would appear to be motivated simply by solicitude for public morality and order. 

I would declare that in the future no newspaper would be allowed to operate without governmental authorization. There's the way to nip evil in the bud. It's  not hard to see that only those organs devoted to the government will receive  authorization in the future.

Montesquieu: But since you raise these points, let me just say that the spirit of a newspaper is a function of the personnel on its editorial board. How will you  prevent editorial boards from being hostile to your power?

Machiavelli: The problem you raise is really a paltry one. The choice is ultimately up to me not to authorize any new newspaper, if I so wish. But I have  other schemes, as you 'll see. You ask me how I would neutralize a hostile editorial board? It's very simple, really. I will stipulate that governmental authorization is also necessary for all changes in editorial personnel, from editors-in-chief  to managing editors.

Montesquieu: But the old established newspapers-those inveterate enemies of your government whose editorial board won't change-will speak out.

Machiavelli: Just hold on. All newspapers, present and future, can be brought under certain fiscal controls to curb their enterprises. I will impose upon political newspapers what is today known as a stamp tax and a surety. The newspaper  business will soon be barely profitable and thanks to the imposition of these  measures, it will only be embarked upon warily.

Montesquieu: This is not an adequate solution for you. Political parties are not concerned with profits.

Machiavelli: Don't get so worked up. I have something to shut them up. Here come the repressive measures. There are states in Europe where suits against the  press are brought before juries. I know of no more deplorable measure than this,  for it means that the pettiest journalistic drivel may stir up a controversy. The  crimes of the press are very hard to pinpoint. A writer can disguise his attacks in  such varied and subtle ways that it is not even possible to bring clear charges  before the courts. The courts will always be empowered to act. That goes without saying. But, ordinarily, this repressive power must be exercised administratively.

Montesquieu: Then there will be crimes that won't be within the province of the courts to judge, or rather, you will strike with two hands-judicially and administratively.

Machiavelli: How awful! Such solicitude for a few nasty and spiteful journalists who make a point of attacking and denigrating everything. They act no differently toward governments than armed bandits toward travelers on their journeys.  Give a little leeway and they constantly put themselves above the law. What if  we took a little of this leeway away?

Montesquieu: They are the only ones you will repress?

Machiavelli: I can't promise that, for these people are like the heads of the Hdra of Lema. If you cut off ten of them, fifty more sprout up. I lay the blame  primarily on newspapers that are scandalmongers. I would have them consider  the following speech. "I could suppress all of you. I haven't yet done so but I  can. I'll let you live, on one condition, that you don't try to block my progress or  discredit my power. I don't want to have to summon you every day before the  courts or to be constantly resorting to the law to curb your infractions. Even  more, I don't want an army of censors looking into the day before what you are  going to publish the next day. You have pens, so write! But keep this in mind. I  reserve to myself or my agents the right to judge when I am being attacked. No  subtleties. I'll know when you attack me. And you will be made aware of it in  return. In such a matter, I will take justice into my own hands, but I won't act  precipitously. We must come to a certain understanding. I shall warn you once  or twice but the third time you will be suppressed."

Montesquieu: I am struck by the fact that your scheme isn't limited to curbing the journalist but it strikes at the newspaper itself, whose ruin affects the interests and groups behind it.

Machiavelli: Let them find some other outlet. They won't be bothered. As I told you, my administration will impartially impose those sentences handed down by  the courts. Two convictions in one year will inevitably lead to the suppression of  the newspaper. I would not stop there. By decree or law, I would also say to  newspapers the following. "Keep to your proper concerns and do not hope to stir  public opinion by commentaries on the debates that take place within my government. I forbid you to report on them. I even forbid you to report on judicial  proceedings that deal with the press. You must no longer expect to move the  public mind by what purports to be news gathered by outside sources. The publication of false news, in good or bad faith, will be punished by jail."

Montesquieu: That seems a bit harsh. In the final analysis, newspapers have nothing else to sustain them but what comes from such newsgathering, it being  too dangerous to engage in political commentary directly. To require that each  news story published by a newspaper be true seems quite unreasonable to me,  for in most cases the newspaper will not be able to defend its veracity with absolute certainty, and even when circumstantially certain that the story is true, hard  evidence may be lacking.

Machiavelli: They will think twice before stirring up public opinion, as they should.

Montesquieu: But there's another problem. You may have eliminated opposition from the domestic press but you may still find opposition in the foreign press.  AIl kinds of discontent and hatred will be inscribed on the doors of your kingdom. Newspapers and inflammatory writings will hurtle across your borders.

Machiavelli: Here you touch upon a point that I intend to regulate in the most rigorous manner, because the foreign press is indeed very dangerous. First, the  introduction or circulation in the kingdom of any unauthorized newspapers or  writings will be punished with imprisonment, and the punishment will be sufficiently severe to stifle the desire. Next, those of my subjects convicted of having  written against the government while abroad will be investigated and punished  when they return. It is truly reprehensible to write against one's government  when abroad.

Montesquieu: That depends. But the foreign press in bordering states will speak out.

Machiavelli: You think so? We are assuming that I rule a large kingdom. The small states on my border will be kept in constant fear, I assure you. I will make  them pass laws that will prosecute their own citizens for attacks on my government by the press or otherwise.

Montesquieu: I see I was right when I said in The Spirit of the Laws that the areas surrounding a despot must be laid waste. Civilization must not be allowed to  penetrate. I'm sure that your subjects will be kept from knowing their own history. As Benjamin Constant once said, you will make your kingdom into an is-  land where what happens in Europe will not be known, and the capital will be  made into another island where what happens in the provinces will not be  known.

Machiavelli: I don't want my kingdom to be disturbed by rumors from abroad. How will news of the outside world be conveyed? By a small number of agencies that will filter information sent from the four comers of the world. So, these agencies have to be bribed, and from then on the only news they transmit will be  under the control of the government.

Montesquieu: That's quite enough. You can now proceed to how you would police books.

Machiavelli: This is less a concern of mine. At a time when newspapers have proliferated so dramatically, books are hardly read any more. But I in no way intend to leave the door open. In the first place, I will require those who choose  for a profession that of printer, editor, or bookseller to have a license. That is to say, government authorization will always be revocable, either directly or after a  judicial hearing.

Montesquieu: But then all these businessmen will only be like public officials. The instruments of thought will become the instruments of power.

Machiavelli: I shouldn't think you'd complain, for this is how things were in your time under parliaments. Old customs should be preserved when they are  good. But let's return to fiscal measures. I shall hit books with the stamp tax already imposed on newspapers or rather I shall impose a heavier stamp tax on  books that do not have a certain number of pages. For example, a book that does  not have two or three hundred pages is not really a book. It is a pamphlet. I think  you grasp the advantages of this scheme. On the one hand, the tax will considerably reduce the great number of these little books, which are like an extended  form of journalism. On the other hand, I force those who want to escape the  stamp tax to embark upon long and expensive compositions that will barely sell  and scarcely be read in that form. Today, there are hardly any but a few devils  that have the conscience to write books. They will give it up. Taxes will discourage literary pretensions and criminal  law will make the publishing industry itself more amenable, for I shall make the publisher and printer criminally responsible for what their books contain. If there are writers daring enough to write works against the government, it is imperative that they find no one to  publish them. Such salutary intimidation will resurrect censorship, but by indirect means. Government could not itself exercise such a power because of the  discredit into which this preventive measure has fallen. Before bringing out new  works, printers and publishers will confer. They will scout what is available and  bring out books that respond to popular demand. Through them, the government can always remain well informed about publications that are being prepared  against it. Prior restraint of such publications can be invoked and their authors  may be handed over to the courts.

Montesquieu: You told me that you would not touch civil rights. You don't seem to realize you have just struck a blow against free enterprise. Property rights are  involved here and will disappear in turn.

Machiavelli: These are mere words.

Montesquieu: Then you have finished with the press?

Machiavelli: Oh, not yet!

Montesquieu: What's left?

Machiavelli: The other half of the job.

Twelfth Dialogue

Machiavelli: So far, I've only shown you the "defensive strategy" I would pursue with regard to this power. But I now must make clear how I will use this institution to augment my power. I dare say that, to this day, no government has  conceived of anything as bold as what I am about to describe. Since it is almost  always because of the press that governments in parliamentary countries are  brought down, my scheme envisions neutralizing the press by the press itself.  Because journalism wields such great power, do you know what my government will do? It will become like them. It will be journalism incarnate.

Montesquieu: Truly, you constantly amaze me. You offer me an ever-changing panorama of things to consider. I confess that I'm curious to see how you will  go about putting this novel project into effect.

Machiavelli: It taxes the imagination much less than you think. I shall count the number of newspapers that represent what you call the "opposition." If there are  ten in this category, I shall have twenty pro-government. If twenty, I shall have forty. If forty, eighty .You will recall that I have reserved myself the power to authorize the creation of new political journals. Surely, by now, it's obvious  how I will make use of it.

