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PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA: SHORT PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS |
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[b]CHAPTER 9: On Jurisprudence and Politics[/b]
§ 120
It is a characteristic fault of the Germans to look in the clouds for that which lies at their feet. An outstanding example of this is furnished by the way in which the professors of philosophy deal with the Law of Nature. In order to explain the simple relations of human life which constitute the material and substance of this, and hence right and wrong, possession, State, criminal law, and so on, the most extravagant, abstract, and consequently the vaguest and emptiest concepts are produced, and from them first one tower of Babel and then another are built into the clouds according to the special whim of the particular professor. In this way, the clearest and simplest relations of life that directly concern us are rendered unintelligible, to the great detriment of the young men who are educated in such a school. These things themselves are extremely simple and easy to understand, and of this the reader may convince himself from my discussion of them in the 'Basis of Ethics', § 17, and in my chief work, The World as Will and Representation, volume i, § 62. But with certain words, such as right, freedom, the good, to be (this meaningless infinitive of the copula), and others, the German becomes quite giddy, falls at once into a kind of delirium, and begins to indulge in futile, high-flown phrases. He takes the vaguest and thus the hollowest concepts and artificially strings them together. Instead of this, he should keep his eye on reality, and intuitively perceive things and relations as they really are from which those concepts are abstracted and which, therefore, constitute their only true substance.
§ 121
Whoever starts from the preconceived opinion that the concept of right must be positive and now undertakes to define it, will not make anything of it; for he is trying to grasp a shadow, pursues a ghost, and looks for a nonens. The concept of right, like that of freedom, is negative; its content is a mere negation. The concept of wrong is positive and is equivalent to injury in the widest sense and hence to laesio. Now such an injury can affect either one's person, property, or honour. Accordingly, human rights are easy to determine; everyone has the right to do that which injures no one.
To have a right or claim to something means simply to be able to do it, take it, or use it without thereby injuring anyone else. Simplex sigillum veri. [1] It is clear from this how meaningless are many questions, for example whether we have the right to take our own life. But as regards the claims that others may have on us personally, these rest on the condition of our being alive and fall to the ground when that condition no longer applies. It is an extravagant demand that a man who no longer cares to live for himself, should still go on living as a mere machine for the benefit of others.
§ 122
Although the powers of men are different, their rights are nevertheless equal since these rest not on powers, but, because of the moral nature of right, on the fact that the same will-to-live at a similar stage of its objectification manifests itself in everyone. This, however, holds good only of original and abstract right which a man has as a human being. The possessions and honour that everyone acquires through his own powers are regulated by the amount and nature thereof, and then endow his right with a wider sphere; and so equality here comes to an end. The man who is better equipped or more active in this respect increases by greater industry not his right, but only the number of things to which it extends.
§ 123
In my chief work (vol. ii, chap. 47), I have shown that the State is essentially a mere institution for protecting all from external attacks and individuals from attacks within its borders. It follows from this that the necessity of the State rests ultimately on the acknowledged injustice and unfairness of the human race. In the absence of injustice, no one would think of a State, for none would need to fear any encroachment of his rights and a mere union against the attacks of wild animals or the elements would bear only a feeble resemblance to the State. From this point of view, we clearly see the narrow-mindedness and shallowness of the philosophasters who in pompous phrases represent the State as the highest purpose and the flower of human existence and thus furnish an apotheosis of Philistinism.
§ 124
If justice prevailed in the world, it would be enough for a man to have built his house, and there would be no need for any other protection than this obvious right of property. But since wrong is the order of the day, it is necessary for the man who has built a house to be also in a position to protect it; otherwise his right is de facto incomplete. Thus the aggressor has the right if might which is precisely Spinoza's concept of right, for he acknowledges no other, but says: Unusquisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentia valet (Political Treatise, chap. 2, § 8) and uniuscujusque jus potentia ejus definitur [2] (Ethics, IV, prop. 37, schol. I). Hobbes appears to have introduced him to this concept of right, especially in De cive, chap. I, § 14. To this passage Hobbes adds the strange explanation that God's right to all things rests merely on his omnipotence. Now in the ordinary world of citizens, this concept of right has been abolished in theory as well as in practice; but in the political world it is abolished only in theory, yet it continues to apply in practice.* This was strikingly confirmed recently by the North American raid on Mexico, although such confirmation was far surpassed by the earlier raids of the French all over Europe under their leader Bonaparte. But instead of covering up their actions by means of public and official lies that are perhaps even more revolting than the actions themselves, such conquerors should boldly and freely refer to Machiavelli's doctrine. From this it may be gathered that between individuals and in the morality and jurisprudence for these the principle quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris [3] certainly holds good, but that between nations and in politics the reverse applies, namely quod tibi fieri non vis, id alteri tu feceris. [4] If you do not want to be subjugated, subjugate your neighbour in time, that is to say, as soon as his weakness offers you the opportunity. For if you let this pass, it will one day show itself as a deserter in the other man's camp and he will then subjugate you, although the present sin of omission will be paid for not by the generation that committed it, but by the next. This Machiavellian principle is always a much more decent cloak for the lust of booty than are the wholly transparent tatters of the most palpable lies in presidential speeches and even of those that remind one of the well-known story of the rabbit that is said to have attacked the dog. At bottom, every state regards another as a gang of robbers who will fall upon it as soon as there is an opportunity.
