[b]15: THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT[/b]

 

 

THE "TELEGRAM FROM MOSCOW" whose contents Hitler disclosed to Ciano at Obersalzberg on the afternoon of August 12 appears to have been, like certain previous "telegrams" which have figured in this narrative, of doubtful origin. No such wire from the Russian capital has been found in the German archives. Schulenburg did send a telegram to Berlin from Moscow on the twelfth, but it merely reported the arrival of the Franco-British military missions and the friendly toasts exchanged between the Russians and their guests.

 

Yet there was some basis for the "telegram" with which Hitler and Ribbentrop had so obviously tried to impress Ciano. On August 12 a teleprint was sent to Obersalzberg from the Wilhelmstrasse reporting the results of a call which the Russian charge had made on Schnurre in Berlin on that day. Astakhov informed the Foreign Office official that Molotov was now ready to discuss the questions raised by the Germans, including Poland and other political matters. The Soviet government proposed Moscow as the place of these negotiations. But, Astakhov made it clear, they were not to be hurried. He stressed, Schnurre noted in his report, which apparently was rushed to Obersalzberg, "that the chief emphasis in his instructions from Molotov lay in the phrase 'by degrees' ... The discussions could be undertaken only by degrees." [1]

 

But Adolf Hitler could not wait for negotiations with Russia "by degrees." As he had just revealed to a shocked Ciano, he had set the last possible date for the onslaught on Poland for September 1, and it was now almost the middle of August. If he were to successfully sabotage the Anglo-French parleys with the Russians and swing his own deal with Stalin, it had to be done quickly -- not by stages but in one big leap.

 

Monday, August 14, was another crucial day. While Ambassador von der Schulenburg, who obviously had not yet been taken fully into the confidence of Hitler and Ribbentrop, was writing Weizsaecker from Moscow advising him that Molotov was "a strange man and a difficult character" and that "I am still of the opinion that any hasty measures in our relations with the Soviet Union should be avoided," he was being sent a "most urgent" telegram from Berlin.2 It came from Ribbentrop and it was dispatched from the Wilhelmstrasse (the Foreign Minister was still at Fuschl) at 10:53 P.M. on August 14. It directed the German ambassador to call upon Molotov and read him a long communication "verbatim."

 

This, finally, was Hitler's great bid. German-Russian relations, said Ribbentrop, had "come to a historic turning point ... There exist no real conflicts of interests between Germany and Russia ... It has gone well with both countries previously when they were friends and badly when they were enemies."

 

[quote]The crisis which has been produced in Polish-German relations by English policy [Ribbentrop continued] and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with that policy, make a speedy clarification of German-Russian relations necessary. Otherwise matters ... might take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Russian friendship and in due course clarifying jointly territorial questions in Eastern Europe. The leadership of both countries, therefore, should not allow the situation to drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be fatal if, through mutual ignorance of views and intentions, the two peoples should finally drift apart.[/quote]

 

The German Foreign Minister, "in the name of the Fuehrer," was therefore prepared to act in proper time.

 

[quote]As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also feel the desire for a clarification of German-Russian relations. Since, however, according to previous experience this clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual diplomatic channels, I am prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the name of the Fuehrer, to set forth the Fuehrer's views to M. Stalin. In my view, only through such a direct discussion can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German-Russian relations.[/quote]

 

The British Foreign Secretary had not been willing to go to Moscow, but now the German Foreign Minister was not only willing but anxious to go -- a contrast which the Nazis calculated quite correctly would make an impression on the suspicious Stalin. [i] The Germans saw that it was highly important to get their message through to the Russian dictator himself. Ribbentrop therefore added an "annex" to his urgent telegram.

 

[quote]I request [Ribbentrop advised Schulenburg] that you do not give M. Molotov these instructions in writing, but that they reach M. Stalin in as exact a form as possible and I authorize you, if the occasion arises, to request from M. Molotov on my behalf an audience with M. Stalin, so that you may be able to make this important communication directly to him also. In addition to a conference with Molotov, a detailed discussion with Stalin would be a condition for my making the trip. [3][/quote]

 

There was a scarcely disguised bait in the Foreign Minister's proposal which the Germans, not without reason, must have thought the Kremlin would rise to. Reiterating that "there is no question between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both counties," Ribbentrop specified "the Baltic States, Poland, southeastern questions, etc." And he spoke of the necessity of "clarifying jointly territorial questions of Eastern Europe."

 

Germany was ready to divide up Eastern Europe, including Poland, with the Soviet Union. This was a bid which Britain and France could not -- and, obviously, if they could, would not -- match. And having made it, Hitler, apparently confident that it would not be turned down, once more -- on the same day, August 14 -- called in the commanders in chief of his armed forces to listen to him lecture on the plans and prospects for war.

 

[b]THE MILITARY CONFERENCE AT OBERSALZBERG: AUGUST 14 [ii][/b]

 

"The great drama," Hitler told his select listeners, "is now approaching its climax." While political and military successes could not be had without taking risks, he was certain that Great Britain and France would not fight. For one thing, Britain "has no leaders of real caliber. The men I got to know at Munich are not the kind that start a new world war." As at previous meetings with his military chiefs, the Fuehrer could not keep his mind off England and he spoke in considerable detail of her strengths and weaknesses, especially the latter.

 

[quote]England [Halder noted down the words], unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war lasting for years ... Such is the fate of rich countries. Not even England has the money nowadays to fight a world war. What should England fight for? You don't get yourself killed for an ally.[/quote]

 

What military measures, Hitler asked, could Britain and France undertake?

 

[quote]Drive against the West Wall unlikely [he answered]. A northward swing through Belgium and Holland will not bring speedy victory. None of this would help the Poles.

 

All these factors argue against England and France entering the war ... There is nothing to force them into it. The men of Munich will not take the risk ... English and French general staffs take a very sober view of the prospects of an armed conflict and advise against it....

 

All this supports the conviction that while England may talk big, even recall her Ambassador, perhaps put a complete embargo on trade, she is sure not to resort to armed intervention in the conflict.[/quote]

 

So Poland, probably, could be taken on alone, but she would have to be defeated "within a week or two," Hitler explained, so that the world could be convinced of her collapse and not try to save her.

 

Hitler was not quite ready to tell his generals just how far he was going that very day to make a deal with Russia, though it would have immensely pleased them, convinced as they were that Germany could not fight a major war on two fronts. But he told them enough to whet their appetite for more.

 

"Russia," he said, "is not in the least disposed to pull chestnuts out of the fire." He explained the "loose contacts" with Moscow which had started with the trade negotiations. He was now considering whether "a negotiator should go to Moscow and whether this should be a prominent figure." The Soviet Union, he declared, felt under no obligation to the West. The Russians understood the destruction of Poland. They were interested in a "delimitation of spheres of interest." The Fuehrer was "inclined to meet them halfway."

 

In all of Halder's voluminous shorthand notes on the meeting there is no mention that he, the Chief of the Army's General Staff, or General von Brauchitsch, its Commander in Chief, or Goering questioned the Fuehrer's course in leading Germany into a European conflict -- for despite Hitler's confidence it was by no means certain that France and Britain would not fight nor that Russia would stay out. In fact, exactly a week before, Goering had received a direct warning that the British would certainly fight if Germany attacked Poland.

 

Early in July a Swedish friend of his, Birger Dahlerus, had tried to convince rum that British public opinion would not stand for further Nazi aggression and when the Luftwaffe chief expressed his doubts had arranged for him to meet privately with a group of seven British businessmen on August 7 in Schleswig-Holstein, near the Danish border, where Dahlerus had a house. The British businessmen, both orally and in a written memorandum, did their best to persuade Goering that Great Britain would stand by its treaty obligations with Poland should Germany attack. Whether they succeeded is doubtful, though DaWerus, a businessman himself, thought so. [iii] This curious Swede, who was to playa certain role as a peacemaker between Germany and Britain in the next hectic weeks, certainly had high connections in Berlin and London. He had access to Downing Street, where on July 20 he had been received by Lord Halifax, with whom he discussed the coming meeting of British businessmen with Goering; and soon he would be called in by Hitler and Chamberlain themselves. But, though well-meaning in his quest to save the peace, he was naive and, as a diplomat, dreadfully amateurish. Years later at Nuremberg, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in a devastating cross-examination, led the Swedish diplomatic interloper to admit sadly that he had been badly misled by Goering and Hitler. [4]

 

And why did not General Halder, who had been the ringleader in the plot eleven months before to remove Hitler, speak up on August 14 to oppose the Fuehrer's determination to go to war? Or, if he thought that useless, why did he not renew plans to get rid of the dictator on the same grounds as just before Munich: that a war now would be disastrous for Germany? Much later, in his interrogation at Nuremberg, Halder would explain that even at mid-August 1939 he simply did not believe that Hitler would, in the end, risk war, regardless of what he said.5 Also, a diary entry of August 15, the day after the meeting with Hitler at the Berghof, shows that Halder did not believe that France and Britain would risk war either.

