PANDIT REVISITED

Foreword by

Dr. Vidyaniwas Misra

Edited by

Dr. B. N. Miśra

Sampurnanand Sanskrit University
Varanasi

Pandit Revisited

The Pandit also called *Kāśī-Vidyā-Sudhā-Nidhi*, was a monthly journal of The Benares College (presently the Sampūrnānand Sanskrit University, Varanasi) devoted to Sanskrit literature. This pioneering journal in the field of Sanskrit appeared from 1866 till 1917. After being published regularly for almost fifty years, it was withdrawn owing cheifly to the lack of support in 1917. The journal mainly aimed at publishing unpublished Sanskrit texts, but it also contained gleaning from reports, research articles, book-reviews etc., both in English and Sanskrit.

Sampūrnānand Sanskrit University has taken up the much awaited task of bringing out reprints of such selected materials from the file of *The Pandit* which are not available outside its pages. The first part of the *Pandit Revisited* contains a selection of articles in English originally appeared in *The Pandit*, old series, volume I-X (1866-1876).

Some of the important articles are: (i) *Ballantyne* : On the Nyāya System of Philosophy; The Paṇḍits and Their Manner of Teaching, On the Ontology of the Vedānta, (ii) *Fitz-EdwardHall* : Benares, Ancient and Medieval, (iii) *A. E. Gough* : Widow-Marriage; Ancient Indian History, (iv) *Śivaprasād* : The Benares Pillar Inscription; Prophecy in Favour of the British Government etc.

The Volume projects a plain picture of Indological studies in the later half of the 19th centrury. These are also significant sources of academic research in Indology.

Subsequent parts in this series are under print.

10 —)

UNIVERSITY BI-CENTENARY SERIES

[Volume-III]

PAṆḌIT REVISITED

[PART—ONE]

Foreword By

Dr. Vidyāniwās Miśra

Vice-chancellor

Edited By

Dr. B. N. Miśra

M. A., M. L. I. Sc., Ph. D.

Librarian,

Sarasvati Bhavana Library

Sampurnanand Sanskrit University

VARANASI

1 9 9 1

[Published under the Rare Texts Publication Scheme of Sarasvati Bhavana Library with the financial assistance provided by **The University Grants Commission**, New Delhi.]

Published by—
Dr. Harish Chandra Mani Tripathi
Publication Officer,
Sampurnanand Sanskrit University
Varanasi— 221 002.

□

Available at—
Sales Department,
Sampurnanand Sanskrit University
Varanasi— 221 002.

□

First Edition, 500 copies
Price Rs. 190.00

□

Printed by—
Tara Printing Works
Kamachha,
Varanasi—221 010.

10-1

Foreword

The Pandit, also called *Kaśī-vidyā-sudhā-nidhi*, has made a mark in the field of Sanskrit studies as it is the first journal in Sanskrit, published from 1866 to 1917 A. D. The journal was aimed at publishing unpublished texts primarily, but it also published book-reviews, gleanings from reports and research articles, both in Sanskrit and English.

Sampurnanand Sanskrit University has taken up the much awaited task of bringing out reprints of such selected materials from the file of *The Pandit* from 1866-1917 A.D., as are not available outside its pages and bear upon the importance of Sanskrit studies. We have already published two volumes in Sanskirt under the title *The Paṇḍita Parikramā*, volumes 1 and 2.

It gives me great pleasure in bringing out the first volume of the second series of *The Pandit* in English entitled *The Pandit-Revisited*. This volume contains articles from *The Pandit* in English from 1866 to 1876 A. D.

Some of the important articles are the papers of Dr. J. R. Ballantyne on Indian philosophy, e.g. 'On the Nyāya System of Philosophy'; 'The Eternity of Sound— A Dogma of the Mīmāṁsā'; The Gist of the Vedānta Philosophy, etc., Fitz-Edward Hall's documentation on Benares and Rev. Sherring's paper entitled 'The Bhars'. There are two other important papers by A. E. Gough on 'Widow-Marriage' and 'Ancient Indian History'. There are some valuable notes, by Indian scholars— Shashi Shekhara Sānyāla, Babu Śivaprasād, Pramadādāsa Mittra, etc.

Besides, the two notes on the porspective project of translation of the Ṛigveda Saṁhitā by Max Müller, would be of great interest to bibliographers.

This volume projects a plain picture of Indological studies in the later half of the 19th century. These are also significant sources of academic research in Indology. The article of Dr. Ballantyne 'The Pandits and Their Manner of Teaching' is of a great dimensional value. It deals with the problems of communication between western scholars and Sanskrit Pandits. He has also dealt with the texts taught along with the methodology of teaching those texts by giving suitable examples. This paper indicates the typical European response to a different type of traditions and is, therefore, of great interest to us. Hall's paper on Benares as a nucleus of culture is one of the first, succeeding James Prinsep's *The Benares Illustrated.*

I hope, this selection would give a total picture of the standpoint of western scholars associated with the erstwhile Queen's College, Benares, with regard to the scholastic tradition. One may not agree with some of their views as I myself do not agree with them but, as the first western confrontation to India's scholastic tradition, it is of great interest today when we are looking forward to a possiblilty of dialogue between the two traditions. This volume would, indeed, provide a good background for initiating such a dialogue.

Varanasi,

6th November, 1991.

Dr. Vidyāniwās Miśra

Vice-Chancellor

Sampurnanad Sanskrit University,

Varanasi.

10-1

Preface

Kāśī-Vidyā-Sudhā-Nidhi, or to give its English title *The Pandit* was a monthly journal of the Benares College, devoted to Sanskrit literature. It appeared from June, 1866 to September, 1917. The first ten volumes, in larger size (34 x 20 cms.) published from June 1866 to May, 1876, consist of its Old Series. The subsequent volumes, in smaller size (22 x 13 cms.) and numbered afresh from vol. I - XXXIX, published between June, 1876 and September, 1917, comprise of the New Series. This pioneering journal in the field of Sanskrit learning became extinct abruptly after volume 39, no. 9 for the reasons not clear to us.

The main objective of *The Pandit*, as stated, was "to publish rare Sanskrit works which appear worthy of careful editing hereafter; to offer a field of discussion of controverted points in old Indian Philosophy, Philology, History and Literature, to communicate ideas between the Aryan scholars of the East and of the West – between the Pandits of Benares and Calcutta – and the Sanskritists of the Universities of Europe." The Journal published, chiefly, articles, excerpts from reports, brief communications, review articles, biographical sketches, original works in Sanskrit, commentaries on them or English translation and also Sanskrit rendering of some major works of western philosophy. Since the files of *The Pandit* are practically inaccessible to scholars in libraries at present, reprint of the materials in the journal for their benefit has been a long desideratum. In our initial step in this direction, a selection of writings in Sanskrit from the first five volumes of *The Pandit* have already been brought out under the title *Paṇḍita – Parikramā*.

As a next step, a selection of some 35 articles in English, contained in the first ten volumes of *The Pandit* (Old Series), is now being published here under the title *Pandit Revisited.* These articles, originally appearing in instalments, are arranged thematically and duly edited to suit the needs of the present day readership. A complete list of English writings in the above ten volumes of the old series of *The Pandit* is given below for convenience to the readers :

Vol. I, June 1866 to May 1867

Vol. II, June 1867 to May 1868

Vol. 3, June 1868 to May 1869

Vol. 5, June 1970 to May 1971

Vol. 6, June 1871 to May 1872

Vol. 7, June 1872 to May 1873

Vol. 8, June 1873 to May 1874

Vol. 9, June 1874 to May 1875

Out of the above 51 writings, only 35, are included in part one of the *Pandit Revisited* here. These writings in English in the volumes of '*The Pandit*' are mainly contributed by western scholars associated with the Govt. Sanskrit College, Benares or as it was later on termed—The Queen's College. The college has had the advantage of distinguished scholars as principals and professors. To name only a few, among its late principals were John Muir, J. R. Ballantyne, R. T. H. Griffith, George Thibaut, A. E. Gough and Arthur Venis, etc.

J. R. Ballantyne, a scholar widely reputated for his deep acquaintance with Sanskrit literature and philosophy, contributed a series of articles on different branches of Indian Philosophy. These are mostly reproduced in *The Pandit* from the extinct *Benares Magazine*. References, practically from all major works of western philosophers, not merely enrich his writings, but present an insight of the author towards the comparative study of Indian philosophy and religion.

John Muir's contributions in the field of Hindu religion and mythology are well known to the scholars of Indology. His extensive articles 'On the Relation of the Priests to the Other Classes of Indian Society in the Vedic Age' and 'Metrical Sketches of the Vedic gods'—such as Indra, Parjanya, etc. are well attested in the volumes of his *Original Sanskrit Texts*. Similarly, excerpts from the '*Scenes from the Rāmāyaṇa, Megadūta*, etc.' translated by Ralph T. H. Griffith, are interspersed throughout the volumes of *The Pandit*.

Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall, the former Librarian, India Office Library, London, and Inspector of School, in the Central Province, has contributed a well documented monograph on Benares, which is next only to James, Prinsep's, *The Benares Illustrated*.

Rev. M. A. Sherring, a missionary, was long associated with Benares and Mirzapur. His big three volumes 'On Hindu Tribes and Castes', (London, 1881 rep. 1974) are still held as a standard work on social history of India. His article on 'The Bhars', published in *The Pandit*, later found place in the first volume (p. 360 ff.) of his above work. A. E. Ghough's articles 'Ancient Indian History' and 'Widow-marriage' are valuable additions to India's social and political history based on Sanskrit sources.

When George Bühler (1807-1898) was Professor at Elphinstone College, Bombay, he found that Sanskrit texts for the use of students were needed. He submitted his proposal, in collaboration with Professor F. Kielhorn, for the publication of Sanskrit Classics, which appeared first in *The Bombay Educational Record*, Vol. II, 1866, later reproduced in *The Pandit*.

Biographical sketches of Pandits published as obituaries are the most of valuable sources of information about their contributions and other literary activities. Review-articles, epigraphical notes, and brief communications ad-

dressed to thc Editor of *The Pandit*, are also of equal interest to scholars in general and Indologists in particular.

I express my deep sense of gratitude to our Vice-Chancellor, Professor Vidyāniwās Miśra, for his valuable guidance in making this work presentable. Dr. Harish Chandra Mani Tripathi, Publication Officer of the University deserves my grateful thanks for supporting and helping me in preparing this work. Sri Ravi Prakash Pandya of the Tara Printing Works, Varanasi, took special care for the neat and flawless printing. Acknowledgement is also due to Sri S. N. Sharma and Sri S. K. Chaudhari of the Photography Section in Sarasvati Bhavan Library, for photocopying delicate pages of *The Pandit* with care and thoroughness. The editor would be grateful to any reader who cares to pass on his comments and suggestions for the improvement of the book in future editon.

Sarasvatī Bhavan,
Varanasi :

The 30th Nov., 1991.

Dr. B. N. Miśra
Librarian
Sampurnanand Sanskrit University,
Varanasi.

Contents

Remarks on Prof. Goldstücker's Enlarged Edition of Wilson's Sanskrit Dictionary[1]

Pramadā Dāsa Mittra
Assit. Anglo-Sanskrit Professor.

Although but six parts of this great Dictionary have yet appeared, not finishing even the first letter, a cursory glance over the pages is sufficient to strike the reader with the uncommon arduousness of the task which this eminent Sanskritist has undertaken. There is sacrcely a page in the work that does not bear ample testimony to the vast erudition, profound grammatical knowledge and extensive researches of the author. But the work which the Professor has projected, is I think, too vast to be accomplished by one man. Instead of contenting himself with giving all the different meanings of words, each illustrated, when necessary, by one or two examples, the Professor often writes under them elaborate articles on subjects connected with history, philosophy, grammar, rhetoric, etc. replete with a superabundance of quotations drawn from an infinite variety of sources. The consequence of this attempt to do too much is, that inaccuracies and errors have crept in, which are, not unfrequently, serious and bewildering.

I shall point out a few errors committed in the interpretation of some of the technical terms used in Rhetoric. The Professor writes :—

"अभिधान — A word e.g., the Ṭīkā on the Sāhityad. : अन्विताभिधानवादिनो (i.e. those who argue that the words of a sentence are logically connected) मीमांसकगुरवस्तु क्रियाकारकयोः प्रथमत एवान्वयबोधो जायते ततः शक्तिग्रहः — [इत्याहुः].

The term अभिधान is not used, as the Professor supposes, in the sense of *Word* in the compound अन्विताभिधानवादिनः but in that

1. Pan. 1, 1 (June 1, 1866) 9-10.

of *expression, or an act of expressing.* अन्विताभिधानवादिनः (those who hold the expression of the logically connected) is the disignation of the Mīmāṁsakas, as contradistinguished from the old Naiyāyikas, the अभिहितान्वयवादिनः (i.e. those who hold the logical connection of the expressed). The former reject the tenet of the latter that the words of a sentence at first severally suggest *distinct* ideas, the *connection* whereof is *afterwards* suggested by the sentence as a whole, through that power belonging to it which is termed Purport. For, according to them, all our notions of agent, action, object, instrument, position and the like being necessarily connected, the words cannot convey distinct notions *to be* connected afterwards, but convey them *already* connected.

"अनुचितार्थ — Having an unknown or an unusual meaning (as a word; in rhetoric considered as one of the पददोष q. v.; e.g. if the word पशु animal, is used in the sense of sacrificial animal in a poetical passage, while it has this sense only in the ritual literature, or with the intention of implying timidity which it does not imply."

The above term means 'Having an *improper* signification.' The passage referred to by the Professor is: —

शूरा अमरतां यान्ति पशुभूता रणाध्वरे ।

पशु is not faulty here because it is used in the sense of sacrificial animal, that meaning being by no means restricted to the ritual literature, but because it *does* imply timidity or wretchedness which was *not* intended to be implied, being inconsistent with the character of a hero शूर.

"आरोपित — Thrown off, shot off; e.g.

यत्र पतत्यबलानां दृष्टि र्निशिताः पतन्ति तत्र शराः ।
तच्चापरोपितशरो धावत्यासां पुरः स्मरो मन्ये ॥

The above stanza is no exemplification of the present word, for the *sandhi* is तच्चापरोपितशरः is not to be separated thus — तत् + च + अपरोपितशरः, but thus — तत् + चापरोपितशरः, as the former analysis brings in the unmeaning expletive च. Besides, the etymology of the word अपरोपित can not well warrant its use in the sense of *thrown off*, much less in that of *shot off*. The following line of an

exactly similar import, occurring in the same book, *viz*, the *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, from which the above couplet is taken, seems to favour the latter analysis :—

ईक्षसे यत् कटाक्षेण तदा धन्वी मनोभवः ।

The Professor's rendering (p. 98, c. 2, 1.9), therefore, should be altered thus : "Wherever falls the look of woman there fall sharpened arrows; I think therefore that the God of love runs before them *with his bow furnished with arrows*."

"अभवन्मतयोग— Not conveying accurately by a sentence the intended sense, (a) by connceting syntactically words which have no logical relation to each other, or (b) by disconnecting syntactically words which are logically connected, or (c) by erring in the mode of connection; e.g. (a) in the sentence :—

येषां तास्त्रिदशेभदानसरितः पीताः प्रतापोष्मभि-
र्लीलापानभुवश्च चन्दनतरुच्छायासु[1] यैः कल्पिताः ।
येषां हुंकृतयः कृतामरपतिक्षोभाः क्षपाचारिणां
किन्तैस्त्वत्परितोषकारि विहितं किञ्चित्प्रवादोचितम् ॥

There is no logical relation between the words in the relative and those in the correlative sentence—"

The remark on the example is not correct, as will be evident from the following translation of the stanza :

'They, the flames of whose triumphant energy drank up those streams of juice *flowing from the temples* of the divine elephants, who made the shades of Indra's garden the places of their mirthful carousals, whose—the night-prowlers'— roarings troubled the prince of the gods— what have they done to thy satisfaction and in accordance with the report of their prowess?'

The blemish of the stanza consists in the use of the word क्षपाचारिन् (night-prowler) in one of the Protatic, or relative, clauses, when, as representing the subject of the sentence, it ought to have been employed in the Apodosis, or correlative

1.चन्दनतरुच्छायासु is a mistake of the printed Kāvya-prakāśa for नन्दनतरु-

clause. The example is exactly similar to the one cited by the Professor to illustrate his second division of the fault, marked b.

"अमतपरार्थ Having another sense (*viz.,* one) What is at variance with (that of) the subject matter (as a sentence)— *Kāvyapra.*[1] अमतः प्रकृतविरुद्धः परार्थो यत्र । यथा—

राममन्मथशरेण ताडिता दुःसहेन हृदये निशाचरी ।
गन्धवद्रुधिरचन्द्रनोक्षिता जीवितेशवसतिं जगाम सा ॥

the erotic character of which sentence, as the *Kāvyapra.* observes, is at variance with the character of the poem where it occurs."

The above stanza occurs in the 11th canto of the Raghuvaṁśa. It is scarcely necessary to add that its character is not erotic disgustful. It is faulty not because its character is at variance with that of the poem in which it occurs (which is not the case, as the Raghuvaṁśa is of a varied character and devotes more than one canto to erotic descriptions), but because its *second* sense is erotic and is incongruous with the principal meaning.

Such errors are not confined to the explanation of technical terms. Words of common occurrence are also sometimes found misinterpreted. For instance, the word अल्केद्य, [1] instead of being rendered 'not to be wet,' is rendered 'not to be distressed.' This error however is Prof. Wilson's and is only retained by the editor, The word अभव्य, besides other interpretations, is explained to mean *deceitful*, and the following śadloka of the Mahābhārata is cited to authorize this sense :—

एतस्मिन्नन्तरे रक्षो रावणः प्रत्यदृश्यत ।
अभव्यो भव्यरूपेण भस्मछन्न इवानलः ॥

1. There is indeed a root क्लिद् given in Wilson and Rādhākānta Deva and interpreted *to lament or bewail.* Even if it did mean to distress, that would be no ground for setting aside, in the present instance, the far more common meaning of *to wet.* Need I here remind the reader of that well known sublime couplet of the *Bhagavad gītā*?—

अच्छेद्योऽयमदाह्योऽयमक्लेद्योऽशोष्य एवच ।
नित्यः सर्व्वगतः स्थाणुरचलोऽयं सनातनः ॥२.२४.

अभव्यो भव्यरूपेण is rendered 'deceitful on account of his future appearance,' when it evidently means— 'evil, with a good appearance.'

Nowhere however in the pages of the Dictionary, I feel myself bound to observe, is the reader disgusted with any of the faintest mark of that presumptuous and perverse pedantry which leads the author, while professing to write a *Sanskrit* Dictionary, outrageously to strip Sanskrit words of their native forms, and capriciously to force upon them foreign and uncouth shapes such as make it difficult even for those to recognize them who bear the most affectionate and natural relation to them— the Hindus. Great indeed would be the work— wondrous as the production of one man— though not entirely to be relied upon as an authority— even with errors such as have been pointed out, were there any chance of its ever being completed. As the case is, it is much to be wished that the Professor would circumscribe the sphere of his work within narrower limits, and secure the chance of soon finishing a comprehensive Sanskrit and English Dictionary, the want of which is daily felt with growing urgency.[1]

1. H. H. Wilson entrusted Goldstücker the task of preparing, the third edition of his Sanskrit English Dictionary. It was planned on a grand scale but was never completed. Ed.

On the Nyāya System of Philosophy, and the Correspondence of its Divisions with those of Modern Science[1]

J. R. Ballantyne

Probably no one of our readers requires to be told, that the three leading schools of Indian philosophy are the *Vedānta,* the *Sāṁkhya*, and the *Nyāya.* The first is an attempt to deduce a philosophical theory of the universe from the doctrines of the *Vedas*. Its conclusion is, the non-existence of anything besides God. The second is an attempt to account for the universe without the supposition of Deity at all. It keeps up for a long time a not very definite antithesis between Soul and Nature, and ends in a way which tasks all the ingenuity of its advocates to avoid the conclusion that the author of the system believed in the existence of neither the one nor the other. The third is not so mystical as the *Vedānta*, not so fanciful as the *Sāṁkhya*; and, though mystical and fanciful enough, yet possesses a scientific character. This, we think, may be turned to useful account, and, with the view of showing how, we have proposed here to attempt to determine what correspondence may exist between its divisions and those of modern Science. Incidentally, we shall have occasion to vindicate the Hindū syllogism from some underserved reproach, and also to decline for it some undeserved commendation.

One undeserved reproach that the whole system has met with, orginated, we think,in the practice of calling the *Nyāya* the "Hindū logic," under which character it can not but be regarded as meddling with a great variety of irrelevant matters. But, if we bear in mind that it is an attempt to account for the universe, we must be aware that nothing whatever can lie beyond the

1. Pan. 1, 2 (July 2, 1866) 22-25. From the pen of the lamented Dr. Ballantyne : reprinted from the extinct Benares Magazine, Vol I. 1849.

province of which it legitimately takes cognizance. The word *nyāya*, signifying "propriety, fitness, good government," is derived from a verb signifying, "to go," combined with a preposition signifying "in." We are not prepared to decide how far this ("going in" a right way) may answer to the *μεθοδος* of the Greek; but we entertain no doubt that the proper way in which to regard the *Nyāya*, is in the light of what Harris calls, a "Philosophical Arrangement." It is an attempt to treat "de omnibus rebus," or "de omni scibili," in some such well-ordered fashion as Coleridge inculcates the value of in his dissertation on "Method," prefixed to the *Encyclopedia Metropolitana*, the compilation of which his suggestion led to.

For information respecting the writers on the *Nyāya*, and other particulars not bearing upon our present design, the reader can consult Mr. Colebrooke's celebrated discourse published in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. I.p. 92-118, and re-published in the first volume of his "Miscellaneous Essays." The founder of the system, the inspired sage *Gautama*, left a collection of succinct aphorisms in five books. With the intention, apparently, rather of suplying what was incomplete in this exposition, than of disputing it, *Kaṇāda* put forth another collection of similar aphorisms.— It is with *Kaṇāda's* arrangement chiefly that we are at present concerned.— In Bengal, we believe the student usually makes his first acquaintance with *Kaṇāda's* views in the pages of the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, a work of *Viśvanāth Pañcānana Bhaṭṭa*, which, along with its commentary, the *Sidhānta-muktāvalī* of the same author, was published in Calcutta, under the authority of the Committee of Public Instruction, with the somewhat inappropriate English title of "An Elementary treatise on the terms of Logic."— A simpler compendium is the *Tarka-saṁgraha* of *Annam Bhaṭṭa*, which contains nearly all that we shall have occasion to refer to at present.

Our author begins with an enumeration of the Categories, or most general heads, under one or other of which every name current in the world is capable of being classed. These are enumerated as follows :— "Substance (*dravya*), Quality (*guṇa*),

Action (*karmma*), Community (*sāmānya*), Difference (*viśeṣa*), Intimate or material Relation (*samavāya*), and Non-existence (*abhāva*)." These seven our text-book designates by the term *padārtha,* which, in ordinary language, means "a thing." We shall not stay to enquire at present how far this popular application of the word may have served to give the system an appearance of being more decidedly Realistic than in fact it is. Neither shall we stay to enquire whether *Kaṇāda's* Categories exhaust the matter of nomenclature, or whether they sub-divide it in the most unexceptionable fashion. These are enquiries to which we may address ourselves some other time, but are beside the business in hand. We ourselves, though we doubt whether the paṇdits will agree with us, to take the term *padārtha* to have been used by *Kaṇāda* in its etymological sense (*padasya artha*) to signify "that which is meant by a word," and of course the meaning of every word that is a common term must be comprised under one or other of the categories which constitute a correct division of Names.

The first of the Categories, *viz.*, Substance, is subdivided into the nine following; *viz.*, "Earth, Water Light, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul and Mind." Before sub-dividing these further, our text-book proceeds to sub-divide the second category, *viz.,* Quality, of which there are reckoned twenty-four species; *viz.*, "Colour, savour, odour, feel, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity fluidity, viscidity, sound, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, virtue, vice and faculty." The third category, *viz.,* Action, is sub-divided into "Casting upward, casting downward, Contraction, dilatation, and going on." The fourth category, *viz.,* community, is divided into "the higher and the lower." These bear to each other the relation of genus and species. The Differences, which make up the fifth category, are stated to be endless. The sixth category, or Intimate Relation, such as that between a jar and the clay of which it is formed, is of only one kind. The last category, Non existence, is split into four kinds, *viz.*, antecedent non-existence, (or the state of anything before it began to be); emergent non-existence (or the state of

anything after it has ceased to be); absolute non-existence; and mutual non-existence, or difference.

Having thus advanced a step in the sub-division of each category, our text-book reverts to the first of them, and proceeds to sub-divide Earth. This is stated to be of two-kinds, "Eternal, and Transient— Eternal in the form of Atoms, Transient in the form of Products." The same sub-division is made of Water, Light, and Air. Taking these together, we arrive here at one of the points beyond which the Hindu mind has not satisfactorily advanced. The division of matter into Atom and mass, provided nothing be assumed in regard to atoms that has not been fairly established, is a convenient one; and the division corresponds with the modern division of physical science into the Chemical and the non-Chemical. This, then, we note as the first point in the system at which we can distinctly and intelligibly acquaint the learned Hindū with one of our own marked scientific divisions. Matter, not in the form of atoms, is sub-divided into "organized body, organs of sense, and inorganic mass." As regards the fanciful notion that the organs of sense are formed of the matter of the supposed elements, the reader can consult Professor H. H. Wilson's edition of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, p.122. Of organized bodies we must necessarily ignore those which, to complete the system, the *Nyāya*, like Paracelsus, feigns the existence of — firey in the solar realms— aqueous in those of Neptune— and aerial in the shape of goblins. But we agree with the Hindūs that animals and plants have organized bodies, the difference between the two being in general sufficiently well marked by their own criterion, the presence or absence of the power of locomotion. Here then, in the *Nyāya* arrangement, is the place for Zoology and Botany, descriptive, anatomical, and physiological. Again, when the unorganized products of matter are spoken of, we come to the consideration of the globe itself, which may be considered superficially, substantially, or as a unit in a larger system. Here then we place Geography, Geology, and Astronomy.— Leaving Ether as we find it, and passing over Time and Space, which metaphysicians in general are puzzled whether to regard as mere fictitious non-entities, or as the only

entities in their own right,— seeing that this "par nobile fratrum." must necessarily remain even were all else to be annihilated, we come to Soul, which our text-book defines as "the receptacle of knowledge." This is divided into two— God, the Supreme Soul, unconnected with pain or pleasure, and the sould of living creatures, of which there is one to each body, distinct and eternal.— Here we may place Theology, and also Mental Philosophy, for the next topic that presents itself is the Mind, which our text-book regards as the "organ of the soul." —Into the pertinency of the definition we are not now going to enquire.

Our text-book, having disposed, for the present, of the category of Substance, now reverts to that of Quality. Of the qualities, those cognizable by the senses, and considered as phenomena existing only in as much as they are perceived, can be best disposed of when the senses themselves are under consideration. Considered objectively as the causes, in posse, of phenomena, they come under another division— that of Motion or Action, where we place Mechanics in its widest acceptation.

The citation of the Qualities of Number and Quantity, fixes, in the system, the place of the corresponding sciences, on which we need not dwell.

As the objective qualities (or causes of sensation), Colour &c., belong to the division of Motion, so the qualities of Intelligence, Memory and the like, must be remitted to that division in which we placed Mental Philosophy; and from the division would branch out the department of Ethics, private and public, occupying itself about the qualities "Volition, Virtue, Vice," &c.

Under the head of Intelligence our text-book treats of Cause and Effect, in terms directly answering to those of Aristotle, and of course readily resolvable into the simpler language of modern philosophy. Under the same head it treats largely of Inference, which as we have already remarked, appears to have been too generally regarded as the only province with which the *Nyāya* was legitimately concerned.

Deduction (*anumāna*) is defined as the efficient cause of an inference or conclusion (*aunmiti*). "An inference (*anumiti*)," our

text-book goes on to say, "is knowledge" produced from a logical datum (*parāmarśa*). The logical datum consists of the knowledge of a general principle combined with the knowledge that the case in question is one to which it is applicable (*vyāpti-viśiṣṭa-pakṣadharmatā-jñāna.*) For example, the knowledge that 'This hill is characterized by invariably-fire-attended smoke' is a logical datum, the knowledge produced from which, *viz.* that 'The hill is fiery,' is an inference."

Now, in this form of the syllogism (which we do not find alluded to in Mr. Colebrooke's essay,) there is neither more nor less than there is in the Aristotelic syllogism. The wonder would have been if there had. The first formal difference observable, is the wrapping up of the premises in one logical datum. The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable members of a single statement appears to be this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind, that the premises suggest the inference, and this simultaneousness of cognizance is secured by combining the two assertions in a period, or sentence, of which the whole becomes intelligible only when the last word in it has been uttered. It might appear that such a form of statement is not the most convenient for enabling an objector to declare which part of it his objection applies to— but this, were it granted, does not matter— for we shall find that the *Naiyāyikas* have another way of arranging their argument, when it is to be brought under the consideration of another person. If we separate the two members of the logical datum in the example above-cited, we obtain the following :—

"Whatever smokes is fiery :

The hill smokes :

Therefore the hill is fiery."

Another formal difference that requires to be noticed is the fact, that whilst the European logic employes a phraseology founded on classification, the *Nyāya*, in testing the validity of an argument, operates by means of the terms on which a classification would be based. The former infers that "Kings are mortal," because kings are men— a class of beings who are mortal. The

latter arrives at the same inference by means of the consideration that mortality is inherent in humanity and humanity in kings. We shall not here enquire how far the habitual employment of abstract terms as the foundations of all truth, may help to foster Realistic notions. What we wish to impress in regard to this is, the necessity (if both parties wish to understand each other) of acquiring readiness and dexterity in transforming the one phraseology into the other, – for, a person habituated to the one form, finds the other at first both repulsive and perplexing, because the rules which he has previously been accustomed to trust to, do not apply directly to the form of expression propounded, and are of no use to him till he has got the matter into the shape in which it might have been advantageously presented to him at the outset. The European logician will have no difficulty in bringing to the test of his own rules a statement presented to him in any intelligible shape by a pandit or any one else, but he will place a needles obstacle in the way of his own argument, if he leaves to a pandit the task of doing the same thing for himself.

Here then is the place, in the *Nyāya* system, to be allotted to Deductive Logic, and also to the process of Induction, which is indicated, in the above-quoted definition of the logical datum, by the term *vyāpti* a term importing the invariable attendance of a given property on its ascertained sign.

In regard to the import of a proposition which the logic of Europe calls a Universal Affirmative, such as "All men are mortal," the *Naiyāyika* would say that there is pervading inherence (*vyāpti*) of mortality in humanity – and he would state the proposition thus: – "Where there is humanity, there is mortality." In elucidation of two other terms connected with the important question of *vayāpti-niścaya*, (or the "ascertainment of pervading inherence" as we would propose to render the term Induction,) we may remark that, in a Universal Affirmative, the predicate, or major term, connotes the "pervader" (*vyāpaka*) or invariable concomitant of the characteristic connoted by the subject, or minor term, which is "pervaded" (*vyāpya*) by it. The term *pakṣa*, quoted a little way back, means the subject, or

minor term, of the conclusion; and the compound word of which it forms a part, *pakṣa-dharmatā* means "the possession of the character which entitles its possessor to the subject of the conclusion" — the condition of a mountain, for instance, in so far as the *vyāpya*, or characteristic connoted by the subject of the major premiss, *viz.*, the characteristic "smoke," belongs to the mountain, which is thereby entitled to be the subject of the conclusion. In the language of European logic, it is the agreement of the minor term of the syllogism with the middle term.

The expression "*vyāptiviśiṣṭa-pakṣadharmatā-jñānam*" corresponds to the Aristotelic "dictum de omni et nullo," for it tells us that the knowledge constituting an inference results from the knowledge that the subject of the proposition to be proved possesses a characteristic which is invariably accompanied by the property the presence of which in the subject we wish to establish. This is tantamount to saying, in terms of the classificatory view, that "what may be asserted of every individual in a class, may be asserted of any individual which can be ascertained to belong to the class" — things being spoken of as belonging to a class for no other reason than their possessing a common characteristic. The statement of the *Nyāya* include the "dictum de nullo," because the absence (*abhāva*) of a characteristic is reckoned as itself a characteristic.

Of the process of Induction our text-book gives the following account. "Having repeatedly observed, in "the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, *having assumed that the concomitancy is invariable*," and so on :— but we may as well let our author finish his sentence — "having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, one *recollects* the invariable concomitancy of fire where there is smoke". — This *recollection* of a previously established general principle, belongs to the same place in the logical system as the Enthymeme. The un-expressed premiss is held by the Greek to be "in the mind," by the Hindū "in the memory."

The arrival at a conclusion in the manner above described is said to be a process of "Inference for one's

(*svārthānumāna*)— and this is all that belongs to European Logic, even when the term is taken in the extended sense preferred by Mr. J. S. Mill, so as to include the process of Induction.

Injustice has been done to the *Nyāya* system by treating as its Logic what is in reality its Rhetoric. This we shall proceed to explain, after having shown where *Gautama* and *Kaṇāda* stopped short in their analysis of the reasoning process, whilst Aristotle took the further step of separating the matter of the syllogism from the form of it, and showing that the latter can be made the subject of a science as abstract and as certain as Arithmetic. And what wonder is it that the Hindū mind did not take this magnificent stride, when the European mind (in the bulk of the individual minds that go to make up its aggregate) has positively slid back from the point that had been thus attained?

[1]Hampered by the currency of a nomenclature founded on the correct analysis which they did not correctly apprehend. Locke and Stewart and their followers ended by being inferior logicians to the Brāhmans, whose logic offers a correct analysis so far as it goes, though they hold that to be one (as, in their physics they still do air or water) which a more searching analysis has discovered to be of two constituent parts. We take leave, in passing, to offer our thanks to Mr. Knighton for the very neat way in which he has shown that Bacon is not chargeable with holding the inaccurate opinions on this subject which have been imputed to him by those who, holding an inaccurate opinion themselves, though that they were doing a service to Bacon in attributing it to him also. Mr. Knighton (in his lecture delivered to the students of the HIndū College, Calcutta, on "The utility of the Aristotelian Logic,")allots to Bacon the precise amount of blame due to his neglect in not guarding against the misapplication of so weighty an authority as his own, by directing his censures (at the commencement of the organum) explicitly, instead of implicitly, against the abuse of a science, of the legitimate use of which he subsequently indicates his thoroughly correct appreciation. It would not be difficult to anticipate Bacon's reply to

1. Pan. 1, 3 (Aug. 1, 1866) 38-40.

this residuary censure. Some other time we may throw it into the shape of a dialogue among the parties concerned.

With regard to the difference of opinion existing among thinking men in Europe as the the proper province of Logic, the title of Professor De Morgan's work, from which we gave extracts in an earlier Number of the Benares Magazine, supplies the means of getting rid of all that is of any moment in the controversy. "Formal Logic" is an abstract Science, just as Arithmetic or Algebra is. Whatever therefore is not, as in Algebra, expressible by symbols, the meaning of which, provided it do not change without notice being given, does not require to be known, lies beyond the province of that distinctly bounded science to which exclusively Whately restricts the name of Logic— a name which, in order to accommodate the world in general and put an end to misconception, may advantageously, we think, retain the badge put upon it by De Morgan, though, to Whately's eye, it must always suggest a tautology, and, to his mind if not his lips, a protest against the inveterate abuse of language which rendered the tautology expedient. To state the case in homely language, the term had been so long ill-handled, that it indispensably required patching; and Professor De Morgan has patched it so neatly, that though *not* as good as new, it is, as patched, better than anything that could be substituted for it.

Before quitting the subject of Formal Logic, for which ("like an ass for a thistle," as a practical man might illustratively suggest,) we own a liking, let us advert to the question how it comes that, by the wise— that is to say, by the people who make money,— formal logic, is scouted as an abstraction; whilst Arithmetic— equally abstract— is admitted as Gospel, "according to Cocker," by men who admit no Gospel of any other description. The answer "lies in a nut-shell"— in the difference between the tangible, reddish-brown, marketable solidity of a half-penny, and the intangible, unmarketable, unprofitable nature of truth.

To return to our text-book— the author tells us that man after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind inferred the presence of fire from the perception of smoke, may wish to

impart his conviction to another. In other words—having ascertained the truth as a logician, he may wish, as a rhetorician, to establish it to the satisfaction of somebody else. Here we step distinctly out of the province of Logic, and enter that of Rhetoric. In order to show that, in saying so, there is not here a case of "holding a candle to the sun," or a case where "there needs no ghost" to tell us what is told, we proceed to quote from Mr. Colebrooke's essay, of which he promises a continuation. The non-fulfilment of the promise (Miscellaneous Essays, vol. I.p. 267) we lament.

Mr. Colebrooke says (p. 292 *ibid*) :—

> "A regular argument, or complete syllogism(*nyāya*), consists of five members (*avayava*) or component parts. Ist, the proposition (*pratijñā*); 2nd, the reason (*hetu or apadeśa*); 3rd, the instance (*udāharaṇa or nidarśana*); 4th, the application (*upanaya*); 5th, the conclusion (*nigamana*). Example :—
>
> 1. This hill is fiery :
> 2. For it smokes.
> 3. What smokes, is fiery : as a culinary hearth.
> 4. Accordingly, the hill is smoking :
> 5. Therefore it is fiery.

"Some," Mr. Colebrooke adds, (alluding, in a note, to the followers of the *Mīmāṁsā* school,) "confine the syllogism "(*nyāya*) to three members; either the three first, or the "three last. In this latter form it is quite regular." Dr. Heinrich Ritter ("History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. 4, p. 365 of Morrison's translation) does not grant even thus much. Amidst all the perplexity that he left in by the scantiness of the information at his command, "One point alone," to him "appears certain," in regard to the *Naiyāyikas*, and that is, "that they can lay but slight claims to accuracy of exposition. This, he conceives, "is proved clearly enough by the form their syllogism, which is made to consist of five instead of three parts." Into this disparaging opinion. Ritter may have been led by supposing that the ex-

ample in Mr. Colebrooke's essay represented what answer to the European syllogism; whereas we have seen that what really answers thereto consists, not of five parts, but only of two. But, whilst Mr. Colebrooke is ready to admit that the syllogism of *Gautama* is "quite regular," provided two of the members be lopped off; Ritter holds that not only are two of the members "manifestly superfluous," but that "by the introduction of an example in the third, the universality of the conclusion is vitiated." This is an injustice from which we have undertaken to vindicate the *Nyāya*, an injustice not chargeable upon Ritter, but upon the scantiness of his information. Those to whom he owed his information did not perhaps calculate upon the necessity under which so speculative a mind as his lies of drawing provisional conclusions—and they had better have been, under all the circumstances, stated as provisonal— not merely from what is adduced, but from the absence of what is not adduced. Our own conclusions, we beg it may be understood, are provisional only; and very much obliged shall we be to any one who can and will set us right in regard to any point which we may have misconceived.

Not only, owing to the confounding of the Rheteorical with the Logical section of the *Nyāya* philosophy, has undeserved censure been directed against its Rhetoric, but equally undeserved praise has been bestowed upon it, under the notion that its Rhetoric is a better kind of logic than that of Aristotle. Sir Graves Haughton (in his "*prodromus,*" p. 214, note.) after referring the reader who may take an interest, in the subject of Hindū logic, to the essay of Mr. Colebrooke from which we have recently been quoting, says :—

> "In the *Asiatic Journal* for February 1837, Colonel Vans Kennedy has given an exposition of Hindu logic; in which he differs, apparently with reason, from Mr. Colebrooke, and I think the following passage deserving of quotation :— 'But it seems, at the same time, evident, that the argument of Gautama, and the syllogism of Aristotle, are too essentially different, in both form and substance, to admit of its being supposed that the one was derived from the other. For the validity of the syllogism depends on this axiom, that *if*

two terms agree with one and the same third, they agree with each other; but the nature and properties of the term which should be employed as the middle term have not been explained by Aristotle. Gautama, on the contrary, founds the conclusiveness of his argument, on such a property being assigned, as a reason for affirming the proposition, as will prove the predicate, and, on the applicability of the reason being shown, by adducing, in its suport the instance of some object which possesses the property specified in the reason and predicate. In this case, therefore, it is not sufficient to lay it down as a rule, that if A can be attributed to every B, and B to every C then A is attributable to every C, and to frame syllogisms with the letters of the Alphabet : for the argument of Gautama cannot be formed, unless a distinct notion of the properties of the subjects by which the question is to be proved has been first conceived. When, however, this argument is duly considered, it will, perhaps, be admitted, that it exhibits a more natural mode of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits of the syllogism, and that its conclusion is as convincing as that of the syllogism, p. 146."

To every reader who has derived his notions on logic, as Colonel Kennedy would seem to have done, from Lock, Stewart, Reid, Brown, or Campbell, the foregoing remarks will appear to decide the matter. That Sir Graves Haughton should be among the number, we marvel. To any one who has read and understood Whately, it will be obvious that Colonel Kennedy's mistake turns on his preference of Rhetoric to Logic, as if the one were the preferable of two articles of the same kind. We must therefore repudiate Colonel Kennedy's irrelevant compliment to the Oration at the expense of the Syllogism; which compliment our *Naiyāyika*, after having decided that the syllogism ought to have even more "compressed limits" than those assigned to it by Aristotle, would assuredly have begged leave to decline. We have sought in vain (sending to Calcutta, Bombay, Agra, and elsewhere,) for the Number of the *Asiatic Journal* containing Colonel Kennedy's Essay.— We are sure that we should learn much from the remarks of so eminent a Sanskrit scholar, though the passaage which we have been obliged to quote at secondhand, satisfies us that we should learn nothing

from Colonel Kennedy in regard to the analysis of the reasoning process.

The five-membered expression, so far as the arrangement of its parts is concerned is a summary of the *Naiyāyika's* views in regard to Rhetoric, "an offshoot from Logic," (see Whately's Elements of Rhetoric, p. 6.) and one to which, after "the ascertainment of the truth by investigation," belongs the establishment of it to the satisfaction of another." Disregarding what is called rhetorical artifice, *Kaṇāda* directs his rhetorician to commence, as Euclid does, by laying down the proposition to be proved. The reason is next to be alleged; and then the general principle, or major premiss, is to be brought forward along with an example in *confirmation.* This is what Ritter objects to; — and if Logic, not Rhetoric, had been in question, the objection would have been relevant. But, remember that we are now concerned about Rhetoric, and read the following from Whately (Rhetoric p. 124) : "Aristotle accordingly has remarked on the expediency of not placing Examples in the foremost rank of Arguments: in which case, he says, a considerable number would be requisite; whereas, *in confirmation,* even one will have much weight." With this view the *Naiyāyika* cites his own example, confirmatory, and also suggestive. The auditor is then to be reminded that there is no dispute that the case in question possesses the character which brings it within the rule; and the oration winds up with the re-introduction of the original proposition in the new character of an established conclusion; just as Euclid's argument winds up by re-introducing the now triumphant proposition with a flourish of trumpets in the shape of a "Quod erat demonstrandum," Thus, rhetorically considered, the five-membered expression is a very suitable framework for a straight-forward argumentative speech, making no appeal to the passions, and not hesitating to table, without exordium, the proposition which it undertakes to establish. Logically considered, the five-membered expression, with its suggestive example, is a combination of the Inductive with the Deductive Syllogism. — It aims at laying before the auditor, for his conviction, an exposition, conjointly, of the two processes which are

described as having previously led to the conviction of the speaker himself.

Here then we would fix, in the *Nyāya* system, the place of Rhetoric, of which the *Alaṅkāra-śāstra,* literally"the Institutes of Decoration," may be regarded as an appendage, if we concur in Cicero's decision, that an orator, having first found something to say, and in the next place disposed it judiciously, ought in the third place "vestire et ornare oratione."— The Hindūs have themselves associated Poetry with their Institutes of Decoration, and there is no occasion to disturb the arrangement.

[1]Whilst *Kaṇāda,* in his rhetorical section, gives the framework for a set harangue, to be delivered without interruption, *Gautama* supposes an opponent, and a chairman, or Speaker of the House. In his first aphorism, (see the "Logical Aphorisms of Goutama," published in Calcutta, p. 2; Colebrooke's Essay, p. 265; or Ward's "View, &c. of the Hindoos, v. 4, p. 239)" he sketches, by an enumeration of the sixteen topics following, what may be regarded as "the natural history of a debate." What is to be admitted as proof (*pramāṇa*) having been predetermined, and the subject of discussion (*prameya*) having been mooted, the impartial chairman, not having yet heard the arguments, is in a state of doubt (*saṁsaya*), both as to what is the fact of the matter, and also as to there being any suffcient motive (*prayojana*)for entertaining the question. The asserter of the proposition explains the importance of the question, which furnishes the motive for entertaining it; and he supports his own opinion on the matter by citing examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) sufficient, he conceives, to make out an established case (*siddhānta*). An opponent rises, and takes the reasoning to pieces *(avayava)*, putting it, that is to say, into the form of the five membered discourse, and trying to show its insufficiency. The first speaker makes a refutation (*tarka*) of these objections, and thus furnishes confirmation (*nirṇaya*) of his own position. The objector, who, being, by hypothesis, in the wrong, is of course obstinate, begs that a fair discussion (*vāda)* may be allowed; and he proceeds to offer a wrangling rejoinder (*jalpa*); and, in default of better arguments, he brings forward cavils

(*vitaṇḍā*), fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*), ambiguous expressions, and such-like disingenuous artifices (*chala*). By these unworthy proceedings he lays himself open to the confutation (*jāti*)to which a reasoner is liable who evidently contradicts himself, and the assembly being no longer disposed to listen to him, he is voted a nuisance and finds himself in the predicament of being rebuked (*nigraha-sthāna*) by the president, who puts him down, and declares that "the Ayes have it."

Kaṇāda's six categories belong, in the foregoing enumeration of topics, to the head of *prameya* — things, the existence of which is to be proved.

After the rhetorical section of our text-book, we come to the chapter on Fallacy, or "the more appearance of a reason" (*hetvābhāsa*). The examples, as might have been expected, are all regarded as being "extra dictionem," and the refutation is made to turn on the citation of instances in which there is avowedly present or avowedly absent that property, the existence of which in the subject (*pakṣa*) is in question.— "That which certainly possesses the property in question," says our text-book, "is called an instance on the same side (*sa-pakṣa*); as the culinary hearth, in our example. That which is certainly devoid of the property in question is called an instance on the opposite side (*vi-pakṣa*); as the great deep lake, in the same example."

The *sa-pakṣa* corresponds to Bacon's *instantiae convenientes* "quæ in eâdem naturâ conveniunt, per materias licet dissimillimas." The *vi-pakṣa* answers to the instantiæ "quæ natura datâ privantur" — (Organum, Lib. 2. Aph. xi. and xii.)

The five kinds of allegation that present merely the semblance of a reason (*hetv*ābhāsa), are specified as follows :— (1) that which would prove too much "(*savyabhicāra*; (2) that which would prove the contradictory (*viruddha*); (3) that than which there is a stronger argument on the other side (*satpratipakṣa*); (4) the inconclusive (*asiddha*); and (5) the self-refuted (*bādhita*)." "The alleged reason which would prove too much," (*sa-vyabhicāra*, — i.e. which wanders away to cases

where the property is absent, instead of being exclusively predicable in cases where the property is present,) is described as "that which has several conclusions" (besides the one wanted.) "As, for instance, if one should say, The mountain is fiery, because the existence of the mountain is capable of proof," (the reason assigned would be liable to this objection,) "because the capability of having its existence proved, belongs (equally) to a lake, which is characterized by the absence of fire."

The result of this, translated into the language of European logic is this, that in such a case an opponent would deny the supressed premiss, essential to the validity as an argument — *viz.* that "All that is demonstrable is fiery" — the truth of which is a question not of formal logic but of fact — a question to be determined by inductive investigation. If the suppressed premiss be merely that "Some things demonstrable are fiery," then of course the middle term is not distributed.

It is obvious (see Whately's Logic, Book 3, § 1) that it is impossible, in the case of a fallacy propounded as an Enthymeme, to tell whether the fallacy is in the form or in the matter; but there is no doubt that our text book views it as residing in the matter, seeing that what is brought forward, in refutation, is an instance designed to disprove the universality of the suppressed major.

Under the same division of fallacies our text-book places two other varieties — that in which the reason alleged is "not common" (*asādhāraṇa*), being a property of the subject under consideration and of nothing besides, — and that which is "non-exclusive" (*anupasaṁhārī*). Of the former the example given is, "Sound is eternal, because it has the nature of sound"; on which our text-book remarks that "the nature of sound resides in sound alone, and in nothing else, whether eternal or non-eternal." This fallacy corresponds to what has been ungallantly termed "Ladies' logic" — the proving of a proposition by reassserting it "It is so" "Why?" — "because it is so." Of the other variety, the example given is, "Everything is non-eternal, because the existence of everything is capable of proof." To this

our text-book objects, that "since *every thing* is taken as the subject of the "proposition, nothing is left to furnish examples," by means of which the truth of the assertion might be tested. This view of the matter is taken under the impression that truth can be ascertained only by an induction of examples, the *Naiyāyikas* agreeing rather with Mr. Mill than with Mr. Whewell on this point.

Of the second class of fallacies we find the following example— "Sound is eternal, because it is created"— an argument to be rejected, according to our text-book, because the fact of its having been created implies, not eternity, but the negation thereof. In this case the denial of the major, *viz.*, that "Everything created is eternal," rests on the ground that the very reverse is the fact. Whether sound be created or uncreated, is a disputed point among Indian philosophers,— the Grammarians, of course, taking the side in the dispute which tends most to exalt the subject-matter of their own science.

As an example of the third class of fallacies, we are told that if one should argue that "Sound is eternal, because it is audible, as the nature of sound (*śabdatva*) is (by both parties admitted to be,)" it might be argued with equal force, on the other side, that "Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product —as a jar is."

Wherever there appears to be an equiponderance of arguments, the case is of course one for further enquiry into facts. As for the example just quoted, a Buddhist would dispose of it by denying that anything exists in reality answering to the term *śabdatva,* "the abstract nature of sound." Granting that there were such a thing, and that it were eternal as here assumed, there is a fallacy of equivocation in the attribution to it at once of the terms "audibleness" and "eternity." The term *śabdatva* is audible, like other words, only in the sense of what is called in the Logic of the Schools its *suppositio materialis* (the *anukaraṇa* of the Sanskrit Grammarians)— in so far as it is a pronounceable collection of vowels and consonants; but it is held to be eternal in quite a different sense— in the sense it is no more audible than is the abstract nature of a jar, or any other kindred Pseudo-Platonic Universal.

