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PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA: SHORT PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS |
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[b]CHAPTER 2: On Logic and Dialectic[/b]
§ 22 Every general truth is related to special ones as gold to silver in so far as we can convert it into a considerable number of special truths that follow from it, just as a gold coin can be turned into small change. For example, the entire life of the plant is a process of deoxidation, whereas that of the animal is one of oxidation; or again, wherever an electric current flows in a circuit, there arises at once a magnetic current cutting across it at right angles; or again, nulla animalia vocalia, nisi quae pulmonibus respirant; [1] or tout animal fossil est un animal perdu; [2] or no egg-laying animal has a diaphragm. All these are universal truths from which we can derive very many particular truths in order to use them for explaining phenomena that occur or even anticipate these before they appear. General truths are just as valuable in the sphere of morals and psychology. Indeed, how golden is every general rule here, every sentence of the kind, in fact every proverb! For they are the quintessence of thousands of events which are repeated every day and are through them illustrated and exemplified.
§ 23
An analytical judgement is merely a concept drawn apart, whereas a synthetical is the formation of a new concept out of two that are already otherwise present in the intellect. But the combination of these two must then be brought about and established through some intuitive perception. Now according as this is empirical or is a pure a priori intuition, so will the resultant judgement be synthetical a posteriori or a priori.
Every analytical judgement contains a tautology and every judgement without any tautology is synthetical. It follows from this that in a discourse analytical judgements are to be used only on the assumption that the man addressed does not have so complete or ready a knowledge of the subject as does the man who addresses him. Further, the synthetical nature of geometrical propositions can be demonstrated from the fact that they contain no tautology. This is not so obvious in the case of arithmetic, but yet it is so. For the fact that, when we count from I to 4- and from I to 5, the unit is repeated just as often as when we count from I to 9, is not a tautology, but is brought about by the pure intuition of time and without this is inconceivable.
§ 24
From one proposition there cannot result more than what is already to be found therein, that is to say, more than it itself states for the exhaustive comprehension of its meaning. But from two propositions, if they are syllogistically connected to premisses, more can result than is to be found in each of them taken separately; just as a body that is a chemical compound displays properties that do not belong to any of its constituent elements considered separately. On this rests the value of syllogisms.
§ 25
Every demonstration of a truth is a logical deduction of the asserted proposition from one already settled and certain-with the aid of another as second premiss. Now that proposition must either have itself direct, more correctly original, certainty, or logically follow from one that has such certainty. Such propositions of an original certainty that is not brought about by any proof, constitute the fundamental truths of all the sciences and have always resulted from carrying over what is somehow intuitively apprehended into what is thought, the abstract. They are, therefore, called evident, a predicate that really belongs only to them and not to the merely demonstrated propositions that, as conclusiones ex praemissis, can be called merely logical or consequential. Accordingly, this truth of theirs is always only indirect, derived, and borrowed. Nevertheless, they can be just as certain as any proposition of direct truth, namely when they are correctly inferred from such a proposition even if only through parenthetical clauses. Even on this assumption, their truth can often be demonstrated and made clear to everyone more easily than can that of an axiom whose truth is to be known only immediately and intuitively because there lack now the objective, now the subjective conditions for the recognition of such an axiom. This relation is analogous to the case where the steel magnet, that is produced by having its magnetism imparted to it, has an attractive force not only just as strong as, but often stronger than, that of the original magnetic iron ore.
Thus the subjective conditions for knowing propositions that are directly true constitute what is called power of judgement; but this is one of the merits of superior minds; whereas no sound intellect lacks the ability to draw correct conclusions from given premisses. For to establish original propositions, that are directly true, we need to carryover into abstract knowledge that which is known through intuitive perception. But the ability to do this is extremely limited in the case of ordinary minds and extends only to an easily visible state of affairs as, for instance, to the axioms of Euclid, or even to quite simple facts that are plainly obvious to them. What goes beyond this can convince them only on the path of proof which calls for no other direct knowledge than that which is expressed in logic by the principles of contradiction and identity and is repeated in the proofs at every step. Therefore on such a path everything must be reduced for them to the simplest possible truths that are the only ones they are capable of directly grasping. If we proceed here from the general to the special, we have deduction, but if we go in the opposite direction we have induction.