Montesquieu: Indeed, it's all quite simple.

Machiavelli: Not quite as simple as you might think. However, the public at large must not suspect this tactic or the scheme would miscarry and public opinion would forsake those that openly defend my policies.

I shall divide the newspapers devoted to my cause into three or four categories. In the first group, I will put a certain number of newspapers that will adopt  the official line of things in a straightforward way. They win defend my acts unreservedly. I hasten to say that these are not the ones that will have the most influence on public opinion. In the second group, I will gather another host of newspapers whose character will be less orthodox and whose mission will be to  rally to my power that mass of lukewarm and indifferent men who accept the  established order without reservation but whose political religion extends no farther than this.

In the following categories of newspapers, the most powerful support for my power will be found. Here, the official or quasi- official slant on things is totally  absent, but only on the surface, of course. Even these newspapers will be tied to my government, visibly, in some instances, and invisibly, in others. I won't venture to say how many there will be, since I expect a loyal organ in every camp,  in every party .I shall have an aristocratic organ in the party of aristocrats, a re-  publican organ in the republican party, a revolutionary organ in the party of  revolution, an anarchistic organ, if need be, in the party of anarchists. Like the  god Vishnu, my press will have a hundred arms, and these arms will stretch out  their hands throughout the country delicately giving form to all manner of opinion. Everyone will belong to my party without knowing it. Those who think they  are speaking the language of their party will be acting for mine. Those who  think they are marching under their own banner will be marching under mine.

Montesquieu: Are these ideas possible or only wild fantasies? They make the head swim.

Machiavelli: Steady yourself. We're not finished yet.

Montesquieu: I'm only wondering how you will be capable of leading and rallying all these troops of propagandists secretly enlisted to your government.

Machiavelli: You must consider it an organizational matter only. For example, I will set up under the title of Division of Printing and the Press a center to coordinate action. It is from here that instructions will be sought and commands will  issue. As it so happens, those wholly in on the secret of this scheme will witness something bizarre. Newspapers devoted to my government will attack me, cry out, and stir up controversy about me.

Montesquieu: That is beyond me. I'm not following you.

Machiavelli: It's not all that difficult. Let it be well understood that neither the foundations nor the principles of my government will ever be attacked by the  newspapers I'm talking about. They will only give voice to polemical nitpicking and will be an in- house opposition operating within the narrowest limits.

Montesquieu: So what's the use of all this?

Machiavelli: That's a rather naive question. The advantages are quite considerable in themselves. But beyond them, most people will come to be heard saying  something like the following. "This regime lets anyone speak his mind. It is unjustly attacked. But instead of clamping down, which it might do, it puts up with  these things and is tolerant." Another no less important result will be to elicit observations like the following. "See the extent to which the foundations of this  government and its principles command the respect of everyone. Here, newspapers are allowed the greatest freedom of speech and yet they never attack the  established institutions. They stand above unjust accusations born of passion. Even the enemies of the government can not help but render them homage."

Montesquieu: That, I swear, is truly Machiavellian.

Machiavelli: I am greatly honored but I haven't yet mentioned the best things. Such newspapers, secretly devoted to my cause, allow me to shape public opinion the way I want on all questions of domestic or foreign policy. I can stimulate  the imagination of my people or put them to sleep. I can reassure or disconcert  them. I can take either side of an issue and present one or the other as true or false. Depending on circumstances, I can admit to something as a fact or deny it.  In such a way, I plumb public opinion and assess whatever reaction I provoke. I  try out schemes and plans and make decisions on impulse in order to launch  what you call in France "trial balloons." I am free to fight against my enemies  without ever compromising my power. After making these newspapers speak, I  can force them to make the strongest possible retractions. I elicit public favor for  certain decisions. I can incite enthusiasm or hold it back. I always have my finger on the pulse of the public. Unconsciously, it reflects my personal feelings on  things. Sometimes it expresses astonishment at finding itself so consistently in  agreement with its sovereign. It will be said that I am a man of the people, that  there is a secret and mysterious sympathy that unites me with their will.

Montesquieu: In theory, these various schemes seem to be perfectly conceived. However, I offer one more observation, though I do so tentatively this time. You  abandon China as a model in this regard and the silence that prevails there. But  if you allow your troops of newspapers to fake opposition in order to advance  your designs, I truly don't see very clearly how you can prevent the non-affiliated newspapers from mounting a real attack on you, after figuring out the  game you're playing. Don't you think that eventually they will lift some of the  veils that cover so many machinations? When they figure out the secret of this comedy, how can you keep them from laughing? It all appears to me a squalid joke. 

Machiavelli: Not at all. I tell you I've spent a great deal of my time here examining the strong and weak points of these schemes. I am quite well informed about  the conduct of the press in parliamentary countries. Surely you are aware that  journalism is a kind of freemasonry. Those who live by it are all more or less  attached to one another by bonds of professional discretion. Like ancient auguries, they do not easily divulge the secret of their oracles.

They would gain nothing by betraying one another since most of them have skeletons in their closets. I agree that it is fairly likely that in the heart of the  capital city, among a certain class of people, these things will not stay a mystery.  But such things will not be suspected anywhere else. The overwhelming majority of the nation win proceed along the track I have laid out for it with the utmost trust.

What does it matter if in the capital a certain group may be aware of the artifices my journalism employs. Its most potent influence is reserved for the provinces. The climate of opinion will always be favorable to me there, and each of  my schemes will carry the day. The provincial press win belong to me completely. No contradictions or discussion is tolerated. From the administrative  center where I shall sit, the order will be transmitted to the governor of each  province to make the newspapers speak out in a particular way on a given matter. At the same time, the whole country will come under the same influence. A  particular impulse will be transmitted and felt long before the capital is aware of  it. You see that opinion in the capital does not preoccupy me. It may indeed find  itself enveloped by opinion emanating from the provinces and running behind trends, if need be, without their even knowing it.

Montesquieu: I wanted to raise one last objection. But your train of thought is so powerful and sweeping that you have made me lose my own. A certain number of independent newspapers still exist. It's well nigh impossible for them to debate political questions, but they will be able to attack you over matters of administration. Your officers will not be perfect. Achieving absolute power brings  in its train a number of abuses for which the sovereign himself may not be responsible. But all those acts of your agents that affect the private interests of  your subjects will make you vulnerable. Complaints will be heard. Your agents will be attacked. You will necessarily be held responsible and public esteem for  you will gradually erode.

Machiavelli: I don't fear that.

Montesquieu: It is true that you have so multiplied the means of repression that you only have to choose among them.

Machiavelli: That's not what I had in mind. I don't want to have to resort to repression constantly. A simple decree is enough to put an end to all discussion on  a subject related to my administration. 

Montesquieu: And what form will it take?

Machiavelli: I shall require newspapers to give front-page coverage to the corrections sent them by the government. Agents of my government will hand them  memoranda that will lay the matter out in no uncertain terms. "You have said  such and such, but what you say is not exactly true. You have allowed yourself  to voice such and such a criticism, but you have been unfair, acted improperly, and are mistaken. Consider yourself notified." As you can understand, this is a  rebuke that is fair and open. 

Montesquieu: Of course there will be no reply.

Machiavelli: Obviously not. Discussion will be closed.

Montesquieu: So you will always have the last word and without resorting to violence. Very ingenious. You phrased it very well a moment ago when you said  your government would be journalism incarnate.

Machiavelli: Just as I don't want the country to be stirred up by rumors coming from abroad, I don't want it to be set off by rumors from within, even those passed on by word of mouth. If there is some strange case of suicide, some shady financial dealings, some malfeasance by a public official, I shall forbid  the newspapers to speak of it. Silence about such things, rather than noising  them about, is more respectful of public decency.

Montesquieu: All the while, you yourself will be making use of journalism with a vengeance?

Machiavelli: It's quite essential. Today, it's a law of survival for any government to make effective use of the press in all its forms. It's very strange, but true. And so I will be involved in this medium well beyond what you may imagine.

To understand all the ramifications of my scheme, you have to see how I will use statements in my press to prepare the ground for official political acts. Suppose I want to resolve some problem in domestic or foreign affairs. For several  months, each of my newspapers will play upon the public mind in their own  fashion and then recommend a course of action. One fine morning, this course  of action is officially adopted. You know with what care and ingenious circumspection official documents must be drafted in important matters. The problem  in such cases is to give a certain amount of satisfaction to all parties. Therefore, each of my newspapers, according to its particular slant, win try to persuade  each party that an adopted course of action favors it most. Things not explicitly  stated in official documents can be implied through interpretation. The official  newspapers will openly expand upon what appears only by allusion. Democratic  and revolutionary newspapers win trumpet what they read into it. Meanwhile, as  dispute rages and my acts are given the most diverse interpretations, my government always reserves the right to answer once and for all. "You are mistaken regarding my intentions. You have misread my declarations. I only meant to say  this or that." What is key is never to be forced to contradict yourself.

