IV: REBUILDING TODAY’S ARMED SERVICES

Executing the variety of missions outlined above depends upon the capabilities of the U.S. armed services. For the past decade, the health of the armed services has steadily declined. Not merely have their budgets been dramatically reduced, their force structures cut and their personnel strength sapped, modernization programs starved and efforts at transformation strangled, but the quality of military life, essential for preserving a volunteer force, has been degraded. From barracks to headquarters to maintenance bay, the services’ infrastructure has suffered from neglect. The quality of military housing, especially abroad, ill becomes a great nation. The other sinews of a strong service, particularly including the military education and training systems, have been disproportionately and shortsightedly reduced. Shortages of manpower result in soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines spending increased amounts of time on base maintenance – mowing grass, repairing roofs, “painting rocks.” Most disappointing of all, military culture and the confidence of service members in their senior leaders is suffering. As several recent studies and surveys have demonstrated, civil-military relations in contemporary America are increasingly tense.

Army: To ‘Complete’ Europe And Defend the Persian Gulf

Of all the armed services, the Army has been most profoundly changed by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. The Army’s active-duty strength has been reduced by 40 percent and its European garrison by three quarters. At the end of the Cold War, the Army budget was 50 percent higher than it is this year; its procurement spending almost 70 percent higher.

Elements of U.S. Army Europe should be redeployed to Southeast Europe, while a permanent unit should be based in the Persian Gulf region.

At the same time, the Army’s role in post-Cold-War military operations remains the measure of American geopolitical commitment. In the 1991 Gulf War, the limits of Bush Administration policy were revealed by the reluctance to engage in land combat and the limit on ground operations within the Kuwait theater. In the Balkans, relatively short air campaigns have been followed by extended ground operations; even the 78 days of Operation Allied Force pale in comparison to the long-term effort to stabilize Kosovo. In short, the value of land power continues to appeal to a global superpower, whose security interests rest upon maintaining and expanding a world-wide system of alliances as well as on the ability to win wars. While maintaining its combat role, the U.S. Army has acquired new missions in the past decade – most immediately, missions associated with completing the task of creating a Europe “whole and free” and defending American interests in the Persian Gulf and Middle East.

These new missions will require the continued stationing of U.S. Army units abroad. Although these units should be reconfigured and repositioned to reflect current realities, their value as a representation of America’s role as the prime guarantor of security is as great as their immediate war-fighting capabilities. Indeed, the greatest problem confronting the Army today is providing sufficient forces for both these vital missions; the Army is simply too small to do both well.

These broad missions will continue to justify the requirement for a large active U.S. Army. The Army’s increasing use of reserve component forces for these constabulary missions breaks the implied compact with reservists that their role is to serve as a hedge against a genuine military emergency. As long as the U.S. garrisons in the Balkans, for example, require large numbers of linguists, military police, civil affairs and other specialists, the active-duty Army must boost its ranks of soldiers with these skills. Likewise, as high-intensity combat changes, the Army must find new ways to recruit and retain soldiers with high-technology skills, perhaps creating partnerships with industry for extremely skilled reservists, or considering some skills as justifying a warrant-officer, rather than an enlisted, rank structure. In particular, the Army should:

• Be restored in active-duty strength and structure to meet the requirements of its current missions. Overall active strength should rise to approximately 525,000 soldiers from the current strength of 475,000. Much of this increase should bolster the over-deployed and undermanned units that provide combat support and combat service support, such as military intelligence, military police, and other similar units.

•  Undertake selective modernization efforts, primarily to increase its tactical and operational mobility and increase the effectiveness of current combat systems through “digitization” – the process of creating tactical information networks. The Army should accelerate its plans to purchase medium-weight vehicles, acquire the Comanche helicopter and the HIMARS rocket-artillery system; likewise, the heavy Crusader artillery system, though a highly capable howitzer, is an unwise investment given the Army’s current capabilities and future needs, and should be canceled.

• Improve the combat readiness of current units by increasing personnel strength and revitalizing combat training.

• Make efforts to improve the quality of soldier life to sustain the current “middle class,” professional Army.

• Be repositioned and reconfigured in light of current strategic realities: elements of U.S. Army Europe should be redeployed to Southeast Europe, while a permanent unit should be based in the Persian Gulf region; simultaneously, forward-deployed Army units should be reconfigured to be better capable of independent operations that include ongoing constabulary missions as well as the initial phases of combat.

• Reduce the strength of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, yet recognize that these components are meant to provide a hedge against a genuine, large-scale, unanticipated military emergency; the continuing reliance on large numbers of reservists for constabulary missions is inappropriate and short-sighted.

• Have its budget increased from the current level of $70 billion annually to $90 to $95 billion per year.

The Current State of the Army

Measuring by its ability to perform any of the missions outlined above – overseas presence, fighting major theater wars, transforming for the future – the Army today is ill prepared. The most immediate problem is the decline in current readiness. Until the spring of 1998, the Army had managed to contain the worst effects of frequent deployments, keeping its so-called “first-to-fight” units ready to react to a crisis that threatened to become a major theater war. But now, as recently retired Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer explained to Congress:

[C]ommanders Army-wide report that they are reducing the frequency, scope, and duration of their exercises…. Additionally, commanders are not always able to make training as realistic and demanding as they would like. In some cases, commands are not able to afford the optimum mix of simulations to live-fire training events, resulting in less-experienced staffs. Several commands report that they are unable to afford the participation of their aviation units in Combat Training Center rotations. Overall, affordable training compromises are lowering the training proficiency bar and resulting in inexperience….Already, readiness at the battalion level is starting to decline – a fact that is not going unnoticed at our Combat Training Centers.

In recent years, both the quality and quantity of such training has diminished. Typically, in prior years, a rotational unit might have eight battalion-level field training “battles” prior to its Fort Irwin rotation, and another eight while at the training center. Today, heavy forces almost never conduct full battalion field exercises, and now are lucky to get more than six at the National Training Center.

Like the other services, the Army continues to be plagued by low levels of manning in critical combat and maintenance specialties. Army leaders frankly admit that they have too few soldiers to man their current force structure, and shortages of NCOs and officers are increasingly com- on. For example, in Fiscal Year 1997, the Army had only 67 percent to 88 percent of its needs in the four maintenance specialties for its tanks and mechanized infantry vehicles. In the officer ranks, there are significant shortfalls in the captain and major grades. The result of these shortages in the field is that junior officers and NCOs are being asked to assume the duties of the next higher grade; the “ultimate effect,” reported Gen. Reimer, “is a reduction in experience, particularly at the…‘tip of the spear.’”

The Army’s ability to meet its major-war requirements, particularly on the timetables demanded by the war plans of the theater commanders-in- chief, is uncertain at best. Although on paper the Army can meet these requirements, the true state of affairs is more complex. The major- theater- war review conducted for the QDR assumed that each unit would arrive on the battlefield fully trained and ready, but manpower and training shortages across the Army make that a doubtful proposition, at least without delays in deployment. Even could the immediate manpower shortages be remedied, any attempt to improve training – as was done even in the run-up to Operation Desert Storm – would prove to be a significant bottleneck. The Army’s maneuver training centers are not able to increase capacity sufficiently or rapidly enough. Under the current two-war metric, high-intensity combat is envisioned as a “come-as- you-are” affair, and the Army today is significantly less well prepared for such wars  than it was in 1990.

Army Forces Based In the United States

The primary missions of Army units based in the United States are to rapidly reinforce forward-deployed units in times of crisis or combat and to provide units capable of reacting to unanticipated contingencies. In addition, the service must continue to raise, train and equip all Army forces, including those of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. While the reforming the posture of its forces abroad is perhaps the largest task facing the Army for the immediate future, it is inevitably intertwined with the need to rebuild and reconfigure the Army at home.

The need to respond with decisive force in the event of a major theater war in Europe, the Persian Gulf or East Asia will remain the principal factor in determining Army force structure for U.S.-based units. However one judges the likelihood of such wars occurring, it is essential to retain sufficient capabilities to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion, including the possibility of a decisive victory that results in long-term political or regime change. The current stateside active Army force structure – 23 maneuver brigades – is barely adequate to meet the potential demands. Not only are these units few in number, but their combat readiness has been allowed to slip dangerously over recent years. Manning levels have dropped and training opportunities have been diminished and degraded. These units need to be returned to high states of readiness and, most importantly, must regain their focus on their combat missions.

The Army needs to restore units based in the United States – those needed in the event of a major theater war – to high states of readiness.

Because the divisional structure still remains an economical and effective organization in large-scale operations as well as an efficient administrative structure, the division should remain the basic unit for most stateside Army forces, even while the service creates new, smaller independent organizations for operations abroad. The Army is currently undergoing a redesign of the basic divisional structure, reducing the size of the basic maneuver battalion in response to the improvements that advanced technologies and the untapped capabilities of current systems permit. This is a modest but important step that will make these units more deployable, and the Army must continue to introduce similar modifications. Moreover, Army training should continue its emphasis on combined-arms, task-force combat operations. In the continental United States, Army force structure should consist of three fully-manned, three-brigade heavy divisions; two light divisions; and two airborne divisions. In addition, the stateside Army should retain four armored cavalry regiments in its active structure, plus several experimental units devoted to transformation activities. This would total approximately 27 ground maneuver brigade-equivalents.