On the other hand, minds capable of judgement, but even more so inventors and discoverers, possess in a much higher degree the ability to pass from what is intuitively perceived to what is thought or abstract; so that such ability extends to their discerning very complicated relationships. In this way, the field of propositions of direct truth is for them incomparably more extensive and embraces much whereof the rest can never obtain more than a feeble and merely indirect conviction. For the latter the proof of a newly discovered truth is subsequently sought, i.e. the reference to truths that are already acknowledged or otherwise beyond question. Yet there are cases where this is impracticable. For example, I can find no proof for the six fractions whereby I have expressed the six primary colours and which alone give an insight into the real specific nature of each one of them and thus for the first time actually explain colour to our understanding. Yet their absolute certainty is so great that scarcely any mind capable of judgement will seriously doubt them. And so Professor Rosas of Vienna presumed to give them out as the result of his own insight, and for this I took him to task in my work On the Will in Nature (Physiology and Pathology).
§ 26
Controversy, disputing on a theoretical subject, can undoubtedly be very profitable to the two parties engaged thereon since it corrects or confirms the ideas they have and also stimulates fresh ones. It is a conflict or collision of two minds which often causes sparks; yet it is also analogous to the collision of bodies in that the weaker has often to suffer for it, whereas the stronger comes off well and merely emits a triumphant note. In this respect, there is also the requirement that the two disputants should at any rate be fairly well matched in intellect and ability as well as in knowledge. If one of them lacks knowledge, he is not au niveau [3] and is thus not amenable to the arguments of the other; in the contest he is, so to speak, standing outside the ring. But if he lacks intellect, the exasperation that is soon stirred in him will induce him to make use of all kinds of unfair tricks, subterfuges, and chicanery in the dispute and to descend to rudeness when these are pointed out to him. Accordingly, just as those of equal rank and birth were admitted to tournaments, so above all a scholar should not argue with those who are illiterate; for he is unable to use his best arguments against them, since they lack the knowledge to understand and ponder over them. If, however, in this embarrassing situation he tries to make these clear to them, he will generally fail; in fact through a bad and crude counter-argument, they will appear to be right after all in the eyes of those who are as ignorant as they. And so Goethe says in the Westostlicher Diwan:
[quote]Let not yourself at any time Be wrongly guided into argument; The wise lapse into ignorance, When disputing with the ignorant.[/quote]
But it is even worse if the opponent is wanting in intellect and understanding unless he makes good this defect by a sincere attempt to obtain information and arrive at the truth. Otherwise he soon feels himself hurt at his tenderest spot; and then whoever argues with him will at once notice that he no longer has to deal with his intellect, but with the radical part of the man, his will, to which the only thing that matters is that he ultimately triumphs either per fas or per nefas. [4] Therefore his intellect is now directed exclusively to tricks, dodges, and every kind of unfairness; and when he is ultimately driven from these, he will finally resort to rudeness merely to compensate in some way for the inferiority he feels and, according to the station and circumstances of the disputants, to turn the conflict of minds into one of bodies, where he hopes for a better chance of success. Accordingly, we have the second rule that we should not argue with those of limited intellect. We can see already that there will not be many left with whom we can perhaps enter into an argument. Indeed we can do so only with those who are the exceptions. On the other hand, men as a rule take offence when we are not of their opinion; but then they should modify their opinions so that we could adopt them. Now in a controversy with them, we shall often experience only annoyance and vexation even when they do not resort to the abovementioned ultima ratio stultorum. [5] For here we shall have to do not merely with their intellectual incapacity, but very soon with their moral depravity as well which will reveal itself in the frequent dishonesty of their methods when they argue. The tricks, dodges, and chicanery, to which they resort in order to be right in the end, are so numerous and manifold and yet recur so regularly that some years ago I made them the subject of my own reflection and directed my attention to their purely formal element after I had perceived that, however varied the subjects of discussion and the persons taking part therein, the same identical tricks and dodges always came back and were very easy to recognize. This led me at the time to the idea of clearly separating the merely formal part of these tricks and dodges from the material and of displaying it, so to speak, as a neat anatomical specimen. I therefore collected all the dishonest tricks so frequently occurring in argument and clearly