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HISTORY, SOPHIA AND THE RUSSIAN NATION |
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IV. The Polish Question [1]
Solov'ev ascribed a unique role to Poland as mediator between Eastern and Western Christianity. The fact that Poland belonged to the Russian empire, or at least part of it, allowed him to understand this role as a part of Russia's regenerating mission in the world. In Solov'ev-scholarship, his views on the Polish question have not yet been analysed against the Russian historical background, but are mostly interpreted within the philosophical context of Polish and Russian messianism. [3] In this chapter I aim to make a case for the following points. Firstly, Soloy'ey's treatment of the Polish question was instrumental to his own agenda in so far as it was thoroughly based on his ideal of reconciling Eastern and Western Christianity. Solov'ev was interested in the Polish question to the extent that he saw in it elements for this ideal, which initially took the form of church reunification as a first step towards free theocracy, and later of spiritual unity between Russian Orthodox and Polish Catholics. This ideal, however utopian it may seem, was nevertheless reflected in the ongoing relationship between the Vatican and Russia. Secondly, Solov'ev combined borrowings from ongoing debates with a unique interpretation. On the one hand, his intervention was characteristic of the debates held in his time, yet without exclusively belonging to one camp. His framework was the Slavophile worldview of a religious antagonism between East and West, into which he moulded the principles of cultural and religious freedom defended by the liberals. On the other hand, he was probably the only thinker who interpreted the Polish question in terms of church reunification, and certainly the only thinker to see in it a step towards free theocracy. This is where his profound originality lies, as well as his loneliness in Russian public opinion on this issue. The three registers of history that I have identified as forming his views of history allow to understand why his fellow countrymen hardly reacted to his views on the Polish question. Thirdly, and most interestingly if we put that in contrast with the other cases, all three key figures of free theocracy are dealt with concurrently in the Polish question namely: the tsar through the government's attitude to the Poles, the prophet as the announcer of church reunion, and the pope as spiritual head of the Poles and Western Europe. Arguably, this three-fold prism made his views obscure for all camps in Russian public opinion. Fourthly, his conception of history plays a decisive role both for the promotion of his ideal and for legitimising and reinforcing his position in Russian public opinion. In The three registers of history defined in Part One have an explanatory value in this respect. Interestingly, while theology of history dominates in the texts and provides a partly Slavophile framework, philosophy of history provides the necessary support of his liberal position. Also, some aspects of his sophiology of history come to the fore due to inspiration by the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz, and possibly also from Polish philosopher August Cieszkowski. In order to drive home these points, I first provide a brief survey of the situation of the Poles in the Russian empire (1b) and of the debates on the Polish question (1e) in the time when Solov'ev intervened on the issue (1880-1900). In the second part, the presentation of the texts in which Solov'ev dealt with the Polish question is followed by a confrontation of these texts with the historical context of the situation of the Poles (2b), and with the debates (2c). Finally, his intervention in the Polish question is unravelled in terms of the three registers of theology of history, philosophy of history and sophiology of history (2d). b) The historical context: policies [4] The Polish kingdom disappeared from the European map as a result of partitions of the country between Russia, which was given the lion share, Prussia and Austria at the turn of the 19th century. After a first Polish uprising in 1831 a second followed in 1863, which was mercilessly repressed. From the end of the 1860s onwards up to the end of the century, the government decided to solve this specific aspect of the question of nationalities, the Polish question, by a policy of russification. This involved a permanent action upon the Polish people aimed at eliminating their specificities in order to gradually assimilate them into the Russian population. [5] For this purpose, reforms were implemented in three fields, namely agriculture, administration, and culture. The agrarian reform succeeded in creating a free Polish peasant class and in weakening the Polish gentry (szlachta); indirectly, it transformed the urban demography by driving the middle gentry into the cities, where they formed a middle class, by creating a working class, and more generally by creating opportunities for quick economic development. [6] The administrative reform aimed at concentrating full power over the Polish provinces in Russian hands. But it was the goal of cultural fusion of the Poles within the Russian empire that entailed the harshest measures. Education was russified by prohibiting the use of Polish as teaching language. The Catholic Church, considered a main factor in the uprising, came under constant vigilance, most monasteries were closed, and ecclesiastical goods were confiscated. The clergy were remunerated by the government and the bishops appointed by the Ecclesiastical College of St. Petersburg. [7] Strikingly, the objective of cultural fusion of the Poles was not accompanied with Orthodox missionary campaigns to convert them. As a matter of fact, the number of conversions of Catholics to Orthodoxy remained very low. [8] Between 1880 and 1900, opposition to Russian occupation, though weakening with the time, came mostly from the Polish clergy. This factor increased the traditional antipathy of Russian Orthodox with respect to Catholicism, and contributed to reinforce the religious aspect of the Polish question. Pobedonoscev did not hesitate to link the Catholicism of the Poles as the cause of their national aspirations and their hatred of Russia, and to denounce a Polish conspiracy against Russia through the Vatican. [9] In this sense, the Polish question played a role in the diplomatic relationship between Russia and the Vatican. These had been broken off in the 1860s after the repression by Russia of the Polish uprising. Pope Leo XIII (1810-1903, pope from 1878 to 1903) worked at resuming the bond by promising Russia that he would use his spiritual authority to soften the tension between the Polish population and the Russian occupyers. In 1889, urged the resistant core of Polish Catholics, namely the Polish bishops, to cooperate with the Russian authorities. [10] In contrast, many Poles worked at building a Polish society and developing Polish culture without seeking open confrontation with Russian rule, namely by clandestinely teaching Polish, promoting cultural activities and improving the economic infrastructure. [11] From 1885 to 1904, 'the whole period was to pass without an appeal to violence, without a concerted blow struck for national independence.' [12] c) Debates in Russian public opinion [13] In the aftermath of the Polish uprising of 1863, a consensus reigned in the Russian press that regarded the Russian occupation of Polish territories as fully justified. [14] A differentiation of views appeared in the 1870s, with the progressive camps who advocated religious and cultural freedom for the Poles on the one hand, and the conservatives, who defended an assimilation of the Polish population within the empire through the policy of russification, on the other. In the 1880s, when Solov'ev started writing on the Polish question, the issue practically disappeared from the debates, eclipsed by other problems connected with the new era of reaction under Alexander III. [15] In the 1890s, a number of authors expressed themselves on the Polish question, while the claim to Polish national autonomy was heard increasingly. Four main positions can be distinguished for the period in question (1880-1900): the conservative nationalists, Slavophiles, liberals, and (mostly Polish) radicals. The conservative nationalists (Konstantin Pobedonoscev, Mikhail Katkov, Vladimir Gringmut) fiercely defended the policy of russification as a necessary means for boosting the interests of the Russian state. [16] The highly prolific writer Gringmut stressed the necessity of reinforcing state unity, which implied that the Poles should work towards a 'complete fusion of the former Polish kingdom with the great, powerful Russian empire.' [17] The Poles had the right to speak Polish and go to Catholic churches as long as this practice remained in the private sphere, but in no way should deprive the Russian language of its 'state significance' [gosudarstvennoe znacenie], or diminish the sanctity or dignity of the Orthodox church. [18] The Slavophiles (Ivan Aksakov, Nikolaj Danilevskij, Vladimir Lamanskij, I. Filevic) on the whole approved of repressive measures against the Poles but, in contrast with the conservative nationalists, rejected a military dictatorship in the Polish provinces. [19] Basing them selves on Samarin's identification of Poland with Western civilisation and Latinity, as