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S141 HEARINGS EXHIBITS I Exhibit 1 SPECIAL REPORT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLJGENCE (AD HOC) CHAffiMAN J. EDGAR HOOVER JUNE, 1970 I Under criteria determined bv the Committee, in consultation with the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of .Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, certain materials have been deleted from those documents, some of which were previou~ly classified, to maintain the internal operating procedures of the agencies involved, and to protect intelligence sources and methods. Further deletions were made with respect to protecting the privacy of certain individuals and groups. These deletions do not change the material content of these exhibits. 142 June 25, 1970 This report, prepared for the President, is approved by all members of this committee and their signatures are affixed hereto. Dir~C\or, Federal Bureau of Investigation \J 'chairman Director, Central Intelligence Agency Director, Defense Intelligence Agency ~t?~1~ Director, National Security Agency 143 PREFACE The objectives of this report are to: (1) assess the current internal security threat; (~) evaluate current intelligence collection procedures; identify restraints under which U. S. intelligence services ope rate; a:1d list the advantages and disadvantages of such restraints; an::! en evaluate current interagency coordination and recommend means to improve it. The Committee has attempted to set forth thE: essence of the issues and the major policy considerations involved which fall within the scope of its mandate. 144 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE PART ONE SUMMARY OF INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT 1, MILITANT NEW LEFT GROUPS A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 1 1. Student Protest Groups 1 2. Antiwar Activists 3 3. New Left Terrorist Groups 4 B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures 5 1. Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage 5 2. Gaps in Current Coverage 6 3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection 7 ll. BLACK EXTREMIST MOVEMENT 9 A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 9 1. Black Panther Party 9 2. New Left Support for BPP .9 3. BPP Propaganda Appearances 9 4. Appeal to Military 10 5. BPP Philosophy and Foreign Support 10 6. Other Black Extremist Groups 10 7. Black Student Extremist Influence 11 8. Foreign Influence in the Black Extremist Movement 11 B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures 12 1. Other Black Extremist Organizations 13 145 Page III. INTELUGE~CESERVlCES OF COMMUNIST COUl\"TRIES 14 A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 14 1. Intervention in Domestic Unrest 11 2. Intelligence Operations 15 B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection 17 1. Scope and Effectiveness 17 2. Gaps in Current Coverage 18 IV. OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS 20 A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 20 1. Communist Party 20 2. Socialist Workers Party and Other Trotskyist Grot\ps 20 3. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups 21 4. Puerto Rican Nationalist Extremist Groups 21 B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Coverage 21 1. Scope and Effectiveness 21 2. Gaps in Current Coverage 22 3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection 22 PART TWO RESTRAINTS ON INTELUGENCE COLLECTION I. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS 23 A. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence 23 B. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations 26 C. Mail Coverage 29 D. Surreptitious Entry 32 E. Development of Campus Sources 34 F. Use of Military Undercover Agents 37 II. BUDGET Mm MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS 110 PART THREE EVALUATION OFINTEnAGiffiCY COORDINATION 1. CURRENT PROCEDURES TO EFFECT COORDINATION 42 II. SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COOHDINATION OF OOMESTIC INTELUGENCE COLLECTION '12 146 PART ONE SlJM'rvIARY OF il.'lTERNAL SECUPJTY THREAT I. MILITANT NEW LEFT GROUPS A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat The movement of rebellious youth known as the "New Left, " involving and i'l1fluencing a substantial number of college students, is having ~impas!_on c0ll!fmJ?.QL?:IoU:'2.£},f,Jy with a D~li~s QQJJ1('sUc 'itrTI'ii:'.-?!he revolutionary aims of the New Left are apparent when their identification with Marxism- Leninism is examine#-, They pointedly advertise their objective as the overthrow of our system of .