Yet such a force, though capable of delivering and sustaining significant combat power for initial missions, will remain inadequate to the full range of strategic tasks facing the Army. Thus, the service must increasingly rely on Guard units to execute a portion of its potential warfighting missions, not seek to foist overseas presence missions off on what should remain part-time soldiers. To allow the Army National Guard to play its essential role in fighting large-scale wars, the Army must take a number of steps to ensure the readiness of Guard units. The first is to better link the Guard to the active-duty force, providing adequate resources to increase the combat effectiveness of large Guard units, perhaps to include the partial manning of the first-to-deploy Guard brigades with an active command cadre. Secondly, the Guard’s overall structure must be adjusted and the overall number of Army National Guard units – and especially Guard infantry divisions – reduced. This would not only eliminate unnecessary formations but would permit improved manning of the first-to-fight Guard units, which need to be manned at levels significantly above 100 percent personnel strength to allow for timely deployment during crises and war.

In addition, the Army needs to rationalize the missions of the Army Reserve. Without the efforts of Reservists over the past decade, the Army’s ability to conduct the large number of contingency operations it has faced would be severely compromised. Yet the effort to rationalize deployments, as discussed in the previous section, would also result in a reduction of demand for Army Reservists, particularly those with highly specialized skills. Once the missions in the Balkans, for example, are admitted to be long-term deployments, the role of Army Reserve forces should be diminished and the active Army should assume all but a very small share of the mission.

Returning the National Guard to its traditional role would allow for a reduction in strength while lessening the strain of repeated contingency operation deployments.

In sum, the missions of the Army’s two reserve components must be adjusted to post-Cold-War realities as must the missions of the active component. The importance of these citizen-soldiers in linking an increasingly professional force to the mainstream of American society has never been greater, and the failure to make the necessary adjustments to their mission has jeopardized those links. The Army National Guard should retain its traditional role as a hedge against the need for a larger- than-anticipated force in combat; indeed, it may play a larger role in U.S. war-planning than heretofore. It should not be used primarily to provide combat service support to active Army units engaged in current operations. A return to its traditional role would allow for a further modest strength reduction in the Army National Guard. Such a move would also lessen the strain of repeated deployments in contingency operations, which is jeopardizing the model of the part-time soldier upon which Guard is premised. Similarly, the Army Reserve should retain its traditional role as a federal force, a supplement to the active force, but demands for individual augmentees for contingency operations reduced through improvements to active Army operations and deployments, organizations, and even added personnel strength. In the event that American forces become embroiled in two large-scale wars at once, or nearly at once, Army reserve components may provide the edge for decisive operations. Such a capability is a cornerstone of U.S. military strategy, not to be frittered away in ongoing contingency operations.

A second mission for Army units based in the United States is to respond to unanticipated contingencies. With more forward-based units deployed along an expanded American security perimeter around the globe, these unforeseen crises should be less debilitating. Units like the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions and the Army’s two light infantry divisions, as well as the small elements of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, that are kept on high alert, will continue to provide these needed capabilities. So will Army special operations units such as the 75th Ranger Regiment. Moreover, the creation of middle-weight, independent units will begin the process of transforming the Army for future contingency needs. As the transformation process matures, a wider variety of Army units will be suitable for unanticipated contingency operations.

Forward-based Forces

American military presence abroad draws heavily on ground forces and the Army, which is the service best suited to these long-term missions. In the post-Cold-War environment, these forward-based forces are, in essence, conducting reconnaissance and security missions. The units involved are required to maintain peace and stability in the regions they patrol, provide early warning of imminent crises, and to shape the early stages of any conflict that might occur while additional forces are deployed from the United States or elsewhere. By virtue of this mission, these units should be self-contained, combined-arms units with a wide variety of capabilities, able to operate over long distances, with sophisticated means of communication and access to high levels of U.S. intelligence. Currently, most forward-based Army units do not meet this description.

Such requirements suggest that such units should be approximately brigade or regimental-sized formations, perhaps 5,000 strong. They will need sufficient personnel strength to be able to conduct sustained traditional infantry missions, but with the mobility to operate over extended areas. They must have enough direct firepower to dominate their immediate tactical situation, and suitable fire support to prevent such relatively small and independent units from being overrun. However, the need for fire support need not entail large amounts of integral artillery or other forms of sup-porting firepower. While some artillery will prove necessary, a substantial part of the fire support should come from Army attack aviation and deeper fixed-wing interdiction. The combination of overwhelming superiority in direct-fire  engagements, typified by the performance of the Bradley fighting vehicle and M1 Abrams tank in the Gulf War (and indeed, in the performance of the Marines’ Light Armored Vehicle), as well as the improved accuracy and lethality of artillery fires, plus the capabilities of U.S. strike aircraft, will provide such units with a very substantial combat capability.

These forward-based, independent units will be increasingly built around the acquisition and management of information. This will be essential for combat operations – precise, long-range fires require accurate and timely intelligence and robust communications links – but also for stability operations. Units stationed in the Balkans, or Turkey, or in Southeast Asia, will require the ability to understand and operate in unique political- military environments, and the seemingly tactical decisions made by soldiers on the ground may have strategic consequences. While some of these needs can be fulfilled by civilians, both Americans and local nationals, units stationed on the American security frontier must have the capabilities, cohesion and personnel continuity their mission demands. Chief among them is an awareness of the security and political environment in which they are operating. Especially those forces stationed in volatile regions must have their own human intelligence collection capacity, perhaps through an attached special forces  unit if not solely through an organic intelligence unit.

The technologies required to field such forces already exist and many are already in production or in the Army inventory. New force designs and the application of information technologies can give new utility to existing weaponry. However, the problem of mobility and weight becomes an even more pressing problem should ground forces be positioned in Southeast Asia. Even forward-based forces would need to be rapidly deployed over very long distances in times of crisis, both through fast sealift and airlift; in short, every pound and every cubic foot must count. In designing such forces, the Army should consider more innovative approaches. One short-term approach could be to build such a unit around the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft now being built for the Marine Corps and for special operations forces. A second interim approach would be to expand the capabilities of current air-mobile infantry, by adding refueling probes to existing helicopters, as on special operations aircraft. Another approach could involve the construction of truly fast sealift vessels.

In sum, it should be clear that these independent, forward-based Army units can become “change-agents” within the service, opening opportunities for transformational concepts, even as they perform vital stability operations in their regions. In addition, such units would need to train for combat operations on a regular basis, and will require new training centers as well as new garrisons in more relevant strategic locations. They will operate in a more dispersed manner reflecting new concepts of combat operations as well as the demands of current stability operations. In urban areas or in the jungles of Southeast Asia, they will operate in complex terrain that may more accurately predict future warfare. Certainly, new medium-weight or air-mobile units will provide a strong incentive to begin to transform the Army more fundamentally for the future. Not only would increased mobility and information capabilities allow for new ways of conducting operations, the lack of heavy armor would mandate new tactics, doctrines and organizations. Even among those units equipped with the current Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle, the requirement for independent operations, closer ties to other services’ forces and introduction of new intelligence and communications capabilities would result in innovation. Most profoundly, such new units and concepts would give the process of transformation a purpose within the Army; soldiers would be a part of the process and take its lessons to heart, breaking down bureaucratic resistance to change.

American landpower is the essential link in the chain that translates U.S. military supremacy into American geopolitical preeminence.

In addition to these  newer force designs for Europe, the Gulf, and elsewhere in East Asia, the Army should retain a force approximating that currently based in Korea. In addition to headquarters units there, the U.S. ground force presence is built around the two brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division. This unit is already a hybrid, neither a textbook heavy division nor a light division. While retaining the divisional structure to allow for the smooth introduction of follow-on forces in times of crisis, the Army also should begin to redesign this unit to allow for longer-range operations. Because of the massive amount of North Korean artillery, counter-battery artillery fires will play an important role in any war on the peninsula, suggesting that improving the rocket artillery capabilities of the U.S. division is a modest but wise investment. Likewise, increasing the aviation and attack helicopter assets of U.S. ground forces in Korea would give commanders options they do not now have. The main heavy forces of the South Korean army are well trained and equipped, but optimized for defending Seoul and the Republic of Korea as far north as possible. In time, the 2nd Infantry Division’s two brigades might closely resemble the kind of independent, combined-arms forces needed elsewhere.

Army Modernization and Budgets

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has suffered dramatic budget cutbacks, particularly in weapons procurement  and research, that have resulted in the degradation of current readiness described above and have restricted the service’s ability to modernize and innovate for the future. The Army’s current attempts at transformation have been hobbled by the need to find “bill-payers” within the Army budget.

In Fiscal Year 1992, the first post-Cold-War and post-Gulf War Army budget was $91 billion measured in constant 2000 dollars. This year, the Congress has approved $69.5 billion for Army operations – including several billion to pay for operations in the Balkans – and President Clinton’s request for 2001 is $70.6 billion, more than $2 billion of which will be allocated to Balkans operations. Likewise, Army procurement spending is way down. Through the Clinton years, service procurement has averaged around $8 billion, dipping to a low of $7.1 billion in 1995; the 2000 request was for $9.7 billion, by far the largest Army procurement request since the Gulf War. By contrast, Army weapons purchases averaged about $23 billion per year during the early and mid-1980s, when the current generation of major combat systems – the M1 tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Apache and Black Hawk helicopters and Patriot missile system – entered production.

In addition to terminating the Crusader artillery program, the Army’s annual budget must increase to the $90 to $95 billion level to finance current missions and the Army’s long-term transformation.