opposed to Russia and Slavdom, they stigmatised the Polish gentry and clergy as the armed propaganda of Catholicism, and in the name of the unity of Slavic peoples favoured the assimilation of the Poles as the only solution to the Polish question. [20] The liberals (Nikolaj Kareev, Vladimir Spasovic) went yet another step further than the Slavophiles. [21] Their defence of the greatest possible autonomy for Poles within the Russian empire logically prompted them to vehemently condemn the policy of russification. Drawing from his experience of living in Warsaw, Kareev was highly critical of the aggressive, paternalistic attitude of the Russian press with respect to the Poles, and stressed positive developments in Poland, such as a free peasantry developing a Polish nationality, economic progress, and a notable social bloom. Spasovic not only advocated equal civil treatment of Russians and Poles, but also worked at bringing together the two nations as a publicist and literary critic. As regards the radicals, they began to openly defend the idea of Polish national autonomy by the end of the 1890s onwards. Until then they did not reflect along the line of national self-determination, but mainly thought in terms of cooperation between Russians and Poles. The country's national independence was nevertheless generally accepted among socialists. [22] In 1883, the labour party was founded in the Polish provinces, and it was active in the publication of journals, organisation of strikes, and collaboration with the analogous Russian underground organisation, Narodnaja Volja. [23] The movement also found support in the Polish League founded in 1886 and based in Switzerland. The Manifest of the Polish League was published in 1897. Mostly of Polish nationality, such as Stanislav Tarnowski, its members advocated political independence. [24] The poor living conditions among the working class created a favourable soil for an enthusiastic reception of Marx in Poland, and for the development of Polish Marxism. [25] Its unbending internationalism made it a subsidiary of Russian Social Democracy. [26] The Polish question had thus become a central problem for Russian authorities, who implemented radical transformations in the Polish provinces between 1863 and 1900. The period in which Solov'ev lived was precisely the harshest period of Russian rule over Poland, both in terms of the scale of measures that touched all areas of existence and of the thoroughness with which these measures were applied. The debates on the Polish question focused on the question whether the policy of russification was the best solution to the Polish question, and whether it was legitimate and desirable for the Russian nation as well as for the Poles. A whole scale of views was given from a full defence of the repressive policies to a claim of Polish national autonomy. In the following section I will show Solov'ev's instrumental approach to the issue and situate it within the context of the debates in order to show his originality, his support of common views, as well as the role of his conception of history in his peculiar position. Solov'ev became acquainted with Poland as early as 1875 on his trip to London, when he stayed in Warsaw for a couple of days. Even though he did not begin to write on the Polish question until the early 1880s, his Polish sympathies may date back to that journey. [27] Solov'ev wrote a contre-courant on the Polish question: his writings extend from 1883 until 1898, in a period when the wave of interest in the Polish question that had dominated in the 1870s had practically disappeared, and was only beginning to come back with the claims for Polish independence. He devoted several articles to expound his views, mostly in connection with other questions. In the first article, 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros' [Poland and the Eastern Question], published in 1883 in Aksakov's journal Rus' as an introduction to his work Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika [The Great Schism and Christian Politics], the philosopher set the historical and conceptual framework of his reflection upon Christian politics. [28] The Polish question was significant for Solov'ev in two respects: first, it was the most urgent of the three national tasks, next to the Jewish question and the Eastern question. Secondly, and more specifically, Poland was a pivot in his theocratic idea. In his opinion, Russia had a crucial role to play in the resolution of the great schism that was tearing mankind apart, namely the schism between East and West. By reconciling with Poland in the form of a religious solidarity between Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia, Russia would pave the way for reconciliation between East and West, understood by Solov'ev as Orthodox Russia and (mostly) Roman Catholic Western Europe. Poland, being ethnically close to Russians and religiously affiliated to Catholicism, would work as the reconciling factor. In this way, Poland would contribute to the reunification of the churches, a necessary condition for the establishment of theocracy. In the following year, 1884, a few pages were devoted to the Polish question as a national task for Russia in the essay 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros' [Judaism and the Christian Question]. [29] Polish society was dominated by the landed gentry, the szlachta, which was the main hindrance for building a state. Nevertheless, Poland had a role to play in the theocratic mission, in virtue of its belonging to Catholicism, i.e. to the spiritual authority of the pope. Solov'ev linked the Polish question with the Jewish question by pointing to the fact that, at this moment, the people of Israel could also playa reconciling role between Poland and Russia. A couple of years later, his tone changed and became openly critical of Russia's foreign and internal policies. Given the strict control of the press by censorship, this critique was not published in Russia at the time of its writing. In 1887, in the unpublished 'Grekhi Rossii' [Russia's Sins], he denounced the policy of Poland's russification and the absence of religious freedom for Catholics. [30] In 1888, he had the opportunity to voice his criticism publicly, though abroad, in Paris, in his lecture L 'idee russe. [31] The year 1888 was the ninth centenary of the Baptism of Russia, a topic which Solov'ev connected with the 'raison d'etre of Russia in universal history' in order to castigate the un-Christian attitude of the Russian government with respect to the religious minorities. [32] This lecture provoked a reaction from the Polish thinker Stanislaw Tarnowski, to whom Solov'ev responded in his 'Lettre a la redaction du Przeglad Polski' in 1889. [33] This text offers one of the very few reflexive considerations on his work, and, more importantly for our analysis, on his own contribution to history. Next to Russia's historical mission and the idea of Christian prophetism, the philosopher broached the Polish question and argued against the restoration of Poland's political autonomy. At the same time he envisaged the possibility of a plebiscite in order to ask the Polish population to which nation it preferred to belong. He also valued the destiny of Poland positively, which, by giving up being a particular national state, would precede all other European countries, and in this way anticipate the ideal supranational Christian community. His next publication in Russia on the Polish question, in 1893, was the second part of the essay 'Iz voprosov kul'tury' [From Questions of Culture] entitled 'Istoriceskij sfinks' [The Historical Sphinx], and consisted of a defence of religious tolerance, written in reaction to two publications by the neo-Slavophile Konstantin Bestuzev-Rjumin and the Orthodox conservative I.S. Durnovo. [34] Religious tolerance should be part of Orthodoxy, and, implicitly, of the Russian idea, and as such should be applied notably to Catholic Poles. In that same year, Solov'ev was already working on his comprehensive work of ethics, Opravdanie dobra [The Justification of the Good]. In his account of each historical nation and its universal character, he defined the essence of the Polish nation as follows: Polish universalism manifests itself in its broad idealism, characterised by openness to foreign influences. [35] The motive of religious tolerance was picked up again in his 'Mir' Vostoka i Zapada' [The World of East and West], a eulogy for empress Catherine II on the occasion of the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of her death in 1896. [36] He stressed the assessment of the contribution of Peter the Great to Russian history, and the significance of the reign of Catherine in continuing the task of bringing East and West closer together. Here we also find Solov'ev's interpretation of the situation of Poland in the 18th century, and his justification of its annexation by Catherine. One year later, in 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja cerkov" [The Polish National Church], Solov'ev rejected the creation, advocated by some Polish Catholic priests, of a national Polish church. This church would be separated from the Roman Catholic Church and would allow, notably, the marriage of priests. [37] From the perspective of the historical bonds between Poland, Russia and Rome, Solov'ev argued, this would be a negative development, especially now that the diplomatic relationships between Russia and the Vatican