-government by force and violence. Under the guise of freedom of speech, they seek to ~E51.nt Jl}~§.ta.W.tr~,mJ.t!!mit1 and p.r.9.'i..~_gi~. Ths,Y-~~ t~aSJi.t~d,)1..s!~}Onal.~,st~, th.~gQL'WlDi.wi.tr~e, 3;.n~.. glli\l1'y, ...tlJ~.:::.er..mnp..r.lUt~. ~l~~tt groups do n~ll.Jarge _, eUQ1!IDllmber of raJlt;.a.lld-f i1e fQUo..~~Q!....QQ...thQ.Y...h'tve a unit'! 01.. purpose to carry out massive Qr pa~:.z.iD,g ..s1.ct~...QLi.u.'i.lU:l:f;.I:.ti.(.ln. I.h~.:wio, on the Qther hand, have the will tQ car,rv Oll DJO):..e_rnilitauUill.cu:t.'LilL\Q£?:.l situations ;>.nd an inciination to uWjz:e more extreme me2ns to att"in their Q-bj-ec-tives. . - . 1. Student Protest Groups. The @U,j~l)..t..tJirrA1?~.lc\l,g.rJ.J.tjc W~(§L2~) has, in the past ye:..r, §,PJit into several factions, including It~e RevC)lilli.Q.1J.ar.l: YQ~t!l..M~!;!2.t ..m,.':M,), which has contr(ll c;;:.e"r,j.O cba.rl~rs; and the W.m:ii~ Stu e1l!.~llj;l~... cwhich consist~_~ c~te.::s. The ~M. fa.£li.on, dQmll:l1&.9..Q:i...t~_ .____ _ P.J:,Q~t~2.!:-~nuPL..!:waiill§..!Q_9.lJ..il9J1.~~~~.!'~s>~~~t in keeping with tile PLP's aim -61 developing a broad wQrker-oased revolutiQnary movement in the United States. There are some 85 unaffiliated SDS chap~e;.s$.cn.s.r.a.ily -~-~~~ - s¥mnath~tlc to l'evolutionary tactics and goalS. 1 ne trend of inueased radical campus organizations is noticeabie at campuses where recognition of SOS has been refused or rescinded and SDS members ha ve b:>.nded together, with or withQut sanction, under a new title to attract shldent support. In addition, numerous ad hoc groups have been established on campuses and elsewhere to exploit specific issues. The National Student Strike (NAS), also known as the NationalStrike.J1JOr'ii'i'a'ITOnCe·~r;-w·as-for;;'ewdiTowing t'ile'entry Of the United Slates forces into Cambodia and the deaths of four students at K,"nt State University. NSS, which helped to cQQrdinate the nationwide student strike in May. 1970, has three regional centers ;:.nd includes ,'------ _ • ,......,-._= -----'-----~_~;,~~·~~·~IJ_- 147 among its leadership SDS members and other New Left activists. 1~hJ; N~.e,~e~!~~~~~~ c2!].~~,~:ili2~!~""..,0L:.'Jm;m":' n1io Sf<ill.s2!ls on..sa.;;~~~~~~~2\~.Q~1~e stU(~~l~p.'ll.I~sns ;1I.:.9~9~\JJ}.tj2].s. TiJis commUI1lCatlOns capability may have a significant impact On campes stability in the coming school year. The ~£.m.Cl:i.1.lrjr..ii.rlll'{.I.?), established to send United States youth to Cuba to aid in the 19'10 harvests, has continually received favorable publicity in Cuban propaganda media. To date, over 900 members of the VB have visited Cuba and another group of approximately 500 m~mbers are expected to fallow suit. While in Cuba, VB members were individually photographed and questioned in detail about their backgrounds. Because of their contacts with Cuban officials, these individuals must be considered as ~ntial recOlits for Cuban intelligenc~~ities a!Jd sah2E.~irille United States. - The greatest threat 0 p thp. spcllrity of the country by student protes grouos is thp.ir potential for fomenUng- violence and ~t on colIp.ge camPllSps. Demonstrations have triggered acts of arson by e;dremists against war-oriented research and nOTC facilities and have virtually paralyzed many schools. There has been a g!'owing number Df noncampus, but student-related, acts of violence which increase tensions between "town and gown" and which constitute a marked escalation of the scope and level of protest activities. Few student protests are cu!'rently related to exclusively campus issues; virtually all involve political and social issues. IncreasingJ.y, the battlefield is the community with the campus serving primarily as a staging area. - , .,. i- t<j. '.,J' The efforts of the New Left aimed at fomenting unrest and subversion among civil servants, labor unions, and mass media have met with very limited success, although the WSA and its parent, the PLP, have attempted through their "Summer Work-Ins" to infiltrate and radicalize labor. The inability of these groups to subvert and control the mass media has led to the establishment of a large nctworl: of underground publications which serve. the dual purpose of an internal communication network and an external propaganda organ. Leaders of student protest groups have traveled extensively over the years to communist countries; have openly stated their sympathy with the international communist revolutionary movements in South Vietnam and Cuba; and have directed others into activities which support these movements. These individuals must be considered to have potential for ..