To field an Army capable of meeting the new missions and challenges discussed above, service budgets must return to the level of approximately $90 to $95 billion in constant 2000 dollars. Some of this increase would help the Army fill out both its under-manned units and refurbish the institutional Army, as well as increasing the readiness of Army National Guard units. New acquisition programs would include light armored vehicles, “digitized” command and control networks and other situational awareness systems, the Comanche helicopter, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Renewed investments in Army infrastructure would improve the quality of soldier life. The process of transformation would be reinvigorated. But, as the discussion of Army requirements above indicates, Army investments must be redirected as well as increased. For example, the Crusader artillery program, while perhaps the most advanced self-propelled howitzer ever produced, is difficult to justify under conditions of revolutionary change. The costs of the howitzer, not merely in budgetary terms but in terms of the opportunity cost of a continuing commitment to an increasingly outmoded paradigm of warfare, far outweigh the benefits; the Crusader should be terminated. However, addressing the Army’s many challenges will require significantly increased funding. Though the active-duty force is 40 percent smaller than its total at the end of the Cold War, several generations of Army leadership have chosen to retain troop strength, paid for by cuts in procurement and research. This cannot continue. While the Army may be too small for the variety of missions discussed above, its larger need is for reinvestment, recapitalization and, especially, transformation. Taken together, these needs far exceed the savings to be garnered by any possible internal reforms or efficiencies. Terminating marginal programs like the Crusader howitzer, trimming administrative overhead, base closings and the like will not free up resources enough to finance the radical overhaul the Army needs.

American landpower remains the essential link in the chain that translates U.S. military supremacy into American geopolitical preeminence. Even as the means for delivering firepower on the battlefield shift – strike aircraft have realized all but the wildest dreams of air power enthusiasts, unmanned aerial vehicles promise to extend strike power in the near future, and the ability to conduct strikes from space appears on the not-too- distant horizon – the need for ground maneuvers to achieve decisive political results endures. Regimes are difficult to change based upon punishment alone. If land forces are to survive and retain their unique strategic purpose in a world where it is increasingly easy to deliver firepower precisely at long ranges, they must change as well, becoming more stealthy, mobile, deployable and able to operate in a dispersed fashion. The U.S. Army, and American land forces more generally, must increasingly complement the strike capabilities of the other services. Conversely, an American military force that lacks the ability to employ ground forces that can survive and maneuver rapidly on future battlefields will deprive U.S. political leaders of a decisive tool of diplomacy.

Air Force: Toward a Global First-Strike Force

The past decade has been the best of times and worst of times for the U.S. Air Force. From the Gulf War to Operation Allied Force over Kosovo, the increasing sophistication of American air power – with its stealth aircraft; precision-guided munitions; all-weather and all-hours capabilities; and the professionalism of pilots, planners and support crews – has allowed the Air Force to boast legitimately of its “global reach, global power.” On short notice, Air Force aircraft can attack virtually any  target on earth with great accuracy and virtual impunity. American air  power has become a metaphor for as well as the literal manifestation of American military preeminence.

Specialized Air Force aircraft, like the JSTARS above, are too few in number to meet current mission demands.

Simultaneously, the Air Force has been reduced by a third or more, and its operations have been increasingly diffused. In addition, the Air Force has taken on so many new missions that its fundamental structure has been changed. During the Cold War, the Air Force was geared to fight a large-scale air battle to clear the skies of Soviet aircraft; today’s Air Force is increasingly shaped to continue monotonous no-fly-zone operations, conduct periodic punitive strikes, or to execute measured, low- risk, no-fault air campaigns like Allied Force. The service’s new “Air Expeditionary Force” concept turns the classic, big-war “air campaign” model largely on its head.

Like the Army, the Air Force continues to operate Cold-War era systems in this new strategic and operational environment. The Air Force’s frontline fighter aircraft, the F-15 and F- 6, were built to out-perform more numerous Soviet fighters; U.S. support aircraft, from AWACS and JSTARS command-and-control planes to electronic jamming aircraft to tankers, were meant to work in tandem with large numbers of American fighters. The U.S. bomber fleet’s primary mission was nuclear deterrence.

The Air Force also has begun to purchase new generations of manned combat aircraft that were designed during the late Cold War; the F-22 and, especially, the Joint Strike Fighter, are a response to requirements established long ago. Conversely, the decision to terminate the B-2 bomber program was taken before its effectiveness as a long-range, precision, conventional-strike platform was established; in the wake of Operation Allied Force, regional commanders-in-chief have begun to reevaluate how such a capability might serve their uses. Further, the Air Force should reevaluate the need for greater numbers of long-range systems. In some regions, the ability to operate from tactical airfields is increasingly problematic and in others – notably East Asia – the theater is simply so vast that even “tactical,” in-theater operations will require long- range capabilities.

In sum, the Air Force has begun to adapt itself to the new requirements of the time, yet is far from completing the needed changes to its posture, structure, or programs. Moreover, the Air Force is too small – especially its fleet of support aircraft – and poorly positioned to conduct sustained operations for maintaining American military preeminence. Air Force procurement funds have been reduced, and service  leaders have cut back on purchases of spare parts, support aircraft, and even replacements for current fighters in an attempt to keep the F-22 program on track. Although air power remains the most flexible and responsive element of U.S. military power, the Air Force needs to be restructured, repositioned, revitalized and enlarged to assure continued “global reach, global power.” In particular, the Air Force should:

• Be redeployed to  reflect the shifts in international politics. Independent, expeditionary air wings containing a broad mix of aircraft, including electronic warfare, airborne  command and control, and other support aircraft, should be based in Italy, Southeastern Europe, central and perhaps eastern Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia.

•  Realign the remaining Air Force units in Europe, Asia and the United States to optimize their capabilities to conduct multiple large-scale air campaigns.

• Make selected investments in current generations of combat and support aircraft to sustain the F-15 and F-16 fleets for longer service life, purchase additional sets of avionics for special-mission fighters, increase planned fleets of AWACS, JSTARS and other electronic support planes, and expand stocks of precision-guided munitions.

• Develop plans to increase electronic warfare support fleets, such as by creating “Wild Weasel” and jammer aircraft based upon the F-15E airframe.

• Restore the condition of the institutional Air Force, expanding its personnel strength, rebuilding its corps of pilots and experienced maintenance NCOs, expanding support specialties such as intelligence and special police and reinvigorating its training establishment.

• Overall Air Force active personnel strength should be gradually increased by approximately 30,000 to 40,000, and the service should rebuild a structure of 18 to 19 active and 8 reserve wing equivalents.

The State of the Air Force

Also like the Army, in recent years the Air Force has undertaken missions fundamentally different than those assigned during the Cold War. The years since the fall of the Berlin Wall have been anything but predictable. In 1997, the Air Force had four times more forces deployed than in 1989, the last year of the Cold War, but one third fewer personnel on active duty. Modernization has slowed to a crawl. Under such circumstances, the choices made to build a warfighting force can become liabilities. As Thomas Moorman, vice chief of staff of the Air Force from 1994 through 1997, has stated:

None of us believed, at the end of the Cold War, that we would be doing Northern Watch and Southern Watch in 1998. Bosnia still exists – everyone [in the Air Force has] been there since 1995….Couple that with the fact that we've seen surges, particularly in Iraq. Saddam Hussein has been very effective in pulling our chain, and we've had three major deployments, the last of which was very significant; it was 4,000 people and 100 aircraft. And we stayed over there a lot longer than we thought we would.

As a result, Air Force “readiness is slipping – it’s not just anecdotal; it’s factual,” says Gen. Michael Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff. Since 1996, according to Ryan, the Air Force has experienced “an overall 14 percent degradation in the operational readiness of our major operational units.” And although Air Force leaders claim that the service holds all its units at the same levels of readiness – that it does not, as the Navy does, practice “tiered” readiness where first-to-fight units get more resources – the level of readiness in stateside units has slipped below those deployed overseas. For example, Air Combat Command, the main tactical fighter command based in the United States, has suffered a 50 percent drop in readiness rates, compared to the service-wide drop in operational readiness of 14 percent.

These readiness problems are the result of a pace of operations that is slowly but surely consuming the Air Force. A 1998 study by RAND, “Air Force Operations Overseas in Peacetime: OPTEMPO and Force Structure Implications,” concluded that today’s Air Force is barely large enough to sustain current no-fly-zone and similar constabulary contingencies, let alone handle a major war. While the Department of Defense has come to recognize the heavy burden placed upon the Air Force’s AWACS and other specialized aircraft, the study found that “specialized aircraft are experiencing a rate of utilization well beyond the level that the current force structure would seem able to support on a long-term basis.” The study also revealed that the current fighter force is stretched to its limit as well. Under current assumptions, the current fighter structure “has the capacity to meet the [peacekeeping] demand, but with a meager reserve – only about a third of a squadron (8 aircraft) beyond the demand.” An additional no-fly-zone mission, such as is now being conducted over the Balkans, for example, “would be difficult to meet on a sustained basis.” According to Ryan, the accumulation of these constabulary missions has had a dramatic effect on the Air Force. He recently summarized the situation for Congress:

Our men and women are separated from their home bases and families for unpredictable and extended periods every year — with a significant negative impact on retention. Our home-station manning has become inadequate — and workload has increased — because forces are frequently deployed even though home-station operations must continue at near-normal pace. Our units deploying forward must carry much more infrastructure to expeditionary bases. Force protection and critical mission security for forward-deployed forces is a major consideration. The demands on our smaller units, such as [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] and combat search and rescue units, have dramatically increased — they are properly sized for two major theater wars, but some are inadequately sized for multiple, extended contingency operations. Due to the unpredictable nature of contingencies, training requirements have been expanded, and training cannot always be fully accomplished while deployed supporting contingencies. Because contingencies are unpredictable, it is much more difficult to use Reserve Component forces, many of whom need time to coordinate absences with civilian employers before they are free to take up their Air Force jobs.