 

As for Brauchitsch, he was not the man to question what the Fuehrer planned to do. Hassell, who on August 15 learned of the military conference at the Obersalzberg from Gisevius, got word through to the Army chief that he was "absolutely convinced" that Britain and France would intervene if Germany invaded Poland. "Nothing can be done with him," Hassell noted sadly in his diary. "Either he is afraid or he doesn't understand what it is all about... . Nothing is to be hoped for from the generals ... Only a few have kept clear heads: Halder, Canaris, Thomas." [6]

 

Only General Thomas, the brilliant head of the Economic and Armaments Branch of OKW, dared to openly challenge the Fuehrer. A few days after the August 14 military conference, following a discussion with the now largely inactive conspirators Goerdeler, Beck and Schacht, General Thomas drew up a memorandum and personally read it to General Keitel, the Chief of OKW. A quick war and a quick peace were a complete illusion, he argued. An attack on Poland would unleash a world war and Germany lacked the raw materials and the food supplies to fight it. But Keitel, whose only ideas were those he absorbed from Hitler, scoffed at the very idea of a big war. Britain was too decadent, France too degenerate, America too uninterested, to fight for Poland, he said. [7]

 

And so as the second half of August 1939 began, the German military chiefs pushed forward with their plans to annihilate Poland and to protect the western Reich just in case the democracies, contrary to all evidence, did intervene. On August 15 the annual Nuremberg Party Rally, which Hitler on April I had proclaimed as the "Party Rally of Peace" and which was scheduled to begin the first week in September, was secretly canceled. A quarter of a million men were called up for the armies of the west. Advance mobilization orders to the railways were given. Plans were made to move Army headquarters to Zossen, east of Berlin. And on the same day, August 15, the Navy reported that the pocket battleships Graf Spee and Deutschland and twenty-one submarines were ready to sail for their stations in the Atlantic.

 

On August 17 General Halder made a strange entry in his diary: "Canaris checked with Section I [Operations]. Himmler, Heydrich, Obersalzberg: 150 Polish uniforms with accessories for Upper Silesia."

 

What did it mean? It was only after the war that it became clear. It concerned one of the most bizarre incidents ever arranged by the Nazis. Just as Hitler and his Army chiefs, it will be remembered, had considered cooking up an "incident," such as the assassination of the German minister, in order to justify their invading Austria and Czechoslovakia, so now they concerned themselves, as time began to run out, with concocting an incident which would, at least in their opinion, justify before the world the planned aggression against Poland.

 

The code name was "Operation Himmler" and the idea was quite simple -- and crude. The S.S. -- Gestapo would stage a faked attack on the German radio station at Gleiwitz, near the Polish border, using condemned concentration camp inmates outfitted in Polish Army uniforms. Thus Poland could be blamed for attacking Germany. Early in August Admiral Canaris, chief of the Abwehr Section of OKW, had received an order from Hitler himself to deliver to Himmler and Heydrich 150 Polish uniforms and some Polish small arms. This struck him as a strange business and on August 17 he asked General Keitel about it. While the spineless OKW Chief declared he did not think much of "actions of this kind," he nevertheless told the Admiral that "nothing could be done," since the order had come from the Fuehrer. [8] Repelled though he was, Canaris obeyed his instructions and turned the uniforms over to Heydrich.

 

The chief of the S.D. chose as the man to carry out the operation a young S.S. secret-service veteran by the name of Alfred Helmut Naujocks. This was not the first of such assignments given this weird individual nor would it be the last. Early in March of 1939, shortly before the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, Naujocks, at Heydrich's instigation, had busied himself running explosives into Slovakia, where they were used, as he later testified, to "create incidents."

 

Alfred Naujocks was a typical product of the S.S.-Gestapo, a sort of intellectual gangster. He had studied engineering at Kiel University, where he got his first taste of brawling with anti-Nazis; on one occasion he had his nose bashed in by Communists. He had joined the S.S. in 1931 and was attached to the S.D. from its inception in 1934. Like so many other young men around Heydrich he dabbled in what passed as intellectual pursuits in the S.S. -- "history" and "philosophy" especially while rapidly emerging as a tough young man (Skorzeny was another) who could be entrusted with the carrying out of the less savory projects dreamed up by Himmler and Heydrich. [iv] On October 19, 1944, Naujocks deserted to the Americans and at Nuremberg a year later made a number of sworn affidavits, in one of which he preserved for history the account of the "incident" which Hitler used to justify his attack on Poland.

 

[quote]On or about August 10, 1939, the chief of the S.D., Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack on the radio station near Gleiwitz near the Polish border [Naujocks related in an affidavit signed in Nuremberg November 20, 1945] and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles. Heydrich said: "Practical proof is needed for these attacks of the Poles for the foreign press as well as for German propaganda." ...

 

My instructions were to seize the radio station and to hold it long enough to permit a Polish-speaking German who would be put at my disposal to broadcast a speech in Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech should state that the time had come for conflict between Germans and Poles ... Heydrich also told me that he expected an attack on Poland by Germany in a few days.

 

I went to Gleiwitz and waited there fourteen days ... Between the 25th and 31st of August, I went to see Heinrich Mueller, head of the Gestapo, who was then nearby at Oppeln. In my presence, Mueller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn [v] plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops ... Muel· ler stated that he had 12 to 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground of the scene of the incident to show they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the incident members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident ...

 

Mueller told me he had an order from Heydrich to make one of those criminals available to me for the action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals was "Canned Goods." [9][/quote]

 

While Himmler, Heydrich and Mueller, at Hitler's command, were arranging for the use of "Canned Goods" to fake an excuse for Germany's aggression against Poland, the Fuehrer made his first decisive move to deploy his armed forces for a possibly bigger war. On August 19 -- another fateful day -- orders to sail were issued to the German Navy. Twenty-one submarines were directed to put out for positions north and northwest of the British Isles, the pocket battleship Gra! Spee to depart for waters off the Brazilian coast and her sister ship, the Deutschland, to take a position athwart the British sea lanes in the North Atlantic. [vi]

 

The date of the order to dispatch the warships for possible action against Britain is significant. For on August 19, after a hectic week of frantic appeals from Berlin, the Soviet government finally gave Hitler the answer he wanted.

 

[b]THE NAZI-SOVIET TALKS: AUGUST 15-21, 1939[/b]

 

Ambassador von der Schulenburg saw Molotov at 8 P.M. on August 15 and, as instructed, read to him Ribbentrop's urgent telegram stating that the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to come to Moscow to settle Soviet-German relations. According to a "most urgent, secret" telegram which the German envoy got off to Berlin later that night, the Soviet Foreign Commissar received the information "with the greatest interest" and "warmly welcomed German intentions of improving relations with the Soviet Union." However, expert diplomatic poker player that he was, Molotov gave no sign of being in a hurry. Such a trip as Ribbentrop proposed, he suggested, "required adequate preparation in order that the exchange of opinions might lead to results."

 

What results? The wily Russian dropped some hints. Would the German government, he asked, be interested in a nonaggression pact between the two countries? Would it be prepared to use its influence with Japan to improve Soviet-Japanese relations and "eliminate border conflicts"? --  a reference to an undeclared war which had raged all summer on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier. Finally, Molotov asked, how did Germany feel about a joint guarantee of the Baltic States?

 

All such matters, he concluded, "must be discussed in concrete terms so that, should the German Foreign Minister come here, it will not be a matter of an exchange of opinions but of making concrete decisions." And he stressed again that "adequate preparation of the problems is indispensable." [10]

 

The first suggestion, then, for a Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact came from the Russians -- at the very moment they were negotiating with France and Great Britain to go to war, if necessary, to oppose further German aggression. [vii] Hitler was more than willing to discuss such a pact "in concrete terms," since its conclusion would keep Russia out of the war and enable him to attack Poland without fear of Soviet mtcrvention. And with Russia out of the conflict he was convinced that Britain and France would get cold feet.

 

Molotov's suggestions were just what he had hoped for; they were more specific and went further than anything which he had dared to propose. There was only one difficulty. With August running out he could not wait for the slow Soviet tempo which was indicated by Molotov's insistence on "adequate preparation" for the Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow. Schulenburg's report on his conversation with Molotov was telephoned by the Wilhelmstrasse to Ribbentrop at Fuschl at 6:40 A.M. on August 16 and he hurried across the mountain to seek further instruction from the Fuehrer at Obersalzberg. By early afternoon they had drawn up a reply to Molotov and it was rushed off on the teleprinter to Weizsaecker in Berlin with instructions to wire it "most urgent" to Moscow immediately. [12]

 

The Nazi dictator accepted the Soviet suggestions unconditionally. Schulenburg was directed by Ribbentrop to see Molotov again and inform him

 

[quote]that Germany is prepared to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union and, if the Soviet Government so desire, one which would be undenounceable for a term of twenty-five years. Further, Germany is ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union. Finally, Germany is prepared to exercise influence for an improvement and consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations.[/quote]

 

All pretense was now dropped that the Reich government was not in a hurry to conclude a deal with Moscow.

 

[quote]The Fuehrer [Ribbentrop's telegram continued] is of the opinion that, in view of the present situation and of the possibility of the occurrence any day of serious events (please at this point explain to M. Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian relations, and of each country's attitude to the questions of the moment, is desirable.

 

For these reasons I am prepared to come by airplane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to deal, on the basis of full powers from the Fuehrer, with the entire complex of German-Russian relations and, if the occasion arises, to sign the appropriate treaties.[/quote[

 

Again Ribbentrop added an "annex" of personal instructions to his ambassador.