were restored. In this connection, he envisaged a future reconciliation between Poland and Russia in spiritual terms, through the shared veneration of an ancient Byzantine Icon of the Virgin on Polish territory, our Lady of Czestochowa. [38] This spiritual, rather than religious or institutional, dimension of the Polish question, is also present in his last text on the topic, 'Mickevie', Solov'ev's commemorative speech on the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz, on December 27th, 1898. [39] Solov'ev emphasised that Mickiewicz had correctly perceived his nation in terms of self-sacrifice and bowed before the suffering of his fatherland. In Solov'ev's eyes, Poland was not only a symptom of the conflict between East and West, but also played a role in its solution, Although the motives of reconciling East and West and of the reunification of the churches do not always appear equally prominently, they lie at the basis of his rel1ections on the Polish question. These take various thematic directions: towards a messianic discourse, with such topics as the national mission, the national idea; towards a spiritualization of the topic, with reference to the icon and the characterisation of Poland as Nation-Prophet; and towards a moral discourse, as the terms of sins, punishment, obligations, and principle of religious tolerance indicate. A shift of emphasis appears in the course of his interventions. The earlier texts bring to the foreground Solov'ev's ideas about the role of Poles in his future theocratic project, while social, political and cultural considerations on Poland -- mainly concerning the policy of russification and the rejection of political autonomy -- are only mentioned in passing. Later, as his theocratic hopes weakened, the philosopher committed himself more deeply to a struggle in the social, political and cultural field, by advocating freedom of confession and of cultural development in the Polish province. The question, dealt with in the next section, is to what extent these reflections are based on historical events. b) Confrontation with the historical development of Poland Solov'ev was fascinated by Poland, belonging as it did ethnically to Slavdom, and religiously to Catholicism. And although one could name other cases of ethnic Slavs belonging to Catholicism, for instance Croats, Solov'ev did not deal with those cases. [40] An explanation is that the philosopher defined the Polish question as one of the vital questions that the Russian nation had to solve. This definition shapes his perspective as a whole on the Polish question and on Polish history. In his various publications, Solov'ev recurrently broached four main moments of Polish history: the defeat of Poland under Catherine II, the partitions, the 1863 uprising, and the present time (1880-1900). These points are never elaborate arguments or analyses, but rather statements or conclusions, on the basis of which it is possible to reconstruct the chronology of the Polish question according to Solov'ev and to discuss his views. The chronology of the Polish question properly speaking thus starts for Solov'ev with the fall of Poland at the end of the 18th century, He first characterised the Polish regime as a whole as the embodiment, through the gentry, of 'the extreme of Western individualism., [41] Solov'ev repeatedly emphasised Poland's political and social weakness, which he ascribed to the exclusive power of the szlachta by virtue of the institution of Poland's constitutional system, the liberum veto, [42] In the liberum veto, the effective power lay in the hands of the gentry and did not leave any room for reform or decisive action by the monarch. [43] The same point is made by modern historians who stress the weakness of royal power due to its submission to the rule of the liberum veto in the 18th century, yet without reducing the cause of the fall of Poland to this factor, as did Solov'ev. [44] Besides, his general valuation of the degradation of Poland was correct, although he tended to reduce Polish political history to its unfortunate development in the 18th century, neglecting its flourishing, especially the 16th century. [45] In addition, his interpretation of the fall of Poland reduces Polish society to the szlachta, and Polish politics to the liberum veto. without taking into account the attempts to reform the latter. [46] With respect to the definitive defeat of Poland, Solov'ev significantly did not refer to any Polish historical figure, but only to Catherine II. The occasion on which Solov'ev expressed himself, namely the eulogy of the great empress, naturally also played a role in this choice. Her deeds in foreign politics were widely considered to be her greatest achievements, and in this respect Solov'ev simply joined the common choir of praise in the historiography of both his time and ours. [47] Her greatness as a Christian ruler was shown by her intervention in Poland in the I760s, as an example of commitment to tolerance and justice. Without mentioning dates or Polish or Russian historical figures, he referred to the pinnacle of Catherine's policy of influence in Poland, when she sent her troops into the kingdom, an episode that sharpened Poland's inner crisis, and accelerated its loss of political autonomy. Solov'ev justified the intervention by Catherine, in terms of 'reparation of injustice, defence of the persecuted dissidents, not in the name of exclusively confessional sympathies, but in the name of the broad, truly imperial principle of fair religious tolerance for all. ' [48] By 'dissidents', Solov'ev meant the Protestants and Orthodox in Poland, who indeed had suffered persecutions, especially in the Counter- Reformation period. At the end of the 18th century, however, Protestants and Orthodox in Poland possessed full civil rights and freedom of confession. Catherine II and Frederick II demanded that they also be given political rights, in the same way as Catholics, which reinforced dissent within the szlachta. [49] Viewing Catherine's politics in Poland exclusively as a defence of religious tolerance seems to have been a commonly accepted view among many thinkers known for their commitment to this cause. [50] In the same vein, Solov'ev did not interpret Catherine's actions in Poland as a strategic move, understandable from the perspective of her territorial ambitions on Polish soil. [51] He acknowledged the category of 'historical right' in the territorial question, yet without according it to the Poles. [52] Polish ambitions to rebuild Poland according to its earlier borders were mere 'hallucinations' and the fruit of a 'pathological' attitude. [53] Russia was called to intervene in favour of justice: 'The right to Poland was given to Catherine's imperial politics by the offences done to the dissidents.' [54] From there, it was a small step to regarding the territorial annexation as a fair, justified, and deserved 'restitution', a step which Solov'ev indeed took. [55] The same conclusions can be drawn from Solov'ev's examination of the partitions of Poland (1773, 1793, 1795, 1815), the second episode of Polish history that retained his attention. In 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', Solov'ev unfolds the map of the strategic situation of Poland at the congress of Vienna (1815), which decided Poland's fourth partition between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Solov'ev justified Russia's good intentions by arguing, firstly, that Russia did not act out of its own interest. His argument that 'Russian' Galicia was left to Austria is debatable: this 'leaving' of Galicia was not so much an altruistic gesture as one of the conditions of the partitions themselves, namely that part of the whole would be left for Austria; from the first partition onwards, it was indeed clear to Russia and Prussia that Austria was also involved.56 Solov'ev also considered the Russian annexation of the main Polish territories a gesture by tsar Alexander I to educate Poland and to preserve it from 'germanisation' by Prussia. This gives rise to three remarks. First, Solov'ev does justice to Alexander's efforts to guarantee the Poles the freedom of national development; Alexander did indeed grant them a constitution, a system of local self- government, liberty of the press, and the right to have a separate army. Second, his position is typical for a 19th century view on politics and of colonisation, formulated in paternalistic terms of education and protection. Thirdly, Solov'ev, quite significantly, does not value the annexation of the other parts of Poland by Austria and Prussia in the same manner. On the contrary, he condemns the German appetite. This stance shows that Solov'ev does not content himself with approving annexation as good in itself, but judges the intention behind it according to moral criteria. Concerning the Polish uprising of 1863, the philosopher focused on the social composition of Poland at that time. He realistically stated that Polish society was exclusively dominated by the gentry, the szlachta, at the expense of the rest of the population, notably the peasants. On this basis, he interpreted Russia's repression of the uprising and the accompanying reforms -- redistribution of the land to the liberated peasants, and the correspondingly weakening of the gentry -- as the emancipation of the peasants and the liberation of Poland from the 'fatal antagonism' between the two classes. His statement that Russia 'guaranteed the future of the