-~-_._--"_.~.._.._.~ ....-... - ~.._--~._-~_._---: -----_..~- ... -.~.. _._._- 148 recruitment.aT!Qpa:r:li.';.ipation_~rt foreign~ directed inte lligence aeti~ii.y.. 2. Antiwar Activists. The impetus and continuity for the antiwar movement is provided by the New Mobilization Committee ta End the War in :::'ietnamJ],Mf) and the~l':!...dent1ViO~l2..n§~ee to End the~ar lI1Vietnam (SMC). lThe NMC is a coalition ot numerous antiwar groups and individuals including communist "old left" clements. The SMC is under the contro I of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP).j, The NMC and SMC have announced a policy of "nonexclusion" which places no limitation on the type of individuals allowed to pa!"ticipate .:-_ in demonstrations. This policy opens the door for violence-prone individuals who want to capitalize on the activities of these groups. Both groups profess to follow a policy of nonViolence; however, the very nature of the protests that they sponsor sets the stage for civil disobedience and police confrontation by irresponsible dissident elements. Various individuals in NMC and SMC are callin for more militant protest activities a sulf ect t be discussed at national meetings y th groups in late June. 1970+ Although antiwar groups are not knovm to be collecting weapons, engaging in paramilitary training, or advocating terrorist tactics, the pro-Hanoi attitude of their leaders, the unstable nature of many NMC advocates and their policy of "nonexclusion~' underscore the ~~e 3.I!.!iwarmox,ement lL§ a conduit fm;..ciyjl disQt.dc.r. This is further empti'asized bYt'fi'eNMC leadership's advocacy of civil disobedience to achieve desired objectives. .... There is no indication that the antiwar movement has made serious inroads or achieved any more.than a slight degree of influence among labor unions, the mass media, and civil servants. One group, however, the Federal Employees for a Democratic Society (FEDS), offers a means of protest for recent radIcal graduates employed by the Federal Government. - 3 - 149 The mi litarv and ed~~~lltmn;:;ar.? th\,J"]Qw~ t~J.s Q!J:'.,),f..",i!~ffi~'"0.g.y~. In addition to vanc,ji~~;'~ a~'sons, and bombings of ROTC far-ilittes, there has been stepped-i.lp activity to spread antiwar sympathy among American servicemen frum within through sympathetic members in the military and from without through such programs as HGI Coffeehouses" and the proposed National GI Alliance. The increasing access by members of the military to the underground press, the establishment of servicemen's unions, and organizations which facilitate desertions, have contributed significantly to the increasing instances of disse!1t In the military services. 12:1C :'lnd SMC leaderf: are const~tlUEQ;1k.il:.r;J"l.!ll(l.t.e....tlu.dent ~lD':; .and ell..d~tll'· tQ use stu.~t radic~aJ~oJm:tlterJl)f~:lj)til'~r lJl2vem.euJ:. They have called for an end to the ROTC and have demonstrated, often Violently, to force universities to halt war-related research projects. [The NMC maintains close contact with the __ World Council for Peace and Stockholm Conference on Vietnan~ b..!1!:.w organization dominated bv NMC leaders, the Committee of LiaIson wij;h ~ ... - _.._------- Familie.s...Q,I Servicemen,Petained in Nortb..Ytrt!1.1:lJJ1, emerged in January, 1970, after contacts with North Vietnamese representatives. It at~empts to present a favorable picture of North Vietnamese treatment of American prisoners of war. NMC leaders have frequently traveled abroad. It is therefore 'necessary to consider these individuals as ~.~im®t~~.U3.!.Lorl'v~ng }n forei!2E-~trii1i.~W!i.l,lli':e~ce colleeJLq~· ~ [rhe~.~..L!~!el!.i~ence ~ge.~..cyjCIAt! ..in..i..ts analysis of bloc intelligence, is of th~viewthat u:e-Soviet andblociniclligence scrv~c.es ar(f"con1tnitted afthe Political level to exploit all domestic dissidents -- wner~Y~..ijJoss!j)lei - This" attack isbeing condUcted through recruited , agents, agents orlnfluence, and the use of front g~oups. It is established bloc policy to deploy its forces against the United States as "the main enemy" and to direct all bloc intelligence iorces toward ultimately political objectives which disrupt U. S. domestic and foreign policies. 