 

[quote]I request that you again read these instructions word for word to Molotov and ask for the views of the Russian Government and of M. Stalin immediately. Entirely confidentially, it is added for your guidance that it would be of very special interest to us if my Moscow trip could take place at the end of this week or the beginning of next week.[/quote]

 

The next day, on their mountaintop, Hitler and Ribbentrop waited impatiently for the response from Moscow. Telegraphic communication between Berlin and Moscow was by no means instantaneous -- a condition of affairs which did not seem to be realized in the rarefied atmosphere of the Bavarian Alps. By noon of the seventeenth, Ribbentrop was wiring Schulenburg "most urgent" requesting "a report by telegram regarding the time when you made your request to be received by Molotov and the time for which the conversation has been arranged." [13] By dinnertime the harassed ambassador was replying, also "most urgent," that he had only received the Foreign Minister's telegram at eleven the night before, that it was by then too late to conduct any diplomatic business and that first thing in the morning of today, August 17, he had made an appointment with Molotov for 8 P.M. [14]

 

For the now frantic Nazi leaders it turned out to be a disappointing meeting. Conscious of Hitler's eagerness and no doubt fully aware of the reasons for it, the Russian Foreign Commissar played with the Germans, teasing and taunting them. After Schulenburg had read to him Ribbentrop's telegram, Molotov, taking little note of its contents, produced the Soviet government's written reply to the Reich Foreign Minister's first communication of August 15.

 

Beginning acidly with a reminder of the Nazi government's previous hostility to Soviet Russia, it explained "that until very recently the Soviet Government have proceeded on the assumption that the German Government are seeking occasion for clashes with the Soviet Union ... Not to mention the fact that the German Government, by means of the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact, were endeavoring to create, and have created, the united front of a number of States against the Soviet Union." It was for this reason, the note explained, that Russia "was participating in the organization of a defensive front against [German] aggression."

 

[quote]If, however [the note continued], the German Government now undertake a change from the old policy in the direction of a serious improvement in political relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government can only welcome such a change, and are, for their part, prepared to revise their policy in the sense of a serious improvement in respect of Germany.[/quote]

 

But, the Russian note insisted, it must be "by serious and practical steps" -- not in one big leap, as Ribbentrop proposed.

 

What steps?

 

The first step: conclusion of a trade and credit agreement.

 

The second step, "to be taken shortly thereafter": conclusion of a nonaggression pact.

 

Simultaneously with the second step, the Soviets demanded the "conclusion of a special protocol defining the interests of the contracting parties in this or that question of foreign policy." This was more than a hint that in regard to dividing up Eastern Europe at least, Moscow was receptive to the German view that a deal was possible.

 

As for the proposed visit of Ribbentrop, Molotov declared that the Soviet government was "highly gratified" with the idea, "since the dispatch of such an eminent politician and statesman emphasized how serious were the intentions of the German Government. This stood," he added, "in noteworthy contrast to England, which, in the person of Strang, had sent only an official of second-class rank to Moscow. However, the journey by the German Foreign Minister required thorough preparation. The Soviet Government did not like the publicity that such a journey would cause. They preferred to do practical work without much fuss." [15]

 

Molotov made no mention of Ribbentrop's urgent, specific proposal that he come to Moscow over the weekend, and Schulenburg, perhaps somewhat taken aback by the course of the interview, did not press the matter.

 

The next day, after the ambassador's report had been received, Ribbentrop did. Hitler, it is obvious, was now growing desperate. From his summer headquarters on the Obersalzberg there went out on the evening of August 18 a further "most urgent" telegram to Schulenburg signed by Ribbentrop. It arrived at the German Embassy in Moscow at 5: 45 A.M. on the nineteenth and directed the ambassador to "arrange immediately another conversation with M. Molotov and do everything possible to see that it takes place without any delay." There was no time to lose. "I ask you," Ribbentrop wired, "to speak to M. Molotov as follows":

 

[quote]... We, too, under normal circumstances, would naturally be ready to pursue a realignment of German-Russian relations through diplomatic channels, and to carry it out in the customary way. But the present unusual situation makes it necessary, in the opinion of the Fuehrer, to employ a different method which would lead to quick results.

 

German-Polish relations are becoming more acute from day to day. We have to take into account that incidents might occur any day that would make the outbreak of open conflict unavoidable ... The Fuehrer considers it necessary that we be not taken by surprise by the outbreak of a German-Polish conflict while we are striving for a clarification of German-Russian relations. He therefore considers a previous clarification necessary. if only to be able to take into account Russian interests in case of such a conflict. which would, of course, be difficult without such a clarification.[/quote]

 

The ambassador was to say that the "first stage" in the consultations mentioned by Molotov, the conclusion of the trade agreement, had been concluded in Berlin this very day (August 18) and that it was now time to "attack" the second stage. To do this the German Foreign Minister proposed his "immediate departure for Moscow," to which he would come "with full powers from the Fuehrer, authorizing me to settle fully and conclusively the total complex of problems." In Moscow, Ribbentrop added, he would "be in a position ... to take Russian wishes into account."

 

What wishes? The Germans now no longer beat around the bush.

 

[quote]I should also be in a position [Ribbentrop continued] to sign a special protocol regulating the interests of both parties in questions of foreign policy of one kind or another; for instance, the settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area. Such a settlement will only be possible, however, in an oral discussion.[/quote]

 

This time the ambassador must not take a Russian "No."

 

[quote]Please emphasize [Ribbentrop concluded] that German foreign policy has today reached a historic turning point ... Please press for a rapid realization of my journey and oppose appropriately any fresh Russian objections. In this connection you must keep in mind the decisive fact that an early outbreak of open German-Polish conflict is possible and that we, therefore, have the greatest interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately. [16][/quote]

 

August 19 was the decisive day. Orders for the German submarines and pocket battleships to sail for British waters were being held up until word came from Moscow. The warships would have to get off at once if they were to reach their appointed stations by Hitler's target date for the beginning of the war, September l -- only thirteen days away. The two great army groups designated for the onslaught on Poland would have to be deployed immediately.

 

The tension in Berlin and especially on the Obersalzberg, where Hitler and Ribbentrop waited nervously for Moscow's decision, was becoming almost unbearable. The Foreign Office dispatches and memoranda that day disclosed the jittery feelings in the Wilhelmstrasse. Dr. Schnurre reported that the discussions with the Russians on the trade agreement had ended the previous evening "with complete agreement" but that the Soviets were stalling on signing it. The signature, he said, was to have taken place at noon this day, August 19, but at noon the Russians had telephoned saying they had to await instructions from Moscow. "It is obvious," Schnurre reported, "that they have received instructions from Moscow to delay the conclusion of the treaty for political reasons." [17] From the Obersalzberg, Ribbentrop wired Schulenburg "most urgent" to be sure to report anything Molotov said or any sign of "Russian intentions" by telegram, but the only wire received from the ambassador during the day was the text of a denial by Tass, the Soviet news agency, in Moscow that the negotiations between the Russian and Anglo-French military delegations had become snarled over the Far East. However, the Tass dementi added that there were differences between the delegations on "entirely different matters." This was a signal to Hitler that there was still time -- and hope.

 

And then at 7: 10 P.M. on August 19 came the anxiously awaited telegram:

 

[quote]SECRET

 

MOST URGENT

 

The Soviet Government agree to the Reich Foreign Minister coming to Moscow one week after the announcement of the signature of the economic agreement. Molotov stated that if the conclusion of the economic agreement is made public tomorrow, the Reich Foreign Minister could arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27.

 

Molotov handed me a draft of a nonaggression pact.

 

A detailed account of the two conversations I had with Molotov today, as well as the text of the Soviet draft, follows by telegram at once.

 

SCHULENBURG [18][/quote]

 

The first talk in the Kremlin, which began at 2 P.M. on the nineteenth and lasted an hour, did not, the ambassador reported, go very well. The Russians, it seemed, could not be stampeded into receiving Hitler's Foreign Minister. "Molotov persisted in his opinion," Schulenburg wired, "that for the present it was not possible even approximately to fix the time of the journey since thorough preparations would be required ... To the reasons I repeatedly and very emphatically advanced for the need of haste, Molotov rejoined that, so far, not even the first step -- the concluding of the economic agreement -- had been taken. First of all, the economic agreement had to be signed and published, and achieve its effect abroad. Then would come the turn of the nonaggression pact and protocol.

 

"Molotov remained apparently unaffected by my protests, so that the first conversation closed with a declaration by Molotov that he had imparted to me the views of the Soviet Government and had nothing to add to them."

 

But he had something, shortly.

 

"Hardly half an hour after the conversation had ended," Schulenburg reported, "Molotov sent me word asking me to call on him again at the Kremlin at 4:30 P.M. He apologized for putting me to the trouble and explained that he had reported to the Soviet Government."

 

Whereupon the Foreign Commissar handed the surprised but happy ambassador a draft of the nonaggression pact and told him that Ribbentrop could arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27 if the trade treaty were signed and made public tomorrow.