Montesquieu: What! After what you've just told me, you can make such a claim? 

Machiavelli: Certainly. And your astonishment proves that you have not under- stood me. It is a very important matter that words be consistent when acts can  not. Do you think the masses can judge whether logic guides its government?  It's enough to tell them so. I want the various phases of my policies to be presented as the development of a single thought linked to an unchangeable goal.  Every event, whether foreseen or unforeseen, will appear to be a cleverly in  tended result of policy. Changes of direction will be presented as different responses to the same problem, different roads leading to the same destination, various means to an identical solution, a goal unremittingly pursued despite obstacles. The most recent event will be presented as the logical culmination of all  the others.

Montesquieu: Truly, you are to be admired. What strength of mind! What deeds!

Machiavelli: Every day my newspapers will be filled with official speeches and reports, referring to ministers and the sovereign. I am not forgetting that we live at a time of faith in human industry to solve all the problems of society. It is a  time that is preoccupied with improving the lot of the working classes. I would  devote myself all the more to such matters as a welcome outlet for channeling  the energies of domestic politics. People in southern climes need to see the government constantly busy. The masses consent to be inactive, but on one condition-that those who govern them provide a spectacle of incessant, feverish activity. The masses constantly want to be distracted by novelties, surprises, and  dramatic moves. Perhaps it seems bizarre, but once again, that's the way it is.

I would assiduously pursue what all this implies. Therefore, with regard to industry, the arts, and even administrative matters, I would commission studies  calling for all manner of projects, plans, schemes, changes, reshuffling, and improvements. Reports of such things in the press would overshadow proposals  coming from the most numerous and innovative publicists. It is said that political economy is a fertile field in your country. Well, I would leave nothing to be  invented, published, or even said by thinkers, utopians, and the most enthused  intellectual hacks of your schools. The welfare of the people would be the single  and invariable object of my public utterances. Whether I speak or have my ministers or my writers speak for me, all subjects relating to the greatness of the  country, its prosperity, the majesty of its mission and destiny would never be  exhausted. The exalted principles of modern right, the great questions that stir  humanity would find constant expression. My writings will breathe the spirit of  the most enthusiastic, universal liberalism. Western peoples love the oriental  style. Therefore, all my official speeches, all my proclamations would be filled  with exalted and scintillating images, always stated in the most high-sounding  way. People do not like atheistic governments. Therefore, in my dealings with  the public, I would never fail to present my acts as falling under Divine Providence, while subtly tying my fate to that of the country.

I would like the acts I take during my reign to be compared constantly to those of past governments. This would be the best way to accentuate my benefactions and elicit the gratitude they deserve.

It will be very important to cast the mistakes of those who preceded me into relief. This will demonstrate my capacity to avoid the same. In such a way, a kind of antipathy, indeed an ineradicable aversion, will be attached to the regimes I succeed.

I would give a certain number of my newspapers the task of constantly exalting the glory of my reign while holding other governments responsible for the  shortcomings of European politics. Moreover, I would want a great many of  these eulogies to seem to be only an echo of foreign newspapers. I would reprint  articles paying homage to the brilliance of my policies, whether deserved or not.  In addition, I would have certain newspapers sold abroad. Their support of me would be all the more persuasive as I would allow a tincture of opposition on  certain small points.

I am not unaware of the need of outlets for the public spirit. Intellectual activity closed off at one point will necessarily manifest itself at another. For that  reason, I have no fears in seeing the nation engage itself in all manner of speculation- theoretical and practical-regarding industrial life.

Moreover, outside of politics, I assure you I would be a very good prince. Philosophical and religious questions would be debated undisturbed. In such matters, freedom of conscience becomes a sort of obsession. This tendency need not be opposed. It couldn't be done without danger anyway. In the most civilized countries of Europe, the invention of printing has given rise to a foolish and mad kind of writing that stops just short of pornography. It's a grave disease that knows no bounds. But, sad to say, it is better not to restrain it, so that this  rage to write that possesses your parliamentary democracies may be satisfied to  a certain extent.

This pestilential writing whose speech can not be stopped issues from the platitudinous writers and men who dominate journalism. It will not fail to create a repellant contrast to the dignity of the language that will issue from the throne  and the lively and picturesque arguments that win subtly defend my power in all  its manifestations. Now you understand why I wanted to surround the prince  with this swarm of publicists, bureaucrats, lawyers, businessmen, and judges.  They are essential for drafting this mass of official communications. Its impact  on men's minds would be very potent.

In brief, that is the broad outline of my regime's regulation of the press.

Montesquieu: Then are you finished with it?

Machiavelli: Yes, regretfully, for I have been much briefer than I should. But our time is limited. We have to proceed quickly.

Thirteenth Dialogue

Montesquieu: You've put me through an emotional ringer. You have at your disposal such a wealth of resources! You put forward such novel ideas! There is  poetry in all this-a kind of sinister beauty worthy of a modern Byron. The  dramatic talent of the author of The Mandragola is again on display here.

Machiavelli: Do you think so, Monsieur de Secondat? Your irony hints at a lack of self-assurance. You are not certain that these things are not possible.

Montesquieu: If you're concerned about what I think, I tell you I'm waiting for the upshot to all this.

Machiavelli: I'm not quite there yet.

Montesquieu: So, go on.

Machiavelli: I await your orders.

Montesquieu: Your first moves have seen you enact a formidable set of laws governing the press. You have extinguished all voices except your own. Factions stand mute before you. Don't you fear anything from conspiracies?

Machiavelli: No, for I wouldn't have been very far-sighted if I didn't disarm them all. All it would take would be a single swat from the back of my hand. 

Montesquieu: How so?

Machiavelli: I would start with hundreds of deportations-all those who greeted my coming to power with gun in hand. In Italy, Germany, and France, I am told  that secret societies recruit the lawless individuals who conspire against established governments. In my country, the dens where such sinister threads of conspiracy are woven into plots win be found out. I shall break them like spiders' webs.

Montesquieu: And after that?

Machiavelli: The act of organizing a secret society or of being affiliated with one will be severely punished.

Montesquieu: That's fine for the future. But what about societies already in existence?

Machiavelli: In the name of public safety, I will expel all those notorious for having been members. Those beyond my reach will remain subject to constant  harassment. I will pass a law that will allow the government administratively to deport anyone who has been affiliated with such societies.

Montesquieu: That is to say, injudiciously deported.

Machiavelli: Why do you say "injudiciously?" Administrative decisions can be judicious, can't they? Rest assured. There will be little pity for factions. In countries continually agitated by civil discord, peace must be implacably restored. If  domestic tranquility must claim a certain number of victims, the price will be  paid. Afterward, the imposing presence of the commander is so formidable that  no one will make an attempt on his life. After having covered Italy in blood,  Sulla could appear again in Rome as an ordinary citizen. No one would dare  touch a hair on his head.

Montesquieu: I see we are in a period filled with terrible executions. I am reticent about making any comment. Yet, it seems to me you could be less harsh  and still achieve your ends.

Machiavelli: If an appeal were made to my mercy, I would look into it. Confidentially, some of the tough provisions I write into law are there to intimidate  and will remain so, as long as I am not forced to use them otherwise.

Montesquieu: That's what you mean by "simply to intimidate?" Nevertheless, your nod to mercy does reassure me somewhat. Really, if any mortal heard you,  there would be moments when you chill his blood.

Machiavelli: Why? I lived very near to the time of Duke of Valentino is whose historic reputation for terror was well deserved. He did have his ruthless moments. However, I assure you that once the necessity for executions had passed,  he was a rather good-natured fellow. The same could be said of almost all absolute monarchs. Deep down, they are filled with goodwill, especially toward the  disadvantaged.

Montesquieu: I'm not sure whether or not I like you better in your outbursts of rage. Your gentleness is even more frightening for me. You've abolished secret  societies. Let's get back to the matter at hand.

Machiavelli: Don't go so fast. That I didn't do. You've confused things on this point.

Montesquieu: What? How so?

Machiavelli:  I have suppressed secret societies of a certain ilk.  I am speaking of those whose machinations would escape the surveillance of my government. But  I have no intention of depriving myself of a useful channel of information and a  means to influence affairs that can be considerable, if cleverly used.

Montesquieu: What are you thinking of in this connection?

Machiavelli: As I see it, I could give to a certain number of these societies a kind of legal existence or, rather, I could put them all under a single organization  whose chief I would name. Then I would be in a position to control the various  revolutionary elements in the country. These societies are made up of people  from every nation, every class, and every social rank. I will be privy to the most  obscure political intrigues. It will be like an auxiliary unit of my police.  I will  speak further about them in a short while.