These cumulative stresses have created a panoply of problems for the Air Force: recruiting and retention of key personnel, especially pilots, is an unprecedented worry; the service’s fleet of aircraft, especially support aircraft, is aging significantly; spare parts shortages, along with shortages of electronic subsystems and advanced munitions, restricts both operational and training missions; and the quality and quantity of air combat training has declined.

Even as routine, home-station combat  training has suffered in recent years, so have the Air Force’s major air combat exercises. Lack of funds for training, reports Ryan, means that “aircrews will no longer be able to meet many training requirements and threat training will be reduced to unrealistic level. Aircrews will develop a false sense of security while training against unrealistic threats.” Similarly, the Air Force’s program to provide advanced “aggressor” training to its pilots is a shadow of its former self: during the 1980s there was one aggressor aircraft for every 35 Air Force fighters; today, the ratio is one for every 240 fighters. The frequency with which Air Force aircrews participate in “Red Flag” exercises has declined from once every 12 months to once every 18 months.

Air Combat Command, the main tactical fighter command based in the United States, has suffered a 50 percent drop in readiness rates. 

The Air Force’s problems are further compounded by the procurement holiday of  the 1990s. The dramatic aging of the Air Force fleet and the resulting increase in cost and maintenance workload caused by air-craft fatigue, corrosion and parts obsolescence is the second driving factor in decreasing service readiness. By the turn of the century, the average Air Force aircraft will be 20 years old and by 2015, even allowing for the introduction of the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter and continuing purchases of current aircraft such as the C-17, the average age of the fleet will be 30 years old. The increased expense of operating older aircraft is well illustrated by the difference in airframe depot maintenance cost between the oldest F-15A and B models – at approximately 21 years old, such repairs average about $1.9 million per aircraft – versus the newest F-15E model – at 8 years in average age, the same kinds of repairs cost about $1.3 million per plane, a 37 percent cost difference. But perhaps the costliest measure of an aging fleet is that fewer airplanes are ready for combat.  Overall Air Force “non-mission capable rates,” or  grounded aircraft, have increased from 17 percent in 1991 to 25 percent today. These rates continue to climb despite the fact that Air Force maintenance personnel are working harder and longer to put planes up. The process of parts cannibalization – transferring a part from one plane being repaired to keep another flying – has increased by 58 percent from 1995 to 1998.

Some of the Air Force’s readiness problems stem from the overall reduction in its procurement budget, combined with the service’s determination to keep the F-22 program on track – as much as possible. The expense of the “Raptor” has forced the Air Force to make repeated cuts in other programs, not only in other aircraft programs, but in spare parts and even in personnel programs; even the Air Force’s pilot shortage stems in part from decisions taken to free up funds for the F- 2. These effects have been doubly compounded by the changes in the pattern of Air Force operations over the past 10 years. Support aircraft such as the AWACS and JSTARS, electronic combat and tanker aircraft were all intended to operate in concert with large numbers of tactical aircraft in large-scale operations. But in fact, they are more often called upon now to operate with just a handful of fighter or strike aircraft in no-fly zone operations or other contingencies. As a result, these types of aircraft routinely are rated as “low-density, high-demand” systems in the Pentagon’s joint-service readiness assessments; in other words, there are too few of them to meet mission requirements. The Air Force’s modernization program has yet to fully reflect this phenomenon. For example, the formal JSTARS “requirement” was reduced from 19 to 13 aircraft; only lately has an increased requirement been recognized. Likewise, the original C-17 procurement was cut from 210 to 120 aircraft. In fact, to meet emerging requirements, it is likely that 210 C-17s may be too few. Overall, the Air Force’s modernization programs need a thorough-going reassessment in light of new missions and their requirements.

Forward-Based Forces

The pattern of Air Force bases also needs to be reconsidered. Currently, the Air Force maintains forward-based forces of two-and- one- half wing equivalents in Western Europe; one wing in the Pacific, in Japan; a semi-permanent, composite wing of about 100 aircraft scattered throughout the Gulf region; and a partial wing in central Turkey at Incirlik Air Force Base. Even allowing for the inherent flexibility and range of aircraft, these current forces need to be supplemented by additional forward-based forces, additional permanent bases, and a network of contingency bases that would permit the Air Force to extend the effectiveness of current and future aircraft fleets as the American security perimeter expands.

In Europe, current forces should be increased with additional support aircraft, ranging from an increased C-17 and tanker fleet to AWACS, JSTARS and other electronic support planes. Existing forces, still organized in traditional wings, should be supplemented by a composite wing permanently stationed at Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey and that base should be improved significantly. The air wing at Aviano, Italy might be given a greater capability as that facility expands, as well. Additionally, the Air Force should establish the requirements for similar small composite wings in Southeastern Europe. Over time, U.S. Air Forces in Europe would increase by one to two-and-one-half wing equivalents. Further, improvements should be made to existing air bases in new and potential NATO countries to allow for rapid deployments, contingency exercises, and extended initial operations in times of crisis. These preparations should include modernized air traffic control, fuel, and weapons storage facilities, and perhaps small stocks of prepositioned munitions, as well as sufficient ramp space to accommodate  surges in operations. Improvements also should be made to existing facilities in England to allow forward operation of B-2 bombers in times of crisis, to increase sortie rates if needed.

In the Persian Gulf region, the provisional 4044th Wing should continue to operate much as it has for the better part of the last decade. However, the Air Force should take several steps to improve its operations while deferring to local political sensibilities. To relieve the stress of constant rotations, the Air Force might consider using more U.S. civilian contract workers in support roles – perhaps even to do aircraft maintenance or to provide additional security. While this might increase the cost of these operations, it might also be an incentive to get the Saudis, Kuwaitis and other Gulf states to assume a greater share of the costs while preserving the lowest possible U.S. military profile. By the same token, further improvements in the facilities at Al Kharj in Saudi Arabia, especially those that would improve the quality of life for airmen and allow increased combat training, warrant additional American as well as Saudi investments. The Air Force presence in the Gulf region is a vital one for U.S. military strategy, and the United States should consider it a de facto permanent presence, even as it seeks ways to lessen Saudi, Kuwaiti and regional concerns about U.S. presence.

The overall effectiveness of the B-2 bomber is limited by the small size of the fleet and the difficulties of operating solely from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

But it is in East Asia that the Air Force must look to increase its capabilities and reach. The service currently has about two wings worth of aircraft stationed at three bases in Japan and Korea; like the Army, the Air Force is concentrated in Northeast Asia and lacks a permanent presence in Southeast Asia, thus limiting its regional reach. The Air Force also has an F-15 wing in Alaska that is officially part of its Pacific force, as well. The Air Force needs roughly to double its forces stationed in East Asia, preferably dispersing its bases in the south as it has in the north, perhaps by stationing a wing in the Philippines and Australia. As in Europe, Air Force operations in East Asia would be greatly enhanced by the ability to sustain long-range bomber operations out of Australia, perhaps also by including the special maintenance facilities needed to operate the B-2 and other stealth aircraft. Further, the Air Force would be wise to invest in upgrades to regional airfields to permit surge deployments and, incidentally, help build ties with regional air forces.

Air Force Units Based In the United States

Even as the Air Force accelerates operations and improves its reach in the key regions of the world, it must retain sufficient forces based in the United States to deploy rapidly in times of crisis and be prepared to conduct large-scale air campaigns of the sort needed in major theater wars and to react to truly unforeseen contingencies. Indeed, the mobility and flexibility of air power virtually extinguishes the distinction between reinforcing and contingency forces. But it is clear that the Air Force’s current stateside strength of approximately eight to nine fighter-wing equivalents and four bomber wings is inadequate to these tasks. Further, the Air Force’s fleets of support aircraft are too small for rapid, large- scale deployments and sustained operations.

The Air Force’s structure problems reflect troubles of types of aircraft as well as raw numbers. For example, when the service retired its complements of F-4 “Wild Weasel” air defense suppression and EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft, these missions were assumed by F-16s fitted with HARM system pods and Navy and Marine EA-6B “Prowlers,” respectively. The effect has been to reduce the size of the F-16 fleet capable of doing other missions. The F-16 was intended to be a multi- mission airplane, but the heavy requirement for air defense suppression, even in no-fly-zone operations, means that these aircraft are only rarely available for other duties, and their pilots’ skills rusty. Likewise, the loss of the EF-111 has thrust the entire jamming mission on the small and old Prowler fleet, and has left the Air Force without a jammer of its own. The shortage of these aircraft is so great that, during Operation Allied Force, no-fly-zone operations over Iraq were suspended.

The Air Force’s airlift fleet is similarly too small. The lift requirements established in the early 1990s did not anticipate the pace and number of contingency operations in the post-Cold-War world. Nor have the requirements been changed to reflect force design changes – both those already made, such as de facto expeditionary forces in the Army and Air Force, nor those advocated in this report. The need to operate in a more dispersed fashion will increase airlift requirements substantially.