 

"Molotov did not give reasons," Schulenburg added in his telegram, "for his sudden change of mind. I assume that Stalin intervened." [19]

 

The assumption was undoubtedly correct. According to Churchill, the Soviet intention to sign a pact with Germany was announced to the Politburo by Stalin on the evening of August 19. [20] A little earlier that day -- between 3 P.M. and 4:30 P.M. -- it is clear from Schulenburg's dispatch, he had communicated his fateful decision to Molotov.

 

Exactly three years later, in August 1942, "in the early hours of the morning," as Churchill later reported, the Soviet dictator gave to the British Prime Minister, then on a mission to Moscow, some of the reasons for his brazen move. [21]

 

[quote]We formed the impression [said Stalin] that the British and French Governments were not resolved to go to war if Poland were attacked, but that they hoped the diplomatic line-up of Britain, France and Russia would deter Hitler. We were sure it would not. "How many divisions," Stalin had asked, "will France send against Germany on mobilization?" The answer was: "About a hundred." He then asked: "How many will England send?" The answer was: "Two, and two more later." "Ah, two, and two more later," Stalin had repeated. "Do you know," he asked, "how many divisions we shall have to put on the Russian front if we go to war with Germany?" There was a pause. "More than three hundred."[/quote]

 

In his dispatch reporting the outcome of his conversations with Molotov on August 19, Schulenburg had added that his attempt to induce the Foreign Commissar to accept an earlier date for Ribbentrop's journey to Moscow "was, unfortunately, unsuccessful."

 

But for the Germans it had to be made successful. The whole timetable for the invasion of Poland, indeed the question of whether the attack could take place at all in the brief interval before the autumn rains, depended upon it. If Ribbentrop were not received in Moscow before August 26 or 27 and then if the Russians stalled a bit, as the Germans feared, the target date of September 1 could not be kept.

 

At this crucial stage, Adolf Hitler himself intervened with Stalin. Swallowing his pride, he personally begged the Soviet dictator, whom he had so often and for so long maligned, to receive his Foreign Minister in Moscow at once. His telegram to Stalin was rushed off to Moscow at 6:45 P.M. on Sunday, August 20, just twelve hours after the receipt of Schulenburg's dispatch. The Fuehrer instructed the ambassador to hand it to Molotov "at once."

 

[quote]M. STALIN, Moscow,

 

I sincerely welcome the signing of the new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement as the first step in the reshaping of German-Soviet relations. [viii]

 

The conclusion of a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union means to me the establishment of German policy for a long time. Germany thereby resumes a political course that was beneficial to both States during bygone centuries ...

 

I accept the draft of the nonaggression pact that your Foreign Minister, M. Molotov, handed over, but consider it urgently necessary to clarify the questions connected with it as soon as possible.

 

The substance of the supplementary protocol desired by the Soviet Union can, I am convinced, be clarified in the shortest possible time if a responsible German statesman can come to Moscow himself to negotiate. Otherwise the Government of the Reich are not clear as to how the supplementary protocol could be cleared up and settled in a short time.

 

The tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable ... A crisis may arise any day. Germany is determined from now on to look after the interests of the Reich with all the means at her disposal.

 

In my opinion, it is desirable in view of the intentions of the two States to enter into a new relationship to each other, not to lose any time. I therefore again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has the fullest powers to draw up and sign the nonaggression pact as well as the protocol. A longer stay by the Foreign Minister in Moscow than one to two days at most is impossible in view of the international situation. I should be glad to receive your early answer.

 

ADOLF HITLER [22] [/quote]

 

During the next twenty-four hours, from the evening of Sunday, August 20, when Hitler's appeal to Stalin went out over the wires to Moscow, until the following evening, the Fuehrer was in a state bordering on collapse. He could not sleep. In the middle of the night he telephoned Goering to tell of his worries about Stalin's reaction to his message and to fret over the delays in Moscow. At 3 A.M. on the twenty-first, the Foreign Office received a "most urgent" wire from Schulenburg saying that Hitler's telegram, of which Weizsaecker had advised him earlier, had not yet arrived. "Official telegrams from Berlin to Moscow," the ambassador reminded the Foreign Office, "take four to five hours, inclusive of two hours' difference in time. To this must be added the time for deciphering." [23] At 10:15 A.M. on Monday, August 21, the anxious Ribbentrop got off an urgent wire to Schulenburg: "Please do your utmost to ensure that the journey materializes. Date as in telegram." [24] Shortly after noon, the ambassador advised Berlin: "I am to see Molotov at 3 P.M. today." [25]

 

Finally, at 9:35 P.M. on August 21, Stalin's reply came over the wires in Berlin.

 

[quote]TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN REICH, A. HITLER:

 

I thank you for the letter. I hope that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact will bring about a decided turn for the better in the political relations between our countries.

 

The peoples of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a nonaggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries.

 

The Soviet Government have instructed me to inform you that they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop's arriving in Moscow on August 23.

 

J. STALlN [28][/quote]

 

For sheer cynicism the Nazi dictator had met his match in the Soviet despot. The way was now open to them to get together to dot the i's and cross the t's on one of the crudest deals of this shabby epoch.

 

Stalin's reply was transmitted to the Fuehrer at the Berghof at 10: 30 P.M. A few minutes later, this writer remembers -- shortly after 11 P.M. --  a musical program on the German radio was suddenly interrupted and a voice came on to announce, "The Reich government and the Soviet government have agreed to conclude a pact of nonaggression with each other. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs will arrive in Moscow on Wednesday, August 23, for the conclusion of the negotiations."

 

The next day, August 22, 1939, Hitler, having been assured by Stalin himself that Russia would be a friendly neutral, once more convoked his top military commanders to the Obersalzberg, lectured them on his own greatness and on the need for them to wage war brutally and without pity and apprised them that he probably would order the attack on Poland to begin four days hence, on Saturday, August 26 -- six days ahead of schedule. Stalin, the Fuehrer's mortal enemy, had made this possible.

 

[b]THE MILITARY CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 22, 1939[/b]

 

The generals found Hitler in one of his most arrogant and uncompromising moods. [ix] "I have called you together," he told them, "to give you a picture of the political situation in order that you may have some insight into the individual factors on which I have based my irrevocable decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence. After that we shall discuss military details." First of all, he said, there were two personal considerations.

 

[quote]My own personality and that of Mussolini.

 

Essentially, all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I have. There will probably never again in the future be a man with more authority than) have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lunatic.

 

The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The Italian Court is fundamentally opposed to the Duce.[/quote]

 

Franco too was a help. He would assure Spain's "benevolent neutrality." As for "the other side," he assured his listeners, "there is no outstanding personality in England or France."

 

For what must have been a period of several hours, broken only by a late lunch, the demonic dictator rambled on, and there is no evidence from the records that a single general, admiral or Air Force commander dared to interrupt him to question his judgment or even to challenge his lies. He had made his decision in the spring, he said, that a conflict with Poland was inevitable, but he had thought that first he would turn against the West. In that case, however, it became "clear" to him that Poland would attack Germany. Therefore she must be liquidated now.

 

The time to fight a war, anyway, had come.

 

[quote]For us it is easy to make the decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act ...

 

Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable to us; in the Mediterranean, rivalry among Italy, France and England; in the Orient, tension ...

 

England is in great danger. France's position has also deteriorated. Decline in birth rate ... Yugoslavia carries the germ of coIlapse ... Rumania is weaker than before ... Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.

 

AIl these fortunate circumstances will not prevail in two to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore a showdown, which it would not be safe to put off for four to five years, had better take place now.[/quote]

 

Such was the Nazi Leader's fervid reasoning.

 

He thought it "highly probable" that the West would not fight, but the risk nevertheless had to be accepted. Had he not taken risks -- in occupying the Rhineland when the generals wanted to pull back, in taking Austria, the Sudetenland and the rest of Czechoslovakia? "Hannibal at Cannae, Frederick the Great at Leuthen, and Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Tannenberg," he said, "took chances. So now we also must take risks which can only be mastered by iron determination." There must be no weakening.

 

[quote]It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans in high places spoke and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question. The Fuehrer carried his point when you lost your nerve and capitulated too soon.[/quote]

 

Halder, Witzleben and Thomas and perhaps other generals who had been in on the Munich conspiracy must have winced at this. Hitler obviously knew more than they had realized.

 

At any rate, it was now time for them all to show their fighting qualities. Hitler had created Greater Germany, he reminded them, "by political bluff." It had now become necessary to "test the military machine. The Army must experience actual battle before the big final showdown in the West." Poland offered such an opportunity.

 

Coming back to England and France:

 

[quote]The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:

 

1. Blockade: It will not be effective because of our self-sufficiency and our sources of aid in the East.

 

2. Attack from the West from the Maginot Line. I consider this impossible.

 

Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium and Swiss neutrality. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Actually they cannot help Poland.[/quote]

 

Would it be a long war?

 

[quote]No one is counting on a long war. If Herr von Brauchitsch had told me that I would need four years to conquer Poland I would have replied, It cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.[/quote]

 

Having disposed, to his own satisfaction, at least, of Poland, Britain and France, Hitler pulled out his ace card. He turned to Russia.

 

[quote]The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich.