3. New Left Terrorist GrO\lps. The Weatherman terrorist group, which emerged from a Jaction::il split of SDS durliigThe Summer of 1969, is a revolutionary youth Inovement \\h ieh actively supports the - 4 - 150 revolutionary leadership role of the Negro in the United States. It has evolved into a number of small commando-type units which plan to utilize bombings, arsons, nnd assassinations as political weapons. There h2.s been evidence of Weatherman involvement in terrorist tactics, including the accidental explosion of a "Weatherman bomb factory" in New York City on March 6, 1970; the discovery of two undetonated bombs in Deb'oit police facilities on the same date; and the blast at New York City police installations on June 9, 1970. While W.f.~t~I1!1..illl...L11~.~~!J.ip is not clearly defined, it is estimated that ~t least 1. 000 indiyid1Ja1§ arlhpre j-o WeatiJerman id00l£fJ. In addition, groups such as the White Panther Party, Running Dog, Mad Dog, and the Youth International Party (Yippies) are supporters of Weatherman terrorism but have no clearly definable ideology of their own. Adherents to Weatherman ideology are also ~ound within radical elements On campuses, among t.hose living in off-campus communes', among New Left movement lawyers arid doctors, and the underground press. Individuals who adhere to the \Veatherman ideology have offered support and aid to hard-core Weatherman members, including 21 Weatherman members currently in hiding to avoid apprehension. They identify themselves politically with North Vietnam, Cuba, and Nortll Korea and consider pro-Soviet and pro-CNnese. qrgani-. . " zaH91ls as being aligned with imperialist powers. In 2.dctl.Ubn,'·scSn;eof'ftie 'Weatherman leaders and adherents have traveled to communist countries Or ha\'e met in Western countries with communist representatives. Weatherman leaders and other memberfl of terrorist groups are not known at this time to be involved in foreign-directed intelligence collection activity. The fugitive and underground status of many of these people, as well as their involvement in activities which ~lould likely bring them to the attention of American authorities, would be a deterrent to contacts by foreign intelligence organizations. B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures 1. Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage. Although New Left groups have IJeeo responsible for widespread damage to ROTC facilities, for the halting of some weapons-related researCh, and for the increasing dissent within the military services, the major threat to the internal security of the United States is that directed against the civiliar. sector of our society. - 5 - 151 Cove'rage of student groups is handled prima.tiJsJ.hr2l!gh live informants and it is generally effective aUhe natic.nal level or at -rnaJormcetin~s of these gr0t!ps whGre overall policy, aim~ ~.t:j~c..~~i2E.0uPSare determined. The antiwar movement's acti.Y.itifs are cO'lBred tbrQ~the FBI bv live informants in all organi-iations of interest. This is supported by li'iIOrillation furnis;led by all members of the intelligence community and otner Fede'ral, st;rte, and IQC.a~ie.:;;. Key leaders and activists are afforded concentrated and intensified investigative coverage on a continuing basis and, in situations where th..~re are positive indications of violence, electronic surveillances have been implemented on a selective basis. Informant and electronic coverage ~t meet present requirements. - Although several SDS chapters on college campuses which adhere to Weatherman ideology have been penetx:ated by live informants, there is no live informant coverage at present of qnderground Weatherman fugitives. There is electronic coverage on the residence of a Weatherman contact in New York City and on the resid~nce of an a~leged Weather;mm member in San Francisco; however, no information has been developect concerning the whereab::>uts of the 21 Weatherman fugitives. 2. Gaps in Current Coverage. Establi'Jhed, long-term coverage is not availabl"itwithinstudent protest groups due to the fact that the student body itself changes yearly, necessitating a constant turnover in the informants targeted against these groups. His idealism and immaturity, as well as the sensitive issues of academic freedom and the right to dissent, all serve to increase the risk that the student informant will be exposed as such. Generally, day-ta-day coverag~ oi the plo:.nncd actiVi~ of student protest ~roup£, which are somewhat autonO!TIO"S :md disjointed, eQuId be strpnrrthf'ned. r.f..dvance notice of fordg:1. tr:wel af... by student militants is particularly neededJ Ca!l'l)U~nce !s ,:" " generally