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125
fund number, work relating to CIA funds, and he thinks it is a reference
to an account number.
The CHAIRMAN. We will pursue that further because, as I recall
the labels on the containers, "Do not use, unless directed by P600."
That does not sound like a system of accounts or an account ledger.
Senator MONDALE. I know It but--
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will track that down.
Senator MONDALE. Could we ask them to give a full report ?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; of course we will track it down. If there are
no further questions of these two witnesses I would like to move on to
Ambassador Leonard.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Ambassador HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. KARAMESSINES. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Leonard, if you would please come
forward at this time. Because of the confusion here, we will take a
5 minute recess so we can get back to order. Mr. Ambassador, if you
would come forward and take your place at the witness stand during
the recess I would appreciate it.
[A brief recess was taken.]
The CHAlRMAN. The hearing will please come back to order.
Mr. Ambassador, would you stand and take the oath, please.
Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this
proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. LEONARD. I do.
The CHAffiMAN. Thank you. .
I understand that you have some opening remarks you would hke
to make, and I invite you to make them now.
TESTIMONY OF lAMES LEONARD, PRESIDENT, U.S. UNITED
NATIONS ASSOCIATION
Mr. LEONARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is not a prepared statement; I simply would like to state
briefly for the record, my relationship to this question which you are
looking at.
My name is James Leonard. I am, at the present time, the President
of the United Nations Association in New York. I left the U.S. Government
in 1973, after 25 years in the State Department, and for the
last 4 of those years, I was on loan from the State Department to the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as an Assistant Director, and
I wore a second hat during that period.
I was also the head of the U.S. dele~ation to the Disarmament
Conference in Geneva, known as the CCD-the Conference of Committee
on Disarmament. That was in 1969, 1970, and 1971. And in 1971,
basically between March and September, we neg-otiated at that conference,
the Treaty on Biological Weapons. .
That convention was then discussed in the General Assembly In the
fall of 1971, and it was commended by the General Assembly by a
vote of 110 to nothing. There was one delegation that abstained, and
..... _ ....t.. .... ..J':.,J __• _ ... ~: ....:_......... ':_ 4'L ............ .:__
126
And the treaty was then opened for signature in April of 1972.
It was ratified by the United States after appropriate advice and
consent of the Senate, and brought into force only in March of this
year-March 25, 1975. So that treaty became.binding on us only in
March.
The treaty has been signed by something over 100 nations, and
the last count I had, had been ratified by 40 to 50.
This question of chemical and biological warfare had gotten a high
place on the international agenda along in 1967 and 1968, and there
had been a proposal in 1968 from the United Kingdom that the two
questions of biological warfare and chemical warfare should 'be
separated. And that the question of biological warfare should be dealt
with first as a more simple, and in some respects, though not all
respects, a more urgent question.
The matter was placed under study very early in 1969-early in the
Nixon administration-in the spring and summer of 1969. I did not
participate actively in the process within the U.S. Government in
Washington here, since. I left for Geneva in July of 1969 and was
there in Geneva during the principal part of the period during which
these decisions were being taken.
The decisions were, of course, reached and reflected in the President's
press conference on November of 1969. The subsequent year-I'm
sorry. When I came back from Geneva in the latter part of 1969, I
found that the process of weighing what sort of a decision should be
made about chemical and biological weapons was really very far advanced,
and my memory is not precise on this, but just about the time
I got back in November, a memorandum was sent from the Defense
Department--from the Se<:retary of Defense, Mr. Laird, to the White
House suggesting a course of action with regard to chemical and biological
weapons. And that memorandum from the Defense Department
essentially became the decision which Mr. Nixon approved and issued
late in November.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Mr. Ambassador, the action taken
by President Nixon was a unilateral action.
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. That preceded the treaty.
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.
As a part of that, he decided that we would support the British proposal
that there be a separate treaty on biological weapons.
The CHAIRMAN. So that the President took a position which was a
kind of initiative, was it not?
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. You wanted to say to the world, the United States
not only favors this, but we are going to do it unilaterally before a
treaty itself is negotiated.
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct. That was the essence of his decision
that was publicly announced. It was not a secret decision.
The CHAIRMAN. It was a gesture for decency and a gesture for peace.