 

I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. Only a blind optimist could believe that Stalin would be so crazy as not to see through England's intentions. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland ... Litvinov's dismissal was decisive. It came to me like a cannon shot as a sign of a change in Moscow toward the Western Powers.

 

I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversations. Finally a proposition came from the Russians for a nonaggression treaty. Four days ago I took a special step which brought it about that Russia announced yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contact with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her ... A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, now that I have made the political preparations.[/quote]

 

The way would be open for the soldiers, that is, if Chamberlain didn't pull another Munich. "I am only afraid," Hitler told his warriors, "that some Schweinehund [x] will make a proposal for mediation."

 

At this point the meeting broke up for lunch, but not until Goering had expressed thanks to the Fuehrer for pointing the way and had assured him that the armed services would do their duty. [xi]

 

The afternoon lecture was devoted by Hitler mainly to bucking up his military chiefs and trying to steel them for the task ahead. The rough jottings of all three records of the talk indicate its nature.

 

[quote]The most iron determination on our part. No shrinking back from anything. Everyone must hold the view that we have been determined to fight the Western powers right from the start. A life-and-death struggle ... A long period of peace would not do us any good ... A manly bearing ... We have the better men ... On the opposite side they are weaker ... In 1918 the nation collapsed because the spiritual prerequisites were insufficient. Frederick the Great endured only because of his fortitude.

 

The destruction of Poland has priority. The aim is to eliminate active forces, not to reach a definite line. Even if war breaks out in the West, the destruction of Poland remains the primary objective. A quick decision, in view of the season.

 

I shall give a propagandist reason for starting the war -- never mind whether it is plausible or not. The victor will not be asked afterward whether he told the truth or not. In starting and waging a war it is not right that matters, but victory.

 

Close your hearts to pity! Act brutally! Eighty million people must obtain what is their right ... The stronger man is right ... Be harsh and remorseless! Be steeled against all signs of compassion! ... Whoever has pondered over this world order knows that its meaning lies in the success of the best by means of force ...[/quote]

 

Having thundered such Nietzschean exhortations, the Fuehrer, who had worked himself up to a fine fit of Teutonic fury, calmed down and delivered a few directives for the campaign ahead. Speed was essential. He had "unshakable faith" in the German soldier. If any crises developed they would be due solely to the commanders' losing their nerve. The first aim was to drive wedges from the southeast to the Vistula, and from the north to the Narew and the Vistula. Military operations, he insisted, must not be influenced by what he might do with Poland after her defeat. As to that he was vague. The new German frontier, he said, would be based on "sound principles." Possibly he would set up a small Polish buffer state between Germany and Russia.

 

The order for the start of hostilities, Hitler concluded, would be given later, probably for Saturday morning, August 26.

 

The next day, the twenty-third, after a meeting of the OKW section chiefs, General Halder noted in his diary: "Y Day definitely set for the 26th (Saturday)."

 

[b]ALLIED STALEMATE IN MOSCOW[/b]

 

By the middle of August the military conversations in Moscow between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union had come to a virtual standstill -- and for this the intransigence of the Poles was largely to blame. The Anglo-French military missions, it will be remembered, after taking a slow boat to Leningrad, had arrived in Moscow on August 11, exactly one week after the frustrated Mr. Strang had left the Russian capital, obviously relieved to be able to turn over to the generals and admirals the difficult and unpleasant job of trying to negotiate with the Russians. [xii]

 

What now had to be worked out hurriedly was a military convention which would spell out in detail just how and where, and with what, Nazi armed force could be met. But as the confidential British minutes of the day-to-day military conversations and the reports of the British negotiators reveal [29] the Anglo-French military team had been sent to Moscow to discuss not details but rather "general principles." The Russians, however, insisted on getting down at once to hard, specific and -- in the Allied view -- awkward facts, and Voroshilov's response to the Allied declaration of principles made at the first meeting by General Doumenc was that they were "too abstract and immaterial and do not oblige anyone to do anything ... We are not gathered here," he declared coolly, "to make abstract declarations, but to work out a complete military convention."

 

The Soviet Marshal posed some very definite questions: Was there any treaty which defined what action Poland would take? How many British troops could reinforce the French Army on the outbreak of the war? What would Belgium do? The answers he got were not very reassuring. Doumenc said he had no knowledge of Polish plans. General Heywood answered that the British envisaged "a first contingent of sixteen divisions, ready for service in the early stages of a war, followed later by a second contingent of sixteen divisions." Pressed by Voroshilov to reveal how many British troops there would be immediately on the outbreak of war, Heywood replied, "At the moment there are five regular divisions and one mechanized division in England." These paltry figures came as an unpleasant surprise to the Russians, who were prepared, they said, to deploy 120 infantry divisions against an aggressor in the west at the very outbreak of hostilities.

 

As for Belgium, General Doumenc answered the Russian question by saying that "French troops cannot enter unless and until they are asked to, but France is ready to answer any call."

 

This reply led to the crucial question before the military negotiators in Moscow and one which the British and French had been anxious to avoid. During the very first meeting and again at a critical session on August 14, Marshal Voroshilov insisted that the essential question was whether Poland was willing to permit Soviet troops to enter her territory to meet the Germans. If not, how could the Allies prevent the German Army from quickly overrunning Poland? Specifically -- on the fourteenth -- he asked, "Do the British and French general staffs think that the Red Army can move across Poland, and in particular through the Vilna gap and across Galicia in order to make contact with the enemy?"

 

This was the core of the matter. As Seeds wired London, the Russians had now

 

[quote]raised the fundamental problem, on which the military talks will succeed or fail and which has indeed been at the bottom of all our difficulties since the very beginning of the political conversations, namely, how to reach any useful agreement with the Soviet Union as long as this country's neighbors maintain a sort of boycott which is only to be broken ... when it is too late.[/quote]

 

If the question came up -- and how could it help coming up? -- Admiral Drax had been instructed by the British government on how to handle it. The instructions, revealed in the confidential British papers, seem unbelievably naive when read today. The "line of argument" he was to take in view of the refusal of Poland and Rumania "even to consider plans for possible co-operation" was:

 

[quote]An invasion of Poland and Rumania would greatly alter their outlook. Moreover, it would be greatly to Russia's disadvantage that Germany should occupy a position right up to the Russian frontier ... It is in Russia's own interest therefore that she should have plans ready to help both Poland and Rumania should these countries be invaded.

 

If the Russians propose that the British and French governments should communicate to the Polish, Roumanian or Baltic States proposals involving co-operation with the Soviet Government or General Staff, the Delegation should not commit themselves but refer home.[/quote]

 

And this is what they did.

 

At the August 14 session Voroshilov demanded "straightforward answers" to his questions. "Without an exact and unequivocal answer," he said, "continuance of the military conversations would be useless ... The Soviet Military Mission," he added, "cannot recommend to its Government to take part in an enterprise so obviously doomed to failure."

 

From Paris General Gamelin counseled General Doumenc to try to steer the Russians off the subject. But they were not to be put off. [30]

 

The meeting of August 14, as General Doumenc later reported, was dramatic. The British and French delegates were cornered and they knew it. They tried to evade the issue as best they could. Drax and Doumenc asserted they were sure the Poles and Rumanians would ask for Russian aid as soon as they were attacked. Doumenc was confident they would "implore the Marshal to support them." Drax thought it was "inconceivable" that they should not ask for Soviet help. He added -- not very diplomatically, it would seem -- that "if they did not ask for help when necessary and allow themselves to be overrun, it may be expected that they would become German provinces." This was the last thing the Russians wanted, for it meant the presence of the Nazi armies on the Soviet border, and Voroshilov made a special point of the Admiral's unfortunate remark.

 

Finally, the uncomfortable Anglo-French representatives contended that Voroshilov had raised political questions which they were not competent to handle. Drax declared that since Poland was a sovereign state, its government would first have to sanction the entry of Russian troops. But since this was a political matter, it would have to be settled by the governments. He suggested that the Soviet government put its questions to the Polish government. The Russian delegation agreed that this was a political matter. But it insisted that the British and French governments must put the question to the Poles and pressure them to come to reason.

 

Were the Russians, in view of their dealings with the Germans at this moment, negotiating in good faith with the Franco-British military representatives? Or did they, as the British and French foreign offices, not to mention Admiral Drax, later concluded, insist on the right to deploy their troops through Poland merely to stall the talks until they saw whether they could make a deal with Hitler? [xiii]

 

In the beginning, the British and French confidential sources reveal, the Western Allies did think that the Soviet military delegation was negotiating in good faith -- in fact, that it took its job much too seriously. On August 13, after two days of staff talks, Ambassador Seeds wired London that the Russian military chiefs seemed really "to be out for business." As a result, Admiral Drax's instructions to "go very slowly" were changed and on August 15 he was told by the British government to support Doumenc in bringing the military talks to a conclusion "as soon as possible." His restrictions on confiding confidential military information to the Russians were partially lifted.

 

Unlike the British Admiral's original instructions to stall, those given General Doumenc by Premier Daladier personally had been to try to conclude a military convention with Russia at the earliest possible moment. Despite British fears of leaks to the Germans, Doumenc on the second day of the meetings had confided to the Russians such "highly secret figures," as he termed them, on the strength of the French Army that the Soviet members promised "to forget" them as soon as the meeting was concluded.