The underground world of secret societies is filled with empty-heads who don't concern me in the least. But they can take directions. They represent a  force that can be put in motion. If there is a commotion somewhere, it is my  hand that sets it going. If a plot is hatched, I am the instigator. I am the head  conspirator.

Montesquieu: And you think these bands of democrats, republicans, anarchists, and terrorists will let you come into their midst and break bread with them?  What makes you think that those who want to throw off all forms of human domination will accept a guide who, you might say, is nothing but a master!

Machiavelli: O Montesquieu. You don't realize how impotent and even stupid most of these European demagogues are. These tigers have the souls of sheep.  They're airheads. All you have to do to be accepted by them is speak their language. Moreover, almost all their ideas have an incredible affinity with the doctrines of absolute power. They dream of the gathering of individuals into a symbolic unity. They demand the complete realization of equality, which can only  be brought about by power wielded by a single person. You see, even here I am  the headmaster of their school! And besides, I have to say they have no choice.  Secret societies exist under the conditions I have just laid down or they don't  exist at all.

Montesquieu: The finale of sic v% sic jubeo does not have to wait long with you. I acknowledge you are definitely well protected against conspiracies.

Machiavelli: Yes, and it is important to underline the fact that the law will not allow gatherings or meetings in excess of a certain number of people.  Montesquieu: How many?

Machiavelli: Why are you concerned with such details? All right, gatherings of more than fifteen or twenty people will not be allowed.

Montesquieu: What! Friends numbering more than that won't be able to dine together?

Machiavelli: I clearly see how worked up you're getting by this outrage to Gallic conviviality. All right, they may dine together, for my reign will not be as  savage as you think. But on one condition. Politics is not to be discussed.

Montesquieu: Can they talk about literature?

Machiavelli: Yes, but only if literature is not used as the pretext for a political assembly. It is possible not to discuss a word of politics at a banquet. But a banquet itself may assume the character of a demonstration and be so understood by  the public. That must not happen.

Montesquieu: Alas! Such a regime makes it difficult for citizens to breathe with- out offending the government.

Machiavelli: That's not correct. Only the factious will suffer from these restrictions. No one else will feel them. 

It goes without saying that I am not talking here about acts of rebellion against my power, nor attempts whose aim is to overthrow my rule. Nor am I  talking about attacks on the person of the prince or acts that question his authority or institutions. These are true crimes that are rightfully suppressed by procedures common to all legal orders. Legislation will anticipate all such acts. They  would be punished in my kingdom according to various degrees of seriousness.  The laws will be clearly framed in such a way to prevent the least injury,  whether direct or indirect, to the established order of things.

Montesquieu: I take you at your word in this matter and will not inquire into your methods. Still, it's not enough to enact draconian legislation. A judge must  be found who is willing to apply it. This poses a bit of a problem.

Machiavelli: There's no problem.

Montesquieu: Are you going to destroy the judicial system?

Machiavelli: I destroy nothing. I modify and innovate.

Montesquieu: Then do you plan to set up military courts, summary courts, and, finally, courts of special jurisdiction?

Machiavelli: No.

Montesquieu: Then what are you going to do?

Machiavelli: First, you should realize that I feel no need to decree a great number of harsh measures that I must then enforce. Many already exist and they are still in force. All good governments, free or absolute, republican or monarchic,  face the same difficulties. In moments of crises, they are forced to resort to harsh  laws. Some of these remain in vigor and others have grown weak after the necessities that occasioned their birth disappear. Both kinds must be used. With  regard to the latter, remember that they haven't been explicitly abrogated. Prudence dictated their enactment and they are perfectly defensible. The return of  abuses they first prevented necessarily brings them back into application. In this  way, the government seems merely to be doing what good administration re-  quires. And this is often the case.

You see that it is only a question of giving the courts a little fine-tuning. This is always an easy matter in centralized countries where the judiciary stays in direct contact with the administrative machinery under the authority of the government ministry responsible for it.

Implementation of the new laws made under my reign, most of which will have been promulgated as small decrees, will not likely be so easy. In countries  where judges serve for life, there may be resistance to direct meddling by the  government when it comes to interpreting the law.

But I think I have found a very ingenious and simple scheme, which appears as totally legal. Although it challenges the principle of life tenure for the bench,  it will be seen as correcting the most unfortunate consequences of that principle.  I shall issue a decree that will require judges who reach a certain age to retire. I  don't doubt that here again I will have popular sentiment on my side. It is pitiable to see, as so frequently happens, a judge who is called upon to decide the  highest and most difficult questions of law fall into a state of debilitating senility.

Montesquieu: Allow me a word here. I have some ideas on this subject. What you present as the fact of the matter is completely belied by experience. Men  whose lives entail a continued exercise of the mind do not suffer a weakening of  intelligence, as you would have it. If I may say so, this is the privilege granted  those whose primary pursuit is thinking. If the faculties fail with age in the case  of a few judges, they are preserved among the greater number. Their powers of  thought continually augment. There is no need to replace them. Death inevitably  and naturally brings vacancies to their ranks. But even if there were as many examples of senility as you claim, it would be a thousand times better, in the inter-  est of sound justice, to suffer this drawback than to accept your remedy.

Machiavelli: I have other reasons for this remedy that are proof against your objections.

Montesquieu: Reasons of state?

Machiavelli: Perhaps. Be assured of one thing. In cases that are purely civil, judges will not deviate from the letter of the law any more than they did before. 

Montesquieu: I think I see what you're driving at. If I correctly read what you just said, you will give judges a certain flexibility when it comes to political  matters.

Machiavelli: I won't. They must do their duty and side with power. In politics, public order requires it. It would be the worst of all worlds if the sovereign were  exposed to the seditious decisions of a court. These might be seized upon by the whole country and used against the government. To what purpose was silence  imposed on the press if the voice of the people can make itself heard in the decisions of the courts?

Montesquieu: Though it seems a modest change, your appointment scheme has far-reaching consequences. This is why you attach such importance to it.

Machiavelli: You 're right. It effectively eradicates that spirit of resistance, that esprit de corps, which is always dangerous in judicial bodies that have preserved  the memory of past governments and display a devotion that may border on  worship. It brings to them new elements whose influences are all favorable to  the spirit that animates my reign. Every year twenty, thirty, or forty posts in the  judiciary will open up due to retirement. This means that the entire personnel of  the judicial system can be reshuffled from top to bottom every six months. You  understand that a single vacancy may lead to fifty new appointments by the successive upward movement of the holders of lower positions. Imagine what hap-  pens when there are thirty or forty vacancies at the same time. The collective  spirit formed by prior professional attachments evaporates and greater solicitude  for the present government is created because of the large number of positions at  its disposal. There are young men ambitious to advance whose careers are not  blocked by the life tenure of those who are ahead of them. They know that the  government prizes law and order. The country, too. They serve both when they  do what is called for on such questions. 

Montesquieu: Unless people are incredibly blind, you win be accused of infecting the judiciary with a competitive spirit fatal to judicial bodies. I shall not elaborate on the consequences for I don't think that will stop you.

Machiavelli: I don't expect to escape criticism. It matters little to me, provided it doesn't reach my ears. In any case, I would consistently keep to a policy that  sees my decisions as irrevocable in spite of any grumbling. A prince who acts in  this way is always sure to win respect for his force of character.

Fourteenth Dialogue

Machiavelli; I have told you many times already, and I repeat it once more, that I don't need to create and reorganize everything. I find in existing institutions a  great many of the instruments of my power. Do you know what sovereign immunity is?

Montesquieu: Yes, unfortunately for you. Without setting out to do so, I spoil a surprise that you would have been happy to spring on me with all your dramatic  flair.

Machiavelli; What do you have in mind?

Montesquieu: I'm thinking of what you seem to want to talk about and what's true at least in France. Traditionally, exceptions to this practice have been countenanced under certain circumstances. But this legal recourse must be modified,  if not completely abrogated, in a regime where sovereign immunity is recognized.

Machiavelli; I find you quite amenable on this point. Put simply, your ideas on this subject support one of the most tyrannical practices in the world. What!  When individuals are wronged by government agents performing their duties  and bring them before the courts, judges must answer them thus: "You have no  legal recourse here. The doors of the court are closed. Go to the ministry for authorization to prosecute its officials." Such rigid conformity to legal process is a  veritable denial of justice. How often will the government authorize such prosecutions?

Montesquieu: What are you complaining about? This would seem to suit your purposes very well.

Machiavelli: I told you that only to point out that in states where judicial procedure encounters such obstacles, a government does not have much to fear from the courts. In others, it is always as a temporary expedient that exceptions are  inserted into the law. But when circumstances change, the exceptions remain, as  they should. When order returns, they are not inconvenient; only when it is disturbed are they necessary.