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.
Basically, the President decided on Mr. Laird's recommendation
that it was in our interests to get out of the BWbusiness-to get totally
out of it-whether other people did so or not. We were better off out of
thAt. hll~inp~~. 'T'hi'l 11011nt.l'V WA.R 'l1l.TAl'. in Tact. without biolomcal weap127
And having taken that position, the President then directed that the
State Department and the Arms Control Agency attempt to persuade
others of that and put this in treaty form.
The CHAIRMAN. And that decisIOn that we get out of this business
for the reasons that you stated was a decision that was concurred in by
the Defense Department.
Mr. LEONARD. Mr. Laird, in fact, advanced the original-took the
initiative.
The CHAIRMAN. In fact, the recommendation that we get out of this
business was one that came from the Secretary of Defense,
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.
Now that decision taken in November of 1969 did not clearly deal
with the problem of toxins, and it became necessary, as you know from
your investigations, to have a further quick study of the toxin problem,
which then produced a further Nahonal Security Decision Memorandum
in February of 1970, and which did, in fact, include toxins
within the scope of the renunciation-the unilateral renunciationthat
we had taken on ourselves and proclaimed.
As a consequence of that, we also suggested to the British-and, of
course, they agreed-that toxins should also be included in the treaty
which was to be negotiated.
The proposal that we negotiate a treaty on this really did not go
anywhere m particular durmg 1970. We were engaged in negotiating
a different treaty at that time, known as the Sea Bed Treaty, and we
were attempting to persuade other governments that our approach to
this question of chemical and biological weapons was a correct one;
that we should separate the two categories of weapons and deal with
biologicals first.
And that was not readily accepted by other governments. It was not
accepted by the Soviet Umon, nor was it accepted, in general, by other
nonaligned countries. It was accepted by our allies-our NATO allies,
in general.
Nevertheless, during 1970, the President's order to get out of this
business unilaterally was moved forward and the process of destruction
was planned-carefully planned-and it is my understanding,
was actually begun in 1970; certainly production of these was halted
during 1970.
There was no question in my mind-the question was never raised
as to whether CIA was in the business of producing or dealing with
these matters. That simply was not, from our point, something that we
even thought about to the best of my recollection at this time.
Well, we finished up this Sea Bed Treaty, and it became clear that
chemicals and biologICals was the next thing on the agenda. And
we went back to Geneva in early 1971 and did, at that point, succeed in
scoring a breakthrough, so to speak.
We persuaded the Soviet Union to alter its position and to join us
in agreeing to take care of the biological questIOn first, and deal with
chemicals later. And that was done, then, during the spring and summer
of 1971. The treaty was drafted and brought back to New York
and agreed upon in its final form, as it stands today.
Just one comment on this whole diplomatic effort. I think it is clear
that what we were doing was basically a British-American way of
handling the chemical and biological problem. It was very much
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criticized by most other countries. They felt it was improper to separate
biologicals because then nothing would be done about chemicals,
which they were :far more concerned about, really.
And they tended to downplay the importance of biological weapons.
We argued the other way, of course. When they did agree to this, it was
basically as a concession to us because they wanted to move the whole
question of disarmament forward, and if this was the way we preferred
to do it, well and good, let's do it that way. Then we would turn to
chemicals. So it is particularly unfortunate that this event~a treaty
of which we were the principal sponsors-should have been handled in
t~e way that it eVIdently has been handled in' this particular
CIrcumstance.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question on that very point.
From what you have said, the President, acting unilaterally, and
in an attempt to make a g-esture of decency 'and peace, and in compliance
with a recommendation that came to him from the Defense
Department itself, announced to the world that we would not stockpile,
or use, bacteriological weapons.
Then, on the--
Mr. LEONARD. Could I, Senator, just on that point.
We had already renounced the use of chemical and biological weapons,
not in treaty form, but by our repeated assertion in international
forums, that we would abide by the principles and objectives of the
Geneva Protocol which deals with the question of use.
We later, as you know, have ratified that and become a formal
party to that agreement. But use was not really in question. We already
had excluded the use of biological weapons before Mr. Nixon
even announced it.
The CHAIRMAN. But the President went further in his announcement.