The fourth class of fallacies, that of the inconclusive (*asiddha*) is sub-divided into three kinds, (1) "where there is not established the existence of any such locality as that where the property is alleged to reside" (*āśrayāsiddha*); (2) "where the inconclusiveness is apparent from the form of the expression" *(svarūpāsiddha)*; and (3) "where invariableness of concomitancy is not established," (*vyāpyatvāsiddha*). As an example of the first kind, our text-book supposes one to argue that "The sky-lotus is fragrant, because the nature of a lotus resides in it, as in the lotuses of the lake." And it is remarked that "the sky-lotus which is here (alleged as) the locality (of the nature of a lotus) does not exist." — Mr. Mill (Logic, vol. 1, p. 200,) treating of the nature of Definition, has the following remarks, which noticeably illustrate the case in hand.

He says :—

> "Let this, for instance, be our definition; A dragon is a serpent breathing flame. This proposition, considered only as a definition, is indisputably correct. A dragon *is* a serpent breathing flame : the word *means* that. The tacit assumption, indeed, (if there were any such understood assertion,) of the existence of an object with properties corresponding to the deflnition, would, in the present instance be false. Out of this definition we may carve the premisses of the following syllogism" :—
>
> "A dragon is a thing which breathes flame.
>
> But a dragon is a serpent!
>
> From which the conclusion is
>
> Therefore some serpent or serpents breathe flame?"—
>
> "An unexceptionable syllogism, in the first mode of the third figures, in which both premisses are true, and yet the conclusion false; which every logician knows to be an absurdity. The conclusion being false, and the syllogism correct, the premisses cannot be true. But the premisses, considered as parts of a definition, are ture : there is no possibility of controverting them. Therefore, the premisses considered as parts of a definition cannot be the real ones. The real premisses must be" :
>
> "A dragon is a really existing thing which breathes flame :—

A dragon is a really existing serpent :

Which implied premisses being false, the falsity of the conclusion presents no absurdity."

The example given of an argument "the inconclusiveness of which is apparent on the face of it," is the following: "Sound is a quality, because it is visible, as colour is," – in the case of which argument, we are told, every one would perceive at once that "visibility does not reside in sound, for sound is recognized by the hearing" (not by vision). This is the case of notorious falsehood in the minor premiss.

The third case in this class, *viz.,* the case "where in variableness of concomitancy is not established," exhibits an approach to a recognition of the formal necessity of the distribution of the middle term; –but, as treated, it falls under the head of the procedure "a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter." The example given is the following :– "The mountain must be smoky, because it is fiery;" whereupon our text-bok remarks justly, that things may be ignited, like a red-hot iron ball, without being smoky; and, less justly, that smoke can be looked for only where "wet fuel" is in the way. The term *upādhi* ("a special cause for a general effefct"–Wilson's Dict.) answers to the "quid" in the "dictum secundum quid."

Of the last kind of fallacy treated of, the futile or self-contradictory, the following is given as an example :–"Fire is devoid of heat, because it is a substance, as a jar is." In this case, says our text-book, the alleged proof is defeated by the opposition of a thoroughly ascertained one– for we know, by the evidence of our senses, that "fire is hot." – If we did not, the argument is not the less a non sequitur.

Having thus pursued Fallacy down to its lowest hiding-place in sheer nonsense, our text-book goes on to cite comparison as a separate kind of proof. We agree with the *Sāṁkhya* in declining to recognise this as a special kind of proof :– so we pass it over, and proceed to "Testimony" (*śabda*), which is defined as "the word of one worthy" (to be received as an authority). Here is the starting point for an enquiry into the

truth of history— a question of the greatest moment in our dealings with Hindū thinkers, and a question in regard to which we fear their notions are at present of the crudest.

Our text-book next proceeds to some considerations about the nature of language, indicating the place in the system for the Philosophy of grammar :— and then come some of the Qualities which we have already remitted to the province of Psychological and Ethical science; our text-book itself here remarking that "the eight qualities in the list, beginning with "Intellect, belong to Soul only."

The last of the qualities, *viz.,* Faculty (*saṁskāra*) is said to be of three kinds, viz. (1) Momentum (*vega*); (2) Imagination (*bhāvanā*); and (3) Elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*). It seems strange to class together things so seemingly different as these three. Our own view of the classification, (which those pandits that we have got to understand us seem to concur in,) is this— that for the production of such an effect, or the establishment of such a product, as a jar, two causes at least must co-operate; *viz.* the maker and the material :— for the clay may be said to make the jar, as reasonably as the potter can be said to make it. So again, in order that there may be Perception, both the Mind and an external Object must co-operate. But equally in the case of the Mind's exerting the faculty of Memory, of a bent bow's righting itself on the removal of the strain, and of a body's continuing its course after disjunction from that which orginated the motion, an agent is recognized as operating *by itself.* Looking at the etymology of the word *saṁskāra*— (*sam* "with," and *kṛi* "do")— one might imagine the word to be better fitted to express what is done, by the mind, &c. in co-operation with something else, than what is done without such co-operation : but occasionally, in a compound verb, the separate force of the constitnent elements is nearly as little obvious as the character of the acid or the alkali in a neutral salt.

Our text-book, having finally disposed of the two first categories— Substance and Quality,— reverts to the third— that of Action, which is defined as "consisting in motion."— Here, as we stated before, we find the place, in the *Nyāya* sys-

tem, for all the physical sciences dependent on the laws of motion. On the remaining four categories, (Community, Difference, Intimate Relation and Non-existence,) it would be needless here to add to what has been already said.

Now, reviewing the ground that we have gone over with the view of finding out its available points, we think we have shown that the *Nyāya* system furnishes starting points, from which the learned mind of India may be invited to advance into the scientific paths of Chemistry, Zoology, Botany, Geography, Geology, Astronomy, Psychology, Ethics, Mathematics, Formal Logic, the Philosophy of Induction, Rhetoric, and Mechanical Philosophy.

Why we think the determination of these points a matter of some importance, and how we think they might be turned to practical account, we propose to set forth in a paper "On the Prospects of India, Religious and Intellectual". —K.

The Eternity of Sound : A dogma of the Mīmāmsā[1]

Dr. Ballantyne

At page 05, vol. 1, of Mr. Colebrooke's *Collected Essays*, where he is treating of Jaimini's system of philosophy, the *Mīmāṁsā*, we read as follows – "In the first chapter of the lecture occurs the noted disquisiton of the *Mīmāṁsā* on the original and perpetual association of articulate sound with sense." What this dogma means, and why the question forced itself upon Jaimini at the opening of his work, we here propose to consider.

"The object of the Mīmāṁsā" — to employ the words of Mr. Colebrooke, – "is the interpretation of the *Vedas*". As he adds, – "Its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty". This is declared in the opening aphorism, which interspersing an explanatory comment, we may render as follows – "Well, then, [O student, since thou hast read the *Vedas* while residing in the family of thy preceptor], therefore a desire to know *Duty* [which knowledge, without further aid, thou wilt scarcely gather from the texts with which thy memory is stored, ought now to be entertained by thee]."[2] But what do you *mean* by "Duty?" – enquires the sutdent. To expound the entire import of the term would be difficult, if not impossible, at the outset; so Jaimini, following the recognised method of laying down a "characteristic" (*lakṣaṇa*), by which the thing, though not fully described, may be securely *recognised*, decalres as follows – "A duty is a matter which may be recognised [as a duty] by the instigatory character [of the passage of Scripture in which it is mentioned].[3] As Mr. Colebrooke observes – "Here *duty* in-

1.Pan. 1, 5 (Oct. 1, 1866) 68-71. (Reprinted from the extinct Benares Magazine, August, 1852).

२. अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ॥१ ॥

३. चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः ॥२ ॥

tends sacrifices and other acts of religion ordained by the *Vedas*. The same term (*dharma*) likewise signifies *virtue*, or moral metrit; and grammarians have distinguished its import according to the gender of the noun. In one (the masculine), it implies virtue; in the other (neuter), it means an act of devotion. It is in the last-mentioned sense that the term is here employed." We may add, in explanation of this, that the discussion of the gender of the word was provoked by Jaimini's choosing to employ the masculine form (as may be observed in the original aphorism given in the note), instead of the neuter. To the query, why Jamini was guilty of this grammatical solecism, one of his commentators coolly replies — " take [and be content with] as the reason thereof, the fact that he [Jaimini] is a great sanctified sage, — [and therefore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases]." Arguments of this lofty Pope Hildebrand order, which were doubtless rolled out with unction *et ore rotundo*, in the palmy days of Hinduism, the Brāmans now-a-days are most amusingly ashamed of; — those of them, at least, who are not prepared to join cordially in a broad grin over the "bumptiousness" of the pretention.

Whilst Jaimini contents himself with giving in the first instance, a 'characteristic' by which *duty* may be recognised, his commentator supplies an account of its *nature*, — i. e. what constitues that a Duty to which the characteristic in question belongs. According to him, what constitutes anything a Duty is "the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure — [or, in other words, its being calculated to produce more pleasure than pain]." The agreement of this with the Benthamite definition of the Useful is noticeable. Another thing which we wish here to take an opportunity of noticing, is a correspondence, in point of terminology, between the systems of the East and of the West. That which constitutes anything what it is, was called by Plato its *Idea*. Aristotle disliked the term; and he sought to convey the same meaning by a term which the School-men rendered *Form*. Bacon adopted the word *Form* in this sense, and the exactly corresponding Sanskrit word — viz., *svarūpa* — is the one here employed, and generally employed, to convey the notion of what

is the abiding cause of a thing's being what it is. When a Hindu writer, at the opening of a treatise on anything says "I shall decalre the *lakṣaṇa* and the *svarūpa* of the thing in question", he means to say, that he will tell first how we are to recognise the thing as *the* thing that we are talking about, and that he will tell next – *all about it*. The *lakṣaṇa* is the mark on the sealed package, by which we recognise it among other packages; – the *svarūpa* is the contents of the package. The reason why we think it worth while to advert to the import of the phraseology in question is this, that we ourselves once took a good deal of pains unprofitably to reconcile these two terms with the "genus" and the "specific difference" which together make up the "definition" according to European logic. The one set of terms and the other, however, belong to different aspects of thought.

To return to Jaimini – having intimated that the cause of our knowing anything to be a duty was simply an instigation, in the shape of a passage of Scripture holding out the promise of a reward for the performance of a given act, he next thinks proper to show how nothing else *could* be the evidence for it. "An examination", he says, "of the cause of [our recognising] it [– viz., a duty, – is to be made];"[1] – and he explains, as follows, how our organs of Sense cannot supply the evidence of it. "When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something *extant*, that birth of knowledge [which then takes place] is Percetption, – [and this Perception is] *not* the cause [of our recognising a duty], because the apprehension [by the senses] is of what is [then and there] existent, [– which an act of Duty is *not*]."[2] Since Perception is not the evidence of a thing's being a duty, it follows, according to the commentator, that Inference, or Analogy, or anything else, "which has its *root* in Perception," cannot be the evidence; and, consequently, precept – express or implied – is the only evidence of a thing's being a duty.

But here the doubt presents itself, whether the evidence in favour of a thing's being a duty may not be as fallacious as is the evidence of the senses. According to the objector, – "after

१. तस्य निमित्तपरीष्टिः ।३ ॥

२. सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्य तत्प्रत्यक्षमनिमित्तं वर्तमानोपलम्भानत्वात् ॥४ ॥

words and meanings have presented themselves, since the connection between the two is one devised by *man*, — consisting, as it does, of the conventions which man has devised, — therefore, as sense-knowledge wanders away from truth when it mistakes mother-o'pearl for silver, so language is liable to part company with veracity in matters of assertion, and consequently the instigatory nature of a passage which, being couched in words, is liable to be misunderstood, cannot be the instrument of certain knowledge in respect of *duty*". Jaimini, in reply, denies that this doubt affects the evidence of Scripture. "But the natural [— i. e., the *eternal* and not conventional—] connection of a word with its sense, *is* [the instrument of] the knowledge thereof, and the intimation [of Scripture which is] infallible though given in respect of something imperceptible. This [according to our opinion as well as that] of Bādarāyaṇa [the author of the *Vedānta* aphorisms] is the evidence [by means of which we recognise a duty], for it has no respect [to any other evidence — such as that of sense].[1] Assertions in regard to ordinary things, such as the assertion that there is fire in this or that place, meet with credit, because people have opportunities of verifying such assertions by ocular inspection. This is not the case with regard to assertion that this or that act is a duty; and therefore Jaimini, — in the absence of the possiblity of verification, — rests the evidence of testimony, in the case of Scripture, on its *infallibility*. The mention of the name of Bādarāyaṇa (who is the same as Vyāsa), in this fifth aphorism goes to prove that Jaimini's work, the *pūrva-mīmāṁsā*. *Mr. Colebrooke's rendering of the terms pūrva* and *uttara* by "prior" and "later" (— see *Essays*, vol. i. pp. 227 and 295 —) would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that Jaimini's system was the earlier in order of publication. Dr. Ritter says (at p. 376 vol. iv. of his History of Philosophy, — Morrison's version —) that "according to Colebrooke, the adherents of this school may be divided into the earlier and the later", — and then he goes on to speak of "the older and genuine Vedānta :" — but in fact the terms "prior" and "later"

१ औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् ॥५॥

refer not to time but to the divisions of the *Veda* which Jaimini and Vyāsa respectively expound, — the latter directing his attention to the *Upaniṣad-s*, or theological, sections, which should last in *order*. The word *mīmāmsā* means "a seeking to understand" — and the *pūrva mīmāmsā* is "a seeking to understand the prior (or ritual portion of the *Vedas*"), while *uttara-mīmāmasā* is "a seeking to understand the latter (or theological portion of the *Vedas*)." These two compounds, in short, to speak grammatically, are not *Karmadhāraya* but *Ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa*.

Jaimini, we have just seen, denies that the connection of a word with its sense is dependent on human convention. This he was obliged to do in order to remove the *Vedas* beyond the imputation of that fallibility which attaches to all that is devised by man. The *eternal* connection between a word and its sense, the commentator here remarks, "is dependent on the enternity of *Sound*", — seeing that if Sound were not eternal, then words which consist of sound could not be eternal, non consequently could the relation of such to their significations be eternal. Being compelled, therefore, to demonstrate that sound *is* eternal, Jaimini, in pursuance of the established method of procedure, first grapple with the arguments which, *primâ facie*, might seem to countenance an opposite view of the matter. The first objection to the eternity of Sound is its being made by effort. Thus, according to Jaimini, "Some [— viz., the followers of the Nyāya —] say that it is a product, for in the case of it, we *see* [the effort made for its production]"[1] Jaimini is far too secure in the strength of his own position, to be under any temptation to stop the mouths of objections before they have said their say. Half a dozen objections he allows to be tabled against the eternity of Sound, the second of them being "Because of its transitoriness,"[2] — because "beyond a moment, it is no longer perceived." Moreover, the Naiyāyika-s contend, in the third place, that sound is not eternal, because it is stamped as factitious by the usage of language, — "Because of [our employing, when we speak of sound], the expression '*making*'."[3] When you talk of *making* something, as a jar for instance, you talk of something

१. कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात् ॥६॥ २. अस्थानात् ॥७॥ ३. करोतिशब्दात् ॥८॥

that has a commencement, else where were the need of its being *made*? Fourthly, according to the Naiyāyikas, the alleged eternity of Sound is incompatible with its undeniable *multeity*; — and the fact that multeity *does* belogn to it is inferred. "From its being simultaneously in another person [occupying a different place from some first person whom it also affects]."[1] According to the explanation of the scholiast, "The scope of the present objection is this, that an argument which establishes the *eternity* of sound will equally establish its *unity*; and thus we shold have to admit that a numerically single and eternal entity is simultaneously present to the senses, both of those near and those far off — which is an inconsistency." And the Naiyāyikas infer that Sound is not eternal, because, "Also, of the original and altered forms"[2] of words, — a condition incompatible with the changelessness of eternity; — and, finally, because, "Also, by an multitude of makers there is a augmentation of it."[3] A thousand lamps, rendering a jar manifest, do not make the jar seem larger than single lamp does; yet a thousand persons uttering a sound in concert, make a proportionately greater sound than one person does; so this must be a case not of manifesting a previously existent sound, but of *making* one.

Before stating the arguments in support of his own view, Jaimini addresses himself to the refutation of the foregoing objections; and antecedently to this also he judiciously seeks to narrow the ground of contention by determining how far both parties *agree*. "But alike", he says, "is the *perception* thereof"[4], — according to both views — both agreeing that the *perception* of Sound is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to sound itself being momentary. But though acquiescent so far as *this* point is concerned, Jaimini connot allow that the sound which we perceive for the moment was *produced* at the moment. He explains — "Of this [Sound], while it really exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived] is due to the non-application [of a

१. सत्त्वान्तरे यौगपद्यात् ॥९ ॥
२. प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्च ॥१० ॥
३. बृद्धिश्च कर्तृभूम्नाऽस्य ॥११ ॥
४. समन्तु तत्र दर्शनम् ॥१२ ॥

manifester] to the object [— the then unheard sound[1]]." In like manner a jar, seen by a flash of lightning is not then *produced*, nor does it cease to exist on its ceasing to be perceived. The same jar may be manifested for another moment by a subsequent flash. According to the commentator — "Sound is eternal, [as we are constrained to admit] by force of the recognition that "This is that same letter K" [— viz., the same[2] sound that I heard yesterday, or fifty years ago —], and in virtue of the *law of parsimony*," — one of the fundamental laws of philosophizing acknowledged by philosophers both of the East and of the West, and implying that we must never assume more causes of a given effect than are sufficient to account for it. Europeans hold that sound is due to vibration. Jaimini's commentator admits that it is not perceived when there is *no* vibration; but with perverse ingenuity, he argues that the absence of vibration, or the stillness of the air, is what prevents us from perceiving the sound, which never ceases to *exist*, whether perceived or not. "The conjuctions and disjuctions [—or undulations] — of the air issuing from the mouth, remove the *still* air which was the obstacle to the perception of sound, and thence it becomes perceptible."

Replying to the objection conveyed in Aph. 8, Jaimini says "This [expression 'making'] means *employing*[3];" — we talk of *making* a sound when we only make *use* of it. Then, as for the objection that sound cannot be *once*, because its perception is present to many at a time, he replies, "the simultaneousness is as in the case of sun;[4] " — which is explained to mean, that, "As the Sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, Sound is a great

१. सतः परमदर्शनं विषयानागमात् ॥१३॥

2. In opposition to Mīmāṁsaka-s the Naiyāyika-s contend that the form of expression 'This is that same letter K' is grounded merely on the fact that the things referred to are of the same *kind*, — just as is the case with the expression 'He has taken the same medicine that I did.' See the *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, p. 103; and compare the remarks of Whately (in the Appendix to his Logic) on the ambiguity of the word 'Same'.

३. प्रयोगस्य परम् ॥१४॥

४. आदित्यवद्यौगपद्यम् ॥१५॥

object, not a minute one" – such as cannot come at once under the cognizance of persons at any distance from one another. Then, as for the objection that sound cannot be eternal since it undergoes changes in the hands of the grammarian, he says – "This [– e.g. the letter *y* coming in the room of *i* –] is another letter, not a modification"[1] – of that whose place it takes. As the commentator adds – "The *y* is not a modification of the *i* as a mat is a modification of the straw. If it were so, then, as the maker of a mat is under the necessity of providing himself with straw to make it of, the man that employs the letter *y* would be under the necessity of taking the letter *i* to make it of." Finally, to the objection that Sound must be a product, because there is the more of it the more numerous are those employed in making it, he replies – "It is the increase of *noise* that becomes great," – and not of *Sound.*

[2]Here we begin to perceive that this notable dispute is somewhat of a verbal one, and that Jaimini does not mean by Sound what his opponents mean by it. Sound, according to Jaimini, like the music spoken of in Othello, is of a kind "that may not be heard[3]," – a "silent thunder" in its way. But let us hear Jaimini, who, having, disposed of the offered objections, proceeds to defend his own theory. "But it must be eternal [–this Sound–], because its exhibition is for the sake of another[4]", –and the commentator adds, in explanation, – "If it were not eternal, then, as it would not continue till the hearer had understood our meaning [–the *perceived* sound ceasing on the instant that it reaches the ear–] the understanding [of what was uttered] would not take place because of the absence of the cause; – for, – to explain further, the understanding of what is

१. वर्णान्तरमविकारः ॥१६॥

2. Pan. 1, 6 (Nov. 1, 1866) 86-88. Reprinted from the Benares Magazine, August, 1853.

3. *Clown*. If you have any music that may not be heard, then to't again; but, as they say, to hear music, the general doth not greatly care. *Musician*. We have none such, sir.
Clown. Then put up your pipes. Othelo. *Act* iii, sc. 1.

४. नित्यस्तु स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् ॥१८॥

uttered must *follow* — at however short an interval — the perception of the sound uttered; and if the sound perish on the hearing, as the *noise* does, then being no longer in existence, it cannot be the *cause* of anything. If, on the other hand, it continue to exist, for any period however short, after ceasing to be perceived, — it is impossible to assign any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discontinuance of its existence, — when its eternity is inferred. Moreover, as it is prospectively eternal, so was it antecedently, which he considers to be proved, "By there being everywhere simultaneousness[1]" in the recognition of it by ever so many hearers, who could not *recognise* it if it were a new production. For example, when the word *cow* is uttered, a hundred persons recognise the word alike; and, the commentator adds, "a hundred persons do not simultaneously fall into an error," — this being as unlikely as it is that a hudred arrows discharged simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by *mistake* hit the same object. Then, again, Sound is proved to be eternal. "By the absence of number;"[2] — for, *e. g.*, "when the word *cow* has been uttered ten times, we say 'The word *cow* has been uttered ten times,' but not 'The words of the form *cow* have been uttered.' " Further, Sound, as being indestructible, is proved to be eternal. "By there being no ground for anticipation[3] of its destruction. As on the mere inspection of a web, one feels certain that 'This web was produced by the conjunction of thread and it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of the threads,' — so, from the absence of this knowledge of any cause that sould lead to the destruction of *Sound*, we conclude that *it* is *eternal.*

But some one may contend that Sound is a mere modification of the Air, and he may cite the *Śikṣā* —that appendage of the Vedas which treats of pronounciation, which tells us that "Air arrives at the state of being Sound" after undergoing such and such treatment; — so Jaimini anticipates and repels this, "Because [if it were so], there would be no perception [by the

१. सर्वत्र यौगपद्यात् ॥१९ ॥

२. संख्याऽभावात् ॥२० ॥

३. अनपेक्षत्वात् ॥२१ ॥

organ of Hearing [of any object appropriate to it."[1] He means to say that "modifications of the *Air* are not what the organ of Hearing takes cognizance of, Sound not being something *tangible*," as the Air is held by the Naiyāyika-s to be, which Sound, they admit, has an altogether different substratum, viz., the Ether. Here Jaimini, though he does not himself hold Sound to be quality of Ether, does not however disdain to avail himself of the *argumentum ad hominem.*

Finally, to put the seal upon the evidence of Sound eternity, he refers to the Hindu scriptures; – "And [Sound is proved to be eternal] by our seeing a proof[2]", of this, in the text which the commentator supplies, viz., "By language, that alters not, eternal," &c. Here ends the topic of Sound; and assuredly Jaimini does not make it very clear what he means by the term. Let us therefore turn to a fuller exposition of the dogma in question, and this may be found in the *Mahābhāṣya*, and its commentaries.

Patañjali commences the *Mahābhāṣya*, or "Great[3] Commentary" on the Grammatical Aphorisms of Pāṇini, by saying "Now, the teaching of Sound :" – "Of *what* Sounds?" he asks, – and he replies, "Of those secular and those sacred." Kaiyaṭa remarks on this as follows : – "Since the word "Sound" signifies sound in general, having reflected that – since, but for the question in hand, &c., there would have been nothing to determine the species, – the teaching also of the sounds of fiddle-strings, and of the cries of crows, &c., might have suggested itself, he asks, " *Of what*", &c." Then, having further reflected, that since Grammar is an appendage of the Veda, from the sense of the terms the species [of sounds with which Grammar is concerned] may be inferred, he says [– in order to give a useful reply to his own question –] '*Of secular*' &c." After

१. प्रख्याभावाच्च योग्यस्य ॥२२॥

२. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥२३॥

3. Its 'greatness' – though the commentator Kaiyaṭa, with allusion to its bulk, styles it an 'ocean of a commentary' – is explained by *his* commentator, again, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, to consist in its being, unlike ordinary commentaries, a subsquent authority, and not a mere exegesis.

several pages of such disquistion, which provoke twice as many more from Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, Patañjali is allowed to go on again. "Of these, the secular, in the first place, are such as *cow, horse, man, elephant, bird, deer, brāhmaṇa*. The scriptural are verily indeed such as *sanno devīrabhiṣṭaye* ('may the goddess be propitious to my prayers,')" &c. He goes on to say — "Well — '*cow*', — here which is the *word*? That which is in the shape of a thing with dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns, — pray, is *that* the word? Nay, replies he, — that is verily a *thing*. Then, the hints, gestures, and winking, — is *that* the word? Nay, he replies, that verily is *action*. Then the white, the blue, the tawny, the spottèd, — is *that* the word? Nay, he replies, that verily is *quality*. Then, that which in [many] different is [one and] not different, — and which is not destroyed in things which [by disintegration] are destroyed, — that which is the common nature, — is *that* the word? Nay, he replies, that verily is the *form* [—implying the genus, or Platonic 'idea' — *the ἐν ἐρὶ πολλωγ*.] — What then *is* the word[1]? The word ['cow'] is that through which, when uttered, there, is the cognition of things with dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns." We must not at present indulge ourselves in a *réchauffement* of all the drolly sagacious things that Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa take occasion to propound with reference to these remarks of His Snakeship[2] Patañjali. We must confine ourselves to the question of what is *eternal*, or hold to be eternal. in the matter of sound.

Everybody allows that the constituent *letters* of a word are non-significant; because, says Kaiyaṭa, "if letters severally were significant, the pronounciation of the second, or of any subsequent [letter in any word] would be purposeless; — but, assuming that they *arise*, since they cannot arise *simultaneously*; and [then again] on the theory that they are *manifested*, since, from their being manifested *successivley*, there is no [stable]

1. The enquirer is supposed to ask this after having run through all the categories, which the grammarians reckon to be four, — the four above-mentioned.

2. Whilst the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* (and of the *Yoga* Aphorisms) honoured the world with the prsence, he is understood to have been a serpent.

aggregate, — if those that are impressed on a single [page of] memory were what express [the meaning connected with these letters so recorded], then we should find no difference between the sense gathered in the case of *sara* 'an arrow' and *rasa* 'a taste' [—the letters of which are the same.] In the *Vākyapadīya* [of Bhartṛhari] it is diffusely established, that what denotes [the thing denoted] is [— so to speak —] a 'disclosure' (*sphoṭa*), — other than these [letters, and , at the same time] revealed by utterance." What is here called *sphoṭa* — a 'disclosure' — is what Jaimini meant by the term sound (*śabda,*) though he chose, for prudential reasons of his own, not to point out to his opponents— what they ought to have had perspicacity enough to discern for themselves — that he was "paltering with them in a double sense." Possibly, again, the case may have been an exemplification of the Hudibrastic principle, that.

Sure the pleasure is as great

Of being cheated, as to cheat.

The Naiyāyika-s had no interest in really clearing up a confusion of ideas which allowed Jaimini to settle the eternity of the *Vedas*, on which all the six schools repose, while at the same time it left a world of cloudland available for endless and luxurious logomachy. The Naiyāyika-s were *humbugs* when they did not come down upon Jaimini with the sledge-hammer of Gautama's 52nd Aphorism. They *knew* that he was "paltering in a double sense," — but then their philosophical virtue was not of the termagan order, but rather of the kind that coyly resists with sheathed claws. Paying no further attention to the Naiyāyikas, let us attend to the conception which the Grammarians, in accordance with the Mīmāṁsakas, denominate *sphoṭa*.

At page 305 of the first volume of his *Essay*, Mr. Colebrooke says — "Grammarians assume a special category, denominated *sphoṭa*, for the object of mental perception, which ensues upon the hearing of an articulate sound, and which they consider to be distinct from the elements or component letters of the word. Logicians disallow that as a needless assumption." Of this *sphoṭa*, which the Grammarians —as Vedāntin-s — as-

sume to be the only real entity in the universe, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa speaks as follows : "The cognition 'This is one word,' 'This is one sentence', is proof of there being such a thing as *sphoṭa*, and of its unity [—it being held to be one with knowledge, or one with God—]; because too there is no solid evidence of the fact that memory is exactly according to the order of apprehension [—so that *sara* and *rasa* might come to suggest each the same idea —] since we *see* things that were apprehended in one order recollected even in the inverse order. But, in my opinion, as there becomes gradually, in a web, a tincture of various hues deposited by various dye-stuffs, so in that [*sphoṭa*] which is perfectly single, by the course of utterance does there take place a quite gradual tincture in the shape of each letter; and this is permanent, and it is this that the mind apprehends." He adds, that this *sphoṭa* — this substratum of unqualified but diversely qualifiable knowledge — is *one* thing, though "common to the denomination of jars, webs, &c.;" and he mentions, that, in another work of his, the *Mañjūṣā*, he has shown how "the apprehension of the difference is reflectional," — as when the pellucid crystal[1] assumes successivley the hue of the red, blue, or yellow flower beside it.

This illustration of the web, to which a succession of tints may be communicated, reminds us of the contrivance of an editor in the backwoods of America, where printing materials were scare. Each of his subsribers was provided with a towel, on which the current number of the journal was stamped, not with ink but with the black mud from the neighbouring swamp. When this had been duly persued by the family, the towel was washed and sent back to receive the next day's impression. Th towel of the subscriber, like the *sphoṭa* of the Grammarian, remained one and the same towel throughout, whether serving as the substratum of a democratic harangue, a defence of repudiation, or an advertisement of wooden nutmegs.

1. Cf. Sāṁkhya Aphorisms, § 19. c. The word *sphoṭa* 'to open as a bud or flower,' being that by means of which eah particular meaning is opened out and revealed. It means *meaning in general*, the foundation of all particular meaning.

We observed, that, by the Vedāntin grammarians the *sphoṭa* is regarded as the sole entity : — with them the 'word, (*śabda*) is 'God' (*Brahma*). This remarkable expression would require to be carefully considered when the question has reference whether to the adoption or the avoidance of such terms in conveying the doctrines of Christianity. The pandits furnish a striking exemplification of Bacon's remark, that, by men in general, "those things which are new in themselves will still be understood according to the analogy of the old." Employ a term that holds a definite place in any of the current systems, and the whole of the pandit's thoughts will immediately run in the mould of that system, to which he will strive to accommodate what he hears, — rejecting whatever refuses to be so accommodated. A pandit remarked to us one day, for example, that the very first verse of the Bible contained a palpable contradiction. "It is stated here," said he pointing to the first verse in the Sanskrit version of Genesis by the Baptist Missionaries, "that God, in the beginning, created Earth (*pṛthivī*) and Ether (*ākāśa*); and then it is added that the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the *Water* — an element the creation of which is nowhere mentioned in the chapter, the next verse going on to speak of the creation of Light. If Water and Air did not require to be created, why did the other three?" Here the unfortunate employment of the terms *pṛthivī* and *ākāśa* had marshalled his thoughts at once under the categories of the Nyāya. Our explanation, that the one term was intended to denote all the matter of this globe, and the other term all that is material, extenal to this globe, satified him that the contradiction did not exist which he had supposed; but he felt sure that the words would raise precisely the same notions in the mind of every Naiyāyika that they had raised in his own. The terms *bhūmi* and *diva*, not being technically appropriated, would be free from the objection.

Manu's Bull[1]

In the Journal of the German Oriental Society, Vol. VI, Fasciculus III, Dr. Weber observes, in a foot-note in page 303 of his translation of the 1st Book of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, that Dr. A. Kuhn compares the Bull of Manu with the Grecian Minotaurus; and adds, truely enough, that the resemblance is obvious, but that the detailed comparison is attended with considerable difficulties.

It appears to me that points of resemblance will multiply and difficulties decrease if we compare the Bull of Manu not with the Minotaurus, but with his father the Bull of Minos. In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (Book I., Adhyāya I., Brāhmaṇa IV.), it is written : "Manu had a bull. Into him had entered a voice that slew Asuras and Fiends. With his snorting and bellowing the Asuras and Rākṣasas were ever trodden under foot. Then the Asuras said among themselves, Alas ! this bull worketh us woe : how many we now prevail over him? Now Kilāta and Ākuli were the chief priests of the Asuras : and they said, Surely Manu is faithful : now shall we know it. They went to him, therefore, and said, O Manu, we will sacrifice for thee. And he said, Wherewithal *will ye sacrifice*? And they answered, Even with this *thy* bull. And he said, Be it so. And the voice of the bull that was sacrificed went away and entered into Manāvī, the wife of Manu."

The Grecian legend tells us that Minos was the son of Zeus, in his Bull-avatār, and Europa. He was a great law-giver while he lived upon earth, and after death a righteous Judge among the shades. Once, as he was sacrificing to the God of the Sea, he prayed that a bull might come forth from the sea and promised to sacrifice the animal to the God. The bull appeared[2], but Minos, struck with his beauty, spared him, and sacrificed

1. Pan. 1, 4 (Sept. 1, 1866) 56.

2. Cf. *Sahasraśṛṅgo vṛṣabho yaḥ samudrād udàcharat. Rig-veda.*

another in his place. The God of the Sea in his anger made the bull mad, and caused Pasiphaë, the wife of Minos, to fall in love with the animal, by whom she became the mother of the Minotaurus, a man-eating monster with a human body and a bull's head.

There are several striking points of resemblance in these two stories, quite sufficient to indicate a common origin for both. Manu, the Indian law-giver, is, of course, the prototype of his Cretan namesake, the law-giver and king, whose name and fame were once in Greece almost what Manu's are now in India. In the words of the Brāhmaṇa quoted above in translation, Manu had a bull (*Manorha và 'ṛṣabha āsa*) : Minos, himself begotten by a God in the form of a bull, prayed for and obtained a miraculous bull. Manu gave his bull to be sacrificed : Minos vowed to sacrifice his, but failed to keep his vow. The voice of the sacrificed bull entered into the wife of Manu, and tormented the Asuras and Fiends more grievously than before : the love of the bull that was spared from the slaughter inflamed the wife of Minos, and she became the parent of a moster that lived upon the flesh of foreign youths and maidens.

So much for the points of resemblance in the two legends. It should be remembered that the Bull, the possession of which is attributed to both the Indian and the Cretan law-giver, was in India the symbol of justice. As such, he is the favourite animal of Mahādeva, and in this form Justice or Righteousness (Dharma) is represented in the Śrī-Bhāgavat Purāṇa (Book I. Ch. 17.), the four legs that support him being Mortification, Purity, Charity and Truth.

VII. 55. But in the passage the bull is the Sun, according to Sāyaṇa; the Moon, according to Professor Aufrecht, whose interpretation is the more probable one, as a night-scene is described (Indische Studien. Vierter Band. Drittes Heft. p. 343.). In either case the thousand horns are the light-beams and the rising up from the sea is obvious. Is there any connection between light, as represented by horns, and the Minotaurus the bull-headed son of Pasiphaë the daughter of the Sun ?

The Pandits and Their Manner of Teaching

Dr. J. R. Ballantyne

It would not be easy to imagine a prospect more probably pregnant with plague, perplexity, and disappointment, – in a small way – than that of a person of mature years, who, having some leisure at his disposal, and being commendably inclined to employ it not unworthily, shall resolve to commence studying Sanskrit with a Pandit. Let the parties be supposed qualified to converse together with facility on ordinary topics :– the Englishman has had his share of education, and the pandit is a first-rate grammarian. Why should there be any special difficulty in the way of the pandit's communicating the knowledge required ? This is the question which it is here proposed – not exactly to answer, but – to investigate. That difficulties stand in the way, those know to their cost who have read with pandits. Those who have not done so may take the fact on credit till they try the experiment;and possibly the present disquisition may satisfy them that the *a priori* probability of the fact's being as here alleged renders an experiment – with a view merely to the determination of that one point – superfluous.

The dificulty in the way of intercommunication on grammaticl matters – to begin with the beginning – originates in the difference of the training which the two parties have respectively undergone. To give a complete exposition of that in which the difference consists would involve an account of English as well as Hindu education – but, presuming that the reader knows as much as could be told him, or at all events as much as he would care to be told, in regard to the former, the latter only will at present require to be adverted to.

---

1. Pan. 1. 10 (Mar. 1, 1867) 146-149. Reprinted from the Benares Magazine, October, 1849.

The young Brāhman commences his study of the Sanskrit by committing to memory an arrangement of the alphabet ingeniously contrived so as to enable whole classes of letters to be spoken of when requisite, by means of the citation of a single syllable. For example – the whole alphabet is denoted by the syllable *al* – the vowels and diphthongs by the syllable *ac* – the consonants by the syllable *hal* – and so on. The ingenuity was not inconsiderable which was required in arranging the letters of the alphabet in such an order that in taking up any poriton containing consecutively all the letters cocerned in any particular case whatsoever throughout the whole grammar, no letter required should be omitted, and none should be found there that ought to have been excluded. The ingenious author of the arrangement – which the Hindūs attribute to their deity *Śiva* – overcame, with unimpeachable neatness, almost every difficulty except one – it having been found unavoidable to give the letter *h* in two separate places in the scheme. It might be objected that the recurrence of the letter *n*, as an accessary, in two places, leads to ambiguity – but the pandits ingeniously trace in this the divine wisdom as indicating the necessity for *commentaries*, to clear up whatever may be designedly left ambiguous in the original revelation.

The pupil, having become as familiarly at home as an arithmatician in the multiplication table, with this arrangement of the alphabet, proceeds to commit to memory some twenty pages of the grammar – written in Sanskrit – without understanding one word of it. As he is about nine years old, an age at which the memory is strong and the reflective faculties comparatively inactive, this toil of sheer learning by rote – which, to a mature mind, would be a drudgery simply insupportable – appearns neither to fatigue not to distress him. He commits to memory every thing as he goes along; and, in anticipation of this, whatever occurs in the course of the grammar pre-supposes the most complete recollection of all that went before. Any previous matter is therefore referred to, when reference is not tacit, with such shorthand brevity of allusion as is of no earthly use to any one whose recollection is much less perfect than that pre-sup-

posed. This principle – of the pre-supposition of perfect recollection of all that went before – runs through the whole grammatical literature of the Sanskrit; and no native student dreams of entering upon the reading of a grammatical work for the study of which he has not been prepared by going through the various other works to which it happens to be notorious that these shorthand reference or allusions will occur in it.

Now, suppose that the English student, believing that he understands, as well as any Hindū treatise can teach him, the force of the tenses of the verb or the cases of the noun, or any other point of general grammar, or that he is sufficiently well acquainted with some of the declensions or conjugations, shall choose to skip the chapters in which the matter in question is treated – he will be pretty sure to light very soon after on something which presumed him to have skipped over nothing; and, when he applies to his pandit for help, the pandit, though aware that such and such a portion of the ground has been gone over cursorily, cannot for the life of him accommodate his explanations to that state of things, but can mould his instructions only in accordance with usual supposition that the learner has gone ploddingly onward from the very first. Hence, when he finds you puzzled about a matter which a European instructor would make clear in six words, the pandit – not being able to avoid imagining that you are ignorant of all the matters the accidental forgetting of which makes an ordinary Hindū boy boggle at the same point – sets to, with the greatest seriousness, to explain things that had not for a moment puzzled you – the real cause of puzzle scarcely ever by any chance occuring to him from its not lying strictly in the line of routine. In a case of this kind, one scarcely knows which to admire most – the pandit's thinking that you require the information which, in ignorance of your wants, he offers – or the imperturbable patience and temper with which – supposing, as he does, that you really require the information which he offers – he still continues to regard yourself.

One reason why the pandit is generally not more suprised at your apparent ignorance of an important and very simple

point than at your having probably forgotten a comparatively trifling one, seems to be this, that, between important and unimportant matters the Sanskrit grammar makes no express distinction — an exception of the most trifling description being put forward as prominently as a rule of the most extensive application. The Hindū grammarian apparently does not choose to consider anything in his science as a trifle; and what we should regard as an irregularity, he prefers regarding as a matter entitled to a rule of its own. This defect of literary perspective and proportion in the grammar — making every thing equally prominent and equally important — if it have the effect of delaying the student's thorough acquaintance with essentials until he is equally well acquainted with non-essential, has at all events this converse result, that the student who has thoroughly mastered the essentials is likely to be found perfectly conversant with every, even the least important, particular.

Before reverting to the review of the progress of the young Brāhman student through the school compendium of the grammar, it will be worth while to extract, for the sake of those readers who have not access to Mr. Colebrooke's Essay, the account which Mr. Colebrooke gives of the ground work of the grammatical literature of the Sanskrit. This groundwork is comprised in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the set of Eight Lectures, of the sage *Pāṇini*. Each of the lectures is divided into four sections, and each section into a number of succinct aphorisms termed — *sūtras*. On these Mr. Colebrooke thus remarks :

> "The studied brevity of the *Pāṇinīya sūtra-s* renders them in the highest degree obscure; even with the knowledge of the key to their interpretation, the student finds them ambiguous. In the application of them when understood, he discovers many seeming contradictions; and with every exertion of practised memory, he must experience the utmost difficulty in combining rules dispersed in apparent confusion through different portions of Pāṇini's eight Lectures."

The studied brevity which, as Mr. Colebrooke observes, renders the *sūtra-s* sufficiently obscure, was adopted — we have not the shadow of a doubt — with the most unaffected desire to simplify to the utmost the acquisition of the grammar. This, we

believe, is not the general opinion, and the assertion may sound paradoxical. We shall return to the question. Meantime we continue to quote from Mr. Colebrooke :

> "The outline of Pāṇini's arrangement is simple; but numerous exceptions, and frequent digressions, have involved it in much seeming confusion. The first two lectures (the first section especially, which is in a manner the key of the whole grammar) contains definitions; in the three next are collected the affixes, by which verbs and nouns are inflected. Those which appertain to verbs, occupy the third lecture : the fourth and fifth contain such as are affixed to nouns. The remaining three lectures treat of the changes which roots and affixes undergo in special cases or by general rules of orthography, and which are all affected by the addition, or by the substitution of one or more elements. The apparent simplicity of the design vanishes in the perplexity of the structure. The endless pursuit of exceptions and limitations so disjoins the general precepts, that the reader cannot keep in view their intended connection, and mutual relation. He wanders in an intricate maze, and the clew of the labyrinth is continually slipping from his hands."

A more graphically accurate picture of the perplexity to which every one exposes himself who ventures into the Pāṇinian labyrinth, could not be given, yet Pāṇini did not intend his work to be a labyrinth; and he may safely defy, the wit of man to compress within limits so *narrow* as those of the Aṣṭādhyāyī the same extent of *information* in such a shape as shall prove otherwise than labyrinthine. Ask an engineer to lay down some thousand leagues of road within the area of a few square miles, and what can you expect but a labyrinth? Let Brahmah's patent press be employed to squeeze some thousand webs into a compact small parcel, and the convolutions will rival those in the labyrinth of Crete. The Parcel, however, will be found portable – and this is what Pāṇini aimed at. Before the invention of printing, writers were much less diffuse than they have since become. The further the stream of literary operaions is retraced, the less will be found the reliance on pen and paper, and the more on memory. When the claims on memory were necessarily large, then the precautions taken for its benefit were the more thoughtfully considerate. One has a more tender concern about one's horse in the desert than in a land of railways. Thus it will

be found that all early teachers were cautious not to break the back of the Memory on which alone their wisdom could have a chance of riding down to posterity. Their labour was "brevis esse"; — the "obscurus fio" was a consequence as little desired by them as it was desirable. To think otherwise is an injustice to the grand spirits of antiquity, which serves, among other bad consequences, to prevent a correct apprehension of the world's history. That the foolish followers of a great man of old often rejoiced in the sententious obscurity which enabled them to assume an air of preposterous profundity, it would be needless to dispute :— the race of such is not extinct. But the characteristic of a great mind is simple directness of purpose, and this is exemplified by Pāṇini throughout the most involved complexities into which he was constrained by the almost unimaginable condensation which he aimed at and *attained.* When the half sarcastic remark (cited in the "great commentary") first gained the proverbial currency which it yet maintains, that "a grammarian rejoices in the economising of half a short vowel as much as he rejoices in the birth of a son," the writings of Pāṇini, rather than those of some of his successors, must have been in the mind's eye. In illustration of this rigid economy, the concluding aphorism of Pāṇini may be instanced. It had been necessary to direct that the short vowel *a* should be regarded as if its pronunciation were some measure different from what it is, otherwise the operation of certain euphonic rules would have been debarred. In order to restore the short *a* to its natural rights, thus infringed throughout the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Pāṇini with oracular brevity in his closing aphorism gives the injunction "A. A.", which is interpreted to signify. "Let short *a* be held to have its utterance from an organ 'contracted' — now that we have reached the end of the work in which it was necessary to regard it in a different point of view." But that the word here employed is the term "contracted" instead of its opposite, the dismissal of this unlucky vowel from its durance vile by the great Indian master of "Grammarye" might have seemed to foreshadow Prospero's release of Ariel :—

"Then to the elements,

Be free, and fare thou well."

As Grammar took the rank of "Grammarye" in the dark ages of Europe, so it still holds a rank not much less mysterious in the vulgar opinion of India. Query – was it the grammatical division of "Orthography" that gave rise to the wizard's "spell"? As a spell to scare the fiend, or a beginner in Sanskrit, we would back the following Pāṇinīyan *sūtra* as rattled out from the mouth of a pandit, viz.—"*Aptrin-tric-svasri-naptri-neṣṭri-tvaṣṭri-kṣaṭṭri-hotri-potri-prasātrīṇām.*[1]"

The reader perhaps may ask – what could a boy nine years old make of such a book as that of Pāṇini ? Not much certainly. Such a work being obviously unsuited for a beginner, a different arrangement of Pāṇini's *sūtras* was attempted by several grammarians, "for the sake of bringing into one view, the rules which must be remembered in the inflections of one word, and those which must be combined even for a single variation of a single term." This arrangement, Mr. Colebrooke adds, "is certainly preferable; but the *sūtras* of Pāṇini, thus detached from their context, are wholly unintelligible; without the commentator's exposition, they are indeed, what Sir William Jones has somewhere termed them, dark as the darkest oracle."

Such an arrangement as that here referred to, is adopted in the *Siddhānta Kaumudī* of *Bhaṭṭojj Dīkṣita* and in its abridgement, the *Laghu Siddhānta Kaumudī* of Varadarāja. This abridgement is the work in which most grammar students (out of Bengal) begin studies. Its order is sufficiently different from that of the elementary grammars of Europe. After the technical arrangement of the alphabet already adverted to, the next division of the subject to which the learner is introduced is that which treats of every possible euphonic change among the vowels and the consonants. This might seem like teaching how to polish the statue before explaining how to hew it out; but the retention of Pāṇini's rules with a change in their order, scarcely left an alternative but to dispose of the whole question of euphonic modification at the outset.

१. अप्तृन्तृच्स्वसृनप्तृनेष्टृत्वष्टृक्षत्तृहोतृपोतृप्रशास्तॄणाम् । अष्टा.६.४.११

After the chapter on euphony, the student proceeds to the declensions, which are presented to him in a very different shape from that in which a declension is exhibited in a European grammar. Here every new form instead of being simply exhibited, is elaborated by means of the various Pāṇinīyan rules which bear upon it; and thus the declension of a single word is frequently diffused over many pages. The student is not called upon to recollect, nor even to make himself acquainted with the sense of each new modification of the word as the declention proceeds — the consideration of the force of the various cases being remitted to a chapter in the grammar subsequent to those that contain the whole array of Sanskrit conjugation. This seemingly anomalous arrangement is not adopted in the large grammar of which the school compendium is an abstract; but the exposition of the sense of the cases as given in the concise language of Pāṇini, is, even with the aid of a gloss, so difficult to understand, that the alteration of the arrangement in this instance was perhaps judicious. The rules about the sense of the cases are of no use unless they be throughly comprehended — whereas the rules for the formation of all the tenses of all the verbs are serviceable, provided they only remain in the memory; and they may be perhaps just as well consigned to that repository before the doors thereof begin to turn less readily on their hinges than they do in early youth. Everything in this arrangement, however, it will have been seen, in proportion as it is suited to the period of life at which the memory is willing and the judgement weak is just in the same proportion displeasing to the mature mind of the European student, whom we suppose sitting down with an accomplished pandit to commence the study of the Sanskrit grammar.

The best of joke — if jocularity be not out of place in reference to so serious a situation — is this — that the pandit does not conceive the possiblility of your being acquainted with any one fact which he is prepared to inform you of. If he finds that you know anything at *all*, his suprise and satisfaction are quite unfeigned — for, how you could contrive to attain to any right

knowledge of grammatical matters except through the Sanskrit grammar, revealed by gods and demi-gods, he does not pretend to understand. We remember once starting an objection to some generally received grammatical opinion in a meeting of pandits. Much surprise was expressed, considering that it was but a few years since we had commenced the study of Pāṇini, that we should be competent to conduct something like an independent argument, not utterly futile, on such high themes. One of the party whom we had before remarked as a simple-hearted student who from time to time blurted out remarks which occasionally puzzled and more frequently amused his fellows, suggested that perhaps our previous training in Europe had exercised some influence on the development of our faculties before we met with the real Simon Pure in the shape of Pāṇini. The idea appeared to strike the others as something quite original – and yet as having possibly, however stragely, a colour of probability.

[1]We left the pandit and his pupil in the middle of the *Laghu Kaumudī*. Let us now suppose that they have finished it. If the pupil be an intelligent youth, his instructor will probably advise him to dispense with the perusal of the intermediate grammatical work—the *Madhya Kaumudī*;— and to enter at once upon the unabridged and sufficiently voluminous *Siddhānta Kaumudī*—the "Moonshine on Established Grammatical Doctrine":— the title of *Kaumudī*;— moonlight—apparently implying that the work does not affect to shine by its own light, as an original authority, but only by the reflected beams of the prime luminary *Pāṇini*.

The pupil— a young brāhman of course— will probably at this time, if not before, have made up his mind whether he is to range at large through the fields of Sanskrit lore; or to confine himself to certain paths, or even to one alone. We shall suppose that his studious ambition (at starting) will permit him to contemplate, contentedly, nothing short of the whole range; and we shall accompany him as far as we conveniently can :— not bar-

1. Pan. 1, 21 (Feb. 1, 1868) 207-210.

gaining, by any means, to follow him everywhere through thick and thin—

"Through bog, through bush, through brake, through brier,"

but purposing to ride quietly round by the gate when we find him bent on taking a "rasper"— and so rejoin him if practicable on smoother ground.