 

As late as August 17, after he and Drax had waited vainly for three days for instructions from their governments as to how to reply to the Polish question, General Doumenc telegraphed Paris: "The U.S.S.R. wants a military pact ... She does not want us to give her a piece of paper without substantial undertakings. Marshal Voroshilov has stated that all problems ... would be tackled without difficulty as soon as what he called the crucial question was settled." Doumenc strongly urged Paris to get Warsaw to agree to accepting Russian help.

 

Contrary to a widespread belief at the time, not only in Moscow but in the Western capitals, that the British and French governments did nothing to induce the Poles to agree to Soviet troops meeting the Germans on Polish soil, it is clear from documents recently released that London and Paris went quite far -- but not quite far enough. It is also clear that the Poles reacted with unbelievable stupidity. [31]

 

On August 18, after the first Anglo-French attempt was made in Warsaw to open the eyes of the Poles, Foreign Minister Beck told the French ambassador, Leon Noel, that the Russians were "of no military value," and General Stachiewicz, Chief of the Polish General Staff, backed him up by declaring that he saw "no benefit to be gained by Red Army troops operating in Poland."

 

The next day both the British and French ambassadors saw Beck again and urged him to agree to the Russian proposal. The Polish Foreign Minister stalled, but promised to give them a formal reply the next day. The Anglo-French demarche in Warsaw came as the result of a conversation earlier on the nineteenth in Paris between Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, and the British charge d'affaires. Somewhat to the Briton's surprise, this archappeaser of Hitler was now quite aroused at the prospect of losing Russia as an ally because of Polish stubbornness.

 

[quote]It would be disastrous [Bonnet told him] if, in consequence of a Polish refusal, the Russian negotiations were to break down ... It was an untenable position for the Poles to take up in refusing the only immediate efficacious help that could reach them in the event of a German attack. It would put the British and French Governments in an almost impossible position if we had to ask our respective countries to go to war in defense of Poland, which had refused this help.[/quote]

 

If this were so -- and there is no doubt that it was -- why then did not the British and French governments at this crucial moment put the ultimate pressure on Warsaw and simply say that unless the Polish government agreed to accept Russian help Britain and France could see no use of themselves going to war to aid Poland? The formal Anglo- Polish mutual-security treaty had not yet been signed. Could Warsaw's acceptance of Russian military backing not be made a condition of concluding that pact? [xiv]

 

In his talk with the British charge in Paris on August 19, Bonnet suggested this, but the government in London frowned upon such a "maneuver," as Downing Street called it. To such an extreme Chamberlain and Halifax would not go.

 

On the morning of August 20 the Polish Chief of Staff informed the British military attache in Warsaw that "in no case would the admission of Soviet troops into Poland be agreed to." And that evening Beck formally rejected the Anglo-French request. The same evening Halifax, through his ambassador in Warsaw, urged the Polish Foreign Minister to reconsider, emphasizing in strong terms that the Polish stand was "wrecking" the military talks in Moscow. But Beck was obdurate. "I do not admit," he told the French ambassador, "that there can be any kind of discussion whatsoever concerning the use of part of our territory by foreign troops. We have not got a military agreement with the U.S.S.R. We do not want one."

 

Desperate at such a display of blind stubbornness on the part of the Polish government, Premier Daladier, according to an account he gave to the French Constituent Assembly on July 18, 1946, took matters in his own hands. After once more appealing to the Poles to be realistic, he telegraphed General Doumenc on the morning of August 21 authorizing him to sign a military convention with Russia on the best terms he could get, with the provision, however, that it must be approved by the French government. The French ambassador, Paul-Emile Naggiar, was at the same time instructed by Bonnet, according to the latter's subsequent account, to tell Molotov that France agreed "in principle" to the passage of Soviet troops through Poland if the Germans attacked.

 

But this was only an idle gesture, as long as the Poles had not agreed -- and, as we know now, a futile gesture in view of the state of Russo-German dealings. Doumenc did not receive Daladier's telegram until late in the evening of August 21. When he brought it to the attention of Voroshilov on the evening of the next day -- the eve of Ribbentrop's departure for Moscow -- the Soviet Marshal was highly skeptical. He demanded to see the French General's authorization for saying -- as Doumenc had -- that the French government had empowered him to sign a military pact permitting the passage of Russian troops through Poland. Doumenc, obviously, declined. Voroshilov next wanted to know what the British response was and whether the consent of Poland had been obtained. These were embarrassing questions and Doumenc merely answered that he had no information.

 

But neither the questions nor the answers had by this time any reality. They were being put too late. Ribbentrop was already on his way to Moscow. The trip had been announced publicly the night before, and also its purpose: to conclude a nonaggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

 

Voroshilov, who seems to have developed a genuine liking for the French General, tried gently to let him know that their contacts were about to end.

 

[quote]I fear one thing [Voroshilov said]. The French and English sides have allowed the political and military discussions to drag on too long. That is why we must not exclude the possibility, during this time, of certain political events. [xv][/quote]

 

[b]RIBBENTROP IN MOSCOW: AUGUST 23, 1939[/b]

 

Those "certain political events" now took place.

 

Armed with full powers in writing from Hitler to conclude a nonaggression treaty "and other agreements" with the Soviet Union, which would become effective as soon as they were signed, Ribbentrop set off by plane for Moscow on August 22. The large German party spent the night at Koenigsberg in East Prussia, where the Nazi Foreign Minister, according to Dr. Schmidt, worked throughout the night, constantly telephoning to Berlin and Berchtesgaden and making copious notes for his talks with Stalin and Molotov.

 

The two large Condor transport planes carrying the German delegation arrived in Moscow at noon on August 23, and after a hasty meal at the embassy Ribbentrop hurried off to the Kremlin to confront the Soviet dictator and his Foreign Commissar. This first meeting lasted three hours and, as Ribbentrop advised Hitler by "most urgent" wire, it went well for the Germans. [32] Judging by the Foreign Minister's dispatch, there was no trouble at all in reaching agreement on the terms of a nonaggression pact which would keep the Soviet Union out of Hitler's war. In fact the only difficulty, he reported, was a distinctly minor one concerning the division of spoils. The Russians, he said, were demanding that Germany recognize the small ports of Libau and Windau in Latvia "as being in their sphere of interest." Since all of Latvia was to be placed on the Soviet side of the line dividing the interests of the two powers, this demand presented no problem and Hitler quickly agreed. Ribbentrop also advised the Fuehrer after the first conference that "the signing of a secret protocol on the delimitation of mutual spheres of interest in the whole Eastern area is contemplated."

 

The whole works -- the nonaggression treaty and the secret protocol -- were signed at a second meeting at the Kremlin later that evening. So easily had the Germans and Russians come to agreement that this convivial session, which lasted into the small hours of the following morning, was taken up mostly not by any hard bargaining but with a warm and friendly discussion of the state of the world, country by country, and with the inevitable, effusive toasts customary at gala gatherings in the Kremlin. A secret German memorandum by a member of the German delegation who was present has recorded the incredible scene. [33]

 

To Stalin's questions about the ambitions of Germany's partners, Italy and Japan, Ribbentrop gave breezy, reassuring answers. As to England the Soviet dictator and the Nazi Foreign Minister, who was now on his best behavior, found themselves at once in accord. The British military mission in Moscow, Stalin confided to his guest, "had never told the Soviet government what it really wanted." Ribbentrop responded by emphasizing that Britain had always tried to disrupt good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. "England is weak," he boasted, "and wants to let others fight for her presumptuous claim to world dominion."

 

"Stalin eagerly concurred," says the German memorandum, and he remarked: "If England dominated the world, that was due to the stupidity of the other countries that always let themselves be bluffed."

 

By this time the Soviet ruler and Hitler's Foreign Minister were getting along so splendidly that mention of the Anti-Comintern Pact no longer embarrassed them. Ribbentrop explained again that the pact had been directed not against Russia but against the Western democracies. Stalin interposed to remark that "the Anti-Comintern had in fact frightened principally the City of London [i.e., the British financiers] and the English shopkeepers. "

 

At this juncture, the German memorandum reveals, Ribbentrop felt himself in such good humor at Stalin's accommodating manner that he even tried to crack a joke or two -- a remarkable feat for so humorless a man.

 

[quote]The Reich Foreign Minister [the memorandum continues] remarked jokingly that M. Stalin was surely less frightened by the Anti-Comintern Pact than the City of London and the English shopkeepers. What the German people thought of this matter was evident from a joke, which had originated with the Berliners, well known for their wit and humor, that Stalin will yet join the Anti-Comintern Pact himself.[/quote]

 

Finally the Nazi Foreign Minister dwelt on how warmly the German people welcomed an understanding with Russia. "M. Stalin replied," says the German record, "that he really believed this. The Germans desired peace."

 

Such hokum grew worse as the time for toasts arrived.

 

[quote]M. Stalin spontaneously proposed a toast to the Fuehrer:

 

"I know how much the German nation loves its Fuehrer. I should therefore like to drink to his health."

 

M. Molotov drank to the health of the Reich Foreign Minister ... MM. Molotov and Stalin drank repeatedly to the Nonaggression Pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and to the German nation.