Further, the Air Force’s need for other supporting aircraft is also greater than its current fleet. As Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ryan has observed, his service is far short of being a “two-war” force in many of these capabilities. Even in daily no-fly-zone operations with relatively small numbers of fighters, the nature of the mission demands AWACS, JSTARS and other long-range electronic support aircraft; EA-6Bs and F-16s with HARM pods for jamming and air defense suppression; and several tankers to permit extended operations over long ranges. The “supporter-to-shooter” ratios of the Cold War and of large-scale operations such as the Desert Storm air campaign have been completely inverted. Air Force requirements of such aircraft for perimeter patrolling missions and for reinforcing missions far exceed the service’s current fleets; no previous strategic review has contemplated these requirements. While such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study, it is obvious that significant enlargements of Air Force structure are needed.

The Air Force’s fleets of support aircraft are too small for rapid, large- scale deployments and sustained operations.

Finally, the Air Force’s fleet of long-range bombers should be reassessed. As  mentioned above, the operations of the B-2s during Allied Force are certain to lead to a reappraisal of the regional commanders’ requirements for that aircraft. Yet another striking feature of B-2 operations during the Kosovo war was the length of the missions – it required a 30-hour, roundtrip sortie from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri for each strike – and the difficulty in sustaining operations. The bulk of the B-2 fleet is often reserved for nuclear missions; in sum, the Air Force could generate no more than two B-2s every other day for Allied Force. Whatever the performance of the B-2, its overall effectiveness is severely limited by the small size of the fleet and the difficulties of operating solely from Whiteman. While the cost of restarting the B-2 production line may be prohibitive, the need is obvious; the Air Force could increase the “productivity” of B-2 operations by establishing overseas locations for which the plane could operate in times of need, and by developing a deployable B-2 maintenance capability. As the Air Force contemplates its future bomber force, it should seek to avoid such a dilemma as it develops successors to the B-2. And considering the limited viability of the bomber leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, the Air Force might seek to have bombers no longer counted for arms control purposes, and equip its B-52s and B-2s solely for conventional strike.

At minimum, the Air Force based in the United States should be increased by two or more wing equivalents. However, the majority of these increases should be directed at the specialized aircraft that represent the “low-density, high-demand” air assets now so lacking. But while this will do much to alleviate the stresses on the current fighter fleet, it will not be enough to offset the effects of the higher tempo of operations of the last decade; the F-15 and F-16 fleets face looming block obsolescence. This will be partly offset by the introduction of the F-22 into the Air Force inventory, but as an air superiority aircraft, the F-22 is not well suited to today’s less stressful missions. The Air Force is buying a new race car when it also needs a fleet of minivans. The Air Force should purchase new multi-mission F-15E and F-16 aircraft. The C-17 program should be restored to its original 210-aircraft buy, and the Air Force should address the need for additional electronic support aircraft, both in the near-term but also in the longer term as part of its transformation efforts.

If the F-22 is less than perfectly suited to today’s needs, the problem of the Joint Strike Fighter program is a larger one altogether. Moreover, more than half the total F-22 program cost has been spent already, while spending to date on the JSF – although already billions of dollars – represents the merest tip of what may prove to be a $223 billion iceberg. And greater than the technological challenges posed by the JSF or its total cost in dollars is the question as to whether the program, which will extend America’s commitment to manned strike aircraft for 50 years or more, represents an operationally sound decision. Indeed, as will be apparent from the discussion below on military transformation and the revolution in military affairs, it seems unlikely that the current paradigm of warfare, dominated by the capabilities of tactical, manned aircraft, will long endure. An expensive Joint Strike Fighter with limited capabilities and significant technical risk appears to be a bad investment in such a light, and the program should be terminated. It is a roadblock to transformation and a sink-hole for defense dollars.

The reconstitution of the stateside Air Force as a large-scale, warfighting force will complicate the service’s plans to reconfigure itself for the purposes of expeditionary operations. But the proliferation of overseas bases should reduce many, if not all, of the burdens of rotational contingency operations. Because of its inherent mobility and flexibility, the Air Force will be the first U.S. military force to arrive in a theater during times of crisis; as such, the Air Force must retain its ability to deploy and sustain sufficient numbers of aircraft to deter wars and shape any conflict in its earliest stages. Indeed, it is the Air Force, along with the Army, that remains the core of America’s ability to apply decisive military power when its pleases. To dissipate this ability to deliver a rapid hammer blow is to lose the key component of American military  preeminence.

Air Force Modernization And Budgets

As with the Army, Air Force budgets have been significantly reduced during the past decade, even as the service has taken on new, unanticipated missions and attempts to wrestle with the implications of expeditionary operations. At the height of the Reagan buildup, in 1985, the Air Force was authorized $140 billion; by 1992, the first post-Cold- War budget figure fell to $98 billion. During the Clinton years, Air Force budgets dropped to a low of $73 billion in 1997; the administration’s 2001 request was for $83 billion (all figures are FY2000 constant dollars).

During this period, Air Force leaders sacrificed many other essential projects to keep the F-22 program going; simply restoring the service to health – correcting for the shortfalls of recent years plus the internal distortions caused by service leadership decisions – will require time and significantly increased spending. A gradual increase in Air Force spending back to a $110 billion to $115 billion level is required to increase service personnel strength; build new units, especially the composite wings required to perform the “air constabulary missions” such as no-fly zones; add the support capabilities necessary to complement the fleet of tactical aircraft; reinvest in space capabilities and begin the process of transformation.

The F-22 Raptor program should be continued to procure three wings’ worth of aircraft and to develop and buy the munitions necessary to increase the F-22’s ability to perform strike missions; although the plane has limited bomb-carrying capacity, improved munitions can extend its utility in the strike role. The need for strategic lift has grown exponentially throughout the post-Cold-War era, both in terms of volume of lift and for numbers of strategic lift platforms; it may be that the requirement for strategic airlift now exceeds the requirement in the early 1990s when the C-17 program was scaled back from a planned 210 aircraft to the current plan for just 120. The C-17’s ability to land on short airfields makes it both a strategic and tactical airlifter. Or rather, it is the first airlifter to be able to allow for strategic deployment direct to an austere theater, as in Kosovo.

The Joint Strike Fighter, with limited capabilities and significant technical risk, is a roadblock to future transformation and a sink-hole for needed defense funds.

Likewise, the formal requirements for AWACS, JSTARS, “Rivet Joint” and other electronic support and combat aircraft were set during the Cold War or before the nature of the current era was clear. These aircraft were designed to operate in conjunction with large numbers of fighter aircraft, yet today they operate with very small formations in no-fly zone, or even virtually alone in counter-drug intelligence gathering operations. As with the C-17, it is likely that a genuine calculation of current requirements might result in a larger fleet of such aircraft than was considered during the late Cold War. In sum, the process of rebuilding today’s Air Force – apart from procuring sufficient “attrition” F-15s and F-16s and proceeding with the F-22 – lies primarily in creating the varied support capabilities that will complement the fighter fleet.

In the wake of the Kosovo air operation, the Air Force should again reconsider the issue of strategic bombers. Both the successes and limitations of B-2 operations during “Allied Force” suggest that the utility of long-range strike aircraft has been undervalued, not only in major theater wars but in constabulary and punitive operations. Whether this mandates opening up the B-2 production line again or in accelerating plans to build a new bomber – even an unmanned strategic bomber – is beyond the level of analysis possible in this study. At the same time, it is unlikely that the current bomber fleet – mostly B-1Bs with a shrinking and aging fleet of B-52s and the few B-2s that will be available for conventional-force operations – is best suited to meet these new requirements.

To move toward the goal of becoming a force with truly global reach – and sustained global reach – the Air Force must rebuild its fleet of tanker aircraft. Sustaining a large-scale air campaign, whatever the ability of strategic-range bombers, must ultimately rely upon theater-range tactical aircraft. As amply demonstrated over Kosovo, the ability to provide tanker support can often be the limiting factor to such large-scale operations. The Air Force’s current plan, to eventually operate a tanker fleet with 75- year-old planes, is not consistent with the creation of a global-reach force.

Finally, the Air Force should use some of its increased budget and the savings from the cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter program to accelerate the process of transformation within the service, to include developing new space capabilities. The ability to have access to, operate in, and dominate the aerospace environment has become the key to military success in modern, high-technology warfare. Indeed, as will be discussed below, space dominance may become so essential to the preservation of American military preeminence that it may require a separate service. How well the Air Force rises to the many challenges it faces – even should it receive increased budgets – will go far toward determining whether U.S. military forces retain the combat edge they now enjoy.

New Course for the Navy

The end of the Cold War leaves the U.S. Navy in a position of unchallenged supremacy on the high seas, a dominance surpassing that even of the British Navy in the 19th and early parts of the 20th century. With the remains of the Soviet fleet now largely rusting in port, the open oceans are America’s, and the lines of communication open from the coasts of the United States to Europe, the Persian Gulf and East Asia. Yet this very success calls the need for the current  force structure into question. Further, the advance of precision-strike technology may mean that naval surface combatants, and especially the large-deck aircraft carriers that are the Navy’s capital ships, may not survive in the high- technology wars of the coming decades. Finally, the nature and pattern of  Navy presence missions may be out of synch with emerging strategic realities. In sum, though it stands without peer today, the Navy faces major challenges to its traditional and, in the past, highly successful methods of operation.

The Navy must begin to reduce its heavy dependence on carrier operations.