Of all Pandits who confine their attention to a single branch of study, the most uninteresting, to our mind, is an Astrologer. Your mere astrologer makes a very perfunctory perusal of the grammar, if he looks into it at all before he devotes himself for life, and for a livelihood, to his own particular line of business. Dealing among the stars, he grows proud; and dealing among horoscopes and the old women who apply for them, he acquires a swaggering air of charlatanerie and bold forwardness, very different from the dignifiedly unpretending manner of the really learned. We speak of the mere astrologer— for there are pandits, versed in varied lore, with whom the mere astrologer can stand no comparison even in his own department. The mere astrologer we like not— even as the poet liked not "Dr. Fell"— though not perhaps quite so unreasonably.

Our desultory student is not, of course, deposed to undergo his eight or ten years of grammatical discipline—working his way through the long and thorny vista of treatises up to the "Great Commentary,"— without a glimpse of something more cheerful. With a view to understanding the poets, he will probably commit to memory large portions, if not the whole, of Pāṇini's Catalogue of verbal Roots (*Dhātu-pāṭha*) with their significations, and of the *Amara-koṣa*— "Immortal Treasury" of synonymes, versified by *Amara-simha* in order to facilitate recollection. With or without these appliances he may commence upon the *Raghuvaṁśa* of *Kālidāsa*— skipping, as "unlucky," the first Canto, at the recommendation of his teacher, lest the description of king *Dilīpa's* distress, from the want of a son, should too painfully affect his juvenile sensibilities. In the second Canto he will read how well that pious king played the part of lackey to a cow— a subject so edifying that we suspect it

furnishes a more influential motive than that alleged by the pandit for advising the pupil to skip Canto first, and to commence where he may learn "to whom honour is due," and how to render it— a lesson which, if he be a youth of virtuous tendencies, should make him burn with ambition to go and do likewise.

No inconsiderable portion of the poetical and dramatic literature of the Sanskrit has been rendered accessible to the occidental reader by the Latin versions of the Germans, thè metrical English versions of Mr. Milman, and the fine rifacimenti of Professor H.H. Wilson in his "Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindūs." The native student has no translations to refer to; nor is he set down, like an English school boy to construe a passage with the aid of a dictionary— the native dictionaries being constructed, not with a view to consultation in this way, but with a view to being conveniently got by heart. In the case of any book that may be in hand, passage after passage is explained to the pupil by his teacher; and, in the interval between the lectures he cons over, again and again, the portion that formed the subject of the previous lecture. In the case of various books he has the aid of convenient commentaries, written in a very simple style of Sanskrit corresponding to what at school we used to call "dog-Latin." The texts of several poems, with commentaries of this kind, have been printed in Calcutta. These are much valued by Native students. We annex, as a sample of the simple style of commenting employed in these books, a verse from the *Raghu-vaṁśa* with its comment.

V. 6th, Canto II.

> "Stopping whenever she stopped—rising to follow when she went on—consistent in seating himself when she sat down— experiencing a desire for water when she drank water—like her shadow did this lord of the earth attend her."

Commentary.

> "'*Stoping*' &c.— '*lord of the earth*'— i.e. king :— '*her*'— i.e. the cow—'*attend*'— as a shadow attends a body. Again-accordingly as the cow stopped—stopping :—again—accordingly as she went on—rising to follow; —again— accordingly as the cow sat down—consis-

tent in taking his seat :— again— accordingly as she became a taker of water—becoming desirous of water."

On the earlier verses the comment is still more full and explicit. As regards the wants of many readers, much of such a commentary must be superfluous :— but it is a convenient to be able to refer to it for the recorded opinion of the republic of pandits as to the intended meaning of passages where the language chances to be ambiguous.

Among the poems generally read there is a curious one, by *Bhaṭṭī*, on the actions of *Rāma*, the design of which is to exercise the pupil in the rules of the grammar. With this view no part of the verb is employed throughout the first Canto except the 3rd preterite :— none in Canto second except the 2nd preterite— and so on. The work is accompanied by two commentaries, the one explaining the sense, and the other furnishing a synopsis of the grammatical rules employed in the formation of the words It is noticeable that the tense to the exhibition of which the first Canto is devoted— the "praeteritum augmentatum multiforme" of Bopp— is, though far from the most useful, much the most troublesome of the tenses. Professor Monier Willams remarks on it (at p. 81 of his Grammar) as follows :—

"Fortunately for the study of Sanskrit the third preterite very rarely occurs in the earlier and better specimens of Hindu composition; and the student who contents himself with the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, Hitopadeśa, and Laws of Manu, and avoids the grammatical Poem of *Bhaṭṭī*, and the extravagant writings of more modern authors, will lose nothing by an almost total ignorance of this tense, or, at least, may satisfy himself with a very cursory survey of its character and functions."

The placing of something so impressively alarming in the very portal, is as characteristic of the more recent pandits as the preliminary hot-poker process is of the Freemasons— with whom after the first dreąd ceremony of initiation, it is all plane-sailing and whiskey-punch. The same arrangement in each case, would seem to have been contemplated, as that which Nature, in the cocoa-nut, offers to the monkey— who, when he has managed to gnaw through the shell— finds for his practised

teeth, the kernel no very hard matter, and the milk mere child's play.

After having read some of the poets, the student may feel some curiosity to know the principles on which the critics hold one set of verses to be a poem, and another set of verses to be no poem:— but the professor of criticism (*Sāhitya*) will probably require that he shall come to this enquiry provided with some knowledge of the phraseology at least of the philosophical systems. He goes, therefore, through the *Tarka-Saṁgraha*, the text and a version of which were given some months ago in this magazine; and then, finding that there is much which the meagreness of that compendium leaves without satisfactory explanation, he reads the memorial verses of the *Bhāṣā paricheda*— (the "discrimination of language" as employed by the *Naiyāyikas* in contradistinction to the followers of the *Mīmāmasā, &c. with the esteemed and popular commentary the Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* (the "Pearl-string of established truths"). With some notice of this standard work we shall conclude for the present.

The memorial verses, and the commentary, are the work of the same author, *Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭa* who opens the commentary with the following invocation and announcement :—

> "May that *Śiva* be auspicious, who, skilled in the sportive dance has made a crest gem of the Moon and a bracelet of the Sovereign of the Snakes!
>
> Prompted by regard for my pupil *Rājīva*, let me, as a relaxation, illustrate, by the aid of the very succinct expressions of the ancients, my own work— the String of memorial verses."

In the *Dinakarī*, a commentary on our commentary, the propriety of each separate term in this benedictory invocation is voluminously (if not luminously) demonstrated. The writer there explains how the moon, though no crest-gem, may yet without impropriety be spoken of as such— and the same of the snake-bracelet;— how the author whom he comments spoke of his work as a "relaxation" in order to soothe the apprehensions of the alarmed but yet possibly securable reader; — and how the

mention of the "succinct" expressions of the ancients was designed to insinuate that the author, without compromising his character for modesty, might attempt to illustrate what the "succinctness' of his predecessors had left— to sight less keen than that of those predecessors— somewhat obscure. On the double meaning of the verses that follow, the *Dinakarī* expatiates satisfactorily but, our reader might think, tediously. We return to the *Muktāvalī*, where the author makes not a few reflexions on the benedictory invocation with which he commences his own memorial verses. The benediction is as follows :—

> "Salutation to *Kṛṣṇa—to him— lovely as a fresh cloud— the stealer of the raiment of the young milk-maids— the seed of the world-tree!*"[1]

We should like to transcribe, as a curious specimen of Hindu reasoning, the author's reflexions on the importance of commencing with a Benediction (*maṅgala*;) but we are considerate enough to forbear.

On the expression "the seed of the world-tree," he remarks as follows :—

> The world is here spoken of as a tree— what springs from the earth. By speaking of the *seed* of that tree, a proof of the existence of the Deity is exhibited. That is to say :— such productions as a water-jar are produced by a maker, and so also are such productions as the herbs of the field :— and, to make these is not possible for such as we are :— hence the existence of the Deity, as the Maker of these, is established."

After combating objections to this argument, he cites the *Veda* to the following effect :—

> "There is One God— the Maker of Heaven and Earth— the Creator of all—the Preserver of all."

He then propounds the Categories, —intimating that the whole are primarily divisible into those of Existence and Non-existence. The latter will furnish abundant matter for consideration in the present paper. Like the foil of the *maitre d'armes*, it is far from being so small an affair as it may, at first sight, appear in

1. Conf. the tree Igdrasil— Carlyle's "Heroes and Hero-worship" p. 31.

the eyes of the inexperienced. One might as well engage to fence with the maitre d'armes without knowing the difference between quarte and tierce, as venture to chop logic with a pandit without some conversancy with the manipulation of Non-existence.

Non-existence is the darling of the Indian logician. Like Izaak Walton, impaling a frog upon his hook, "he handles it as though he loved it." Like an epicure with a beccafico, —instead of gulping it at a mouthful —he makes four bites of his cherry. He first divides it into two —Mutual and Universal. The Universal he cuts into three— Antecedent, Emergent, and Absolute. The last of the three is the Benjamin of the family— nor is his coat less curiously variegated than that of any of his brethren. He makes his appearance at every turn; —and, even when he cannot altogether eject the others, it is ruled that he shall go shares —as we shall see when we come to the *vexata questio* of the baking of a water-jar in a brick-kiln.

But it may be necessary to satisfy the reader that there is such a thing as Absolute Non-existence; and we shall take it for granted that he holds "Seeing is Believing." Place a jar, then, on the ground, —and you see[1] that there is a jar on the ground. Seeing "that there is a jar on the ground," is, in the language of our philosophy, seeing "the existence of a jar on the ground." Now, let the jar be removed —and what do you see then? Why, you see, or ought to see, that there is not a jar on the ground— or— by substitution, as an algebraist would express himself— you see the Non-existence of the jar on the ground.

But now comes the question— where was the Non-existence whilst the jar was there? On this point there exists—or existed—a difference of opinion. The generally received opinion now is, that of our author— viz.:— that the Non-existence was there all the time. The argument in support of this

1. Were we debating the point with an opposing Pandit, we should take the precaution to specify the requisite conditions—viz.; that the sun, or some sufficient substitute, is shining; —that your spectacles are properly wiped :— that your eye sight is not particularly worse than usual; —and that you, bona fide, look at the jar.

view runs thus. The Absolute Non-existence of the jar is *one* non-existence, and not a number of non-existences. In whatever spot of ground this may be, then, it cannot be destroyed even by the placing of the jar itself upon the spot— for, if it were thus destroyed, it could be found no where else— or, in other words, we should find the jar itself everywhere. That a jar should thus usurp the universe, being what neither gods, men, nor columns, could submit to, the hypothesis which would lead to such a state of things must needs be given up. The Non-existence, therefore, is not destroyed, but only *hidden* :— and this view of the matter may be summed up in the proposition that the Absolute[1] non-existence of every thing is at all times present every where, and is only, for the time, there hidden where the thing itself happens to be. In proof of this, you have only to remove the jar, and you will find the Non-existence exactly as you left it. Moreover— our author contends— if you suppose another kind of non-existence, which is to be destroyed every time that the thing is brought, and re-produced every time that the thing is removed, your hypothesis is an un-philosophically cumbrous one— which can stand no comparison with the one here propounded.

In the case of the baking of a water-jar in a brick kiln, an attempt, as we intimated before, was made to secure the entire right of occupancy, as a Non-existence, for the Antecedent with the Emergent as his successor, to the exclusion of the absolute. The attempt is generally admitted to have been a failure. The case stood thus. Before the earthen jar is baked in the kiln, it is a black jar; but, by the process of baking, it become a red jar. Now, a black jar is not red; —neither is a red jar black. Hence—argued the claimants—the case involves the Antecedent non existence of the redness whilst it has not come into being, and the

1. Universal non-existence, it is to be observed, is, in its first sub-division, of two kinds— limited in some direction, and limited in no direction. The latter is our author's Absolute or Unlimited Non-existence (*atyantābhāva*). The other may be limited by a definite beginning or by a definite ending. Thus the Antecedent non-existence of a jar, having had no beginning, ends when the jar is made. Its Emergent non-existence (as a jar) commences its endless course from the moment when the jar is shivered into potsherds.

Emergent non-existence of the blackness when it has ceased to be; —and, the state of the case being thus completely accounted for, Absolute non-existence has no business here. To this it was replied, that there was no intention to eject the other parties, that there was room enough for all three, and that the respondent was entitled to be admitted as a joint occupant, seeing that all three ought to meet and shake hands fraternally at the turning point, the instant of change, when there is the Emergent non-existence (or Destruction) of the blackness, the Antecedent non-existence of the redness, and the Absolute non-existence of both—both colours being, at that instant, like a pair of Newtonian "prime and ultimate ratios," just equally predicable, and the simultaneous predication of both being absurd.

One of the nicest points in regard to absolute non-existence, is that involved in the question whether the Absolute non-existence of Absolute non-existence is a Non-existence or an Existence. Those who favour the latter view adopt the argument that two negatives make an affirmative. The opponnents of this view contend that— as the non existence of x, no matter what x may be, is the non-existence thereof— the non-non-existence of non-existence can be nothing else than Non-existence. Where there is such a "very pretty quarrel as it stands," it would be a pity to spoil sport by interfering with the settlement of it.

A Pandit, desirious to make acquaintance, called upon us one day — eager to display his dialectical subtlety, and (like the Irishman of easy conscience who, to the remonstrance— "good gracious— you're not going to take such an oath as that?" — replied— "I'd like to see the oath I would'nt take") —prepared to take objection to any proposition however unimpeachable. Finding him no granter of propositions, we reverted, as a last resource, to Aristotle's fundamental position —that it is impossible for the same thing at once to be and not to be. Our visitor was disposed as little to grant this as anything else, —and he had made some way towards demonstrating the perfect compatibility of "being" and "non-being" under certain circumstances, when

fortunately another pandit came in— and to him we resigned the conduct of the argument. Quotations from all the most profound authorities on the subject of Non-existence were soon flying about our ears—each disputant screaming at the highest pitch of his voice— and, some other pandits having come in and seated themselves as spectators and judges, the contest raged so "fast and furious" that our little boy slunk out of the room in a state of alarm in which we ourself began rather to participate. At length the arguments on the side of Aristotle were found to be in accordance with the dicta of the authorities— whereupon the stranger gracefully gave in and was complimented on the vigour with which he had fought a losing battle.

It is but fair to observe that the pandits, except when regularly contending for victory, appear to be quite as capable of appreciating the whimsical side of such scholastic disquisitions as any European is. They set store by them as furnishing occasion for admirable discipline in the rigidly correct employment of language. It is a mode of mental gymnastics— an intellectual bout at fence. One— that is to say one decidedly practical and venerable— one who makes money and invests it judiciously— may question whether exercise in this kind of fencing is of any use. If fencing, bodily or mental, be of any use at all, the latter will not (by any one that we care to exchange words with,) be held the less useful of the two. The usefulness of the former, and of gymnastics in general, does not require to be demonstrated at this time of day.

For the present we quit our friend the student— hoping to meet him next in the field of "criticism."

[1] Let us now accompany, through some part of his course, our desultory student who is entering upon the study of the Hindū system of Poetical Criticism.

Among the Sanskrit texts printed at Calcutta under the authority of the General Committee of Public Instruction, there are two works the titles of which are given in English as follows :—

1. Pan. 2, 23 (April 1, 1868) 250-253.

"*Kāvya prakāśa*; a treatise on Poetry and Rhetoric by Mammaṭa ācārya. (1829)."

"*Sāhitya Darpaṇa*; a treatise on Rhetorical Composition by Viśvanātha Kavirāja. (1828)."

Before reading either of these our student will have gone through the *Kuvalayānanda*— fortunate if, instead of a half decypherable manuscript, he shall have been able to get a copy of the nicely lithographed Poonah edition. The *Kāvya prakāśa*— the "Illustration of Poetry"—consists of a number of metrical rules *(kārikā)* interpersed with comments and illustrative examples. The rules are founded on the Aphorisms of Vāman, who owed his knowledge of the subject to the divine sage Bharata. The *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* also has memorial verses as its text; and the rules are frequently illustrated by the same examples as those employed in the earlier work. Both works are held in high esteem; but that of Viśvanātha—the more recent and the more copious of the two—is generally admitted as the standard of taste among the learned Hindūs. We propose to consider its arrangement—to dip into it here and there—and to note the more salient points of agreement and of disagreement in opinion between the author and European writers on kindred topics.

The term Rhetoric, as employed to denote the subject of the treatise in question, is liable— according to our view of the division and denomination of the sciences— to an objection the converse of that to which we hold the term Logic liable when employed to denote the all-embracing sphere of the Nyāya philosophy. In the *Sāhitya* we have but a part, and the least important part of what, according to Aristotle,[1] belongs to Rhetoric. In order to attain its specific end of convincing or persuading— between which we agree with Mr. Smart in thinking that there is more of a distinction than a difference[2]—

1. The main consideration being that of Arguments— *τα δ' αλλα προσθηκαι*— "but the rest mere out-work." *Rhet. B. l. c. 1.*

2. "That common situation in life, *Video mcliora proboque, dcteriora scquor*, proves indeed that there are degrees of conviction which yield to persuasion, as there are other degrees of conviction which yield to

Rhetoric does not hesitate to avail itself of the graces of language which gratify the taste; but the *Sāhitya* confines itself to these exclusively; —"taste" (*rasa*) being here all in all. The difference between the political history of India and that of Greece or Rome so obviously suggests the reason why eloquence, in the two cases, proposed to itself ends thus different, that it would be idle to do more than allude to it in passing.

Of the etymology of the term *Sāhitya* two explanations are offered. According to the one, it is derived from *hita* 'benefit' and *saha* 'with,' because a knowledge of it is beneficial in all departments of literature. The other, with less appearance of reason, explains it as denoting the sum total of the various sections of which the system itself is made up.

The printed volume of the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* the "Mirror of Composition"— is an octavo of between three and four hundred pages. The work is divided into ten sections— of lengths varying from eight or nine pages to eighty or ninety. The first section is introductory. The second treats of the various powers of a word. The third treats of taste. The fourth treats of the divisions of poetry. The fifth discusses more fully one of the powers of a word adverted to in section second. The sixth takes particular cognizance of the division of poetry into 'that which is to be seen,' and 'that which is to be heard.' The seventh treats of blemishes. The eighth treats of style. The ninth treats of the varieties of composition resulting from the blending of styles, and the predominance of one or other of them. The tenth and last treats of embellishment. To the subject of this tenth section the *Kuvalayānanda* of Apyayya Dīkṣita, with which the student usually commences, confines itself.

According to established custom the *Sāhitya Derpaṇa* commences with an invocation. "At the opening of his work (says the

persuasion, as there are other degrees which no persuasion can subdue: yet perhaps we shall hereafter be able to show that such junctures do but exhibit one set of motives outweighing another and that the application of the term persuasion to the one set, and of conviction to the other, is in many cases arbitrary, rather than dictated by a correspondent difference in the things." *Sematology*— *p.*175.

author—officiating as his own commentator)— desiring that he may complete without obstruction what he is about to commence, he thus propitiates the goddess of Speech—seeing that everything that is made up of words lies within her jurisdiction."—

> "May that Goddess of Language, whose light is fair as that of the autumnal moon, having removed the over-spreading darkness, render all things clear in my mind!"

He then proceeds to say that as his work is ancillary to poetry, its fruits can be no other than those which poetry bestows. These are declared to consist in the attainment of the four great objects of human desire— viz. Merit, Wealth, Enjoyment, and Salvation— which, "by means of poetry alone, can be obtained pleasantly even by persons of slender capacity." Salvation, it is to be remembered, or liberation from the liability to being born again, is the reward held out to its followers by each of the various systems of Hindū doctrine. Even the Grammarians claim for their own art (—more than was claimed for the kindred Grammarye of the Dark Ages)— the power of leading the soul to bliss[1]; and it is scarcely to be wondered at that the poets should contend that the goal might be gained, as surely as by any of the more rugged routes, and much more pleasantly, by the "primrose path" of poesy is to conduce to this by setting before its votary such examples for imitation as that of Rāma, and for avoidance as that of Rāvaṇa, an so training him up to virtue. After showing how all the four great objects sought after by the wise have been at various times obtained through conversancy with poetry, our author gravely disposes of the objection that the study of the Vedas renders the study of poetry superfluous, by asking where is the wisdom of seeking to remove by means of bitter drugs an ailment that can be cured with sugar-candy.

1. According to the Grammarians— "A single word, perfectly understood, and properly employed, is, alike in heaven and on earth, the *Kāmadhuk*"— the marvellous cow from which you may "milk out whatever you desire"— including, of course, final emancipation if you wish it.

Having established the importance of Poetry, he proceeds to determine what it is that poetry consists in; and here he demurs to the opinion of the author of the *Kāvya Prakāśa* who says that the designation may be sometimes applied "where there is elegance of expression, even though ornament be awanting" – provided "the words and the sense are faultless." But, our author contends, if faultlessness in the words and in the sense be a necessary part of the definition, then the following verses from Bhavabhūti's drama, the *Vīra-caritra*, would not be poetry :–

(*Rāvaṇa* loquitur) ..... "Foul scorn to me
That any one should dare to be my foe–
And now forsooth this *auchoret* defies me–
This slaughterer of the race of Rākṣasas!
He! – can it be – doth Rāvaṇa yet live?
Fie, fie, my son – thou conqueror of Indra –
What boots it now, that Kumbhakarṇa[1] wakes,
Or that these brawny arms of mine in vain
Have swoln with pride when they have borne away
The spoils of Swerga?"

Now these verses are chargeable with the fault (–to be discussed in section seventh–) of obscuring the predicate by wrapping it up in a long compound epithet applied to the subject :– for the subject of which the speaker here intends to say

1. Kumbhakarṇa, the gigantic brother of the titanic Rāvaṇa, – named from the size of his ears which could contain a *kumbha* or large waterjar – had such an appetite that he used to consume six months' provisions in a single day. Brahmā, to relieve the alarm of the world, which had begun to entertain serious apprehensions of being eaten up, deereed that the giant should sleep for six months at a time and wake for only one day, during which be might consume his six months' allowance without trespassing unduly on the reproductive capabilities of the earth. When Rāma invaded the capital of Rāvaṇa, the titans, requiring all their forces, employed the most violent measures – and eventually with success – to awake the sleeping giant; causing elephants to trample upon him, and assailing his ears with the noise of gongs – and even, according to a more recent authority, disturbing him with cannon.

something is his brawny arms — and what he intends to say of his arms is this, that, so far as regards gaining the day against Rāma, their previous feats of strength, in the war with Indra, have been in vain : — and all this is made up into an epithet applied to the arms. According to the definition, then, this is not a case of poetry : — and yet, on the other hand, it is a case of the highest kind of poetry, if you go by the determination of the same authority, that the highest kind of poetry is that where the mind of the utterer is revealed not by the literal sense of the terms but by their suggestiveness; — for the speaker here, for example, does not really entertain any doubt of his being himself alive — whilst his making a question of it suggests in a lively manner his astonishment : — nor is he speaking of a literal anchoret when he contemptuously indicates by that term the hero Rāma who had been dwelling in banishment in the forest. Hence the definition that we have been testing is too exclusive — seeing it excludes what it is agreed on all hands ought not to be excluded.

Our author next rejects an offered compromise between the two definitions which he holds to be inconsistent.

> "But, it may be said, — 'There is only a portion faulty here, and not the whole.' If you say this, then the part in which there is a fault furnishes a reason why it is not a case of poetry; and the part where there is suggestiveness furnishes a reason why it is a case of first rate poetry : — and so, being pulled both ways by the two parts, it will be neither poetry nor not poetry".

He adds : —

> "Nor do such blemishes as unmelodiousness and the like mar only a part of a poem but the whole (if any part of it —) that is to say — when there is no damage to the flavour (*rasa* — which is the soul of poetry — or that in virtue of which alone poetry is poetry), then it is not conceded that these (viz. unmelodiousness and the other blemishes) are faults at all — as a great authority[1] declares, — when he says 'And the blemishes, such as unmelodiousness &c. which have been exhibited, are not always blemishes; — they have been instanced as what must be invariably shunned in erotic poetry only.'

1. Always cited as the "author of the *Dhvani*."

> Mercover if it were as you would seem to say, (that a blemish is always a blemish), then cases of poetry would be very rare, or rather none—for it is quite impossible that there should be faultlessness in every respect."

So determined is our author to allow of no compromise that he goes on to say :—

> "If you contend that the word 'no' (is employed in the sense of 'little') then let us grant [for the sake of argument with the author of the *Kāvya Prakāśa*, that poetry is there— not where we have *no* fault, but that poetry is there where the faults, in sound or sense, are *slight*, —and it will follow that where there is no fault at all, there is no poetry."

And not only this— but—

> "Granting that there may be poetry where the faults, in sound or sense, are slight, —this is not to be mentioned in the *definition* of poetry; just as in the definition of such a thing as a jewel, we omit such a circumstance as its being perforated by insects— (that circumstance not being what constitutes anything a jewel, though it may not cause it to cease to be regarded as such—) for certainly the boring of insects, and such like accidents, cannot deprive the jewel of its nature as a jewel, but can only affect its degree of value. In like manner here also unmelodiousness &c. affect that of poetry.

The rest of this unlucky definition finds as little mercy at the hands of our author as that portion of it of which we have followed the dissection. Here, however, let us leave our native student to force his way through the argument unattended by ourselves— the conduct of the argument being, as regards the student, all the thornier in so far as it turns upon the application of a variety of terms the explanation of which he will not meet with for a long time afterwards—the first half of the work, like many others in Sanskrit, requiring to be read by the light of the second. But there are illustrative snatches of poetry interspersed throughout the argument— so let us try if we can gather some of these flowers without "snapping" them in bits like Cowper's rose. The following, according to the author of the *Kāvya Prakāśa*, is a case of poetry without anything in the shape of

embellishment— the lady simply stating how she comes to be melancholy.

"Tis true thou art beside me, dear[1]
Companion of my youth;
The autumn moon shines mild and clear,
The gale smells sweet in sooth—
All is as once when you and I,
On Reva's bank so fair,
Made love beneath the trees :— I sigh—
Just—that we are not *there*.

The author of the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* demurs to the assertion that this is unembellished, —and contends that as one of the embellishments of poetry, specially recognised in the tenth section, is the exhibition of "effects devoid of causes"—the mention of the melancholy of the lady, with her beloved beside her in the moonlight, is a glaringly poetical embellishment.

The next example is written in one of the rude dialects termed *Prākṛta*. Our author cities it as an example of "suggestiveness"— where the suggestiveness might seem to have reference, not as in one class of instances, to the words, nor as in author class to the sentiment, but only the matter, (*vastu—πράγμα*)— in which case, he contends, it would not be entitled to the designation of poetry. The verses (which we omit here)

1. The same verses have been rendered, under an apparent misconception of their drift, as a

"*Lament of the Disconsolate.*

Ah— where is he who stole my virgin heart?
Again the autumn moon shines on my bower,
And full-blown Mālatīs their sweets impart
To the bold breeze that shakes the Kadamb-flower.
I am the same to whom his troth he gave
When autumn's moon, as now, so sweetly shone
On our secluded bower by Reva's wave—
Yet not the same— I pine for pleasure gone."

suggest an assignation whilst seeming to forbid intrusion. The example, our author holds, while it has, "suggestiveness" is entitled to be called poetry in virtue of the consideration that what it suggests is a semblance (*ābhāsa*) of the genuine sentiment (*rasa*) of love, which can be genuine only where it is legitimate— semblances and realities being all alike as regards the category of teste. If— he contends— it be, as you allege, that there is poetry here because— apart from any consideration of sentiment—more is implied than meets the ear; then the sentence, "Devadatta goes to the village" must be poetry— because Devadatta (being a gentleman) is understood of course to take his servants along with him, although the circumstance is not explicitly set forth. And he adds, determinedly. —"if you say *be it so* [that the sentence 'Devadatta goes to the village,' *is* poetry because it implies more than meets the ear] — then I say, *No*— for I can consent to give the name of poetry to that only which has some flavour (*rasa*) in it."

It is worth noticing here that the notion of reckoning *metre* among the circumstances that constitute poetry is not even hinted at by our critic. He denies that there is poetry in the assertion, "Devadatta goes to the village," simply because the assertion raises no emotion through anything that it is calculated to suggest. The fact that the learned of India are accustomed to put into verse almost all their driest treatises— on law, physic, divinity, &c. —affords a ready enough explanation why the accident of metre should not be mistaken by them for the essence of poetry. Their test of poetry, (under which title, as we shall see, they reckon "poetry in prose"— *gadya-kāvya*, coincides pretty closely, we shall find, with that specified by Whately when he says (Rhet, p. 344,) —"The true test is easily applied : that which to competent judges affords the appropriate *pleasure* of poetry, is good poetry, whether it answer any other purpose or not : that which does *not* afford this pleasure, however instructive it may be, is not good *poetry*, though it may be a valuable *work*." The Archbishop, indeed, goes on to say, "Notwithstanding all that has been advanced by some French critics, to prove that a work, not in metre, may be a Poem, (which doctrine was partly derived

from a misinterpretation of a passage in Aristotle's Poetics), universal opinion has always given a contrary decision. Any composition in *verse*, (and none that is not,) is always called, whether good or bad, a Poem, by all who have no favourite hypothesis to maintain." Now for our own part, we should have little objection, at times, to a hypothesis which so conveniently enables us to escape debating the question whether such a work as Macpherson's "Ossian" is poetry; —but really, if you wish to *astonish* a pandit, you have only to ask him gravely whether, for example, that terse *metrical* composition, the Nyāya compendium entitled the *Bhāṣā pariccheda*, is a *poem*. If, in holding it to be as far removed as anything well can be from poetry, he goes on a "favourite hypothesis," it is because the notion of an opposite hypothesis probably never occurred to him.

Our author, having demolished to his satisfaction the definitions of his prodecessors, proceeds to give his own; —and he declares— with a brevity for which he atones by the coplousness of his subsequent explanations, that "A speech whereof the soul is flavour, is Poetry[1]." He adds –

> "We shall discuss the nature of 'flavour' (*rasa*) afterwards— [in Section 3rd]. Flavour alone is the soul of it [Poetry]— being, in the most intimate way, the supporter of its very *life*— for without that [flavour] we do not allow that the case is one of poetry at all.
>
> The words *rasa* 'flavour' is regularly formed from the passive voice of the verb *ras* 'to relish.' In it— [i.e. in the word *rasa*, on which the

1. *Vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam.*

"He o'er whose sealy neck the ocean rolled;
Who bore upon his back the world of old;
Who raised upon his tusk the earth, and tore
With lion's claws the demon chief of yore;
Who traversed, in three steps, heaven earth and hell;
Before whose wrath the Kṣattra armies fell;
Whose arrow pierced the ten-faced Titan-king,
Fiend-slayer :— kind to every living thing;
He at whose advent the unjust shall quail—
Whate'er his name— to Him all hail!"

definition of poetry hinges]— are implied also 'veneration' (*bhāva*), and the 'semblance' (*ābhāsa*) of flavour."

He next illustrates these three implied senses by examples— and first he examplifies flavour (or sentiment) by a case of the 'erotic'— (*śṛṅgāra-rasa*)— which we omit "by particular desire."

As an example of poetry where the sentiment of love, being directed towards the Deity, takes the name of 'Veneration' (*bhāva*), he gives the following synopsis of the ten incarnations of Vishnu— viz. (1) the fish (2) the tortoise, (3) the boar, (4) the man-lion, (5) the dwarf, (6) Parśurāma, (7) Rāma, (8) Krishna, (9) Buddha, and (10) the deliverer yet expected by the Hindoos.

Lastly, as an example of the 'semblance' (*ābhāsa*) of sentiment— there being but the semblance of human sentiment in the feelings of the lower animals, he cites the following :—

"Within a single floweret's bell apart
The bee sipped honey with his loving spouse :—
Soothed by the fondling horn of her loved hart,
with eyes half-closed, the hind forgot to browse."

But it may be asked— if blemishes, as before asserted, do not annihilate poetry, have they no effect in regard to it at all? To this our author replies that "blemishes lower its character"— and what are to be reckoned blemishes he will state further on, as well as what are the beauties which elevate its character. Here ends the first section of the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*— and here we may break off for the present.

[1]At page 447 of the Magazine we broke off, in our account of the Hindū "De Poetica," at the end of the first section of the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*— the "Mirror of Composition." The second section, as already mentioned, treats of "the various powers of a word." The subject is dry but curious, and, if we cannot be either very instructive or entertaining on it, we shall endeavour to be intelligible and brief.

1. Pan. 3, 25 (June 1, 1866) 22-26. Reprinted from the Benares Magazine, December, 1850.

Before treating of the "powers of a word" our author —like Mrs. Glasse before proceeding to make soup of her hare— thinks it necessary to "catch his word." Now, as regards the point yet attained, we only know [—see page 446-] that "A speech whereof the soul is flavour is Poetry." But what is a *speech*? To this our author, at the commencement of his second section, replies— "Let a Speech [or sentence] be a collection of words possessing Compatibility, Expectancy, and Proximity." These requirements he illustrates severally. First—the collection of words. "He irrigates with fire" is no sentence— for, fire being incompatible with irrigation, the collection of words is nonsensical. Secondly, the collection of words "cow horse man elephant" is no sentence— for, the words do not "look out for" one another, being nowise interdependent. Thirdly— the word "Devadatta," pronounced just now, makes no sentence with the word "goes" pronounced twenty-four hours afterwards— the want of "Proximity" being destructive of the apprehension. Of course this last rule refers more particularly to the south. In the "north countrie" a man might oppose, to the third requirement, the instance of the Laird of Balnamoon, who, on riding across a bridge, turned round and asked his man John— "John— do you like eggs?" "Yes" said John. —They proceeded; and, about a year afterwards, on passing the same spot, the Laird looked back and asked "How"? —"Poached" replied John— nothing at a loss.

But— as far as we have gone—a sentence —with or without "flavour"— is only a sentence— and is Poetry to be confined to a *sentence*? Moved, apparently, by this consideration, our author—who comes oddly close upon Aristotle every here and there—decalres that "A collection of sentences is a great sentence"—adding that "Thus is a sentence held to be of two kinds," and citing, as examples of the "great sentence," the *Mahābhārata*, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and the *Raghuvaṁśa*. In like manner Aristotle says, in his "Poetics" "But a sentence is one in a twofold respect; for it is either that which signifies one thing, or that which becomes many from conjunction. Thus the *Iliad* indeed is one by conjunction."

Well— a sentence being a "collection of words" —a word is next defined as meaning "letters [so combined as to be] suited for use, not in logical connection, conveying a meaning, and only one." The investigation of this definition, we remit to another time, if not to another place. But a word, (whether the investigation of the definition be kept in abeyance or not,) may have a meaning, or rather three— for, according to our author, "The Meaning is held to be threefold— the Express (*vācya*,) the Indicated (*lakṣya*,) and the Suggested (*vyaṁgya*)." How this happens he next declares— saying "The express meaning is that conveyed to the understanding by [the word's] Denotation (*abhidhā*): the indicated [meaning] is held [to be conveyed] by [the word's] indication (*lakṣaṇā*); the suggested [is held to be conveyed] by [the word's] Suggestion (*Vyañjanā*). Let these [viz., Denotation, Indication, and Suggestion.] be the three *powers (Śakti)* of a word." "Among these three powers, the primary one, it is remarked, is Denotation— "it being this which conveys the meaning which belongs to the word by convention *(saṅketa)*." How one learns the conventional meaning of words the author illustrates thus. "On the old man's saying, when giving directions to the middle-aged man, —'Bring the cow' —the child, having observed him [the man to whom the order was given by his senior] employing himself in bringing the cow, determines, first that 'The meaning of this sentence was the fetching of a body possessing a dewlap &c." and afterwards, through the insertion and omission [of the portions of the sentence which he as yet understands only in the lump] in such sentences as 'Fasten the cow'— 'Bring the horse'— he ascertains the convention that the word 'cow' shall mean the thing with a dewlap &c., and the word 'bring' shall mean fetching." When the young philologist has thus acquired a certain stock of words, he is able to make additions to it sometimes by gathering the sense of unknown terms from the context, and sometimes by learning it from the mouth of persons worthy of his confidence.

As it would be impracticable to make a convention in regard to every individual case, a convention is made— according to our author, who on this point follows the grammarians—

in respect of "Kinds, Qualities, Things, and Actions." These he defines as follows. "Kind [or genus – *jāti*] is the nature of a cow or the like [which resides] is the [individual] body [called] cow or the like [–and the virtue whereof such and such is a cow or the like]. Quality (*guṇa*) is a settled habit of a thing which causes the making of a distinction – for [the qualities] *white* &c. difference such a thing as a cow from its congeners–such as a *black* cow. Names of things (*dravya*) are those that denote a single individual– as Hari, Hara, (and other proper names). Actions (*kriyā*) are habits of a thing [not settled, as qualities are, but] in course of accomplishment– as 'cooking' [–which is the habit of the thing whilst in progress towards being ready for eating–] for, what is denoted by such a word as 'cooking' is the collection of proceedings from first to last, as the putting on [the pot with the rice to boil] and ultimately taking it off again."

How the power called "Indication" comes into play is thus explained. "Where the primary meaning of a word is incompatible (with the other matters in the sentence) the power of Indication (*lakṣaṇā*) is communicated (to the word) whereby another meaning (than the express one–yet) in connection therewith, is thought of– either through notoriety (of the employment of the term in some particular secondary sense), or through a Motive –discernible– for using the word rather than some other word which would have conveyed the meaning expressly." úit

This he further illustrates as follows. "The power by which in such (an expression) as 'The impetuous 'Kalinga,' a word, such as 'Kalinga,' incompatible (with 'impetuosity'– if taken) in its own sense– as that of a particular country (on the Coromandel coast), causes one to think of (not the country, for instance, that the word denotes, but) the men, for instance, connected therewith; and (–to give a second example– the power) by which, in such (an expression) as 'A herdstation on the Ganges,' a word, such as 'the Ganges,' incompatible with the matter in question (–here, viz., the actual locus of the station of herdsmen–) inasmuch as the thing that it denotes is in the shape, for instance, of a mass of water (on the surface of which

the herdsmen could not have built the huts of which the herd-station consists—) causes one to think of something connected with itself by the relation of proximity or the like— such as the river's *bank*— *this* power of a word— *communicated* to it— other than the power which (—to use the language of some) belongs to it naturally, or (to use the language of others) which is not that given to it by God— (this second power it is that) is called *Indication*."

The distinction between the two examples just given requires attention. "In the former, the reason (why the word denoting the region of Kalinga has the power of indicating the inhabitants of that region) is 'Notoriety'— the fact, simply, of its being familiarly known (that the name of the region is employed to signify its inhabitants— as Shakespere uses the name of 'France' to signify the king of France.) In the latter of the examples the 'Motive' (for using the word 'Ganges' when we really mean 'bank of the Ganges') consists in this that it causes one to think of the extreme of coolness and purity (pertaining to the Ganges itself) which would not have been apprehended from the exposition of (the same matter in the shape of the expression). A herd-station on *the Bank of the Ganges*."

Our author now plunges into some profound and whimsical discussion on a point in regard to which he differs with the author of the *Kāvya Prakāśa*, and on which he seems to have the best of the argument. The other (like a Hindū Horne Tooke) holds that words denote just what their etymology gives, and hence the word *kuśala* ("expert") means strictly " a getter of sacrificial grass" —the etymology being *kuśam lāti* "he gets sacrificial grass." The word comes to *indicate* an "expert" man "through the relation of a homogeneousness of character in respect of the being a person of discrimination" —which the gatherer of sacrificial grass must be —else how could he tell one kind of grass from another? To this our author retorts, that "The primary meaning of the word is simply that of 'expert' —notwithstanding that the sense of 'gatherer of sacrificial grass' might be obtained from the etymology :— for, the reason for the (technically recognized) etymology of words is one thing (—viz. the

convenience of the grammarians, who are bound to furnish an etymology for every word that is not a radical—) and the reason for the employment (of a word) is another (—viz., the fact of the word's having, by convention, such a denotation as the speaker happens to have occasion for)." By way of a reductio ad absurdum he brings forward the word *go* "a cow" — which, according to *Pāṇini*, is derived from the verb *gam*, "to move" —and he proposes for consideration the applicability of the term, on the opposite hypothesis, to the animal when fast asleep. The whole discussion, we incline to think, must, constitute one of those parts of the book on which the young Brāhman student luxuriates.

Our author next proceeds to divide the power of Indication into four-score different species. Even the pandits are disposed to rebel against this, and to prefer foı once the comparative simplicity of the *Kāvya Prakāśa* which contents itself with eight. We shall not inflict the eighty upon the reader, but shall select the more noticeable. First, then, —the indicatory word either abandons its own meaning, with a view to indicating something else— when the case is one simply of "Indication indicative" (*lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā*); or it carries its own sense along with it, and then the case is one of "Indication inclusive" (*upādāna-lakṣaṇā*). Of the former the expression "A herd-station on the Ganges" is an example —for there the word "Ganges." as already shown, stands for the bank alone and not for the body of water. Of the latter an example is "The lances enter". Here the "lances" of course mean men bearing lances— but when the men, indicated by the word, enter then the lances, denoted by the word, enter also. "These (kinds of Indication), further," says our author, "are severally twofold, through 'Superimposition (*āropa*) and 'Introsusception,' (*adhyavasāna*)." The explanation of these terms is rather curious. "Let that (Indication) be 'Super imponent' which makes one think of the identity with something else of an object *not swallowed* (by that with which it is identified, but expressed along with it.) That (Indication) is held to be 'Introsusceptive' (which makes one think of the identity with

something else) of an object *swallowed* (—not expressed— but recognised as it were within that with which it is identified)." For example— "The horse— the white —gallops" :— here the horse" and "the white" mean just one and the same thing, and both terms are exhibited; but the same sense would be equally well understood (by a jockey, for example, to whom the horse was notoriously "the white" —or "the dun" —or "the chestnut"—) if the sentence were briefly. "The white gallops." Here the "white" has swallowed the "horse," and the case is one of "Indication inclusive introsusceptive founded on Notoriety" (*rūḍhāvupādāna-lakṣaṇā sādhyavasānā.*) This classification of phraseology may serve to illustrate a passage in the "Poetics" of Aristotle, which Mr. Theodore Buckley (of Christ Church) concurs with Dr. Ritter in condemning as spurious. The passage occurs in the 21st chapter, where, in speaking of metaphors, Aristotle, as rendered by Mr. Buckley, says "And sometimes the proper term is added to the relative terms." We incline to regard the passage as genuine. Let us see. Aristotle goes on to remark "I say, for instance, a cup has a similar relation to Bacchus that a shield has to Mars. Hence, a shield may be called the cup of Mars, and a cup the shield of Bacchus." Now, it seems to us that if the following proportion— viz.

Cup : Bacchus : : shield : Mars.

were not present to the mind of the hearer, then (to use Mr. Buckley's words— on a kindred passage in the 11th chap. 3d Book of the Rhetoric—) "with a view to guard the metaphor from any incidental harshness or obscurity" the proper term may be advantageously added— making what our author calls a case of the "Superimponent" (*saropā*). Thus, had Aristotle followed up his remark by a special example, we should have read. "The cup— the shield of Bacchus"— "The shield— the cup of Mars". According to the Hindū phraseology, when we say. "The cup of Mars", then, (through Indication introsusceptive) the cup has *swallowed* the shield— which latter, nevertheless, is discerned within the other by the eye of the intelligent. In the same way— wishing to avoid obscurity— one says, at full length,

"That *cow*, — the man of the Panjāb" and then one can say (to take another example of our author's) "That *cow* talks." Here "cow" has swallowed "Panjābī." On the question as to the precise relation between the cow and the Panjābī" under the circumstances, there is an infinite quantity of subtlety expended— to the discomfiture of course of all that differ from our author —who is a perfect Baconian Aristotle in respect of "bearing no brother near the throne."

When certain kinds of Indication specified have come to be sixteen, there is a duplication of these in respect of the consideration that the thing "suggested" may belong to the thing "indicated" or not. Of the case where the thing suggested does *not* belong to the thing indicated, the standing example "A herd-station on the Ganges" serves as an illustration— for here the "purity &c." are properties *not* of the bank but only of the river. Of the other case the following example is given —from the *Vīra Caritra* of Bhavabhūti— viz.—

Here are the clouds, in which the cranes disport,
And by whose smooth dark-loveliness the sky
Is overspred. Here are the dewy winds,
And the melodious joy-screams of the peacocks—
Friends of the clouds. Be all these as they list.
I— very firmly stout of hert— am *Rāma*—
I endure all [—hard though it be to bear
Those vernal sights and sounds with patience which
Enhance the joy of lovers when united.]
But how will *she* be now— Videha's daughter?
Alas, my goddess— O do *thou* be patient.

Here— says our author— the property indicated (viz. patience) belongs to the thing indicated (viz., *the peculiar* Rāma italicised in the fifth line) which was not the case in respect of the *bank* of the Ganges. But we must get on— leaving, till some other occasion, the further elucidation of this point as regards those who may feel interested about it; and we proceed to the *third* power of a word— viz., "Suggestion," which is declared as follows :—

"When Denotation &c., surcease (—after having done their duty,) that function of a word or its sense &c., by which something further is caused to be thought of, is what we call *Suggestion.*"

As the power of "Suggestion" may originate in the powers of "Denotation" and "Indication," and either in the word or in the sense of the word or in the drift of the whole discours &c., there are abundant subdivisions of this power also. At one point in the discussion (—reminding us of Dr. Johnson, who met the exclamation of surprise on his once defending Garrick whom he himself had so often abused, with the intimation— "Garrick is my dog, Sir;— I allow no one else to kick him."—) our author turns round upon some assailants of the author of the *Kāvya Prakāśa*— and, after bringing him off in triumph (for his own use,) he exclaims— "But enough of this (idly censorious) glancing (on the part of these objectors—) at the venerable man (—to whom—though constrained to find fault with him occasionally myself— I am indebted for so much of the materials of my work, that I may call him) the bestower of my livelihood."

"Suggestion" is held to originate in the "Denotation" in such cases as that exemplified by our author in a set of verses by "the lotus-feet of his father" so crammed with dreary double-entendre that we hasten past it. When founded on "Indication"— it may be exemplified by the Universally familiar "Herd-station on the Ganges"— which some of our pandit friends cannot hear mentioned without grinning "like Cheshire cats"— the grinning of which cats (—according to Charles Lamb— though he professes himself unable to explain *why*—; is said to be occasioned by the recollection that Cheshire was once a County Palatine, and the cats can't help laughing whenever they think of it. Verily the pandits who have heard all that they are likely, in a reasonable life-time, to have heard on the topic ought not to be grudged their laugh— if they have heart for it.

But, apart from the Denotative or the Indicative powers of *words*, Suggestion may be based upon the *sense*— and this may have a reference to some "speciality of the Speaker, or the Addressed, or the Sentence or the Proximity of some one else,

or the Drift, or the Occasion, or the Place, or the Time, or the Emphasis, or Gesture &c:" Of the case where Time, Place, the character of the Speaker, &c, combine to suggest somewhat more than is plainly expressed— we have the example following :—

Tis loves's own season— jocund Spring,
The God of the flowery bow,
Now scatters his shafts, and the breezes bring
Fresh vigour as they blow.
Round the arbours the shading creepers curl,
And my husband is far away—
Do think of something— can't you, girl?
What *are* we to do to-day?

"Here"— says the commentator— "some one in virtue of the known character of the Speaker suggests to her confidante— Let my un-avowed lover be speedily summoned."

Where the speciality is in respect of the person addressed , we may have such an example as the following— viz.

From your bosom the sandal-wood unguent is rubbed.
And your lip has lost its red :
The collyrium is washed from your eyes, and a glow
O'er your face and form has spread.
You *lying* girl— you've been to bathe—
No concern about *me* could prevent you—
And you haven't gone with my message at all
To the *wretch* to whom I sent you.

"Here"— says the commentator— "by 'Indication of the contrary' (*viparīta-lakṣaṇā*)— 'You *did* go to him is indicated, and 'To play with him' (instead of delivering your message) is suggested" — and all this in virtue of the person addressed being a "lying girl."

Where the speciality is in respect of the proximity of some one else—to the speaker— we may have such an example as the following— viz.

That crane, on the floating lotus leaf,
Stirs not :— you could not tell
But, on a slab of emerald.
It were a white conch-shell.

"Here"— says the commentator— "from the immobility of the crane its security (is inferred), and from that the fact that the place is devoid of people (—who, had they been there, would have frightened the crane)" whence— as the lines suggest to one Proximate to the speaker— what a pleasant place for a tête à tête.

With reference to "Emphasis" we have the following example— which might go to the Scotch tune of "He's low doon, he's in the broom, that's waiting for me."

His faither sends him—gang he maun—
And far awa' frae me;
But, when Spring comes back again,
Will he come back? —*not he.*

"Here"— according to to the commentator— she *says* "'He wont come back'— but by the (slily appropriate) Emphasis it is suggested that 'He assuredly *will* come back.'"

Where the speciality consists in the gesture, we may have such an example as the following —viz.

His look entreated her to speak the hour
Of assignation;— which when she did spy,
The dame, quickwitted, closed the lotus-flower
Full fraught with meaning from her laughing eye.

"Here"— says the commentator— "by the gesture of closing the lotus, &c., it is suggested by some woman, that the twilight (—when the lotus-flowers close themselves—) is the time of assignation."

Here we come to the end of Chapter Second— and if all the examples of the cases considered in it turn upon the "tender passion," we verily believe that the reason is this, that that pas-

sion happens to stand at the top of the list of sentiments recognised by the Hindūs, and the author would have met (—what he did not care to encounter—) a storm of obloquy had he taken his examples, immethodically, from any of the other topics without exhausting the first.

The Gist of the Vedānta — as a Philosophy[1]

J. R. Ballantyne

Having reviewed the Hindū Classification of Things, as exhibited in the Nyāya and probably the oldest systematised Hindū theory of the Origin of Things, as exhibited in the Sānkhya, we propose now to consider the Vedānta — the theological-philosophical system — with a view to the correct appreciation of which the Nyāya and the Sānkhya are by many chiefly valued as furnishing a preparatory training.