 

The Reich Foreign Minister in turn proposed a toast to M. Stalin, toasts to the Soviet Government, and to a favorable development of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.[/quote]

 

And yet despite such warm exchanges between those who until recently had been such mortal enemies, Stalin appears to have had mental reservations about the Nazis' keeping the pact. As Ribbentrop was leaving, he took him aside and said, "The Soviet Government take the new pact very seriously. He could guarantee on his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner."

 

What had the new partners signed?

 

The published treaty carried an undertaking that neither power would attack the other. Should one of them become "the object of belligerent action" by a third power, the other party would "in no manner lend its support to this Third Power." Nor would either Germany or Russia "join any grouping of Powers whatsoever which is aimed directly or indirectly at the other Party." [xvi]

 

Thus Hitler got what he specifically wanted: an immediate agreement by the Soviet Union not to join Britain and France if they honored their treaty obligations to come to the aid of Poland in case she were attacked. [xvii]

 

The price he paid was set down in the "Secret Additional Protocol" to the treaty:

 

[quote]On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union the undersigned plenipotentiaries discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the delimitation of their respective spheres of interest in Eastern Europe.

 

 

1. In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the U.S.S.R.

 

2. In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of interest of both Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San.

 

The question whether the interests of both Parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish State appear desirable and how the frontiers of this State should be drawn can be definitely determined only in the course of further political developments.

 

In any case both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly understanding.[/quote]

 

Once again Germany and Russia, as in the days of the German kings and Russian emperors, had agreed to partition Poland. And Hitler had given Stalin a free hand in the eastern Baltic.

 

Finally, in Southeastern Europe, the Russians emphasized their interest in Bessarabia, which the Soviet Union had lost to Rumania in 1919, and the Germans declared their disinterest in this territory -- a concession Ribbentrop later was to regret.

 

"This protocol," the document concluded, "will be treated by both parties as strictly secret." [36]

 

As a matter of fact, its contents became known only after the war with the capture of the secret German archives.

 

On the following day, August 24, while the jubilant Ribbentrop was winging his way back to Berlin, the Allied military missions in Moscow requested to see Voroshilov. Admiral Drax had actually sent an urgent letter to the Marshal requesting his views on the continuation of their talks.

 

Voroshilov gave them to the British and French military staffs at 1 P.M. the next day, August 25. "In view of the changed political situation," he said, "no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversations."

 

Two years later, when German troops were pouring into Russia in violation of the pact, Stalin would still justify his odious deal with Hitler, made behind the backs of the Anglo-French military delegations which had come to negotiate in Moscow. "We secured peace for our country for one and a half years," he boasted in a broadcast to the Russian people on July 3, 1941, "as well as an opportunity of preparing our forces for defense if fascist Germany risked attacking our country in defiance of the pact. This was a definite gain for our country and a loss for fascist Germany."

 

But was it? The point has been debated ever since. That the sordid, secret deal gave Stalin the same breathing space -- peredyshka -- which Czar Alexander I had secured from Napoleon at Tilsit in 1807 and Lenin from the Germans at Brest Litovsk in 1917 was obvious. Within a short time it also gave the Soviet Union an advanced defensive position against Germany beyond the existing Russian frontiers, including bases in the Baltic States and Finland -- at the expense of the Poles, Latvians, Estonians and Finns. And most important of all, as the official Soviet History of Diplomacy later emphasized, it assured the Kremlin that if Russia were later attacked by Germany the Western Powers would already be irrevocably committed against the Third Reich and the Soviet Union would not stand alone against the German might as Stalin had feared throughout the summer of 1939.

 

All this undoubtedly is true. But there is another side to the argument. By the time Hitler got around to attacking Russia, the armies of Poland and France and the British Expeditionary Force on the Continent had been destroyed and Germany had the resources of all of Europe to draw upon and no Western front to tie her hands. All through 1941, 1942 and 1943 Stalin was to complain bitterly that there was no second front in Europe against Germany and that Russia was forced to bear the brunt of containing almost the entire German Army. In 1939-40, there was a Western front to draw off the German forces. And Poland couId not have been overrun in a fortnight if the Russians had backed her instead of stabbing her in the back. Moreover, there might not have been any war at all if Hitler had known he must take on Russia as well as Poland, England and France. Even the politically timid German generals, if one can judge from their later testimony at Nuremberg, might have put their foot down against embarking on war against such a formidable coalition. Toward the end of May, according to the French ambassador in Berlin, both Keitel and Brauchitsch had warned Hitler that Germany had little chance of winning a war in which Russia participated on the enemy side.

 

No statesmen, not even dictators, can foretell the course of events over the long run. It is arguable, as Churchill has argued, that cold-blooded as Stalin's move was in making a deal with Hitler, it was also "at the moment realistic in a high degree." [39] Stalin's first and primary consideration, as was that of any other head of government, was his nation's security. He was convinced in the summer of 1939, as he later told Churchill, that Hitler was going to war. He was determined that Russia should not be maneuvered into the disastrous position of having to face the German Army alone. If a foolproof alliance with the West proved impossible, then why not turn to Hitler, who suddenly was knocking at his door?

 

By the end of July 1939, Stalin had become convinced, it is obvious, not only that France and Britain did not want a binding alliance but that the objective of the Chamberlain government in Britain was to induce Hitler to make his wars in Eastern Europe. He seems to have been intensely skeptical that Britain would honor its guarantee to Poland any more than France had kept its obligations to Czechoslovakia. And everything that had happened in the West for the past two years tended to increase his suspicions: the rejection by Chamberlain of Soviet proposals, after the Anschluss and after the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, for conferences to draw up plans to halt further Nazi aggression; Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at Munich, from which Russia had been excluded; the delays and hesitations of Chamberlain in negotiating a defensive alliance against Germany as the fateful summer days of 1939 ticked by.

 

One thing was certain -- to almost everyone but Chamberlain. The bankruptcy of Anglo-French diplomacy, which had faltered and tottered whenever Hitler made a move, was now complete. [xviii] Step by step, the two Western democracies had retreated: when Hitler defied them by declaring conscription in 1935, when he occupied the Rhineland in 1936, when he took Austria in 1938 and in the same year demanded and got the Sudetenland; and they had sat by weakly when he occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. With the Soviet Union on their side, they still might have dissuaded the German dictator from launching war or, if that failed, have fairly quickly defeated him in an armed conflict. But they had allowed this last opportunity to slip out of their hands. [xix] Now, at the worst

 

 

 

possible time in the worst possible circumstances, they were committed to come to the aid of Poland when she was attacked.

 

The recriminations in London and Paris against the double-dealing of Stalin were loud and bitter. The Soviet despot for years had cried out at the "fascist beasts" and called for all peace-loving states to band together to halt Nazi aggression. Now he had made himself an accessory to it. The Kremlin could argue, as it did, that the Soviet Union had only done what Britain and France had done the year before at Munich: bought peace and the time to rearm against Germany at the expense of a small state. If Chamberlain was right and honorable in appeasing Hitler in September 1938 by sacrificing Czechoslovakia, was Stalin wrong and dishonorable in appeasing the Fuehrer a year later at the expense of Poland, which had shunned Soviet help anyway?

 

Stalin's cynical and secret deal with Hitler to divide up Poland and to obtain a free hand to gobble up Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Bessarabia was not known outside Berlin and Moscow, but it would soon become evident from Soviet acts, and it would shock most of the world even at this late date. The Russians might say, as they did, that they were only repossessing territories which had been taken away from them at the end of the First World War. But the peoples of these lands were not Russian and had shown no desire to return to Russia. Only force, which the Soviets had eschewed in the heyday of Litvinov, could make them return.

 

Since joining the League of Nations the Soviet Union had built up a certain moral force as the champion of peace and the leading opponent of fascist aggression. Now that moral capital had been utterly dissipated.

 

Above an, by assenting to a shoddy deal with Nazi Germany, Stalin had given the signal for the commencement of a war that almost certainly would develop into a world conflict. This he certainly knew. [xx] As things turned out, it was the greatest blunder of his life.

 

_______________

 

[b]Notes:[/b]

 

i. See p. 523.

ii. The only source found for what happened at this meeting is in the unpublished  diary of General Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff. It is the first entry,  August 14, 1939. Halder kept his diary in Gabelsberger shorthand and it is an  immensely valuable record of the most confidential military and political goings  on in Nazi Germany from August 14, 1939, to September 24, 1942, when he was  dismissed from his post. The Obersalzberg entry consists of Halder's shorthand  notes jotted down while Hitler spoke and a summary which he added at the end. It is  strange that no American or British publisher has published the Halder diary. The  writer had access to the German longhand version of it, transcribed by Halder himself,  during the writing of this vclume. Hitler's daily record book confirms the  date of this meeting and adds that besides the commanders in chief, Brauchitsch,  Goering and Raeder, Dr. Toot, the engineer who built the West Wall, also was  present.

 

iii. Dahlerus told the Nuremberg tribunal on March 19, 1946, when he was on the  stand as a witness for Goering, that the Field Marshal had assured the British  businessmen "on his word of honor" that he would do everything in his power to  avert war. But Goering's state of mind at this time may have been more accurately  expressed in a statement he made two days after seeing the British visitors. In  boasting about the Luftwaffe's air defenses, he said, "The Ruhr will not be subjected  to a single bomb. If an enemy bomber reaches the Ruhr, my name is not  Hermann Goering: you can call me Meier!" -- a boast he was soon to rue.

