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PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA: SHORT PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS |
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[b]CHAPTER 14: Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of the Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-Live[/b]
§ 161
To a certain extent, it can be seen a priori, vulgo it is self-evident, that that which now produces the phenomenon of the world must also be capable of not doing this and consequently of remaining at rest; in other words, that to the present [x] there must also be a [x]. [1] Now if the former is the phenomenon of the will-to-live, the latter will be that of the will-not-to- live. Essentially this will also be the same as the magnum Sakhepat2 of the Veda teaching (in the Oupnekhat, vol. i, p. 163), as the Nirvana of the Buddhists, and also as the [x] [3] of the Neoplatonists.
Contrary to certain silly objections, I observe that the denial if the will-to-live does not in any way assert the annihilation of a substance, but the mere act of not-willing; that which hitherto willed no longer wills. As we know this being, this essence, the will, as thing-in-itself merely in and through the act of willing, we are incapable of saying or comprehending what it still is or does after it has given up that act. And so for us who are the phenomenon of willing, this denial is a passing over into nothing.
The affirmation and denial if the will-to-live is a mere Velle et Nolle. [4] The subject of these two acts is one and the same and consequently, as such, is not annihilated either by the one act or by the other. Its velle manifests itself in this world of intuitive perception which is for that very reason the phenomenon of its own thing-in-itself. On the other hand, we know of no phenomenon of nolle except merely that of its appearance and in fact in the individual who already belongs originally to the phenomenon of velle. And so as long as the individual exists, we still see nolle always in conflict with velle. If the individual has come to an end and nolle has triumphed in him, this has been a pure declaration of nolle (this is the meaning of the Papal Canonization). Of this we can only say that its phenomenon cannot be that of velle; but we do not know whether it appears at all, that is, whether it maintains a secondary existence for an intellect which it would first have to produce. Since we know the intellect only as an organ of the will in the affirmation thereof, we do not see why, after the suppression of such affirmation, it should produce the intellect; and we cannot make any statement about the subject thereof, for we have known this positively only in the opposite act, the velle, as the thing-in-itself of its phenomenal world.
§ 162
Between the ethics of the Greeks and that of the Hindus there is a striking contrast. The former (although with the exception of Plato) has for its object the ability to lead a happy life, vita beata; the latter, on the other hand, the liberation and salvation from life generally, as is directly expressed in the very first sentence of the Samkhya Karika.
We shall obtain a contrast which is akin to this and is more marked and vivid, if in the gallery at Florence we contemplate the fine antique sarcophagus whose reliefs depict the whole series of ceremonies of a wedding from the first proposal to where Hymen's torch lights the way to the torus, and then picture next to it the Christian coffin, draped in black as a sign of mourning and with the crucifix on top. The contrast is highly significant. In opposite ways both attempt to comfort and console for death, and both are right. The one expresses the affirmation of the will-to-live to which life remains sure and certain throughout all time, however rapidly the forms may change. The other expresses through the symbols of suffering and death the denial of the will-to-live and salvation from a world where death and the devil reign; donec voluntas fiat noluntas. [5]
Between the spirit of Graeco-Roman paganism and that of Christianity is the proper contrast of the affirmation and denial of the will-to-live, according to which, in the last resort, Christianity is fundamentally right.
§ 163
My ethics is related to all the ethical systems of European philosophy as the New Testament to the Old, according to the ecclesiastical conception of this relation. Thus the Old Testament puts man under the authority of the law which, however, does not lead to salvation. The New Testament, on the other hand, declares the law to be inadequate, in fact repudiates it (e.g. Romans 7, Galatians 2 and 3). On the contrary, it preaches the kingdom of grace which is attained by faith, love of one's neighbour, and complete denial of oneself; this is the path to salvation from evil and the world. For in spite of all protestant-rationalistic distortions and misrepresentations, the ascetic spirit is assuredly and quite properly the soul of the New Testament. But this is just the denial of the will-to-live; and that transition from the Old Testament to the New, from the dominion of the law to that of faith, from justification through works to salvation through the Mediator, from the dominion of sin and death to eternal life in Christ, signifies, sensu proprio, the transition from the merely moral virtues to the denial of the will-to-live. Now all the philosophical systems of ethics prior to mine have kept to the spirit of the Old Testament with their absolute (i.e. dispensing with ground as well as goal) moral law and all their moral commandments and prohibitions to which the commanding Jehovah is secretly added in thought, different as their forms and descriptions of the matter may prove to be. My ethics, on the other hand, has ground, basis, purpose, and goal; it first demonstrates theoretically the metaphysical ground of justice and loving kindness and then indicates the goal to which these must ultimately lead if they are completely carried out. At the same time, it frankly and sincerely admits the abominable nature of the world and points to the denial of the will as the path to redemption therefrom. It is, accordingly, actually in the spirit of the New Testament, whereas all the others are in that of the Old and thus theoretically amount to mere Judaism (plain despotic theism). In this sense, my teaching could be called Christian philosophy proper, paradoxical as this may seem to those who do not go to the root of the matter, but stick merely to the surface.