real, not only noble, and not only peasant, but Polish Poland' came down to the view that 'real Poland' was more Polish under Russian rule than as an independent state, which testifies to Solov'ev's belief in Russia's essentially protective mission with respect to the country. [57] The assumption, however, that this 'liberation' was definitive is contradicted by frequent statements by Solov'ev himself on the division in Polish society up to his own time, and for this reason, the impossibility of Poland building a state. The time in which he was writing (the 1880s-1890s), is the fourth aspect examined by Solov'ev with respect to the Polish question. The unacceptability of the policy of russification forms a core issue in the years 1887 ('Grekhi Rossii'), 1888 (L'idee russe), and 1893 ('Istoriceskij sfinks'). Clearly, they are not directly linked by any special events or particularly crude news from the Polish province. As we know, the policy of russification had started by the 1860s, and the repression of Catholicism reached its peak in the 1870s, So what was the motive behind Solov'ev's fierce criticism of the Russian policy? Arguably, the underlying motive was the principle of religious freedom. Solov'ev did not elaborate on the measures taken to repress Polish culture, but his position against the assimilation of Poland into Russian culture is obvious. He repeatedly denounced the persecution of Catholic Poles, but again without elaborating on this point. The only concrete example can be found in one of his last articles, 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja cerkov". There he saluted, carefully but clearly, the fact that the Polish Catholic clergy had returned to the authority of the Roman pope, thereby implicitly criticising both the attempts by Poles to create a Polish national church, and the subordination of the Polish Catholic clergy to the Ecclesiastical College in St. Petersburg after 1863. [58] He also welcomed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between St. Petersburg and the Vatican, which had restored the ancient Roman authority, legitimised by tradition. In this respect, his ideal of church reunion, or at least of a rapprochement between the Eastern and the Western churches was not merely the fruit of his own utopian dream, but found a concrete basis, relevance and legitimacy in the ongoing developments. Solov'ev's noble defence of Poland's right to free cultural development and religious confession was a response to concrete persecution in Polish territories. However, this concern for the implementation of freedom and respect eclipsed other, social and economic realities in the Polish territories. His views of the components of Polish society were simplistic and outdated: 'without any aptitudes to a strong state power, with the exclusively passive character of the peasant class and with the absence of an urban class, Poland as a whole is represented by the szlachta alone.' [59] This quotation shows that Solov'ev strikingly stuck to an image of Poland as it existed in the 18th century, and until the 1860s at the most. [60] By the 1880s, Polish society had become more complex than the conflict between gentry and peasants, with the appearance of an urban intelligentsia and of a working class. Solov'ev also held that Poland's annexation by Russia was economically valuable. [61] On the one hand, the Polish area under Russian rule did experience tremendous economic growth that went beyond the development of Prussian and Austrian Poland. On the other hand, this development was hardly due to Russian tsardom, since Russia did not offer any assistance to the Polish economy by building infrastructure such as railways, sewage or waterworks. [62] As a consequence, it is impossible to speak of the Russian occupation in terms of active support and contribution to welfare in the Polish province, as Solov'ev did. [63] This again reveals his total disinterest as to Russia's strategic manoeuvres in Poland. Russia strove to divide in order to strengthen its power, by first helping the gentry during the uprising, then, once the uprising was crushed, by helping the peasants by way of agrarian reform. Russia did work at reducing social differences, as Solov'ev claimed, but at the same time strove to keep these two social groups separate, secluded, as is shown by the administrative measures in the villages imposed after the repression of the uprising. [64] c) Confrontation of Solov 'ev 's views with debates i) The conservative nationalists Solov'ev's position with respect to the conservative nationalists was univocally and constantly critical. Solov'ev reacted to the statements made by historian Bestuzev-Rjumin and publicist I.S. Durnovo by explicitly rejecting their defence of the policy of russification and religious persecution of the Catholic Poles. He argued that Orthodoxy should include religious tolerance, and that as such this tolerance should be applied to Catholic Poles and to other religious minorities living on Russian soil, notably the Jews. [65] Opposing the twist given to the concept of a national mission towards intolerance and aggressive nationalism, he repeatedly emphasised the necessity of understanding Russia's mission not as a privilege, but as a moral obligation, a serving [sluzenie]. [66] Besides, when the utterly conservative journal Novoe Vremja supported the creation of a Polish national church separated from Rome, the philosopher explicitly reacted by showing that this idea was inconsistent, inspired by anti-Catholic motives, and formed an obstacle to the relationships between Russians and Poles. [67] Significantly, the only reactions to Solov'ev's interventions came from the conservative nationalist camp. In the 1890s, two minor authors, the abovementioned I.S. Durnovo and Dmitrij Ilovajskij, put pen to paper to react in Moskovskie Vedomosti against Solov'ev's writings on the Polish question. Both were engaged in an ongoing polemic with Solov'ev. [68] Ilovajskij criticized Solov'ev for propagating ideas against the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state, especially with respect to the occupation of the Polish territories. [69] Solov'ev's statements on the obligation to respect your neighbours' religion and law only amounted, he claimed, to negating and humiliating the Orthodox Church in relation to Catholicism. Durnovo's response was far more elaborate. [70] Against Solov'ev's critique of intolerance, Durnovo protested that the policy of russification had in no way violated the respect for Polish narodnost'. He claimed that Solov'ev displayed logical inconsistency in founding a government's policy on respect for the free development of another narodnost'. Moreover, the principle of respect was subjective, negative, and led to non-participation in public affairs. For these reasons, it could not serve as a basis to act for the Russian government, in particular in the Polish territories. Significantly, these two reactions to Solov'ev's writings concern his fundamental critique of Russian government policy, which obviously was serious enough to generate the need to react. [71] However, the strong hostility between Solov'ev and the conservative nationalists should not conceal the fact that there were points of convergence in their worldviews. For instance, with Gringmut Solov'ev shared the faith in the Russian institutions of tsardom and the Orthodox Church. But while this faith prompted Gringmut and the conservative nationalists to prohibit all criticism of these institutions, it motivated Solov'ev to exhort them to act according to the Christian principles they embodied. [72] ii) The Slavophiles Solov'ev's perception of Poland was closest to the Slavophile perspective. In fact, he shared with them a basic identification of Poland with Western civilisation, and more specifically, with Catholicism. In a similar stance, Solov'ev characterized Poland as bearing within itself the extreme feature of Western civilisation, that is, individualism, as a result of which it was doomed to fall. [73] He regarded the 18th century Polish regime as a whole as the embodiment of 'the extreme of Western individualism.' [74] This individualism was typical of the gentry, the szlachta, which, by abusing its privileged position, had concentrated Polish society and politics within itself: 'all the force of Poland was in the szlachta, and Poland died. It did not die because of possessing a strong gentry, for this was a privilege, but because its gentry, instead of being a social class, organized to serve the state and to rule over the people, transformed into a class which ruled without limits, and included the state in itself.' [75] Solov'ev, however, went further than the Slavophiles's identification of Poland with Catholicism in two respects, namely by valuing Catholicism positively, and by ascribing to Poland a role in solving the universal schism. While the Slavophiles saw the conflict in its universal scope as unsolvable, and sometimes regarded the Poles as irredeemably divided and as traitors of the Slav world, Solov'ev used the Polish situation as a means to overcome the schism: the Polish reason of being was even to serve Catholicism. [76] In his eyes, Catholicism, with its seat in Rome, represented the unity and authority received from tradition that Orthodoxy lacked. Poland, being religiously affiliated with Catholicism, would work as the reconciling factor, and contribute to the reunification of the churches. [77] Poland bore within