As with the Army, the Navy’s ability to address these challenges has been additionally  compromised by the high pace of current operations. As noted in the first section of this report, the Navy has disrupted the traditional balance between duty at sea and ashore, stressing its sailors and complicating training cycles. Units ashore no longer have the personnel, equipment, or opportunities to train; thus, when they go to sea, they go at lower levels of readiness than in the past. Modernization has been another bill-payer for maintaining the readiness of at-sea forces during the defense drawdown of the past decade. As H. Lee Buchanan, the Navy’s top procurement official, recently admitted, “After the buildup of the 1980s, at the end of the Cold War we literally stopped modernizing in order to fund near-term readiness [and]…our procurement accounts plummeted by 70 percent. The result has been an aging force structure with little modernization investment.” According to recently retired Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jay Johnson, the Navy is in danger of slipping below a fleet of 300 ships, a level that would create “unacceptable risk” in executing the missions called for by the national military strategy. Unfortunately, he added, “The current level of shipbuilding is insufficient to preserve even that level of fleet in the coming decades.”

As a consequence, the Navy is attempting to conduct a full range of presence missions while employing the combat forces developed during the later years of the Cold War. The Navy must embark upon a complex process of realignment and reconfiguration. A decade of increased operations and reduced investment has worn down the fleets that won the Cold War. The demands of new missions require new methods and patterns of operations, with an increasing emphasis on East Asia. To meet the strategic need for naval power today, the Navy should be realigned and reconfigured along these lines:

• Reflecting the gradual shift in the focus of American strategic concerns toward East Asia, a majority of the U.S. fleet, including two thirds of all carrier battle groups, should be concentrated in the Pacific. A new, permanent forward base should be established in Southeast Asia.

• The Navy must begin to transition away from its heavy dependence on carrier operations, reducing its fleet from 12 to nine carriers over the next six years. A moratorium on carrier construction should be imposed after the completion of the CVN-77, allowing the Navy to retain a nine-carrier force through 2025. Design and research on a future CVX carrier should continue, but should aim at a radical design change to accommodate an air wing based primarily on unmanned aerial vehicles. The Navy should complete the F/A-18E/F program, refurbish and modernize its support aircraft, consider the suitability of a carrier-capable version of the Air Force’s F-22, but keep the Joint Strike Fighter program in research and development until the implications of the revolution in military affairs for naval warfare are understood better.

• To offset the reduced role of carriers, the Navy should slightly increase its fleets of current-generation surface combatants and submarines for improved strike capabilities in littoral waters and to conduct an increasing proportion of naval presence missions with surface action groups. Additional investments in counter-mine warfare are needed, as well.

State of the Navy Today

The first step in maintaining American naval preeminence must be to restore the health of the current fleet as rapidly as possible. Though the Navy’s deployments today have not changed as profoundly as have those of the Army or Air Force – the sea services have long manned, equipped and trained themselves for the rigors of long deployments at sea – the number of these duties has increased as the Navy has been reduced. The Navy also faces a shipbuilding and larger modernization problem that, if not immediately addressed, will reach crisis proportions in the next decade.

Thus, like the other services, the Navy is increasingly ill prepared for missions today and tomorrow. For the past several years, Adm. Johnson has admitted the Navy “was never sized to do two [major theater wars]” – meaning that, after the defense drawdown, the Navy is too small to meet the requirements of the current national military strategy. According to Johnson: “The QDR concluded that a fleet of slightly more than 300 ships was sufficient for near term requirements and was within an acceptable level of risk. Three years of high tempo operations since then, however, suggest that this size fleet will be inadequate to sustain the current level of operations for the long term.”

Even as the Navy has shrunk to a little more than half its Cold-War size, the pace of operations has grown so rapidly that the Navy is experiencing readiness problems and personnel shortages. These problems are so grave that forward-deployed naval forces, the carrier battle groups that are currently the core of the Navy’s presence mission, now put to sea with significant personnel problems. When the USS Lincoln carrier battle group fired Tomahawk cruise missiles at terrorist camps in Afghanistan and suspected chemical weapons facilities in Sudan, it did so with 12 percent fewer people in the battle group than on the previous deployment. Similarly, during the February 1998 confrontation with Iraq, the Navy sent three carriers to the Persian Gulf. The USS George Washington deployed the Gulf with only 4,600 sailors, almost 1,000 fewer than its previous cruise there two years earlier. The carrier USS Independence, dispatched on short notice from its permanent home in Japan, sailed with only 4,200 sailors and needed an emergency influx of about 80 sailors just so it could be rated fit for combat. The USS Nimitz, already in the Middle East, was 400 sailors shy of its previous cruise. The Navy also had to issue two urgent calls for volunteer sailors in port back home.

This is a worrisome trend. Today more than ever, U.S. Navy operations center around the carrier battle group. Indeed, the ability to conduct additional operations or even training independent from battle group operations is increasingly difficult. But the process of piecing together the elements of a battle group – the carrier itself, its air wing, its surface escorts, its submarines, and its accompanying Marine Amphibious Ready Group – is also becoming a substantial challenge.

Bringing a carrier battle group to the high states of readiness demanded by deployments to sea is a complex and rigorous task, involving tens of thousands of personnel over an 18-month period. Formally known as the “interdeployment training cycle” and more often called the readiness “bathtub,” this period is the key to readiness at sea. Equipment must be overhauled and maintained, personnel assigned and reassigned, and training accomplished from individual skills up through complex battle group operations. Shortfalls and cutbacks felt in the inter-deployment cycle result in diminished readiness at sea. And finally and vitally important to the health of an all-volunteer force – sailors must reestablish the bonds and ties with their families that allow them to concentrate on their duties while at sea.

Although Navy leaders have recently focused on the cutbacks in their inter-deployment training cycle, it is clear that postponed maintenance and training is having an increasing effect on the readiness of forces at sea. As a result, naval task forces are compelled to complete their training while they are deployed, rather than beforehand. And with fully 52 percent of its ships afloat, including training, and 33 percent actually deployed at sea – compared to historical norms of 42 percent at sea and 21 percent deployed, Navy leaders are contemplating a reduction in the size of carrier battle groups by trimming the number of escorts. Most ominously, the Navy’s ability to surge large fleets in wartime – the requirement to meet the two-war standard – is declining. As Adm. Johnson told the Congress:

[N]early every Major Theater War scenario would require the rapid deployment of forces from [the United States]. Because of the increasingly deep bathtub in our [interdeployment training cycle] readiness posture, these follow-on forces most likely will not be at the desired levels of proficiency quickly enough. Concern over the readiness of non- deployed forces was a contributing factor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently changing his overall risk assessment of a two [- war] scenario to moderate to high.

This assessment has prompted Johnson’s successor, Adm. Vernon Clark, the former commander of the Atlantic Fleet who was confirmed as CNO in June, to outline a major reallocation of resources to increase the readiness of carrier battle groups – although only to the “C-2” rating level, still below the highest standard. “To me, readiness is a top priority,” said Clark in his confirmation testimony. “It simply means taking care of the Navy that the American people have already invested in.”

But while Clark is correct about the Navy’s increasing troubles maintaining its current readiness, an even larger problem looms just over the horizon. The Navy’s “procurement holiday” of the past decade has left the service facing a serious problem of block obsolescence in the next 10 years. Unless current trends are reversed, the Navy will be too small to meet its worldwide commitments. Both in its major ship and aircraft programs, the Navy has been purchasing too few systems to sustain even the reduced, post-Cold War fleet called for in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

The Navy has built up a ‘modernization deficit’ – of surface ships, submarines and aircraft – that will soon approach $100 billion.

As a result of the significant expansion of the Navy to nearly 600 ships during the Reagan years and the following drawdown of the 1990s, today’s Navy of just over 300 ships is made up of relatively new ships, and thus the low shipbuilding rates of the past decade have not yet had a dramatic effect on the fleet. Assuming the traditional “ship-life” of about 30 to 35 years, maintaining a 300-ship Navy requires the purchase of about eight to 10 ships per year. The Clinton Administration’s 2001 defense budget request includes a request for eight ships, the first  time in several years that the number is that high. And the administration’s long- term plan would purchase 39 ships over 5 years, still below the required replacement rate, but an improvement over recent Navy budgets.

However, there is less to this apparent improvement than meets the eye. The slight increase in the shipbuilding rate is achieved by purchasing less expensive auxiliary cargo ships, which typically cost $300 to $400 million, compared to $1 billion for an attack submarine or Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer, or $6 billion for an aircraft carrier. According to a Congressional Research Service analysis, the administration plan would buy unneeded cargo ships, “procured at a rate in excess of the steady-state replacement for Navy auxiliaries.” The replacement rate for auxiliaries is approximately 1.5 per year; the administration’s request includes one in 2001, three each in 2002 and 2003, and two each in 2004 and 2005.

While buying too many cheap auxiliaries, the administration is buying too few combatants, as the state of the submarine force indicates. In 1997, the Navy’s fleet of 72 attack boats was too small to meet its operational requirements, yet, at the same time, the QDR called for a further reduction of the attack submarine force to 50 boats. Since then, these additional reductions in the submarine force have exacerbated the problem. As the Navy’s director of submarine programs, Adm. Malcolm Fages told the Senate last year, “We have transitioned from a requirements-driven force to an asset-limited force structure. Today, although we have 58 submarines in the force, we have too few submarines to accomplish all assigned missions.”

Nor is it likely that the Navy will be able to stop the hemorrhaging of its attack submarine fleet. For the period from 1990 through 2005, the Navy will have purchased just 10 new attack submarines, according to current plans. But the replacement rate for even a 50-sub fleet would have required procurement of 23 to 27 boats during that time period. In sum, the Navy has a submarine-building “deficit” of 13 to 17 boats, even to maintain a fleet that is too small to meet operational and strategic needs. According to the administration’s budget request, the Navy plans to build no more than one new attack submarine per year. Assuming the 30- year service life for nuclear attack submarines, the American submarine fleet would slip to 24 boats by 2025.