The term Vedānta, as remarked by Mr. Colebrooke (Essays, vol. 1, p. 326), signifies "the end and scope of the Vedas". How far the doctrine, as at present current, may be entitled to the name, we are not now concerned with enquiring. We shall take the doctrine as we find it in the popular compendium the *Vedānta-sāra* (the Marrow of the Vedānta) by Sadānanda, with its commentary the *Vidvanmano-rañjinī* (the Stimulator of the Mind of the Learned) by Rāma-Tīrtha; and we shall regard it, for the present, not as the digested result of an alleged revelation, but simply as a philosophical theory. Since, even on this lower ground, the orthodox Hindūs are quite ready to defend the system, it must needs be desirable that those who are concerned with assailing it should form an accurate conception of the character and the strength of the position which it there occupies. If the theory that we have to deal with prove to be one of the chapes of Pantheism, it may be matter for consideration what notions, of a pantheistic tendency, are likely to occur to the mind of a heathen speculator; and such a consideration may profitably precede the attmept (— transcending the scope of our immediate design—) to determine what amount of correction would change the pantheistic formula, that, "God is all," into the Christian doctrine, that, "in Him we live and move and have our being."

1. Pan 2, 14 (July 1, 1867) 47-48. Reprinted from the extinct Benares Magazine, Vol. IV, 1850.

Of the *Vedānta-sāra* three translations have been published – one by Mr. Ward, a second (in German) by Professor O. Frank, and a third (in English – in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for 1845 –) by Dr. Roer. To his translation, – (which we have found useful even where we have seen fit to adopt another rendering) Dr. Roer prefixes an interesting exposition "intended to place before the reader the chief metaphysical topics of this work, and to compare the doctrines, explained in it, with those philosophical systems, Hindoo as well as European, with which it has an affinity in its principles." Our immediate design is more limited than this. We are concerned only with the enquiry – what is the gist of the doctrine as at present held; how was the conception arrived at; and what legitimately follows from it – supposing it granted for the sake of argument. And first, something of our text-book and its arrangement.

With reference to the commencing of any scientific work, according to Hindū opinion, four questions present themselves – (1) what qualifications are required to render one competent to enter upon the study? – (2) what is the subject-matter? – (3) what connection is there between the subject-matter and the book itself? – and (4) what inducement is there to enter upon the study at all? The answer to each of these questions is called an *anubandha* – a "bond of connexion" or "cause" – because, unless a man knows what a given book is about, and whether he is competent to understand it, and what good the knowledge will do him, he cannot be expected to apply himself to the study of the book instead of employing himself otherwise. Now, in the case of our Compendium, as the author tells us, any other replies to these questions are not be looked for than those which are already notorious as regards the whole Vedānta literature whereof the Compendium itself is a portion. Here however – says his commentator – a doubt strikes the author, who may be supposed to soliloquize as follows: –

> "But let us see: – any consideration specially calculated to lead to the study of any particular doctrine is notorious among those only who are versed in the doctrine, and not to those who [without knowing what

branch of study will best repay them] are ambitious of becoming learned. How then shall *these* enter upon the study of this work, ignorant as they are as to such points as what it is that constitutes the subject-matter of the enquiry?" – under this apprehension the author proceeds to set forth compendiously the *anubandhas* [or the considerations calculated to invite to the study] of this particular doctrine [the Vedānta.]"

In other words – our author proceeds to state who it is that is qualified to study the Vedānta what Vedānta is all about, what is the relation between the Vedānta doctrine and the book, and what is the use of knowing the Vedānta doctrine.

In the first place, then, the qualifications required in a student of the Vedānta are stated as follows: –

"But [unlike the persons competent to the study, for example, of Law] the person competent [to the study of the Vedānta] is he who, by having gone over the Vedas and their appendages [the treatises on Grammar, Astronomy &c.] in the manner prescribed [that is to say – in such a manner as to be able to recollect, for example, the words of any passage on hearing the first few words of it quoted,] has attained to a rough notion of the sense of the whole Veda – &c. &c."

Other requisites – such as penances, sacrifies, &c., – are dwelt upon tediously in our text book and still more tediously in its commentary. The "rough notion" of the sense of the Veda – the meaning "gathered hastily" (*āpātato' dhigata*) – or, as the commentator paraphrases it, "without perfect ascertainment" (*parryyavadhāraṇam antareṇa*) — it is the business of the Vedānta treatises to elaborate and perfect. It will then conform to that which constitutes the subject-matter of the work before us; – and what this is the author in the second place compendiously declares: –

"The 'subject-matter is the fact – to be known for certain – that the Soul and God are one and the same – pure intelligence – for this is the drift of all treatises on the Vedānta doctrine – [and consequently of the one in hand]."

In the third place – he tells us –

"The relation between this demonstrable identity [of Soul and God] and the scriptural which ascertain it, is the relation between that which is to be known and that which makes it known."

One would think there needed no ghost to tell us *that*. The relation, to be sure, between the subject and the book, might seem to be different in the case of such a book as Berkeley's "Querist" – where, it might be plausibly contended, the relation is that between "what is to be known, and what *asks* about it"; but even by his queries Berkeley was seeking to convey knowledge; – and so – avowedly – are all the Hindū doctors; – and why then state in this formal sort of way the relaion between their books and the subjects thereof – as Euclid might have done had he chosen to state that the subject of his book was Geometry, and that the relation between Geometry and his book was this – that the one was to be explained and the other was to explain it? We put the question to a Pundit – a young Mahratta, deep in the Nyāya philosophy – and he replied. "The relation is obvious enough, and it is regarded as being, in this case, always the same. But we Hindūs are in the habit of talking a great deal about *relation* – everything in the universe being regarded as holding some relation or other to every other thing – so, for fear that hypercritical persons should object that the work must be incoherent because there is no evidence of the relation in question, the author mentions it – and there's an end of it." Acquiescing in this account, we may now go on to the fourth and last of the considerations – that of the "cui bono?" – in regard to which our author remarks: –

> "But the end [which by its desireableness should move us to enter upon the enquiry] is the cessation of the *ignorance* which invades this demonstrable identity [of Soul and God] and the [consequent attainemnt] by Soul of that bliss which is His essence."

[1]Here then – in the shape of the proposition which the rest of the book is taken up with expounding and demonstrating – we have the net result of the Veda according to the showing of its most generally accredited expositors. Soul and God are one – and God is bliss; – and yet Soul is *not* bliss: – why? – because of *ignorance* which stands somehow in the way. This *ignorance* (*ajñāna*) is the "pons asinorum" of the Vedāntī system. To manage the subtleties respecting Non-existence which

1. Pan. 2, 15 (Aug. 1, 1867) 67-69.

we dipped into when remarking on the Nyāya system, is a trifle compared with the grasping of the strange conception that we have now to deal with. It is a nothing — and yet the cause of all that people usually look upon as everything. Let us see what our author says of it: —

> "But Ignorance, they [the Vedantīs] declare, is a somewhat that is not to be called positively either entity or nonentity — not [as the Naiyāyikas allege] a mere negation [— the mere absence of knowledge —] but the opponent of knowledge — consisting of the three fetters [the triple cord of pleasure, pain, and dulness]."

Let us consider the way in which this conception — this mysterious "what you will" — (*yatkiñcit*) — that neither is nor isn't — may have come to occupy the place it occupies in the system under examination. Sir G. C. Haughton, in his reply to Col. Vans Kennedy's strictures on Mr. Colebrooke's Essay, (As. Jour. vol. xviii. p. 217) after quoting from different writers to show in what diverse fashion different persons have attempted to convey their conception of this feature in the Vedāntī system, remarks as follows : "It must be, indeed, clear from all that has been said, that such a system, if it be even perfectly comprehensible, cannot be represented by language, but must be inferred by the mind from the principles already laid down." Very well : — let us attempt to present to the mind of the reader those principles, as much as possible divested of everything irrelevant, which seem to us to constitute the prerequisites for the inference.

Place yourself, then, — for the time being — in the position of the Vedāntī, and try to view things as he does. Suppose — as the Vedāntī does — that God, the essentially happy, omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent, exists. Suppose further — as the Vedāntī does at all times, but as you need do for the time only — that nothing besides God exists. Suppose in the next place, — as held long in Europe and to this day in India — that "*ex nihilo nihil fit*" : — and suppose finally that God wills to make a world. Here you have the conditions of the problem; and you must stick to them with something like the geometrical rigour of a Spinoza — for on no subject in heaven or on earth is

vague declamation more easy and more idle. God, then, wills to make a world. Being omnipotent, He *can* make it. The dogma "ex nihilo nihil fit" being, by the hypothesis, an axiom, it follows that God, being able to make a world, can make it without making it out *nothing*. The world so made must, then, consist of what previously existed – i.e. of God. Now, what *is* a world? It is an aggregate of souls with limited capacity – (for, were their capacities unlimited, these would be Gods) – and of what these souls (– whether rightly or wrongly we are not at present concerned with enquiring)– regard as objects – the special or intermediate causes of various modes of intelligence. Taking this to be what is meant by a world, how is God to form it out of Himself? God is omniscient – and, in virtue of his omnipresence, his omniscience is everywhere. Where then is the room for a *limited* intelligence? Viewing the matter (were that strictly possible) *a priori*, one would incline to say "nowhere" – but the Vedāntī, before he had got this length, was too painfully impressed by the conviction, forced upon him as on the rest of us by a Consciousness which will take no denial that there *are* limited intelligences;[1] – and all that was left for him was to show this mortifying but indisputable fact was reconcilable with the position already laid down. Holding – as a point beyond dispute – that the soul *is* God, and confronted with the inevitable fact that the soul does *not* spontaneously *recognise* itself as God – there was nothing for it but to make the fact itself do duty as its own cause – to say that the soul does not know itself to be God just because it does not know it – i.e. because it is ignorant – i. e. because it is obstructed by *ignorance* (*ajñāna*).

At this point in his speculation let us suppose that our speculator stopped; but that a disciple, with a lively imagination – or taste for the concrete – took up the matter at the same point, and set himself to make something more satisfyingly palpable out of the abstraction – Ignorances. Were it not – he

1. Our author says that the fact of there being what he calls Ignorance may be deduced "from the judgment [forced upon the consciousness of every man] that 'I am ignorant' :– and from various texts of Scripture. We have heard a Hindū remark, in corroboration of this, that if the man is *wrong* in saying, "I am ignorant," then, by that blunder, the fact of Ignorance is established just as well as if he had said rightly.

argues — for this Ignorance — this *ajñāna* of which my teacher speaks — soul would know itself to be God — there would be nothing but God — there would be no world. It is this *ajñāna*, then, that *makes* the world; and, this being the case, it ought to have a name suggestive of the fact. Let it be called *prakṛti* — the name by which the Sānkhyas speak of their unintelligent maker of worlds. Good — says another :— but recollect that this *prakṛti* or "energy" can be nothing else than the power of the All powerful — for we admit the substantial existence of God alone — so that the *ajñāna*, which you have shown to be entitled to the name of *prakṛti*, will be more significantly denoted by the name of *śakti* — God's "power" — only by supposing an exertion of which can the fact be accounted for that souls which are God *do not know* that they are so. The reasoning is accepted, and the term *śakti* is enrolled among the synonyms of *ajñāna*. Lastly comes the mythologist. You declare — says he — that this world would not appear to be a reality were it not for ignorance. Its apparent reality is the result, then, of *illusion*; — and, for the word *ajñāna* you had better substitute the more expressive term *māyā* — "deceit, illusion, jugglery." The addition of this to the list of synonymes being acquiesced in, the mythologist furnishes his *Māyā* with all the requisites of a goddess, and she takes her seat in his Pantheon as the wife of Brahmā the creator. Such we hold to be the genesis of *Māyā* — that conception which, explicitly, may be, as Mr. Colebrooke (Essay, vol. I. p. 377), taxes it — "no tenet of the original *Vedāntin* philosophy" — but which seems to us yet to be in such a way involved in the conception of *ajñāna* — when once objectified that it quite in due course became evolved therefrom in the later writings of the *Vedāntīs*.

Passing over, as irrelevant to our immediate purpose, the curious details of the scheme according to which the mysterious principle of *ajñāna* is described as carrying on its operations[1] we

1. In seeking to reproduce conjecturally the train of thought by which the Vedānta system arose, we have taken as the starting-point the conception of the Omnipotent, which the system contains, and not that logically antecedent conception of a fundamental unqualified unity supposed to lie still further back — a conception chronologically later, and furnishing a point, indeed, — but no starting-point. To this we shall have future occasion to revert.

are now met by the practical question — what does the Vedāntī deduce from the doctrine the essentials of which have been now stated; — and, holding him to be wrong, how are you to deal with him? Holding him to be wrong, you may question his theology, his metaphysics, or his logic — that is to say, you may argue with him (1) on the supposition that his faith rests on what he holds to be a revelation — or (2) that his faith is what he holds to, as a philosopher, even were there no revelation — the doctrine being, in his estimation, the most unexceptionable that the wit of man has yet propounded — or — (3) — waiving the merits of the doctrine — on the agreement that the question discussed shall be this — viz. — Hindū revelation apart, what follows from the doctrine? Under each of these aspects the question may be considered; and as, under each of these aspects, the question will in practice have to be treated, we would deprecate the treatment of it under all these aspects simultaneously and confusedly. Why? Because your opponent is pretty sure to be a man who could not for the life of him refrain from taking what might be called a Jesuitical advantage of any hitch in your dialectic procedure, — and when he baffles your attack by shifting discussion from one aspect of the question to another, he gains his victory — his victory being quite satisfactory to him so long as, by baffling you for the time, he maintains the "status in quo."

Under which aspect, then, were it best to treat the questions first? For treating it under its theological aspect, people will be in a more advantageous position when the labours in which Dr. Müller and Professor Wilson are engaged shall have put the world in possession of the Vedas themselves. As regards the Metaphysical aspect of the question—if the theory necessarily led to the conclusion practically drawn from it, there would then be an urgent necessity that the theory itself should be first assailed, however arduous might be the nature of the required assault. But if the theory does not really necessitate the conclusion practically drawn from it, it might seem expedient in

the first instance—waiving the discussion of the difficult ontological questions involved in the theory—to let our first step be the denial of the ligitimacy of the conclusion practically drawn from the theory. This conclusion may be compendiously summed up in the allegation that man, being God, and being debarred from divine beatitude by Ignorance, can break his bars simply by the acquisition of Knowledge. In making this inference form his system—regarded as a philosophical theory (—and dogmatic assertions of the Veda are excluded under the present conditions of the debate—) we do not see how the Vedāntī can rebut the charge of falling into what Whately calls the semilogical fallacy of Ambiguous Middle. His argument, stated syllogisticlly, runs (if we do him no injustice) thus :—

"All obstacles in the shape *ajñāna* are to be got over by means of *jñāna*:—

The obstacle to soul's identification with God is *ajñāna* — Ergo — The obstacle to soul's identification with God is to be got over by means of *jñāna*."

The argument is perfect if the term *ajñāna* is employed in the same sense in both the premises. But *is* it? Let us see. In the major premiss the term *ajñāna* means simply "ignorance" which is the "negation of *jñāna* knowledge" — for if it means either more or less, then the assertion, instead of being, as it is intended to be, self-evidently true, begs the question in dispute. If the reasoning is to be valid, then, *ajñāna* in the major premiss must stand for neither more nor less than the negation of *jñāna*. But does it stand for neither more nor less than this in the *minor* premiss? Turn back to our text-book's definition of the *ajñāna* which is alleged as the obstacle to man's beatitude, and you will find it expressly *denied* to be the "mere negation of knowledge":— it is there spoken of as the "opponent of knowledge" — and it is there understood, and elsewhere decalred, to be the Power of God — that power being regarded as manifesting itself in the production of that ignorance which

consists in man's consciousness of a limited intelligence. The equivocation is palpable. It is the caricature of the Baconian equation "Knowledge = Power". A man bound is not released by having light thrown upon his fetters.[1] So long as the power of God – the power of the Being whom the theory speaks of as the Omnipotent and the Eternal – shall continue, so long – i. e. for ever if He wills it – must man continue to be, to all intents and purposes, a separately personal and limited intelligence – precisely as he is held to be on other theories than that of the Vedānt. Under the Vedānta theory, taken as a philosophical theory, man is precisely as dependent upon the power of the Almighty as he is under any other theory :– dependent, therefore, upon the Almighty for every ray of light upon his path.

Here we come round upon the question – through what channel, if through any, has the Almighty revealed His will – that will on which our mode of being, here and hereafter, depends? This great question – the question under its theological aspect – we have already said, is a separate one from that which we seek to get disposed of at the outset. We have done all that we aimed at doing for the present if we have indicated the fallacy in the Vedānti deduction – viz., that, because one may choose to give to one *result* of God's power the name of Ignorance, and then transfer that name to the *power* itself, therefore man's knowledge can avail against God's power that, on the theory of Vedānti, as opposed to the belief of the Christian, man's soul is less entirely dependent on the Power of God which caused it to be what it is.

In our next paper we propose to address ourselves more especially to points connected with the question under its second aspect – the "Ontology of the Vedānta."

1. He *would* be – if *darkness* were his fetter, as it was in the case of Don Quixotte when he hung in terror all night, with his toes within three inches of the ground, over what he believed to be a fathomless abyss – chained by a delusion which the mornig light dispelled.

On the Ontology of the Vedānta[1]

Late Dr. J. R. Ballantyne

"Nothing seems of more importance, towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by *thing, reality, existence* : for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words." *Berkeley* :– "Of the Principles of Human Knowledge," § 89.

At the end of a paper on "The gist of the Vedānta as a Philosophy" (*Ben. Mag.* Vol. iv., p. 325), in which we confined ourselves to disproving the legitimacy of the conclusion practically drawn from the Vedāntic theory, we intimated our intention to address ourselves, in a subsequent paper, "more especially to points connected with the question under its second aspect, the Ontology of the Vedānta". As regards this aspect of the question, we remarked, – "If the theory necessarily led to the conclusion practically drawn from it, there would then be an urgent necessity that the theory itself should be first assailed, however arduous might be the nature of the required assult." That the theory did *not* necessitate the conclusion practically from it, we undertook to demonstrate; and a year has now passed without our having met with any attempt to shake the position that we then took up. What we hope *now* to show is this, that the evil is in the inference, and not in the theory, – and that the Indian Missionary will do well to reserve his strenght for the combat with the deadly error, instead of wasting it upon a speculation which, whether philosophically just or not, is in no respect whatever incompatible with the reception of Christianity. In our attempt to show this, we claim an unprejudiced and an attentive hearing. We claim this on the ground that we have shown, by our previous papers, that we have at all events not spared pains to qualify ourselves for form-

1. Pan. 2, 16 (Sept. 1, 1867) 91-92. (Reprinted from the Benares Magazine, vol. VI, 1851).

ing a judgement on the deeply important and generally very ill understood point which we are going to discuss.

To those who do not read Sanskrit, the sources generally availble for acquiring a knowledge of the Vedānta are the Essay of Mr. Colebrooke, the criticism of Col. Vans Kennedy on that essay, the intended defence of Mr. Colebrooke by Sir G. C. Haughton, and the tracts of Rammohun Roy. We do not speak of Mr. Ward's work on the Hindoos, because the reader of that work, who imagines that he is therein reading the speculations of the Indian sages, is under a delusion. It appeared advisable, when we undertook to address those whose conception of the Vedānta is derived from the sources just mentioned, that we should first remove whatever of perplexity might result from the seemingly conflicting testimony of the parties, in regard to the question whether the Vedānta were a system of Materialism or of Spiritualism. We therefore, (in a first and Second Dialogue "On the Notions of the Hindū," — *Ben Mag.* Vols. v. and vi., pp. 422 and 863), — traced out the occasion of Col. Kennedy's misapprehension of Mr. Colebrooke, and showed that Mr. Colebrooke quite agreed with him and with the Hindū expositors in holding the system to be one of pure Spiritualism. We now propose to show, in accordance with this, that the *Ontology* of the Vedānta is the Ontology of Bishop Berkeley; — which being shown, it will follow that it must be something else than *this* against which our efforts require to be directed. It is labour worse than lost to argue against what does not stand in the way of your argument. In attempting to convince a European unbeliever in Christianity who held the doctrine of Berkeley, it would clearly be a waste of labour to urgue against the doctrine of Berkeley, because we know, from Berkeley's own case, that the holding of that doctrine is compatible with the highest form of Christian piety. Let us show, then, that the deoctrine of Berkeley is the Ontology of the Vedānta — *without the illicit inference deduced by the Vedāntists,* — and it will then be seen how we had better waste no longer, in assailing the impregnable or the impalpable, the strength that was given us for labours less Quixotic.

But, methinks, a smile of compassionate surprise has come over the face of the reader; and he ejaculates "Berkeley!" Good reader, if you know Berkeley, you must love him; — If you do not know him, pray listen to what we shall tell you of him. If you borrowed your conception of his philosophy from Byron's lines —

> "When Bishop Berkeley said there was no matter,
> It surely was no matter what he said;" —

then, pary, revise your conception as you go along with us. If, again, you enrol yourself among these of whom Pope speaks when he says —

> "And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin;" —

then lay aside our article — it will profit you as little as you will profit the cause of evangelization in the educated division of Hindū society.

George Berkeley was born in 1684. In 1724, when holding the Deanery of Derry, worth £ 1,100 per annum, he drew up a Scheme for converting the savage Americans to Christianity, by a college to be erected in the isles of Bermuda. The scheme included his resignation of his rich benefice, and his dedicating the remainder of his life to instructing the youth of America, on the moderate allowance of one hundred pounds yearly. Subscriptions having been raised for promoting "so pious an undertaking," as it is styled in the king's answer to the Address of the Commons relative to a grant of land for the use of the mission, Dean Berkeley sailed for Rhode Island, with his lady, in 1728. It would appear that the minister of the day had never heartily embraced the project for which the dean had made such sacrifies; — obstacles were thrown in the way; and, the scheme on which Berkeley had expended much of his private fortune, and more than seven years of the prime of his life, having been thus rendered abortive, he returned to Europe. Before he left Rhode Island, he distributed what books he had brought with him among the clergy of that province; and immediately after his arrival in London, he returned all the private subscriptions that had been advanced for the support of his undertaking. At

this time he preached, before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, a sermon, which was printed at the desire of the Society. In this sermon occurs the following passage, to which we request the particular attention of the reader—

> "The metaphysical knowledge of God, considered in his absolute nature and essence, is one thing; and to know him as he stands related to us as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, is another. The former kind of knowledge (whatever it amounts to) hath been, and may be, in Gentiles as well as Christians, but not the latter, which is life eternal."

[1]We beg attention especially to the pregnant parenthesis. The metaphysical knowledge of God "*whatever it amounts to*", — *this*, he says, "may be in Gentiles as well as Christians." It is not this, therefore, that is "life eternal;" but neither can any such metaphysical conception, compatible, in the case of a Christian preacher, with the more momentous knowledge of a Redeemer and Sanctifier, amount to an exclusion of its Gentile holder from the possibility of receiving also that more momentous knowledge. Observe, that we are not at this moment considering what the metaphysical knowledge in question *is*; — that inquiry will recieve attention in due time — but we seek to impress upon the reader the intelligent apprehension of our position, viz., that the metaphysical conception, of which we shall have to treat, does *not* amount to an obstacle in our way, unless we choose to run our heads against it.

In the same year that Berkeley preached his missionay sermon, he published his *Minute Philosopher*, in a series of dialogues on the model of Plato. Here he pursues the freethinker through the various characters of atheist, libertine, enthusiast, scorner, critic, metaphysician, fatalist, and sceptic, — with what success the reader who may chance not to have read the book may certify himself by a persual, from which we promise him an enjoyment of no ordinary description. Southey, we observe from a passage in his "Life", was greatly delighted with this work, which he warmly recommended to his friends.

1. Pan. 2, 18 (Sept. 1, 1867) 136-139.

In 1734 Berkeley was made Bishop of Cloyne. He repaired immediately to his manse-house at Cloyne – being a determined opponent of non-residence, – and applied himself with vigour to the discharge of all espiscopal and parochial duties. His zeal in the cause of revealed religion was not, however, confined to his diocese. Mr. Addison had given the bishop an account of their common friend Dr. Garth's behaviour in his last illness. It appears that when Mr. Addison went to see the Doctor, and began to discourse with him seriously about preparing for his approaching dissolution, the other made answer – "Surely, Addison, I have good reason not to believe those trifles, since my friend Dr. Halley, who has dealt so much in demonstration, has assured me that the doctrines of Christianity are incomprehensible, and the religion itself an imposture." The Bishop, therefore, – (in the words of the biographer from whom we cull these particulars) – "took arms against this redoubtable dealer in demonstration," and addressed *The Analyst* to Dr. Halley, with the view of showing, that mysteries of faith were unjustly objected to by mathematicians, who adimtted much greater mysteries in science, – especially in the doctrine of Fluxions, now known as the Differential Calculus, &c. This led to a great commotion among the mathematicians, and to not a little controversy. Meanwhile the bishop employed his pen on "*Queries* proposed for the Good of Ireland," on his "Discourse addressed to Magistrates," which put a stop to an impious society calling themselves *Blasters*, on a "Letter to the Roman Catholics" of his diocese, and on another letter, to the clergy of that persuasion in Ireland, written with so much candour and moderation as well as good sense, that those gentlemen, to their own credit, in the Dublin Journal of Nov. 18, 1749, thought fit to return "their sincere and hearty thanks to the worthy author; assuring him, that they are determined to comply with every particular recommended in his address, to the utmost of their power." They add, that in "every page it contains a proof of the author's extensive charity; his views are only towards the public good; the means he prescribeth are easily complied with; and his manner of treating persons in their circumstances so very singular, that they plainly show the good

man, the polite gentleman, and the true patriot." Lord Chesterfield – a judge of merit, whatever else he may have been, – had no sooner the disposal of patronage in Ireland than he wrote to inform Berkeley that the see of Clogher, then vacant, the value of which was double that of Cloyne, was at his service. But Berkeley, though grateful for the offer, had no ambition in this way. He loved the place where he had been actively useful; and now his health was failing. He had derived great relief, in a distressing complaint brought on by his sedentary course of living, from the use of *tar-water*; and, being anxious that the benefit of the remedy should not be confined to himself, he composed, in recommendation of it, a work which he has been heard to declare cost him more time and pains than any other he had ever been engaged in. The work is entitled "Siris, a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-water." As his biographer remarks – "It is indeed a chain, which, like that of the poet, reaches from earth to heaven, conducting the reader, by an almost imperceptible gradation from the phenomena of tarwater, through the depths of the ancient philosophy, to the sublimest mystery of the Christian religion."

In 1752, Berkeley, in bad health, removed with his wife and family to Oxford, in order to superintend the education of one of his sons. Strongly impressed with the impropriety of non-residence, he had previously endeavoured to exchange his high preferment for some canonry or headship at Oxford. Failing of success in this, he wrote over to the Secretary of State to request that he might have permission to resign his bishopric, worth at that time at least £ 1,400 per annum. So uncommon a petition excited his majesty's curiosity to know who was the extraordinary man that preferred it. Being told that it was his old acquaintance Dr. Berkeley, he declared that he should die a bishop in spite of himself, but that he had free liberty to reside where he pleased. The Bishop, before leaving, made a handsome provision for the respectable poor of his district.

At Oxford he expired suddenly, the year following, on a Sunday evening, as he was reclining on a couch, in the midst of

his family, listening to a sermon of Sherlock's which his wife was reading aloud. He seemed to be asleep, and his body was quite cold and his joints stiff, before his daughter, on offering of of tea, first perceived his insensibility.

It was of Berkeley, that the discerning, fastidious and turbulent Atterbury said, after an interview with him, "So much learning, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman." The friends that survived him, of all factions and parties, concurred in the dictum of the satirist – melted for the time into the encomiast – which ascribed

"To Berkeley every virtue under heaven."

Such was the man and the Christian whose ontological creed we propose, to show, was that of the Vedānta without its illicit deductions. In the notice of his labours which we have tacked together from the biography prefixed to his collected works, we have not mentioned his treatise "Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge," from which we have taken our motto, nor his Three Dialogues "In Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists." It is from these that we have to take his ontological doctrine for comparison with that of the Vedānta. Of the vulgar estimate of Berkeley's system Mr. G. H. Lewes – though no sympathiser with Berkeley's highest aspirations – writes most justly, – "All the world has heard of Berkeley's Idealism, and innumerable 'coxcombs' have vanquished it 'with a grin'. Ridicule has not been sparing of it. Argument has not been wanting. It has been laughed at, written at, talked at, shrieked at. That it has been *Understood* is not so apparent. Few writers seem to have honestly read and appreciated his works; and those few are certainly not among his antagonists. In reading the criticism upon his theory it is quite ludicrous to notice the constant iteration of trivial objections which, trival as they ar, Berkeley had often anticipated. In fact the critics misunderstood him, and then reproached him for his inconsistency, – not with *his* principles, but with *theirs*. They force a meaning upon his words which he had expressly rejected; and then triumph over him because he did not pursue their principles to the ex-

travagances which would have resulted from them." Among those who spoke or wrote nonsense about Berkeley's Idealism, it is sad to find Dr. Johnson and Dr. Reid. However, Sir William Hamilton, by his annotations on Dr. Reid's collected works, has provided an antidote to the misrepresentations of the latter; and Dr. Johnson's kicking a stone, as a refutation of the theory, may continue to be preserved for the joke's sake.

But it is time that we proceed to show that Berkeley's theory of Being really is; to show what terms in it correspond, and how far, to what terms in the Vedānta philosophy; and to show how much of the Vedāntic theory, inasmuch as it is that of the good Bishop, it would be useless to overthrow, even granting it were possible to overthrow it. Having done this, it will remain to be considered – how we are to deal with the residue; – in other words – (the words of the Bishop's missionary sermon) – it will remain to be considered how the knowledge of God "as he stands related to us as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier," is, in the case of the Vedāntīs, to be superadded to "the metaphysical knowledge of God, considered in his absolute nature and essence," respecting which the Bishop and the Vedāntīs are consentient.

The ugly word Ontology means "the science of *being*". It proposes the inquiry, – "What do you mean by saying that a thing *is*, – and what is a *thing*, – and can a thing in any way be at all without *really* being?" Thus it aims at that, than which, according to Berkeley as quoted in our motto, "nothing seems to be of more importance, towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assults of scepticism," – viz., the "distinct explication of what is meant by *thing, reality, existence* : for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words."

According to the Vedānta[1] "Existence or Being (*sattva*) is of three kinds – (1) Being, in its highest sense (*pāramārthika*),

1. We quote from the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Chapter 2.

(2) such as has to be dealt with (*vyāvahārika*), and (3) merely seeming (*prātibhāsika*). Of these, Being, in its highest sense, belongs to God [i. e. Soul or Spirit]; Being, such as has to be dealt with, belongs to the Ether [or Space], &c.; and merely seeming Being belongs to the [merely seeming] silver which is [in fact] mother o'pearl [mistaken for silver by a beholder]." The first of these is equivalent to substantial or independent existence, the second to phenomenal or dependent existence, and the third to deceptive appearance. Let us compare this with the views of Berkeley, in regard to the first kind of existence. Berkeley declares — "From what has been said, it follows there is not any other substance than *spirit*, or that which perceives."[1] Here we have absolute existence. But such an existence as this, Berkeley concurs with the Vedāntists in denying to the objects perceived. To these (whose 'esse' he holds to be 'percipi'), while he denies "an existence independent of a substance,"[2] — contending that it is either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all, to speak of "the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind,"[3] — yet he by no means denies a *real* existence. He says, "I can as well doubt of my own being, as of those things which I actually perceive by sense : it being a manifest contradiction, that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in *being perceived*"[4] The third degree of existence, inferior to this, he assigns to dreams and the creatures of the imagination; for, in comparison with these, he says, "The ideas of sense are allowed to have *more reality* in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent;"[5] — and these, being impressed upon the mind "according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits."[6]

1. Principles of Human Knowledge, § vii. 2. Ibid., § xci.
3. Ibid., § xxiv. It must be remembered that Mind and Spirit, in Berkeley's language, mean the same thing.
4. Ibid., § lxxxviii. 5. Ibid., § xxxiii. 6. Ibid., § xxxvi.

While Berkeley and the Vedāntists, then, agree in holding that existence differs in its degrees, and also in allowing the first degree — viz. that of independent or substantial existence — to Spirit alone; they differ — apparently at least — in their application of the term *real*. In examining this part of the question, therefore, we may expect to come upon some difference of opinion such as shall involve, on one side or the other, an error requiring to be combated. But, before proceeding to investigate this, let us take account of what has been ascertained. We have seen that the Vedāntīs, in allowing the rank of Substantial Existence to Spirit alone, hold the opinion which one of the most pious and thoughtful of Christian bishops advocated, not as merely harmless, but, as a grand bulwark of the truth against the assults of a debasing Materialism. Verliy there seems to be anything but an obligation upon us to insist that the Vedāntī should give up this philosophical belief, and accept at our hand, as something indispensable to his further progress, a term denoting "an unknown quiddity, with an absolute existence," — a term which, Berkeley adds, "should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses [he goes on to say] it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards atheism, than the use of that general confused term."[1]

[2]With regard to the third degree of Existence — that belonging to what presents itself in dreams, &c. — there is no

1. Third Dialogue, between Hylas and Philonous. We beg leave to remind the reader that we are not professing ourselves a follower of Berkeley, nor urging any one to adopt his views. We are simply concerned to show which of the Vedānta tenets by being Berkeleian, are not in any way anti-christian, and not therefore the points against which it were wise to direct our efforts. Hence we are at present under no engagement to satisfy the reader in regard to all the difficulties which Berkeley's theory may, at first sight, appear to give occasion for. More objections than were likely to have occurred to any single objector, Berkeley himself has anticipated and replied to. His treatises are open to all and are not voluminous.

2. Pan. 2, 19 (Dec. 1, 1867). p 162-164.

occasion for our here remarking more than this, that the Missionary is not likely to quarrel with the Vedāntī for calling such things, in general, illusions rather than realities. What we are more particularly concerned about is the second degree of Existence, which some of the Vedāntīs professedly, and the others too generally in fact, degrade to the level of the third. The second and third degrees are in effect reduced to much the same level by the employment of the term *vastu* to denote spirit, and, on the other hand, its contradictory — *a-vastu*- to denote all else. Now the word *vastu* means a "thing" or "substance", —and, while *a-vastu*, therefore, properly means "*not* a substance", the Vedāntīs are all too much disposed to treat whatever comes under the name as being (in the familiar sense of the word) no *thing*, — as *unreal*. They are in fact not disinclined to own the impeachment, against which Berkeley has so repeatedly protested, of holding that the phenomenal universe is delusive, because phenomenal and dependent. The Vedāntīs — as philosophers — [for at present we are viewing them as speculative ontologists and not as assertors of a revelation] — would seem to have been duped by the word *thing*, and its kindred term *real*. They close to restrict the name of *thing* to Spirit, and then jumped to the conclusion that all else must be *nothing* — or nothing of any consequence.

Waiving the question of revelation, which, we repeat, does not fall within the present section of our argument, we would recommend, therefore, that, in reasoning with the Vedāntī on his philosophical belief, he should be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of the opinion that there is no independent entity besides Spirit, — that opinion being one which need not prevent his becoming as good a Christian as Bishop Berkeley. We should also leave him to think, for the present, as he may choose in regard to dreams or waking misapprehensions; but we should press him with the unreasonableness of holding that the phenomena of waking existence are beneath the notice of the wise because, forsooth, they are not entitled to the name of *vastu* — the name of *substance*. If phenomena have an existence "that must be dealt with" (*vyāvahārika*), their importance will

depend upon our relation to them; and if it so happen that our relation to them is to be *eternal*, it is idle to disparage their immense importance by dubbing them "insubstantial". Whether their relation to us *is* to be eternal, and what relation our spirits bear to that Great Spirit whom we agree with the Vedāntīs in holding to be the sole independently existent — the Self-existent, — are questions to be answered only by a revelation. The replies afforded to these questions, on the one hand, by the books which the Vedāntīs hold to be a revelation, and, on the other hand, by the book which we ourselves hold to convey the true revelaion, we propose to take a future opportunity of comparing.

Confining ourselves, for the present, to the consideration of ontological theories and terminology, we now proceed to inquire what is the Vedāntic conception of the relation of the phenomenal to the real. the Vedāntists are commonly charged with holding that the phenomenal *is* the real, — in other words, with Pantheism. At the same time they are charged with wildest extravagance, of an opposite description, in declaring that the Supreme is *devoid of qualities*, — or, in Sanskrit, *nir-guṇa*. With regard to the relation of the real and the phenomenal no point appears to have occasioned more perplexity to those who were impressed with the baselessness of Vedāntism than the employment of this term *nir-guṇa* — so frequently connected in the Vedāntic writings with the name of the Supreme (Brahm). We find, for example, a zealous writer against Vedāntism declaring, that, "in any sense, within the reach of human understanding he (Brahm) is *nothing*. For the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes." And the same writer calls upon his readers to admire the extravagent notion that Brahm exists "without intellect, without intellingence, without even the consciousness or his own existence!" Now, the reply to all this is, that the word *nir-guṇa* is a technical term, and must be understood in its technical acceptation. It means "devoid of whatever is meant by the term *guṇa*," and the term *guṇa* is employed (as remarked at p. 868 of the 5th volume of the Benares Magazine) to denote whatever is phenomenal.

In denying that anything phenomenal belongs constitutively to the Supreme Spirit, the Vedāntī speaks very much like Bishop Berkeley, and like other good Christians whom Milton's epic has not educated into a semiconscious Anthropomorphism. Berkeley expresses himself as follows – "We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can effect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing; it is evident, such a being as this can suffer nothing; nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such *qualities*,"[1] and so on. The Vedāntī, in like manner, denying that such 'qualities' belong the Supreme, declares, "We ought not to ascribe to Almighty God properties, attributes, or modes of being, which are the peculiar characteristics of humanity, such as the faculty of vision,"[2] &c. In short, the Vedāntī denies that the Supreme either has or requires senses or bodily organs; – and, holding that organs of sense or motion are made up of what he calls *guṇa* as we Europeans in general hold them to be made up of what we prefer to call *matter*, he asserts that the Supreme is *nir-guṇa*, in very much the sense that we Europeans assert that God is *immaterial*. We say, guardedly, "in very much the sense" – and not simply "in the sense" – because the term *guṇa*, as we have shown before, denotes strictly – not the imperceptible quiddity 'matter' – but what Berkeley calls the sensible, or the sum of the objects of sense. Theologically, the Vedāntī, asserting that the Deity is *nir-guṇa*, and Christian, asserting that God is *immaterial*, are asserting the very same fact in terms of separate theories, – just

1. Berkeley's Third Dialogue.
2. The *Tattva-bodhinī patrikā* – the organ of the modern Vedāntīs – p. 113.

as two chemists might make each the same assertion in regard to some individual specimen, while the one spoke of it as destitute of Chlorine, and the other as destitute of Oxymuriatic Acid.

To say that "the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes," is therefore no *reductio ad absurdum* of the Vedāntic dogma that nothing of what is technically called *guṇa* enters into the essence of God. Take away everything of what is comprised under that name, — that is to say, take away every thing that is perceived through the organs of sense, and every sense-organ, and all merely human feelings or mental processes, such as alarm, delighted suprise, recollection, computaion, deduction, — take away all this, and there remains to the Vedāntī, nor a mere empty substratum, but the One Reality consisting of Existence, Thought, and Joy, in their identity as an ever-existing joy-thought. This, whatever else we may think of it, is something very different from a substratum evacuated to nonentity. *We* are accustomed to regard eternal existence, wisdom,and blessedness, as *attributes* of God. The Vedāntīs, or the other hand, instead of regarding these as attributes, regard them, in their eternal identity, as God Himself. Instead of holding, as they have been so often accused of holding, that God has no attributes in *our* sense of the terms, they hold in fact that he is *all* attribute, — sheer Existence, sheer Thought, sheer Joy "as a lump of salt is wholly of an uniform taste within and without." So far is the conception of Brahma from being reduced to that of a nonentity by the Vedāntic tenet of his being *nir-guṇa*, that, according to one of Vyāsa's aphorisms, as rendered by Mr. Colebrooke — (Essays, p. 352.) — "Every attribute of a first cause (omniscience, omnipotence, &c.) exists in *Brahme*, who is devoid of qualities." It is rather stange that the occurrence of this passage in Mr. Colebrooke's well-known essay should not have sufficed to awaken a suspicion that the term "devoid of qualities" must be employed in a sense other than that of an empty substratum a nonentity. The Vedāntīs, seeing no occasion for any such a vehicle of the Joy-Thought, never postulated any such. The empty substratum, the

"nothing," which they are supposed to place in the room of the Supreme, is precisely what, as a nothing, does not enter into their conception of the Supreme at all. It will readily occur to the reader that the Hindū conception of *Thought*, as the ultimate ground of all, independently of any substratum beyond it, anticipates Hume's extreme development of Locke.

The misconception to which we have been now adverting, furnishing, as it has done, seeming ground for a charge which has been reiterated against the Vedāntīs under all the varied forms of remonstrance, taunt, anathema, and virtuous indignation, has, we fear, done much harm. It has done much to confirm the modern Vedāntī in his opinion that his European assailants are incompetent to appreciate his system, and in his belief that the creed urged upon his acceptance by such assailants cannot have any strong claims on his attention. If it be asked why the Vedāntī could not explain so simple a matter as this misconception to the person who blamed him unjustly, we reply, that the asker had better reflect what intense confusion of mind has been again and again occasioned, in every part of the world, by a mutual misunderstanding of a term when the two parties were not aware that they really misunderstood one another. People are always too apt to fancy that it is in regard to some *opinion* that they differ, when they only differ in regard to the employment of a term. In a recent paper we analysed and exhibited a most notable example of logomachy, in regard to the very system that we are now engaged upon, originating in a unsuspected misunderstanding respecting a single term, — the parties in the case being men of no less note than Col. Vans Kennedy, Sir G. C. Haughton, and Rammohun Roy. Do you suppose that the misconception would have lasted ten minutes if the discussion had been carried on in the Rājā's presence in *Sanskrit*? No, truly; — and neither would the misconception to which we have been now adverting, have existed so long as it has done if the assailants of the Vedāntic tenet in question had written in Sanskrit and English simultaneously. To prevent future logomachy, therefore, in regard to this point, we beg that any

one who is dissatisfied with our expianation will express his dissatisfaction in parallel columns of Sanskrit and English and we promise to reply, if at all, in similar form.

In regard to the charge of Pantheism, we would observe, in the first instance, that some people are apt to be taken for pantheists when they really are not such; and that there is a great difference between the Pantheism which, in all that it sees, sees God alone, and the patheism (more properly called atheism) which, byond what it sees, acknowledges no God. The heavy condemnation due to the grovelling system last mentioned, it were idly mischievous cruelty to hurl again the Vedāntī. The man who believes that his spirit is in the same category with his disgestion, that his soul is a function of his brain as the biliary secretion is a function of his liver, let us not, in common justice insult the Vedāntī by mentioning in the same breath with him. If the Vedāntī be a pantheist, he must be one of the other order, – a spirit of a far higher mood, erring though he be. Let us be cautious, however, lest in our zeal we too rashly condemn him on a charge what he repudiates. Two expressions, familar in the Vedānta, are usually founded upon, in contending that the Vedāntī confounds the Creator with the creature, viz., the test "All this is God", and the illustration of the spider spinning its web from its own body. The passage in the *Vedāntasāra* where the illustration of the spider occurs, we render as follows – "Thought [i.e. Deity] located in *ajñāna* [i.e. in the aggregate of the phenomenal], which has the two powers [of obscuring the light and of projecting its own shadow], is, in virtue of itself, the efficient cause, – and, in virtue of what it is located in, material cause; as the spider is personally the efficient, and in virtue of its *body* – [which body is not the agent but the locus of the agent] – the material cause, as regards that product [which we call] its thread." Now, as no one charges the man who says that the spider made its web from its own stores, with saying that the web is the spider; so we think that no one is justified in deciding that the Vedāntī says "The world God", on the allegation that the Vedāntī really does say "God made the world out of stores of his own." What *were* those stores? We

have already seen (at p. 329, Vol. iv. of the *Magazine*) that they are, in the creed of the Vedāntī, just what amount to the sense of the word *Power* — the word *śakti* — the recognised synonyme for the aggregate of the phenomenal — for the *ajñāna* — i. e. for that which is *not* God. We have discussed this again and again with learned Hindūs; days and nights of earnest thought intervening between the discussions, and we declare our conviction that those who condemn the Vedāntīs as pantheists on this particular ground, would in like manner condemn St. Paul if, — not recognised as St. Paul, — he were to reappear, declaring what he meant by asserting of God that in Him "we live and move and have our being."

But, the reader will be ready to exclaim, how can we be said to be unfair in assuming that the Vedāntī says "The world is God," when there is no dispute that a Vedānta text declares "All this is God"? We reply, that there is a distinction between "the world" and "all this", which, however it might be ridiculed in Birmingham as being wire-drawn beyond what there is any utilitrarian occasion for, yet requires to be recognised where you have to deal with men who are not astonished at steam-engines, and who, however tenderly they may regard, will by no means consent to look up to, the man whose mind impatiently breaks down under the task-work of close thinking. "The world" is the display of the phenomenal. It is not *this*, as we have shown from the *Vedānta-sāra*, that the Vedāntī regards as God. But when he looks on the phenomenal, the Vedāntist feels that an unchangeable Reality must *underlie* this changeable; he recognise, through the phenomenal veil, the one Reality; and if he exclaims "*All* is God", is the exclamation necessarily profane? Understood as we have put it — the phenomenal being ignored as a reality — we think it is not. He only says — "All that is *real* here is the God who is Invisible."

In making these remarks, as in our exposition of the gist of the Vedānta, we have regarded the system under this philosophical aspect, and we have therefore sought out data in the systematic treatises of the school. But there is a sect of Vedāntists — and to our mind the most interesting among the

followers of the Vedas – who deny the authority of the systematic treatises, and who allow of no appeal except to the Vedāntic portion of the Veda itself. We cannot reasonably dispute their right to take up this position. The claim is not other than that which Protestants asserted at the Reformation, – the privilege of having Scripture as their rule of faith and not uninspired dictation. As we observed, indeed, when noticing the Rev. K. M. Banerjea's lecture, the removal of the contest from the *champ-clos* of the systematic treatises to the wide and diversified region of the Upanishads, is extremely inconvenient for those who would rather meet their man than hunt him. But the challenger cannot claim the choosing of the ground, and we must now set ourselves to survey the field where alone the Vedāntists of modern Bengal will consent to be found. We have to deal next, then, not with a philosophy, but with what professes to be a revelation. We must try to take accurate account of The Upanishads.[1]

1. This has been again republished, cp. Ballantyne : Hindu Philosophy, Calcutta, 1879, pp. 67-85.

BENARES,
Ancient and Medieval : A Monograph.[1]

By Fitz-Edward Hall, M.A., D.C.L., Oxon.

Alike as to limits and as to influence, the Indian kingdoms of former times were, with few exceptions, inconsiderable; such of them as lay conterminous were often at open feud; and their cities, or fortified towns, constituted, in fact, their only stable boundaries. It was, probably, with the dominion of the Kāśis as it was with other seats of Hindu power. Deriving its origin from some city, as Pratiṣṭhāna,[2] or Vārāṇasī,[3] it must have acquired extent and consideration by very gradual development.

At least since a hundred and twenty years before our era, Vārāṇasī, as denoting a city, has been a name familiar to Brah-

1. Pan. 3, 30 (Nov.2, 1868) 137-142, Reprinted by permission? [Cp. also Benares : past and present by Sherring. Introd. p. I-XXXVI, July 1868.]
2. *Vide infra*, p. 118, note 1.
3. Also called Varāṇasī and Varaṇasī, according to the *Haima-kośa* and the *Sabda-ratnāvalī*, respectively. The latter of these vocabularies is of small authority.

   A rational system of Romanized spelling would give us, instead of Benares; Banāras. The form बनारस was the work, perhaps, of the Muhammadans. It should appear that the metathesis of the semi-vowel and nasal of the original word must be later than the times of Fā Hian and Hiouen Tsang. *Vide infra*, p. 119, note 4 and p. 120, note 3.

   In the ordinary belief of the vulgar of Benares, the name of their city is connected with Raja Banār, —a mythical magnate whom we find legendarily associated with the reformer Kabīr, of the beginning of the fifteenth century, *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XVI, p.57. "According to some of the Muhammadan accounts." says Mr. James Prinsep, but without naming his voucher for the statement, Benares was governed by a Raja Banār, at the time of one of Mahmūd's invasions, or in A.D. 1017, when one of its generals penetrated to the Province, and defeated the Raja."— *Benares Illustrated*, p. 9. General Cunningham reports that Raja Banār is traditionally believed to have re-built Benares

manical literature.[1] The word is crudely referred, by modern inventiveness, to a combination of Varanā and Asi;[2] and all the other explanations which we have of its source are equally questionable.

---

about eight hundred years ago. *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, for 1863, Supplementary Number, p.xcvi.

1. Vārāṇasī is specified more than once in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. On the age of that work, see my edition of Professor Wilson's translation of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, Vol. II., p. 189, *ad calcem*.
2. So allege the Pandits of the present day; repeating, no doubt, a long-current conceit of their predecessors : see the *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. III., pp. 409, 410. This notion, though it has found expression in the *Araish-i mahfil* and other recent Muhammadan books, is, I believe, only implied in the Purāṇas. It is said, for instance, in the third chapter of the *Vāmana-purāṇa*, that Vārāṇasī lies between the Varaṇā and the Asi :

हरिरुवाच ।
महेश्वर शृणुष्वेमां मम वाचं कलस्वनाम् ।
ब्रह्महत्याक्षयकरीं शुभदां पुण्यवर्धिनीम् ॥
योऽसौ ब्रह्माण्डके पुण्ये मदंशप्रभवोऽव्ययः ।
प्रयागे वसते नित्यं योगशायीति विश्रुतः ॥
चरणाद्दक्षिणात्तस्य विनिर्गता सरिद्वरा ।
विश्रुता वरणेत्येव सर्वपापहरा शुभा ॥
सव्यादन्या द्वितीया च असिरित्येव विश्रुता ।
ते उभे च सरिच्छ्रेष्ठे लोकपूज्य बभूवतुः ॥
तयोर्मध्ये तु यो देशस्तत्क्षत्रं योगशायिनः ।
त्रैलोक्यप्रवरतीर्थं सर्वपापप्रमोचनम् ॥
न तादृशं हि गगणे न भूम्यां न रसातले ।
तत्रास्ति नगरी पुण्या ख्याता वाराणसी शुभा ।
यस्यां हि भोगिनो नाशं प्रयान्ति भवतो लयम् ॥

There is a statement to the like effect in a section of the *Padma-purāṇa*, the *Kāśī-māhātmya*, V., 58 :

वाराणसीति यत्ख्यातं तन्मानं निगदामि वः ।
दक्षिणोत्तरयोर्नद्यौ वरणासिश्च पूर्वतः ॥

The same idea occurs more than once in a putative appendage to the *Skanda-purāṇa*, the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa*. It will suffice to quote XXX., 20, 21 :

दक्षिणोत्तरदिग्भागे कृत्वासिं वरणां सुराः ।
क्षेत्रस्य मोक्षनिक्षेपरक्षारिवृतिमाययुः ॥

Particular reference may, also, be made to stanzas 69 and 70 of the same chapter; and similar passages might be extracted from other Purāṇas.