§ 164
Whoever is capable of thinking somewhat more deeply will soon see that human desires cannot begin to be sinful first at that point where, in their individual tendencies, they accidentally cross one another and cause evil from one quarter and malice from another. On the contrary, he will see that, if this is so, they must already be sinful and bad originally and according to their true nature and consequently that the entire will-to-live itself is detestable. Indeed, all the misery and horrors whereof the world is full are merely the necessary result of all the characters in which the will-to-live objectifies itself under circumstances which occur on the unbroken chain of necessity and furnish the characters with motives. Those horrors and misery are, therefore, the mere commentary to the affirmation of the will-to-live. (Cf. Theologia Germanica, p. 93.) That our existence itself implies a guilt is proved by death.
§ 165
A noble character will not readily complain about his own fate; on the contrary, what Hamlet says in praise of Horatio will apply to him:
[quote]for thou hast been As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing.[/quote]
This can be understood from the fact that such a man, recognizing his own true nature in others and thus sharing their fate, almost invariably sees around him an even harder lot than his own and so cannot bring himself to complain of the latter. An ignoble egoist, on the other hand, who limits all reality to himself and regards others as mere masks and phantoms, will take no part in their fate, but will devote the whole of his sympathy and interest to his own; the results of this will then be great sensitiveness and frequent complaints.
It is precisely that recognition of oneself in another's phenomenal appearance from which, as I have often shown, justice and loving kindness proceed in the first instance, and which finally leads to giving up the will. For the phenomena, wherein this will manifests itself, are so definitely in a state of suffering, that whoever extends his own self to all of them can no longer will its continuance; just as one who takes all the tickets in a lottery must necessarily suffer a great loss. The affirmation of the will presupposes the restriction of self-consciousness to one's own individuality and reckons on the possibility of a favourable career in life from the hand of chance.
§ 166
If in our conception of the world we start from the thing-in-itself, the will-to-live, we find as its kernel and greatest concentration the act of generation. This presents itself as the first thing, the point of departure; it is the punctum saliens [6] of the world-egg and the main issue. What a contrast, on the other hand, if we start from the empirical world that is given as phenomenon, from the world as representation! Here that act manifests itself as something quite individual and special, of secondary significance, in fact as a matter concealed and covered up which is of no importance and merely slips in, a paradoxical anomaly that often affords material for laughter. However, it might even seem to us that here the devil wanted merely to hide his game, for copulation is his currency and the world his kingdom. For has it not been observed how illico post coitum cachinnus auditur Diaboli? [7] Seriously speaking, this is due to the fact that sexual desire, especially when through fixation on a definite woman it is concentrated to amorous infatuation, is the quintessence of the whole fraud of this noble world; for it promises so unspeakably, infinitely, and excessively much, and then performs so contemptibly little.
The woman's share in generation is, in a certain sense, more innocent than the man's, in so far as the man gives to the being to be procreated the will that is the first sin and hence the source of all wickedness and evil, whereas the woman gives knowledge which opens up the way to salvation. The act of generation is the world-knot, for it states: 'The will-to-live has affirmed itself anew.' In this sense, a standing Brahmanical phrase laments: 'Alas, alas, the lingam is in the yoni!' Conception and pregnancy, on the other hand, say: 'To the will is once more given the light of knowledge'; whereby it can again find its way out; and so the possibility of salvation has once more appeared.
From this is explained the remarkable phenomenon that, whereas every woman would die of shame if surprised in the act of generation, she nevertheless bears her pregnancy in public without a trace of shame and even with a kind of pride. For as everywhere else an infallibly certain sign is taken as equivalent to the thing signified, so also does every other sign of the completed coitus shame and confuse the woman in the highest degree; pregnancy alone does not. This can be explained from the fact that, according to what has been said, pregnancy in a certain sense entails, or at any rate offers, the prospect of an expiation of the guilt or debt that was contracted by the coitus. And so this bears all the shame and disgrace of the matter, whereas the pregnancy, so closely related to it, remains pure and innocent, and to a certain extent even becomes sacred.
Coitus is mainly the affair of the man; pregnancy is entirely that of the woman. From the father the child receives the will, the character; from the mother, the intellect. The latter is the redeeming principle, the former the binding. The sign of the constant existence of the will-to-live in time, in spite of all increase in illumination through the intellect, is the coitus. The sign of the light of knowledge and indeed in the supreme degree of clearness, which is presented afresh to this will and holds open to it the possibility of salvation, is the renewed coming into existence of the will-to-live as man. The sign of this is pregnancy which, therefore, goes about frankly and freely and even proudly, whereas coitus like a criminal creeps into a corner.
