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THEIR KINGDOM COME -- INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OPUS DEI |
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11. Spanish Engineering
WITH THE VATICAN'S STAMP OF APPROVAL IN HIS PASSPORT, ESCRIVA de Balaguer at last felt equipped to launch Opus Dei on the most active expansion drive in its history. He expected his soldiers -- his milites Christi -- to be as catholic as the Church herself in terms of geographical reach and racial diversity, placing his Obra at least on an equal footing with the Jesuits and the other great religious orders, though in his heart he knew that in the long run Opus Dei, being divinely inspired, was destined to surpass them all. In establishing a strong Catholic -- i.e., Opus Dei -- presence at the summit of society, Escriva de Balaguer believed that the use of pilleria -- dirty tricks -- was permissible and, indeed, frequently necessary. 'Our life is a warfare of love and in love and war all is fair.' The theory behind this reasoning was that in politics and big business the most successful practitioners resorted to devilish tactics and therefore their use should not be denied to those whose sole intention was to further the work of God. In the next five chapters several cases of holy pilleria will be analysed as examples of Opus Dei's evolving modus operandi. But first, after considering its international expansion we will examine how Opus Dei came to dominate the Spanish political establishment during Franco's last decades. Because of the strange status it had fashioned for itself -- neither religious nor secular, but nevertheless God-inspired -- Opus Dei was prepared to operate in spheres that no other organization of the Church would dare imagine. As in Europe, the Founder wanted a strong Opus Dei presence in Latin America. In January 1949, the seventh apostle, Pedro Casciaro, architect and theologian, left for Mexico City with hardly any money, a ceramic portrait of Nuestra Senora del Rocio and a list 'of wealthy contacts. Within the next few years he built such an efficient network that Mexico became Opus Dei's third strongest power in terms of membership, after Spain and Italy. The United States came next, although Father Jose Luis Muzquiz and his colleagues, Salvador Martinez Ferigle and Jose Maria Gonzalez Barredo, found proselytizing in the US hard-going, the spiritual soil being relatively barren, with the result that by 1995 Opus Dei had no more than 5,000 members in the US. [1] Father Muzquiz, however, did have an introduction to the Shriver family which he put to good use. Yale graduate R. Sargent Shriver, Jr., would marry Eunice Mary Kennedy, a member of America's leading Catholic family, and would playa leading role in John Kennedy's presidential campaign, subsequently becoming the first director of the US Peace Corps. Both Eunice and her husband became active Opus Dei co-operators. The terrain in Italy was infinitely more fertile. In one month August 1949 -- thirty Italian students asked to join and began their intensive training at a villa belonging to the Holy See near the Pope's summer residence at Castelgandolfo. Opus Dei later replaced this rather run-down building with the more opulent Villa delle Rose, a women's residence attached to the Roman College of Saint Mary. In March 1950 it opened centres in Argentina and Chile followed in 1951 with an official presence in Venezuela and Colombia. In 1952 it opened residences in Germany, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay. International expansion generated a need for increased staff at the Opus Central headquarters in Rome. Escriva de Balaguer had transferred from Madrid a beautiful dark-haired NSRC research assistant, Maria del Carmen Tapia, to become his private secretary. Maria del Carmen had been recruited four years before by Raimundo Panikkar and to her parents' dismay she abandoned fiance, marriage plans and a newly purchased post-nuptial home to devote her life to Opus Dei. When she arrived in Rome she found that not only was she required to run the Founder's secretariat but also to surpervize between eighty and ninety assistant numeraries who worked as domestics, looking after the housekeeping of the 300 to 400 male numeraries employed at the Villa Tevere. The domestic staff, living under the same vows of celibacy, poverty and obedience as other numeraries, were often required to work twelve or more hours a day without time off and no place to go as they were not allowed out on their own. Perhaps as a result of his Civil War