presented each of them in its characteristic setting, illustrated by examples and given a name of its own. Finally, I added the means to be used against them, as a kind of guard against these thrusts; and from this was developed a formal eristical dialectic. Now in this dialectic, the above-mentioned artifices or stratagems took the place, as eristical dialectical figures, which was filled in logic by the syllogistic figures and in rhetoric by the rhetorical. With both of these they have in common the fact that they are to a certain extent inborn in that their practice precedes theory; and so to exercise them we do not need to have first learnt them. Accordingly, their purely formal statement would be complementary to that technique of reason [Vernunft] which appears in the second volume of my chief work, chapter g, as consisting of logic, dialectic, and rhetoric. Since, as far as I know, no previous attempt of this kind exists, I could not avail myself of any preliminary work. Aristotle's Topica was the only work I could make use of here and there and for my purpose I was able to apply some of its rules for setting up ([x]) and setting aside ([x]) the statements. But the work of Theophrastus, [x], [6] mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, must have been really suitable for this; it has been lost with all his rhetorical writings. Plato (Republic, bk. v, p. 12, ed Bip.) also touches on an [x] [7] that taught [x], [8] just as [x] [9] taught [x]. [10] Of modern books, the one that best serves my purpose is that of the late Professor Friedemann Schneider of Halle, entitled Tractatus logicus singularis in quo processus disputandi, seu officia, aeque ac VITIA DISPUTANTIUM exhibentur, [11] Halle, 1718. This work is useful in so far as it exposes in the chapters on the vitia many instances of eristical unfairness. Yet he always has in mind only the formal academic disputations; moreover, his treatment of the subject is on the whole poor and feeble, as such faculty-fabrications usually are; and besides, it is in extremely bad Latin. The methodus disputandi of Joachim Lange which appeared a year later is definitely better, but contains nothing suitable for my purpose. With the revision, now undertaken, of that earlier work of mine, I find that such a detailed and minute consideration of the crooked ways and tricks that are used by common human nature to cover up its shortcomings is no longer suited to my temperament and so I lay it aside. However, to express in more detail my way of treating the subject for those who might in future feel disposed to undertake something of the kind, I will here set down one or two stratagems as specimens, but before so doing I will give from that same work the outline of what is essential to every disputation. For this furnishes the abstract framework, the skeleton so to speak, of the controversy in general and can, therefore, be regarded as its osteology. On account of its clearness and its visibility at a glance, it is well worth recording here. It runs:
In every disputation, whether carried on publicly in academic lecture-rooms and courts of law or in ordinary conversation, the essential procedure is as follows:
A thesis is stated and is to be refuted; now for this purpose there are two modes and two courses.
(1) The modes are ad rem and ad hominem, or ex concessis. [12] Only by the first do we upset the absolute or objective truth of the thesis by showing that it does not agree with the nature of the case in question. By the other, however, we upset merely its relative truth by showing that it contradicts other statements or admissions of the man who advocates the thesis, or by showing that his arguments are untenable whereby the objective truth of the case itself is then left really undecided. For instance, if in a controversy relating to matters of philosophy or natural science, the opponent (who for this purpose is bound to be an Englishman) ventures to advance biblical arguments, then we may refute him with just such arguments, although they are mere argumenta ad hominem which do not settle anything in the matter. It is as if we had paid someone in the very same paper-money we had received from him. In many cases, this modus procedendi is comparable to the plaintiff's producing in court a false promissory note that the defendant on his part forwarded by a false receipt; yet for all that the loan might have been made. But just like this latter case, the mere argumentatio ad hominem often has the advantage of brevity since, in the one case as in the other, the true and thorough explanation of the matter would frequently be extremely complicated and difficult.
(2) Further, the two courses are the direct and the indirect. The former strikes the thesis at its grounds or reasons, the latter at its results; the former shows that the thesis is not true, the latter that it cannot be true. We will consider this more closely.
(a) Refuting by the direct way and thus attacking the grounds or reasons of the thesis, we show either that these themselves are not true by saying nego majorem or nego minorem [13] through both of which we attack the subject-matter of the conclusion that establishes the thesis; or else we admit these grounds or reasons, but show that the thesis does not follow from them; and so we say nego consequentiam, [14] in which case we attack the form of the conclusion.