§ 125
Between serfdom, as found in Russia, and landed property in England and generally between the serf and the farmer, tenant, mortgager, and the like, the difference is to be found more in the form than in the matter. Whether the peasant belongs to me or the land from which he must earn his living; whether the bird is mine or its food, the fruit or the tree, is essentially a matter of indifference, for, as Shakespeare represents Shylock as saying:
[quote]You take my life, When you do take the means whereby I live.[/quote]
The free peasant, it is true, has the advantage of being able to depart into the wide world; on the other hand, the serf and glebae adscriptus [5] has perhaps the greater advantage that, when a bad harvest, illness, old age, and incapacity render him helpless, his master has to look after him. He therefore sleeps soundly, whereas with a bad harvest, his master tosses and turns in his bed thinking of ways and means for providing his serfs with bread. And so even Menander said (Stobaeus, Florilegium, vol. ii, p. 389, ed. Gaisford):
[quote] [x] [x] (Quanto benignum satius est dominum pati, Quam vivere inopem liberi sub nomine.) [6][/quote]
Another advantage of the free man is the possibility of improving his position through any talents he may develop; but the slave too is not entirely deprived of this. If through achievements of a higher order he becomes valuable to his master, he is treated accordingly, just as in Rome mechanics, factory managers, architects, and even physicians were often slaves and even today in Russia there are said to be great financiers who are serfs. In consequence of his industry, the slave can also buy his freedom, as often happens in America.
Poverty and slavery are, therefore, only two forms, one might almost say two names, for the same thing whose essential nature is that a man's powers are for the most part employed not for himself, but for others. The result of this is partly that he is overloaded with work and also that his needs meet with meagre satisfaction. For nature has given man only as much strength as will enable him to gain a living from the earth by a moderate use of such powers; he has not received a great surplus of strength. If a not inconsiderable portion of the human race is relieved of the common burden of physically maintaining human existence, the remainder of the race is thereby excessively burdened and in misery. This, then, is the primary source of that evil which, either under the name of slavery or that of the proletariat, has at all times borne heavily on the great majority of the human race. Its more remote cause, however, is luxury. Thus in order that a few may have what is an unnecessary and superfluous refinement; indeed that these may be able to satisfy artificial needs, a great part of mankind's existing powers must be devoted to things of this nature and so be withdrawn from the production of what is necessary and indispensable. Instead of building cottages for themselves, thousands build mansions for a few. Instead of coarse materials for themselves and their families, they weave fine silk materials or even lace for the wealthy, and generally manufacture a thousand articles of luxury for the pleasure of the wealthy. A large part of the population of cities consists of such makers of luxury articles; and so for them and those who give them such work the peasant must then plough, sow, and tend his flocks and thus has more work than had been originally imposed on him by nature. Moreover, he himself must still devote a great deal of his efforts and land to wine, silk, tobacco, hops, asparagus, and so on, instead of to corn, potatoes, and cattle-breeding. Further, many are withdrawn from agriculture to serve in shipbuilding and the merchant marine, so that sugar, coffee, tea, and other things may be procured. Again the production of these superfluous things then becomes the cause of the misery of those millions of Negro slaves who are forcibly torn from their native land in order to produce by their sweat and agony those objects of pleasure. In short, a great part of the powers of the human race is withdrawn from producing all that is necessary in order to procure for the few that which is entirely superfluous and unnecessary. Therefore, as long as there is luxury on the one side, there must necessarily be excessive work and a miserable existence on the other, whether it be given the name of poverty or slavery, proletarius or servus. The fundamental difference between the two is that slaves have to attribute their origin to violence, and poor men theirs to cunning. The whole unnatural condition of society, the universal struggle to escape from misery, sea navigation that is attended with so much loss of life, the complicated interests of trade, and finally the wars to which all this gives rise-all these things have their sole root in luxury which does not even make happy those who enjoy it, but rather makes them unhealthy, delicate, and bad-tempered. Accordingly, the most effective way to alleviate human misery would be to diminish luxury, or even to abolish it altogether.
There is unquestionably much truth in this whole train of thought. Yet it is in effect refuted by another which is, moreover, confirmed by the testimony of experience. Thus the human race devotes much labour to luxury; what it loses in this way in muscular strength (irritability) for its most necessary purposes, is gradually made good to it a thousandfold by the nervous strength (sensibility, intelligence) which on this occasion becomes free (in the chemical sense). For, as sensibility and intelligence are of a higher order, their achievements surpass a thousandfold those of irritability:
[quote] [x] (ut vel unum sapiens consilium multorum manuum opus superat.) [7]
-- Euripides, Antiope.[/quote]
A nation of none but peasants would achieve little in the way of discovery and invention; but the hands of leisure give active minds. The arts and sciences are themselves the offspring of luxury and repay their debt to it. Their work is that perfection of technology in all its branches, mechanical, chemical, and physical, which in our day has brought machinery to a pitch never previously imagined and achieves, especially through steam-engines and electricity, things which in times past would have been attributed to the agency of the devil. For now in factories and workshops of every kind and occasionally in agriculture machines do a thousand times more work than could ever have been done by the hands of all the leisured and well-to-do classes and cultured brain-workers and thus could ever have been attained by the abolition of all luxury and the introduction of a universal peasant life. The products of all these industries, however, certainly do not benefit the wealthy alone, but all classes. Things which in former times one could hardly afford are now obtainable at a low price and in quantities, and even the life of the humblest classes has greatly gained in comfort. In the Middle Ages a king of England once borrowed from a member of the aristocracy a pair of silk stockings in order to wear them for an audience with the French Ambassador. Even Queen Elizabeth was highly delighted and astonished to receive as a New Year's gift in 1560 the first pair of silk stockings (Disraeli, i. 332); [8] today every shop-assistant has such things. Fifty years ago ladies wore dresses of calico or cotton such as are worn today by maid-servants. If further progress at the same rate is made in the development of machinery, the result after a time may be that the efforts of human labour will be almost entirely saved, just as are those of horses to a large extent even now. For we could, of course, conceive of a certain universality of mental culture in the human race which, however, is impossible so long as a large part thereof must apply itself to heavy physical work. Irritability and sensibility in general as well as in particular are always and everywhere in antagonism just because one and the same vital force underlies both. Further, since artes molliunt mores, [9] wars on a large scale and rows or duels on a small will then perhaps disappear entirely from the world, just as both have now become much rarer. It is not, however, my purpose here to write a Utopia.