The Navy’s fleet of surface combatants faces much the same dilemma as does the submarine force: it is too small to meet its current missions and, as seaborne missile defense systems are developed, the surface fleet faces substantial new missions for which it is now unprepared. For these reasons, the Navy has prepared a new report, entitled the Surface Combatant Force Level Study, arguing that the true requirement for surface combatants is 138 warships, compared to the 116 called for under the Quadrennial Defense Review. By comparison, the Navy had 203 surface combatants in 1990 and the Bush Administration’s “Base Force” plan called for a surface fleet of 141 ships.

As of last year, Navy shipbuilding had a current “deficit” of approximately 26 ships, even before the requirements of new missions such as ballistic missile are calculated. To maintain a 300-ship fleet, the Navy must maintain a ship procurement rate of about 8.6 ships per year. Yet from 1993 to 2005, according to administration plans, the Navy will have bought 85 ships, or about 6.5 ships per year. Steady-state rates would have required the purchase of 111 ships, according  to the Congressional Research Service analysis. Once the large number of ships bought during the 1980s begins to reach the end of its service life, the Navy will begin to shrink rapidly, and maintaining a fleet above 250 ships will be difficult to do.

As with ships and submarines, the Navy’s aircraft fleet is living off the purchases made during the buildup of the Reagan years. The average age of naval aircraft is 16.5 years and increasing. While the Navy’s F-14 and F-18 fighters are being upgraded, the aging of the fleet is most telling on support aircraft. The Navy’s plan to refurbish the P-3C submarine-hunting plane will extend the Orion’s life to 50 years; the fleet average now is 21 years. The E-2 Hawkeye, the Navy’s airborne early warning and command and control plane, was first produced in the 1960s. The S-3B Viking is another aircraft essential to many aspects of carrier operations; it is 23 years old and no longer in production. And the EA-6B Prowler is now the only electronic warfare aircraft flown by any of the services, and is now considered a national asset, not merely a Navy platform. Operation Allied Force employed approximately 60 of the 90 operational EA-6Bs then in the fleet; current Navy plans are to refurbish the entire 123 Prowler airframes that still exist, inserting a new center wing section on this 1960s-era aircraft and improving its electronic systems. No new electronic warfare aircraft is in the program of any service.

As a result of a decade-long procurement holiday, a Navy already too small to meet many of its current missions is heading for a modernization crisis; indeed, it already may have built up a “modernization deficit” – of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, that will soon approach $100 billion – even as the Navy is asked to take on additional new missions such as ballistic missile defense. Higher operations tempos, personnel and training problems and spare parts shortfalls have reduced Navy readiness. By any measure, today’s Navy is unable to meet the increasing number of missions it faces currently, let alone prepare itself for a transformed paradigm of future naval warfare.

New Deployment Patterns

Revitalizing the Navy will require more than improved readiness and recapitalization, however. The Navy’s structure and pattern of operations must be reconsidered in light of new strategic realities as well. In general terms, this should reflect an increased emphasis on operations in the western Pacific and a decreased emphasis on aircraft carriers.

As discussed above, the focus of American security strategy for the coming century is likely to shift to East Asia. This reflects the success of American strategy in the 20th century, and particularly the success of the NATO alliance through the Cold War, which has created what appears to be a generally stable and enduring peace in Europe. The pressing new problem of European security – instability in South-eastern Europe – will be best addressed by the continued stability operations in the Balkans by U.S. and NATO ground forces supported by land- based air forces.  Likewise, the new opportunity for greater European stability offered by further NATO expansion will make demands first of all on ground and land-based air forces. As the American security perimeter in Europe is removed eastward, this pattern will endure, although naval forces will play an important role in the Baltic Sea, eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, and will continue to support U.S. and NATO operations ashore.

Tomahawk cruise missiles have been the Navy weapon of choice in recent strike operations.

Also, while it is likely that the Middle East and Persian Gulf will remain an area of turmoil and instability, the increased presence of American ground forces and land-based air forces in the region mark a notable shift from the 1980s, when naval forces carried the overwhelming burden of U.S. military presence in the region. Although the Navy will remain an important partner in Gulf and regional operations, the load can now be shared more equitably with other services. And, according to the force posture described in the preceding chapter, future American policy should seek to augment the forces already in the region or nearby. However, since current U.S. Navy force structure, and particularly its carrier battle- group structure, is driven by the current requirements for Gulf operations, the reduced emphasis of naval forces in the Gulf will have an effect on overall Navy structure. Thus, the emphasis of U.S. Navy operations should shift increasingly toward East Asia. Not only is this the theater of rising importance in overall American strategy and for preserving American preeminence, it is the theater in which naval forces will make the greatest contribution. As stressed several times above, the United States should seek to establish – or reestablish – a more robust naval presence in Southeast Asia, marked by a long-term, semi- permanent home port in the region, perhaps in the Philip-pines, Australia, or both. Over the next decade, this presence should become roughly equivalent to the naval forces stationed in Japan (17 ships based around the Kitty Hawk carrier battle group and Belleau Wood Marine amphibious ready group). Optimally, these forward-deployed forces, both in Japan and ultimately in Southeast Asia, should be increased with additional surface combatants. In effect, one of the carrier battle groups now based on the West Coast of the United States should be shifted into the East Asian theater.

Rotational naval forces form the bulk of the U.S. Navy; as indicated above, the size of the current fleet is dictated by the presence requirements of the regional commanders-in-chief as determined during the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. And, the Navy and Department of Defense have defined presence primarily in terms of aircraft carrier battle groups. The current need to keep approximately three carriers deployed equates to an overall force structure of eleven carriers (plus one reserve carrier for training). In truth, the structure-to- deployed forces ratio is actually higher, for the Navy always counts its Japan-based forces as “deployed,” even when not at sea. Further, because of transit times and other factors, the ratio for carriers deployed to the Persian Gulf is about five to one.

Although the combination of carriers and Marine amphibious groups offer a unique and highly capable set of options for commanders, it is far from certain that the Navy’s one-size-fits all approach is appropriate to every contingency or to every engagement mission now assumed by U.S. forces. First of all, the need for carriers in peacetime, “show-the-flag” missions should be reevaluated and reduced. The Navy is right to assert, as quoted above, that “being ‘on-scene’ matters” to reassure America’s allies and intimidate potential adversaries. But where American strategic interests are well understood and long-standing, especially in Europe and in the Persian Gulf – or in Korea – the ability to position forces ashore offsets the need for naval presence.

While carrier aviation still has a large role to play in naval operations, that role is becoming relatively less important.

More importantly, the role of carriers in war is certainly changing. While carrier aviation still has a large role to play in naval operations, that role is becoming relatively less important. A review of post-Cold War operations conducted by the American military reveals one salient factor: carriers have almost always played a secondary role. Operation Just Cause in Panama was almost exclusively an Army and Air Force operation. The Gulf War, by far the largest operation in the last decade, involved significant elements of all services, but the air campaign was primarily an Air Force show and the central role in the ground war was played by Army units. The conduct of post-war no-fly zones has frequently involved Navy aircraft, but their role has been to lighten the burden on the Air Force units that have flown the majority of sorties in these operations. Naval forces also have participated in the periodic strikes against Iraq, but even during the largest of these, Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Navy aircraft did not have range to reach certain targets or were not employed against well-defended targets. These are now missions handled almost exclusively by stealthy aircraft or cruise missiles. Likewise, during Operation Allied Force, Navy planes played a reinforcing role. And, of course, neither Navy nor Marine units have played a significant role in peacekeeping duties in Bosnia or Kosovo.

The one recent operation where naval forces, and carrier forces in particular, did play the leading role is also suggestive of the Navy’s future: the dispatching of two carrier battle groups to the waters off Taiwan during the 1996 Chinese “missile blockade.” Several factors are worth noting. First, the crisis occurred in East Asia, in the western Pacific Ocean. Thus, the Navy was uniquely positioned and postured to respond. Not only did the Seventh Fleet make it first on the scene, but deploying and sustaining ground forces or land-based aircraft to the region would have been difficult. Second, the potential enemy was China. Although Pentagon thinking about major theater war in East Asia has centered on Korea – where again land and land-based air forces would likely play the leading role – the Taiwan crisis was perhaps more indicative of the longer-range future. A third question has no easy answer: what, indeed, would these carrier battle groups have been able to do in the event of escalation or the outbreak of hostilities? Had the Chinese actually targeted missiles at Taiwan, it is doubtful that the Aegis air- defense systems aboard  the cruisers and destroyers in the battle groups could have provided an effective defense. Punitive strikes against Chinese forces by carrier aircraft, or cruise missile strikes, might have been a second option, but a problematic option. And, as in recent strike operations elsewhere, initial attacks certainly would have employed cruise missiles exclusively, or perhaps cruise missiles and stealthy, land-based aircraft.

The Navy’s surface fleet is too small to meet current requirements, war plans and future missile defense duties.