He said we would not stockpile them, and further, we would
destroy them,
Mr.'LEONARD. That is correct. Absolutely, But that we would simply
not possess these weapons.
The CHAIRMAN, Then we initiated a treaty to secure an international
agreement that other countries would do it'likewise.
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.
The CHA1RIMAN, And now we find that toxins were preserved in violation
of the President's orders. And it has taken us 5 years to make
that discovery.
Now what do you think went wrong ~
What do you think should be done about it to protect against :failures
of this kind in the future?
Mr, LEONARD. Well I would like to offer a few thoughts if I could
on that.
Let me just say first, however, that in terms of the international
implications of this I would not want to exal!g'erate the impart that
I think this particular discovery will have on the attitudes of other
governments.
I think that it will not discourage them from entering into further
arms control agreements with us, and that sort of thin!!'. for reasons
which I believe are quite obviou!"-that this WAS not a deliberate eva·
sion 6f the treatybv the hip-hest levels of the U.S, Governmpnt lit all.
The CHAIRMA'N. And we have assumed throughout that the Presi129
dential order was honestly given and that there was no back-channel
communication by the PresIdent, or anyone in a policymaking position,
to disregard the public announcement. The public announcement
did, in fact, represent national policy. '
Mr. LEONARD. I believe that to be the case, and I think others will
believe that to be the case.
I think there will be something troublesome in all of this, in that in
the future when assertions are made that it is not necessary to write
particularly complicated provisions for oversight and enforcement in
the treaties, other governments may be somewhat more exigent, more
demanding, of us than has been the case in the past when our simple
assertion that you would know we will comply with that, you could
not be in any doubt about that, would generally have sufficed. And that
is a disadvantage, but I think it is a secondary one in this whole
context.
On the question of what might be done to prevent analogous difficulties
in the future, I would think there are a couple of what one
might speak of as administrative measures that would be obviously
appropriate. And several of you Senators have, in fact, referred to
them this morning and perhaps yesterday, although I was not here
yesterday.
It seems to me that in a matter of this sort it is verv desirable to
have a clear written record; a written record that runs· from the top
down, and that then comes from the--I will not say the very bottom,
but at least the middle levels of the Government back up, so that the
order comes down in a written, unambiguous form, which no one
could possibly misinterpret, and it has attached to it some sort of a
certificate, if you like, that the official has read and understood this
instruction, and that he, to the best of his knowledge, he, and everyone
in his office, and everyone-every office of which he has any direct
knowledge, is in compliance with this obligation.
I am told-I cannot say this is my own knowledge, but I have been
told that something of this sort was done in the Defense Department
in connection with quite a different treaty-the Treaty Agamst Prohibiting
Antiballistic Missiles, or limiting them. And that they diel,
in the Army, in the area concerned with antiballistic missile
defense-
The CHAIRMAN. There has been so much testimony about secrecy and
the highly secret nature of these compounds and toxins, yet there was
nothing secret about this at all, was there?
In fact, the President gave great publicity to the order. It was
known at the time that he gave the order that the Government was in
possession of certain toxins of this kind, and he ordered them
destroyed.
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. So that there was no reason whatever in view of the
circumstances that a direct written order shouldn't have gone right
through any agency of the Government that may have possessed such
forbidden substances.
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. And an unclassified,
written order. I see no rea~on it should have been classified.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There was no need to classify it in anysense.
That should have been a public order and a written order in order to
130
make certain that the Government itself was in compliance with the
President's directive.
Mr. LEONARD. I think that should go, obviously, not simply to the
top levels who have this supervisory bureaucratic responsibility, but
down far enough in an organization so that one can be sure that the
people who really know what is being done are aware of what their
g'Uidance is; that It comes from the top.
The second thing, I would think, is of a somewhat different character
that might be done. It seems to me that there is a debate that goes
on within the Government of a more philosophical character which it.
would be well to clarify. And that is, what sort of things are legitimate
and what sort of things are not legitimate.
And this is quite a confused area. There are many people in this
country who feel that if somebody else, some other government is
doing certain things, then that means it is legitimate for us to do those
things. And, in fact, there is a general rule, I believe, in international
law that something that is not prohibited is permitted.