There is another modem institution that serves the purposes of the central power no less effectively. I am speaking of the creation of that great magistracy  attached to the courts that you call the Public Ministry. It was formerly called, much more accurately, the Ministry of the King, because this office holder is essentially removable and his power revocable at the discretion of the prince. I hardly need to describe the influence this magistrate has on the courts near  where he is seated. It is considerable. Keep all of this in mind. Now I am going  to speak of the Supreme Court of appeals, which I have avoiding speaking  about, but which plays a considerable role in the administration of justice.

The Supreme Court of appeals is more than a judicial body. In some ways, it is a fourth branch in the state because it has the last word in determining the  meaning of the law. So I will repeat what I believe I have already said with respect to the Senate and the legislative Assembly. If a court of justice were completely independent of the government, it could overthrow it at will by virtue of  its powers and almost total discretion in matters of constitutional interpretation.  In the name of liberty, all the court would have to do is systematically limit or  expand those provisions of the law that regulate the exercise of political rights.

Montesquieu: Apparently you are going to demand it do the opposite.

Machiavelli: I won't demand anything. It will do what is appropriate all by it- self. The various ploys I mentioned a short time ago will bring their respective  influences to bear here. The nearer a judge is to power, the more power controls him. The conservative spirit of my reign will concentrate here to the highest degree. In their deliberations, the police power will receive an interpretation so favorable to my power that I will be relieved of a multitude of restrictive measures  that otherwise would be necessary.

Montesquieu: Hearing you, someone would think that the laws are subject to the most fantastic interpretations. Aren't the laws written with clarity and precision?  Do they lend themselves to the expansions and contractions that you imply?

Machiavelli: Surely the author of The Spirit of the Laws, the experienced judge who authored so many excellent decisions, does not need me to teach him about  jurisprudence. There is no text, however clear, that is not susceptible to the most  contrary interpretations, even in matters purely of civil law. 

But please keep in mind that we are talking about political matters here. Now it is a common practice of legislators in all times to adopt elastic wording in  many of their provisions. This allows them to adjust for various circumstances  that cover all cases and allow exceptions that would have been imprudent to  specify more precisely.

I am perfectly well aware that I must furnish you some examples, for without them what I am proposing would appear too conjectural to you. While speaking  of sovereign immunity, you said that the common practice of making exception to the law must be changed in a free country.

Well, suppose that a certain law exists in the state that I govern and suppose that it has been changed somewhat. Thus, I am supposing that before my time a law had been promulgated that in electoral matters permitted the prosecution of  government agents without the authorization of the Council of State.

The question is presented under my reign that has, as you know, introduced great changes in public right. Someone wants to prosecute an official before the  courts on an electoral matter. The public prosecutor gets up and says: "The  privilege that is claimed no longer exists today. It is no longer compatible with  current institutions. The old law that dispensed with the authorization of the  Council of State in such a case has been tacitly abrogated." The courts respond yes or no and finally the debate is brought before the Supreme Court of appeals.  It defines public right on this point in the following manner. "The old law is tacitly abrogated. The authorization of the Council of State is necessary to prose-  cute public officials, even in electoral matters."

Here is another more specific example borrowed from the regulation of the press. I am told that in France there was a law that required, under penal sanction, that anyone making a living by distributing and peddling published materials must have a license. This license was to be furnished by a public official in  charge of the general administration of a province. The law sought to regulate peddling as its main goal and to subject it to strict surveillance. Let us suppose that the text of the provision declares: " All distributors and peddlers must be  furnished with an authorized license."

Well, in the event that the matter came before it, the Supreme Court of appeals could say: "It is not only the regulation of an occupation that the law had  in view. It meant to cover any distribution or peddling per se." Consequently,  the author of a piece of writing or a book who delivers even a single copy of his  work, without prior authorization, (even if nominally complementary and not for sale), is engaged in an act of distributing and peddling. As a result, he falls under  the penal provisions."

Y u immediately see what results from such an interpretation. Instead of a simple exercise of the police power, you have a law regulating freedom of the  press and restricting the right to publish one's thoughts.

Montesquieu: You've certainly got what it takes to be a jurist.

Machiavelli; It's a must. How are governments overthrown today? Through legal distinctions and the subtleties of constitutional law, put to the task of opposing the ruling power by all available means, tools, and contrivances not prohibited by law. Do you expect the ruling power not to use these legal stratagems  against the opposition, when they use them so relentlessly against the ruling  power? Then the contest would not be equal. It would be impossible to mount  any resistance. It would be necessary to abdicate.

Montesquieu: So many dangers stand in your way. It would be a miracle if you would anticipate them all. The courts are not bound by previous decisions. Jurisprudence will leave you with many lawsuits on your hands. People with justifiable claims will not tire of knocking on the doors of courts asking for different  interpretations.

Machiavelli: In the beginning, it's possible. But when a certain number of decisions have definitively settled the law, the opening that existed before will close  and the source of lawsuits will dry up. Public opinion would become so tame  that total reliance would be placed on the official opinions of the government for  the meaning of the law.

Montesquieu; How so?

Machiavelli: At certain moments, when there is a good reason to fear that some controversy may arise over some point of law, the government will declare as an  advisory opinion that the law applies to this or that situation or that the law extends to this or that case.

Montesquieu: But these are merely declarations that in no way bind the courts.

Machiavelli: Nevertheless, coming from a government as powerful as the one I have organized, these declarations will have very great authority for and influence over courts of justice. They will be particularly effective in controlling individual petitions and, in many cases, not to say always, they will forestall annoying lawsuits, which won't even be filed.

Montesquieu: As you proceed, I see that your government becomes more and more tutelary. This is judicial behavior that is almost patriarchal in spirit.. In effect, such paternal solicitude demonstrated in so many ingenious ways must be  acknowledged.

Machiavelli: So you have been brought to admit that I stand quite distant from the barbarous methods of government that you seemed to ascribe to me at the beginning of our conversation. You see that violence plays no role in all this. I take my stand where everyone does today, on right.

Montesquieu: On the right of the strongest.

Machiavelli: The right that gains obedience is always the right of the strongest. I know of no exception to this rule.

Fifteenth Dialogue

Montesquieu: We have covered a vast amount of ground in our discussion and you seem to have an answer for just about everything. But I feel compelled to tell you that you've got a long way to go before convincing me that you can hold  onto power for very long. The thing that most astonished me was your intention  to base your power on universal suffrage. I allow of nothing more fickle. Please  tell me if I am understanding you correctly. You told me you would be king,  right?

Machiavelli: That's right, king.

Montesquieu: Elected for life, or a hereditary monarch?

Machiavelli: I would be king in the strict sense of the word-a hereditary monarch whose crown would pass to the first-born male. Women would never occupy my place.

Montesquieu: Not a very gallant attitude.

Machiavelli: Let me point out that it is the tradition of the French and Salic monarchy that I am following here.

Montesquieu: How will you be able to establish a hereditary line, given a democratic right to vote like that in the United States? Can you tell me this?

Machiavelli; Certainly.

Montesquieu: Come on now! Do you expect the will of future generations to be bound to such a principle?

Machiavelli: Yes.

Montesquieu: For the moment, though, I would like to know how you would square suffrage with the appointment of public officials.

Machiavelli: Which public officials? In monarchies, you allow full well, the government appoints officials at all levels.

Montesquieu: That depends. Generally, administrators at the local level are chosen by local inhabitants, even in monarchic governments.

Machiavelli: A simple law can change that. In the future, such officials will be appointed by the government.

Montesquieu: Will you also appoint the nation's representatives?

Machiavelli; You know that is not possible.

Montesquieu: That's a real pity. If suffrage is left free, and you fail to contrive the outcome of elections, a popularly elected Assembly, under the influence of  various parties, will soon be filled with deputies hostile to your power.

Machiavelli: But I have no earthly intention of leaving suffrage free.

Montesquieu: I expected as much. What then do you propose to do?

Machiavelli: One thing is extremely important. Those who wish to represent the country must be attached to the government. I will have all candidates swear a solemn oath. I don't mean an oath to the nation, in the manner of your revolutionaries of 1789. I want an oath of fidelity sworn to the prince himself and to  his constitution.

Montesquieu: If you have no compunction about violating your political oaths, how do you expect others to be more scrupulous in this regard?

Machiavelli; I rely very little on the political conscience of men. Rather, I put my stock on the power of public opinion. No one will dare disgrace himself by  being openly false to his sworn word. Let me underscore the fact that the oath I require will precede ejections rather than follow. them. Under such circumstances, the commitment to serve me would have to precede any vote gathering.

Henceforward, the government will have to possess the means to resist the opposition and prevent it from drawing away its supporters. At election time, the  parties customarily proclaim their candidates and submit their lists to the government. I shall reciprocate by declaring my candidates and placing their names  before the parties.

Montesquieu: If you didn't have a monopoly on power, the odious way you deal with the opposition would alone spark resistance. By offering open competition,  you invite retaliation.

Machiavelli: I intend to have the agents of my government, from the lowest to the highest rank, actively involved in making sure that only my candidates are
elected.