But even apart from all these arguments which are given above in favour of the abolition of luxury and the uniform distribution of all physical labour, we must mention in opposition to them the fact that the great flock of the human race necessarily needs, everywhere and at all times, leaders, guides, and counsellors in many different guises according to the affairs in, question, such as judges, governors, military commanders, officials, priests, physicians, scholars, philosophers, and so on. All these have the task of leading through the labyrinth of life this race which for the most part is exceedingly incapable and perverse. Therefore according to his position and abilities, each has obtained a general view of the race in a narrower or broader horizon. Now it is natural and reasonable that these leaders be left free from all common needs or discomfort, and also from physical labour; in fact, in accordance with their much greater achievements, they should possess and enjoy more than does the ordinary man. Even wholesale merchants should be included in that exempted class of leaders in so far as they make farsighted preparations in meeting the nation's needs.
§ 126
The question concerning the sovereignty of the people turns at bottom on whether anyone can originally have the right to rule a nation against its will. I do not see how this can be reasonably maintained; and so the people or nation is certainly sovereign; yet it is a sovereign for ever under age which must, therefore, be under a permanent guardian and can never itself exercise its rights without creating infinite dangers, especially as it very easily becomes, like all minors, the sport of cunning swindlers and sharpers, who for that reason are called demagogues.
Voltaire says:
[quote]Le premier qui fut roi, fut un soldat heureux. [10][/quote]
Originally, of course, all princes were certainly victorious army commanders and for a long time really ruled in that capacity. After they had standing armies, they regarded the people as a means to support themselves and their soldiers, and consequently as a herd of sheep to be tended, so that they would provide wool, milk, and meat. This is due to the fact that (as will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraph) naturally and thus originally might, not right, rules on earth, and that the former has the advantage over the latter of the jus primi occupantis. [11] Therefore might can never be annulled and actually abolished from the world, but must always have its place. All that we can desire and demand is that it will always be on the side of, and associated with, right. Accordingly, the prince says: 'I rule over you by authority; but in respect thereof my authority excludes every other, for, beside my own, I shall not tolerate any other either from without or from within through one of you trying to oppress the other; and so be satisfied with my authority.' Just because this was carried out, something quite different developed in the course of time out of kingship and that notion retreated into the background where it is still occasionally seen floating past like a ghost. Thus in its place has come the notion of a national father and the king has become the firm and unshakable pillar on which alone the whole of law and order and hence the rights of all are supported and thus maintained.* But the king can achieve this only by virtue of his inborn prerogative. This gives him and him alone an authority which is not equaled by any other, which cannot be questioned or challenged, and which everyone instinctively obeys. He is, therefore, rightly called 'by the grace of God' and is at all times the most useful person in the State whose services can never be adequately repaid by any civil list, however heavy.
But even Machiavelli started so definitely from the earlier medieval conception of the prince that, regarding the matter as self-evident, he did not discuss it, but tacitly assumed it and based all his advice thereon. In general, his book is merely the practice prevailing at the time which was reduced to theory and systematically and consistently expounded therein. In this novel, theoretical, and perfected form, it then gains an extremely piquant appearance. Incidentally, this also applies to the immortal little book of La Rochefoucauld, whose theme, however, is private life, not public, and who gives observations, not advice. Perhaps some might object to the title of this admirable little book; its contents are, in the main, not maximes or reflexions, but apervus; and therefore they should be so called. Moreover, even in Machiavelli there is also to be found much that applies to private life.
§ 127
In itself right is powerless; by nature might rules. The problem of statesmanship is to associate might with right so that, by means of the former, the latter may rule. And a hard problem it is when we bear in mind what boundless egoism is to be found in almost every human breast, associated in most cases with an accumulated store of hatred and malice, so that originally [x], [12] far outweighs [x]. [13] Moreover, it is many millions of individuals so constituted who are to be kept within the bounds of law, order, and peace, whereas originally everyone has the right to say to everyone else: 'I am just as good as you!' If we consider all this, it must surprise us that, on the whole, the world pursues its course with such peace and quiet, law and order, as we see. This, of course, is brought about solely by the State machine. For only physical force can always have an immediate effect, since only this impresses and instils respect in people, constituted as they normally are. If, to convince ourselves of this through experience, we once tried to remove all compulsion and to urge people most clearly and emphatically to be reasonable, just, and fair-minded, but to act contrary to their interests, then the impotence of merely moral force would be obvious, and in most cases only a mocking laugh would be the answer to Our attempt. Therefore physical force alone is capable of securing respect; but such force is found originally with the masses, where it is associated with ignorance, stupidity, and injustice. Accordingly, in such difficult circumstances, the primary task of statesmanship is to subject physical force to intelligence and mental superiority, and to make it serve these. If, however, this intelligence itself is not accompanied by justice and good intentions, then, where it succeeds, the result is that the State so established consists of deceivers and deceived. But this gradually comes to light through progress in the intelligence of the masses, however much it may be impeded, and then leads to a revolution. On the other hand, if this intelligence is accompanied by justice and good intentions, then the result is a State that is perfect so far as human affairs generally are concerned. It is very useful for this purpose, if justice and good intentions not only exist, but are also demonstrable and openly exhibited and are, therefore, subject to public account and control. Nevertheless, care must here be taken that, through the resultant participation of several men, the central power of the whole State, with which it has to act in home and foreign affairs, does not lose in concentration and force, as is almost invariably the case in republics. Accordingly, the supreme task of statesmanship is to satisfy all these requirements through the form of the State. Yet in point of fact, it has also to consider the given people with their national peculiarities. This is the raw material whose nature will, therefore, always have a great influence on the completeness of the work.