It is not an invariable rule, but it is a general sort of principle that
one goes by. I would think it very desirable for the President of this
country at least to lay down some more unilateral rules as to what we
are constrained not to do and what officials of this Government are
constrained not to do. That can get rather philosophical, but I think
we have a President whose character, whose ability to distin,guish between
right and wrong, is very widely respected. And I would like to
see him take stands on these issues and make it perfectly clear where
he stands and where he expocts other officials to stand on what is permitted
and what is prohibited to agents of the U.S. Government, in the
broad sense in which all of us, who at one time or another, draw a
Government salary, are a~ents.
And then there is a thIrd area which is obviously much more complicated,
it seems to me, than simply issuing directives. And that is
this question of what I mi~ht call the span of control in an organization
of the sort that we are dealing with here.
And here it does seem to me tliat a very real question is raised, and
it has been rather differently illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Helms
and Mr. Karamessines.
These are very large organizations in which the senior officials are
dealing with an enormous number of totally diverse problems, and it
is difficult for them to really be confident that they know what is g-oing
on down in one or another small part of an organization that is as large
as that.
And it seems to me that there is, therefore, since not everything could
be reduced to writing, not everything could be put-the guidance cannot
always be laid out in categorical and legal form. It certainly could
have been here, but the question of dividing an agency as large as the
CIA is really a legitimate area of discussion.
It seems to me that the functions there are quite disparate; for
any lar~e agency performing a wide variety of functions.
The CHAIRMAN. When you say dividing it, you mean taking an
agency of this size and breaking it up ~
Mr. LEONARD. Breaking it up.
I would certainly not want to see the CIA abolished. As a person who
spent a good deal of time in arms control, I am very conscious of the
131
contributions that the CIA has made to arms control. We just simply
oould not have the kind of arms control we have ~ot today, the kind of
agreements on strategic weapons that we have wIth the Soviet Union
if it were not for the intelligence that the CIA provides. And I certainly
would not want to see that capability impaIred in any way. But
I do not think that is necessarily inherent in the present structure of
the Agency. I do not think it necessarily would be impaired, and I
can even imagine that, in fact, command and control mIght be somewhat
improved if these were less ponderous, less huge, organizations
than the one we presently have.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is certainly true that the organization has
grown very large, and that may complicate the question of command
and control. Your suggestion is it mIght be broken into several component
parts, over which more effective command could be established
by virtue of their--
Mr. LEoNARD. More compact and more homogeneous nature.
The CHAIRMAN. Of a more compact, more homogenous nature.
Mr. LEOXARD. Precisely, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further to say in the way of
opening remarks, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. LEONARD. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. .
The CHAIRMAN. All right. I think we can go to questions, then. I
would turn first to Senator Mondale.
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Leonard, you spent, I think, over 20 years
in the Foreign Service and were assigned in a whole range of assignments
in a host of countries where you could 'lee the operation of the
CIA, particularly covert operations, in action. It has been my belief
as we have gone throug-h these hearing-s, most of them in private, that
one of the problems with covert activities is that they are usually decided
and determined in a way that does not fully appreciate the possible
damag-e and cost to this country should it fail or should it become
known, and that the failure to consider that part of CIA covert activities
often encourages our operatives to undertake projects which are
very foolish, very costly, and often bear a cost far disproportionate
to any kind of return that we could conceive. Is that a fair conclusion ~
Mr. LEONARD. I think it is a fair conclusion, Senator, although I
would not want to seem to be levying some sort of a blanket charge
against the CIA and its people abroad of general irresponsibility or
being out of control in some fashion or another, because my experience
with them is precisely to the contrary. They are not. But there is, as
you suggest, this possibility there, in the eovert character of some of
the things they have to carry out, and in the problems of insuring and
oversi~ht of those activities that is not somehow involved or committed
to the activity that is being contempla.ted.