The Asi— now known as the Asī, and still trickling during the rainy season, despite Father Vivien de Saint-Martin's scepticism as to its existence,— has a niche in the *Haimakośa*, a work of the twelfth century. The Varuṇā (*sī*) and Asī are named in the Calcutta edition of the *Mahābhārata, Bhīṣma-paravan'*, *Śl.* 338. But, in my annotations on the English translation of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa,* Vol. II., p. 152, it is surmised that this stanza is an interpolation; and it may be added that is omitted from the text of the *Mahābhārata* as accepted by the commentator Nīlakaṇṭha; while the scholiast Arjunamiśra reads, at least in my manuscript, Charuṇā and Asi.

Dr. Schwanbeck— *Megasthenis Indica, p.* 36, note, — is reminded, by Arrian's Ερεννεσις, of Varāṇasī. Hereupon, Professor Lassen— *Indische Alterthumskunde,* Vol. I., Appendix, p. LIV.,— precipitately took the two for one; and he still holds to this opinion; for, in the second edition of his great work, Vol. I., p. 161, note 1, (1867), he writes : "Des Megasthenes Erennesis ist die vereinigte Varāṇasī. This "conjunct Varāṇasī" — or, rather, what he unwarrantably calls its modern name, Barāṇaśī, — he compounds, incautiously, after Mr. Walter Hamilton, of two unknown streams, the Varā and the Naśī.

The *Jābāla-upaniṣad* places Avimukta— which is a Paurāṇik title of Benares, —between the Varaṇā and the Nāśī or Nāsī; and the commentator, Śankarānanda, disciple of Ānandātman, etymologizes the words. An anonymous expositor of the same Upaniṣad, whose work I consulted in India, reads *varaṇā* and *asī*, explains them by *piṅgalā* and *iḍā*, and makes the result of their combination, *vārāṇasī*, in some acceptation or other, to be equivalent to *suṣumṇā*. One need not pause to expatiate on such trifling.

Something of the same sort is to be seen in the fifth chapter of the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa*.

Father Vivien de Saint-Martin— the genesis of whose fictitious river I trace in note 2 to p. 12, *infra*, —began with being disposed to make the Asī an affluent to the Varāṇā with a Varāṇasī below their confluence, and the city Varāṇasī therefrom denominated. *Mémoires sur les Contrées Occidentales,* Vol. II. p. 361. Here "il serait très-possible que l'un de ces ruisseaux se fût nommé Asī, et qu'après sa réunion à la Varáṇála petite rivière eût pris le nom composé de varāṇasī qu'elle aurait communiqué à la ville." This, as speculation, will pass; but, to this writer, with his bias in favour of the ecclesiastical or mythopœic method of geographizing, what are, at first, only suggestions very soon ripen into indubitable certainties : . ."Cette rivière [the Ερέννεσις], la

Convertible, in later usage, with Vārāṇasī is the designation Kāśi.[1] or Kāśī.[2] Whence it arose history has long forgotten;[3] but

---

dernière de la liste d'Arrien, se reconnait sans difficulté dans la Varānasī, petite revière qui se jette dans la gauche du Gange à Bénarès, qui en a pris son nom (en sanscrit Vārāṇāsī)." *Etude sur la Géographie Grecque et Latine de l' Inde,* p. 286.

This author more than inclines to see Vārānāsī in the words Erarasa (or Cragausa) metropolis, foisted into the Latin translation of Ptolemy, *Ibid.*, pp. 227, 351. Here, very much as above, having to do with a Latin interpolation, he sets out with describing it as such, and as offering "un reste de ressemblance qu'on entrevoit encore à travers la corruption du mot;" and, a little while afterwards, as if process of time necessarily stood for an accession of facts and reasons, persuades himself that he may speak of "une ville que Ptolémée énumère sous le nom altéré d'Erarasa," and that he finds, therein, "la trace bien reconnaissable de Váránásí, forme sanscrite de notre Bénarès."

I have everywhere scrupulously reproduced the varieties of spelling indulged in by the writer just cited.

The final *ā* and the initial *a* of two words coalescing into a compound might, possibly, yield *a*; and Varaṇā and Asī would, therefore, combine into Varaṇasī. But this form seems to be the peculiar property of a single recent and very indifferent lexicographer; and, moreover, the name of the second stream is, correctly, Asi, not Asī. In the *Kāśīkhaṇḍa, XXX., 18,* it is the subject of a pun, in connexion with *asi,* "a sword."

1. This is the oldest form, and that recognized in the *Haima-kośa* and by Ujjvaladatta's commentary on the *Uṇādi-sūtra.*

2. Kāśi is not so markedly feminine as the more usual Kāśī, its derivative. Most Indian cities have feminine appellations.

   Kāśikā is found in the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa,* XXX., 70, and elsewhere. Compare Avantikā, for Avanati, as in note 3 to p. 124, col. 2., *infra.*

3. The vocabularists refer the word to *Kāś,* "to shine." And herewith agrees the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa, XXVI., 67 :*

   काशतेऽत्र यतो ज्योतिस्तदनाख्येयमीश्वर ।
   अतो नामापरं चास्तु काशीति प्रथितं विभो ॥

   In the stanza immediately preceding this, the city is called Muktikṣetra. Kṛṣṇa is speaking; and he says that the radiance of Kāśī emanates from *Śiva.*

   If, where they interpret Kāśī by "splendid", Colonel Wilford and his numerous followers intend to take the word from the adjective *kāśin,* they have forgotten that the feminine is not *kāśī, but kāśinī.* See the *Asiatic Researches,* Vol. III., p. 409.

conjecture may, possibly unravel its etymology.[1]

Among the descendants of Āyus[2] was Kāśa, whose son is noticed under the patronyms[3] of Kāśeya,[4] Kāśīya,[5] and Kāśi.[6] The regal successors of Kāśi, and also their subjects, were called Kāśis.[7] Though at first a masculine appellation, Kāśi, as applied to the city so styled, is feminine.[8] An exact parallel to this hypothetical evolution is not far to seek. The name of King Champa, femininized, became that of the metropolis of Anga Champā.[9]

The term Kāśi, denominating, if not a city,[10] a people and its chieftains, occurs repeatedly in Sanskrit works of all but the

1. Professor Wilson has already written : "It seems probable that the city [of Kāśi] was founded, not by him [Kṣattravṛddha], but by his grandson or great-grandson, denomintated Kāśa and Kāśirāja," Mr. James Prinsep's *Benares Illustrated*, p. 8. It is meant, here, I suppose, to hint a derivative connexion of Kāśi with Kāśa or Kāśirāja. The latter name Professor Willson everywhere puts, erroneously, for "King Kāśi." See note 6 in the present page.
2. See the English *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, Vol. IV., pp. 30-32.
3. Compare Māṇḍūkeya, from Māṇḍūka; and Śvāphalki, from Śvaphalka.
4. So reads the *Harivaṁśa, Ś.* 1734, in the best MSS. accessible to me.
5. *Gaṇa* on Pāṇini, IV., II., 90; and the *Brahma-purāṇa.*
6. *Bhāgavata-purāṇa, IX., XVII., 4. In the Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, he is called *Kāśirāja;* but the term, a compound, is there to be explained "Raja Kāśī." Differently, *Kāśirāja, Kāśpati*, etc., descriptive of Ajātaśatru, Divodāsa, Pratardana, and others, signify "Raja of the Kāśis." That काशिराजः may be the same as काशिषु नृपः is clear from the *Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana- parvan, Ś.* 1949 and 1952.
7. Kāśi's successors were likewise known as Kāśyas and as Kāśikas. These terms are, all, actually employed. The last is, also, applied to persons or things pertaining to Kāśi.
8. Kuntī, a woman, was so called from Kunti, a man.

   Kāśī, according to the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, – see the English translation, Vol. VI., p. 159, –was the name of the wife of Bhīmasena. The reading is, however, erroneous, most probably. I find, as a variant, Kāśeyī. This like the corresponding Kāśyā of the *Mahābhārata, Ādi-parvan, Ś.* 3829, is a derivative of Kāśi.
9. See the English Viṣṇu-purāṇa, Vol. IV., p. 125. I am not unaware of the *gaṇa* on Pāṇini, IV., II., 82.
10. "In the *Mahābhārata*, frequent mention of Kāśī occurs." according to Professor Wilson, as quoted in *Benares Illustrated*, p. 8. I should be much surprised to find Kāśī mentioned even once in the *Mahābhārata.*

highest antiquity.[1] Of Kāśi, in whatever sense of the word, we cannot, however, collect, from indigenous records, materials from which to construct anything approaching a history. The kingdom of the Kāśis, and its rulers, as is evinced by the frequency of reference to them, enjoyed, from distant ages, more or less of notoriety; and this is, substantially, all that the Hindu memorials teach us.

The Purāṇas specify but one dynasty of Kāśi kings; a goodly catalogue, beginning, in the most authoritative of those works,

---

Not till medieval times, it seems, do we read of the city of Kāśī. To the authority, on this behalf, of the Purāṇas may be added that of an inscription which I have deciphered and published in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, for 1862, pp. 14, 15. The document in question, a land-grant was issued by Vināyakapāla, Raja of Mahodaya or Kanauj, about the middle of the eleventh century, it may be, Kāśī is there indirectly described as in the *vishaya* of Vārāṇasī, in the *bhukti* of Pratishṭhāna, *vide infra*, p. 118, note 1.

It is, in my judgment, very doubtful indeed that Ptolemy's Κασσίδα metamorphoses Kāśi, as has been confidently asserted by Colonel Wilford and very many others. See the *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. III., p. 410; Vol. IX., p. 73.

Fă Hian may have intended to reproduce *Kāśirājya*, "kingdom of the Kāśis," in his words rendered by "le royaume de *Kiachi.*" *Vide infra*, p. 119, col. 1, note 4.

The expression काशिपुरीं वाराणसीं, in the *Daśa-kumāracarita*, means "Vārāṇasī, a city of the Kāśis." In the subjoined verse, from the *Rāmāyaṇa, Uttara-kāṇḍa*, XXXVIII., VI., 17, Vārāṇasī is qualified by an expression meaning, the commentator says, "a city in the country of the Kāśis :"

तद्भवानद्य काशेयपुरीं वाराणसीं व्रज ।

Finally, in the *Mahābhārata, Ādi-parvan, Ś.* 4083, 4084, we read of the king of the Kāśis as dwelling in the city of Vārāṇasī.

1. The oldest among them, probably, is Pāṇini, IV., II., 116; with which compare IV, II., 113. Then come the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, the Bṛihad-āraṇyaka* and *Kausītakibrāhmaṇa Upaniṣads*, etc., etc. In some of these works, the substantive is involved in the adjective Kāśya. This word, like Kāśika, —for which see the *Mahābhārata, Udyoga-parvan, Ś.* 5907, —means, etymologically, Kāśian. But scholiasts on old writings explain it, and rightly, to signify "king of the Kāśis." Kāśirāja and Kāśya are used of the same person in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, I., 5, 17.

The *Ṛgveda* affords no warrant for connecting with the Kāśis any person whom it mentions. It speaks of Divodāsa, and it speaks of

with the son of Kāśa.[1] To Kāśa, after a lapse of perhaps two centuries, succeeded Divodāsa, in whose reign Buddhism seems to have been still acting on the aggressive.[2] In this synchronism there is no discernible improbability; and, with some likelihood, it embodies an historic fact. A reflexion of actual events may, likewise, be afforded in the story of the burning of Vārāṇasī by the discus of Viṣṇu.[3] Of the age of Ajātaśatru, as of other very early leaders of the Kāśis, none but most vague indications have, as yet, been discovered. Some of these personages ruled, not at

---

Pratardana; but only in later literature are they called father and son, and rulers of the Kāśis; and where Kātyāyana, in his *Ṛgvedānukramaṇikā*, characterizes the latter as Kāśirāja, he may have expressed himself metachronically, under the influence of a modern tradition which he and his contemporaries accepted. As to the former, we find, indeed, in post-vaidik books, two Divodās; into whom a single personage seems to have been parted. One of them is son of Badhryáva, as in the *Ṛgveda*; but it is the other, the son of Bhīmaratha, and father of Pratardana, that is called king of the Kāśis. It may be added, that there is no ground for considering Badhryaśva and Bhīmaratha to be two names of one and the same person. See the English *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, vol., IV., pp. 33, and 145, 146. Badhryaśva, not Bahwasva, is the reading of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. Correct accordingly Professor Wilson's translation of the *Ṛgveda*, vol. III., p. 504, note 1. See, further, the *Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana-parvan*, Chapter XXX.

1. A Kāśa is named in the *gaṇa* on Pāṇini, IV., I., 110. According to my five wretched copies of the *Vāyu-purāṇa*, Kāśa was followed by Kāśayya (???), Raṣṭra (??), Dīrghatapas, Dharma, Dhanvantari, Ketumat, Bhīmaratha, Divodāsa.

   The *Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa* has, in one place, Kāśa and Kāśīya, as sire and son, and, a little further on, in lieu thereof, Kāśika and Kāśēya. Kāśika, as evolving Kāśēya, must be considered as an optional elongation of Kāśi.

2. See the English *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, Vol. IV., pp. 30-40. We read, in the *Vāyu-purāṇa*:

   दिवोदास इति ख्यातो वाराणस्यधिपो ऽभवत् ।
   एतस्मिन्नेव काले तु पुरीं वाराणसीं पुरा ।
   शून्यां विवेशयामास क्षेमको नाम राक्षसः ॥

   Then follows an account of the expulsion of Divodāsa from Vārāṇasī. To all appearance, he was the only king of the Kāśī that had to do with that city.

3. See the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa, Book V., Chapter XXXIV.*

Benares, but at Pratiṣṭhāna.[1] and, at the time of the Muhammadan conquest, Benares and the surrounding country appertained to the throne of Kanauj.[2]

1. Its site was near Allahabad. Pūru's capital was Pratiṣṭhāna, in the kingdom of the Kāśis, according to the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Uttarakāṇḍa*, LIX., 18, 19 :

   त्रिदिवं स गतो राजा ययातिर्नहुषात्मजः ॥
   पूरुश्चकार तद्राज्यं धर्मेण महतावृतः ।
   प्रतिष्ठाने पुरवरे काशिराज्य महायशाः ॥

   Before Pūru, his father, Yayāti, "lord of all the Kāśis," reigned at Pratiṣṭhāna, *Mahābhārata, Udyoga-parvan*, śl. 3905 and 3. 18.

   Purūravas received Pratiṣṭhāna in gift from his father Sudyumna. English *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, Vol. III., Preface, pp. XCVII., XCIX.

   Pratiṣṭhāna appears as a district of the kingdom of which Kanauj was the metropolis, in comparatively recent times *Vide supra*, p 115, note 10.

   Pratiṣṭhāna is the name of a kingdom, or of part of one in the *Kathā-sarit-sāgara*, VI., 8.

2. *Vide supra*, p. 115, col. 2, note 10. Several Sanskrit land-grants have been published, —two, among them, by myself, —from which it appears that the kings of the latest dynasty of Kanauj, from Madanapāla to the unfortunate Jayachandra, were masters of Benares, like their predecessors; and that they were so is, further, to be inferred from the Muhammadan historians.

   In the fifth volume of the *Asiatic Researches* is a professed transcript of a short inscription from a stone, now long disappeared from sight, which was exhumed near Benares, in 1794. We read, therein, of a king of Gauḍa, Mahīpāla, father of Sthirapāla and Vasantapāla; and, at the end, the date 1083. An easy credulity may accept these statements no longer possible of verification; but there still remains the question as to the era of the year 1083, whether Vikramāditya's, or Śālivāhana's—better Sātavāhana's, —or Harsha's, or whose. Not only are the blunders in this inscription, as printed, so many and so gross that we are forbidden to suppose they were in the original; but they provoke the surmise that the interspersed patches of the record which read as if correct may be, to a large extent, equally products of ignorant mistake and misrepresentation. A good deal of weight has been allowed to this inscription; and it has been, from time to time, honoured as a piece of genuine historic evidence. Uncritically enough, I once followed the herd, myself, in this respect : see the *Journal of the Asiatic society of Bengal*, for 1862, p. 8, first foot-note. It now appears to me rash to see, in it, proof that Benares was subordinate to Gauḍa, or anything else whatever claiming reliance.

Flagrant as is the exaggeration of the Hindus, it is surpassed by that of the Buddhists. The Brahmadatta who figures so largely, in their sacred writtings, as king of Benares[1] very likely was not a myth;[2] but there is no ground for crediting that Gautama ever governed that city at all, notwithstanding that they represent him to have reigned there during nineteen several states of existence.[3] In a similar spirit, they assert, that, at the same capital ruled, in turn, eighty-four thousand monarchs descended from Aśoka.[4] From these specimens it is manifest that the Buddhist scriptures are little to be trusted for throwing light on the history of Benares. That Buddhism, or any Buddhism, or any Buddhist king, ever dominated there is altogether problematical.

Some relevant details, scant, but interesting as far as they go, are derivable from the itinerary of Hiouen Tsang, [5] a Buddhist pilgrim from China, who visited India in the first half of the seventh century. At that date, as he informs us the kingdom of Vārāṇaśi had a circuit of eight hundred miles,[6] while its capital measured nearly four miles by somewhat more than one. The inhabitants of the kingdom were, for the most part, Hindus. These were, mainly, worshippers of Śiva; and, among them were two classes of ascetics.[7] Their temples amounted to a hundred,

1. Burnouf's *Introduction à l' Histoire du Buddhisme Indien*, Vol. I., p. 140; and Mr. R.S. Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 101.
2. Two other kings of Benares, unknown to the Hindu chronicles, are spoken of by the Buddhists. Their names are Bhīmaśukla and Bṛihanmanas (??). See *Der Buddhismus*, translated from the Russian of Professor Wassiljew, Part I., p. 54; and the *Foě Kouě Ki*, p. 230.
3. Mr. R.S. Hardy's *Manual of Budhism*, p. 134.
4. So states the *Dīpavamśa*. See the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, for 1838, p. 927.
5. *Mémoires sur les Contrées Occidentales*, Vol. I., pp. 353, *et seq.*
6. "About four thousand *lis*." On the length of the *li*, consult Father Vivien de Saint-Martin, in *Mémoires*, etc., Vol. II., pp. 356-259.
7. On M. Julien's own showing, both in the *Mémoires* and in the *Méthode*, one of these classes, that of naked mendicants, has the name, in Chinese translettering, of *nikien-t'o, i.e., niggantha*, or even *nigānth*,— a Prakrit word softened from the Sanskrit *nirgrantha*, which the French translation exhibits. Nowhere in his works does M. Julien acknowledge,

which gave lodgement to about ten thousand devotees.[1] The Buddhists, who are stated to have been much in the minority, kept up thirty religious houses, tenanted by three thousand inmates, all of the Sammatīya sect. In the capital[2] were twenty Hindu temples, and a latten statue of Śaiva, a hundred feet in height. We are not apprised whether there were any sacred edifices of the pilgrim's fellow religionists in the capital itself; and the obvious inference is, that there were none, or none worth commemorating. On the monasteries, towers, and reservoirs of the immediate vicinity,[3] hallowed by Buddhist associa-

---

what he must have known full well, that he constantly puts into the mouth of Hiouen Tsang Sanskrit vocables, where he really used Prakrit. But there was a theory to support; and facts must be fitted to it.

1. In the first instance, M. Julien wrote : "On compte une centaine de temples des dieux (*Dévá ayas*) où habitent environ dix mille hérétiques, qui, la plupart, adorent le dieu*Ta-tseu-t'saï-t'ien (Mahéçvara déva)*." And there should seem to be no improvement in his subsequent rendering : "On voit une centaine de temples des Dieux. Il y a environ dix mille hérétiques qui, la plupart, révèrent le dieu *Tatseu-thsaï* (Mahéçvara Déva)."

   The Chinese does not, to be sure, as the translator at first expressed it, literally quarter the aforesaid heretics in the temples, or, rather, monasteries; and yet its indefiniteness easily endures this interpretation. So I am informed by Professor Summers, my obligations to whom I shall presently acknowledge in connexion with a matter of graver import. And this construction alone quadrates with the previous context. For Hiouen Tsang makes Benares a large kingdom, and one in which the Hindus much outnumbered the Buddhists; and there must, then, have been many times ten thousand of the former.

   One need do no more than collate M. Julien's two versions of Hiouen Tsang's short account of Benares, to be satisfied that the translator's notion of the sense of his original is, sometimes, of the vaguest.

2. Its name is not specified. Fă Hian —of the beginning of the fifth century, and so an earlier traveller than Hiouen Tsang, —is translated as speaking of "la ville de *Pho lo naï*, dans le royaume de *Kia chi*." *Foĕ kouĕ Ki*. p. 304.

3. Two of these remembrancers of the Buddhist faith, towers at Śārnāth, beyond the Varaṇā or Burna, are still conspicuous landmarks. The larger of them is called, by the natives, Dhamekh, —a corruption, in all likelihood, of an old word involving *dharma* as its first factor.

   On the word of M. Stanislas Julien, Hiouen Tsang locates a monument "au nord-est de la capitale, et à l'occident du fleuve de *Po-lo-ni-sse* (Varāṇaçi)," and tells of a certain monastery at the distance of "environ

tions, Hiouen Tsang dwells at great length, and with that lingering and minutiose reminiscence which marks a credulous and fervid piety.

---

dix li au nord-est du fleuve de *po-lo-ni-sse* (Vārāṇaçí)." In a foot note, the phrase "à l'occident du fleuve de *Po-lo-ni-sse* (Vārāṇaçí)" is explained to signify " à l'occident du fleuve de *Po-lo-ni-sse* (Vārāṇaçí)" is explained to signify "à l'occident du Gange."

As the Chinese pilgrim again and again names the Ganges, it seemed to me unlikely that he should anywhere speak of it by a periphrasis like that of "the river of London." I had observed, too, that, instead of "environ," etc., M. Klaproth had written : "Au nord [*sic*] de la ville coule la rivière *Pho lo nď* (Varaṇā) : sur son bord, à dix *li* de la ville," etc.; *Pho lo násse* being, as he says just before, Hionen Tsang's name for Benares. Moreover, in M. Julien's "Liste des Mots Abrégés on Corrompus." I noticed the entry "*Po-lo-naï*, faute pour *Po-lo-ni-sse* (Vārāṇaçí);" and I was thereby, unavoidably misled to the conclusion that *Po-lo-naï*, the so-called shortened or depraved form of *Po-lo-ni-sse*, must be employed in the original, the passage or passages containing it being left undesignated by the translator.

No one can give much thought to the labours of M. Jullien without detecting that they were never executed in contemplation of circumspect perusal. Warned by my past contemplation of circumspect perusal. Warned by my past experience, and weighing the premisses just recited, I at once suspected management, issuing in the obliteration, in two places, of the river Varaṇā. I had recourse to Professor James Summers, a distinguished Sinologist; and my suspicion was changed into certitude.

Especially ought M. Julien to have abstained from mending his text here by guess. —above all unconfessedly, —inasmuch as, where, the name *Po-lo–ni-sse* is first introduced there is, in the Chinese, a gloss, —delusively appropriated by the translator, as we have seen, —notifying that the kingdom so named had aforetime been called, by mistake, *Po-lo-naï*; the spelling, in passing, of the *Foě Kouě Ki*. It was not surely, to be expected, that close to this notification, we should find —and not once only, but twice, —*Po-lo-nie (Varaṇā)*, of *Po-lo-ni-sse* (Vārāṇasí), had been intended. M. Julien, however, deemed otherwise; and he unavowedly took for granted, besides, that, in both these instances, *Po-lo-nie* was a corruption of the already corrupt *Po-lo-naï*.

Father Vivien de Saint Martin, in his geographical commentary on M. Julien's translation, is pleased to substitute, or "fleuve de *Po-lo-ni-see* (Vārāṇaçí)," " rivière *Po-lo-ni-ssé* (Varāṇasī);" and he proceeds to suggest, —as I have shown above, in note 3 to p. 120, —that the city of Benares borrowed its appellation from that of this imaginary stream, held, by him, to be identical with the Ερεννεσις of, Arrian.

That, in very early days, Benares came short of prominent fame is a conclusion apparently indicated by all extant evidence. And so it was during the period of the Buddhists. So far as we know, these sectaries, unlike the Muhammadans, never assumed an attitude of vehement hostility as against the Hindus. Not only was the character of their religion pacific, but at no

More than this, M. Julien, in one of his Indexes, writes "Vārāṇaçī, rivière, aujourd'hui Bana, l'Erinésès des Grecs;" and the violence which Father Vivien de Saint-Martin does to his text has, thus, his implied acquiescence. So important an alteration of opinion as that herein involved certainly called for specific acknowledgement in his "Errata Alphabétique," a list which extends to seven pages.

In fine, M. Julien has no Sanskrit authority whatever for his "Varaṇaçí;" *i.e.*, Vārāṇaśī. *Po-lo-ni-sse* may, indeed, stand for Vārāṇaśí, but —so indeterminate is the Chinese alphabet, —may just as wel disguise Vārāṇaśī, Varāṇasī. Varaṇasī, Bārānaśī and scores more of quadrisyllables.M. Julien allows us an option between *Po-la-na-sse*, *Po-lo-ni-sse* *Po-lo-ni-se* and *P'o-lo-ni-sse*, and between "Varāṇaçí" and "Vārāṇaçí". It cannot be proved that Hiouen Tsang did not hear, and do his best to spell, as the names of the river and city, Barṇā —the very word now used, —and Barāṇas. Indeed, the balance of probability is overwhelmingly in favour of the position, that the Indian proper names translettered by Hiouen Tsang were Prakrit, not Sanskrit. Perhaps it is not strange that M. Julien, in drawing up his suicidal *Méthode*, and even earlier, chose to shut his eyes to this presumption. *Vide supra*, p. 120, note 1.

"With M. Julien's method, mathematical certainty seems to have taken the place of learned conjectures." So we read, in the *Saturday Review*, Vol. XI., p. 247 (1861), in an article lately republished as Professor Max Müller's. Finding M. Julien's method to be much more precarious than it appears at first sight, I took occasion, some years ago, with ample exhibition of reasons, to reclaim against this heedless hyperbole of panegyric. Continued examination has multiplied my arguments of protest; and I am convinced that one will do well to use M. Julien's volumes, valuable and instructive as they are, with constant caution.

That M. Julien, for all the self-complacent air of his *Méthode*, has truck out a single idea, save of detail that was unknown to M. Rémusat and the editors of the Foĕ Kouĕ ki. I have not succeeded in discovering.

Memoires sur les Contrées Occidentales, ect., Vol. I., p. 354; Vol. II., pp. 345, 360, 361, 479,562 : *Foĕ Kauĕ Ki*, p. 307 : *Histoire de la Vie de Hiouen-Thsang*, ect., pp. 83, 132, 429, 464 : *Chips from a German Workshop*, Vol. I., p. 296 : *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, for 1861, pp. 334-336.

time during their presence in India[1] were they, however in the ascendant, beyond doubt a majority of the people. It was but natural for their founder, in the course of his mission, to take thought of the centres of population; and the spots which he and his disciples signalized by their teachings were reverently regarded, in after ages, as consecrated ground. These spots were, however, in the neighbourhood of cities, —as Gayā,

1. How the Buddhists came to leave India has not yet been shown satisfactorily. The Śankara-digvijaya of Mādhava— which professes to abridge an older work, but which, perhaps, has no better basis, for the most part, than oral tradition, eked out by romance, —bears witness, it is true, to a ferocious spirit of opposition to those religionists; and such a spirit, if entertained after they had become strangers to the country, may have been entertained while they were still face to face with Hindus. Nevertheless, we have no historical proof that India was ever the theatre of a Buddhist persecution. Few Sanskrit manuscripts exist that were copied more than four or five centuries ago, at which time Indian Buddhists must have been very rare, if there were any at all. Neither among the Hindus nor among the Jainas has one ever observed anything like that liberality of literary curiosity which would be at much pains to perpetuate, by transcription, the holy writ of an antagonist creed; and the fact of a persecution of the Buddhists cannot, accordingly, be deduced from the fact that their books are now but very rarely met with in the possession of natives of India.

Considering the character of their respective belief, the Buddhists and the Hindus were under no obligation to be truculently inimical to each other. There is even reason to believe that there were medieval Indian kings who, from motives of policy, adiaphorized between the two great classes of the faithful into which their subjects were divided. For instance, a position of practical indifference in respect of the prevailing superstitions seems to be ascertained with reference to Harsha, king of Kanauj in the seventh century. Hiouen Tsang speaks of him much as if he were a Buddhist; and Bāṇa, in the *Harṣa-carita*, writes of him as if of a Hindu. Further, we find that monarch figuring as dedicatee of the *Nāgānanda*, and also of the *Ratnāvalī*, two dramas, severally Buddhist and Brahmanical.

For the *Harṣa-carita*, and the *Nāgānanda*, —of which I discovered copies, after these works had slumbered neglected for many generations, — see my *Vāsavadattā*, Preface, pp. 12-18 and 50-54; and the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, for 1862, pp. 12, 13. See further, on the Buddhists in Southern India, Professor Wilson's *Mackenzie Collection*, Vol. I., Introduction. pp. lxiii.- lxvi.

Mathurā, Ayodhyā, and Benares[1] —rather than in the ciries themselves; and it was not till after Buddhism had passed its prime on Indian soil, that these towns acquired the special repute which now attaches to them. As for Benares, the attribution to it of peculiar sanctity seems to date from the period of the Purāṇas; [2] and some of these compositions may, unquestionably, claim a very respectable antiquity.

A diligent perusal of the copious inanity of the *Kāśī khaṇḍa* might lead to the discovery of its era,[3] and to other chronological determinations. In so recent a composition, and one having to do with real localities, there must, almost of necessity be many facts interwoven with the fictions : the attempt to discriminate them would, perhaps, be remunerated. The Benares of the present day offers numerous and varied objects of interest[4] to the contemplation of the devout Hindu; and yet, a very

1. It is very true, that, all the way between Benares and the towers at Sārnāth, the fields are thickly strewed with bricks and other remains of former buildings. But I am not aware that Colonel Wilford has any authority for speaking of "the old city of Benares, north of the river Burna," which old city, he says, is sometimes called Śōṇitapura, *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. IX., p. 199.

2. Professor Wilson asserts, characteristically, that Benares "has been, from all time, as it is at present, the high place of the Śaiva worship." Translation of the Viṣṇu-purāṇa, Book V., Chapter XXXIV., last note.

   In the twelfth century, as we learn from the *Haima-kośa*, Benares was already distinguished as Śivapurī, "the city of Śiva;" and we may thence gather that the worship of Śiva especially predominated there at that time.

3. "There is every reason to believe the greater part of the contents of the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa* anterior to the first attack upon Benares by Mahmūd of Ghaznī." Thus pronounces Professor Wilson, in his translation of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, Vol. I., Preface, pp. LXXII., LXXIII. It would be interesting to be put in possession of even a single reason out of those to which the Professor alludes.

4. Unless we are deceived by identity of names, scores of these are enumerated in the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa*.

   In the last chapter of that work, cycles of pilgirmages are prescribed as means to particular ends, precisely as at this hour. Thus : there is one round to warrant the practitioner from liability to further

few of them excepted, to speculate touching their age, in reliance on the data hitherto made available, would be much too perilous for prudence.

[1]To the early Arab and Persian travellers Gangetic India was an unexplored tract.[2] Albirūnī, who wrote about A.D. 1000,

---

metempsychosis; another, to secure the attainment of Rudrahood; a third, to ensure emancipation before death. These for samples.

Saints whose aspirations are less ambitions are promised store of good things in future for repeating the *Pañcatīrthikā* daily. This consists in : (1) ablution, without disrobing, in the pool of *Cakrapuṣkariṇī*, with a propitiation-service addressed to the gods, manes, Brahmans, and beggars; (2) reverential salutation to Āditya, Draupadī, Viṣṇu, Daṇḍapāṇi, and Maheśvara; (3) visual contemplation of *ḍhuṇḍhivināyaka* (4) a dip of the fingers in the Jñānavāpī well with adoration of Nandikeśa, Tārakeśa, and Mahākāleśvara and, finally, (5) a second visit to Daṇḍapāṇi.

Of seven pre-eminently holy places Kāśī is named first; the others being Kāntī, Māyā, Ayodhyā, Dvāravatī, Mathurā, and Avantikā :

काशी कान्ती च मायाख्या त्वयोध्या द्वारवत्यपि ।
मथुरावन्तिका चैताः सप्त पुर्योऽत्र मोक्षदाः ॥ VI., 68.

Māyā is Hurdwar. I am not sure whether or not Kāntī is the same as Kāñcī. The rest are well known. These places are all, named in the *Ayeen Akbery*, in Mr. Gladwin's translation of which, —Vol. III., pp. 255, 256, — Mathurā and Avantikā are disguised as Mehtra and Ownitka.

At least thirty or forty epithetical designations of Benares are scattered through the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa*. Half of that number, or thereabouts, from this or some other work or works, have been noted by native lexicographers. One of them, Pañcanadatīrtha, "the quinquamnian resort," refers to five rivers, the Kiraṇā, Dhūtappā, Sarasvatī, Gaṇgā, and Yamunā :

किरणा धूतपापा च पुण्यतोया सरस्वती ।
गंगा च यमुना चैव पञ्च नद्योऽत्र कीर्त्तिताः ॥
अतः पञ्चनदं नाम तीर्थं त्रैलोक्यविश्रुतम् । LIX., 114, 115.

Four of these streams, in small quantities, are believed to emerge into the Ganges, through subterraneous channels, just in front of the Pañcagaṅgā landing.

1. Pan. 3, 31 (Dec. 1, 1868) 163-164.
2. "La partie de l' Inde avec laquelle les Arabes avaient le moins de rapports était l' Hindostan proprement dit, c'est à-dire la contrée baignée par la Djomna et le Gange, depuis le Penjab jusqu'au fond

Mathurā, Ayodhyā, and Benares[1] —rather than in the ciries themselves; and it was not till after Buddhism had passed its prime on Indian soil, that these towns acquired the special repute which now attaches to them. As for Benares, the attribution to it of peculiar sanctity seems to date from the period of the Purāṇas; [2] and some of these compositions may, unquestionably, claim a very respectable antiquity.

A diligent perusal of the copious inanity of the *Kāśī khaṇḍa* might lead to the discovery of its era,[3] and to other chronological determinations. In so recent a composition, and one having to do with real localities, there must, almost of necessity be many facts interwoven with the fictions : the attempt to discriminate them would, perhaps, be remunerated. The Benares of the present day offers numerous and varied objects of interest[4] to the contemplation of the devout Hindu; and yet, a very

1. It is very true, that, all the way between Benares and the towers at Sārnāth, the fields are thickly strewed with bricks and other remains of former buildings. But I am not aware that Colonel Wilford has any authority for speaking of "the old city of Benares, north of the river Burna," which old city, he says, is sometimes called Śōṇitapura, *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. IX., p. 199.

2. Professor Wilson asserts, characteristically, that Benares "has been, from all time, as it is at present, the high place of the Śaiva worship." Translation of the Viṣṇu-purāṇa, Book V., Chapter XXXIV., last note. In the twelfth century, as we learn from the *Haima-kośa*, Benares was already distinguished as Śivapurī, "the city of Śiva;" and we may thence gather that the worship of Śiva especially predominated there at that time.

3. "There is every reason to believe the greater part of the contents of the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa* anterior to the first attack upon Benares by Mahmūd of Ghaznī." Thus pronounces Professor Wilson, in his translation of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, Vol. I., Preface, pp. LXXII., LXXIII. It would be interesting to be put in possession of even a single reason out of those to which the Professor alludes.

4. Unless we are deceived by identity of names, scores of these are enumerated in the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa*.

In the last chapter of that work, cycles of pilgirmages are prescribed as means to particular ends, precisely as at this hour. Thus : there is one round to warrant the practitioner from liability to further

few of them excepted, to speculate touching their age, in reliance on the data hitherto made available, would be much too perilous for prudence.

[1]To the early Arab and Persian travellers Gangetic India was an unexplored tract.[2] Albirūnī, who wrote about A.D. 1000,

---

metempsychosis; another, to secure the attainment of Rudrahood; a third, to ensure emancipation before death. These for samples.

Saints whose aspirations are less ambitions are promised store of good things in future for repeating the *Pañcatīrthikā* daily. This consists in : (1) ablution, without disrobing, in the pool of *Cakrapuṣkariṇī*, with a propitiation-service addressed to the gods, manes, Brahmans, and beggars; (2) reverential salutation to Āditya, Draupadī, Viṣṇu, Daṇḍapāṇi, and Maheśvara; (3) visual contemplation of *ḍhuṇḍhivināyaka* (4) a dip of the fingers in the Jñānavāpī well with adoration of Nandikeśa, Tārakeśa, and Mahākāleśvara and, finally, (5) a second visit to Daṇḍapāṇi.

Of seven pre-eminently holy places Kāśī is named first; the others being Kāntī, Māyā, Ayodhyā, Dvāravatī, Mathurā, and Avantikā :

काशी कान्ती च मायाख्या त्वयोध्या द्वारवत्यपि ।
मथुरावन्तिका चैताः सप्त पुर्योऽत्र मोक्षदाः ॥ VI., 68.

Māyā is Hurdwar. I am not sure whether or not Kāntī is the same as Kāñcī. The rest are well known. These places are all, named in the *Ayeen Akbery*, in Mr. Gladwin's translation of which, —Vol. III., pp. 255, 256, — Mathurā and Avantikā are disguised as Mehtra and Ownitka.

At least thirty or forty epithetical designations of Benares are scattered through the *Kāśī-khaṇḍa*. Half of that number, or thereabouts, from this or some other work or works, have been noted by native lexicographers. One of them, Pañcanadatīrtha, "the quinquamnian resort," refers to five rivers, the Kiraṇā, Dhūtappā, Sarasvatī, Gaṇgā, and Yamunā :

किरणा धूतपापा च पुण्यतोया सरस्वती ।
गंगा च यमुना चैव पञ्च नद्योऽत्र कीर्त्तिताः ॥
अतः पञ्चनदं नाम तीर्थं त्रैलोक्यविश्रुतम् । LIX., 114, 115.

Four of these streams, in small quantities, are believed to emerge into the Ganges, through subterraneous channels, just in front of the Pañcagaṅgā landing.

1. Pan. 3, 31 (Dec. 1, 1868) 163-164.
2. "La partie de l' Inde avec laquelle les Arabes avaient le moins de rapports était l' Hindostan proprement dit, c'est à-dire la contrée baignée par la Djomna et le Gange, depuis le Penjab jusqu'au fond

had, however, heard of the holy fame of Benares, which he compares, not inaptly, to Mecca.[1] Mahmūd of Ghaznī is said, by a late writer, to have advanced as far as Benares, and to have made a few converts there, during his ninth incursion.[2] In 1194, Shihābuddīn, after defeating the Kanaujan monarch, Jayachandra, marched on that city, where he is reported to have demolished near a thousand Hindu temples.[3] The subsequent history of the place, for many centuries, is well-nigh a blank. Its religious character was not, in the eyes of its Islamite masters, a thing to recommend it; and commercial or political importance it had none.[4] Even Akbar, with all his toleration of Hinduism, and occasional partiality to it, did nothing to prop the sinking

du golfe du Bengale. Le grand rôle joué jadis par les rois de Canoge, près du confluent du Gange et de la Djomna, avait retenti jusqu'à eux; mais ils n'avaient qu'une idée confuse deces belles et riches contrées, et il paraît que telle était la politique ombrageuse des radjas et des brahmanes que, jusqu'au commencement du XI siécle de notre ére, lors des conquétes de Mahmoud le Gaznévide, aucun Arabe n'avait pu pénétrer dans ces régions."—*Relation des Voyages*, etc., by M. Langlès and Father Reinaud, Vol. I., Preliminary Dissertation, pp. XLVIII., XLIX.

1. "Benarès était aussi, suivant Albyrouny, un lien réputé pour sa sainteté, et où les personnes pienses venaient des provinces les plus lointaines pour se livrer à des exercises de religion, à peu prés comme les musulmans étaient dans i'usage de se rendre à peu prés comme les musulmans étaient dans l'usage de se rendre à la Mekke, auprès de la Kaaba. La plus grande ambition des Indiens était de pouvoir mourir dans cette ville. En effet, dit Albyrouny, tout criminal qui parvenait à mettre les pieds dans cette enceinte, était à l'abri de toute poursuite; à plus forte raisxon, les personnes qui y mouraieut n'avaient plus de crainte à concevoir, de la part de Dieu, pour leurs fautes passées,"—Father Reinaud's *Mémoire Géographique, Historique et Scientifique sur l'Inde*, etc. p. 288.
2. English *Ayeen Akbery*, Vol. II., p. 35.
3. Major Stewart's *History of Bengal*, p. 36. Elsewhere we read, that, "having broken the idols in above a thousand temples, he purified and consecrated the latter to the worship of the true God." Colonel Briggs's translation from Farishta, Vol. I., 1., p. 179.
4. Fiscally, too, it had come, in the days of Akbar, to be of very secondary note. See the *Ayeen Akbery*, Vol. II., Appendix, p. 28.

fortunes of Benares. Its decline was uninterrupted; and, under Aurangzeb, who changed its name to Muhammadābād[1] it reached, at last, the depth of its abasement. At the command of that harsh bigot, its principal temples were laid in ruins,[2] and mosques, constructed from their materials, were reared on their half-destroyed foundations. The Observatory, built by Mānasimha[3] about A.D. 1600, is, probably, the only noteworthy Hindu edifice of the city, still entire, of so great antiquity. For almost all that is striking in its architectural embellishment, Benares is beholden to the Marathas; and the recent resuscitation of its former celebrity, in the decadence of Hinduism is due, in large measure, to the zeal and enterprise of the same ener-

1. I have met with this substitute for Benares in an Urdū book written within the last hundred years. It was originally meant, of course, as a poignant insult. Deservedly, it never obtained, it is believed, any currency.

   The Muhammadan names of Delhi, Agra and Patna are of everyday use. Less familiar are Jahāngīrābād, Mustafābād. Islamābād, and Mūminābād, for Dacca, Rampoor, Chittagong and Brindabun.

2. Captain Orlich, in the tenth letter of his *Reise in Ostindien*, says that Akbar entertained the project of establishing a mosque over the Jñānavāpī well. No one at all acquainted with Akbar's character could give this silly legend the least credence. The story looks like an appendix to the tale, that, when Aurangzeb threw down the old temple of Viśvēśvara, its phallus cast itself, unassisted, into the Jñānavāpī.

3. Raja of Ambheri. One of his descendants, Jayasimha II., who flourished rather more than a century after him, provided the Observatory with astronomical instruments. From Raja Mānasimha the building was called, from the first, Mānamandira, now corrupted into Mānmandil. Bishop Heber uninquiringly states that the Observatory was "founded before the Musalmān conquest." Captain Orlich says it was founded by Jayasimha : he does not distinguish which Jayasimha. But it would be endless to pointout the unweighed assertions of incautious travellers.

   Even Mr. James Prinsep, —*Benares Illustrated*, second Series, —from consulting Tavernier with insufficient attention refers the conversion of the Mānmandil into an Observatory to Jayasimiha I.

   An excellent account of the Benares Observatory, by the learned Pandit Bāpū Deva Śāstrin, is given in the *Transactions of the Benares Institute for the Session* 1864-65, pp. 191-196.

getic race. As to the rest, there is no ground whatever for believing that Benares, in comparison of what we now find it, with its thousand temples,[1] and their thronging concomitants of holy harpies and willing victims, can ever have boasted a larger population, a more potent prestige, or more affluent prosperity.

India Office, London
July, 1868.

1. Such was Mr. James Prinsep's estimate in 1828-1829. As to the extent of the city, "the measured length along the banks of the river, by survey, is barely three miles; and the average depth does not exceed one mile." *Benares Illustrated*, p. 12. Hiouen Tsang found Benares, in the seventh century, of not far from the same dimensions. *Vide supra*, p. 120.

The Bhars[1]

Rev. M. A. Sherring, LL.B.

All investigation into the races of India goes to prove, that a multitude of tribes has, at various epochs, spread over the land. One tribe has pushed forward another, the weaker and less civilized retreating to the jungles and hilly fastnesses; while those that have dispossessed them, have, in their turn, been dispossessed by fresh and more vigorous clans. It is remarkable, that the races of India have throughout very largely maintained their distinctive individuality, notwithstanding the fluctuations in their separate histories; and yet it is indisputable that not a few of them sprang from a common stock. To some extent, they have united with one another, and there can be no question that a large number of the low-castes of India are the progeny of distinct races more or less blended together. Still, in many instances, a careful scrutiny can detect in these castes, not only their special differences, but also the very names by which the clans they represent were originally designated.

This scattering of tribes over the country has produced very singular result, which perhaps is not found, on the same scale, in any other part of the world, namely, that every district in India has its peculiar clans, which have their own traditions and annals; and has, in addition, a host of fragmentary and isolated remnants of lost and vanquished tribes, of which scarcely more than their bare names can now be traced.

All illustration of some of these observations is furnished by the history of the once powerful and numerous tribe of Bhars. This race, variously known by the terms Rājbhar, Bharat, Bharpatwa, and Bhar, once inhabited a wide tract of country extending from Gorruckpore in Northern India to Saugor in Central India. Other tribes were associated with them; but there is good reason to believe that the Bhars greatly outnumbered them. The

1. Pan. 3, 31 (December 1, 1869). 160-164.

country lying between Benares and Allahabad, a space of about seventy miles in extent, was almost exclusively in their possession; and they occupied the land on both sides of the Ganges, which flows through this region. The entire district of Allahabad also was originally in thier hands; and traces of them are still found in every pergunnah or. sub-division of the district, more especially in the pergunnahs across the Ganges and Jumna. Their forts, called Bhar-dih, some of which are of vast size, are very numerous; and they have the credit of having excavted all the deep tanks that now exist. The pergunnah of Soraon exhibits many examples of their labourious perseverance, and has no fewer than a dozen ponds and thirteen tanks attributed to them. The pergunnah of Kheyragurh, however, bears perhaps the most abundant trace of their toil and enterprise. The stone fort of that name, of immense proportions, is said to have been their work.

Not in this district alone, but also in the districts of Mirzapore, Jounpore, Azimgurh, as far as Gorruckpore, numerous embankments, tanks, subterraneous caverns, and stone forts, still exist, to testify to their energy and skill. The present inhabitants of the district of Azimgurh have a tradition, that their country, in the time of Rām, with whose kingdom of Ayudhia it was formerly connected, was inhabited by Rājbhars and Asūrs. In this neighbourhood the Bhars have left behind them large mud forts, of which specimens may be seen at Harbanspūr and Unchgāoñ, near Azimgurh, and also at Ghosi. The district of Mirzapore exhibits traces and remains of this people to a greater extent than those of any other ancient tribe. The pergunnah of Bhadohee, or more properly 'Bhardohee', is called after them. Mr. Duthoit, Deputy Superintendent of the Family Domains of the Maharaja of Benares, in his recent elaborate report on the Bhadohee pergunnah, says, that traces of the Bhar *raj* "abound in the pergunnah, in the form of old tanks and village forts. One cannot go for three miles in any direction without coming upon some of the latter." Their tanks, he adds, are Suraj-bedi, that is, longer from east to west than from north to south; and thereby distinguishable from modern tanks, which are Chandr-bedi, and lie north and south. In the names of places

in India as elsewhere old associations and traditions are faithfully represented. Thus we find that in this pergunnah bazars and towns are still called after Raja Līlī, the last Bhar King.

The pergunnah stretches along the north bank of the Ganges; but on the south side of that river, likewise, Bhar forts and towns are met with. One of their principal cities was situated about five miles to the west of the modern city of Mirzapore, and was evidently of great extent. Its brick and stone *debris* is scattered over the fields for several miles. The city included the ancient town of Vindhyāchal, famous in the Purāṇas, and still celebrated throughout a great part of India for its shrine of the goddess Vindhyeśvarī, whom many thousands of pilgrims from every quarter visit yearly. To the east of the town are the remains of a fort from which spot in a westerly direction *debris* is found in great abundance. This old city is called Pampāpūrā by the people now living in the neighbourhood. From its size and the substantial nature of the buildings which, judging from the *debris*, it contained, the city must have been of sufficient importance to be the capital of the country.

Tradition says that the city once possessed one hundred and fifty temples, all which were destroyed by that indomitable enemy of idolatry, Aurungzebe. This statement is manifestly extravagant; yet that there were formerly magnificent temples on this spot is indisputable. Below the Ashṭbhūjī bungalow, a sanatorium erected on a spur of the ridge immediately above the site of the ancient city, by a public-spirited native of Mirzapore, for the special benefit of its European residents is a massive square building having the appearance of a fort. It is, however, a Hindu monastery with a temple on its summit reputed to be of some sanctity. This edifiece has in its foundations, walls, and breastworks, a multitude of carved stones and figures, while many more cover the ground in the vicinity. These sculptures are not of the modern Hindu style; and indeed are far superior to the productions of Hindus of the present day. Some of the figures are of that curious type described, hesitatingly, by Mr. Fergusson, in his "Tree and Serpent Worship in India," as Dasyas or aborigines, in contradistinction to the immigrant

tribes of Hindus. They are readily, distinguishable by their peculiar head-dress and long pointed beards. They form, however, but a small portion of the figures, which are, for the most part, representations of Hindu men and women with most elaborate turbans and head-dresses, while exceedingly few apparently are of a sacred character. It is probable that all these relics point to a later period of Bhar history, when Hindus had come into their midst, and settled amongst them. The contrast between the long-bearded figures and the Hindu is very striking. It is exceedingly questionable whether at the date of these sculptures the Bhars were still in possession of the country; indeed, I am strongly inclined to the supposition that it had, in part or in whole, already passed from them into the hands of the Rajpoots, who are known to have been the rulers over this tract for a period of five hundred years. At the same time, the position and attitude of the Bhar figures on these sculptures, indicate that, at the time of their execution, the Bhars were still a people of importance, although, it is likely, they were subordinate to the Rajpoots.