Thus, while naval presence, including carrier presence, in the western Pacific should be increased, the Navy should begin to conduct many of its presence missions with other kinds of battle groups based around cruisers, destroyers and other surface combatants as well as submarines. Indeed, the Navy needs to better understand the requirement to have substantial numbers of cruise-missile platforms at sea and in close proximity to regional hot spots, using carriers and naval aviation as reinforcing elements. Moreover, the reduced need for naval aviation in the European theater and in the Gulf suggests that the carrier elements in the Atlantic fleet can be reduced. Therefore, in addition to the two forward-based carrier groups recommended above, the Navy should retain a further fleet of three active plus one reserve carriers homeported on the west coast of the United States and a three-carrier Atlantic fleet. Overall, this represents a reduction of three carriers.

However, the reduction in carriers must be offset by an increase in surface combatants, submarines and also in support ships to make up for the logistics functions that the carrier performs for the entire battle group. As indicated above, the surface fleet is already too small to meet  current requirements and must be expanded to accommodate the requirements for sea-based ballistic missile defenses. Further, the Navy’s fleet of frigates is likely to be inadequate for the long term, and the need for smaller and simpler ships to respond to  presence and other lesser contingency missions should be examined by the Navy. To patrol the American security perimeter at sea, including a significant role in theater missile defenses, might require a surface combatant fleet of 150 vessels.

 The Navy’s force of attack submarines also should be expanded. While many of the true submarine requirements like intelligence-gathering missions and as cruise-missile platforms were not considered fully during the QDR – and it will take some time to understand how submarine needs would change to make up for changes in the carrier force – by any reckoning the 50-boat fleet now planned is far too small. However, as is the case with surface combatants, the need to increase the size of the fleet must compete with the need to introduce new classes of vessels that have advanced capabilities. It is unclear that the current and planned generations of attack submarines (to say nothing of new ballistic missile submarines) will be flexible enough to meet future demands. The Navy should reassess its submarine requirements not merely in light of current missions but with an expansive view of possible future missions as well.

Finally, the reduction in carriers should not be accompanied by a commensurate reduction in naval air wings. Already, the Navy maintains just 10 air wings, too small a structure for the current carrier fleet, especially considering the rapid aging of the Navy’s aircraft. Older fighters like the F-14 have taken on new strike missions, and the multi- mission F/A-18 is wearing out faster than expected due to higher-than- anticipated rates of use and more stressful uses. Even should the Navy simply cease to purchase aircraft carriers today, it could maintain a nine- carrier force until 2025, assuming the CVN-77, already programmed under current defense budgets, was built. A small carrier fleet must be maintained at a higher state of readiness for combat while in port, as should Navy air wings.

Marine Corps: ‘Back to the Future’

For the better part of a century, the United States has maintained the largest complement of naval infantry of any nation. The U.S. Marine Corps, with a three-division structure mandated by law and with a strength of more than 170,000, is larger than all but a few land armies in the world. Its close relationship with the Navy – to say nothing of its own highly sophisticated air force – gives the Corps extraordinary mobility and combat power. Even as it has been reduced by about 15 percent since the end of the Cold War, the Marine Corps has added new capabilities, notably for special operations and most recently for response to chemical and biological strikes. This versatility, combined with a punishing deployment schedule, makes the Marine Corps a valuable tool for maintaining American global influence and military preeminence; Marines afloat can both respond relatively rapidly in times of crisis, yet loiter ashore for extended periods of time.

Yet while this large Marine Corps is uniquely valuable to a world power like the United States, it must be understood that the Corps fills but a niche in the overall capabilities needed for American military preeminence. The Corps lacks the sophisticated and sustainable land-power capabilities of the Army; the high-performance, precision-strike capabilities of the Air Force; and, absent its partnership with the Navy, lacks firepower. Restoring the health of the Marine Corps will require not only purchases of badly needed new equipment and restoring the strength of the Corps to something near 200,000 Marines, it will also depend on the Corps’ ability to focus on its core naval infantry mission – a mission of renewed importance to American security strategy.

In particular, the Marine Corps, like the Navy, must turn its focus on the requirements for operations in East Asia, including Southeast Asia. In many ways, this will be a “back to the future” mission for the Corps, recalling the innovative thinking done during the period between the two world wars and which established the Marines’ expertise in amphibious landings and operations. Yet it will also require the Corps to shed some of its current capacity – such as heavy tanks and artillery – acquired during the late Cold War years. It will also require the Marines to acquire the ability to work better with other services, notably the Army and Air Force, by improving its communications, data links and other systems needed for sophisticated joint operations, and of course by more frequent joint exercises. These new missions and requirements will increase the need for Marine modernization, especially in acquiring the V-22 “Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft, which will give the Corps extended operational range. And, as will be discussed in greater detail in the section on transformation, the Marine Corps must begin now to address the likely increased vulnerability of surface ships in future conflicts. To maintain its unique and valuable role, the Marine Corps should:

• Be  expanded to permit the forward basing of a second Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in East Asia. This MEU should be based in Southeast Asia along with the repositioned Navy carrier battle group as described above.

• Likewise be increased in strength by about 25,000 to improve the personnel status of Marine units, especially nondeployed units undergoing training.

• Be realigned to create lighter units with greater infantry strength and better abilities for joint operations, especially including other services’ fires in support of Marine operations. The Marine Corps should review its unit and force structure to eliminate marginal capabilities.

• Accelerate the purchase of V-22 aircraft and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle to improve ship-to-shore maneuver, and increase tactical mobility and range.

The State of the Marine Corps

Like its sister sea service, the Marine Corps is suffering from more missions than it can handle and a shortage of resources. Although Corps commandants have tended to emphasize Marine modernization problems, the training and readiness of units that are not actually deployed have also plummeted. The Marines’ ability to field the large force that contributed greatly to the Gulf War land campaign is increasingly in doubt. Of all the service chiefs of staff, recently retired Marine Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak was the first to publicly admit that his service was not capable of executing the missions called for in the national military strategy.

Like the Navy, the Marine Corps has paid the price for rotational readiness in terms of on-shore training, modernization and quality of life. Marine Corps leaders stress that much of the problem stems from the age of the Marines’ equipment: “Our problems today are caused by the fact that we are, and have been, plowing scarce resources – Marines, money, material – into our old equipment and weapon systems in an   attempt to keep them operational,” Krulak explained to Congress shortly before retiring.

The V-22 Osprey will increase the speed and range with which Marines can deploy.

Much Marine equipment is serving far beyond its programmed service life. And although the Marine Corps has invested heavily in programs to extend the life of these systems, equipment availability rates are falling throughout the service. Marine equipment always wears out rapidly, due to the corrosive effects of salt water on metal and electronics. Even a relatively modern piece of Marine equipment, the Light Armored Vehicle, is feeling the effect. In 1995, the Marines began an “Inspect, Repair Only as Necessary” program on the Light Armored Vehicle, and have experienced a 25 percent rise in the cost per vehicle and a 46 percent rise in the number of vehicles requiring the repairs. For some Marine units, the biggest challenge is the availability of parts, even in such a time of repair and recovery. At Camp Lejuene, North Carolina, maintenance officers and NCOs make near-daily trips to nearby Fort Bragg to get parts for inoperable vehicles such as the battalion’s High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). In part because the Marines have the oldest version of the HMMWV, no longer made for the Army, bartering with the 82nd Airborne is the most common answer for procuring a needed part.

Navy Department spending should be increased to between $100 and $110 billion annually.

But although the Marine Corps’ primary concern is again equipment, the service is hardly immune to the personnel and training problems plaguing the other services. Faced not only with a demanding schedule of traditional six-month sea deployments but with an increasing load of unanticipated duties, the interdeployment “bathtub of unreadiness” has deepened and the climb out has grown steeper. Like the Navy, the Marine Corps has had to curtail its on-shore training, especially in the rudiments that are the building blocks of unit readiness. Even then, it may be required to deploy smaller elements to assist other units in training or participate in exercises. Often, Marine units will be forced to send under- strength units for major live-fire and maneuver exercises that in times past were the keys to deployed readiness. Moreover, large Marine units lack the infantry punch they had in the past. Marine divisions have fewer rifleman than in past; as the overall strength of the Marine Corps has been cut from 197,000 to the 172,000 as specified in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the number of infantry battalions in the division was cut from 11 to nine; authorized personnel in the division went from 19,161 to 15,816.

Navy and Marine Corps Budgets

President Clinton’s 2001 budget request included $91.7 billion for the Department of the Navy. (This figure includes funding for the Navy and Marine Corps.) This is an increase from the $87.2 billion approved by Congress for 2000, a sharp reduction from the Navy’s $107 billion budget in 1992, the first true post-Cold-War budget.

Equally dramatic is the reduction in Navy Department procurement budgets. For 2000, the administration requested just under $22 billion in total Navy and Marine Corps procurement; from 1994 through 1997, at the peak of the “procurement holiday,” department procurement budgets averaged just $17 billion. By contrast, during the Bush years, Navy procurement averaged $35 billion; during the years of the Reagan buildup – arguably a relevant comparison, given the need to expand the size of the Navy again – Navy procurement budgets averaged $43 billion.

To realign and reconfigure the Navy as described above, Department of the Navy spending overall should be increased to between $100 billion and $110 billion. This slightly exceeds the levels of spending anticipated by the final Bush Administration, and is necessary to accelerate ship- and submarine-building efforts. After several years, this will be partially offset by the moratorium in aircraft carrier construction and by holding the Joint Strike Fighter program in research and development. Yet maintaining a Navy capable of dominating the open oceans, providing effective striking power to joint operations ashore and transforming itself for future naval warfare – in short, a Navy able to preserve U.S. maritime preeminence – will require much more than marginal increases in Navy budgets.

Go to Next Page