itself this universal conflict between East and West. Characteristic of his treatment of ideals and their implementation, however, he limited his message to this general exhortation, without proposing concrete measures for a rapprochement between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches. However, in that period marked by strong anti- Catholic feelings in Russia, his call undoubtedly had a disturbing effect. In Solov'ev's eyes, the way of dealing with the Polish territories was a test case for Russia's Christian or non-Christian attitude. For him, the applicability to concrete reality of the principles discussed was at stake, and not the purely theoretical examination of these principles, upon which all Slavophiles agreed, without putting them into practice. Solov'ev criticized the discrepancy between theoretical views (Samarin's claim of the freedom of cultural development and religious confession) and their non-application to concrete situations, which led to religious fanaticism. [78] The same criticism was aimed at Dostoevskij, whose chauvinism Solov'ev condemned explicitly. [79] Walicki has argued that it was precisely Solov'ev's position with respect to the Polish question, especially his liberalism and his heterodox messianism, combined with his growing fascination with Roman Catholicism, that played a key role in his distancing himself from the Slavophiles. [80] This thesis seems true for one part only. Solov'ev did indeed start writing in Rus', the journal of the Slavophile Ivan Aksakov who saluted his publication on the Polish question. [81] However, concerning his later publications after he had left Rus', in spite of his criticism of the Slavophile's purely theoretical preoccupations, and in spite of his properly un-Slavophile valuation of Catholicism, he still shared with the Slavophiles the understanding of Poland and the Polish question from a religious perspective, in terms of an antagonism between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, or between East and West. [82] The case of Poland shows that Solov'ev traded the Slavophile worldview, which was centred on Orthodoxy, traditional Russia and theoretical ideals, and which was on the whole oriented towards the past, for an ecumenical messianism that demanded concrete realisation of principles and was by definition future-oriented. iii) The liberals Solov'ev's distancing from the Slavophiles in the mid-1880s went hand-in-hand with a rapprochement with the liberals. He started to publish regularly in the latters' mouthpiece, Vestnik Evropy, and by the end of the 1880s collaborated closely with the editorial board and attended the weekly meetings with the editor-in-chief Matvej Stasjulevic, so that the conservative press regarded him as a liberal. [83] Solov'ev condemned the 'forced russification in the borderlands', the 'injustice [... ] of the abominable system of russification [... ] which attacks national existence, the very soul of the Polish people.' [84] Here Solov'ev was referring to Poland's cultural achievements, by virtue of which it should be considered a nation. Without elaborating on the measures taken to repress Polish culture, he clearly stated his position against the assimilation of Poland into Russian culture. Equally short and incisive was his condemnation of the persecution of Catholic Poles. However, he did not question Russian occupation, as it had put an end to the tyrannical domination of the gentry and favoured Poland's free development. In this connection, he agreed with the liberals on the positive valuation of the agrarian reform in Poland, He interpreted the reform of land redistribution to the liberated peasants as the emancipation of peasants and the liberation of Poland from the 'fatal antagonism' between the two classes, Solov'ev also shared, especially with Kareev, the idea that Russian occupation protected Poland from germanisation, which was considered a real danger. [85] Of particular interest is the true friendship that developed between Solov'ev and an insider in the Polish question, and close collaborator of Vestnik Evropy, Vladimir Spasovic. [86] With Spasovic, and against the Polish advocates of independence, he argued that no political autonomy was possible because the internal antagonism between the gentry and the common people had remained intact until his time and posed a major obstacle for building a state. [87] Poles still lacked 'the very first necessary conditions for political restoration.' [88] More diplomatically, he suggested that the Polish population be asked by means of a plebiscite to which state it should belong. [89] In any case, instead of being concerned with the goal that Solov'ev envisaged for them, i.e., the reconciliation between East and West, the Poles remained rather focused on their own national interest. [90] His criticism of the Polish attitude shows that his approach to Poland was quite different from the liberal Kareev. Analysis of historical events, of the implementation of policies, and of agrarian reforms, and in general concern for the concrete situation, typical for Kareev's approach, were alien to Solov'ev. It was precisely the reduction of Polish society to gentry and peasantry and the use of cliches that were condemned by Kareev in his critique of the pejorative treatment of the Polish question in the Russian press. [91] Another point of difference of approach concerns Poland's political future. Solov'ev explicitly confessed his absence of concern for the form of political regime, and did not consider it a primary necessity for Poland to again have a state. Instead of being concerned with the evolution of the political status of the Polish nation, he focused on the Christian attitude that Russia should have with respect to Poland, and systematically approached the Polish question from a religious or moral perspective. [92] This different focus may explain the absence of any reaction from the liberals to Solov'ev's views on Poland. It also determined another fundamental difference with the liberals. While Catholic faith was only one of the factors that according to Kareev made up Polish identity, for instance, Solov'ev focused on it to such an extent that he even valued Poland exclusively for belonging to Catholicism and identified the Polish national idea with Catholicism. iv) The radicals Against the Polish defenders of political autonomy, Solov'ev repeatedly argued that the restoration of a Polish state was impossible. [93] The internal antagonism between the gentry and the peasantry had remained until his time, and formed a major obstacle for building a state. Solov'ev nevertheless conceded that the Poles had learnt to give up their arbitrariness, and had adopted organised and disciplined action. [94] It is unclear what Solov'ev was referring to here: Polish docility towards Russian authorities, or their clandestine social organisations in favour of the spreading of the Polish language and culture. He may have heard about the latter through his friend Spasovic. However, Solov'ev never broached the topic of these organisations, perhaps for fear of revealing information that should be kept secret from the Russian authorities, or simply because he did not know about them. It is at least clear that Solov'ev objected to Polish ambitions of political independence. To the reproach by Tarnowski of talking like the Polish messianists, he answered that, contrary to them, he considered his own country not as an elected nation and object of cult, but only as one with a historical obligation at that very moment. [95] The protective tone of the Russian thinker could only meet with disapproval on the part of the Polish defenders of national independence. Solov'ev's approach to the Polish question contributed to redefining his position in the Russian intellectual world of his time. He did not belong fully to anyone camp, but clearly borrowed views from the Slavophiles and the liberals. From the Slavophiles he preserved the framework of world history with its division between East and West, and its overly religious perspective. In the liberals he found support for the implementation of his principles in the concrete situation of the Polish cultural and religious minority. As for the reception of his views, three remarks should be made. His critique of the state's policy of russification and the religious persecution of the Catholic Poles, led to his being considered immoral, decadent and anti-patriotic by the nationalist-conservative party. Besides, the complete absence of a reaction on the liberals' part to his treatment of the Polish question indicates that Solov'ev, though undoubtedly esteemed for his defence of liberal principles, was actually too religious to be considered a valuable partner in the discussion about the economic, social and political aspects of the Polish question. His emphasis on church reunification could therefore only provoke the protest of the conservatively-minded Russians, as well as the disinterest of the liberals and radicals. Finally, his support of the Russian occupation of Poland, and his disinterest in the political future of the country were too conservative in the eyes of the Polish supporters of political independence. The originality of his approach explains his isolated position in the debates. It led him to interpret events in moral and religious terms, thereby turning them into symbols, and thus translating them into a higher, spiritual dimension. By the same token, he did not turn his