(b) Refuting by the indirect way and thus attacking the results of the thesis in order to infer from the falsity of these that of the thesis itself, by virtue of the law a falsitate rationati ad falsitatem rationis valet consequentia. [15] we can make use either of the instance or else of the apagoge.
(i) The instance, [x], is a mere exemplum in contrarium. [16] It refutes the thesis by indicating things or circumstances which are understood by its statement, but to which it obviously does not apply; and so it cannot be true.
(ii) The apagoge is brought about by our provisionally assuming the thesis to be true, but then associating it with some other proposition that is unquestioned and acknowledged as true, so that the two become the premisses of a syllogism whose conclusion is obviously false, in that it contradicts either the nature of things in general, or the state of the case in question which is definitely acknowledged, or else another statement of the defender of the thesis. Therefore the apagoge can be ad rem as well as merely ad hominem, according to the mode. Now if that conclusion contradicts truths that are absolutely beyond question and are even a priori certain, then we have reduced our opponent's position ad absurdum. In any case, as the other added premiss is of undoubted truth, the falsity of the conclusion must result from his thesis; and so this cannot be true.
Every method of attack in an argument will be reducible to the methods of procedure that are here formally described. Therefore these are in dialectics what the regular thrusts, such as the tierce, the carte, and so on, are in the art of fencing. On the other hand, the devices or stratagems, compiled by me, would be comparable possibly to the feints; and finally the personal outbursts in an argument might be compared to the so-called irregular cuts of the university fencing-masters. As specimens and examples of those stratagems that have been collected by me, the following may here be mentioned.
Seventh stratagem: the extension. The opponent's statement is carried beyond its natural limits and so is taken in a sense wider than he intended or even expressed in order then conveniently to refute it in this sense.
Example: A asserts that the English surpass all other nations in the dramatic art. B makes the plausible instantia in contrarium that in music and consequently in 'opera their achievements are insignificant. It follows from this, as a guard to this feint, that, when a contradiction is made, we should at once limit our avowed statement strictly to expressions in use, or to their reasonably accepted meaning, and should generally contract them into the narrowest possible limits. For the more general a statement becomes, the more it is open to attacks.
Eighth stratagem: the tendency to draw conclusions. To the opponent's proposition we add often tacitly a second which is related to his through subject or predicate. From these two premisses we now draw a false and often malicious conclusion which is laid at the opponent's door.
Example: A praises the French for having expelled Charles the Tenth. B at once retorts: 'And so you want to expel our king.' The proposition tacitly added by him as major says: 'All who expel their king are to be praised.' This can be reduced also to the fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. [17]
Ninth stratagem: the diversion. If, in the course of the argument, we notice that we are getting the worst of it and our opponent will win, we try to prevent this misfortune in time by a mutatio controversiae and hence by diverting the discussion on to another subject, to something of secondary importance, if necessary even at one bound. We now try to foist this on to the opponent in order to call it in question and make it, instead of the original subject, the theme of the controversy, so that the opponent has to abandon his expected victory in order to turn his attention to this. But here again if we should unfortunately see a strong counter-argument quickly marshalled against us, we should promptly do the same once more and thus again jump to something else. We can repeat this ten times in a quarter of an hour unless, of course, our opponent loses patience. We shall carry out these strategic diversions most adroitly by gradually and imperceptibly working the controversy round to a subject that is related to the one in question, if possible to something that actually concerns the opponent himself, only in another respect. Of course, it is less subtle if we keep merely to the subject of the thesis, but introduce other references to it which have nothing whatever to do with those under discussion; for example by passing from a talk on the Buddhism of the Chinese to their tea-trade. But now if this too is not even feasible, we lay hold of some expression which our opponent may chance to use in order to fasten on to it an entirely new controversy and thus to be rid of the old one. For instance, our opponent has expressed the following: 'This is just where the mystery of the matter lies', and we promptly cut in and say: ' Ah well if you are talking of mysteries and mysticism, then I am not your man, for as regards this', and so on, and we have won all along the line. But if no opportunity is given to do this, we must go to work even more boldly and suddenly jump to an entirely different subject somewhat as follows: 'Yes, and also quite recently you affirmed this', and so on. The diversion generally is of all the tricks used (often instinctively) by dishonest disputants the most favourite and familiar to which they almost inevitably resort whenever they get into difficulties.