That the Bhars were not altogether an uncouth and barbarous race is sufficiently proved by the works of skill which they have left. Their numerous massive forts testify to their warlike propensities, yet they were probably chiefly erected as means of defence, and a places of refuge; for in their later history it is certain that they were exposed to fierce attacks from their Rajpoot neighbours. The same energy and genius which they exhibited in defending themsleves against their enemies, they also displayed in more peaceful pursuits. They excavated tanks and ponds, raised substantial earthwork, and dug trenches between rivers. The Kunwar and Manghai rivers in the Azimgurh district seem to have been connected by a trench, the work, it is said, of the former Bhar inhabitants. The Hari Bāndh or dam, at Amīn-nagar in the Nizāmābād pergunnah of the same district, is an embankment generally attributed to them. Whence this people obtained the civilization which placed them much above the condition of many other aboriginal tribes, it is hard to say, unless we suppose that it had its origin in themsel-

ves. I know not why we should always be so ready to ascribe all the ancient civilization of India to successive troops of Hindu immigrants. For my part, I am inclined to think that the Hindus have learnt much from the aboriginal races, whom, in the course of ages, they have so subdued and trodden upon, and have treated with such scorn and rigour, that in their present debasement we have no adequate means of judging of their original genius and power.

How long prior to the Rajpoot invasion the Bhars had occupied this tract of country, cannot be ascertained; yet the prosperity to which they had attained, and the civilization which they had acquired, are sound reasons for thinking that they had held possession of it for a protracted period. While they cultivated the land round their villages and towns, nevertheless a large portion remained uncleared, and was an immense forest infested by wild beasts. Even as late as Akbar's reign, in the sixteenth century, elephants frequented the dense jungle between Chunar and Allahabad, and the hills to the south of the Ganges must have been almost unapproachable. The emperor Baber, in his Memoirs, says, that while at Chunar, close on the edge of the camp, a lion and rhinoceros were seen, and also a wild buffalo, and that many elephants roamed in the jungle around Chunar, and, apparently, even as far as, and beyond, Benares. It is manifest, therefore, that the Bhars inhabited a vast forest, which they cleared in places, and cultivated, building villages, towns, and cites, subduing the untamed land, providing against dearth by digging splendid tanks, banking up morasses, utilizing water-courses, and thus laying the foundations of their own prosperity and of those that came after them.

Sir Henry Elliot considers it strange that so little notice is taken of the Bhars in the Purāṇas, yet it is not at all remarkable, seeing that Brahmanical writers generally speak of the Dasyas, Asuryas, and all other non-Hindu races with superciliousness, if not with contempt; and consequently rarely exhibit a particle of interest in their history. Yet he gives one or two references, where, he conjuectures, they may possibly be alluded to. His remarks are as follows — "It is strange", he says, "that no trace

of Bhars is to be found in the Purans, unless we may consider that there is an obscure indication of them in the Brahma Purana, where, it is said, that among the descendants of Jayadhwaja are the Bhāratas who, it is added, are not commonly specified *from their great number*'. So also the 'Harivamśa' says of the Bharatas, 1. p. 157, 'They form an immense family, whose numbers it is impossible to mention'. Or they may perhaps be the Bhurgas, of the 'Mahābhārata', subdued by Bhim Sen on his eastern expedition.[1]

With all their industry and capacity, the Bhars were destined to perish. The final cause of their destruction was, doubtless, the success of the Mahommedan invasions of India, whereby the Rajpoot rulers of the North West, being driven from their homes, fled inot the more secure regions of the east, where coming in contact with aboriginal tribes, they gradually subdued them. These Rajpoot raids occurred at various periods extending over several centuries. The districts in which they located themselves under different leaders, have been, to some extent, discovered. For in the Allahabad district; the Monus Rajpoots, in Kewaī; The Sonuk, in Meh; the Tissyāl, in Secundra; and the Nanwak, in Nawab Gunj. The Bissen Rajpoots have settled in Karra and Atharban in the Dooab.

In the Ghazeepore district, in what is now the Luknepore pergunnah, a fierce and prolonged contest was carried on between the Bhars and Rajpoots, and several battles were fought. But the former were at length completely overthrown, and their lands fell to the lot of their conquerors, who were of the family of Har Thakur and Bīr Thakur, of the clan of Singhi Rishi, of Karn Chetra, Delhi.

The extensive pergunnah of Kuntit in the Mirzapore district derives its name, according to tradition, from the famous Raja Karn, who, it is said, came on a *tīrth* or pilgrimage to the island of Rāmgyah in the Ganges near Vindhyāchal. Karn-tīrth has been contracted into Kuntit. Formerly, this tract was, for the most part, in the possession of the Bhars; but was wrested from

1. Supplemental Glossary, p. 83.

them by the Ghaharwar Rajpoots, under a chief, of the family of Raja Jai Chand of Kanouj, of the name of Gūdhan Deo, who massacred the Bhar ruler together with his relations and attendants. Gūdhan Deo built forts at Kuntit and Bijaipur, portions of which are still standing. He also took from the Bhars the lands of Khyragurh, now a pergunnah in the Allahabad district, which afterwards fell to one of his sons. The number Chaurāsī or eighty-four was, on the division of his property at his death, applied to so many villages; hence there is a *tuppeh Chaurāsī* or sub-division, both in the pergunnahs of Kuntit and Khyragurh. Originally, this family held estate over a wide extent of country, in the districts of Allahabad, Mirzapore, Jaunpore and Benares. The present Raja of Māṇda, one of his descendants, occupies a small portion only of this tract; yet it consists of six hundred and seventy-five square miles of territory.

One division of the Kuntit pergunnah, namely that now styled the tuppeh or sub-division of Saktīsgarh, was, in ancient times, occupied by the Kols, and seems never to have been in the possession of the Bhars. The Kols continued to hold it long after the Rajpoots had established themselves in their neighbourhood, the chief reason of this being, that neither their lands, nor their chattels, nor their own persons, furnished a bait sufficiently tempting. They were a wild people, living in swamps in the dense jungle, their favourite dwellings being stone caverns surrounded by deep pools of water. Here they lived in independence and security. They were, however, eventually subdued, though in what era does not appear; but in the reign of Akbar, a small tax was imposed upon them. When Sakat Singh, a descendant of Gūdhan Deo, was Raja of Kuntit, he seized the country occupied by the Kols for non-payment of the tax, and, apparently with the permission of the emperor, annexed it to his own estate. On the site of their stronghold, he erected a fort, which is still known as the Saktīsgarh fort. In its neighbourhood the jungles continue to be infested with tigers and othr wild animals, and for tiger-shooting perhaps no region in India surpasses it. The Kols have not been utterly exterminated, but are yet found in some places, and are mostly employed in agricul-

ture. The tuppeh was formerly called Kolāna, a term even now occasionally applied to it.

To the north of the Ganges, in what is now the Bhadohee pergunnah, the Bhar principality was destroyed by the Monus Rajpoots, who came from Amber, or Old Jeypore, where the elder branch of the clan still exists. The tradition of the circumstance is as follows. Five persons of the Mon race undertook to perform a pilgrimage from their own country to Benares. Passing through the Bhar territory, they were attracted by its advantages, and determined to remain there, and to settle among its inhabitants. They were joined by other members of their family, whom they invited over. As they increased in numbers and importance, the Bhars, it is said, sought to make alliances with them, but thier overtures being discountenanced, at length a dispute arose on the subject of intermarriage, which increased to blows. This seems to have been the signal for a general attack upon the Bhars; and, in the struggle which occurred, the Monus people were so successful that they not only completely subjugated the aborigines, but utterly destroyed them. At the present day, scarcely a Bhar is to be met with from one extremity of the pergunnah to the other, so absolute and entire has been their extermination.

Fortune, however, is a fickle goddess, and the fate of the Monus Rajpoots of the Bhadohee, and also of the Ghaharwar Rajpoots of Kuntit, affords notable instances of her inconstancy. The former, calling in the aid of Pirtheepat Singh, Raja of Pertabgurh, to settle their family disputes, fell into his power; and in the year 1775 the pergunnah passed from his hands into those of Balwant Singh, Raja of Benares, with whose descendants it still remains. This powerful and ambitious Raja also obtained possession of the Kuntit territory, which continued for a short time in his family, and drove out the Ghaharwar chief, Raja Vikramajīt, who with his attendants sought safety in flight. For nearly five hundred years the Raja and his predecessors had occupied the country. On the rebellion of Raja Gobindjīt, son of Vikramajīt, from his hiding-place, for the purpose of restoring to him his patrimonial estate of Kuntit. The new Raja of Beneras,

however, had sufficient influence with the British Government to hinder its restoration; and he only received a tenth part of the original land revenue. His descendants now reside in the old Ghaharwar fort of Bijaipur, the talooqa of which was afterwards given as a commutation of the tenth. The prestige of the ancient Ghaharwar family, as represented by the Rajas of Bijaipur, in the city of Mirzapore and its neighbourhood, is very great; and in the Mutiny the Government wisely availed themselves of it in preserving order among the people.

It is greatly to the credit of the Raja of Benares that, during the time of his occupancy of the Kuntit estate, he exerted himself most energetically in promoting the prosperity of the rising city of Mirzapore. He sent over traders of various kinds from Benares; and a detachment of horse and foot was staioned there for the security of its inhabitants. The commerce of the city rapidly increased; and its present high commercial postion is the result of the enterprise of the Raja. His possession of the pergunnah, however, was of short duration; and in the year 1781, or thereabouts, it passed from the family, although the present Raja has still considerable property within it.

The Rajpoot tribes, although the principal, were not the only destroyers of the Bhars. The Mohommedans also, at various times, settled in many places on their lands. In the Allahābad district the pergunnahs of Chail and Karālī are almost entirely in the occupation of Mahommedan proprietors. Being near the city itself in which the Nāzim or chief local officer and his underlings resided, it is not remarkable that they should have fallen a prey to their cupidity. When the kingdom of Jounpore was established in the fourteenth century, all this part of the country formed a portion of the King of Jounpore's dominions, and remained so until the downfall of the last king, Husain Khan, towards the end of the fifteenth century.

Yet what has become of the old Bhar race? Their face has been most disastrous; and their present condition only proves too conclusively that they were ever regarded by their oppressors as fair game, to be hunted down and destroyed. Not content with doing their utmost to exterminate them during long cen-

turies of grinding tyranny, they have degraded the survivors to the lowest position in the social scale. Here and there, in many places, Bhars are still found, but with few exceptions, which will presently be referred to, their condition is one of great social ignominy. They are largely employed to tend swine, an office which in India only the most despised and disreputable classes will undertake. By some, they are included in the caste of Pāsīs, one of the lowest of the non-Hindu castes. It would be interesting to learn the history of the degradation of a race of people, of enterprise and skill, of originality and singular practical ability, which it is evident they once possessed in no ordinary degree. Their supplanters, whether Rajpoots, Brahmans, or Mahommedan, though more civilized and refined, are not to be compared with the humbler aborigines, whom they have ruined, for the great works of public utility which they have executed in the land. In default of such historical information, which indeed there is no probability of our ever acquiring, the only explanation of the circumstance that I can give is, that their abject degradation is the result of the pride and intolerance of their conquerors. As a non-Hindu tribe they were impure, and were altogether unfit to be the companions of the twice-born and their associates. Their industry, their natural gifts, their energy and perseverance, in the opinion of these high-caste intolerants, constituted no claim to their consideration; but, on the contrary, may have provided a reason, in addition to their religious uncleanness, for depressing them as low as possible.

Yet a few are still in possession of property and independence, although they may not have saved themselves from social contempt. While not a single Bhar landed proprietor exists in the Bhadohee pergunnah, there are two Bhar landlords, or were, not long since, in the Kuntit pergunnah of Mirzapore district. But these, disloyal to their tribe, though wise in their generation, feeling the grievous burden of their social position, affect a Rajpoot title, notwithstanding that it is well known that they are descended directly from the Bhars. In the Allahabad district this unfortunate race seems to have been well nigh extinguished. There are, however, three Bhar villages in the

Khyragurh pergunnah, namely Majera, Kaliyanpur, and Omraicha, the families in which are said to have the right to six others, while in reality only occupying these three. It is probable that the Bhars, driven away from more civilized regions, retreated into the wild jungle of Khyragurh, and remained there long after multitudes of their race, in other places, had been destroyed. But they were finally expelled from these haunts by the ancestors of the present Raja of Manda to whom reference has already been made. The Arail and Barrah pergunnahs also have Bhars residing in them.

In spite of the pertinacity with which, if tradition is correct, the higher castes kept aloof from Bhar alliances, they were not always successful in doing so. In the Allahabad district, for instance, three examples are found of unions with Bhar families. Mr. G. Ricketts, in his Memorandum in the General Report of the census of 1865, states, that "three influential castes or clans claim an admixture of Bhar blood. These are the Bhurors, Gurhors, and Tikaits. The two former are not numerous. They are landed proprietors in the southern portion of this district; and appear to be a connecting link between the higher castes, who are generally, landed proprietors, and those inferior castes whose lot is servitude. The Tikaits are numerous, and possess much influence. A Chowhan leader carried off his Bhur chief's daughter. The descendants are still proprietors of a portion of that Bhur chief's possessions."

It is a question of considerable ethnological interest, whether the Bhars are connected with the Cheroos, Seorees, and other ancient races, inhabiting the southern part of the Mirzapore district. The Cheroos are sometimes spoken of as a branch of the Bhars; and as to the Seorees, it was the opinion of Sir H. Elliot, that there was great reason to suppose that Cheroos and Seorees were originally one and the same; yet he says it is very difficult to trace the connexion between these tribes. It is certainly remarkable that the pergunnah of Barhar in the Mirzapore district, which I have no doubt should be 'Bharhar', the second syllable 'har' being a reduplication of the 'har' of the first syllable, is partly inhabited by a race of Seorees,

and that the Raja of Barhar himself has Seoree blood in his veins. My own conviction is, that many of the aboriginal tribes of India were originally blended together. But this subject is one which, while to the settlement of it material is being gradually collected, is nevertheless so intricate and involved, that it will require long and patient research before satisfactory conclusions can be attained. The unravelling of the tangled skein of Indian history, although very far from being accomplished, has, however, by no means resulted in complete failure. Difficult and exceedingly harassing as the task undoubtedly is, yet knot after knot of the disordered thread is being gradually unloosed. The labour is one demanding perseverance and industry, which will achieve in this, as in most pursuits, far greater and more brilliant results than the sudden efforts of an intense yet fitful enthusiasm.

It now only remains for me to add, that I am indebted to the following works for information on the subject of this paper — Sir H. Elliots's Supplemental Glossary; Memoirs of Census of the North West Provinces for 1865; Mr. G. Ricketts' Memorandum on Allahabad in the General Report; Report on the Bhadohee Pergunnah of the Family Domains of the Maharaja of Benares, by Mr. W. Duthoit, Deputy Superintedent; Settlement Records of the Kuntit Pergunnah, Mirzapore, by Mr. C. Raikes; Revenue Settlement Reports of Gorruckpore, Allahabad, and Azimgurh; and the Benares Magazine, Vol. II.

Widow-marriage[1]

A. E. Gough

A great social reform has found a new advocate in Viṣṇu Parasu-rāma Śāstrī Pandit of Bombay, who has recently furnished a reply with *Punarudvāha-prati-sedha* a treatise in which the Benares Pandits undertook to refute the arguments of Pandit Iśvar-chandra Vidyāsāgar and others in favour of the marriage of the Hindu widows. The writer of this reply, which is entitled *Vidhavodvāha-viveka*, maintains that the present restrictions on the marriage of Hindu widows may be unexceptionally removed consistently with the strictest orthodoxy. To prove this he quotes a number of authorities, who all sanction the practice under certain conditions; and maintains the plain and literal interpretation of these as opposed to the traditional. The texts cited allow the giving in marriage a daughter or ward more than once under certain conditions. Such are the cases of a wife being left a virgin widow, being abondoned by her husband, where the marriage has been contracted under false pretences on the part of the bridegroom, when the husband loses his caste, and the like. One text only appears to give and explicit and unconditional sanction to the marraige of widows. This is a śloka of the Nārada-smṛti :

नष्टे मृते प्रव्रजिते क्लीवे च पतिते पतौ ।
पञ्चस्वापत्सु नारीणां पतिरन्यो विधीयते ॥

In examining the application of the words नष्टे मृते it is only fair to consider the Hindu conception of marriage and its duties as set forth everywhere in the later Sanskrit literature. A woman is to be always in a state of pupilage. The *patria potestas* passes from her father to her husband, and upon the death of her husband devolves upon her sons. While her husband lives she is to obey and worship him as her deity, looking forward to

1. Pan. 3, 34 (March 1, 1869) 222-223.

reunion with him in a future state as the reward of her devotion. It is by becoming her husband's partner in another life that she may expect a higher place hereafter. After his death she is to lead a religious life, protected by and subject to her sons, chrishing her husband's memory, and not so much as mentioning the name of any other. There is no provision made for her ceasing to live as a *brahma-chāriṇī*, and for her being given in marriage by her sons.

बाल्ये पितुर्वशे तिष्ठेत् पाणिग्राहस्य यौवने ।
पुत्राणां भर्तरि प्रेते न भजेत् स्त्री स्वतन्त्रताम् ॥ Manu v. 148.
कामं तु क्षपयेद्देहं पुष्पमूलफलैः शुभैः ।
न तु नामापि गृह्णीयात् पत्यौ प्रेते परस्य च ॥ v. 157.
आसीतामरणात् क्षान्ता नियता ब्रह्मचारिणी ।
यो धर्म एकः पत्नीनां कांक्षन्ती तमनुत्तमम् ॥ v. 158.

From the time when such became the general, and consequently the legal, conception of women's duties, the marriage of widows must at least have been discouraged. If a more express prohibition of the practice is not found perhaps the want of one was not anticipated by the various writers, after once prescribing the widow's rule of life. There can be little doubt that the spirit of the later Sanskṛit literature is altogether opposed to widow-marriage. A few texts of doubtful interpretaion cannot have been intended to affirm the legality of anything inconsistent with duties already clearly defined. Those, then, who seek a reformation in this as in other matters must appeal elswhere than to the later religious books. Not only the interpretation but the authority of these must be studied from a critical instead of a religious point of view. It is hardly reasonable to innovate upon a religion of authority in one point,and to submit to it without question on every other. A really free inquirer will be able to satisfy himself, from the Veda and the residuum of history in the legends of the epics, that the early Āryas thought and acted differently in this and other matters from their descendants of the present day.

Ancient Indian History[1]

A. E. Gough

It is now many years that the Sanskrit language has been submitted to the scrutiny of European scholars. It has illustrated the earliest stage of thought and its expression, and furnished a principle for the classification of languages. In the absence of all chronology and history in literature has been made to yield many facts respecting ancient India, which have obtained general assent. Hitherto no detailed political and philosophical history of the Hindus has been attempted. The materials for such a history are uncertain, and likely to remain a subject of controversy. Meanwhile a clear and comprehensive review of Sanskrit researches and their difficulties and uncertainties would be of provisional value. Information of this kind has at present to be sought in a number of works which can hardly interest any but Sanskrit students. The favour with which Sanskrit studies are viewed in England is due mainly to the more popular of Prof. Max Müller's works. In a different degree Mr. Wheeler's History of India will, no doubt, contribute to the popularity of these studies; and its author may be regarded as in some measure an interpreter between Sanskrit scholars and general English readers. In this work Mr. Wheeler is undertaking to bring together the historical results of Sanskrit studies, with what success must be left to competent judges to determine. A few remarks may here be offered with the purpose of reminding general readers of the uncertainty of these results. But in the first place admiration must be expressed for the object, and in some degree for the execution of Mr. Wheeler's difficult task. He has made a laborious study of the translations and original works of the great European Sanskrit scholars, and consulted learned Hindus, and gives us his conclusions in an

1. Pan. 4, 40 (Sept. 1, 1869) 92-95.

interesting and popular form. At the same time much of the oriental style is preserved in narrative, perhaps many readers will think this too much the case, especially in the second volume where above four hundred pages are devoted to the beauties and deformities of the Rāmāyaṇa. Mr. Wheeler tells us in his preface that 'his primary object is not to illustrate Sanskrit literature, or to treat of questions connected with the Sanskrit language, but to compile a political History of India.' In a note in his second volume (p. 409) he adds, 'those who desire to enter upon the larger field of inquiry must give their days and nights to the study of the critical labour of Goldstücker, Max Müller, Lassen, Weber, Benfey, Kuhn, Roth, Fitz-Edward Hall, Cowell, Muir, Aufrecht, Monier Williams, Gorresio, and many other scholars in Europe, as well as in this country, who have attained a widely-spread reputation as the pioneers in the study of a comparison of roots and grammars.' It would be unfair, therefore, to object to his work on account of a few occasional inaccuracies in the names of people and places, and the rendering of Sanskrit words. It may be remembered that Macaulay in one of his best essays writes that Surajah Dowlah 'directed, that in memory of his great action Calcutta should thenceforward be called Alinagore, that is to say, the Port of God.'

In the brief notice of the Vedic period at the beginning of the first volume the Vedic religion is said to be a childlike make-believe (p. 11). Should it not rather be regarded as a stage in the growth of thought and language through which, as comparative philology shews us, all nations have had to pass? The actions of living beings and of the powers of nature were expressed in the same words, without any sense of their being applied to the latter by metaphor, and seemed to imply equally a personal agency in both. Language then as now reacted upon and limited thought. The Vedic Aryans were conscious of regularly recurring phenomena, some of which were subject to and others independent of their will. They regarded the causes of these, external and internal, as similar to one another. The powers of nature were beings like themselves, but more powerful, and therefore

to be propitiated by worship. Can the worship be fairly described as a child-like make-believe, or as the worship of personified abstractions?

There seems to be no reason for identifying the Nāstikas of Manu with the Buddhists. Native authorities describe Nāstikas generally as persons who deny the existence of a God and of a future life. The compilation of the laws of the Mānavas would seem to have taken place before the systematising of the Sānkhya doctrine, the cosmothetic theory of which appears in them in a rudimentary form. It has been held by some that Buddhism is later than the Sānkhya system, upon which it might be an advance in thought. It may be conjectured that the interval between the compilation of the laws of the Mānavas and that of the Rāmāyaṇa was not very great. The Rāmāyaṇa appears to describe not the conquest of, but an incursion into, the Dekhan. Its theology would not appear of a much later character, if we excepted certain passages which have been regarded as interpolations. The story in the Bāla-kāṇḍa of the *pāyasa* oblation, and of the subsequent incarnation of Viṣṇu in the four sons of Daśaratha, seems to be a later addition to the narrative of the Aśvamedha. The visit of Vāyu to Rāma and Lakshmaṇa when wounded by the serpent-arrows of Indrajit, and many other passages in which Rāma is described as an incarntion of Viṣṇu, have been shewn to be very possibly interpolations. Whether the Rākṣasas of the Rāmāyaṇa can be identified with the Buddhist, it may be supposed, is very uncertain. The N. W. recension contains no certain allusions to Buddhism. There is no need to assume that Jāvāli, who was attached to the orthodox court of Ayodhyā, was a Buddhist. Rāvaṇa, the Rākṣasa king of Laṅkā, is represented as of Brāhmanical descent as having obtained his power as a boon from Brahmā, as skilled in the Veda, an observer of religious rites, and finally as reconsigned to the funeral pile according to the Vedic ritual by Rākṣasa brāhmans with Rākṣasa mantras. His son Indrajit offers animal sacrifices. Another son, Atikāya, is reverent to the aged, and versed in the Veda. In the Araṇya-kāṇḍa (ch. 1) the Rākṣasas are described as black, with woolly hair and thick lips. Mr. Wheeler suggests that

the episode of Kumbha-karṇa was originally intended as a satirical hit at the Buddhist dogma of Nirvāṇa, but it appears to be, like the emancipation of the Sānkhyas, the cessation of the relation between subject and object. If it be an eternal rest of the soul, it would hardly have occured to a Hindu to see any parallel between it and the sleeping of a giant for six months at a time. In contrasting the doctrines of Sākya-muni with those of modern Europe, Mr. Wheeler says, 'The modern European idea reposes upon the conclusion that there is nothing true in the universe of being, saving the life hereafter in heaven'? Of what sect religious or philosophical is this the doctrine? He assigns the same grounds to Indian and western asceticism (vol. II. p. 540), 'Certain pleasures are lawful, but still they are pleasures; if therefore a man abstain from such pleasures now, he will enjoy pleasures hereafter'. Now Indian asceticism is not regarded as means of obtaining future pleasures, both pleasure and pain being regarded as evils by the Hindus, but for the sake of liberation form personal existence, absorption in the universal soul. Western ascetics propose to themselves closer communion with God in this world, and the beatific vision of God in eternity.

In the first volume (p. 50, note 5) the story of Judah and Tamar (Gen. XXXVII. 12-26) is said to bear a curious resemblance in some points to that of Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā. It may be remarked that Judah gave his ring to Tamar as a pledge, while Duṣyanta gave his to Śakuntalā as a token of recognition. It is stated (p. 122) that Arjuna at the Svayamvara of Draupadī 'offered up a mental prayer to his tutor Droṇa, and then bent the bow.' According to the Calcutta and Bombay editions of the Mahābhārata he called to mind, not Droṇa, but Kṛṣṇa, for which may we conjecture Kṛṣṇa to have been the original reading? Melchizedek (p. 129) is said to have offered sacrifies to Jehovah. In Genesis (XIV. 18-20) he is described as priest of the most high God, El' Elyōn. We are told (vol. II. p. 441) that the marriage rites of Nala and Damayantī were performed by the Raja of Vidarbha. In the episode of Nala (V. 40) we read that 'Bhīma *caused* the marriage of Damayantī and Nala *to be celebrated* (गतेषु पार्थिवेन्देषु भीमः प्रीतो महमनाः । विवाहं कारयामास दम-

यन्त्या नलस्य च ॥). It is said (p. 449) that under the head of the immemorial customs of good men Manu appears to include the usage of different countries, tribes, and families. Manu (II. 18) says that by immemorial customs are intended the traditional rules of the four castes and mixed classes of Brahmāvarta. In this brief space it has been possible only to offer a few suggestions for the consideration of the readers of Mr. Wheeler's first two volumes. We shall wait with much interest for the appearance of the third in which we may expect a fuller treatment of the Brāhmaṇic period, and the history of Buddhism in India.

Asita and Buddha or the Indian Simeon[1]

J. Muir

In the Lalita Vistara – a legendary history in prose and verse of the life of Buddha, the great Indian Saint, and founder of the religion which bears his name – it is related that a Rishi, or inspired sage, named Asita, who dwelt on the skirts of the Himālaya mountains, became informed, by the occurance of a variety of portents, of the birth of the future lawgiver, as the son of King Śuddhôdana in the city of Kapilavastu, in Northern India, and went to pay his homage to the infant. I have tried to reproduce the legend in the following verses. The similarity of some of the incidents to portions of the narrative in the second chapter of St. Luke's Gospel, verses 25, ff., will strike the reader.

I may mention that the Buddhist books speak also of earlier Buddhas, that the word means "the enlightened," or "the intelligent," and that Buddha also bore the appellations of Gautama, and of Sākyasinha, and Sākyamuni – *i. e.*, the lion, and the devotee, of the tribe of the Sākyas, to which he belonged.

That I have not at all exaggerated the expressions in the text which speak of Buddha as a deliverer or redeemer, or assimilated his character more than was justifiable to the Christian conception of a saviour, will be clear to any one who can examine the original for himself. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, a renowned Brahmanical opponent of the Buddhists, while charging Buddha with presumption and transgression of the rules of his caste in assuming the functions of a religious teacher, with which, as belonging to the Kshattriya, and not to the Brahmanical class, he had no right to interfere, ascribes to him these words – "Let all the evils (or sins) flowing from the corruption of the Kali age" (the fourth, or most degenerate, age of the world) "fall upon me; but let the world be redeemed!" If we might judge from this passage, it would seem that the character of a vicarious

1. Pan. 5, 60 (May 1, 1871) 327-328.

redeemer was claimed by, or at least ascribed to Buddha. But a correspondent who is well acquainted with Buddhism informs me that in his opinion the idea of vicarious atonement is foreign to it.

On Himalaya's lonely steep
There lived of old a holy sage,
Of shrivelled form, and bent with age,
Inured to meditation deep.

He — when great Buddha had been born,
The glory of the Sākya race,
Endowed with every holy grace,
To save the suffering world forlorn —

Beheld strange portents, signs which taught
The wise that that auspicious time
Had witnessed some event sublime,
With universal blessing fraught.

The sky with joyful gods was thronged
He heard their voice with glad acclaim
Resounding loudly Buddha's name,
While echoes clear their shouts prolonged.

The cause exploring, far and wide
The sage's vision ranged; with awe
Within a cradle laid he saw
Far off the babe, the Sākyas' pride.

With longing seized this child to view
At hand, and clasp, and homage pay,
Athwart the sky he took his way
By magic art, and swan-like flew;

And came to King Suddhôdan's gates,
And entrance craved — "Go, royal page,
And tell thy lord an ancient sage,
To see the the King permission waits."

The page obeyed, and joined his hands
Before the prince, and said — "A sage,
Of shrivelled form, and bowed with age,
Before the gate, my sovereign, stands,

"And humbly asks to see the King."
To whom Suddhôdan cried — "We greet
All such with joy; with honour meet
The holy man before us bring."

The saint beside the monarch stood,
And spake his blessing — "Thine be health,
With length of life, and might, and wealth;
And ever seek thy people's good."

With all due forms, and meet respect,
The King received the holy man,
And made him sit; and then began —
"Great sage, I do not recollect

That I thy venerable face
Have ever seen before; allow
Me then to ask what brings thee now
From thy far-distant dwelling-place."

"To see thy babe," the saint replies,
"I come from Himalaya's steeps."
The King rejoined — "My infant sleeps;
A moment wait until he rise."

"Such great ones ne'er," the Rishi spake,
"In torpor long their sense steep,
Nor softly love luxurious sleep;
The infant Prince will soon awake."

The wonderous child, alert to rise,
At will his slumbers light dispelled,
His father's arms the infant held
Before the sage's longing eyes.

The babe beholding, passing bright,
More glorious than the race divine,
And marked with every noble sign,[1]
The saint was whelmed with deep delight;

And crying — "Lo ! an infant graced
With every charm of form I greet !"
He fell before the Buddha's feet,
With fingers joined, and round him paced.[2]

Next round the babe his arms he wound,
And "One", he said, "of two careers
Of fame awaits in coming years
The child in whom these signs are found.

"If such an one at home abide,
He shall become a King, whose sway
Supreme a mighty arm'd array
On earth shall stablish far and wide.

If spurning worldly pomp as vain,
He choose to lead a joyless life,
And wander forth from home and wife,
He then a Buddha's rank shall gain."

He spoke, and on the infant gazed,
When tears suffused his aged eyes;
His bosom heaved with heavy sighs;
Then King Suddhôdan asked, amazed —

"Say, holy man, what makes thee weep,
And deeply sigh? Does any fate

1. Certain corporeal marks are supposed by Indian writers to indicate the future greatness of those children in whom they appear. Of these, thirty-two primary, and eighty secondary marks are referred to in the original as being visible on Buddha's person.

2. The word here, imperfectly translated, means, according to Professor H. H. Wilson's Dictionary, "reverential salutation, by circumambulating a person or object, keeping the right side towards them."

Malign the royal child await ?
May heavenly powers my infant keep !"

"For thy fair infant's weal no fears
Disturb me, King" the Rishi cried;
"No ill can such a child betide;
My own sad lot commands my tears.

"In every grace complete, thy son
Of truth shall perfect insight[1] gain,
And far sublimer fame attain
Then ever lawgiver has won.

"He such a Wheel ![2] of sacred lore
Shall speed on earth to roll, as yet
Hath never been in motion set
By priest, or sage, or god before.

"The world of men and gods to bless,
The way of rest and peace to teach
A holy law thy son shall preach –
A law of stainless righteousness.

"By him shall suffering men be freed
From weakness, sickness, pain, and grief,
From all the ills shall find relief
Which hatred, love, illusion, breed.

"His hand shall ! loose the chains of all
Who groan in fleshly bonds confined;
With healing touch the wounds shall bind
Of those whom pain's sharp arrows gall.

"His potent words shall put to flight
The dull array of leaden clouds

1. The term here translated "insight" is derived from the same root as the word "Buddha", and means "intelligence", or "enlightenment".

2. The term thus rendered, "dharmachakra", expresses a somewhat singular figure. It denotes the "wheel of the law", or the "wheel of righteousiness", or the "wheel of religion".

Which helpless mortals' vision shrouds,
And clear their intellectual sight.

"By him shall men who, now untaught,
In devious paths of error stray,
Be led to find a perfect way—
To final calm[1] at last be brought.

"But once, O King, in many years,
the figtree[2] somewhere flowers perhaps;
So after countless ages' lapse,
A Buddha once on earth appears.

"And now, at length, this blessed time
Has come; for he who cradled lied
An infant there before thine eyes
Shall be a Buddha in his prime.

"Full, perfect insight gaining, he
Shall rescue endless myriads tost
On life's rough ocean waves, and lost,
And grant them immortality.

"But I am old, and frail, and worn;
I shall not live the day to see
When this thy wondrous child shall free
From woe the suffering world forlorn.

"Tis this mine own unhappy fate
Which bids me mourn, and weep, and sigh;
The Buddha's triumph now is nigh,
But ah ! for me it comes too late !"

When thus the aged saint, inspired,
Had all the infant's greatness told,

5. The word in the original is "nirvāna", a term of which the sense is disputed — same scholars esteeming it to mean absolute annihilation; others explaining it as the extinction of passion, the attainment of perfect dispassion.

6. The tree referred to in the orginal is the Udumbara, the Ficus glomerata.

The King his wondrous son extolled,
And sang, with pious ardour fired –

"Thee child, th' immortals worship all,
The great Physician, born to cure
All ills that hapless men endure;
I, too, before thee prostrate fail."

And now – his errand done – the sage,
Dismissed with gifts, and honour due,
Athwart the aether swan-like flew,
And reached again his hermitage.

January 21, 1870.

Pandit Prema Chandra Tarkabāgīs : an Obituary[1]

As any thing connected with Sanskrit literature can claim insertion in your celebrated journal, the death of one who was in the foremost rank of the Hindu literary world, whose name is familiar to Sanskrit scholars, European and Indian, and who has left behind him his works which are valuable to Sanskrit students, should be prominently noticed in it.

Pandit Prema Chandra Tarkabagis, late Professor of Rhetoric in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, is dead. This event took place here on the 25th day of last month.

The Hindu Republic of letters has thus lost one of its illustrious constituents. His death has made a gap in it not easy to be filled.

For want of detailed information relating to the career of the learned Pandit, we give in a few words a few general facts of his life. He was a *kulīn* Brāhman of Bengal, an inhabitant of a village in the district of Burdwan. He received the rudiments of his education under private teachers, but he learned the higher branches of literature in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, in the days of Professor Wilson. He was a favourite scholar with the Professor, as he used to tell us, and won his esteem by his proficiency in Grammar, and by translating Bengali passages into Sanskrit verse when the Professor only expected a version in prose. An anecdote is preserved of his College days, which shows that he was very quick in College Examinations. It was a rule with him to give in his papers before all other Examinees. It happened in one examination that while Professor Wilson was expecting to receive his papers, another pupil gave him his own. Without glancing even on this paper the learned Professor immediately went to Prema Chandra to ask the cause of his unusual delay. He had been some years in College when the Professorship of Rhetoric became vacant. There were many

1. Pan. 1, 12 (May 1, 1867) 184-185.

candidates for the much coveted post, and Prema Chandra was one of them. Professor Wilson rejected all other candidates and appointed his favourite scholar, Prema Chandra, to the post. He honourably occupied the Professorial chair for 30 years. After this period he retired from active life and for the last 2 or 3 years he passed his days here with a view to close his life in this sacred spot. This object he obtained.

The literary merits of modern Pandits in general become known to the public by their controversies in assemblies, or by their lectures to their pupils. They seledom devote their time to literary writing. The best opportunity of showing their leiterary talents in writing would be when they are to present some verses to some great men as Rajas or princes, or when they are to give their Judgments (vyavasthā) in writing. Thus the fame of the Pandit often does not travel beyond his neighbourhood and dies away with him; or if it, in some particular case, does not vanish so soon, being preserved through local tradition, friends or pupils, it lasts only a generation or two after him. Besides, the want of literary productions of the Pandits prevents the public from forming any judgment on their merits after death. But such is not the case with the illustrious subject of our writing. The public has not to form any judgment from the reports of his friends or pupils, for he has transmitted to us his works to prove his merits. He used his tongue when in his professorial chair, but he used his pen when in his closet; and hence we enjoy the fruits of those labours.

He has not left for us any poetical compositions, for we have enough of that species of writing. Neither has he left for us theological or polemical controversies, for in these days they are thought too useless to be read. He has left us a useful kind of writing. He has left us commentaries on difficult poems and drams. His first essay in this branch of writing, after his academical career, we learn, was "A commentary on the first 11 chapters of "Naishadha." He did not finish the remaining chapters. His othe principal works are commentaries on the "Kāvyādarśa", on the "Rāghava Pāṇḍavīya", on the "Murari Nāṭaka" and on the "Uttara Rāma Charita". His minor works are his commentaries on a few chapters of the Raghuvaṁśa, on the eighth chapter of

the Kumāra, and his notes on Sacoontalā etc. Besides these, he edited numerous works for the public in the Bibliotheca Indica.

In none of these works is he guilty of the charge laid in the following two lines :

"Commentators each dark passage shun,

And hold a farthing rush-light the sun;"

A charge of which even Mallinātha is guilty in some places of his works.

This is a hurried account of the life and writings of Pandit Prema Chandra Tarkabagis. A little time and proper investigation would bring much interesting matter to light. The friends and relatives of the pandit should furnish the public with a more detailed account.

The day has not come when Indian Boswells will write lives of Indian Johnsons, but the time has certainly arrived when notices of eminent persons should be handled in newspapers and journals.

It is a sacred duty to embalm the memories of the illustrious dead, and it was a sense of this sacred duty ceased, to bring before the public this short account of one who as a commentator, the first of this age, falls not behind the much, celebrated Mallinātha. A. B.

Benares, April 1st, 1867.

Pandit Hīrānand Chaube : an Obituary

The God Yama seems as if he had, this year, directed all his attention towards the most eminent of the Pandits of India. The tears of sorrow which we shed at the death of Pandit Premachandra Tarkavāgīśa had hardly dried up, when the knell tolled in another quarter and announced that Pandit Viṭṭhala Śāstrī was no more. Pandit Hīrānand Chaube who, for more than half a century, held the first place in the eye of the Public, as an eminent Sanskrit Scholar and a zealous antiquarian, also shared the lot of humanity on Sunday last. The death of this learned Pandit suggests a short retrospect of his career.

He was born in a village in the district of Goruckpore.His father died when he was a boy, without bequeathing to him the advantages of wealth or rank. As a poor Brāhmana he came to Benares to prosecute the study of the Sanskrit language; which he did with assiduity and success. He had to struggle with the difficulties which merit generally meets with when involved in poverty. But he was not to suffer these long. Pandit Śālagrāma Upādhyāya, on getting the post of Hindū Law Officer in the Sudder Court at Agra, recommended Pandit Hīrānanda to officiate for him in the College. He served in the Sanskrit College for more than twenty years as the Porfessor of Rhetoric. This connection with the College at once raised him from the recesses of obscurity. His uncommonly great talents, accompanied with his simplicity of manners and openness of heart, recommended him to the notice of the nobility of Benares. He cultivated their society (of course for gain's sake) with assiduity up to the time of his death.

There was yet a brighter prospect before the Pandit. He was chosen for the post of Hindū Law Officer at Agra. He discharged the responsible and onerous duties of this situation with

1. Pan. 2, 15 (Aug. 1, 1867) 70. Letter written from the Benares College, the 9th July 1867, by *An Admirer.*

integrity and honesty. The Officers in the Court were perfectly satisfied with him. He had all which could make a man happy in this world — wealth, knowledge, influence. But his happiness was not without alloy. His eldest and the most promising of his grandsons died. This was too severe a trial for his old age. Fortunately for him the post which he held was soon abolished and he was allowed to retire on a moderate pension. The rest of his life he passed at Benares in devotional exercises.

This eminent scholar, I am sorry to say, left no published works to perpetuate his memory. He amused himself at his leisure with poetical compositions which he would sometimes read to his friends. These peoms breathe the spirit of originality and have been pronounced by learned Pandits to bear the type of a true genius. He also wrote a treatise on Sanskrit Garmmar which has not yet been published. It is however hoped, as his sons are in good circumstances, that it will be soon published. The critical remarks on it till then may be reserved.

As this reverend personage for a long time bore an honorable connection with the Sanskrit College of which the Pandit is a Journal, I hope you will not deny me a space in your columns for the insertion of these lines.

The Hindu Doctrine of Idolatry[1]

Shashi Shekhara Sānyāl
Secretary Benares Asso., & president of the club preparatory to the Benares Asso.

A Hindu gentleman has recently delivered a lecture at the Benares Institute, consisting of remarks on Mr. Lingam Lakshmaji Pantlu Garu's lecture on the "Social Status of the Hindus", in which he has attempted to vindicate *idolatry* and the Hindu doctrine of *necessity*. The lecture is published, but the circulation is very limited. It is in fact a sealed pamphlet to the public, and hence its resemblance to that of the Freemasons. So, I think, it may not be improper to ask you to bestow a little space in your valuable journal entitled काशीविद्यासुधानिधिः [2] (one of the objects of which is "to offer a field for the discussion of controverted points in old Indian Philosophy, Philology, History and Literature") for a slight review of this sealed pamphlet, and consequently of the great questions of *idolatry* and the Hindu Doctrine of *necessity*.

The lecturer in the first place offers a criticism on Mr. Garu's notion of idolatry, who says that the very name of it is sufficient to "trumpet forth the grossness of our system of worship", and in another place "we regard every idol we worship as the Self-existent, Eternal, Supreme Being, who is the cause of everything and into whom everything is finally absorbed". To this latter sentence of Mr. Garu, the lecturer with great ingenuity attaches three distinct meanings which are as follows – (1) "That all our notions of of Godhead are limited to our idols; it is our idols that are our divinities, and beyond our idols we have no divinity." – (2) "That we do believe in a Supreme Being, Infinite and Eternal, who is distinct from the idols, yet at the same time we believe him to be mere idols, or

1. Pan. 2, 16 (Sept. 1, 1866) 88-91.
2. काशीविद्यासुधानिधिः कथंभूतः "प्राच्यप्रतीच्यवाक्पूर्वापरपक्षद्वयान्वितः"

masses of matter inert, unthinking and perishable." – (3) "That we believe that what is Real in the idols is the Supreme Being, that the stone or wood is a mere illusion, seeming to exist because of the sustaining presence of the Divine Spirit." Then, "if by idolatry", exclaims the lecturer, "is meant a system of worship which confines our ideas of the Divinity to a mere image of clay or stone, which prevents our hearts from being expanded and elevated with lofty notions of the attributes of God, we disclaim idolatry, we abhor idolatry and deplore the ignorance or uncharitableness of those that charge us with this grovelling system of worship." Whether idolatry, by confining our ideas of the Divinity to a mere image, prevents us from having lofty notions of the attributes of God or not may be best known by appealing to the consciousness of any true Hindu idolater. If this be actually the case with the generality of the Hindu idolaters, the lecturer's disclaiming and abhorring idolatry and deploring the "ignorance or uncharitableness of those that charge us with this grovelling system of worship", is of no avail. His abhorrence of the system must give way before facts. If millions of Hindu men and women be really found unable to raise their minds to God, is not Mr. Garu quite justified in remarking that the very name of idolatry is "sufficient to trumpet forth the grossness of our system of worship"? Be that as it may, the first meaning which the lecturer attaches to the sentence of Mr. Garu has no sense in it; for the Sanskrit word प्रतिमूर्तिः or प्रतिमा means a *likeness* or an *image*, and it is clear that there must be another thing besides the likeness or image, viz., the thing of which it is a likeness or an image. There must be at least two things for a *likeness*, or an *image*, and what is the second thing here must be a God. Thus the lecturer's fondness for shewing ingenuity by attaching different meanings to the sentence of Mr. Garu has made him blind as regards the Sanskrit word for an idol and led him to the utterance of nonsense.

Neither the second nor the third meaning attached to the sentence of Mr. Garu is the true one, although the lecturer expresses full assurance that Mr. Garu must have meant it in the second sense. Mr. Garu is a representative of the people and

consequently cannot invent three distinct meanings out of his own mind as the lecturer has done; neither has he so much power of invention.

Moreover as regards the second meaning it should be observed that no man can form two different conceptions of the same thing at one and the same time. In order to form two distinct ideas of a thing we require two distinct portions of time. A little consideration would have shewn the lecturer that the second meaning attached to the sentence of Mr. Garu is also nonesense. For to believe a thing at one and the same time to be a "Supreme Being, Infinite and Eternal", distinct from the idol, and also a mere idol, or mass of "matter, inert unthinking and perishable", is impossible.

The fallacy of the lecturer is in supposing that there can be three and only three distinct meanings of the sentence of Mr. Garu, and he argued that as Mr. Garu cannot mean the first and the third which are respectively too foolish and too deep, he being an ordinary man must have meant the second. Little did the lecturer dream of the fact that a fourth and a true meaning can be attached to the sentence of Mr. Garu, which is as follows:– That we believe in a Self-existent, Eternal Supreme Being as distinct from the idol and that He is called into the idol at the time of worshipping by means of mantras. It should be borne in mind "that Mr. Garu, here assuming the philosophic belief of the Hindus that the thirty-three crores of gods are all one and the same Being, shews the grossness of the system. This, I think, is the true sense of the sentence and that which Mr. Garu should, at least, he supposed to have meant, for we should, as justice requires, put the best construction upon it we can. Accordingly it has been said अभिरूप्यां च बिम्बानां देवः सांनिध्यमृच्छति when an idol is beautiful made there comes the god (*i. e.* the particular god whom the worshipper invokes). Such being the case प्रतिमायां शिलाबुद्धिं कुर्वाणो नरकं व्रजेत् any man who thinks of the image of god as a piece of stone goes to hell. If this be acknowledged to be the true sense of the sentence of Mr. Garu the third meaning of the lecturer, though plausible, must be confessed to

be a forced one. Neither can the lecturer claim any originality for it, for the same defence is generally heard in the mouth of idolatrous cavillers.

As regards this third meaning it should be observed that the lecturer, without a shadow of proof, takes for granted the Vedāntic conclusion, (ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः the only truth is Brahma, the universe is a delusion, even the animals are not distinct from Brahma) as true.

Is the lecturer not aware of the fact that there is a rival system of the Sānkhya propounded by the great sage Kapila[1] who says ईश्वरासिद्धेः (aph. 93 book I.) "For there is no proof that there is a god"? The lecturer in order to establish his point should have at least refuted the Sānkhya Philosophy, for it does not at all inculcate the doctrine of the unreality of the external world (जगत्सत्यमदुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाद्बाधकाभावात् aph. 52 book VI. "The world is real for it is the effect of an unobjectionable cause and because there is no one to refute this"). I fear the lecturer has not understood the Vedāntic tenet because he identifies it with Bishop Berkeley's idealism and Mr. Mill's 'Permanent Possibilities of Sensation.' Ture it is that Mr. Mill defines *matter* as a 'permanent possibility of sensation', but the Vedānta goes further and positively affirms that the sensation itself is a delusion. As for Bishop Berkeley, he has never denied the existence of matter which we see and feel around us, but simply the noumenon or substance or substratum of it. "When Berkeley denied the existence of matter", says Mr. Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy, "he simply denied the existence of that unknown substratum the existence of which Locke had declared to be a necessary inference from our knowledge of qualities". But why resort to authorities when we have Berkeley's own words ? — "I do not argue," says the Bishop,

1. Kapila is regarded by the Hindus as an incarnation of Vishṇu and represented to have obtained by birth the knowledge of the twenty-five principles "पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वेषु जन्मना ज्ञानमाप्तवान्" ॥ तथाच भागवते

"पञ्चमः कपिलो नाम सिद्धेशः कालविप्लुतं ।
प्रोवाचासुरये सांख्यं तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम्" ॥

"against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sensation or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hand do exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence I deny is that which philosophers call matter, corporeal substance;" so that the doctrine of the Vedānta can never be identified with the tenets of a Berkeley or a Mill. For the lecturer's consideration I give here the true view of the purport of the Vedānta in Sanskrit and in my own words. — यद्यपि हिन्दुजातयः सांख्यादिसर्वदर्शनानि ऋषिनिर्मितानि मन्यन्ते तथापीदानीं प्रायः सर्वे वेदान्तदर्शनसिद्धान्तान् विशेषरूपेणाद्रियन्ते अतः कारणात् तद्दर्शनसिद्धान्तान् संक्षेपेण यथाबुद्धि निरूपयिष्यामः ॥ वेदस्यान्तो वेदन्तो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति वेदान्तदर्शनस्योद्देश्यः । ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाब्रह्मजिज्ञासा । ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । इत्याशयेन भगवान् बादरायणः शारीरिकसूत्रग्रन्थे प्रथमं सूत्रयामास ॥ ते वेदान्तिनो ब्रह्मवादिनो न सांख्यवत् प्रकृतिमेव जगतो मूलकारणं मन्यन्त इत्यर्थः परंत्विमानि सर्वाणि दृश्यवस्तून्यकल्पितानि रज्जौ सर्पत्वभ्रमवच्छुक्त्यां रजतत्वभ्रमवच्च । एवं प्रकारेण रज्जोर्वा शुक्त्याः स्थाने जगत्प्रपञ्चं स्थापियित्वा जगत्त्वस्याध्यासो बोद्धव्यः ॥ ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापर इति वेदान्तदर्शनसिद्धान्तज्ञाने पुरुषः परमपुरुषार्थं प्राप्नोतीति शम् ॥ काशी स्थसभायाः संपादकः श्रीशशिशेखरसान्यालः ॥

Now it should be remarked that the lecturer's forced assertion : "it is not the image that we worship as the Supreme Being, but the Omnipresent Spirit that pervades the image as he pervades the whole universe," and its anticipated objection — "why do not you worship the Omnipresent Deity in any other material object than an image or symbol consecrated ?" and its answer : "simply because no association has been established in our minds between it and the presence of God", is an example of logical nicety. What is the use of forming *fictitious* associations with he presence of God at all, as if the existence of God depended upon the Lecturer's forming arbitrary association? A whimsical theory indeed ! A true association must be inherent in human nature and therefore must be suggested by its own law. Hence Dr. Brown calls *association* the law of *suggestion*. Let the lecturer associate God with his own body, if he likes, and compassionately call others atheists "being incapable of thinking for themselves".