experiences, Escriva de Balaguer had a fear of police, and civil authority in general. Everyone who worked at Villa Tevere had to surrender their passports to Maria del Carmen, and they were kept under lock and key in the Father's office, partly because they were needed in support of requests for Italian residence papers. In post-war Rome, residence permits were not easy to obtain as the number of foreigners any enterprise might employ was restricted. Opus Dei never had enough permits to go around, even though it obtained extra ones through the Congregation of Religious. The permits were issued by the police. The Father realized that Maria del Carmen's sparkling, slate-green eyes rendered her almost irresistible to young Italian police officers and he made her responsible for obtaining and renewing residence permits. Moreover, he insisted that on her visits to the local commissarist she take Pilar Navarro-Rubio, then head of the kitchen staff, with her -- Pilar was so elegant that the trades-people called her 'Princess' -- and a couple of bottles of cognac as an innocent favour. The Father was not only concerned about the caprices of the civil authorities. During the summer of 1951, he began to fear a plot was afoot to remove him from control of Opus Dei. As the weeks passed, his foreboding became more acute and he decided to visit the Marian shrine of Loreto, south of Ancona, to seek the Virgin's protection. When he returned he gave orders to the kitchen staff that henceforth all his food had to be tasted in his presence before being placed on the table, a practice reminiscent of the Borgias and one he retained for the rest of his life. In 1957, Escriva de Balaguer was informed that the Pope wanted Opus Dei to run a newly created prelatura nullius in Peru so that it might test the Founder's authoritarian clerical ideas for countering the spread of Marxism in Third World countries. The Prelature of Yauyos, with its seat at Canete, 150 kilometres south of Lima, covered a vast mountain region one-third the size of Switzerland with a population of around 300,000. The operation was supported by Adveniat, which in turn was funded by a religious tax in Germany as well as voluntary offerings from Germany's 28 million Catholics. Adveniat concentrated on aiding traditional Church work in Latin America, such as the training of priests, and became one of the biggest supporters of Opus Dei's apostolate in Latin America, providing millions of dollars each year. Politically speaking, the fund's guardian, Bishop Franz Hengsbach of Essen, was somewhere to the right of General Franco and there is no doubt that he admired Escriva de Balaguer. With Adveniat funds, an FM radio transmitter -- Radio Estrella del Sur -- was installed in Canete to broadcast religious programmes and diocesan news. In September 1964 a second station, Radio ERPA -- Escuelas Radiofonicas Populares Andinas -- started broadcasting educational programmes to 300 district schools. All twenty-five of the prelature's parishes, some not served by hard-surfaced roads, became radio-linked, enabling them to exchange information and report social unrest. Opus Dei's methodology in Yauyos was to organize secular life around the Church, which provided opportunity and employment, and put in place an educational system where previously none existed. The Church controlled the media, oversaw the enforcing of civil order and in some cases directed local investment. Above all, Opus Dei rarely employed its own funds in carrying out these works, but used whatever private or public monies that were available to it, such as grants from private foundations or institutions like Adveniat and US AID. In October 1963, Paul VI rewarded Don Ignacio de Orbegozo -- the first prelate of Yauyos -- by elevating him to titular bishop of Ariasso. By the time of his consecration, he could report to Rome that the prelature of Yauyos had thirty seminarians studying in Canete -- when there had been none before his arrival -- and more than 1,000 students attending the prelature's agricultural and trade colleges. But Opus Dei's ultimate success in Peru was due to the influence that its regional vicar Manuel Botas came to exert over the papal nuncio, convincing him that the best way to counter a liberalizing Jesuit influence in the country was to entrust the most tainted dioceses to Opus Dei's care. Within a short time, another five Opus Dei priests in Peru received bishop's mitres. Spain during these years had not been of much help in financing Opus Dei's overseas expansion as the country's economy was in crisis, and