Some Fathers of the Church have taught that even marital cohabitation should be permitted only when it occurs for the sake of procreating children, [x], [8] as is said by Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, lib. III, c. I I. (The relevant passages are found collected in P. E. Lind, De coelibatu Christianorum, chap. 1.) Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, lib. III, c. 3, attributes this view to the Pythagoreans. However, such a view is, strictly speaking, incorrect; for if coitus is no longer desired for its own sake, the denial of the will-to-live has already appeared and then the propagation of the human race is superfluous and senseless in so far as its object is already attained. Moreover, to place a human being in the world so that he should exist therein and to do so without any subjective passion and without lust and physical ardour, merely from sheer deliberation and cold-blooded intention, would be morally a very questionable action. Indeed, few would take this upon themselves and perhaps one might even say of it that it was related to generation from mere sexual impulse as is cold-blooded and deliberate murder to a mortal blow given in anger.
The condemnation of all unnatural sexual satisfaction rests really on the opposite ground, since through it the impulse is gratified and thus the will-to-live is affirmed, but propagation is suppressed, which alone keeps open the possibility of the denial of the will. This is the reason why pederasty was recognized as a grave sin only with the appearance of Christianity whose tendency is ascetic.
§ 168
A monastery is an assemblage of those who have embraced poverty, chastity, obedience (i.e. renunciation of one's own will) and who, by living together, try to lighten to some extent existence itself, but even more so that state of severe renunciation. For the sight of those who hold similar views and undergo the same renunciation strengthens their resolve and consoles them, and the companionship of living together within certain limits is suited to human nature and is an innocent relaxation in spite of many severe privations. This is the normal conception of monasteries. And who can call such a society an association of fools and simpletons, as one is bound to according to every philosophy except mine?
The inner spirit and meaning of genuine monastic life, as of asceticism generally, are that a man has recognized himself as worthy and capable of an existence better than ours and wants to strengthen and maintain this conviction by despising what this world offers, casting aside all its pleasures as worthless, and now awaiting calmly and confidently the end of this life that is stripped of its empty allurements, in order one day to welcome the hour of death as that of salvation. The Sannyasis have exactly the same tendency and significance, and so too have the Buddhist monks. Certainly in no case does practice so rarely correspond to theory as in that of monasticism just because its fundamental idea is so sublime; and abusus optimi pessimus. [9] A genuine monk is exceedingly venerable, but in the great majority of cases the cowl is a mere mask behind which there is just as little of the real monk as there is behind one at a masquerade.
§ 169
The notion that we should submit and surrender entirely and without reserve to the individual will of another is a psychic means of facilitating the denial of our own will and is thus a suitable allegorical vehicle of the truth.
§ 170
The number of regular Trappists is naturally small; but yet half of mankind consists of involuntary Trappists; poverty, obedience, absence of all pleasures and even of the most necessary means of relief, and frequently also chastity that is forced or brought about through want or some defect, are their lot. The difference is simply that the Trappists pursue the matter of their own free choice, methodically and without hope of any change for the better; whereas the other way is to be ranged with what I have described in my ascetic chapters by the expression [x]. [10] Therefore by virtue of the basis of her order, nature has already taken adequate care to bring this about, especially if we add to the evils that spring directly from her those others that are produced by the discord, dissension, and malice of men in war and peace. But this very necessity of involuntary suffering for eternal salvation is also expressed by that utterance of the Saviour (Matthew 19: 24): [x]. (Facilius est, funem ancorarium per foramen acus transire, quam divitem regnum divinum ingredi.) [11] Therefore those who were greatly in earnest about their eternal salvation, chose voluntary poverty when fate had denied this to them and they had been born in wealth. Thus Buddha Sakya Muni was born a prince, but voluntarily took to the mendicant's staff; and Francis of Assisi, the founder of the mendicant orders who, as a youngster at the ball, where the daughters of all the notabilities were sitting together, was asked: 'Now, Francis, will you not soon make your choice from these beauties?' and who replied: 'I have made a far more beautiful choice!' 'Whom?' 'La poverta'; whereupon he abandoned every thing shortly afterwards and wandered through the land as a mendicant.
Whoever through such considerations realizes how necessary to our salvation misery and suffering usually are will see that we should envy others their unhappiness rather than their happiness.
For the same reason, the stoicism of the disposition which defies fate is also, it is true, a good armour against the sufferings of life and helps us to endure the present; but it stands in the way of true salvation, for it hardens the heart. Indeed, how can this be improved by sufferings if it is surrounded by a crust of stone and does not feel them? Moreover, a certain degree of this stoicism is not very rare. Often it may be affectation and amount to a bonne mine au mauvais jeu; [12] where, however, it is genuine and unfeigned, it springs in most cases from a mere want of feeling, from a lack of energy, brightness, sensitiveness, and imagination, all of which are requisite to a great agony of sorrow. The phlegmatic and sluggish temperament of the Germans is particularly favourable to this kind of stoicism.