Senator MONDALE. I understood that you were of the impression that
one step which mi~ht be taken is to separate the covert action side
of the CIA from the receiving or collecting of information and intelligence-~
atheringside, separate them into separate institutions. Is that
correct~
Mr. LEONARD. There seems to me two kinds of covert action, and the
covert gatheri~g- of intelligence, simply finding out what is g-oing on,
I thmk, sometImes does have to be done in a covert fashion. It cannot
be carried out in public. I think the need for that sort of intelligence ____ , ... _._._._. L • •,
132
Basically, most of what the U.S. Govern~ent nE'.eds to know about
foreign countries comes to it either through the press or through State
Department channels. The contribution from CIA intelligence, in
many situations, is really quite marginal. But there are situations in
which it is extremely important, and I would not want to see that
thrown away. .
But I would distinguish that sort of covert activity from covert action
that is directed at some sort of having an effect on the political
life of another country, whether it is by removing individuals or providing
money to individuals, or in some fashion ot' other warping or
skewing or diverting the course of political life in that country from
the direction it's going to take on its own, so to speak.
Senator MONDALE. You think it makes sense to take that functiol'
out of the CIA and put it into some other institution ~
Mr. LEONARD. I would renounce it totally, Senator. I would not take
it out of the CIA and put it somewhere else. I do not think we have
any business being in this, if I may call it, covprt action, operational
action, whether one labels it offensive or whatever. I just do not think
the United States needs that capability. I think we can give it up
unilaterally, just as securely and safely and benefit from giving it up!
t.he way we benefited from giving up biological warfare, biological
weapons,
Senator MONDALE. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias.
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask a hypothetical question relating to our commit·
ment to destroy the biolosrical weapons that we had created and stock·
piled. The Department of Defense, in response to the President's order
did, as I understand it, develop very elaborate procedures for the destruction
of these toxic substances. Would it have complied with our
international commitment had these substances, instead of physically
being destroyed, had been destroyed as far as purpose was concerned,
by making them avltilable for scientific purposes to medical schoolR
and research laboratories in this or any other countrv i
Mr. LEONARD. Well, it would not, strictly speaking, have been in
compliance with the treaty to do that, if Ithe quantities involved were
larger than was necessary for the purposes involved: the treaty is quite
clear on thltt. And 'at the time, both in }11:8 ne~otiation, we made that
ouite clear on the reooro, 'and I believe in the document transmitted to
the 'Senate for advice and consent that wasnlso made Quite clear.
There is It paragraph in this small publication which underlines
that point:
The treaty allows the Government to retain only quantities that have a justIfication
for prophylactic, protective, lor other peaceful purposes, and not quantities
in excess of that, even it the intent eventually may be to direct them in that
fashi'on.
Senator MATHIAS, My thinking- is not directed only at this shellfish
toxin that we are considering today. but really on the whole biological
arsenal 'at Fort Detrick. in which the American people have invested
hundreds of millions of dollars, which may -have been of some importance
to the scientific community in view of the fp..ct that medical
schools all over the country very adtively participated in the Cre.atiOll
133
of that facility and in the continuation of its work. But Ithat hypothetical
question does have some pl'laotical impact at the moment, ~cause
as has been testified here, there has been a request made by vanous
medical schools for this toxin that is in point, for research purposes.
Now, would it be possible for the appropriate authorities, without violating
any international commitment, to make this toxin available f(lr
medical researoh ~
Mr. LEOXARD. It would be quite legitimate to do so, if the quantities
are appropriate. If the Quantities are clearly in excess, then it is not
legi'tiul'wte.
Senator MATHIAS. It might be in ~xcess for a single medical school,
but if it were divided up for research purposes among several, would
th'a.t be ~it;hin your interpretation of ,,,,,,hat is pennissable?
Mr. LEONARD. Oh, yes j there is no question.
Senator MATHIAS. As long as no single agent r~eived more than was
a<:tually physically required for its research work?
Mr. LEOXARD. Well, the question really is one of intent, Senator. If
the intent is honestlv and clearly to use these for these resroreh prophylactic
purposes, then there is no question the quantiti/ty stich as is appropriate
to t,hat. But if the intent is otherwise, if the intent is Ito hold
them as a contingency reserved for some other possible nse, then that
is not legiltimate. .
Senator MATHIS. But if they were exposed, and the whole world
knew where they went and in what quantIties, and for what purposes,
you would find no objection?
Mr. LEOXARD. I would not. I cannot really imagine that a foreign
government would charge us for a violation for tha;t sort of action.