It will always be a great thing if statesmanship solves its problem to the extent of reducing to a minimum wrong and ijustice in the community. To dispose of these entirely without leaving a trace is merely the ideal aim that can be reached only approximately. Thus if they are cast out in one direction, they creep back in another; for unrighteousness and injustice are in human nature deep-rooted. Attempts are made to reach that goal by the artificial form of the constitution and the perfection of legislation; yet they remain an asymptote simply because fixed concepts never exhaust all the particular cases and cannot be brought down to the individual. For such concepts resemble the stones of a mosaic, not the delicate brushwork of a painting. Moreover, all experiments here are dangerous since we have to deal with the most difficult material, the human race. To handle it is almost as dangerous as handling a fulminating high explosive. In this respect, the freedom of the press is certainly for the state machine what the safety-valve is for the steam-engine. For by means of it, every dissatisfaction is at once ventilated in words and such grievance is soon exhausted if in it there is not very much substance. If, however, there is, then such ventilation is a good thing and enables the matter to be known in time and to be put right. This is very much better than forcing down the grievance so that it simmers, ferments, expands, and finally ends in an explosion. On the other hand, the freedom of the press may nevertheless be regarded as a permission to sell poison, poison for the heart and mind. For what is there that cannot be put into the heads of the masses who lack knowledge and judgement, especially if we pretend that there are for them gains and advantages? And when something has been put into a man's head, what outrage is there which he is not capable of committing? And so I am very much afraid that the dangers of a free press outweigh its advantages, especially where there are legal ways of dealing with complaints and grievances. But in any case, a condition of such freedom should be the strictest prohibition of each and every anonymity.
Generally speaking, one might even advance the hypothesis that the nature of right is analogous to that of certain chemical substances. These cannot be exhibited pure and isolated, but at most only with a small admixture that serves as a vehicle for them or gives them the necessary consistency, such as, for example, fluorine, even alcohol, prussic acid, and many others. Accordingly, if it is to gain a footing in the world of reality and even prevail, right necessarily needs a small addition of arbitrary force and might so that, in spite of its merely ideal and thus ethereal nature, it may be able to operate and exist in this real and material world without evaporating and vanishing into the sky, as happens with Hesiod. All birthright, all privileges through inheritance, every national religion, and many other things, may be regarded as such a necessary chemical base or alloy; since only on an arbitrarily established foundation of this kind could right be enforced and consistently carried into effect. Such a foundation would thus be, so to speak, the [x] [14] of right.
The artificial and arbitrarily chosen plant-system of Linnaeus cannot be replaced by a natural one, however much such a system accorded with reason and frequently as the attempt may have been made, because such a system never affords us the certainty and firmness of definition possessed by the artificial and arbitrary. In the same way, the artificial and arbitrary basis of the constitution of the State, as previously referred to, cannot be replaced by a purely natural one. Doing away with the aforesaid conditions, such a natural basis would try to put the privileges of personal merit in place of those of birth, the results of rational investigation in place of the national religion, and so on. Thus however much all this accorded with reason, it would still lack that certainty and firmness of definition which alone ensure the stability of the community. A state constitution that embodied abstract right would be an excellent thing for natures other than human. But since the great majority are extremely egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes even wicked; and since, in addition, they are endowed with very meagre intelligence, there arises from this the necessity of a power which is concentrated in one man, is itself above all law and right, and is wholly irresponsible; a power to which all submit and which is regarded as something of a higher order, a ruler by the grace of God. In the long run, only in this way can mankind be curbed and governed.
On the other hand, we see in the United States of America the attempt to manage entirely without any such arbitrary foundation and thus to let abstract right rule, pure and unalloyed. But the result is not attractive; for, in spite of all the material prosperity in the country, we there find as the prevailing attitude sordid utilitarianism with ignorance as its inevitable companion which has paved the way to stupid Anglican bigotry, shallow conceit, and coarse brutality, in combination with a silly veneration of women. And in that country even worse things are the order of the day, such as revolting Negro slavery coupled with the utmost cruelty to the slaves, the most iniquitous suppression of the free blacks, lynch-law, assassination frequent and often unpunished, duels of unprecedented brutality, sometimes open ridicule of all rights and laws, repudiation of public debts, shocking political defrauding of a neighbouring state followed by predatory incursions into its rich territory. Such raids had then to be covered up by the highest authorities with lies that were known as such and laughed at by everyone in the country. Then there is the ever-growing ochlocracy, and finally we have all the pernicious influence which the above-mentioned denial of integrity in high places is bound to exercise on private morality. And so this specimen of a pure constitution of right on the other side of the planet says very little in favour of republics, but even less do those imitations of it to be found in Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru. A special and paradoxical disadvantage of republics is that in them it is bound to be more difficult for men of superior intellect to gain high positions and thus reach direct political influence than it is in monarchies. For always, everywhere, and in all circumstances, all those with narrow, feeble, and vulgar minds are at once in league or instinctively united against men of superior intellect and regard them as their natural foe; they are firmly held together by their common fear of such men. Now in a republican constitution the numerous host of inferior minds will easily succeed in suppressing and excluding those of superior intellect in order not to be outflanked by them. And in spite of all having equal original rights, men of inferior ability outnumber the others by fifty to one. In a monarchy, on the other hand, this natural and universal league of the narrow-minded against those of superior intellect is one-sided and thus only from below; whereas from above, mental ability and talent are naturally supported and protected. For in the first place, the monarch himself is far too high and firmly established, to be frightened by competition from anyone else. Then he himself serves the State more by his will than by his intellect; for the latter can never be equal to so many claims and demands. He must, therefore, always make use of the brains of others; and, seeing that his interests are firmly bound up with those of his country and are inseparable from and identical with them, he will naturally give preference and show favour to the best because they are his most suitable instruments, that is, as soon as he has the ability to find them, which is not very difficult if only an honest search is made. In the same way, even ministers are too far ahead of junior politicians to regard them with jealousy; and so for analogous reasons, they will gladly single out and set to work men of outstanding intellect in order to make use of their powers. In this way, therefore, intellect always has in monarchies much better chances against stupidity, its implacable and ever-present foe, than it has in republics; but this is a great advantage.