With regard to the man who commits them, unjust or malicious actions are a sign of the strength of his affirmation of the will-to-live and accordingly of the distance separating him from true salvation, from denial of the will-to-live, and consequently from redemption from the world. They are also a sign of the long school of knowledge and suffering he has still to go through before he attains salvation. In respect of the man who has to suffer such actions, they are physically an evil, it is true, but metaphysically a blessing and at bottom a benefit, for they help to lead him to his true salvation.
§ 172
WORLD-SPIRIT: Here then is the task of your labours and sufferings; for these you shall exist, as do all other things.
MAN: But what have I from existence? If my existence is occupied, I have trouble; if it is unoccupied, I have boredom. How can you offer me so miserable a reward for so much labour and suffering?
WORLD-SPIRIT: And yet this reward is the equivalent of all your troubles, and it is precisely this by virtue of its inadequacy.
MAN: Indeed? This really exceeds my powers of comprehension.
WORLD-SPIRIT: I know. -- (aside) Should I tell him that the value of life consists precisely in its teaching him not to will it? For this supreme dedication life itself must first prepare him.
§ I72a
As I have said, looked at as a whole, each human life reveals the qualities of a tragedy and we see that, as a rule, life is nothing but a series of disappointed hopes, frustrated plans, and errors recognized too late, and that the truth of the mournful verse applies to it:
[quote]Then old age and experience, hand in hand, Lead him to death and make him understand, After a search so painful and so long, That all his life he has been in the wrong.[/quote]
All this agrees entirely with my view of the world which regards existence itself as something that were better not to be, a kind of mistake from which a knowledge of it is to bring us back. Man in general, [x], is already in the wrong in so far as he exists and is man; consequently it is wholly in keeping with this that each individual human being, [x], also finds himself generally in the wrong when he surveys his life. That he sees it in general is his salvation, and for this he must begin by recognizing it in the individual case, i.e. in his own individual life. For quidquid valet de genere, valet et de specie. [12]
Life is to be regarded entirely as a sharp scolding which is administered to us, although, with our forms of thought that are calculated for quite different ends, we cannot understand how it could be possible for us to need it. Accordingly, we should look back with satisfaction on our deceased friends, bearing in mind that they have got over their scolding and heartily wishing that it has had the desired effect. From the same point of view, we should look forward to our own death as a desirable and happy event instead of, as is generally the case, with fear and trembling.
A happy life is impossible; the best that man can attain is a heroic life, such as is lived by one who struggles against overwhelming odds in some way and some affair that will benefit the whole of mankind, and who in the end triumphs, although he obtains a poor reward or none at all. For in the end, he is turned to stone like the prince in Gozzi's Re corvo, but he has a noble bearing and magnanimous look. His memory lasts and is celebrated as that of a hero; his will, mortified by toil and trouble, failure, and the world's ingratitude throughout his life, is extinguished in Nirvana. (In this sense, Carlyle wrote On Heroes and Hero-worship, London, 1842.)
§ 173
Now if through considerations such as the above and so from a very lofty standpoint, we see a justification for the sufferings of mankind, this nevertheless does not extend to the animals whose sufferings are considerable, brought on for the most part through man, but often also without his agency. (See World as Will and Representation, vol. ii, chap. 28.) And so the question then forces itself on us as to the purpose of this troubled and tormented will in its thousands of different forms without the freedom to salvation which is conditioned by reflectiveness. The suffering of the animal world is to be justified merely from the fact that the will-to-live must devour its own flesh because in the phenomenal world absolutely nothing exists besides it, and it is a hungry will. Hence the gradation of its phenomena each of which lives at the expense of another. Further, I refer to §§ 153 and 154 which show that the capacity for suffering is in the animal very much less than in man. Now what might be added beyond this would prove to be hypothetical or even mythical and may, therefore, be left to the reader's own speculation.
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Notes:
1 ['Expansion' and 'contraction'.]
2 [Sanskrit maha sushuptih, the great and profound sleep, the periodical entry of the world into the Brahman.]
3 [' The Beyond'.]
4 ['Willing and not-willing'.] 5 ['Until willing becomes not-willing'.] 6 [First trace of the heart in an embryo-Oxford English Dictionary.]
7 [' Directly after copulation the devil's laughter is heard.']
8 ['For the mere procreation of children'.]
9 ['The worst is the abuse of the best.']
10 ['The next best course'.]
11 ['It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.']
12 ['A smile in the face of adversity'.]
13 ['What applies to the genus applies also to the species.' (Logical rule.)]
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