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAmMAx. This isa very important subject that Senator
Mathias raises, because when this committee was first established Senator
Mansfield, the majority leader, and Senaltor Scott, the minority
leader, advised the CIA 'and other agencies tha.1 we will be illvestigat- ,
ing, not to destroy anything for obvious reasons, and when this cache of
toxim: was -discovered, the Agency qui,te properly came to us to ask for
a release, becausei,t may very well be thl',t the executive branch will
now want to destroy these toxins.
One possibility for using them for proper purposes is the point of
SenaJor Mathias' inquiry, though. clearly, other testimony has shown
that the quantities that have been found in this particular Cliche go far
beyond the experimental 'and legitimate needs to which this partIcular
poison could be put.
But if there is a purpose that can be sen-ed that comes within the
treaty, so that t:he United States does not violate its commitment, then
it is important for us to know that, it is important for the executive
branch to know that, in determining what dIsposition to make of this
particular cache.
Senllltor Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Amplifying somewhat on the need for information from t:he CIA,
particularly foreign intelligence, and expanding somewhat on the
statement that you have already made, would you say that it would
be virtually impossible, or at least somewhat unwise, for this country
to enter into agreements involving armaments decreases or many other
134
subjects without informa.tion tha.t is .ga.thered and supplied by the
CIA?
Mr. LEONARD. Senator, there are clea.rly a.greements tha.t it would
be very unwise to enter into without knowing what is being done on
the other side. There are others, such as the biological treaty, where
in fact we entered into it knowing that we could not know and be
reoonciled to the fact that we could not know, as illustrated, of course,
we could not know about our own situation, much less about some
foreign government. .
Senator HUDDLESTON. But it would not be prudent for us to set
our country on a particular course without having ihformation upon
which we can totally rely or information that has been gained by
our own devices, rather than relying on what might be supplied to
us by another country? .
Mr. LEONARD. That, Senator, would depend, really on the weapons
that we are talking about controlling or disarming. Some, obviously,
one needs a high degree of certainty with, and others, one can make
do with a good deal less accurate detailed, current information. It
depends, really, on the risks that this Government would run, as a
consequence of a violation unknown to us of the agreement that we
had entered into.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Another example, and somewhat in a different
area is the joint space venture between this country and the
Soviet Union. Would you say that would be highly improbable or
perhaps imprudent for us to engage in that kind of an operation
without information that would be supplied by the CIA relative to the
Soviet Union's real capability in that field?
Mr. LEONARD. I honestly cannot see the relevance to that enterprise
of information the CIA would supply. It seems to me it is up to the
Soviets themselves to supply us WIth the information that we need
to be confident of the safety of our astronauts, or whatever is involved.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Are you suggesting that we should rely upon
. the information that they supply, or should we rely on information
that we may have ~athered ourselves?
Mr. LEONARD. I think we would rely upon the information they
would supply, because they would supply it in a form that would
be utterly unambiguous. Our technicians would be looking at the
Soviet instruments, satisfying themselves that they work the way they
are supposed to. I just do not think the CIA capability is relevant.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Back to the particular treaty and our involvement
with the toxins and biological warfare agents, subsequent to
this agreement, did other countries, to your knowledge, undertake a
destruction program of their biological weapons and toxins ~
Mr. LEONARD. To my knowledge, I do not know of any, to my own
knowledge. No other country acknowledged publiclv and formally.
to the best of my memory, that they had any stockpiles of biological
weapons. and therefore, there was no acknowledgment by them that
they had an obligation in conformity with article 2 to carry out any
destruction procedures.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But there was no effort by anyone to verify
whether other countries in fact did have a stockpile r
Mr. LEONARD. Quite the contrary, Senator. The intelligence services
of this Government have been trying for many years to gain informa135
tion 'about th~ stockpiles of other countries, but given the nature of
the weapons, it is just extremely difficult md I think one of the
clearest lessons from all of the study of chemical and biological weapons
that went on, 196'7, 1968, on through the present time, is that it
IS extremely difficult to know what another cOWltry is doing, especially
a large country;
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know whether or not any question
has been raised in anY' international forum subsequent to this treaty,
as to whether or not the various countries' signatures were complied.