In general, however, the monarchical form of government is natural to man in almost the same way as it is to bees and ants, to cranes in flight, to wandering elephants, to wolves in a pack in search of prey, and to other animals. All these place one of their number in charge of the adventure. Every human undertaking attended with danger, every military campaign, every ship, must obey one commander; one will must everywhere be the leader. Even the animal organism is constructed monarchically; the brain alone is the guide and governor, the [x]. Although heart, lungs, and stomach contribute much more to the continued existence of the whole, these Philistines cannot for that reason guide and direct. This is the business of the brain alone and must proceed from one point. Even the system of planets is monarchical. On the other hand, the republican system is as unnatural to man as it is unfavourable to higher intellectual life and thus to the arts and sciences. In accordance with all this, we find everywhere in the world and at all times that nations have always been governed monarchically, whether they were civilized or savage or something between the two.
[quote] [x] [x]. [15]
-- Iliad, II. 204-5.[/quote]
How would it be possible at all for us to see many millions and even hundreds of millions, everywhere and at all times, the willing and obedient subjects of one man, or even occasionally of a woman, and provisionally even of a child, if there were not in man a monarchical instinct that urged him to that which is proper and suitable? For this is not the result of reflection; everywhere one man is the king and, as a rule, his dignity is hereditary. He is, so to speak, the personification or monogram of the whole people who in him attain individuality. In this sense he can rightly say: l'etat c'est moi. [16] For this reason, we see in Shakespeare's historical dramas the kings of England and France address each other as France and England, and also the Duke of Austria use the word Austria (King John, Act III, Sc. I), regarding themselves, so to speak, as the incarnation of their nationalities. This is precisely in accordance with human nature and therefore the hereditary monarch cannot possibly separate the welfare of himself and his family from that of the country, as is the case, on the other hand, with those who are elected, in the States of the Church for instance. The Chinese can conceive of only a monarchical government; they simply do not understand what a republic is. When a Dutch legation was in China in 1658, it was obliged to represent the Prince of Orange as its king; otherwise the Chinese would have been inclined to regard Holland as a nest of pirates living without a lord or master. (See Jean Nieuhoff, L'Ambassade de La compagnie orientale des Provinces unies vers l' Empereur de La Chine, translated by Jean le Charpentier, Leiden, 1665, chap. 45.) Stobaeus headed a chapter of his own with the words: on [x]. [17] (Florilegium, tit. 47; vol. ii, pp. 256-63), and in it he collected the best passages from the ancients wherein the advantages of the monarchy are explained. Republics are unnatural and artificial productions and have sprung from reflection; and so in the whole history of the world they occur only as rare exceptions. Thus there were the small republics of Greece, Rome, and Carthage which were all conditioned by the fact that five-sixths, or perhaps even seven-eighths, of the population consisted of slaves. Even in 1840, the United States of America had three million slaves to a population of sixteen millions. Moreover, the duration of the republics of antiquity was very short compared with that of monarchies. Republics generally are easy to establish, but difficult to maintain; with monarchies the very reverse is true.
If we want Utopian plans, then I say that the only solution to the problem is a despotism of the wise and noble, of a genuine aristocracy and true nobility, attained on the path of generation by a union between the noblest men and the cleverest and most brilliant women. This is my idea of Utopia, my Republic of Plato.
Constitutional kings undoubtedly resemble the gods of Epicurus who, without meddling in human affairs, sit up in their heaven in undisturbed bliss and serenity. They have now become the fashion, and in every petty German principality a parody of the English constitution is set up, complete with Upper and Lower Houses down to the Habeas Corpus Act and trial by jury. Proceeding from the English character and English circumstances and presupposing both, these forms are natural and appropriate to the English people. But it is just as natural for the German people to be divided into many branches under as many actually ruling princes, with an emperor over them all who maintains peace at home and represents the unity of the State abroad. These things are natural to the Germans because they have proceeded from the German character and German circumstances. I am of the opinion that, if Germany is not to meet with the fate of Italy, she must restore as effectively as possible the imperial dignity that was abolished by her archenemy, the first Bonaparte. For German unity is bound up with it, and without it will always be only nominal or precarious. But since we no longer live in the times of Gunther of Schwarzburg when the choice of an emperor was a serious business, the imperial throne should pass alternately to Austria and Prussia for the duration of the emperor's life. In any case, the absolute sovereignty of small states is illusory. Napoleon I did for Germany precisely what Otto the Great did for Italy (see Annotazione alla secchia rapita); that is to say, he divided it into small and independent states on the principle of divide et imperia. [18] The English show their great judgement in their sticking firmly and religiously to their ancient institutions, customs, and usages, even at the risk of carrying such tenacity to excess and making it ridiculous. They do so just because such things are not hatched out of an idle head, but have come gradually from the force of circumstances and the wisdom of life itself and are, therefore, suited to them as a nation. On the other hand, the German Fritz allows himself to be persuaded by his schoolmaster that he must go about in an English tailcoat and that nothing else will do. Accordingly, he bullies his father into giving him one and then looks ridiculous enough in it with his awkward manners and stiff nature. But the tail-coat will be for him too tight and uncomfortable, and indeed all too soon when he sits on a jury. Trial by jury came from the most barbarous English Middle Ages, from the times of Alfred the Great, when the ability to read and write still exempted a man from the death-penalty.* It is the worst of all criminal courts where, instead of learned and experienced judges who have grown grey in the daily unravelling of the tricks and dodges of thieves, murderers, and scoundrels and have thus learnt how to get on to the track of things, gaping tailors and shoemakers are to be found. It is hoped to find out the truth from the deceptive tissue of lies and pretence with the aid of their coarse, crude, unpractised, and dull intellect which is not even accustomed to any sustained attention, whereas all the time they are thinking of their cloth and leather and are anxious to get home. They have absolutely no clear idea of the difference between probability and certainty; on the contrary, they set up in their stupid heads a kind of calculus probabilium [19] whereby they then confidently condemn others to death. The remarks are applicable to them which Samuel Johnson made about a court-martial that had been convened to settle an important matter. He had little confidence in it and said that possibly not one of its members had ever in his life spent one hour by himself in balancing probabilities. (Boswell, Life of Johnson, ann. 1780, aetat. 71.) But does anyone suppose that tailors and shoemakers would be really impartial? The malignum vulgus [20] impartial? As if partiality and bias were not to be feared ten times more from those ofthe same class as the accused than from criminal judges who are complete strangers to him, live in an entirely different sphere, enjoy security of tenure, and are conscious of the dignity of their office. But now to allow crimes against the State and its head and also offences against the press laws to be tried by jury, is really like setting a thief to catch a thief.