Montesquieu: In light of what you said before, that is something entirely to be expected.

Machiavelli: "The Jaws establishing suffrage are fundamental, likewise how suffrage is apportioned and how ballots are cast." [3] The smallest details of the electoral laws are of utmost importance.

Montesquieu: Sometimes I don't recognize what I've said when it comes from your mouth. It seems to me that what you just quoted was meant to apply to democratic governments.

Machiavelli: Most certainly. But you have seen already that the essence of policy entails reliance on the people. Although I wear a crown, my avowed and true  goal is to represent them. Trustee of all delegated powers, I am alone their true  representative, after all. What I Will, they will. What I do, they do. Consequently, it is absolutely imperative that elections not afford factions the opportunity to subvert all that I-backed by armed might-personify.

So, I have found other ways to counter their efforts. Take, for example, the law that forbids public assemblies. Naturally, it will be applied to political conventions. In this way, parties will not be able to gather together and draw up  platforms.

Montesquieu: Why do you always emphasize parties? For all your talk about them, isn't your real policy directed toward frustrating the will of the voters?  After all, parties are only groups of voters. If the voters are prevented from  meeting and open debate, how can they ever vote intelligently?

Machiavelli: You show a certain naivete when it comes to political passions and their infinite adaptability and cunning in circumventing prohibitions. But don't  worry about the voters. Those with "politically correct" dispositions will always  know who to vote for .

Besides, I let toleration work to my advantage. Not only will I allow groups to gather in support of my candidates, I will go so far as to close my eyes to the  activities of several popular candidates who loudly proclaim the cause of liberty.  However, let me add that those who cry the loudest will be my own.

Montesquieu: And how will you regulate suffrage?

Machiavelli: Let me first outline my policy as far as the vote in the countryside goes. I don't want people to cast their votes in populated areas. There they can  be infected with the spirit of opposition commonly found in towns and cities, which follow the lead of the capital. I want voting by commune. The benefits of  this arrangement, so deceptively simple, will nevertheless be considerable.

Montesquieu: Your intentions are obvious. The rural vote will divide itself among insignificant local personalities, or, for want of familiar names, will fall  back on candidates nominated by your government. I seriously doubt that this  arrangement will bring many able or talented men to office.

Machiavelli: Public order has less need of men of talent than men devoted to the government. Great ability belongs to the person who sits on the throne and those  gathered around it. Elsewhere it is useless, maybe even harmful, for it can only find expression in measures against authority.

Montesquieu: Your maxims cut like a sword. I have no argument against you. Rather, I ask you please to elaborate further on how you would regulate elections.

Machiavelli; For reasons you can well appreciate, I am opposed to proportional representation. It distorts elections by allowing for coalitions among men of diverse principles. I will draw up a number of electoral districts from larger administrative units, from which a single deputy may be elected. Thus. each voter  will be able to mark only one name on his ballot.

In addition, I must be able to neutralize the opposition in districts where it has too much influence. For example, suppose that in a previous election the  majority in a given district had opposed me. Suppose that there is again good reason to anticipate opposition to the government's candidate. Nothing could be  easier to remedy. If this district has only a small population, I simply redraw it and put it into a neighboring district where opposition voices will be drowned out and where enthusiasm for its cause is dissipated. On the other hand, if the  hostile district has a fairly large population, it can be divided into several smaller  districts. They are then annexed to neighboring districts, where the opposition is  completely submerged.

I am skipping a wealth of detail directed to the same general end. For example, when necessary, I could divide electoral districts in ways to allow for more  administrative control. I could have municipal officers, whose appointment de-  pends on the government, preside over the functioning of these districts.

Montesquieu: I am taken aback by the fact that you are not advocating something that was reportedly once employed in the time of Leo X. I am referring to  having election supervisors rig the results.

Machiavelli: That might prove a tad difficult today. Such a practice would have to be conducted with the utmost prudence. Besides, a skillful government has so  many other resources at its disposal! It's not necessary directly to purchase  votes. Groups of people can be made to vote the way you want by plying them  with government contracts, here promising a port, there promising to buy something, at another place promising to build a canal. Conversely, cities and towns that oppose my government get nothing.

Montesquieu: I don't want to discredit the brilliance of these schemes, but aren't you afraid of opening yourself to the charge that you are at one time a corrupter  of popular will and at another its oppressor? Don't you fear compromising your  power by constantly engaging in struggles where it is always so directly committed? The least success in contests against your candidates will be a shining  victory for the opposition and a rebuff to your government. l am frequently  struck by something quite unnerving in your policy. It seems that you are constantly required to succeed in all your endeavors, or suffer something catastrophic.

Machiavelli: Such language smacks of fear. Let me reassure you. I have come so far and have succeeded in so many things that I can't possibly feel threatened by such infinitely small things. For true political men, Bossuet's grain of sand will  not tip the scale. I am so entrenched that I could weather the storm, without danger. The paltry administrative inconveniences that you mention are of no significance. Besides, I don't claim to be perfect. I know quite well that mistakes will  be made. Certainly, now and then, some cases of corruption and scandal will  surface. What can I do? Will that destroy or even jeopardize in any way the rest  of my project? It is less important to avoid committing mistakes than to assume  responsibility for them with alacrity and a proper attitude that silences critics.  Even if the opposition succeeds in insinuating some local dissidents into my Assembly, what does it matter to me? I am not like others who make no allowances  for the necessities of their times.

One of my great principles is to set things against themselves. Just as I use the press against the press, I would use oratory to counter oratory. I would have  as many men as I needed with prepared speeches, capable of speaking several  hours non-stop. The essential thing is to have a solid majority behind you and a  presiding officer who can be trusted. There is a special art in conducting debates and swrunoning votes. But do I need all these parliamentary tricks? In my Assembly, I will control nineteen out of twenty men, all of whom will follow my  instructions. In the meantime, I would pull the strings of a sham opposition,  clandestinely enlisted to my cause. Anyone may then declaim ever so nobly.  Their words would as easily penetrate the ears of my deputies as wind through a  keyhole. Now do you want me to speak of the Senate? 

Montesquieu: Having studied Caligula's reign, I can imagine what is in store.

Sixteenth Dialogue

Montesquieu: One of the striking features of your politics is the annihilation of parties and the destruction of other collective forces. Your program has not  failed in this regard. However, I see around you certain things that you have not  dealt with, for example, the clergy, universities, the bar, the national militia, and  business corporations. It seems to me there is more than one dangerous element  in all that.

Machiavelli: I can't say everything at once. Let's consider the national militia so that I won't have to be concerned with it anymore. One of my first acts would  have to be its dissolution. A citizen militia can not be reconciled with the existence of a professional army. Unlike regulars, citizens in arms are liable to be  fractious at any given moment.

And this matter does pose some difficulties. A national guard may be a use- less institution but it is nonetheless very popular. In military states, it appeals to  the puerile instincts in certain bourgeois circles. It may be anomalous and ridiculous but it brings together a taste for soldierly pomp and certain commercial mores. It is based on an inoffensive prejudice that would be inconvenient to counter. The prince must never appear to have interests opposed to those of the  city, which believes its security is guaranteed by arming its inhabitants.

Montesquieu: But I thought you dissolved the militia?

Machiavelli: I dissolved it in order to reorganize it on other foundations. It is essential to put it under the command of certain civil authorities and to remove  from it the prerogative of electing its leaders. Furthermore, I will tolerate its existence only in places convenient for me. I reserve the right to dissolve it again  and to reorganize it on still other foundations, if circumstances so require. I have nothing more to tell you on this matter.

As for universities, the way that things are now handled is just about fine for me. You are aware that these great bodies of learning are no longer organized as  they were. I'm told that they have almost everywhere lost their former autonomy. They are no longer anything but institutions in the service of public interests, financially governed by the state.

As I've said more than once, where we find the state, there we find the prince. The moral orientation of public institutions is in his hands. His agents  mold the spirit of the youth. The government appoints the head of the teaching  corps and its staff in their respective capacities. They are tied to it. They are dependent on it. And this is all that's needed. Here or there, we might find some  vestiges of independence in some public school or academy. But it is easy to  bring it back under central control and direction. All that is needed is a new regulation or a simple ministerial decree. I don't have to elaborate on every detail of what could be done. However, before leaving this subject, I must tell you  that I regard it as very important to proscribe studies of constitutional law in the  teaching of public right.

Montesquieu: Indeed, there are reasons enough for that.

Machiavelli: My reasons are actually very simple. I don't want young people who leave the schools to be mindlessly concerned with politics so that at eighteen years of age they are wrapped up in writing constitutions as they would  tragic poetry. Such instruction can only twist the mind of the young and prematurely initiate them into matters that are beyond the limits of their intelligence.  With these poorly digested and badly understood notions, we would not be educating real statesmen but utopians, whose rash thoughts would eventually be  translated into rash actions.