Another ridiculous argument which has been brought forward by the lecturer is that because we cannot conceive God

and His Infinite attributes in the abstract therefore in order to avoid "practical" atheism, we should practise idolatry. It is not a fact that we cannot form abstract notions. On the other hand, I think it is *abstraction* alone that puts a perfect distance between men and brutes. To the effect that we can for abstract notions, I quote the following from Mr. Locke – "The use of words then being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this the mind takes the particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind, such appearances separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existences, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called 'abstraction', whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all the same kind; and their names, general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas". Besides the lecturer, in attestation of his assertion that we cannot conceive God in the abstract, quotes Sir W. Hamilton who says : "True therefore are the declarations of a pious philosophy, 'A God understood would be no God at all; to think that God is as we can think him to be is blasphemy". It seems to me that even Sir W. Hamilton, whom the lecturer acknowledges to be an acute and deep thinker, has fallen here into an egregious blunder. A little consideration would have shewn him that we cannot conceive the nature of God more than our faculties allow us to conceive. Our faculties are given and limited by Him. Consequently there can be no blasphemy in the conception of God who is revealed in the conciousness, however imperfect it may be.

Now let us see the harmony of the argument of Sir W. Hamilton when applied to idolatry. "True therefor are the declarations of a pious philosophy". 'A God *represented by means of an image* would be no God at all; to think that God is as we can *represent Him* by *an image* is blasphemy'. Sir W. Hamilton is correct when he expresses a somewhat similar (but by no means

the same) idea more scientifically. "The Infinite and Absolute are the names of two counter imbecilities of the human mind, transmitted into the nature of things, of two subjective negations transformed into objective affirmations." Further I quote some of the following authorized Hindu texts for the lecturer's consideration, from which it is clear that the learned should not worship idols —

मृच्छिलाधातुदार्वादिमूर्तावीश्वरवुद्धयः ।
क्लिश्यन्ति तपसा मूढाः परां शान्तिं न यान्ति ते ॥

Those fools who think of God in an image of mud, metal, stone or wood only get bodily pain but no salvation.

यो मां सर्वेषु भूतेषु सन्तमा त्मानमीश्वरं ।
हित्वार्च्चाम्भजते मौढ्याद्भस्मन्येवजुहोतिसः ॥

The man who having left me, the I who pervades every being, foolishly adores an idol, he offers *ghee* to ashes.

Lastly it should be observed that the idea prevalent among the Hindus is that in India there has been no change of creed. But certainly there is no foundation for such an assertion. How much the Vedic sentiments were changed in ancient times is clear from the following words of the Maṇḍūka Upanishad, तत्राऽपरा ऋग्वेदोयजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्ववेदः शिक्षाकल्पोव्याकरणंनिरुक्तं छन्दोज्योतिषमिति । अथपरा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते" ॥ There must be some change in the progressive kingdom of God. When there began an enquiry into *one's self* and *God*, most men discredited the rites and ceremonies inculcated in the Karmakāṇḍa. Then they were dissatisfied with the worship of Indra, Varuṇa &c. There was a time when the Vedas were considered as all truth and nothing but the truth, and consequently oblations and sacrifices were worthy of being practised. But in the time of the Upanishads, literary men had no such faith in the mass of rites as they had before. From these considerations it is clear that the Vedas, not to say the Purāṇas, maintain contradictory doctrines and inculcate hero-worship. Therefore I cannot better conclude the first part of my review (viz., of the doctrine of idolatry) than by quoting the following memorable words of Francis W. Newman,

for the lecturer's consideration. – "The glorifying of religious teachers" says the Professor "has hitherto never borne any fruit but canonizations and deifications, 'voluntary humility and worshipping of messengers,' vain competitions and rival sects, stagnation in the letter, quenching of the spirit."

By-the-bye it may be remarked that although the lecture signs himself a Hindu, still he, not being a Brahman, had the courage in a full meeting of the "Benares Institute" to utter Vedic texts, which is strictly forbidden in the Upanishads themselves, under the penalty of the tongue being cut out of the utterer and molden lead being poured into the ears of the audience.

Another time I hope to discuss the Hindu doctrine of *necessity*.

On Different Breeds of Horses[1]

Léon Rodet

Ingénieur des Manufactures de l' Etat, Service des Tabacs à Paris.

My brother-in-law, Mr. Goubaux, Professor of Anatomy in the Veterinary School at Alfort, is very desirous to get precise informations concerning a question now discussed about among the Anatomists, and I esteem I cannot direct him better than to you, Sir, who are surrounded with so many men possessing of so various kinds of knowledge.

The question is the following one : —

Many Naturalists, likely desirous to ground upon a sample their theory about the plurality of human races, say, that there are also many races, two at least, among the *horses*, distinguished between each other by the number of the vertebrœ belonging to the loins : the first, originating from Africa, and introduced in the various countries of the West of Europe by the Arabs, has seven of those vertebrœ; the second, indigenous in Asia, and imported into Europe by the Aryas themselves, possesses only six or five vertebries in the loins. Mr. Goubaux, who slaughtered in his life many hundred horses, has found those numbers of vertebrœ in the loins varying from one individual to another without any variation of origin, and thinks consequently that the character invoked by the naturalists is not fit to establish a distinction of race.

But, the horses in Europe, according to the theory quoted above, being produced by mingling the African race with the Asiatic one, it might be that the indifference with which the numbers observed by my brother-in-law were obtained, be occasioned by that mingling. Therefore, in order to get rid of the matter, Mr. Goubaux wishes to know if horses living in the original countries of the supposed races show the character in question constantly, or, as the horses in Europe do, accidental-

1. Pan. 3, 31 (Dec. 1, 1868) 164. Letter from : Paris, the 3rd November 1868.

ly. For that purpose, he would be very satisfied to get the following informations, which you are able, I imagine, to procure him by the learned men meeting at Benares; viz.:

1st — If there is in India, perhaps in the mountains of Himālaya or Ghondwana or even of Malaya (the Ghats) *a peculiar race of horses, differing by any character soever* from the races known *in Europe*.

2nd — *How many vertebræ* that peculiar race of horses possesses *in the loins*; whether *seven* or *six*; whether *constantly* or *accidentally* the first or the second of those numbers.

Questions of that description being of a general interst, you would most conveniently, without trouble for you, give the answer in your most valuable Journal, "The Pandit", of which I am an assiduous reader.

It is useless to add that my brother-in-law fixes no time to have those informations : the sooner, the better; but within the limits of secure observation.

I take the liberty to say that, for my particular, I would be very glad to possess, for the imperial Library at Paris, a copy, printed or in hand writing, of the treatise in Sanskrit concerning the Veterinary, like the Aśva-āyurveda, the treaty [treatise] about the diseases of the elephant existing at Berlin, something concerning the humped Ox, or Śiva-Ox, and generally every kind of beasts, in order to procure to my brother-in-law the indigenous obsevations about those animals.

Give me leave, Sir, to tell me your most devoted servant and admirator of your most learned journal.

On the Word Barbara[1]

Śivaprasād

Max Müller in his "Chips" says the Western coast of India was inhabited by the *barbaras*, or the savage aborigines, with woolly hair. Barbar in Sanskrit means a blockhead and fool. I am not sure what is the origin of the Greek word *barbaros*; is it not derived from Barbary, and does it not prove that the coast as well as Greece had an intercourse with that part of Africa? Webster says "the Greeks used the iterated syllables *barbar* to denote that a man was unintelligible in his talk;" now in Hindī we still use the verb *baṛbaṛānā* for chattering nonsense; but is not even this meaning attached to the word on account of the unintelligible (to the Greeks) talk of the inhabitants of Barbary? There are good grounds to believe that the whole Indian Peninsula was, at one time, colonized by the Egyptians, and that the doctrines of Buddhism came from that country. The Āryans did not shave their faces as the Persians (Āryans of Persia) did not; but the Buddhists shaved as the Egyptians did. Belief in transmigration of the soul and respect for animal life were common to both. Moreover Barbary under the name of *Babbar* which is the Prākrit form of writing *Barbar* is mentioned in the Jain book, Śrīpāl Charitra quoted below :

"भोभो जइ जल इंधण पमुहेहिं किंपि अत्थि तुम्हाणं । कज्जं ता कहह फुडं बब्बरकूलं समणुपत्तं ॥३० ॥" (meaning in Sanskrit) भो भो लोका यदि युष्माकं जलेन्धनप्रमुखैः किमपि कार्यमस्ति तत् तर्हि स्फुटं प्रकटं यूयं कथयत यतो बब्बरकूलं समनुप्राप्तं बब्बरकूलाख्यं बिंदरम् सम्प्राप्तमस्तीत्यर्थः ॥३० ॥ Again in the 8th adhyāya of the 9th skandha of the Bhāgavat *Barbar* is thus mentioned, with some other similar countries सगरश्चक्रवर्त्यासीत् सागरो यत्सुतैः कृतः । यस्तालजंघान् यवनान् शकान् हैहयबर्बरान् ॥५ ॥ अवधीद्गुरुवाक्येन चक्रे विकृतवेषिणः ।

1. Pan. 2, 23 (April 1, 1868) 250. Communicated by the author from Benares, the 18th March, 1868.

Suggestion for the Improvement of The Pandit[1]

As it is the duty of every one interested in the progress of literature and consequently in that of your journal (i. e. The Pandit) suggest any improvement worthy of notice, I write the following few lines and submit them to your perusal. In my opinion the plan of your journal is susceptible of improvement. The chief principle of my view is that every prakaraṇa (प्रकरण) should be complete in itself, i. e. after the end of each year, the subscribers may be able to unloose the several pamphlets printed during the year and arrange the several prakaraṇas separately so that they may have so many useful books. I shall illustrate my plan by taking the Nos. for September and October 1867. After finishing the "प्रकरणपंचिकोपसंहरणं " on the 71st page, the page (71st) should be left blank. The preface and the essay on " नरेश्वरपरीक्षा " should be commenced on a new page, i. e. at the top of the 73rd page (Vol. II) for example, and pages should be marked 1, 2, 3, &c. Then according to my calculation the 78th becomes sixth; this page should be printed up to bottom and should not be encroached upon by the commencement of another topic, which has been the case. In the next number, i. e. that for October 1867, the page 93rd where the " नरेश्वरपरीक्षा " begins should be marked 7th, the next 8th and so on. The same course must be followed for " हरिविलास " commenced on the 78th page, i. e. it should be commenced on the 79th page and the pages should be numbered one, two, three and so on. In fact the pamphlet should be issued in such a form that every " प्रकरण " Sanskrit as well as English can be arranged separately without destroying the order of the pages. When a "प्रकरण" is finished a title page should be issued for that प्रकरण. In short I recommend the plan of " सर्वसंग्रह " a pamphlet containing the works of

1. Pan. 3, 25 (June 1, 1868) 22. Communicated on 25th May, 1868 (Poona) anonymously under "A POONITE".

Marathi Poets, successfully conducted by the able and beneficent guidance of Mr. Mādhava Chandrobā who during the past 7 years received the merited praise of the educated public for the efforts exerted in the advancement of Marathi Literature. The plan proposed, if adopted, will be of much use to the public and will invite more subscirbers.

The Benares Pillar Inscription

Śivaprasād

I beg to send herewith a fac-simile of an inscription, reduced in size, with its transliteration in Devanāgarī characters. The Pillar which bears this inscription was brought up from Ghazeepore District in the time of the late Mr. Thomason (Lieut.-Governor, N.W.P.) and erected North of the Benares College building. It is by rough measurement 24 cubits high and is estimated to be 900 Mans in weight. For the letters obliterated in the inscription blank circles are left in the fac-simile, but the late Hiranand Chaube, Pandit of the College, fills them up thus :—

विपुलविजयकीर्तिः क्षत्रसद्धर्मपालः ।
सततदयितपार्थः पार्थिवानीकपालः ॥
विनिहितपितृनाकः शस्तसामन्तपालः ।
विहितइवविधात्रोपक्रमाद्धर्मपालः ॥[1]

(Translation.)

"One who is famous for his conquests, who protects the good laws of the Kshatriyas, who is always kind to the kings (or who is always a beloved king) who protects the hosts of kings, who has placed his ancestors in the Heavens (or who has supported his ancestrors and the Heavens) and protects his good neighbours, such a king Providence created Dharmapāla even from the beginning."

Below are mentioned four names, (1) Traividyānuchitra, (2) Traividyānuvidhān, (3) Ativāruṇā or Satīvāruṇā and (4) Nātreyī. The Pandit thought by Dharmapāla Yudhiṣṭhira of the Mahābhārat was meant, and by Pārtha (in the inscription Pārttha) his brother Arjuna, but this is preposterous. The pillar though it does not bear any Samvat year, is no doubt much more modern than the Vikrama era. The Rājā Dharmapāla, or of

1. Pan. 4, 38 (July 1, 1869) 43.

some other name ending with Pāl, belongs in my opinion to the family of the Pāl Rājās of Benares, who are thought to have been Buddhists. I have not the Asiatic Society's books just now with me for reference, but if my memory does not fail there is some mention of these Rājās in them, and also perhaps in Lassen's Indische Alterthumskunde. The letters in which the four names are inscribed seem to differ from those of the Ślōka, and in all probabilty have been added subsequently.

The most curious of all is the undeciphered portion of the inscription at the foot of the fac-simile like a representation of snakes, shells, birds, &c., but I am convince it is a fifth name and most probably in old trans-Himalayan Bhotiyā or Chinese characters. Who knows if it may not be the name of Fa Hian or his follower fellow-countryman ? In the Society's books I have seen several old inscriptions accompanied with such characters at their foot or side (see No. 9, plate XXXV, page 676, and No. 16, plate LVI, page 968, in Vol. VI of the Bengal Asiatic Society's Journal). But to my great astonishment I have seen them written in durable black ink, now unknown, on the roofs of caverns, beyond the ordinary reach of the human hand, in the Valley of the Sutlej, near Dattanagar, in Bisaher territory; and at Achhar Paṭāchhar in Bhujje (a small principality near Simla). There is a similar inscription on a rock by the side of the little rivulet in the small village Kālkā at the foot of the Hills on which the Kussoulee Cantonment stands.


इ ह वि पु ल वि ज य की र्ति : क्ष त्र स द्ध र्म पा ल :
स त त द यि त पा र्थ : पा र्थि वा नी क पा ल : वि नि हि
ना क : वि हि त इ व वि धा नो प क्र मा
त्रै वि द्या नु चि त्र ना त्रै धे त्रै वि द्या नु वि धा न
स तो वा रु ण

Remarks on a Copper Land Grant of Jaya Chandra[1]

Śivaprasād

About a year ago a carpenter named Jagat brought a copper plate 20 inches by 17 1/2 inches to Mr. Griffith, the Principal of the Queen's College here, which he had found in his field, when ploughing about 6 miles North-east from the city in the village Sihvar.

It is the grant of a village to Brāhman from Raja Jaya Chandra the Rathaur King of Kanauj, dated 1232 of the Samvat Era (A. D. 1172). It traces the pedigree of the Raja to Yaśovigrah as noted be below.[2] I find a duplicate of this grant, of course with the difference of the name the village, the donee and the year of grant, published in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. X. Part 1st, January to June 1841, No. 109 page 98, with its translation into English and the following remarks by the Secretary.

"Note on a Copper Land Grant, by Jaya Chandra. The copper plate whence the accompanying reading in modern Sanskrit character and translation are taken, was found near Fyzabad in Oudh, and a fac-simile of it was forwarded to me by Lieut. Col. Caulfield then Resident at Lucknow. The land grants of the donor, Raja Jaya Chandra, are not uncommon. In the first volume of the Transactions of the Asiatic Society there is a notice by the late Mr. Colebrooke (p. 441), of a grant by this Raja, which is however described at second hand : 'Without having seen the original,' says Mr. Colebrooke, 'no opinion can be offered as to the probable genuineness of this monument, (dates S. 1220 A. D. 1164) the inscription is however consistent with Chronology; for Jaya Chandra who is described in the Ayeen Akberi as supreme Monarch of India, having the seat of

1. Pan. 4, 40 (September 1, 1969) p. 94-96.
2. (i) Yaśovigrah. (ii) Mahīchandra. (iii) Chandradeva. (iv) Madanapāl. (v) Govinda Chandra. (vi) Vijaya Chandra. (vii) Jaya Chandra.

his Empire at Canouj, is there mentioned as the ally of Shehabuddin in the war with Prithair Raja, or Pithora, about the year of the Hejira 588, or A. D. 1192; twenty eight years after the date of this grant."

"The date of the grant now published is S. 1243, or A. D. 1187, twenty three years subsequent to that of the same monarch noted by Mr. Colebrooke, and only six years prior to the death of the ill-fated donor, which occurred A. D. 1193. With him expired the dynasty of the Rathore princes of Kanouj.

"The genealogy, as given in the grant now before us, differs only in the name of the first ancestor mentioned from that found in Mr. Colebrooke's grant. The name is there Sripala, here Yaśovigra, but the identity of the monarch known under these different appellations, has been already ascertained, and admitted by the highest authorities, (As. Soc. Jour. Vol. III. p. 339)."

"The phraseology of this grant is not different from those of Jaya Chandra, which have been already discovered : the anathema against the resumers of land granted in free tenure is remarkable for its peculiar bitterness. The plate, judging from the fac-simile, must be in high preservation, and the date it gives is valuable, as bearing corroborative testimony to the accuracy of chronological data."

As the Sanskrit text published in the Journal contains several mistakes. I give it here as read in the College copper plate; but as the College copper plate is very illegible in some parts in the middle, the Journal text has been of great help to me in its restoration. Unfortunately the name of the villlage is only half readable. However it is evident that Jaya Chandra reigned supreme over the Benares Revenue Divsion which was conquered and made a dependency of Kanouj by his ancestors. The names of Gādhipura for Ghazeepore, Kuśikā for Baksar (Buxar) and Uttara Kośala mentioned in the plate cannot be but most interesting to those who are conversant with the Rāmāyaṇa.

The most striking in the plate is the mention of the हम्म्य हिम्बीर नारी. In the Journal's text it is printed हर्म्म हम्वीरनारी, but the

translator there has left in blank with five asterisks ! In my opinion it alludes to some war between the Muhammadan armies of the west and Jaya Chandra's father, who might have gone as an ally with the other Rājās to protect the frontier and gained a victory. I would translate it "women of the *haramsarā* to the *Amīr* (King of Ghazni and Ghor)." Amīr being the title of Khalīfās of Baghdād the head of the Muhammadans, was considered in those days as the highest distinction, and it strengthens the assumption of Sir Henry Elliot that हम्मीर the name of the famous Rajpūt hero of Chitour is nothing but a corruption of Amīr. The poor poet of Jaya Chandra did not know at the time that his master was destined to be shot by the arrow of the slave of the same *Amīr* upon whose wives' tears he has been thus jesting.

Benares
18th August, 1869

[Sanskrit Text of Copper Land Grant]

स्वस्ति । अकुण्ठात्कण्ठवैकुण्ठकण्ठपीठलुठत्करः ।
संरम्भः सुरतारम्भे स श्रियः श्रेयसे ऽस्तु.वः ॥
आसीदशीतद्युतिवंशजातक्ष्मापालमालासु दिवं गतासु ।
साक्षाद्विवस्वानिव भूरिधाम्ना नाम्ना यशोविग्रह इत्युदारः ॥
तत्सुतोभून्महीचन्द्रश्चन्द्रधाम निभं निजं ।
येनापारमकूपारपारे व्यापारितं यशः ॥
तस्याभूतनयो नयैकरसिकः क्रान्ताद्विषन्मण्डलो
विध्वस्तोद्धतधीरयोधतिमिरः श्रीचन्द्रदेवोनृपः ।
येनोदारतरप्रतापशमिता शेषप्रजोपद्रवं
श्रीमद्गाधिपुराधिराज्यमसमं दोर्विक्रमेणार्जितं ॥
तीर्थानि काशिकुशिकोत्तरकोशलेन्द्र-
स्थानीयकानि परिपालयताऽधिगम्यं ।
हेमात्मतुल्यमनिशं ददता द्विजेभ्यो
येनाङ्किता वसुमती शतशस्तुलाभिः ॥
तस्यात्मजो मदनपालइति क्षितीन्द्र-

चूडामणि र्विजयते निजगोत्रचन्द्रः ।
यस्याभिषेककलशोल्लसितैः पयोभिः
प्रक्षालितं कलिरजः पटलं धरित्र्याः ॥
यस्यासीद्विजयप्रयाणसमये तुङ्गाचलोच्चैश्चल-
न्माद्यत्कुम्भिपदक्रमासमतरद् भ्रश्यन्महीमण्डले ।
चूडारत्नविभिन्नतालुगलितस्त्यानासृगुद्भासितः
शेषः पेषवसादिवक्षणमसौ क्रोडेनिलीनाननः ॥
तस्मादजायत निजायत बाहुवल्ली-
वन्धावनद्धनवराज्यगजोनरेन्द्रः ।
सान्द्रामृतद्रवमुचां प्रभवो गवां यो
गोविन्द्रचन्द्र इति चन्द्रइवांबुराशेः ॥
न कथमप्यलभन्तरणक्षणस्तिसृषुदिक्षुगजानथवज्रिणः ।
ककुभिवभ्रमुरभ्रवल्लभप्रतिभटा इव यस्य भटागजाः ॥
अजनिविजयचन्द्रोनाम तस्मान्नरेन्द्रोः
सुरपतिरिव भूभृत्पक्षविच्छेददत्तः ।
भुवनदलनहेला हम्म्यहिम्बीरनारी
नयनजलदधारा धौतभूलोकतापः ॥
लोकत्रया क्रमणकेलिविश्रृंखलानि
प्रख्यातकीर्तिकविवर्णितवैभवानि ।
यस्य त्रिविक्रमपदक्रमभाञ्जिभान्ति-
प्रोज्जृभयंन्ति बलिराजभयं यशांसि ॥
यस्मिंश्चलत्युदधिनेमिमहीजयार्थ-
माद्यत्करीन्द्रगुरुभारनिपीडितेव ।
याति प्रजापतिपदं शरणार्थिनीभू-
स्तद्भर्त्तुरङ्गनिवहोत्थरजश्छलेन ॥
तस्माददुद्भुततविक्रमादथ जयच्चन्द्राभिधानः पति .
र्भूपानामवतीर्ण एष भुवनोद्धाराय नारायणः ।
द्वैधीभावमपास्य विग्रहरुचिं धिक्कृत्यशान्ताशयाः
सेवन्ते यमुदग्रबन्धनभयध्वंसार्थिनः पार्थिवाः ॥
गच्छेन्मूर्छामतुच्छां नयदिकवलयेत् कूर्म्मपृष्ठाभिघातः

प्रत्यावृत्तश्रमार्त्तो नमदखिलफणश्वासवात्यासहस्रं ।
उद्योगे यस्य धावद्धरणिधरधुनी निर्झरस्फारधार
भ्रश्यद्दान द्विपाली बहुलभरगलद्धैर्य्य मुद्रःफणीन्द्रः ॥

सोयं समस्तराजचक्रसंसेवितचरणः स च परमभट्टारकमहाराजाधिराजपरमेश्वरपरम-माहेश्वरनिजभुजोपार्जितश्रीकन्यकुब्जाधिपत्यश्रीचन्द्रदेवपादानुध्यातपरमभट्टारकमहाराजा-धिराजपरमेश्वरपरममाहेश्वरश्रीमदनपालदेवपादानुध्यातपरमभट्टारक महाराजाधिराजपरमेश्वर-परममाहेश्वराश्वपतिगजपतिनरपतिराजत्रयाधिपतिविविधविद्यांविचारवाचस्पतिश्रीगोविन्दच न्द्रदेवपादानुध्यातपरमभट्टारकमहाराजाधिराजपरमेश्वरपरममाहेश्वराश्वपतिगजपतिनरपति-राजत्रयाधिपतिविविधविद्याविचारवाचस्पतिश्रीविजयचंद्रदेवपादानुध्यातपरमभट्टारकमहारा जाधिराजपरमेश्वरपरममाहेश्वराश्वपतिगजपतिनरपतिराजत्रायाधिपतिविविधविद्याविचारवाच -स्पति श्रीमज्जयचंद्र देवोविजयी ॥

माणवपत्तलायां * * * नायीग्राम * निवासिनोनिखिलजनपदानुपगतानपिचराजराज्ञी युवराजमन्त्रिपुरोहितप्रतीहारसेनापतिभाण्डागारिकाख्यपटलिकभिषङ् नैमित्तिकान्तः पुरिकदू-तकरितुरगपत्तनाकरस्थानगोकुलाधिकारि पुरुषानां ज्ञापयति वोधयत्यादिशतिचविदितमस्तु-भवतां ॥

योश्चोपरिलिखितग्रामौ सजलस्थलौसलोहलवणाकरौ समत्स्याकरौ सगर्त्तोषदौसगि-रिगहननिधानौ समधूकाम्रवनवाटिकाविटपतृण * तिगोचरपर्य्यंतौ सोर्द्वाधश्चतुराघाट विशुद्धौ श्चसीमापर्य्यन्तौ द्वात्रिंशदधिकद्वादशशतसम्वत्सरे भाद्रेमासि शुक्लपक्षे त्रयोदश्यां तिथौ रविदिने अङ्कतोपि संवत् १२३२ भाद्रसुदि १३ रवौ अद्येह श्रीमद्विजय वाराणस्यां गङ्गोदकेन स्नात्वा विधिवन्मन्त्रदेवमुनिमनुजभूतपितृगणां स्तर्पयित्वा तिमिरपटलपाटलपटुमहसमुध्मरो-चिषमुपस्थायौषधीपति सकलशेश्वरं समभ्यर्च्य त्रिभुवनत्रातुर्भगवतो वासुदेवस्य पूजां विधाय प्रचुरपायसेन हविषाहविर्भुजं हुत्वा मातापित्रोरात्मनश्च पुण्ययशोभिवृद्धये अस्माभिर्गोकर्णकु-शलतापूतकरतलोदकपूर्वकशार्क्कराक्षगोत्राय भार्गवच्यवनाप्नवानौर्व्वजामदग्न्येति पञ्चप्रव-राय महापण्डितश्रीमहीधरपौत्राय महामिश्रपण्डित श्रीहलिपुत्राय महापण्डितश्रीहृ-षीकेशशर्म्मणे ब्राह्मणाय राजपुत्रश्रीहरिश्चन्द्रनामकरणचन्द्रार्क्कं यावच्छासनीकृत्य प्रदत्तौ मया यथा दीयमान भागभोगकरप्रवणिकरप्रभृतिनियतानियतसमस्तादायानाज्ञाविधेयी -भूयदा * * ति ॥

भवन्ति चात्रश्लोकाः ।
भूमिं यः प्रतिगृह्णाति यश्च भूमिं प्रयच्छति ।
उभौ तौ पुण्यकर्माणौ नियतं स्वर्गगामिनौ ॥
शंखं भद्रासनं छत्रं वराश्वावरवारणाः ।
भूमिदानस्य चिन्हानि फलमेतत्पुरंदर ॥
षष्टिवर्षसहस्राणि स्वर्गेवसति भूमिदः ।

आच्छेत्ता चानुमन्ताच तान्येव नरके वसेत् ॥
बहुभिर्वसुधा भुक्ता राजभिस्सगरादिभिः ।
यस्य यस्य यदा भूमिस्तस्य तस्य तदा फलम् ॥
गमिकां स्वर्णमेकं च भूमेरंशैकमङ्गुलम् ।
हरन्नरकमाप्नोति यावदा भूतसंप्लवम् ॥
स्वदत्तां परदत्तां वा योहरेत् वसुंधरां ।
सविष्ठायां कृमिर्भूत्वा पितृभिस्सह मज्जति ॥
वारिहीनेष्वरण्येषु शुष्ककोटरवासिनः ।
कृष्णसर्पास्तु जायन्ते देवब्रह्मस्वहारिणः ॥
नविषं विषमित्याहुर्ब्रह्मस्वं विषमुच्यते ।
विषमेकाकिनं हान्ति ब्रह्मस्वं पुत्रपौत्रकम् ॥
तडागानां सहस्रेण वाजपेयशतेन च ।
गवां कोटिप्रदानेन भूमिहर्ता न शुद्ध्यति ॥
सर्वानितान् भाविनः पार्थिवेन्द्रान् भूयोभूयो याचते रामभद्रः ।
सामान्योयं धर्म्मसेतुर्नृपाणां कालेकाले पालनीयो भवद्भिः ॥
वाताभ्रविभ्रममिदं वसुधाधिपत्य-
मापातमात्रमधुरां विषयोपभोगाः ।
प्राणास्तृणाग्रजलबिन्दुसमा नराणां
धर्म्मस्सखा परमहो परलोकयाने ॥
लिखितं चेदं ताम्रपत्रकं महाक्षपटलिक ठक्कुर श्री श्रीपति * * ति ।

The English Translation of Sanskrit Works[1]

Allow me to point out, what appears to me to be an inaccuracy in the current number[2] of The Pandit. In translating Samkara Miśra's comment on Kaṇāda, the translator [A. E. Gough] has rendered the work आततायित् [Samkara Miśra on Vaiśēśika Sū. 5.1.12] by "felon". But as the Sanskrit is capable of being used in some such sentence as ममायमाततायो which itself does not admit of being rendered "he is my felon", it appears that the word "felon" ought not to be fixed as a good rendering for आततायिन्. Some such phrase as "imminent foe", unless it grates on an English ear for its novelty, might imply what आततायिन् denotes, judging from its etymology, आतत + इ + यिन् "one who comes with an आतत or uplifted weapon".

I grant that the English criminal jurisprudence classifies as felonies every one of the crimes enumerated in the well known text which characterises an आततायो ; but that is no reason for considering the limitation of the two words "felon" and " आततायिन् " as indentical; a fact that ought to be carefully noticed as the only test for the correctness of the rendering of one word into another.

In the last number of the Pandit there is another point that strikes as somewhat odd and whimsical on signing himself as शिवप्रसाद holds up for the emulous imitation of our countrymen, the proficiency the Germans in our ancient mother tongue; and he reduces the German soldier's Sanskrit letter, which has recently made noise in the papers. But it appears to me that if शिवप्रसाद thought it worth his while to do so much, he ought as well to have pointed out the glaring marks of the exceedingly insufficient knowledge of Sanskrit evinced by the German in his very small Sanskrit letter. The pharase, सकुशलोऽस्मि, महद्भयं गतः, क्षेत्रे

1. Pan. 5, 56 (Jan. 2, 1871) 207. [Signing himself as "A. Hindu", in the letter written to the Editor of The Pandit, renders the writers identify unknown.]

2. [i. e., no. 55 (December issue) and not the current one.]

सुपार्व्वते, are but a scanty instalment of the inaccuracies to which Europeans when attempting Sanskrit composition are necessarily liable. Though it will not be palatable to the Europeans, it had better be set down as an inevitable fact that, unless a long residence among the Pandits of this country should unwontedly ripen their knowledge of Sanskrit, the Europeans pretty often fall into egreous mistakes that would excite the smile of a simple-minded indigenous pandit. The Anglo-maniacs of our country are welcome to applaud the zeal and perseverence of the European Sanskrit scholars and also their exertions in the publication of our ancient Sanskrit works; but to hold up such achievements as the German soldier's letter as an example is a proceeding that we might fairly ask them to spare . . . A. Hindu.

[The German soldier's letter]

[1]वर्त्तते सम्प्रति प्रशियाफ्रांन्सदेशयोर्मध्ये प्रवर्त्तमानः सङ्ग्रामः। तत्र सितंबरमासम्य प्रथमदिवसे घोरतरमेकं युद्धमभूत्। तस्य द्वितीयदिवस एव प्रशियादेशवासिना सङ्ग्रामभूमिस्थितेन केनचिदश्वसादिना स्वमित्रं प्रति संस्कृतभाषया पत्रमेकं व्यलेखि। तत्र ऋग्वेदीयसंहितास्यैका ऋग् दृष्टान्तपरतयोपन्यस्ता। सच विद्वत्तमो जुरिस वोन थीलमान समभिधः प्रशियादेशान्तर्गतबर्लिननगरे न्यायाधीशपदनियुक्तापि वाहिन्यधिकारविनियुक्तत्वात्सेनया सह युद्धार्थं च गच्छति यथावसरं संस्कृतभाषाध्ययनमपि करोति॥

धन्यः सभूपतिर्यस्य देश ईदृग्विलक्षणव्यवसायिनः पुरुषाः सन्ति। अतस्तस्य जयः सम्भाव्यत एव। अत्रत्त्यजना ईदृग्विषय आश्चर्ययुक्ता भविष्यन्ति। अस्माकन्तु महाविस्मयकर मिदं यदेतद्देशवासिन ईदृग्गुणगणसमलङ्कृतैर्यूरोपखण्डीयमहानुभावैः साम्यमिच्छन्तीति॥

शिवप्रसादः

तल्लिखितपत्रन्तु

ह्यो महायुद्धम् अभवत्। शत्रवः सर्वे निर्जिताः, सर्वा तेषां सेना, महाराजश्च स्वयं, बद्धः। त्वष्टानो वज्रं स्वर्यं ततक्ष; अहन्माऽहिं स्वबिले शिश्रियाणम्। (ऋग्वेद १, ३२) अहं सुकुशलोस्मि; युद्धे न महद् भयं गतोहम्, यद् एतस्मिन् क्षेत्रे सुपार्वते पदातय एव योद्धुं शन्कुवन्ति, तुरङ्गिणस्तु नार्हन्ति। महत्यां सेवायां भवतः शिष्य इति॥

1. Pan. 5. 55 (Dec. 1, 1870) 158.

[Some more letters published in The Pandit evincing European scholars interest in Sanskrit.]

1.

My dear Sir,

[1]Can you kindly procure for me the following information? When I was at College, I made a note of a Hindu legend of the human race having been destroyed by the growth of a thick forest all over the world. Certain sages escaped by sheltering themselves in the sea for a time, and when they returned to the land the trees gave way before them. I cannot find any reference to this story in Wilson's Index to the Vishṇu Purāṇa. Can you tell me where it is to be found?

Yours truly,

8th March, 1867. **William Waterfield, C. S.**

Allahabad.

Note : Our Correspondent will find the legend in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Book iv. Ch. xxx. *Śl.* 44.

2.

Sir,

In the portion of the Sāhitya Darpaṇa[1] and Commentary which appeared in the number of "The Pandit" for September 1866 occur the following śloka and translation :

आदाय वकुलगन्धानन्धीकुर्व्वन् पदे पदे भ्रमरान् ।
अयमेति मन्दमन्दं कावेरीवारिपावनः पवनः ॥

"Wafting the perfumes of the Vakula, intoxicating the bees at every step, here blows softly and slowly the purifying breeze

1. Pan. 1, 11 (April 1, 1867) 164.

1. Sri Pramadā Dasa Mittra completed translation of the Sāhitya-Dapaṇa, began by Dr. Ballantyne. This was published under the title "Mirror of Composition" from the Asiatic Soc., Cal. in 1865 of which only Chapter 10th is published in vol. 1, p. 53 ff. of The Pandit. Ed.

from the holy waters of the Kāverī" — Many of your readers will doubtless be as pleased and surprised as I was, on comparing with the śloka, the following stanza from Shelley's Lines "To a Sky-lark": —

"Like a rose embower'd
In its own green leaves,
By warm winds deflower'd,
Till the scent it gives
Makes faint with too much sweet these heavy winged thieves."

Yours &c.,
J. T. Margöschis,

Vediarpuram Seminary,
Banks of the Kāvēri.

A Biblical Teaching and its Correspondence with Manu[1]

Pramadādasa Mittra

'Bless them that curse thee' – this divine precept is still believed by thousands of educated Christians and even perhaps by some of my own countrymen to have been first taught by Jesus Christ. There may possibly be some even among the readers of your valuable Journal labouring under this delusion, for the removal of which it seems worth while to give prominence to the following verse from Manu :

न क्रुध्यन्तं प्रतिक्रुध्येदाक्रुष्टः कुशलं वदेत् ।

Chap. VI, Śl. 48.

Though the verse is not new to European Sanskritists it has not, I believe, been carefully compared with the above Biblical teaching, nor their striking correspondence noticed. Sir William Jones, for instance, renders the latter clause thus wrongly – 'Abused, let him speak mildly'. Now there are two distinct words of the same orthography – कुशल, the one, an adjective, meaning 'skilful', and the other, a substantive, signifying 'blessing'. The word, as used here, is doubtlessly not the adjective, but the substantive, which can neither be used adverbially nor rendered 'mildly'. The pharase कुशलं वदेत् is, in fact, equivalent to आशिषं वदेत् or आशीर्व्वादं कुर्य्यात् (He shall utter a benediction). Further I should think that the English word 'curse' is a corrupted, or cognate form, as European philologists would call it, of the Sanskrti root कुश from which the participle आक्रुष्ट is formed. Hence the clause in qestion ought to be translated – 'When cursed, he shall utter a blessing, or *benediction, towards the offender*. So strong is the belief of zealous Missionaries that meekness and forgiveness are exclusively Christian, that one can not persist too much in controverting it, and the following quotation from the Mahābhārata may scarcely be deemed a tautology :

1. Pan. 5, 57 (Feb. 1, 1871) 238.

अतिवादं न प्रवदेन्न वादयेत्
यो नाहतः प्रतिहन्यान्न घातयेत् ।
हन्तुं च यो नेच्छति पापकं वै
तस्मै देवाः स्पृहयन्त्यागताय ॥

(Udyoga parva, Chap. 26, Śl. 11.)

"He who does not speak, nor incites another to speak reproachful words, who, when struck, strikes not in return nor incites another to strike, who wishes not *in his mind* to strike the evil-doer — the gods long for the advent of such a *man*."

Professor Max Müller does not venture to give the Brāhmans the credit of a full percetpion of that fundamental maxim of morality. — 'Do ye unto others as ye would that others should do to you.' He says — "The Brāhmans too had a *distant* perception of the same truth which is expressed, for instance, in the Hitopadeśa in the following words:— 'Good people show mercy unto all beings, considering how like they are to themselves." *Chips from a Germean Workshop, Vol. I, p.* 312. I should therefore call the Professor's attention to the following from the Mahābhārata.

श्रूयतां धर्म्मसर्व्वस्वं श्रुत्वा चाप्यवधार्य्यताम् ।
आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत्[1] ॥

'Hear the sum-total of duties and having heard, bear it in mind — Thou shalt (lit. he shall) not do to other what is disagreeable to thyself.'

It has the advantage of brevity over the Biblical sentence, expressing at the same time the entire sense though in the negative form.

How cheeringly, it may be remarked *en passant* does this sublime tone of ancient Indian morality harmonize with the equally sublime impartiality and unselfishness of a distinguished Indian of the present day who encourages his dear countrymen to emulate the virtues of the noble races of Europe in the following manner : (I quote from memory).

1. A similar verse was translated by me in the Pandit No. 19.

'As long as light will differ from darkness, so long will the European differ from the Native.'

Methinks I hear an echo answering in a sigh — As long as light will differ from darkness, so long will the European differ from the Native — *when such is the patriotism that animates our breasts !*

In the spirit of veneration peculiar to the Hindoos, our ancient Law-givers have represented the king as an incarnation of the *Lokapālas*, but the remarkable stanza which concludes this letter refutes the common notion that the sages meant to enjoin a slavish toleration of his tyranny or adoration of him as a divinity, though he act the devil :

अहं वो रक्षितेत्युक्त्वा यो न रक्षति भूमिपः ।
स संहत्य निहन्तव्यः श्वेव सोन्माद आतुरः ॥

Mahābhārata Anuśāsana parva.
Dāna-dharma, chap. 61.

"Having declared 'I am your preserver,' that Monarch who does not preserve *his people* — let him be conspired against and killed like a dog, diseased and mad."

Loyalty indeed to such a sovereign as Victoria, I can truly say, notwithstanding the shortcomings of British rule in India, is a sacred duty enjoined on us by our very religion.

My duty towards my neighbour[1]

From the Church Catechism

My duty towards my Neighbour, is to love him as myself, and to do to all men as I would they should do unto me. To love, honour, and succour my father and mother. To honour and obey the Queen, and all that are put in authority under her. To submit myself to all my governors, teachers, spiritual pastors and masters. To order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters. To hurt no body by word nor deed. To be true and just in all my dealings. To bear no malice nor hatred in my heart. To keep my hands from picking and stealing, and my tongue from evil-speak-

1. Pan. 2, 19 (Dec. 1, 1867) 160.

ing, lying, and slandering. To keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity. Not to covet nor desire other men's goods; but to learn and labour truly to get mine own living and to do my duty in that state of life, unto which it shall please God to call me.

■

My duty towards my neighbour

From the Mahābhārata etc.

(1) They who are dreaded by none and themselves dread none, regarding all mankind like themsleves — such men surmount all difficulties. — *Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Chap. 110.*

(2) To heaven shall those men go, who, friends to all, ever behave themselves with an equal heart to friend and foe. —, *Ibid., Anuśāsana-parva Chap.* 144.

(3) Thou shalt not do to others what thou likest not thyself — this is duty in its sum-total, all else proceed from passion. — *Ibid., Udyoga-parva, Chap.* 38.

(4) That *debt of gratitude* is not to be repaid in hundreds of years which men owe to their father and mother *for* the pain they have suffered in bringing them up. Do thou serve them constantly and do thou serve thy spiritual pastor too, for if they are pleased *with thee,* all *thy* penance has been completed. — *Manu, Chap.* 2.

(5) They who work or think harm to their tutor, or their father or their mother — greater is their sin than the killing of an embryo — a greater sinner there is none in the world. — *Mahābhārata, Śānti-parva, Chap.* 108.

(6) Who should not honour him on whose ceasing to exist, mankind all around would cease to exist, on whose well-being ever depends the well-being of all ? — *Ibid., Śāntiparva, Chap.* 68.

(7) He triumphs in both the worlds who is steady in pleasing and doing good to his sovereign, who sustains a burden dreadful to all men. — *Ibid.*

(8) That person who instructs thy ears in truth, removes thy unhappiness and leads thee to immortality — him thou shalt

regard as thy father and mother, to him thou shalt never think evil. — *Nirukta.*

(9) They who disrespect those who are to be honoured and they who insult their elders — all such men, O goddess, shall go to hell. — *Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana-parva, Chap. 145.*

(10) Not to hurt any body by deed or mind or speech, and to be benevolent and charitable, are the eternal duty of the good. — *Ibid.*

(11) Forgiveness and patience, keeping oneself from injuring *any body*, equality towards *friends and foes*, truthfulness and uprightness, chastity, energy, lowliness and modesty, gravity generosity, absence of anger, contentment, kindliness in speech, absence of hatred and malice — the assemblage of these makes what is termed Self-control. — *Ibid., Śānti-parva, Chap. 160.*

(12) They who always keep themselves from stealing, who are content with their own property and depend upon their own luck — such men shall go to heaven. — *Ibid., Anuśāsana-parva, Chap.* 144.

(13) They who never utter a slanderous speech, or a speech that causes disunion between friends, but who speak what is true and friendly — such men shall go to heaven. — *Ibid.*

(14) They who forbear from evil-speaking and avoid unfriendly talk, whose speech is always benevolent — such men shall go to heaven. — *Ibid.*

(15) Thou shouldst not be altogether without food, nor shouldst thou eat too much. — *Ibid., Śānti-parva, Chap. 270.*

(16) They who covet not the property of others, who avoid intercourse with the views of others, who eat the food that is honestly earned — such men shall go to heaven. — *Ibid., Anuśāsana-parva, Chap.* 144.

The Rājā of Benares and the dove[1]

Chased by a hawk, there came a dove
With wron and weary wing,
And took her stand upon the hand
Of Kāśī's noble king.

1. Pan. 2, 18 (Nov. 1, 1867) 139-140.

The monarch smoothed her ruffled plumes,
And laid her on his breast;
And cried, "No fear shall vex thee here,
Rest, pretty egg-born, rest!
Fair Kāśī's realm in rich and wide,
With golden harvests gay,
But all that's mine will I resign
Ere I my guest betray.
But, panting for his half-won prey,
The hawk was close behind,
And with wild eye and eager cry
Came swooping down the wind :
This bird, he cried, my destined prize,
Tis not for thee to shield :
Tis mine by right and toilsome flight
O'er hill and dale and field.
Hunger and thirst oppress me sore,
And I am faint with toil :
Thou shouldst not stay a bird of prey
Who claims his rightful spoil.
They say thou art a glorious king,
And justice is thy care;
Then justly reign in thy domain,
Nor rob the birds of air.
Then cried the King : A cow or deer
For thee shall straightway bleed,
Or let a ram or tender lamb
Be slain, for thee to feed.
Mine oath forbids me to betray
My little twice-born guest :
See, how she clings, with trembling wings,
To her protector's breast.
No flesh of lambs, the hawk replied,
No blood of deer for me;

regard as thy father and mother, to him thou shalt never think evil. — *Nirukta.*

(9) They who disrespect those who are to be honoured and they who insult their elders — all such men, O goddess, shall go to hell. — *Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana-parva, Chap. 145.*

(10) Not to hurt any body by deed or mind or speech, and to be benevolent and charitable, are the eternal duty of the good. — *Ibid.*

(11) Forgiveness and patience, keeping oneself from injuring *any body*, equality towards *friends and foes*, truthfulness and uprightness, chastity, energy, lowliness and modesty, gravity generosity, absence of anger, contentment, kindliness in speech, absence of hatred and malice — the assemblage of these makes what is termed Self-control. — *Ibid., Śānti-parva, Chap. 160.*

(12) They who always keep themselves from stealing, who are content with their own property and depend upon their own luck — such men shall go to heaven. — *Ibid., Anuśāsana-parva, Chap.* 144.

(13) They who never utter a slanderous speech, or a speech that causes disunion between friends, but who speak what is true and friendly — such men shall go to heaven. — *Ibid.*

(14) They who forbear from evil-speaking and avoid unfriendly talk, whose speech is always benevolent — such men shall go to heaven. — *Ibid.*

(15) Thou shouldst not be altogether without food, nor shouldst thou eat too much. — *Ibid., Śānti-parva, Chap. 270.*

(16) They who covet not the property of others, who avoid intercourse with the views of others, who eat the food that is honestly earned — such men shall go to heaven. — *Ibid., Anuśāsana-parva, Chap.* 144.

The Rājā of Benares and the dove[1]

Chased by a hawk, there came a dove
With wron and weary wing,
And took her stand upon the hand
Of Kāśī's noble king.

1. Pan. 2, 18 (Nov. 1, 1867) 139-140.

The monarch smoothed her ruffled plumes,
And laid her on his breast;
And cried, "No fear shall vex thee here,
Rest, pretty egg-born, rest!
Fair Kāśī's realm in rich and wide,
With golden harvests gay,
But all that's mine will I resign
Ere I my guest betray.
But, panting for his half-won prey,
The hawk was close behind,
And with wild eye and eager cry
Came swooping down the wind :
This bird, he cried, my destined prize,
Tis not for thee to shield :
Tis mine by right and toilsome flight
O'er hill and dale and field.
Hunger and thirst oppress me sore,
And I am faint with toil :
Thou shouldst not stay a bird of prey
Who claims his rightful spoil.
They say thou art a glorious king,
And justice is thy care;
Then justly reign in thy domain,
Nor rob the birds of air.
Then cried the King : A cow or deer
For thee shall straightway bleed,
Or let a ram or tender lamb
Be slain, for thee to feed.
Mine oath forbids me to betray
My little twice-born guest :
See, how she clings, with trembling wings,
To her protector's breast.
No flesh of lambs, the hawk replied,
No blood of deer for me;

The falcon loves to feed on doves,
And such is Heaven's decree.
But if affection for the dove
Thy pitying heart has stirred,
Let thine own flesh my maw refresh,
Weighed down gainst the bird.
He carved the flesh from off his side,
And threw it in the scale,
While women's cries smote on the skies
With loud lament and wail.
He hacked the flesh from side and arm,
From chest and back and thigh,
But still above the little dove
The monarch's scale stood high.
He heaped the scale with piles of flesh,
With sinews, blood, and skin,
And when alone was left him bone
He threw himself therein.
Then thundered voices through the air;
The sky grew black as night;
And fever took the earth that shook
To see that wondrous sight.
The blessed Gods, from every sphere,
By Indra led, came nigh;
While drum and flute and shell and lute
Made music in the sky.
They rained immortal chaplets down,
Which hands celestial twine,
And softly shed upon his head
Pure Amrit, drink devine.
Then God and Seraph, Bard and Nymph
Their heavenly voices raised,
And a glad throng with dance and song
The glorious monarch praised.

They set him on a golden car
That blazed with many a gem;
Then swiftly through the air they flew,
And bore him home with them.
Thus Kāśī's lord, by noble deed,
Won Heaven and deathless fame;
And when the weak protection seek
From thee, do thou the same.

Bhīshma's Speech, Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana Parva, Sect. 32. Calcutta Edition, Vol. I-V., p. 72.

Feed the poor

If thou wouldst win the dear reward
which only virtue earns,
Waste not thy wealth upon the lord
Who gift for gift returns.
Not with the rich thy treasures share;
Give aid to those who need;
And, with the gold thy wants can spare,
The poor and hungry feed.
Be sure that those who would receive
Deserve and crave thy care;
And ponder, ere thy hands relieve,
The how, and when, and where.

The wise scholar

I hold that scholar truly wise
Who schools his heart and lips and eyes:
Who can as worthless clay behold
The treasures of another's gold:
Who looks upon his neighbour's wife
As upon her who gave him life :
That live on earth both great and small.

(Quoted in the Hitopadeśa)

A Prophecy in Favour of the British Government[1]

Śivaprasād

Kalpasūtra, a Jain sacred book, written A. D. 453 says that "on the night immediately preceding the new moon, was the time of the adorable ascetic hero (Mahāvīra) completed, his earthly career finished, the bonds of decay and death loosed, when he entered into a state of perfect bliss, wisdom, liberty, freedom from care and passion, and release from all pain." "The same night, the planet *Kshudra Bhasmak*, destined to continue two thousand years, ascended the natal constellation of the Lord Mahāvīra, and as long as it continues in it, there will be a great waning of piety and religious worship among male and female ascetics and religious persons; but when the planet descends from that constellation, asceticism and piety will blaze forth with new brilliance."