back on society and his time, but sought to transfigure the relationships between Russia and Poland, to lift them onto a higher, moral level of solidarity and justice. This translation of the issue into a speculative discourse is true to his threefold conception of history, which serves to explain his approach to the Polish question. d) Theology of history, philosophy of history and sophiology of history It is no coincidence that Solov'ev dealt with the three pillars of free theocracy, namely pope, Russian emperor, and prophet, within one single text, and even on one page. [96] This shows the central significance that he viewed in the Polish question for the realisation of his ideal. In this respect, the three registers of history that I have identified in Solov'ev's texts provide an explanation to his position. The theological register of history clearly dominates in Solov'ev's texts on the Polish question. He viewed the East-West conflict in terms of a conflict between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and, accordingly, defined Poland primarily as a Catholic nation. Poland was to play a role in this conflict by eliminating it through the reunification of the churches. Perhaps as an alternative to the liberal view, he held that the rapprochement with the West should take place not only in political, military and intellectual terms, as Peter and Catherine had done, but also, and even primarily, in religious terms. Russia's attitude with respect to Poland also appears in the theological perspective on history. Russia stands before a crossway: either it contributes to God's work on earth through a reconciliation with Poland involving religious freedom for the Poles, or it leaves God's path. [97] Russia had already been punished by God for its sins, the policy of russification. This was shown by the outcome of the Crimean wars, for instance the decisive battle against Turkish, French and British troops in Sebastopol in 1855, as well as by the withdrawal of some territories promised to Russia at the Congress of Berlin after its victory in the Balkan war in 1878. [98] Solov'ev found support in the philosophical register of history to make the following two points, which were in his opinion fundamental. His emphasis on Poland's right to develop itself culturally is based on the application to Poland of the central category of philosophy of history, the notion of 'historical nation. ' This allowed him to gain firm ground against the understanding of Poland as merely a temporary subculture due for assimilation with Russia, as the conservative nationalists claimed. At the same time, against those arguing for Polish independence, he indicated why Poland was unable to have a state at that stage by referring to an explanation that also belonged to this register, namely the social composition and the historical domination of one social group (the gentry) over the others. As for sophiology of history, this only comes to the fore in Solov'ev's self-definition, decipherable between the lines, as the prophet who establishes the diagnosis of Russia and points to the right path for Russia's attitude with respect to Poland. [99] His status as prophet appears precisely in the fact that he translated values in the concrete situation of his time. Interestingly, for this self-perception, he borrowed elements from the eminent Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz. Mickiewicz, who had emphasised the role of the individual and who, by virtue of his spiritual achievements, acts as the 'revealer' of the higher truth to humanity. [100] This is precisely what Solov'ev did in his treatment of the Polish question, by translating Christian values into the concept of the national missions of Russia (love, brotherhood) and Poland (sacrifice). Besides, Mickiewicz had made the connection between the Polish question and the Jewish question, and had defined Poland as a theocratic nation. Precisely this connection helped Solov'ev to define his own attitude with respect to the issue of nationalities, and in particular with respect to the Polish question. [101] Finally, on a more personal level, another similarity should be mentioned. Solov'ev argued that the notion of sacrifice was fundamental in understanding Mickiewicz's life itself. The Polish poet had renounced and hereby overcome the exclusive love of a woman, as well as the exclusive love of his fatherland Poland, in order to reach love of humanity. [102] In this statement, we cannot fail to discern a projection of Solov'ev's own sophianic relationship with women, Russia, and ultimately World Soul. Significant in this respect is that he sketched the possibility of reconciliation between Orthodox Russians and Catholic Poles in the form of common veneration of an icon. It was precisely in front of this icon that Mickiewicz had had a mystical experience. [103] With respect to the Polish question specifically, it becomes clear that Solov'ev could not agree with a conception of the Polish or Russian nation in terms of superiority over other nations. This is why he rejected Polish messianism in favour of a universalistic conception of Poland's tasks. [104] The critique of Polish messianism for excluding other Slavic nations and hatred of Russia was central to the thought of another Polish thinker, August Cieszkowski (1814-1894). [105] Although there is no evidence that Solov'ev ever read this philosopher, who sought to combine philosophy and religious thought, and more importantly for our matter subject, Hegelianism and messianism, there are striking parallels between both thinkers. [106] Both developed a 'Christiano-centric' theology of history and a philosophy of history in which humanity, nations and great men are the major actors. In addition, both focused on the necessity of action, which is the core concept by which Cieszkowski distinguished his system from Hegel's philosophy of history and called it 'historiosophy.' [107] This term could very well apply to Solov'ev's sophiology of history, which was his own attempt at a synthesis of philosophy of history and theology of history, and by which he sought to contribute to the transfiguration of creation by deeds. This emphasis on action as well as on a future-oriented and universalist vision of the Slav countries, is characteristic of Solov'ev's interventions on the Polish question. As I have demonstrated, Solov'ev's perception of Poland and interpretation of its role in history was instrumental to his own agenda. His motivation to intervene on the Polish question was rooted in his ideal of a reconciliation between Eastern and Western Christianity. Firstly, as the leading Orthodox country, Russia could and should pave the way by reconciling with Catholic Poland in the form of religious solidarity. Poland's role was to serve Catholicism for the purpose of church reunification. In this respect, Solov'ev's interpretation was highly original in Russian public opinion. Secondly, to establish a Christian society on earth also implied that the Russian nation should act according to the Christian principles of love and justice. The attitude of the Russian government towards the Polish land was quite the opposite. This led Solov'ev to fiercely denounce the policy of forced russification and to advocate religious tolerance. Nevertheless, he did not stop believing in the possibility of a spiritual reconciliation between Poland and Russia, and from this perspective suggested a common veneration of the icon of our Lady of Czestochowa. He also identified Poland as a nation-prophet, an example of a true, self- sacrificing nation, as Adam Mickiewicz had conceived before him. From this
perspective, Solov'ev reduced the Polish nation to its Catholicism, and
departed from an outdated conception of Polish society, which did not
take into account the social differentiation of recent decades. I have
also demonstrated how, for his original interpretation of the Polish
question from the perspective of church reunion and reconciliation
between East and West, he leant upon a Slavophile worldview _______________ Notes: 1. This is the extended and revised version of two earlier publications: 'Two narratives on history in Vladimir Solov'ev: the Polish question', in: Borisova and Kozyrev 2001, pp. 475-486; 'Poland as the pivot for church reunion and as a test case for Russia: Vladimir Solov'ev's views on the Polish question', in: David Ransel and Bozena Shallcross (eds.), Russian Identity/Polish Encounters (Indiana University press, forthcoming). 2. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252. 3. Stremooukhoff 1974; Andrzej Walicki, Russia, Poland, and Universal Regeneration: Studies on Russian and Polish Thought of the Romantic Epoch (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), chap. 3: 'Adam Mickiewicz's Paris Lectures and Russian Slavophilism, pp. 107-157. For a first orientation on Polish messianism, see entry 'Polish messianism', in: Andrzei de Lazari (ed.), Idei v Rossii/ldeas in Russia/ Idee w Rosji, vol. 4 (Lodz: Ed. Ibidem, 2001). pp. 431-437. A recent article by Lilianna Kiejzik ('The Polish Case in Vladimir Solov'ev's Vision of the Future', in Studies in East European Thought 55 (2003), 2, pp. 141-155) focuses on the specific polemic of Solov'ev with the Polish thinker Tarnowski. 4. This overview is based on works on Polish history from various periods and origins: Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski. The History of Poland (Westport, Connecticut, & I.ondon: Greenwood Press. 