§ 128
Everywhere and at all times, there has been much discontent with governments, laws, and public institutions, but for the most part only because we are always ready to make these responsible for the misery that is inseparably bound up with human existence itself. For mythically speaking, it is the curse that was laid on Adam and through him on his whole race. But never has that false delusion been made more mendaciously and impudently than by the demagogues of the Jetztzeit. [21] Thus as the enemies of Christianity, such men are optimists; to them the world is an end in itself, and so in itself, that is, according to its natural constitution, is admirably arranged and a veritable abode of bliss. On the other hand, they attribute entirely to governments the crying and colossal evils of the world. They think that, if only governments did their duty, there would be a heaven on earth, in other words, that all could gorge, guzzle, propagate, and die without effort and anxiety. For this is the paraphrase of their 'end in itself'; this is the goal of the 'endless progress of mankind' which they are never tired of proclaiming in pompous phrases.
§ 129
Formerly the mainstay of the throne was faith; today it is credit. The Pope himself may hardly attach more importance to the confidence of the faithful than to that of his creditors. If in former times men deplored the guilt of the world, they now look with dismay on the debts of the world; just as formerly they prophesied the Day of Judgement, so they now prophesy the great [x], [22] universal State bankruptcy, confidently hoping, however, that they themselves will not live to see it.
§ 130
It is true that, ethically and rationally, the right of possession has an incomparably better foundation than has the right if birth. Yet the right of possession is akin to and part of that of birth; and hence it would hardly be possible to cut away the latter without endangering the former. The reason for this is that most property is inherited and is, therefore, a kind of birthright; just as the old nobility bears only the name of the family estate and so through this expresses merely its possession. Accordingly, if all owners of property were prudent instead of envious, they would also support the maintenance of the rights of birth.
Therefore the nobility, as such, afford a double advantage, namely by helping to support the right of possession on the one hand, and the birthright of the king on the other. For the king is the first nobleman in the land and, as a rule, treats a nobleman as a humble relation, a treatment that is quite different from that shown to a commoner, however much he may be trusted. It is also quite natural for him to have more confidence in those whose ancestors were in most cases the first ministers and always the closest associates of his own. And so a nobleman rightly appeals to his name when, in the case of anything arousing suspicion, he repeats the assurance of his loyalty and devotion to his king. As my readers know, the character is certainly inherited from the father; and so it is narrow-minded and ridiculous to show no interest in whose son a man is.
§ 131
With rare exceptions, all women are inclined to be extravagant; and so every existing fortune must be protected from their folly, except in those rare cases where they themselves have earned it. For this very reason, I am of the opinion that women never grow up entirely and should always be under the actual care of a man, whether of a father, husband, son, or the State, as is the case in India. Accordingly, they should never be able to dispose arbitrarily of any property that they themselves have not earned. On the other hand, I regard it as unpardonable and pernicious folly to let a mother become even the appointed trustee and administratrix of her children's share of the father's inheritance. In most cases, such a woman will squander on her paramour all that the father of the children has earned out of consideration for them by the labour and industry of his whole life. It will be all the same whether or not she marries the man. Homer gives us this warning:
[quote] [x] [x] [x] [x]
-- Odyssey, xv. 20-3.[/quote]
After the death of her husband, the actual mother often becomes a stepmother. Yet in general it is only stepmothers and not stepfathers who have such a bad reputation which has given rise to the word 'stepmotherly'; [24] whereas there has never been any mention of stepfatherly. Even in the time of Herodotus (lib. IV, c. 154), stepmothers had that reputation; and they have managed to retain it ever since. At all events, a woman always needs a guardian and should, therefore, never herself be one. But generally a wife who has not been fond of her husband will not have any affection for the children she has had by him, that is to say, after the maternal love has passed which is merely instinctive and is therefore not to be credited to her moral qualities. Further, I am of the opinion that in a court of law a woman's evidence, caeteris paribus, [25] should carry less weight than a man's so that, for example, two male witnesses would carry the same weight as three or even four female. For I believe that, taken as a whole, the female sex in a day spouts three times as many lies as does the male, and moreover with a show of plausibility and frankness which is quite beyond the reach of the male. The Mohammedans, of course, go too far in the other direction. A young educated Turk once said to me: 'We regard woman merely as the soil in which the seed is sown; and hence her religion is a matter of indifference. We can marry a Christian without requiring that she be converted.' When I asked him whether dervishes were married, he replied: 'Of course they are; the Prophet was married and they cannot hope to be holier than he.'
Would it not be better if there were no days of rest at all, but as many more hours of rest instead? What a wholesome effect the sixteen hours of a tedious and therefore dangerous Sunday would have if twelve of them were divided among all the weekdays! Two hours on Sunday would always be enough for religious worship and more is hardly ever given to it, still less to devout meditation. The ancients had no weekly day of rest. But, of course, it would be very difficult actually to keep for the people these daily two hours of leisure that are purchased in this way and to protect them from interference.