The generations born under my reign must be raised to respect established institutions and to love the prince. To this end, I would make fairly ingenious use of the controls I would have over the curriculum. In general, I believe that  the schools make a big mistake in neglecting contemporary history. It is at least  as essential to know one's own times as it is that of Pericles. I want the history of my reign to be taught in the schools while I'm still alive. In such a way, a new  prince finds his way into the hearts of a generation.

Montesquieu: Of course, such history would be one big defense of all your acts.

Machiavelli: Obviously I would not have myself denigrated. I would also try to undermine private education, which could not be directly proscribed. I could do  this through the state universities. These would contain cadres of professors that  would utilize their time outside the classroom to propagate convenient doctrines. I would have them offer courses in all the important cities that anyone could at-  tend. In such a way, I would spread the government's influence and further indoctrination.

Montesquieu: In other words, you would co-opt even the last vestiges of independent thinking.

Machiavelli: I wouldn't co-opt anything at all.

Montesquieu: Would you allow professors other than your own to diffuse learning in the same way, without license, degrees, or authorization?

Machiavelli: What? You want me to sanction "clubs"?

Montesquieu: No, but let's go on to another subject.

Machiavelli: The safety of the government depends on a multitude of regulatory measures. Among my concerns, you were right to draw attention to the legal profession. Yet, regulation of this profession would get me involved where it is  not necessary .Here I am dealing with civil matters and my rule of thumb is to  show as much restraint as possible. In states that have a professional organization of lawyers, litigants regard the independence of the bar as a guarantee inseparable from the right of a public trial, whether it concerns a matter of honor,  money, or life. It will be very rare when I intervene in such things. Public opinion would be alarmed by the inevitable cries that would be raised by the whole  legal profession. Yet, I know that this body will be a source of influence constantly hostile to my power. You know better than I, Montesquieu, that this profession fosters cold and stubborn temperaments when it comes to matters of  principle and minds whose tendency is to hold the acts of government to strict legality. Lawyers do not have as developed a sense of social necessity as a judge does. He sees the Jaw from too close and in ways too narrow to have an accurate  conception, while the judge. ... 

Montesquieu: Spare me your pleadings.

Machiavelli: I don't for moment forget that I am before a descendant of those great magistrates who backed the cause of the French monarchy with so much  brilliance.

Montesquieu: And who rarely submitted to pressure on verdicts that would violate the laws of the state.

Machiavelli: That is why they ended up bringing down the state itself. I don't want my courts of justice to be parliaments, nor do I want lawyers, under the  immunities of the robe, to engage in politics. The greatest man of the century, to whom your country had the honor of giving birth, said: "I wish that the tongue  of a lawyer who speaks evil of the government could be cut out." Because modern mores are softer, I would not go so far.

At the first opportune moment, I would do one simple thing. While doing nothing at all to infringe on the independence of the profession, I will decree  that lawyers be enlisted in the ranks of their profession by the sovereign himself.  Providing a rationale for my decree will not be too difficult. I will merely point  out to potential litigants that this procedure better guarantees their rights than  when the profession, with all its cross-pressures, recruits its own members.

Montesquieu: It is only too obvious that even the most execrable measures can be given the color of reason. But let's see what you do with respect to the clergy.  That is one institution that is only remotely dependent on the state. It is a spiritual power whose seat is located somewhere other than the fatherland. l know of  nothing that threatens your power more than authority that speaks in the name of  heaven but whose roots penetrate the entire earth. Remember that the Christian teaching is a teaching of liberty. I know that the state has strictly segregated religious authority from worldly politics. I also know that the words of preachers are limited to terms found in the Gospels. But the message that emanates-of  otherworldly ideals-will prove the stumbling block to political materialism. It is this book, at once so humble and subdued, that alone destroyed the Roman  Empire, Caesarism, and its power. Nations that avow Christianity will always  escape despotism, for Christianity elevates man's dignity and places him beyond  the reach of despotism. It develops moral strength over which human power has  no sway. [4l Beware of the priest. He depends only on God. His influence is everywhere-in the sanctuary, the family, and the schools. You can exert no influence on him. His priorities are not yours. He obeys a constitution that is beyond  both your Jaws and sword. If you reign over a Catholic nation and have the  clergy for an enemy, you will be brought down sooner or later, even if the people are nominally behind you.

Machiavelli: I don't know why you make such apostles of liberty out of priests. I am unaware of such a role either in ancient or modem times. I have always  found the priesthood to be a natural support for absolute power.

The act of founding may have caused me to make concessions to the democratic spirit of the age and to look to universal suffrage as the basis of my power .  But I hope that you realize that these things are only artifices demanded by the  times. I also claim the privilege of divine right. I am no less a king by the grace of God. It is only natural for the clergy to support me, for we share the same principle of authority. However, if the clergy itself grows fractious, if it takes  advantage of its position to conspire against my government.. ..

Montesquieu: Yes?

Machiavelli: You seem to think the church is so influential! Do you know how unpopular it has made itself in several avowedly Catholic states? In France, for example, the press has so disparaged it in the eyes of the masses that its apostolic mission has been rendered impossible. If I were king of France, do you  know what I could do, if I so chose? 

Montesquieu: What?

Machiavelli: I could provoke a schism in the Church and sever all bonds that tie the clergy to the Court of Rome. That is the real Gordian knot. I would have my  press, publicists, and political men all declaim as follows: "Christianity is independent of Catholicism. Catholicism forbids what Christianity permits. The civil  independence of the clergy and its submission to the Court of Rome are purely Catholic doctrines that constantly threaten the security of the state. Those loyal  to the kingdom must not have a foreign prince for a spiritual leader. This is to  leave the internal order of the regime to the discretion of a power that can turn  hostile at any given moment. This hierarchy of things, dating from the Middle  Ages, is tantamount to the tutelage of the people and keeps them in their in-  fancy. It can not be reconciled with the virile genius of modern civilization, with  its enlightenment and independence. Why seek in Rome for a spiritual leader?  Why can't the sovereign also be pontiff'?"

The liberal press especially could be made to spread such a message. More- over, it is highly likely that the masses would gladly listen.

Montesquieu: If you dared to attempt such a project, you would quickly learn of the awesome power of Catholicism, even among nations where it seems weakened." [5]

Machiavelli: Attempt it, Great God! On bended knee, I ask forgiveness of our Divine Master for having laid out such a sacrilegious doctrine, so infused with  the hatred of the Church. But God, Who is also the source of earthly power, does  not forbid the prince to defend himself from the encroachment of the clergy. In fact, the clergy transgresses against the precepts of the Gospel when it shows  itself insubordinate to the prince. The roots of priestly conspiracies are hidden.  By going to the Court of Rome, I would find the way to stop them before they  grow. 

Montesquieu: How?

Machiavelli: I would have only to point out to the Holy See the moral condition of my people, chaffing under the yoke of the Church, aspiring to break loose, capable of further fracturing Catholic unity, and throwing itself behind the  Greek or Protestant schism in the Church.

Montesquieu: Threats instead of action!

Machiavelli: Montesquieu, you 're way off the mark. You fail to understand the respect I have for the papal throne! My only role and mission as a Catholic sovereign would be to become the defender of the Church. You are aware that today  the temporal power of the Church is threatened by the anti-religious zeal and ambitions of countries north of Italy. Well, I would say to Saint Peter that it is  my mission and duty to support and save him from his enemies. In return, I  would ask him not to attack me but rather to lend me the support of his moral  influence. This would not be too much to ask when I risk my popularity in defense of a cause so thoroughly discredited today in the eyes of the so-called  European democracies.

These risks would not deter me. I would check the encroachment of neighboring states against the Holy See. If, unfortunately, the Pope were attacked and chased from the Papal States (as has already happened), my bayonets alone would restore and maintain him there, as long as I live.

Montesquieu: This would really be a masterstroke. If you could keep a garrison in Rome, you would almost be able to rule the Holy See, as if it were some  province of your kingdom.

Machiavelli: Do you think that after rendering such a service to the papacy that the Pope would refuse to lend his support to my power or to come anoint me in  my capital, if need be? Are there no such historic precedents?

Montesquieu: There is nothing that history has not seen. But what if, instead of finding in the chair of Saint Peter a Borgia or a Dubois, as you seem to expect,  you find a pope who would counter your intrigues and brave your anger? What  would you do then?

Machiavelli: Under the pretext of defending the Papacy's temporal power, I would resolve to bring about its downfall.

Montesquieu: Your genius can not be denied.

Seventeenth Dialogue

Montesquieu: I said that you have a certain genius. It really takes something of the sort to conceive and execute so many extraordinary things. I now have a better understanding of the god Vishnu in Indian folklore. Like the Indian idol, you  have a hundred arms, and each of your fingers can trip a switch. Granting that nothing is beyond your reach, are you able to see everything that's taking place?