2000): Aleksander Gieysztor. Stefan Kieniewicz. Emanuel Rostworowski, Janusz Tazbir and Henryk Wereszycki, Histoire de Pologne (Warszawa: Editions scientiliques de Pologne. 1971), chapters 17-19, pp. 545-636; W.F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson, O. Halecki, R. Dyboski (eds.). The Cambridge History of Poland: From Augustus II to Pilsudski (1697-1935) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941). Chapters XVI-XVII, pp. 365-408; Heller 1999, pp. 792-795; A.L. Pogodin, Glavnye tecenija pol'skoj politiceskoj mysli (1863-/907 gg.) (Sankt-Peterburg: knigoizdatel'skoe Tovariscestvo Prosvescenie, 1907): Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Riasanovsky 1993. 5. Pogodin 1907, p. 13 ff. 6. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 385: Biskupski 2000, p. 30 7. Pogodin 1907, p. 47. 8. Smolitsch 1991. p. 373. 9. Pobedonoscev, quoted in Smolitsch 1991, p. 363. 10. Heller 1999, p. 845. 11. Giesztor et al. 1971, p. 612, Prizel 1998, pp. 47-56. 12. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 387. 13. Surveys of literature on the Polish question and authorial publications allow Solov'ev to be resituated within the debate in the Russian press or his time. The following works in Russian have been found on the Polish question after 1881: M. Gakkebus, Ob avtonomii Pol'si (Voskresajuscij Lazar'), 2nd ed. (n.p.: T-vo I.D. Sytina, 1906), Pogodin 1907, and the bibliographical work of N.A. Rubakin, Sredi knig: Opyt obzora russkikh kniznykh bogatstv v svjai s istoriej naucnofilosofskikh i literaturno-obscestvennykh idej, vol. 3 (Moskva: Nauka, 1915). References to authorial publications arc given below. Solov'ev is not mentioned in the surveys devoted to the Polish question. except in Rubakin. 14. The Poles' ingratitude regarding Russia, their refusal to admit their defeat and the well-deserved loss of their independence, their treachery and their calling the Western compassion and support for their cause, met the unanimous disapprobation of the Russian public opinion (Heller 1999, pp. 792-794). A notable exception was Aleksander Gercen, who supported the insurrectionists from London (Walicki 1991. 65-69). 15. For a comprehensive account of the Polish question before 1881, see Aleksandr Pypin, 'Pol'skij vopros v russkoj literature', Vestnik Evropy, 1880, 2. pp. 703- 736; 4, pp. 686-709; 5, pp. 239-271: 10, pp. 681-711: 11, pp. 281-307. In contemporary scholarship, see: Andreas Renner, Russischer Nationalismus und Offentlichkeit im Zarenreich 1855-1875 (Koln, Weimar & Wien: Bohlau Verlag, 2000), chap. 3, pp. 185-273. 16. On Pobedonoscev, see Byrnes 1968, pp. 192-195; On Katkov (1818-1887), see Renner 2000, pp. 185-273 (on the period up to 1875). On Vladimir Gringmut (1851-1907), see Sobranie statej VA. Gringmuta 1896-1907 (Moskva: Universitetskaja tipografija, 1908). Gringmut was Katkov's successor in the editorial board of Moskovskie vedomosti. For a depreciative picture of his activities, see S.U., 'Mozaika', Istoriceskij vestnik 130 (1912), 12, pp. 1013-1066: pp. 1023-1024. 17. Gringmut 1908, p. 77. 18. Gringmut 1908, p. 22. His argument, based on faith in the greatness of the Russian nation [narod], religion (Orthodoxy), and state, echoed the official credo expressed by Sergej Uvarov under Nicholas I of 'Nationality, Orthodoxy, Autocracy'. 19. I. Aksakov, Sobranie socinenij 3, pp. 569-683; On Danilevskij, see Walicki 1991, p. 492; on Lamanskij (1833-1914), see Pypin 1880, pp. 283-307; I. Filevic (years unknown), 'Pol'sa i pol'skij vopros, Russkoe Obozrenie, 1894, 3. pp. 85-105; 4. pp. 559-581; 8. pp. 668-692: 10, pp. 636-658: 11, pp. 31-45. 20. Jurij Samarin (1819-1876) remained an authoritative figure even after his death. Pypin analysed Samarin's 'Sovremennyj ob'em pol'skogo voprosa' (first published in Den', 1863, 38) (Pypin 1880,4. p. 686 ff.). 21. Gakkebus 1906, p. 48 ff. The historian Nikolaj Kareev (1850-1931) had an insight into Polish culture and society drawn from his experience in teaching history at Warsaw university from 1879 to 1884, and on this basis published a series of articles in Russkaja mysl'. Republished in: Nikolaj Kareev, Polonica: Sbornik statej po pol'skim delam (1881- 1905) (Sankt-Peterburg: Tip. M. M. Stasjulevica, 1905); see esp. 'Necto o russko-pol'skikh otnosenijakh', pp. 1-19. and 'Pol'skie pis'ma', pp. 20-135. Vladimir Spasovic [Wlodzimierz Spasowicz, 1829-1892] was of Polish descent but received a fully Russian education. Trained as a lawyer and based in St. Petersburg, he was close to the liberals. Admiring Russian civilisation, Spasovic was at the same time deeply influenced by Polish cultural values. He showed in deeds that it is possible to be a Polish patriot and a son of Russia at the same time. He participated in the foundation, in 1882, of the weekly journal Kraj, published in St. Petersburg and supported by the trade and industrial bourgeoisie, and by Polish landowners of the Western provinces who thought that the ideas that he propagated were in harmony with their economic and social interests (Obscestvennoe dviznie no Pol'skikh zemljakh: Osnovnye idejnye tecenija i politiceskie partii v 1864-1914 gg. (Moskva: Nauka, 1988), p. 42). For an account of Spasovic's personality and views, see: W. Feldman, Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Polen seit dessen Teilugen (1795-1914) (1st publ. 1917; Osnabruck: Otto Zeller, 1964), pp. 281-283. 22. Jyrki livonen, Independence or Incorporation? The Idea of Poland's National Self- determination and Independence within the Russian and Soviet Socialism from the 1870s to the 1920s (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1990), pp. 98-99. 23. Narodnaja Volja itself had up to 15% of Polish members. These were mainly workers who actively participated in agitation in St. Petersburg factories (livonen 1990, pp. 94 and 97). 24. For literature, see Pogodin 1907; livonen 1990. 25. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 394. About the reception of Marxism in Russia, see Leszek Kolakowski, The Main Currents of Marxism, its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), vol. 2, chap. 9 on Ludwik Krzywicki, pp. 193-207. 26. Rogger 1983, p. 189. 27. Stremooukhoff 1974, p. 175. 28. 'Vstuplenie: Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', Rus', 1883. L pp, 20-30, Edition used: S. 1989 1, pp. 59-75. The significance of this article is attested by the fact that Solov'ev used it in a reworked version opening his collection of essays Nacional'nyj vopros under the title 'Nravstvennost' i politika, Istoriceskie objazannosti Rossii' [1884] (S. 1989 1. pp. 264-279). 29. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', op. cit. 30. 'Grekhi Rossii', op. cit. 31. L 'idee russe, op. cit. 32. Ibid., p. 83, pp. 96-97. 33. 'Lettre a la redaction du Przeglad Polski' Przeglad Polski, 1889, 92, pp. 179-187: the version used here is the Russian translation. 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski' (S. 1989 2, pp. 267-272). For a detailed examination of this polemic and a first publication of Solov'ev's letter in the French original, see Kiejzik 2003 (pp. 149-154); on Tarnowski, see Feldman 1964, passim. 34. 'Istoriceskij stinks', Vestnik Evropy, 1893, 7, pp. 780-789. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 481-491. 35. Opravdanie dobra, p. 375. 36. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 1896, date unknown. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 602-605. 37. 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja cerkov", Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 1897, 41. Edition used: SS. 9, pp. 61-70. 38. On the religious significance of this icon in Poland, see Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 82. 39. 'Mivkevic', Mir Iskusstva, 1899, 5. pp. 27-30. Edition used: S. 1991, pp. 371- 379. 40. Solov'ev did have contact with the Croat bishop Strossmayer with whom he shared an ecumenical commitment. On Solov'ev's contact with Strossmayer and other Catholics abroad, see Stremooukhoff 1974, pp. 188-211; David 1960, pp. 300-326. 41. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada,' p. 603. 42. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 250; See also: 'all the force or Poland was in the szlachta, and Poland died. It did not die because or possessing a strong gentry, for this was a privilege. but because its gentry, instead or being a social class, organised to serve the state and to rule over the people. transformed into a class which ruled without limits, and included the state in itself. This led to 'legitimised anarchy. It is well-known that the Polish szlachta represents the only example in history of a ruling class, or which each member possessed separately complete state power' (both quotations from 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', pp. 250-251). See also 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 603, and 'Mickevic, pp. 376-377. 43. Biskupski 2000, pp. 16-17. 44. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 100, Riasanovsky 1993, p. 290. 45. Biskupski 2000, pp. 16-17. 46. This retrospective interpretation of the fall of Poland can be round among some Western historians (Biskupski 2000, p. 13). 47. In Solov'ev's time. for instance Vasilij Kljucevskij, see Heller 1999, p. 575. In contemporary historians: see Riasanovsky 1993, pp. 301-302. 48. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 603. 49. Heller 1999, p. 579. 