"तं रयणिंचणं खुदाए भासरासीएनामं महग्गहे दोवाएसहस्सठिई समणस्सँ जन्मनिखत्तं संकंत्ते ॥ जप्पभिइंचणंसेखदाए भासरासीए महग्गहे दो वास सहस्सठई समणस्सँ जन्मनखत्तसंकंत्ते तप्पभिइंचणं समणाणं निग्गंथाणं निग्गंथीयं यनो उदये पूयामक्कारेई पवत्तई ॥ जयाणंसेखुदाए भावजम्मनखत्ताउ विद्दक्कंते भविस्मइ तयाणं समणाणं निग्गंथाणं निग्मथीणय उदिए पूयर सक्कारे भविस्सइ ॥

भगवान महावीरो निर्वाणं प्राप्तः तस्यां रात्रौ क्षुद्रो दुष्टः भस्मराशिनामा अष्टाशीतिग्रहाणां मध्ये त्रिंशत्तमोग्रहोयश्च एकस्मिन् राशौ द्विसहस्रवर्षाणि तिष्ठति तावत् भगवत्शासने साधु साध्वीनां उदयः पूजासत्कारश्च न भविष्यति तदा इंद्रेण निर्वाणसमये श्रीमहावीरस्य विज्ञप्तं हेस्वामिन् घटीद्वयं आयुर्वर्द्धनीयं दुष्टो भस्मराशिग्रहः भवद्दृष्ट्या निर्वलो भवेत् तदा इन्द्रं प्रति स्वामीप्राह नेयं भूयं नेयं भब्बं नेयं भविस्सइ अनन्तबलवीर्या अपि आयुर्वर्द्धापने न केचित्समर्थाः न पूर्वं भूताः नच भवंति नचाग्रे भविष्यन्ति एतत् अवश्यं भावि अस्य आयुषो हानिर्वा वृद्धिर्वा केनापि कर्तुंशक्यानास्ति पुनर्यदा सदुष्टो भस्मग्रहो भगवतो जन्मराशेरुत्तरिष्यति ततः परं भगवतः शासने साधुसाध्वीनां उदयः पूजासत्कारश्च भविष्यति ॥

1. Pan. 10, 46 (Nov. 1, 1875) 146. Communication made from Benares, the 9th Sept., 1875.

As Mahāvīra died B. C. 527, the evil influence of the planet *Bhasmak*, after continuing full two thousand years, must have ceased in the year 1473 A. D., which was just about the time that Bartholomew Diaz came to the Cape of Good Hope, and led Vasco da Gama to follow him, who may be truly said to have laid the foundation fo the British Empire in the East, and may be allowed to have the credit of the emancipation of the country from the clutches of the tyrants, after two thousand years of misrule, anarchy, and the "waning of piety and religious worship," at least according to the Jain sacred books. There is not the least doubt that the Jains and Buddhists have been persecuted from the beginning, *i. e.*, from the days of Mahāvīra and Śākya Muni Gautam; and it is only under the full toleration of the British rule that Jain "asceticism and piety" are blazing forth "with new brilliance." They have found at last their golden age, under the genial shadow of the British rule, after enduring for two thousand years, the iron age of the planet *Bhasmak* ; and now, in they suffer themselves to slacken their pious zeal, they will have to blame, not the planet, but themselves.

REVIEW ARTICLES

(Communicated to the Editor of The Pandit)

Proposed Edition of Sanskrit Classics[1]

G. Bühler and F. Kielhorn

The following letter has been addressed to Sir Allexander Grant, Bart., the Director of Public Instruction (Bombay) by Professors Bühler and Kielhorn. We beg to invite the attention of scholars to the rules suggested by them for the editing of Sanskrit text.

Since the establishment of a regular course of Sanskirit studies in connection with the Indian Universities the urgent want of correct and cheap editions of the Sanskrit Classics, made in harmony with the principles of modern philology, has been felt both by the professors and by the students of the Indian High Schools and Colleges. Some attempts to supply this want have been made in Calcutta, at the suggestion and under the supervision of Professor Cowell. But, unfortunately, they have been interrupted by Professor Cowell's departure from India, and the editions published extend over a very small part of the field of Sanskrit classical literature.

2. Considering the great interests at stake, it seems to us highly desirable that a new attempt be made to produce a series of class-books for the study of the Sanskrit language. We beg, therefore to submit to you the annexed plan for the publication of a collection of Sanskrit classics for the use of Indian High Schools and Colleges. The principles of our plan are partly in accordance with those followed by Professor Cowell, but we trust that we have succeeded in adapting it still more to the requirements of modern criticism, and in making the books more generally serviceable for Anglo-Indian education by the addition of English notes, introduction and collections of *variæ lectiones*.

3. We beg to point out also that, besides its value for practical instruction, the publication of a series of critical editions of

1. Pan. 1, 2 (July 2, 1866) 24-25. Reprinted from : *Bombay Educational Record Vol. II. No. 5., May 1866.*

Sanskrit Classics may be made a palæstra for the young native Sanskritists, by inviting their co-operation, and thus may serve to realize the high aims of Indian University education.

4. In order to ensure a greater stability for the undertaking, and to remove the material difficulties which authors in India have to battle with, we humbly beg to suggest that the "collection" be made a departmental undertaking, under the conditions specified in our plan.

We trust that, though no doubt a considerable outlay will be required at the beginning, there will eventually be no actual loss of money, especially if you should see fit to invite the assistance of the Directors of Public Instruction in other parts of India.

A PLAN FOR THE PUBLICATION OF A COLLECTION OF SANSKRIT CLASSICS FOR THE USE OF INDIAN HIGH SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES.

I. Works to be included in the collection of Sanskrit Classics :—

1. Kālidāsa's Raghuvaṁśa.
2. Kālidāsa'sVikramorvaśī.
3. Kālidāsa's Kumārasambhava.
4. Kālidāsa's Ritusaṁhāra.
5. Kālidāsa's Malavikāgnimitra.
6. Kālidāsa's Nalodaya.
7. Bhartṛhari's Sentences.
8. Pañcatantra.
9. Viśākhadatta's Mudrārākṣasa.
10. Ratnāvalī.
11. Bhavabhūti's Mālatīmādhava.
12. Veṇī-saṁhāra.
13. Kirātārjunīya.
14. Māgha's Śiśupālavadha.
15. Daṇḍin's Daśakumāracarita.
16. Bāṇabhaṭṭa's Kādambarī.

Other works to be added if it seem advisable on further consideration.

II— Rules for editing the texts :—

(1) Works for which commentaries are obtainable are to be edited with the commentaries, or with verbal extracts from the same.

(2) If more than one commentary exist, the oldest is to be chosen for edition, and, if possible, that redaction of it which is current in Western India.

(3) The texts of the works are to be printed in strict conformity with the readings given by the commentaries.

(4) The texts of works for which no commentary is procurable are to be based on manuscripts which give the same redaction. But, if it seems absolutely necessary, corrections form other redactions may be introduced.

(5) A description of the manuscripts on which the edition is based, the chief *variæ lectiones* contained in them, and corrections of the text made by the editor, are to be given in a separate appendix at the end of each work.

III— Orthography :—

(1) The strictest attention is to be paid to the rules of Sanskrit orthography as laid down by Pāṇini. In optional cases one principle is to be followed throughout the whole book.

(2) Special rules of Orthography :

(a) It shall not be allowable to use the Anusvāra instead of the nasals in the interior of simple words, or of a final dental *n; e.g.,* write अङ्ग ; not अंग, सिञ्चति, not सिंचति ।

(b) It shall not be allowable to use the Anusvāra instead of a final म् (m) at the end of a sentence or verse, or before vowels.

(c) It shall not be allowable to use the Avagraha (*s*).

(d) It shall not be allowable to use European stops.

(e) The words of a sentence or hemistich shall be written continuously only so far as it is made indispensable by the laws of Sandhi; e.g.

आसीद्राजा नलो नाम वीरसेनसुतो बलो ।

IV.—Notes:—

Short notes in English shall be added at the end of each book or fascicle, elucidating difficult points of grammar or construction, incidental questions regarding geography, history, mythology, philosophy, &c., and containing explanations of the metres, together with references to sources of fuller information.

V.—Introduction:—

An introduction is to be prefixed to each work or its first fascicle, detailing briefly the life of the author of the work, its position in literature, and giving a short summary of its contents.

VI— Form of the books:—

(1) Each work to be printed in octavo.

(2) Each work may be published in fascicles with reference to the regulations of the Bombay University.

VII— Publication:—

(1) The expenses of printing to be borne by the Educational Department, and the copyright to vest in the Director of Public Instruction.

(2) The editors to be remunerated at the rate of Rs. 30 per sheet of sixteen pages octavo, from which sum the editors are to defray the expenses of buying, copying, or collecting manuscripts.

(3) The publication of the books to be placed under the supervision of the Professors of Sanskrit at the Elphinstone and Poona Colleges, who will invite Native Sanskrit scholars to join the undertaking.

Kālidāsa and M. Hippolyte Fauche.[1]

In a note appended to his translation of the *Kumāra-Sambhava* M. Hippolyte Fauche expresses a hope that the missing cantos of the poem may yet be discovered is some unexplored library or in some hitherto unknown place in India, Thibet, Persia or China. He tells us also that there is in Paris "au Dépôt des Manuscrits," a copy in Bengalee characters of the *Kumāra-Sambhava* containing an eighth canto, which he promises, if God lends him life, to translate into Latin and French.

We really think Kālidāsa has suffered enough at the hands of M. Fauche, and we hope that the cantos of which we publish the second instalment in the present Number of the Pandit may be translated for the first time by some one who knows something of Sanskrit and of India. We cannot understand how M. Fauche could, after having gone through, even in a cursory way, translations of the Rāmāyaṇa, the Raghuvaṁśa, the Kumāra-Sambhava, Śakuntalā and Vikramorvaśī, be guilty of blunders so numerous and so unpardonable. So numerous are they, that we cannot attempt to point out more than a very few in a few cantos of one poem. They are unpardonable, because ignorance and conceit have led him to despise the guidance of former translators and the assistance of an elementary dictionary. The only excuse we can imagine for M. Fauche is that he is no better acquainted with Latin than he is with Sanskrit and that he has sneered at Stenzler chiefly because he misunderstood him.

We proceed to give from the Raghuvaṁśa a few specimens of the way in which M. Fauche improves upon Stenzler, whose Latin version, in such cases, he frequently quotes.

कलत्रवन्तमात्मानमवरोधे महत्यपि ।
तया मेने मनस्विन्या लक्ष्म्या च वसुधाधिपः ॥ .

Canto I. Sl. 32.

1. Pan. 1, 3 (Aug. 1, 1866) 37.

"And, though his love was shared by girls besides,
She and dear Fortune were his only brides."

This ślōka M. Fauche thus translates : "ce monarque de la terre n'avait que cette vertueuse épouse avec Lakshmî; et cependant il s'estimait posséder en elles seules les epouses d'un nombreux gynoecée." To this translation is appended the following note : "Rex, etsi frequenti gynæceo gaudebat," dit la traduction latine, hanc feminam prudentem atque Lakshmim præcipuas suas uxores estimabat." Elle se trompe, si je ne me trompe moi-même. La version du texte sanscrit me semble être, mot à mot, et dans l'ordre, celle qui vient ci-dessous : *semet uxores in gynæceo magno habere putabat, illâ quidem sapienti conjuge Lakhmyâque* (sic) *totius orbis dominator.* M. Fauche's Latin version is more wonderful than the French : his ablative *Lakhmyâ*, is perfect.

Śl. 50. नीवारभागधेयोचिचैर्मृगैः

This M. Fauche renders : "Gazelles, *dignes de leur étoile* et nourries largement de riz naturel."

Canto II. Śl. 36

अमुं पुरः पश्यसि देवदारुं
पुत्रीकृतोऽसौ वृषभध्वजेन ।
यो हेमकुम्भस्तनानिःश्रितानां
स्कन्दस्य मातुः पयसां रसज्ञः ॥

Look yonder King! Before thee stands a Pine
Loved like a daughter by my Lord divine.
In its first youth 'twas gentle Umä's joy
To nurse it even as she nursed her body.

M. Fauche's version is as follows : "Tu vois devant tes yeux ce *pin* dévadârou : il fut adopté pour fils par celui, sur les drapeaux duquel est point le taureau, ce Dieu à qui la mére de Skanda fit connaître la saveur du lait distillé de ses mamelles, semblables à des jarres d'or."

By this mistranslation, which it is painful to transcribe, this scholar who has given to the world a French version of the

Kumāra-sambhava, represents Umā, the heroine of that poem, as nourshing, with the treasures of her own bosom, her divine husband Mahādeva.

In the 42nd Ślōka *Tryambaka* is said in a note to be "Le Dieu aux trois yeux, un des noms de Çiva par allusion à sa faculte de voir sous le même regard le passé, le présent et l' avenir."

Śl. 57. एकान्तविध्वंसिषु मद्विधानां
पिण्डेष्वनास्था खलु भौतिकेषु ।

M. Fauche is not satisfied with giving the following mysterious rendering : "car ceux de ma sorte, qui ne s'inquiétent pas d'ensevelir avec eux les offrandes aux mânes de leurs aïeux, sout mis, on ne peut en douter, au nombre des mauvais Génies;" his evil Genius leads him to add in a foot note : "Nous ne saurions adopter le sens de M. Stenzler; qu'on juge le sien et le nôtre sur le texte de l'original : "Mei similes, dit il, haud sane solliciti sunt de libis istis, quæ, ex elementis facta, certæ morti obnoxia sunt."

But perhaps the most wonderful mistranslation is that in the 25th Ślōka of the 4th Canto : वाजिनीराजनाविधौ translates thus : "au moment ou le roi, dans une oblation parfaite, lui sacrifia une cavale suivant les rites;" converting the well known martial ceremony of the Lustration of the Chargers into the hitherto unheard of Sacrifice of a mare! May the discovery of her nest reward and encourage this profound and accurate scholar!

Pandit Rām Jasan's Hitopadeśa[1]

We notice with pleasure a new edition of the Hitopadeśa,[2] with a Hindi Translation, by Pandit Rāmajasan of Queen's College, Benares. The book is well printed and neatly got up, and the translation possesses the merit of being easy and idiomatic, yet closely literal. On opening the book, however, we are somewhat astonished to miss the beautiful benediction (मङ्गलाचरण). Has the editor purposely omitted it? if so, what reason has he for thus tampering with the text? Were it not that the editor is a Hindu and Brahman, one might indeed fancy that the omission savoured of the bitter intolerance of a Muhammadan. While glancing over the pages of the book, we chanced to light upon some instances in which the translator not having understood the text and having had recourse to the mere words has given a rendering which, no doubt, must be as unintelligible to himself as to his readers. As

स जातो येन जातेन याति वंशः समुन्नतिम् ।
परिवर्त्तिनि संसारे मृतः को वा न जायते ॥P. 3.

The second line is rendered. घूमनेवाले संसार में मरा अथवा कौन नहीं जनमता. The Pandit, evidently solicitous to make the sentence somewhat more significant, substitutes, in the errata, the word अनित्य for घूमनेवाले. But the unhappy correction, instead of rendering the passage clear serves only to prove that the translator has not comprehended the sense of the śloka. परिवर्त्तिन् the epithet of संसार was better, though blindly rendered घूमनेवाला; it has nothing to do with the perishableness (अनित्यता) of the world, but refers to the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. Again, the particle वा does not here imply, as the Pandit supposes, an alternative, but an interrogation. The line, therefore, properly rendered would stand thus; — घूमतेहुये (better परिवर्त्तनशील) संसार में कौन भला मरकर नहीं जनमता.

1. Pan. 1, 3 (Aug. 1, 1866) 40.
2. Published by Messers E. J. Lazarus & Co., Medical Hall Press, Beneras.

This is another instance;—

अरावप्युचितं कार्य्यमातिथ्यं गृहमागते ।
छेत्तुः पार्श्वगतां छायां नोपसंहरते द्रुमः ॥ p. 31.

The second line of this couplet is rendered वृक्ष काटने वाले की पार्श्ववर्त्ती छाया का संहार नहीं करता instead of वृक्ष काटनेवाले से (अपनी) पार्श्वर्त्ती छाया को नहीं खींच लेता. We should prefer Prof. Max Müller's reading of the verse with the ablative पार्श्वगतात् instead of the accusative पार्श्वगताम्, as it not only renders the construction free from ambiguity, but makes the epithet more pertinent by applying it to छेत्तुः and making it correspond to the qualification गृहमागते added to अरौ in the foregoing line.

The following is an instance partaking of the ludicrous;—

निर्भिन्नस्य पदं करोति हृदये तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्पृहा (Śl 128, p. 131) rendered विगड़े का पांव उसके हृदय में स्वतन्त्रता की इच्छा करता है । *i.e.* The foot of a corrupted man (having somehow got?) into his heart wishes for independence!. In pity to his readers, the Pandit should have added a commentary serving to unriddle this mysterious enigma.

But while we point out these errors, let us not be supposed to imply that the book abounds in misinterpretations. On the contrary, we believe the blemishes of the work are far outweighed by its merits, and can therefore confidently recommend it not only to all beginners of Sanskrit in this part of India, but also to those candidates for the Civil Service who may wish to acquire a knowledge of that widely spoken vernacular, the Hindi, founded upon an acquaintance with Sanskrit. In this respect, we may add, it will serve as a useful companion of Prof. Max Müller's Handbooks for the Study of Sanskrit. In conclusion we would express our pleasure at finding that this fair Mother of fables is gradually being welcomed into all the tongues of the world, ancient and modern. The only thing that now remains to be done for the Salutary Advice is, for an erudite Sanskritist to prepare an edition tracing its verses, as far as possible to their sources and thus possessing an enhanced interest for the Sanskrit Scholar.

The Riju Vyākhyā[1]

Pandit Rāmagati Nyāyaratna

We gladly acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the "Riju Vyākhyā," a key to Pandit Īśawarachandra Vidyāsāgara's "Rijupāṭha," Part III, which is the Sanskrit course for the first examination in arts of the Calcutta University. We need not enter into any minute criticism on the literary merit of this little key, which is the production of a Sanskrit Professor and is executed in a scholar-like manner.

It is written in the usual style of commentators, on the model of Mallinātha and others. Its object, as the author tells us in his preface, is to help students who are going up for the Little-go examination. Although candidates for the Little-go, whose knowledge of Sanskrit does not extend beyond Vidyāsāgara's Upakramṇikā, will find this key almost as difficult as the text of the Rijupāṭha itself, still we think, with the aid of the teacher, it will prove of much service to them in learning Sanskrit parsing, as also in acquiring and retaining a clear comprehension of the sense of the more difficult passages.

The next point that calls for remark is that the book is printed in the Bengali character, and will consequently be of local use only, not for all the university students. As it is printed in the Bengali character it should have been written in the vernacular tongue too, so that at least every Bengali student might have been able to read and understand it.

We have already said that the book is written in the usual style of Sanskrit commentators.

But we wish the author had not travelled entirely on the beaten path of his predecessors. He might have improved a little upon the old mode of commentary writing. To the meanings, derivations, and grammatical construction, which he has given,

1. Pan. 1, 5 (October 1866, p. 71-72).

he should have added biographical, historical and geographical notes.

For instance, while commenting on the history of Yayāti, he should have given a short account of the king, how he came to be cursed by Śukra, what relation he bore to Śukra, and similar matters. Instead of merely substituting the word Śukra, for Uśanas, he should have given a short account of that great Guru of the Daityas. The author should have borne in mind that a biographical and mythological Dictionary is not within the reach of every student.

Again (in page 42) he puts Hastināpura for Gaja-Sahwaya, both words of the same age and of the same meaning, the one receiving little light from the other. This is of as little use to the student as the literal translation of the same word into English, "the city named after the elephant."

In spite of these drawbacks the author of this commentary deserves much credit for his work; and his brother Pandits would do well to inmitate him and give the fruits of their labours to the public rather than to confine their erudition to controversial discussion in their literary assemblies.

(2)

[1]I see from your notice of this work in your October number, that Pandit Rāmgati Nyāyaratna has published a key to Pandit Īshwarchandra Vidyāsāgar's Rijupāṭha, Part III. But I regret to observe that such a work should have been printed in the Bengali character, as it entirely restricts the use which otherwise would have been made of it.

All publishers of Sanskrit Literature must bear in mind that if the publications they issue are to do any practical service they must publish them in the *Devanāgarī* character, which is the one channel of rendering them accessible to students of Sanskrit in all parts of India, remembering that Sanskrit is the common inheritance of *all* India.

I trouble you with these remarks, simply because one should like to have gone through the work to see how a modern

1. Pan. 1, 7 (Dec. 1, 1866) 104.

Sanskrit. But the fact of its having been published in the Bengali character prevents my curiosity from being satisfied.

In case the author publishes a second edition of his work (which I doubt not he may soon have an opportunity of doing, judging from your favourable remark thereon), I hope, he will be induced to publish it in the *Devanāgarī* character.— A Bombayite.

Bombay, 12th November, 1866.

Banerjea's Edition of Kumāra-Sambhava[1] : a Review.

It is with real pleasure that we notice another edition of Kālidāsa's Kumāra-Sambhava, one of the most charming narrative or descriptive poems in Sanskrit, and perhaps in any language. Besides the intrinsic attractiveness of the book before as, as containing on good paper and in large neat type, a poem which combines tenderness of feeling with the most exquisite delicacy of fancy, it has the additional interest, published as it is under the auspices of the Calcutta University, of being a tangible mark of the impetus already given to Sanskrit study in India by the recent regulation of that Institution which substitutes the classical language of the Hindoos in place of their vernaculars in the Arts Examinations.

In the Preface, the Editor has drawn an interesting comparison between Sanskrit and Greek Prosody, which, though limited within the range of the metres used in the poem, reflects no small credit upon him as a Greek Scholar. The notes on the text itself, consisting of literal interpretations in English, word for word and phrase for phrase, and indicating with sufficient clearness the construction of the sentences, will not only be a help to candidates for the Calcutta University Examination (for whom the work is specially designed) but to all Sanskrit students, whether European or native, who can understand English. We have to remark, however, with reference to the notes, that they would have been still more useful, had they been accompanied with *regular* explanations of the compounds which are so essential an element of the Sanskrit language, especially of that of the Classical Poems.

Here and there in the renderings we meet with slight slips, but in justice to Kālidāsa we have to say, in particular, that the

1. Pan. 1, 11 (April 1, 1867) 162-163. Kumāra-sambhava, with notes in English by Rev. K.M. Banerjea. Calcutta : Thacker Spink ; London: Williams and Norgate, 1867.

Reverend Editor has been incautious in charging the poet's imagination with being 'rather too exuberant' in the following description of unmarried Umā's nourishing the trees –

अतन्द्रिता सा स्वयमेव वृक्षकान्
घटस्तनप्रस्रवणैर्व्यवर्द्धयत् । V. 14.

the sense of which is, without a doubt, as Stenzler interprets it, that is to say the jars of Umā are represented as her breasts, *not* that her breasts are likened to jars. The Commentary of Mallinātha is quite explicit on this point. Stenzler was indeed wrong, along with the Pandits of the Fort William College, in his rendering of a similar stanza in Canto II of the Raghuvaṁśa. The denoting of the 'exemplar', as the Editor calls the object compared to, by the *second* word of a compound, is not only not 'opposed to Sanskrit idiom' but is precisely the idiom,[1] the reverse being true only in the *Bahuvrīhi* compound, *when a simile is implied*[2] as in घटस्तनी, the epithet of a woman. This very poem furnishes numerous instances of the same. We would particularly call the Editor's attention to III, 39, 27, 30, and VII, 74, the first of which stanzas has four consecutive instances. There is another stanza in Raghuvaṁśa, XIV, 78, similar to the verses of the Kumāra-Sambhava in question, which dropping, as it does, the comparison to the breast, unmistakably conveys the meaning of Kālidāsa, with whom the figure, like many others, was a favourite one.

We notice a few slips in the Editor's English, such as *Konches* for *conchs* (p.8.) &c., which we hope to see corrected in a second edition of this very meritorious School-book. Such expressions as 'young lady' and 'jolly woman' offend us in a translation of *Kālidāsa*, and we could point out other renderings nearly as objectionable. We hope that in a future edition too the Editor will be able to "pass over the reference to the 'Serpent-damsel' without making the following extract from (his) own Introduction to the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* — The word *nāgas* is evidently the same as the *nāchas* of Genesis, and we feel no

1. Pāṇaini II, 1, 56, S.K. (Tārānātha's) I, 359.
2. When a metaphor is intended, the 'exemplar' must follow in the Bahuvrīhi too, as in III, 39.

say that there cannot, by any possibility, be the slightest connection between the Aryan and the Semitic word; *nāga* coming from *naga* which comes from *na* and *gam*, no and go, and nāchash (not *nāchas*) נחש being an onomatopoetic word, signifying the "hisser;" the *sh* in the Hebrew word being its most important radical, the s in the Sanskrit word being merely a case-ending.

In spite of a few drawbacks we can strongly recommend this book to the young student.

Colebrooke's Translation of the Sāṁkhyakārikā[1]

Shashishekhara Sānyāla

Secretary Benares Asso, and President of the Club Prepar-atory to the Benares Asso.

Every one is aware of the fact that among the Hindus there are six systems of Philosophy, besides a few others considered eminently heterodox. And as most of the learned Europeans are now-a-days desirous of knowing the extent of Hindu learning and forming an accurate estimate of it, surely it is a duty on our part to present a summary view of all the Sanskrit philosophies, painted in their true colour, and then let them draw any conclusion they like. By saying this I do not mean that the Europeans have not as yet succeeded in getting any idea of our philosophies at all; but simply that their notion of our philosophies is a confused one. I am far from insinuating that the labours of such men as Mr. Colebrooke, Professor Wilson, Dr. Roer and Dr. Ballantyne are to no purpose. On the other hand I really believe that it is only through the labours of such men that the curiosity of Europe is excited concerning the Philosophy of India. That the Europeans have got some right notions concerning the Sanskrit language is clear from remarks like these :—

"The Sanskrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more excellently refined than either." *Sir William Jones.*

"The Sanskrit language, as a later principle of interpretation, stands as it were at the end of a whole series of languages, and these are by no means such as belong to a course of study which for practical purposes is in a certain degree unserviceable : on the contrary, they comprehend our own mother-tongue and

1. Pan. 2, 17 (October, 1867) 116-118.

that of the classical nations of antiquity, and consequently therefore the true and direct source of our best feelings and the fairest part of our civilization itself." *W. Von Humboldt.*

"The world does not now contain annals of more indisputable antiquity than those delivered down by the ancient Brahmins." *Mr. Halhed.*

"So far as the etymological investigations of the Sanskrit have hitherto afforded satisfactory results, it may certainly be considered as the parent stock of all the known languages."[1] *Mr. Hammer.*

But it is a singular fact that all the translations which have been made of some of the Sanskrit philosophical works are not at all accurate. This will no doubt appear at first sight too bold an assertion for a person of my ability. But I am sure that every one will be convinced of the fact if they take a little trouble of opening any page of any of the translations. For instance, let us take up the very first page of the celebrated translation of the Sāmkhya Kārikā by Mr. Colebrooke and its Bhāṣya by Professor Wilson.

The translation of the first line of the first Kārikā stands thus— "The inquiry into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment," while it should be translated thus— From the embarrassment of the three sorts of pain, there arises the desire of knowing the means of precluding them: the text being दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ । The word विहिता which occurs in the second line of the Bhāṣyaśloka is rendered "imparted," while it means *framed, made.* It is here synonymous with निर्मित.

The expression प्रमाणसिद्धान्तहेतुभिर्युक्तं which occurs in the third line of the Bhāṣya-śloka is rendered "resting on authority, and

1. The difference of number in the tenses between the Teutonic verb and the Sanskrit which has been considered by Mr. Hammer a ground against the Northern and Western Asiatic languages being derived from the Sanskrit, is accounted for by Colonel Vans Kennedy from the experience we have "that a rude people prefer the use of auxiliary verbs for the formation of tenses, to the more artificial mode of inflecting the verb."

establishing certain results" while it should be translated—*together with proofs, dogmas and arguments.*

Again in the translation of the eleventh line of the Bhāṣya the word जिज्ञासमानाय is left out, which should be translated as *being desirous of knowing.*

Lastly I will mention one point which is important, because there is an explanation added from the translator's own mind, and by that addition the whole of the Sāmkhya Philosophy is poisoned. I mean the translation of the word मुच्यते which occurs in a śloka quoted in the Bhāṣya after the fourteenth line. The word is rendered "is liberated (from existence)." Liberated from what? From existence. An excellent interpretation of the Sāmkhya indeed! Is final annihilation the sole object of the Sāmkhya Philosophy? Does the great sage Kapila after all his earnest desire to deliver the "world (from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk), perceiving that the knowledge of the *excellence* of any fruit, through the desire (which this excites) for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means (adapted to the attainment of the fruit),"[1] declare final annihilation the chief end of man? A little consideration would have made Professor Wilson careful enough not to hazard such an explanation. Was the Professor not aware of the fact that the Sāmkhya holds (as every reasonable man must hold) that whatever *is* cannot be annihilated. Had he been satisfied with the word 'liberated' only, the translation would have been perfectly right. Such are some of the grand mistakes which are found, at a cursory glance, in the very first page of the celebrated translation of the Sāmkhya Kārikā and its Bhāṣya. Similar mistakes my be traced in Dr. Roer's and Dr. Ballantyne's translations. But I must for justice sake confess that these gentlemen being habituated in Metaphysical disquisitions did not fall into such blunders as Mr. Colebrooke and Professor Wilson.

Now because the best means of communicating the true view of the Sanskrit philosophies to a foreigner would be by translating them into his language, I therefore purpose to trans-

1. "जगदुद्दिधीर्षुर्महामुनिः कपिलः फलसौन्दर्यज्ञानस्य फलेच्छाद्वारा साधनप्रवृतौ कारणत्वं पश्यन् फलसौन्दर्यमाह" ॥

late the elementry works of all the Sanskrit philosophies into English. Accordingly I begin with the Vedānta, solely because this system is held in the greatest esteem among the Hindus.[1] There are two elementary treatises on the Vedānta which are very popular, viz., the Vedāntaparibhāṣā and the Vedāntasāra. Neither of these treatises enters into a complete exposition of the system. So I think it would be better to leave out the *pūrvapakṣas* or *prima facie* arguments of the former work, because then the *siddhāntapakṣas* or demonstrated conclusions of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, a version of which has never been attempted before.

॥वेदान्तपरिभाषा ॥

A Summary Interpretation of the Vedānta,
with Special Reference

To

The Technical Terms Employed in it.

॥प्रथमः परिच्छेदः ॥

Section I

यदविद्याविलासेन भूतभौतिकसृष्टयः ।
तं नौमि परमात्मानं सच्चिदानन्दविग्रहम् ॥१ ॥
यदन्तेवासिपञ्चास्यैर्निरस्ता भेदिवारणाः ।
तं प्रणौमि नृसिंहाख्यं यतीन्द्रं परमं गुरुम् ॥२ ॥
श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथाख्यान् वेलाङ्गुड़िनिवासिनः ।
जगद्गुरूनहं वन्दे सर्वतन्त्रप्रवर्त्तकान् ॥३ ॥
ब्रह्मबोधाय मन्दानां वेदान्तार्थावलम्बिनी ।
धर्म्मराजाध्वरीन्द्रेण परिभाषा वितन्यते ॥४ ॥

I prostrate myself before the Supreme Being whose body is the eternal source of wisdom and happiness and who being

1 "यद्यपिहिन्दुजातयः सांख्यादिसर्वदर्शनानिऋषिनिर्मितानि मन्यन्ते तथापीदानीं प्रायः सर्वे वेदान्तदर्शनसिद्धान्तान् विशेषरूपेणाद्रियन्ते" Vide September No. of the Pandit [The Hindu Doctrine of Idolatry by this author; p. 160 ff.]

acted upon by Ignorance the (five) elements (earth, water, fire, air, and æther) and the material objects (literally elemental, because matter is nothing more than a combination of the five elements) are produced. (And) I reverence the excellent sage and preceptor named Nṛsimha whose lion-like pupils (as it were) shot the tearing elephants (that is, exploded the doctrines of those great men who maintained the reality of the external world, in opposition to the doctrine of the Vedānta that every thing is God.) (And) I salute the preceptor of the world, named the illustrious Veṅkaṭanāth, an inhabitant of Belunguri and the author of all the sciences. I Dharmarājādhvarīndra, expand (this treatise, named). The Paribhāṣā, which is based on the meaning of the Vedānta, for the comprehension of Brahma by the uninstructed.

इह खलु धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाख्येषु चतुर्व्विधपुरुषार्थेषु मोक्ष एव परमपुरुषार्थः । न स पुनरावर्त्तते इत्यादिश्रुत्या तस्येव नित्यत्वावगमात् । इतरेषां त्रयाणां प्रत्यक्षेण तद्यथेह कर्म्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते इत्यादिश्रुत्या चानित्यत्वावगमाच्च ॥ सच ब्रह्मज्ञानादिति ब्रह्म तज्ज्ञानं तत्प्रमाणं च सप्रपञ्चं निरूप्यते ॥

From such texts of the Vedas as (*who is liberated*) *does not come back again* the knowledge which we have of the eternity of it (i.e. liberation) only, and also from the knowledge which we have of the transitoriness of the other three (viz., merit, wealth, and pleasure) by the evidence of the senses as well as from such of the Vedic texts (which declare that) *as those men who performed numerous religious acts here are destroyed, so also those who acquired virtue in another world are destroyed,* indeed in this world among the four human aims namely, merit, wealth, pleasure, and liberation, liberation is the chief end of man. And because that (i.e. liberation) is accomplished by the knowledge of Brahma, so I investigate Brahma, its knowledge and its evidence with copiousness.

A Rejoinder

[1]From the strictures on Colebrooke and Wilson's translation of the Sāmkhya-Kārikā and Bhāṣya, made by a correspon-

1. Pan. 2, 18 (Nov. 1, 1867) 140 [The letter addressed to the editor of The Pandit under the initial A. B.]

dent in your October number, who lays so much strees on accuracy, one might fancy that he would at least make an accurate *beginning* of his own proposed translation of "the elementary works of all the Sanskrit philsosophies." It is strange, however, to find that out of the twelve lines and a half he has translated of the Vedānta-Paribhāshā, not less than six lines, either entirely or in part, are grossly mistranslated. The first line यदविद्याविलासेन भूतभौतिकसृष्टयः is rendered "Who (the Supreme Being) being *acted upon* by Ignorance, &c." Ignorance acting upon the All wise Deity! —an insult to the Vedānta Philosophy. The line means 'By the disportment of the Ignorance (or Mysterious Power) of whom &c.' सच्चिदानन्दविग्रहं is rendered 'Whose body is the eternal source of wisdom and happiness.' Has the Brahma of the Vedāntī a body? Say 'Whose body, or nature, is Eternal Joy and Thought (in their identity) or, in other words, 'Who is the Eternal Intelligence, all, Bliss.'

यदन्तेवासिपञ्चास्यैर्निरस्ता भेदिवारणः (whose pupils, as lions, overthrew those elephants, the dualists) is nonsensically translated into 'Whose lion-like pupils (as it were) *shot* the *tearing* elephants.'

सर्व्वतन्त्रप्रवर्त्तकान् (the *promulgator* or *teacher* of all philosophical systems) the epithet of श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथाख्यान् is thoughtlessly rendered 'The *author* of all sciences.'

परिभाषा वितन्यते is incorrectly rendered 'I expand (this treatise, named) The Paribhāṣā, since, though the verb तन् is literally represented by 'to expand' or 'to stretch,' the English verb 'to expand,', when employed in connection with a book, means to comment upon, or to clear the sense by explanations and illustrations.

The Vaidik text तद्यथेह कर्म्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते,[1] rendered absurdly thus : 'As those men who performed numerous religious acts here are destroyed, so also those who acquired virtue in another world are destroyed,' —means : 'As Life here (in this world) obtained by work (done in a former

1. This may be also interpreted thus : "As, in this world, the whole set of things *such as a harvest and the like*, acquired by labour, is consumed, even so &c."

birth) is destroyed, even so is Life hereafter, attained by meritorious deeds (performed here) destroyed.'

I would pass over the blunders in English, but one, which is the least pardonable of all, deserves being exposed, *viz.*, the use of a noun without a verb or governing preposition, such as that of the noun 'knowledge' in the second line of the second paragraph of the translation.

I may be allowed to say, in passing, that it amused me not a little to remark the confidence and complacency with which your correspondent refers to the exposition, printed in your September number, of the Vedānta, "in Sanskrit and in (his) own words," so remarkable for its grammar and sense.

In conclusion, while giving due credit to your correspondent for the interest, so rare among Hindu youths evinced by him in the learning of his forefathers, I would at the same time advise him to acquire a more tolerable acquaintance with the elements of Sanskrit and a fairer knowledge of English before he ventures to enter upon the study of Hindu Philosophy, and to undertake the translation into English of all its elementary works. I cannot help also remarking that your correspondent ought not to have suffered his superficial knowledge of Indian Philosophy and inability to understand English phraseology to betray him into the gross and laughable presumption of condemning *every page of every translation* from Sanskrit philosophy made by any European Scholar.

Prospectous of the Rig-Veda Translation,[1]

Max Müller, M.A.,

Taylorian Professor of Modern European Languages in the University of Oxford; Fellow of All souls college.

After twenty years spent in collecting and publishing the text of the Rig-Veda with the voluminous Commentary of Sāyaṇa, I intend to lay before the public my translation of some of the hymns contained in that collection of primeval poetry. I cannot promise a translation of all the hymns, for the simple reason that, notwithstanding Sāyaṇa's traditional explanations of every word, and in spite of every effort to decipher the original text, either by an intercomparison of all passages in which the same word occurs, or by etymological analysis, or by consulting the vocabulary and grammar of cognate languages, there remain large portions of the Rig-Veda which, as yet, yield no intelligible sense. It is very easy, no doubt, to translate these obscurer portions according to Sāyaṇa's traditional interpretation, but the impossibility of adopting this alternative may be judged by the fact that even the late Professor Wilson, who undertook to give a literal rendering of Sāyaṇa's, interpretation of the Rig-Veda, found himself obliged, by the rules of common sense and by the exigencies of the English language, to desert, not unfrequently, that venerable guide. I need hardly repeat what I have so often said,[2] that it would be reckless to translate a single line of the Rig-Veda without having carefully examined Sāyaṇa's invaluable commentary and other native authorities, such as the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, the Prātiśākhyas, Yāska's Nirukta,

1. Pan. 2, 13 (June 1, 1867) 21-22. [The translation, however, not continued after its first volume.]
2. This subject and the principles by which I shall be guided in my translation of the Rig-Veda have been discussed in an article lately published in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, New Series, vol. ii., part 2, "*The Hymns of the Gaupāyanas and the Legend of King Asamāti.*" The same volume contains two valuable articles on the same subject by Mr. J. Muir, D.C.L.

Saunaka's Bṛihaddevatā, the Sūtras, the Anukramaṇīs and many other works on grammar, metre, nay, even on law and philosophy, from which we may gather how the most learned among the Brahmans understood their own sacred writings. But it would be equally reckless not to look beyond.

A long controversy has been carried on, during the last twenty years, whether we, the scholars of Europe, have a right to criticise the traditional interpretation of the sacred writings of the Brahmans. I think we have not only the right to do so, but that it is the duty of every scholar never to allow himself to be guided by tradition, unless, that tradition has first been submitted to the same critical tests which are applied to the suggestions of his own private judgment. A translator must before all things, be a "sceptic," a man who looks about, and who chooses that for which he is able to make himself honestly responsible, whether it be suggested to him, in the first instance, by the most authoritative tradition or by the merest random guess.

I offer my translation of such hymns as I can, to a certain extent, understand and explain, as a humble contribution towards a future translation of the whole of the Rig-Veda. There are many scholars in England, Germany, France, and India who now devote their energies to the deciphering of Vedic words and Vedic thoughts; in fact, there are few Sanskrit scholars at present who have not made the Veda the principal subject of their studies. With every year, with every month, new advances are made, and words and thoughts, which but lately seemed utterly unintelligible, receive an unexpected light from the ingenuity of European students. Fifty years hence I hope that my own translation may be antiquated and forgotten. No one can be more conscious of its shortcomings than I am. All I hope is that it may serve as a step leading upwards to a higher, clearer, truer point of view, from which those who come after us may gain a real insight into the thoughts, the fears, the hopes, the doubts, the faith of the true ancestors of our race; —of those whose language still lives in our own language, and whose earliest poetical compositions have been preserved to us for more than three thousand years, in the most surprising, and, to my mind, the most significant manner.

Specimen

The present publication is intended to form eight volumes, of about twenty five sheets each, containing an English translation, notes, and explanatory essays. A transliterated text (in the original Pada form) will be added in order to obviate the necessity of quoting a whole passage again and again in the various notes on the same verse. The first volume will be published as soon as a sufficient number of subscribers has been obtained. Not more than two volumes to be published in each year.

Terms of Subscription before publication. 10s. 6d. per volume — the price to Non-subscribers after publication will be 12s. 6d. per volume.Trübner and Co., 60, Paternoster Row, London.

Rig-Veda-Sanhitā

Hymn to the Maruts (the Storm-gods), ascribed to Kaṇva, the son of Ghora.

1. Sing forth, O Kaṇvas, to the sportive host of your Maruts, brilliant on their chariots, and unscathed.

2. They who were born self-luminous, together with the spotted deer (the clouds), with the spears, the daggers, the glittering ornaments.

3. I hear their whips, almost close by, as they crack them in their hands; they gain splendour on their way.

Mandala I, Sükta 37.
Ashtaka I, Adhyäya 3, Varga 12-14.

Krílám vah śárdhah márutam anarváṇam ratheśúbham káṇváh abhí prá gáyata. 1.

Yé pṛíshatíbhih ṛishṭí-bhih sákám váś ibhi añjíbhih ájáyanta sva-bhanavah. 2.

Ihá-ivasṛiṇve êshám, káśáh hāsteshu yát vádán ní yāman chitrám ṛiñjate. 3.

Notes

Verse 1. Wilson translated *anarvāṇam* by without horses, though the commentator distinctly explains the word by without an enemy. Wilson considers it doubtful whether *arvan* can ever mean enemy. The fact is that in the Rig-veda *anarvān* never means without horses, but always without hurt or free from enemies; and the commentator is perfectly right, as far as the sense is concerned, in rendering the word by without an enemy, or unopposed (*apraty-ṛita*). *Anarvān* is not formed from *ārvat*, horse.

Pratna- Kamra- Nandinī[1] : a Review

We heartily welcome the appearance in this city of another Sanskrit journal, entitled Pratna-Kamra-Nandinī or the Hindu Commentator. The first number of the periodical, very fairly got up both as to paper and type, contains the first portion of a commentary on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras, the first chapter of the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, the beginning of an epitome of the Mahābhāṣya, and of a new Commentary on the Kavi-kalpalatikā (a rhetorical treatise), and the first nine verses of the first hymn of the Sāma-veda, accompanied with Sāyaṇa's Commentary, a Bengali translation, and the forms in which they are sung, with the modulations idicated by numerical and other marks. As we are sincerely interested in the prosperity of the journal, we would take the liberty of pointing out some of the imperfections of the first number with the hope to see them removed. In the first place, we would remark that the name प्रत्न कम्र नन्दिनी, as bearing scarcely any sense, ought to be changed. Words forming members of a compound must, at least, be joined by a hyphen, if they be not completely united. As to the plan of the periodical, we have earnestly to advise the editors chiefly to aim at bringing out valuable old works instead of new compositions, and to restrict themselves scrupulously to the printing of those only that have never been printed before. We have little doubt that the journal will meet with success, if conducted on the above plan which is that of our own. The Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, as we suppose the editior of the journal is aware, has already been edited by Pandit Īśwara chandra Vidyāsāgara and a new edition is hardly wanted yet. The Saṁhitā of the Sāma-Veda tob has been edited by Professor Benfey, with notes, glossary and translation, and rendered into English by the Revd. Dr. Stevenson. European scholars however will gladly hail the appearance of another Indian in the field of Vaidik exegesis, especially if he

1. Pan. 2, 17 (October 1, 1867) 116.

gives a larger instalment in each succeeding month and takes a little more pains in correcting the press. The present rate of nine verses in a month will not bring us to the end of the Saṁhitā for the next eight years, and two misprints in these nine verses grievously offend our eyes.

Dr. Haug on the Word Brahma[1]

This is an able and interesting article on the original meaning of the word 'brahma' or 'brahman', which, as the author justly observes, is the most important word of Hindu theology and philosophy. 'Brahma', says Dr. Haug, occurs twice in the *Nighaṇṭavas* as name for 'food' (*Annanāma* 2.7), and for 'riches' (*dhananāma* 2, 10). In Sāyaṇa's commentary on the Hymns of the Rig-veda it is sometimes explained with reference to this signification and sometimes in other ways, *ex. gr.* (a) food, in general; 1, 10, 4 *brahma cha no vaso sachendra yajnam cha vardhaya*, "Increase, O Vasu, our *brahma* and also our sacrifice, O Indra," Schol. *anna*, food, in general. More frequently, sacrificial food, as in 4, 22, 1. Schol. *brahma havirlakshaṇa puro ḍāśādikam annam*. (b) Performance of the song of the Soma singers, 7, 35, 7. Sāy. *brahma stotram*. (c) Magic charm, spell, *mantra* 2, 23, 1. *brahmaṇām brahmaṇaspate, i. e.* Lord of the *brahma*, of the *brahmas* (Bṛihaspati, later called *Gaṇeśa) Schol. brahmaṇāmmantrāṇām*. (d) Ceremonies, having a song of praise as their characteristic, *Karmāṇi stuti-lakshaṇāni*. (e) Performance of song and sacrifice (both ideas expressed by one word *brahma*) 7, 23, 1. Sāy. *brahmāṇi stotrāṇi havīṅṣicha*. (f) The recitation of the Hotri-priests, *brahma stutaśastrātmakam*. (g) Great 6, 23. 1. Sāy. *brahmaṇi brihati mahati*. These all seem to point to two principal meanings, namely "food", in particular "sacrificial food", and the performance of the song at the sacrifice.

The author proceeds to show that the meaning "devotion" given to the word *brahma* in the St. Petersburg lexicon is quite inapplicable, that feeling in our sense of the word being as foreign to the Veda as it is to modern Hinduism.

The root of the word is *bṛih* which in its simple form does not appear to be found in the Veda in the sense of to "increase". It is always there found compounded with propositions, as

1. Pan. 3, 30 (Nov. 1, 1968) 136. *Über die ursprungliche Bedeutung des Wortes brahma. Von Dr. Martin Haug, München, 1868.*

udbṛih, parivṛiḍha &c. The original meaning of *vṛih, bṛih,* which is to be considered as a mere modification of the root *vṛidh* "to increase", seems to have been "to raise oneself up." The idea of "devotion" cannot, without forcing, be arrived at from this signification.

In the language of the Zendavesta, so closely connected with the Veda, we find, as far as sound is concerned an absolutely identical word namely *baresman*. By it the Pārsīs understand a regularly cut bundle of twigs tied together with grass, and used at their Fire-ceremonies exactly as the little clipped bundle of Kuśa grass is used by Brahmans at the Soma-sacrifices. This latter is called *veda* (*Āśval. Śraut. Sūtr. 1*, 11.) which passes later as a synonym of *brahma*. This bunch of grass, as well as the *baresman* of the Pārsīs, has a symbolical meaning. They both represent "growing" "increase", "prosperity". The original meaning of the word was "growth", "sprout" (*cf.* Lat. *virga*). Hence came the meaning "prosperity", "success". As the success of the sacrificial forms and offerings, the word could be used for any one of these essentials. As the chanting of the hymns of praise was the most important of these the word was most frequently employed in this sense. As sacrifice with the Vedic Indians was the chief means to obtain all earthly and spiritual blessings, but was itself useless without the *brahma, i. e.* success, the latter was at last regarded as the original cause of all being.

Ārya-vidyā-sudhākara : a Review[1]

A. E. Gough

The Ārya-vidyā-sudhākara by Pandit Yajñeśvara Śarman of Surat presents us with a brief summary of the literature, religious, political and philosophical, of the Āryans of India. The aim of the author, as an orthodox Hindu, is to provide native students, whose time is much occupied in the study of modern science, with a short review of the revelation, tradition, and philosophy of their ancestors. This he accomplishes in the compass of some two hundred and fifty octavo pages. The first section of the work treats of the creation of the world, the origin of the Āryas and of the four castes, the antiquity of the arts of civil life and especially of that of writing. Here the writer undertakes to vindicate Hindu orthodoxy against modern objections. Next follows an account of the Vedic literature, and, in the second section, of the Vedic ritual. The third division treats of the civil and religious duties prescribed by the Smṛiti, and the fourth exhibits a lucid analysis of the philosophical systems orthodox and unorthodox. The fifth has a practical scope. Systems differ, but it is generally agreed that righteousness leads to knowledge and knowledge to emancipation of the soul. The old paths are the way of safety.

येनास्य पितरो याता येन याताः पितामहाः ।
तेन यायात् सतां मार्गे तेन गच्छन् न रिष्यते ॥ Manu IV. 178.

The author's style is every where methodical, easy, and perspicuous, and his only failure is the attempt to disprove or to reconcile with religious dogmas, adverse facts relating to the early Āryans, which we owe to the free research of European scholars. Thus we are told that all other races of men being, as Manu teaches, sprung from the four castes, whose original seat

1. Pan. 3, 32 (Jan. 1, 1869) 188.

was Kuru-kshetra and other parts of India, their languages resemble Sanskṛit by retaining some of its words in a corrupt form. Of course it is well known that languages other than Sanskṛit belonging to the Indo-European group exhibit occasionally grammatical forms more organic than those of Sanskṛit, as, for instance, in the case of nouns of agency and relationship and of the substantive verb. Yāska's interpretation of the phrase पञ्च जनाः, is an inadequate reply to the mass of evidence respecting the orgin of caste collected in Dr. Muir's Sanskṛit Texts. It is not likely that any one will suppose the earliest Āryans to have been destitute of skill in science and art and merely brutish. (विद्याशिल्पादिकुशलत्वहीनाः केवल पशुकल्पाः p. 12).

That they were acquainted with the arts of agriculture &c., even before the Vedic peirod is established by the testimony of the various Āryan languages. The answer (p. 19) to Prof. Max Müller's statement that writing was unknown before the Sūtra period of Vedic literature appears equally unsatisfactory with the author's objections to other modern inductions. But while such objections arising from strong religious feeling are seldom stated, the work as a whole will be valued by those who know the assistance of such summaries as this in the appropriation or in the mental arrangement of large masses of facts. With a few modifications a translation of the work, and especially of the philosophical portion, would be of great service to English students of Sanskṛit.

Paṇḍita Parikramā

The Sampūrnanand Sanskrit University has planned to reprint of selected articles, books and monographs printed in Sanskrit in *The Paṇḍita* (1866-1917) duly edited under the title *Paṇḍita Parikramā*. The first two volumes have already been published in 1991.

(i) *Paṇḍita Parikramā (Prathama Stabaka)* Ed. by Dr. B. N. Misra ... Rs. 160/-

(ii) *Paṇḍita Parikramā (Dvitīya Stabaka)-Khaṇḍa Praśasti* by Hanumāna with 'Tilaka' Skt. Comm. by Guṇavinaya Gaṇi. Ed. by Dr. B. N. Misra ... Rs. 80/-

Further volumes are in press.