 

 iv. Naujocks had a hand in the "Venlo Incident," which will be recounted further on.  He was involved in an undertaking to disguise German soldiers in Dutch and Belgian  frontier guard uniforms at the time of the invasion of the West in May 1940.  Early in the war, he managed a section of the S.D. which forged passports and  while thus employed proposed "Operation Bernhard," a fantastic plan to drop  forged British banknotes over England. Heydrich eventually tired of him and forced  him to serve in the ranks of an S.S. regiment in Russia, where he was wounded. In  1944 Naujocks turned up in Belgium as an economic administrator, but his principal  job at that time appears to have been to carry out in Denmark the murder of  a number of members of the Danish resistance movement. He probably deserted  to the American Army in Belgium to save his neck. In fact, he had a charmed  life. Held as a war criminal, he made a dramatic escape from a special camp in  Germany for war criminals in 1946 and thus escaped trial. At the time of writing,  he has never been apprehended or heard of. An account of his escape is given in  Schaumburg-Lippe, Zwischen Krone und Kerker.

 

v. S.S. Oberfuehrer Dr. Mehlhorn, who administered the S.D. under Heydrich. Schellenberg, in his memoirs (The Labyrinth, pp. 48-50), recounts that Mehlhorn told him on August 26 that he had been put in charge of staging the faked attack at Gleiwitzbut that Mehlhorn got out of it by feigning illness. Mehlhorn's stomach grew stronger in later years. During the war he was a notable instigator of Gestapo terror in Poland.

 

vi. The submarines sailed between August 19 and 23, the Grat Spee on the twenty-first and the Deutschland on the twenty-fourth.

 

 

 

vii. The British government soon learned of this. On August 17 Sumner Welles, the U.S. Undersecretary of State, informed the British ambassador in Washington of Molotov's suggestions to Schulenburg. The American ambassador in Moscow had wired them to Washington the day before and they were deadly accurate. [11] Ambassador Steinhardt had seen Molotov on August 16.

 

 

viii. It was signed in Berlin at 2 A.M. on Sunday, August 20.

 

ix. No official minutes of Hitler's harangue have been found, but several records of  it. two of them made by high-ranking officers from notes jotted down during the  meeting, have come to light. One by Admiral Hermann Boehm. Chief of the High  Seas Fleet. was submilted at Nuremberg in Admiral Raeder's defense and is  published in the original German in TMWC. XLI, pp. 16-25. General Halder made  voluminous notes in his unique Gabelsberger shorthand, and an English translation  of them from his diary entry of August 22 is published in DGFP, VII, pp. 557-59.  The chief document of the session used by the prosecution as evidence in the  Nuremberg trial was an unsigned memorandum in two parts from the OKW files  which were captured by American troops at Saalfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. It is  printed in English translation in NCA, III, pp. 581-86 (Nuremberg Document 798-PS), 665-66 (N.D. 1014-PS), and also in DGFP, VII, pp. 200-6. The original  German text of the two-part memorandum is, of course. in the TMWC volumes. It  makes Hitler's language somewhat more lively than do Admiral Boehm and General  Halder. But all three versions are similar in content and there can be no doubt of  their authenticity. At Nuremberg there was some doubt about a fourth account  of Hitler's speech, listed as N.D. C·3 (NCA, VII, pp. 752-54), and though it was  referred to in the proceedings the prosecution did not submit it in evidence. While  it undoubtedly rings true, it may have been embellished a little by persons who were  not present at the meeting at the Berghof. In piecing together Hitler's remarks  I have used the records of Boehm and Halder and the unsigned memorandum  submitted at Nuremberg as evidence.

 

x. "Dirty dog."

 

xi. According to the account in Nuremberg Document C-3 (see footnote above, p. 529), Goering jumped up on the table and gave "bloodthirsty thanks and bloody promises. He danced around like a savage. The few doubtful ones remained silent." This description greatly nettled Goering during an interrogation at Nuremberg on August 28 and 29, 1945. "I dispute the fact that I stood on the table," Goering said. "I want you to know that the speech was made in the great hall of Hitler's private house. I did not have the habit of jumping on tables in private homes. That would have been an attitude completely inconsistent with that of a German officer."

 

"Well, the fact is." Colonel John H. Amen, the American interrogator, said at this point, "that you led the applause after the speech, didn't you?"

 

"Yes, but not on the table," Goering rejoined. [27]

 

xii. "A humiliating experience," Strang had called it in a dispatch to the Foreign  Office on July 20. [28]

 

xiii. The timing is important. Molotov did not receive the Nazi proposal that Ribbentrop  come to Moscow until the evening of August 15. (See above, p. 520.) And  though he did not accept it definitely he did hint that Russia would be interested in  a nonaggression pact with Germany, which of course would have made negotiation  of a military alliance with France and Britain superfluous. The best conclusion this  writer can come to is that, as of August 14, when Voroshilov demanded an "unequivocal  answer" to the question of allowing Soviet troops to meet the Germans  in Poland, the Kremlin still had an open mind as to which side to join. Unfortunately  the Russian documents, which could clear up this crucial question, have  not been published. At any rate, Stalin does not seem to have made his final  decision until the afternoon of August 19. (See above, p. 526.)

 

xiv. Lloyd George, in a speech in the Commons on April 3, four days after Chamberlain's  unilateral guarantee to Poland had been announced, had urged the British  government to make such a condition. "If we are going in without the help of  Russia we are walking into a trap. It is the only country whose armies can get  there [to Poland].... I cannot understand why, before committing ourselves to  this tremendous enterprise, we did not secure beforehand the adhesion of Russia  ... If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings the  Poles have that they do not want the Russians there, it is for us to declare the  conditions, and unless the Poles are prepared to accept the only conditions with  which we can successfully help them, the responsibility must be theirs."

 

xv. At a session of the military delegates the morning before, on August 21, Voroshilov had demanded the indefinite adjournment of the talks on the excuse that he and his colleagues would be busy with the autumn maneuvers. To the Anglo-French protests at such a delay the Marshal had answered, "The intentions of the Soviet Delegation were, and still are, to agree on the organization of military co-operation of the armed forces of the three parties ... The U.S.S.R., not having a common frontier with Germany, can give help to France, Britain, Poland and Rumania, only on condition that her troops are given rights of passage across Polish and Rumanian territory ... The Soviet forces cannot co-operate with the armed forces of Britain and France if they are not allowed onto Polish and Rumanian territory ... The Soviet Military Delegation cannot picture to itself how the governments and general staffs of Britain and France, in sending their missions to the U.S.S.R.... could not have given them some directives on such an elementary matter ... This can only show that there are reasons to doubt their desire to come to serious and effective co-operation with the U.S.S.R."

 

The logic of the Marshal's military argument was sound and the failure of the French and especially the British governments to answer it would prove disastrous. But to have repeated it -- with all the rest of the statement -- on this late date, August 21, when Voroshilov could not have been ignorant of Stalin's decision of August 19, was deceitful.

 

xvi. The wording of the essential articles is almost identical to that of a Soviet draft which Molotov handed Schulenburg on August 19 and which Hitler, in his telegram to Stalin, said he accepted. The Russian draft had specified that the nonaggression treaty would be valid only if a "special protocol" were signed simultaneously and made an integral part of the pact. [34]

 

According to Friedrich Gaus, who participated at the evening meeting, a highfalutin preamble which Ribbentrop wanted to insert stressing the formation of friendly Soviet-German relations was thrown out at the insistence of Stalin. The Soviet dictator complained that "the Soviet government could not suddenly present to the public assurances of friendship after they had been covered with pails of manure by the Nazi government for six years." [35]

 

xvii. Article VII provided for the treaty to enter into force immediately upon signature. Formal ratification in two such totalitarian states was, to be sure, a mere formality. But it would take a few days. Hitler had insisted on this provision.

 

 

The British ambassador informed London that the State Secretary was confident that the Soviet Union "would in the end join in sharing the Polish spoils." (British Blue Book, p. 91.) And Coulondre, after his talk with Weizsaecker, wired Paris: "It is necessary at all costs to come to some solution of the Russian talks as soon as possible." (French Yellow Book, p. 282.)

 

Throughout June and July, Laurence Steinhardt, the American ambassador in Moscow, had also sent warnings of an impending Soviet-Nazi deal, which President Roosevelt passed on to the British, French and Polish embassies. As early as July 5, when Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky left for a leave in Russia, he carried with him a message from Roosevelt to Stalin "that if his government joined up with Hitler, it was as certain as that the night followed day that as soon as Hitler had conquered France he would turn on Russia." (Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow, p. 450.) The President's warning was cabled to Steinhardt with instructions to repeat it to Molotov, which the ambassador did on August 16. (U.S. Diplomatic Papers, 1939, I, pp. 296-99.)

 

xx. Years before, Hitler had written prophetically in Mein Kampf: "The very fact of the conclusion of an alliance with Russia embodies a plan for the next war. Its outcome would be the end of Germany." (See p. 660 of the Houghton Mifflin edition, 1943.)

 

 

Go to Next Page