50. This interpretation was also given for instance by Voltaire, who praised Catherine's intervention as being the first 'army of peace in the history of mankind' (quoted in Heller 1999, p. 579), and, on Russian soil, by Solov'ev's father himself, the historian Sergej Solov'ev, who characterised Catherine's policy of annexation as a 'victory of tolerance over fanaticism'. Ironically enough, Solov'ev qualified the fact that Catherine admired the French philosopher, who was the French champion of religious tolerance, as an intellectual weakness, common to that milieu and epoch' ("Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 605). Solov'ev may not have known Voltaire's piece on Catherine's intervention, yet it remains striking to see that it was precisely on that point that he shared the opinion of the French thinker, who he perhaps despised for his anti-clericalism. About the position of Sergej Solov'ev. see J.L. Black, 'Interpretations of Poland in Nineteenth Century Russian Nationalist-Conservative Historiography', in: The Polish Review 27 (1972), 4. pp. 20-41 [Offprint, p. 19]. 51. As did, for example. Vasilij Kljucevskij, Kurs russkoj istorii. Cast' V, in: Socinenija v devjati tomakh, vol. 5 (Moskva: Mysl;, 1989), p. 48. 52. Pis'mo' v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski', p. 271. 53. 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 73. 54. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', pp. 603-604. 55. Ibid., p. 603. 56. Biskupski 2000, p. 18. 57. 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 70. 58. 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja ccrkov'', p. 66. 59. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252. 60. See also: 'The upper class was and is everything. Poland and the szlachta are one and the same thing' ('Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 250). As far as the peasants were concerned, it seems that for a long time they indeed remained passive and tried to avoid any conflicts with the Russian occupant (see Prizel 1998, pp. 49-50). 61. 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 70. 62. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 390. 63. See 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros'. p. 70. This discrepancy between historically attested information and Solov'ev's interpretation again has to do with his exclusive focus on the intentions of the Russian state. He tends to characterize these intentions as good as long as they emanate from those Russian rulers whom he identifies as truly Christian rulers, i.e. primarily Peter the Great and Catherine II, but also Alexander I and Alexander II. 64. Gieysztor et al. 1971, p. 574. 65. 'Istoriceskij sfinks', pp. 482-483. 66. See for example 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 62. 67. 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja cerkov', p. 67. 68. Among the conservative nationalists, Gringmut did not react to Solov'ev's views on the Polish question, but was his merciless opponent in the polemic provoked by Solov'ev's 1891 lecture 'On the Reasons of the Downfall of the Medieval Worldview'. Like Gringmut, Dmitrij Ilovajskij had voiced strong disapprobation of Solov'ev's abovementioned lecture in 1891. Both Ilovajskij and Durnovo wrote in response to Solov'ev's 'Iz voprosov kul'tury'. Durnovo was highly hostile with respect to Solov'ev since Solov'ev had quoted him as an example of the intolerance exhorted under the banner of defence of Orthodoxy. 69. Dmitrij Ilovajskij, 'Antinacional'nye i Izekhristianskie teorii', Moskovskie vedomosti, 1893, 157, p. 2. Dmitrij Ilovajskij (1832-1920) was a historian and publicist. No further contacts between Solov'ev and him are known of. 70. I.S. Durnovo,
'G. Solov'ev v roli Pol'skogo patriota; Vos'moe "Pis'mo" iz Peterburga', 71. Arguably. it is for the same reason that L 'idee russe was condemned by the oberprokuror of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonoscev. Pobedonoscev published a critique of the lecture in Moskovskie vedomosti (1888, 271), and attracted the attention of Alexander III with respect to Solov'ev, whose lecture testified to the "craziness" of its author (K.P. Pobedonoscev i ego karrespondenty: Pis 'ma i zapiski, vol. 1, part 2 (Moskva & Pctrograd: Gosudarstvennoe Izd., 1923), p. 828. 72. The most radical example is Solov'ev's criticism of Alexander III for not having forgiven the murderers of his father, tsar Alexander II [see case study 1]. 73. In 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros' and 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', as well as 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada'. These views were first expressed by Jurij Samarin, whose work, on the whole, Solov'ev valued highly. 74. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 603. 75. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros' pp. 250-251. See also 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 603, and 'Miekevic', pp. 376-377. 76. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros, p. 253. 77. 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', pp. 71-2. 78. 'Istoriceskij sfinks', p. 484. 79. Ibid., p. 485. 80. See Andrzej Walicki. Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (1st publ. 1967: Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). pp. 171-174. 81. See 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', comment p. 653. 82. Globally, he criticized the Slavophiles' uncritical and unhistorical treatment of the Russian past. For a critical appraisal of Solov'ev on these issues, see Schrooyen 2000, pp. 13-27. 83. See Anatolij Koni, 'Vestnik Evropy', in: Sobranie socinenij, vol. 7 (Moskva: Juridiceskaja literatura, 1969), pp. 220-259. Also worth noticing in this respect is his assimilating Solov'ev to the liberals. This was also the opinion of I.S. Durnovo in the conservative newspaper Moskovskie Vedomosti (Durnovo 1893b). 84. 'Grekhi Rossii', p. 211: L 'idee russe, p. 96. 85. Kareev 1905, pp, 16-17, Solov'ev: 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 69. 86. See Walicki 1992. p. 172. About Spasovic's role in Vestnik Evropy, see Koni 1969, pp. 237-243. His death in 1892 was 'an enormous loss' to Solov'ev, as he confessed (Pis 'ma 1. p. 109). 87. About Spasovic, see Feldman 1964, pp. 281-283. Solov'ev emphasized this point in 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', 'Grekhi Rossii', and 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski'. 88. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252. 89. It is unclear whether Solov'ev really believed in this option or not. He only mentioned it once, and admitted that the purely political aspect of the question did not interest him very much, and that he did not believe in the future of independent states ('Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski', p. 271). Interestingly, Aleksej Khomjakov had also made this claim, going as far as calling for a plebiscite among the Poles. Solov'ev's punctual call for a plebiscite in 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglqd Polski' was perhaps an unacknowledged echo of Khomjakov's position (Ibid.). 90. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252. 91. 'For hostile and mistrustful speeches there is always ready material at hand; a couple of common places about the historical character of the Polish szlachta and the Polish ksendzy [Catholic priests, MC]' (Kareev 1905, p. 2). Even though Solov'ev did not intend to write hostile pieces on Poles, his approach is quite similar to those Polonophobes in the Russian press. 92. Significantly, the same formulation of a liberal stance in religious terms on the Polish question can be found in the view of his father (Black 1972, offprint p. 19). 93. See especially his polemics with Tarnowski in 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski'. 94. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252. 95. 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnaia Przeglad Polski', p. 269. 96. Ibid., p. 268. 97. Ibid., pp. 268-269. 98. 'Grekhi Rossii', p. 209. 99. See for instance 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski'. 100. Andrzej Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 258-259. 101. Walicki considers that Mickiewicz directly influenced Solov'ev on this point (Walicki 2000, p. 481). 102. ‘Mickevic', pp. 376-377. 103. Ibid., p. 376 (excerpts quoted from Mickiewicz's poem Pan Tadeusz (1834)). 104. In the entry 'Messianizm' he rejected the ideas of the father of Polish messianism Hoene-Wronski (SS 12. p. 600). 105. On this point, see Andre Liebich, Between Ideology and Utopia: The Politics and Philosophy of August Cieszkowski (Dordrecht et al.: Reidel, 1979), p. 252. 106. The affinity between Cieszkowski and Solov'ev has been pointed out by Berdjaev (quoted in Walicki 1982, p. 296) and Kiejzik 2003, pp. 47-48. On Cieszkowski's conception of history, see also Walicki 1982, pp. 295-307. 107. See Cieszkowski's Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (Berlin: n.p., 1838). Since then, the meaning of this term has evolved to refer to any speculative conception of history containing a religious perspective, for instance in Berdjaev, Zenkovsky, and in post- communist Russian discourse on history, especially on the 'Russian idea' and the 'specificity' of Russia (Jutta Scherrer, Kulturologie: Russland auf der Suche nach einer zivilisatorischen Identitat (Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2003), p. 96.
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