despite a ministerial reshuffle in 1951 the situation continued to deteriorate. Education, on the other hand, changed radically under its new minister, Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez, a former ambassador to the Holy See. And whereas Ibanez Martin's disappearance from the political scene -- he was named ambassador to Portugal -- might have seemed an insurmountable blow for Opus Dei, a new man of providence rose from Franco's Presidencia to replace him, giving Escriva de Balaguer's militia even broader access to the country's highest councils. No one was closer to Franco than Admiral Carrero Blanco. In the autumn of 1950, however, Carrero Blanco's marital problems became the talk of Franco's entourage. His wife had gone off with an American aviator, bringing the couple into disfavour with Franco's wife, Carmen, who was prudish about such things and wanted him replaced. A thirty-year-old Opus Dei numerary, Laureano Lopez Rodo, was helping at the time to draft Spain's Concordat with the Vatican. These delicate negotiations were overseen for Franco by Carrero Blanco. Inevitably Lopez Rodo met Carrero Blanco and they became friends in spite of a seventeen-year age difference. They frequently dined together at Madrid's finest restaurants and one day Carrero Blanco mentioned his marital problems. Lopez Rodo introduced Carrero Blanco to Amadeo de Fuenmayor, a law professor recently ordained an Opus Dei priest. With tact and good sense, Fuenmayor, who became Carrero Blanco's confessor, was able to restore unity to the admiral's broken marriage. Franco's wife assuaged, Carrero Blanco was promoted secretary general of the Presidencia. After the Caudillo, he became the strongest man in the cabinet and remained grateful to the two Opus Dei numeraries for saving his career. At the time a handful of senior Opus Dei members were actively conspiring to insure that post-Franco Spain would revert to a monarchy. In spite of Escriva de Balaguer's contention that the Work would never become involved in politics the country's future political system began to take shape at a secluded Opus Dei estate in the hills of Segovia. Escriva de Balaguer followed all aspects of the plan and he even met with the various claimants to the throne to harvest their reactions. Opus Dei's political energies were channelled into two separate streams. The most visible, and undoubtedly the pump-primer for the constitutional changes that followed, was the so-called 'Third Force', led by the tenth apostle, Calvo Serer. But the deeper and more enduring stream began with Lopez Rodo. A successful lawyer and law professor who practised with fervour the Opus Dei ethic of professional virtuosity, he viewed the success of whatever department he headed as a sign of his Christian perfection. Calvo Serer and Lopez Rodo were opposites, not only in temperament but although guided by similar goals they employed different means. Calvo Serer burned himself out relatively quickly. A dedicated technocrat, Lopez Rodo went on to dizzying heights, leaving a lasting impact on the institutions that govern Spain. He represented everything that was noble, though elitist, in the Opus Dei ethic. The tenth apostle launched his Third Force with the intention of promoting closer links between the monarchists and Franco; he favoured a restoration of the monarchy under Don Juan, Alfonso XIII's son who lived in exile in Portugal. Lopez Rodo, on the other hand, preferred Don Juan's eldest son, Juan Carlos, a choice that was more palatable to Franco. In either case, a climate of confidence had to be created between the Caudillo and the official Pretender, Don Juan. In September 1953, Calvo Serer, at some personal risk, published in Paris an article criticizing the Falange, which opposed the restoration of the monarchy, particularly under Don Juan, because his mother was English and he had sided with the Allies during the Second World War. The article called the Falange administratively incompetent, economically inefficient and totally misguided in its autarkistic beliefs. By the same measure, he branded the Christian Democrats as wishy-washy and claimed that the educational policies of Ruiz Gimenez lacked cohesion. He set forth a Third Force platform based on tighter controls over public spending, decentralized government, a more liberal economy and 'representative' monarchy. The article caused a furore. [2] For the first time a public figure known to belong to Opus Dei had adopted a political stance. Inside the secular institute there was criticism of Calvo Serer's intentions. Some feared