Mr. LEONARD. I do not, Senator. I've been out of the Government
during this period.
Senator HUDDLESTON. WouldIOU say that in a matter of an international
treaty and the question 0 whether or not this country complies
to it, that it would be a reasonable standard operating procedure
emanating rerhaps from the White House or at least from the Department
0 State, that an;r agency of this Federal Government that
has any responsibility for implementing any part of an international
agreement should have a wntten record of all actions taken which
were taken for the purpose of implementing that treaty ~
Mr. LEONARD. I think the feneral vrinciple is a sound one, but to
make it aQsolutely categorica , applymg to all treaties, all situations,
all agencies, could get one, I thmk, into very complicated problems
which I honestly have not thought through. I think in the case of an
arms control treaty of this sort, it is important that the agencies that
might possibly have something which is prohibited should be required
to make it clear that they do not, but we have an enormous range of
treaties with other countries, economic character, consular character,
all sorts of things, and that is another matter, I think.
Senator HUDDLESTON. There could hardly be any harm, in the case
of international treatit's, which are seldom secret in nature to start
with, in having some tangible proof that this country did, in ~ood
faith, attempt to implement that treaty, and did issue whatever necessary
instructions or orders might be to implement that treaty.
Mr. LEONARD. That is very desirable, yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston.
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if the next Senator
would yield for just one observation at this point.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you ask him ~
Senator SCHWEIKER. I would be delighted to.
Senator MATH1AS. Thank you.
I do not think the record ou~ht to remain in the state in which I
now perceive it to be. We are m a state of innocence and ignorance
about the activities of other nations in this field. There is a great deal
that is known about what other countries are doing in biological and
chemical warfare and paradoxically, some of that mformation comes
from the cooperative efforts of scientists.
When Fort Detrick was in full bloom, they had some difficulty in developing
strains of Tuberine and they obtained strains from the Soviet
Union, and that kind of scientific exchange went on during the depths
of a cold war, so that a great deal is known, and I do not think the
record should reflect that we are in complete ignorance of what is happening
on the international scene.
136
Mr. LEONARD. Could I just comment on that, if you please, ~r.
Chairman. I did not want to imply that I was addressing myself SImply
to the question of stockpiles, stockpiles in the chemical and biolo~ical
area. Those are particularly difficult to gain knowledge of, whether
it is overtly or covertly.
The CHAffiM:AN. But having made a very careful study of the question,
the Department of Defense evidently decided that for purposes
of protecting the United States, it was not necessary for us to stockpile
such weapons, regardless of what other countries did.
Mr. LEONARD. That IS correct, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. And therefore, that decision became a unilateral
decision, made in advance of the treaty, which we then advocated
and initiated; is that correct ~
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct, that we are best protected by defensive
measures, }?rophylactic measures Rg&:inst this, not by the threat
to retaliate in kmd. If you hit us with bIOlogical weapons, we will hit
you-that was not the way to lEO, and that was what Mr. Laird and
Mr. Nixon saw very clearly and decided interms of. .,.
Senator MATHIAS. I think one of the elements of that deCISIon IS,
of course, the availability of these weapons to any primitive society.
Any society that has the capability of brewing beer has the capability
of creating a biological weapon. So the dangers involved are very, very
great.
Mr. LEONARD. Senator Mathias' point, I think, is very valid. I
think we have learned more through peaceful cooperation with other
countries than we have by attempting to spy on their defense
laboratories.
The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we have already placed the shellfish market
in jeopardy. I don't know whether we should extend that to beer.
I do think, though, that when our expert witness comes on he will
make clear that this particular toxin takes a great deal of synthesis
and concentration and that ordinary shellfish are very healthy and can
be eaten without serious dangers to anyone's health. We have 1Z0t
problems enough in this committee without beginning to affect the
markets for various products.
Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Chairman, r have no questions.
The CHAffiMAN. Very well.
Senator Hart ~
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Leonard, I have three factual questions.
Based upon the President's statement of November 25, 1969, it is
my understanding- that the CIA or its representatives participated in
the working groups or study ~roups that led up to the U.S. position
with reg-ard to biological warfare. Is that correct ~
Mr. LEONARD. That is correct.