I had, therefore, compiled and worked out some forty of such stratagems. But now I dislike throwing light on all these lurking places of narrow-mindedness and incapacity that are so closely allied to obstinacy, vanity, and dishonesty. I shall, therefore, rest content with this specimen and refer the more earnestly to the above-mentioned grounds for avoiding an argument with the common ruck of people. At all events, we may try to come to the aid of another's power of comprehension by arguments; but as soon as we notice in his rejoinders any obstinacy we should stop at once. For he will soon become unfair, and what in theory is a sophism is in practice chicanery. But the stratagems here introduced are even more worthless than sophisms. For in them the will puts on the mask of understanding in order to play the role thereof. The result is always detestable; for few things excite such indignation as when we observe a man who deliberately misunderstands. Whoever does not admit his opponent's sound arguments betrays an intellect that is either directly weak or is so indirectly through being suppressed by the mastery of his own will. We should, therefore, go for such a person only when duty and obligation require it. In spite of all this, however, to do justice to the above-mentioned tricks and dodges, I must confess that we may also act too hastily by surrendering our opinion to a striking argument of the opponent. Thus we feel the force of such, but the counter-arguments, or whatever else could save and sustain our statement itself, do not as readily occur to us. Now if, in such a case, we at once give up our thesis as lost, it may well be that, in so doing, we betray truth, since it might be discovered that after all we had been right. Through weakness and lack of confidence in our case, we had yielded to the impression of the moment. Even the proof we had advanced in favour of our thesis may have been actually false, but there may be another which is correct. Aware of this, even sincere lovers of the truth do not readily yield all at once to a good argument, but still try to offer a brief resistance; in fact in most instances, they stick to their statement even when counter-arguments have rendered its truth questionable. In this respect, they are like the commander of a force who tries for a while to hold on to a position which he knows he cannot maintain, in the hope that reinforcements will arrive. Thus they hope that, while for the time being they are defending themselves with inferior arguments, the sound ones will in the meantime occur to them, or that the mere plausibility of the opponent's arguments will become evident to them. Therefore we are almost compelled to be a little unfair in an argument in that, for the moment, we have to contend not so much for truth as for our own statement, in as much as this is a consequence of the uncertainty of truth and of the imperfection of the human intellect. But now there at once arises the danger that we may go too far in this direction, contend too long for a wrong conviction, and finally become stubborn and unyielding. There is the risk of our giving way to the baseness of human nature, of our defending our statement per fas et nefas [18] and thus with the aid of dishonest stratagems, and of our sticking to it mordicus. [19] May everyone be here protected by his good genius so that there will be no need for him afterwards to feel ashamed! However, a clear knowledge of the nature of the case, as here expounded, certainly leads to self-culture even in this respect.
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[b]Notes:[/b]
1 ['No animals are vocal which do not breathe through lungs.']
2 ['Every fossil animal is an extinct animal.']
3 ['Up to the mark'.]
4 ['By hook or by crook'.] 5 ['The last resource of the stupid'.]
6 ['Theoretical manual concerning disputants'.]
7 ['Art of contradiction'.]
8 ['To dispute', 'to argue'.]
9 ['Art of conversation'.]
10 ('Discussion', 'conversation '.]
11 ['Special logical treatise in which the method used in disputation, its laws, and also the vices of the disputants are expounded'.]
12 ['Arguments in relation to the thing, in relation to the person (with whom we are carrying on the discussion), on the basis of concessions'.] 13 ['I dispute the major proposition'; 'I dispute the minor proposition'.]
14 ['I dispute the conclusion (of the syllogism).']
15 ['From the falsity of the consequent follows the falsity of the ground or reason.']
16 ['Contrary example'.] 17 ['The trick of taking in an unlimited sense what was asserted in a limited'.]
18 ['By hook or by crook'.]
19 ['With all our might', 'by main force'.]
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