Machiavelli: Yes. My police force will be so vast that in the heart of my kingdom one half the populace will be watching the other half. Permit me to elaborate a bit on how my police force will be organized.

Montesquieu: Proceed.

Machiavelli: The Ministry of the Police that I set up will be the most important of my ministries. It will bring under centralized control a multitude of tasks that  have as much to do with foreign as with domestic affairs.

Montesquieu: But if you do that, your subjects will immediately see that they are caught in a horrible net.

Machiavelli: If this ministry is disliked, I will abolish it and rename it the Ministry of State, if you wish. Besides, in the other ministries, I will organize bureaus  with similar functions, most of which will be thoroughly integrated into what are today called the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As  far as this latter department goes, I am not for the moment concerned with diplomacy but only with ways to insure myself against factions at home and  abroad. When it comes to security, most monarchs find themselves in similar  straits. They would very likely further my projects for an international police  force designed to promote our mutual security. I don't doubt for a minute that I  could pull such a thing off.

I would then break down my cadres of international police into certain sub- groups. First, there would be men who are well off, bon-vivants, planted in foreign courts, whose job would be to keep me informed of the intrigues of princes  and exiled pretenders to my crown. Next, I would have a set of revolutionary  refugees to serve-for a price, of course-as my conduit into  he affairs of obscure rabble-rousers. I would set up political journals, publishing houses, and  bookstores in all the great capitals, secretly subsidized to follow at close hand  the movements in current thought.

Montesquieu: Your policy is no longer directed at factions in your kingdom. You will end up conspiring against the very soul of humanity.

Machiavelli: You know that big talk doesn't really frighten me. I want every political man in league with foreigners to be observed and continually tracked until  he returns to my kingdom. Here he will be immediately incarcerated to prevent a  continuation of any such activities. To better infiltrate revolutionary intrigues, I  have in mind a scheme that I think rather clever.

Montesquieu: Good God, what could that be?

Machiavelli: I would have a prince of my house, directly in line for my throne, play the role of a malcontent. In posing as a liberal and a critic of my rule, he would rally to his side, and thereby expose, those in the upper echelons of my kingdom who might conceivably engage in some rabble-rousing. Privy to foreign and domestic intrigues, this prince would play the lead role in an elaborate  play that would end by informing on such unsuspecting dupes. 

Montesquieu: What! You would have a prince of your own house engage in activities of police work?

Machiavelli: Why not? I know reigning princes who, in exile, have served on the staff of the secret police.

Montesquieu: I will hear you out, Machiavelli, but only to put an end to this frightful wager .

Machiavelli: Don't be indignant, Monsieur de Montesquieu. In The Spirit of the Laws you called me a great man. [6]

Montesquieu: I've paid dearly for such words. My punishment is listening to you. From now on, we can do without so many sordid details.

Machiavelli: As for domestic affairs, I will be forced to reestablish the cabinet noir.

Montesquieu: Go on.

Machiavelli: Your best kings have made use of it. The privacy of the mails must not serve to shelter conspiracies.

Montesquieu: Come clean. The merest whiff of conspiracy scares you, doesn't it?

Machiavelli: You're wrong. There will be conspiracies under my reign. Some are even a necessity.

Montesquieu: Come again?

Machiavelli: There might be some genuine conspiracies, but I am not talking about them. I can assure you that there will also be some sham conspiracies. At  certain opportune times, when the prince's popularity is on the decline, they can  be an excellent way of arousing the people's sympathy. The public can be intimidated and the prince can, if need be, procure the harsh measures he wants or  put into effect those already at hand. These contrived conspiracies, which of  course must be employed cautiously, have yet another use. They can lead to the  discovery of real conspiracies. Blanket investigations can be undertaken into  anything suspect.

Nothing is more precious than the life of the sovereign and many pains must be taken to guarantee it. He must be surrounded by countless bodyguards. But  his secret service must be rather skillfully disguised so that the sovereign does  not seem afraid when he shows himself in public. I am told that in Europe such  precautions were so perfected that a prince could go out in public like an ordinary individual, and seemingly stroll heedlessly through the crowds, while actually being surrounded by two or three thousand of his protectors.

I intend to have my police infiltrate all ranks of society. There will be no private room or gathering place, no drawing room or intimate setting where an eavesdropper is not found to take in what is said at any hour. For those experienced at it, it is astonishingly easy to get men to inform on each other. The techniques of observation and analysis developed by professional cadres of the secret police are more astonishing yet. You have no idea of the range of their  tricks and disguises. Instinct, patience, and imperturbability combine with a certain passion for these sorts of things. The ranks of the profession are made up of  men from all sectors of society who are brought together by a-how shall I put  it-a kind of love of the art.

Montesquieu: Let's keep the curtain closed on such things!

Machiavelli: You get no argument from me on this score. Ruling does indeed involve terrifying, dark secrets. I'll spare you some of the more frightening ones.  The way the system is organized, I will be so completely informed that I would  be able to tolerate certain genuine intrigues because I would have the power to  suppress them anytime I wanted.

Montesquieu: Why would you even consider tolerating them?

Machiavelli: In European states, the absolute monarch must not use force indiscriminately. There are always certain underground activities that need some operating room before they reveal themselves and can be dealt with. Public opinion must not be aroused for just any reason of state security. Consider also that  political parties, reduced to impotence, are often not content merely to grouse  and remonstrate. To deprive them even of an outlet for their cantankerous minds  would be a great mistake. Here and there, their complaints will be heard in  books and newspapers. The government will be attacked by innuendo in some  public speeches or in court, as the defense makes it summation. Under various pretexts, they will undertake small-scale demonstrations to voice their grievances. All these things, I assure you, will be timid undertakings, and the public,  if made aware of them, will only be tempted to laugh. People will find me quite liberal. I will pass for being too easygoing.

I don't want anyone to utter even a word to the effect that my government is afraid. This is the real reason why I tolerate what, after all, can't really harm me.

Montesquieu: That reminds me. You have left a serious gap in your discussion-something your decrees have not touched upon.

Machiavelli: What?

Montesquieu: You have not dealt with individual rights.

Machiavelli:  I won't touch them.

Montesquieu: How so? I don't see how you can square tolerance with your claim to be able to squash anything that you see as threatening. Take a state of  emergency, for instance, even a Jess serious concern that requires immediate  preventive detention. How can you proceed in the face of habeas corpus laws?  Isn't it the case that certain legal formalities and procedural guarantees will  stand in your way? Time is lost while the mechanisms of law roll on.

Machiavelli: Wait a minute. When I said I would respect individual liberty, that did not preclude some very useful judicial reforms.

Montesquieu: I knew it.

Machiavelli: Hold on. Don't think you've scored some big point against me.  What I have in mind would be the simplest thing in the world to do. In parliamentary countries, who is principally entrusted with overseeing individual liberties? 

Montesquieu: It is a judicial tribunal composed of judges whose number and in- dependence guarantee justice.

Machiavelli: That is most surely a defective institution. The slowness of its de- liberations robs justice of the celerity and fear necessary to deter wrongdoers.

Montesquieu: What kind of wrongdoers?

Machiavelli: I am speaking of people who commit murders, thefts, crimes, and offenses justifiable as crimes against society. Jurisdiction over such matters  must be given the necessary unity and dispatch. I would replace your council  with a single judge, charged with overseeing the arrests of criminals.

Montesquieu: But we're not only talking about criminals. By this provision, you threaten the liberty of all citizens. At least draw a distinction between different kinds of crime.

Machiavelli: That is exactly what I don't want to do. Isn't someone who con- spires against the government guilty in the same way as someone who commits a felony or misdemeanor? A moment of passion and being without resources can  explain certain crimes. But what forces people to be interested in politics?  Therefore, I want no distinction between crimes against society and crimes against the state. What is there about the spirit of modern government that leads  it to organize different kinds of courts? In my kingdom, no distinction will be  made between the insolent journalist and the ordinary thief. They will share the  same cell and appear in the same court. The conspirator will share the docket  with the forger and the murderer and appear before the same jury. Let me underscore the brilliance of such a reform. Public opinion, seeing the conspirator  treated no differently than the common criminal, will begin to blur the two categories of crime. It will end up scorning them equally.

Montesquieu: You are destroying the very grounds of sound moral judgments. I know this means nothing to you. But what surprises me is that you would seem  to retain the jury system.

Machiavelli: In centralized states like mine, public officials designate the members of the jury. In cases involving ordinary political offenses, my Minister of Justice will be able, if need be, to convene a panel of judges to deal with such things.

Montesquieu: Your scheme of domestic reforms is up to its task. It is time to go on to other concerns.

_________________

1.  The Prince VII.

2.  The Spirit of the Laws XI 3.

3.  The Spirit of The Laws II 2 and following.

4.  The Spirit of the Laws XXIV 1 and following.

5.  The Spirit of the Laws XXV 12.

6.  The Spirit of the Laws VI 5.
 

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