they might compromise the Work's canonical status. Clearly Opus Dei was not interested in traditional power politics -- i.e., the political system per se, with its party structure, special interests and alliances. But it was interested in the politics of its own apostolate -- that Christ may reign in every aspect of human endeavour. This, of course, was coloured by its vision of how Christ should reign, which was not necessarily the same as everyone else's vision, nor even the vision of every other Catholic. In the end, Franco ignored the Third Force, and Calvo Serer passed into political limbo. Franco's confidence went instead to Lopez Rodo. The Concordat with the Vatican was signed in August 1953. It ended Spain's diplomatic isolation. But Franco had to pay a price. The Church was exempted from taxation and given grants with which to construct new churches. Her bishops acquired the right to demand that publications found offensive be withdrawn from sale, while diocesan publications were freed from state censorship. The Concordat also gave the Church the right to found universities and for this reason it was as important to Opus Dei as it was to Franco. As education minister, Ruiz Gimenez blocked Opus Dei from acquiring further influence over higher education -- by the early 1950s one-third of all university departments in Spain were headed by Opus Dei members. Escriva de Balaguer, therefore, decided to found Opus Dei's own university: the Estudio General de Navarra in Pamplona. To begin with it only had a law faculty and, under a 1949 law governing independent institutions of higher learning, was not entitled to issue degrees. This problem was solved by attaching it to the University of Saragossa. It soon opened a medical school, followed by arts and science and journalism faculties. As soon as Franco signed the Concordat, Opus Dei moved to transform the Estudio General into a pontifical university. Bu. 'insurmountable difficulties' were raised to bar its way to a papal charter and the project was only saved by the new nuncio, Monsignor Ildebrando Antoniutti. He was so pro-Opus that he could have been a member. His entire staff, from chauffeur to cleaning ladies, was reported to be Opus Dei and the joke circulated in Madrid that he was not the apostolic nuncio but the opustolic nuncio. [3] Escriva de Balaguer took it for granted that, with Antoniutti in charge, the Holy See's approval would be forthcoming and he began referring to Estudio General as the University of Navarra shortly after the new nuncio's arrival in Madrid. During the lobbying for Navarra's pontifical charter a miracle occurred at the Villa Tevere for which the medical fraternity had no explanation. The Founder's diabetes had become progressively worse in spite of the daily insulin injections. Some days he would be unable to stand up. Sight in his right eye was failing. He was forbidden the use of the discipline and cilice because they provoked skin irritations that easily became infected. He had a bell installed by his, bedside so that he could call for the last sacraments during the night. On Tuesday, 27 April 1954 -- the feast day of Our 'Lady of Montserrat -- the Father was seated at the dinner table in his private dining room when he passed out. 'Something very peculiar happened,' explained Don Alvaro. 'He changed colour instantly: first a deep red, then a purplish colour, and finally a kind of tawny yellow. Above all, he seemed to dwindle and shrink, slumping over to the side.' [4] Don Alvaro gave him absolution and then called for the doctor. To counterbalance the effect of the insulin, he put some sugar in the Father's mouth. By the time the doctor arrived, the Father had regained consciousness. He was unable to see for several hours. But with the return of his sight, he was no longer diabetic. He had been cured of the illness that had accompanied him for more than ten years. Soon after his cure, people started calling him the 'Miracle Priest'. As Don Alvaro remarked, a reason exists for everything. 