§ 132
Ahasuerus, the wandering Jew, is nothing but the personification of the whole Jewish race. Since he sinned grievously against the Saviour and World-Redeemer, he shall never be delivered from earthly existence and its burden and moreover shall wander homeless in foreign lands. This is just the flight and fate of the small Jewish race which, strange to relate, was driven from its native land some two thousand years ago and has ever since existed and wandered homeless. On the other hand, many great and illustrious nations with which this pettifogging little nation cannot possibly be compared, such as the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Phoenicians, Egyptians, Etruscans and others have passed to eternal rest and entirely disappeared. And so even today, this gens extorris, [26] this John Lackland among the nations, is to be found all over the globe, nowhere at home and nowhere strangers. Moreover, it asserts its nationality with unprecedented obstinacy and, mindful of Abraham who dwelt in Canaan as a stranger but who gradually became master of the whole land, as his God had promised him (Genesis 17: 8), it would also like to set foot somewhere and take root in order to arrive once more at a country, without which, of course, a people is like a ball floating in air.* Till then, it lives parasitically on other nations and their soil; but yet it is inspired with the liveliest patriotism for its own nation. This is seen in the very firm way in which Jews stick together on the principle of each for all and all for each, so that this patriotism sine patria inspires greater enthusiasm than does any other. The rest of the Jews are the fatherland of the Jew; and so he fights for them as he would pro ara et focis, [27] and no community on earth sticks so firmly together as does this. It follows from this that it is absurd to want to concede to them a share in the government or administration of any country. Originally amalgamated and one with their state, their religion is by no means the main issue here, but rather merely the bond that holds them together, the point de ralliement, [28] and the banner whereby they recognize one another. This is also seen in the fact that even the converted Jew who has been baptized does not by any means bring upon himself the hatred and loathing of all the rest, as do all other apostates. On the contrary, he continues as a rule to be their friend and companion and to regard them as his true countrymen, naturally with a few orthodox exceptions. Even in the case of the regular and solemn Jewish prayer for which ten must be present, a Jew turned Christian, but no other Christian, may be present if one of the ten is missing. The same holds good of all the other religious acts. The case would be even clearer if Christianity were to decline and cease altogether; for then the Jews would not on that account cease to exist and to hang together as Jews, separately and by themselves. Accordingly, it is an extremely superficial and false view to regard the Jews merely as a religious sect. But if, in order to countenance this error, Judaism is described by an expression borrowed from the Christian Church as 'Jewish Confession', then this is a fundamentally false expression which is deliberately calculated to mislead and should not be allowed at all. On the contrary, 'Jewish Nation' is the correct expression. The Jews have absolutely no confession; monotheism is part of their nationality and political constitution and is with them a matter of course. Indeed it is quite clear that monotheism and Judaism are convertible terms. The fact that the well-known faults attaching to the Jewish national character, of which a surprising absence of all that is expressed by the word verecundia [29] is the most conspicuous, although this fault is far more useful in the world than is perhaps any positive quality; the fact, I say, that such faults are to be attributed mainly to the long and unjust oppression they have suffered, excuses them, it is true, but does not do away with them. I am bound to praise absolutely the rational Jew who, on giving up old myths, humbug, and prejudices by being baptized, quits an association that brings him neither honour nor advantage (although the latter occurs in exceptional cases), even if he should not take the Christian faith very seriously. For is this not the case with every young Christian who repeats his credo at his confirmation? To save him even this step, however, and to bring to an end in the gentlest manner the whole tragi-comic state of affairs, the best way is certainly for marriages to be permitted and even encouraged between Jews and Gentiles. The Church cannot object to this for there is the authority of the apostle himself (1 Corinthians 7: 12-16). Then in the course of a hundred years, there will be only a very few Jews left and soon the ghost will be exorcized. Ahasuerus will be buried and the chosen people will not know where their abode was. This desirable result, however, will be frustrated if the emancipation of the Jews is carried to the point of their obtaining political rights, and thus an interest in the administration and government of Christian countries. For then they will be and remain Jews really only con amore. Justice demands that they should enjoy with others equal civil rights; but to concede to them a share in the running of the State is absurd. They are and remain a foreign oriental race, and so must always be regarded merely as domiciled foreigners. When some twenty-five years ago the emancipation of the Jews was debated in the English Parliament, a speaker put forward the following hypothetical case. An English Jew comes to Lisbon where he meets two men in extreme want and distress; yet it is only in his power to save one of them. Personally to him they are both strangers. Yet if one of them is an Englishman but a Christian, and the other a Portuguese but a Jew, whom will he save? I do not think that any sensible Christian and any sincere Jew will be in doubt as to the answer. But it gives us some indication of the rights to be conceded to the Jews. § 133 In no affair does religion intervene so directly and obviously in practical and material life as in the oath. It is bad enough that in this way the life and property of one man are made dependent on the metaphysical convictions of another. Now if, as is to be feared, at some future date all religions were to decline and all faith to cease, how would it then be with regard to the oath? It is, therefore, worth while to inquire whether there is not a purely moral significance of the oath which is independent of all positive faith and is yet to be reduced to clear concepts, and which, as something supremely sacred in pure gold, might surpass that universal brand of the Church; although compared with the pomp and pithy language of the religious oath, it might appear to be somewhat bald and dispassionate.
The undoubted aim of the oath is to counter in a merely moral way the all-too-frequent duplicity and mendacity of man by making him vividly conscious of the moral obligation, acknowledged by him, to speak the truth, after he has been strengthened by some extraordinary consideration which here arises. I will endeavour to make clear in accordance with my ethics the purely moral sense of the emphasis of this duty, a sense that will be free from everything transcendent and mythical.