Senator HART of Colorado. During- those working sessions or study
groups did the CIA representatives ever indicate, to your recollection,
the need to stockpile a supply of toxic materials for experimentation
or whatever t
Mr. LEONARD. Senator, I honestly do not think I can testify on that.
I was not personally involved in those discussions.
Another officer of the Arms Control Agency was our representative
in the meetings and I simply was not involved. I had only second- or
137
third-hand knowledge of the discussions that went forward and saw
really what came out of them.
Senator HART of Colorado. So, based upon the discussions and the
record with which you are familiar, you do not know whether this subject
ever arose in those discussions W
Mr. LEONARD. I really do not know, Senator.
Senator lIART of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, those are the only questions
I have.
With the indulgence of my colleagues and with reference to a comment
I made to you at the break, I make an observation out of context
a.nd outside the scope of the work of this committee.
We got into the question of the purity of Dr. Gordon's motives and
the good intentions that he may have had in disobeying orders. It
occurred to me in that connection that, if purity of motives were a
sufficient reason to disobey orders and rules, thousands of young
American men would now be walking the streets who, out of conscience,
disobeyed draft orders for Vietnam.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. LEONARD. May I just make a brief comment on that question of
motives. And it gets back to this area of what is permitted and what is
prohibited. It seems to me this illustrates the desirability of some sort
of categorical ruling-out of whole areas of activity, so that a person
like Dr. Gordon, whose testimony I did not hear, could not be in any
doubt that so-called offensive uses of the material that he had was not
legitimate, was not within the permitted area of U.S. Government activities.
It seems to me that it has got to be a very broad prohibition.
But it is only in that fashion that these various complex doubts and
questions can really be resolved in a categorical fashion.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I might say to you, Mr. Ambassador, that
we have found in our investigation to date that ambiguity seems to
plague the CIA and when you sugO'ested, as you did a few minutes
ago, that it would be well for Presidents to begin to get very precise
about w:hat agen~ies must not do, it was a very good sugg-estion indeed.
If prevIOus PresIdents had been a great deal more preCIse about what
the CIA must not do it is possible that we would not now 'be investi~
gating the Agency.
All of that will come out in due course, but, nevertheless, I want to
say that this recommendation I take to be a very good one. And I hope
that Presidents in the future deal with the Agency and all departments
of the Government in such a way as to make it very clear the kinds of
activities that they are not to engage in.
Mr. LEONARD. I think, Mr. Chairman, it should be clear that the
kind of activities that we are talking about is not prohibited. It is
prohibited to kill people with toxins today 'because of the treaty. But
It is not prohibited to entertain the idea of killing people. There is no,
to my kn()Wledge, directive. I am very pleased to hear Mr. Karamessines
say that lie personally would never, that he would resign from
the Agency sooner than approve that. But that was his personal policy.
That was a matter of hIS individual moral character. It was not a
national policy and to the best of my knowledge it is not a national
policy today.
The CHAIRMAN. That depends upon how national policy is defined.
Today there are directives, two directives, that have been issued by
138
the Director one by Mr. Helms, when he was Director, and one by Mr.
Colby, which do, for the first time clearly declare that no one in the
Agency is to be involved in assassination J.>lote or assassination attempts
or an! other activity related to assassIDation.
However, I agree with you that a matter of this seriousness should
not be left to the Director of the Agency or to an administrative order
that can be changed as Directors are changed, but ought to be a mat~r
of law. And this committee will have recommendations to make when
it completes its investigation of that particular issue.
If there are no more questions of this witness, thank you very mu~h,
Mr. Ambassador. '
We !Will complete our hearings on this subject tomorrow morning
when our first witness will be Dr. Edward Schantz, who is an expert
on these toxins and was at Fort Detrick. Our second witness will be
Mr. Oharles Senseney, who was a Fort Detrick official to whom Dr.
Gordon referred yesterdar afternoon and to whom Dr. Gordon said
that he had offered the tOXIDS.
Perhaps some of the unanswered questions can be cleared up in tomorrow's
testimony. That will complete the public hearings on this
particular subject.
The hearing is adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
[Whereupon, at 12 :50 p.m. the hearing recessed to reconvene the
following morning at 10 a.m.]

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