'Nothing falls outside divine Providence.' [5] What finally propelled the Opus Dei technocrats into power in Spain were the January 1957 worker riots in Barcelona. They highlighted the worsening economic situation. Inflation was out of control and Spain's balance of payments was disastrous. The country was a victim of chronic overspending, encouraged by a lack of ministerial controls, and no coherent monetary or fiscal policy. In an effort to head off a moratorium on foreign payments and a massive devaluation, Franco ordered a cabinet restructuring that marked one of the great watersheds of Opus Dei's development. The architect of the restructuring was Lopez Rodo. His recommendations sounded the death knell of the Falange. After the July 1957 changes, the Falange retained but three minor ministries -- labour, housing and the portfolio of the Falange Movement itself -- while three anti-Falangists were placed in the key portfolios of interior, foreign affairs and army. And then came the Opus Dei technocrats, interested not in playing politics at all but in integrating Spain into the European economy. Thanks to Opus Dei -- or at least to Lopez Rodo - Spain found herself, without realizing it, in the process of leaving the ranks of world dictatorships. Lopez Rodo announced that the new government's first objective was a minimum annual wage of $1,000 for every working citizen. 'If we are able to achieve this, the rest -- social and political -- will follow quite naturally,' he predicted. [6] Who were the Opus Dei technocrats preparing to modernize Spain? Mariano Navarro-Rubio became finance minister. A 43-year-old Aragonese lawyer from Teruel, he had fought with distinction on the Nationalist side during the Civil War, and was three times wounded. Competent, hard-working, he was also on the board of Banco Popular Espanol and was one of the architects of that bank's spectacular growth. He would be credited with giving Spain a stable monetary policy. The new Minister of Commerce was numerary Alberto Ullastres, also forty-three, professor of political economy and deputy governor of the Spanish Mortgage Bank. He had studied in France and Germany, and fought with the Nationalist forces on the Asturian front. Lopez Rodo, Navarro-Rubio and Ullastres worked together as a team and they brought other Opus Dei technocrats into key government positions. Soon after the new cabinet was announced, Opus Dei's Spanish headquarters issued a statement denying the institute's involvement in politics. 'Its activities are directly and exclusively apostolic and because of its dedicated spirituality it is not involved in the politics of any country.' [7] Strictly speaking, that was true. Opus Dei was not a political party and had no pretensions of becoming one. Nevertheless it did have political goals -- however well hidden -- that were consistent with its spiritual beliefs and role as Catholic Regenerator. And its members, whether government ministers or company directors, were subjected to a degree of spiritual guidance far more encompassing than required of any other Catholic lay person -- extending, as will be shown in Chapter 16, to 'all professional, social and other questions'. [8] Political considerations aside, the Opus Dei ethic was soon to pay real dividends for the Spanish people. During the fifteen years from 1960 to 1975, a period referred to as the anos de desarrollo -- the years of development -- Spain's economy grew faster than any other, except Japan. Average annual income would attain Lopez Rodo's magic benchmark of $1,000 annually by 1968. When Spain's first economic miracle ended in the mid-1970s, due to a world economic slump rather than her own economic shortcomings, she was ranked as the world's ninth industrial power. In 1957, one in every hundred Spaniards owned a car. By the end of the 1960s, the figure was one in ten. Almost every home had a telephone and more than half had washing machines and refrigerators. By the mid-1970s, illiteracy had dropped to under 10 per cent, and the student population had doubled. The important change, however, was in expectations. Surveys showed that workers could expect much better jobs, in terms of pay and prestige, in the 1970s than their fathers had known. And so it could be said that, largely thanks to Opus Dei, by the early 1970s Spain had become part of the modern European economy. With wealth came corruption. _______________ Notes: 1. Originally from Badajoz, Spain, Muzquiz adopted American citizenship and twice served as Opus Dei's regional vicar in the US. He died in Plymouth, Massachusetts, in 1983 at the age of 70. 2. Calvo Serer's article, La Politique Interieure de l'Espagne de Franco, appeared in the September 1953 issue of the right-wing Ecrits de Paris. 3. Yvon Le Vaillant, Sainte Maffia -- Le Dossier de l'Opus Dei, Mercure de France, Paris 1971. p. 181. 4. Vazquez de Prada, Op. cit., p. 278. 5. Ibid., p. 278. 6. Ernest Milcent, 'Ainsi Naquit Opus Dei,' Notre Histoire No. 46, Paris 1988. 7. El Correo Catalan, Barcelona, 13 July 1957. 8. Reference to Article 58 of the 1950 Constitutions.
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