In my chief work, volume i, § 62, and in greater detail in my prize-essay' On the Basis of Ethics', § 17, I have laid down the paradoxical yet true principle that in certain cases a man is granted the right to tell a lie, and I have supported it by means of a detailed explanation and argument. Those cases are where (a) he had the right to use force against others and (b) wholly unauthorized questions were put to him framed in such a way that he would jeopardize his interests as much by refusing to answer them as by giving a straightforward reply. Just because in such cases there is undoubtedly a justification to tell a lie, it is necessary in important matters whose decision depends on a man's statement and also in promises whose fulfilment is of great importance, for him first to make an express and solemn declaration that, in this particular instance, he does not admit the existence of the above-mentioned cases; that he therefore knows and realizes that here no violence is being done to him or threatened but right prevails; likewise that he admits that the question put to him is fully authorized; and finally that he is aware that everything depends on his present statement concerning the question. This declaration implies that, ifin such circumstances a man tells a lie, he is committing a grave wrong and is clearly conscious of so doing. For now he is in the position of one in whose honesty and integrity confidence has been placed, and to whom has been given in this instance full authority which he can use equally for doing right or wrong. Now if he tells a lie, he is clearly conscious of being one who, when he has free authority, uses this with the coolest deliberation for the purpose of doing wrong. Perjury furnishes him with this testimony about himself. Now there is in addition the circumstance that, since no man is without the need for some kind of metaphysics, everyone carries the conviction, though vague, that the world has not merely a physical, but at the same time and in some way a metaphysical, significance and also that, in regard to such significance, our individual conduct, according to its merely moral aspect, has consequences quite different from, and far more important than, those accruing to it by virtue of its empirical effectiveness, and is, therefore, really of transcendent significance. I refer here to my prize-essay' On the Basis of Ethics', § 21, and merely add that the man who denies that his own conduct has any other than empirical significance, will never make the statement without feeling an inner conflict therewith and exercising self-restraint. Summoning a man to take an oath now places him explicitly in the position where he has to regard himself in this sense as a merely moral being, conscious of the extreme importance to himself of the decisions he has given in this capacity. In this way, all other considerations with him should now dwindle away to vanishing point. It is immaterial here whether the conviction, thus aroused, of a metaphysical, and at the same time moral, significance of our existence is only felt in a dull way, or is clothed and hence animated in all kinds of myths and fables, or else is brought to the clearness of philosophical thought. Again, it follows from this that, essentially, it is not a question whether the form of the oath expresses this or that mythological connection, or is entirely abstract, like the je le jure [30] that is customary in France. The form should be selected in accordance with the degree of mental development of the man who is taking the oath, just as it is chosen according to the difference of his positive belief. If the matter is considered in this way, then even the man professing no religion could very well be permitted to take an oath.
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Notes: 1 [' Simplicity is the seal of truth.'] * We see just now in China the consequences of neglecting this rule, namely, rebels from within and Europeans from without, and the greatest kingdom in the world is unarmed and defenceless and must pay the penalty for having cultivated only the arts of peace and not also those of war. Between the operations of creative nature and those of man there is a characteristic analogy which is not accidental, but depends on the identity of the will in both. After the animals that live on plants had made their appearance in the whole of animal nature, there appeared in each animal class the beasts of prey, necessarily last of all, for the purpose of living on those others. Now in the same way, after men have won from the soil honestly and by the sweat of their brows what is necessary for the sustenance of a nation, there always appear some who, instead of cultivating the soil and living on its produce, prefer to take their lives in their hands and gamble with their health and freedom in order to set upon those who are in possession of property honestly acquired and to appropriate the fruits of their labour. These beasts of prey of the human race are the conquering nations whom we see appear everywhere, from the most ancient times to the most modern, with varying fortune. For their successes and failures generally furnish us with the material of the history of the world. Voltaire is, therefore, quite right when he says: Dans toutes les guerres il ne s' agit que de voler. [' In all wars it is only a question of stealing.'] That they are ashamed of the whole business is clear from the fact that every government loudly asserts its unwillingness to resort to arms except for the purpose of self-defence.
2 [' Each has as much right as he has power ... everyone's right is determined by the power he has.']
3 ['Do not to another what you do not wish should be done to you.'] 4 ['Do to another what you do not wish should be done to you.']
5 ['One bound to the soil' (cf. p. 69-70).]
6 ['It is much better to serve a good master than to live as a free man in misery and meanness.']
7 ['One piece of good advice often achieves greater advantage than does the work of many hands.']
8 [Curiosities of Literature.]
9 ['The arts mitigate manners and customs.']
10 ['The first king was a successful soldier.']
11 ['The right of first occupation.']
* Stobaeus, Florilegium, tit. 44, 41 (vol. ii, p. 201, ed. Gaisford):
[x] ['When a king died, it was the custom of the Persians to have anarchy for five days so that the people would see how valuable were the king and the law.']
12 ['Quarrel'.]
13 ['Love'.]
14 ['Give me a foothold (and I shall move the earth).' (A saying of Archimedes.)] 15 ['Government by many is not a good thing; there should be only one ruler, one king.'] 16 ['I am the State.']
17 ['On monarchy being the best thing.'] * German lawyers state that, under the Anglo-Saxon kings, there was still no jury in the proper sense, nor was there one under the first Norman kings; but that it was gradually perfected and first appeared as we know it between the reigns of Edward III and Henry IV.
18 ['Set at variance and rule.']
19 ['Theory or calculus of probabilities'.]
20 ['Spiteful mob.']
21 ['Of the present time' (Schopenhauer purposely used this expression by way of condemning cacophonous words to which he drew attention in his essay on the mutilation of the German language).]
22 ['Repudiation of debts'.]
23 ['Know what kind of a disposition dwells in woman's heart. She will add only to the house of the man with whom she lives. When he is dead, she thinks no longer of her children or of the consort of her youth and does not inquire about him.']
24 [The German stiefmutterlich means also grudging, niggard.]
25 ['Other things being equal'.]
* In the Old Testament, Numbers 13 ff. and Deuteronomy 2, we have an instructive example of the course of events in the gradual population of the earth, namely of the way in which mobile hordes who had emigrated sought to displace people already domiciled and occupied the good land. The latest step of this kind was the migration if population or rather conquest of America, in fact the continuous driving back of the American aboriginals. We see it also in Australia. The role of the Jews in their settling in the Promised Land and that of the Romans in settling in Italy is essentially the same, namely that of a people who had immigrated and continually made war on their former neighbours, finally subduing them; only that the Romans carried their conquests incomparably further than did the Jews.
26 ['Refugee race'.]
27 ['For hearth and home'.]
28 ['Rallying-point'.]
29 ['Modesty, shyness'.] 30 ['I swear on oath'.]
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