attributable to small, close-knitmill:.emist,gro~~g radlca:I stmreITts. Cov_~ of these latter groups is minimal. - 6 - 152 The antiwar movement is comprised of a great many organizations ;md people which represent varied political, moral and ethnic beliefs. Current manpower commitments preclude optim11ffi coverage of all antiwar activities on a day-to-day basis. Existing coverage of New Left extremists, the V,7eather!:!!an yQuP in particular. is negligible. Most of the Weatherman group has gone underground and formed floating, commando-type units.composed of three to six individuals. The transitory nature of these units hinders the installation of electronic surveillances and their smallness and distrust of outsiders make penetration of these units through live informants extremely difficult. Financially, the Weatherman group appears to be without a centralized source of funds. Wealthy parents have furnished funds to some of these indiViduals, including those in a fugitive status. Many members have also been involved in the thefts of credit and identification cards, as well as checks, and have utilized them for obtaining operating expenses. 3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection. To establish effective coverat"e of sbljlr>nt lll:Q.!~st groups w0E.!d require the~xpansion of live informant coverage of individual campus ch;;pters of these orgamzahons. This would entail extensive use of student j.nform~nts fOobtain maximum utilization of their services for the periods of their cOllege attendance. . - Because of the great number of individuals and groups in the antiwar movement, an increase in the manpower assi ned to these in~c;tigations would facilitate more III enSlVe cm'er~ge·. In.J!Q.dition, ihe.re are several kev leaders involved in virtually all a'nfhvar activities, including international contacts, against whom electronic surveillances an9 m3.il covers would be particularly effecti-;e. Improvement of ir.telligence gathering against New Left terrorists depends on a combination of .live informant coverage among key leaders and selective electronic surveillances. Because of the nature of the Weatherman groups, live ipjormant coverage will most likely result through the defection of a key ieader. - 7 - 153 Extensive efforts·have been undertaken which should produce a live informant capable of furnishing infDrmation as to the location of Weatherman fugitives and planned terrorist acts. In the event a commune is located, prompt installation of electronic coverage should produce similar results. Utilization of additional resources to expand and intensify thiscollechon would be beneficial. - 8 - 154 II. BLACK EXTRErvrrsT MOVEMENT A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 1. Black Panther Party. The most active and dangerous black extremist group in the United States is the Black Panther Party (BPP). Despite it;; "'datively small number of hard-core members-approximately 800 in 40 chapters nationwide--the BPP is in the iOi"efront of black extremist activity today. The BPP has publicly advertised its goalt: of organizing revolution, insurrection, assassination and other terroristtype activities. Moreover, a recent poll indicates that approximately 25 per cent of the black population has a great respect for the BPP, including 43 per cent of blacks under 21 years of age. The Panther newspaper has a current circulation of approximat€ly 150, 000 copies weekly. Its pages are filled with messages of racial hatred and call for terrorist guerrilla activity in an attempt to overthrow the Government. The BPP has been involved in a substantial" number of planned attacks against law enforcement officers, and its leadership is composed in large part of criminally inclined, violenceprone individuals. Weapons are regularly stockpiled by the Party. During 1968 and 1969, quantities of machine guns, shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, homemade bombs, and ammunition were uncovered in Panther offices. 2. New Left Support for BPP. The BPP has received increasing support from radical New Left elements. During 1970, the BPP formed a working relationship with radical student dissenters by injecting the issue of Government "repression" of PanthE;rs into the antiwar cause. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) supported the BPP in a 1969 "united front against fascism." The probability that black extremists, including the BPP, will work closely with New Left white radicals in Lhe future increases the threat of escalating terrorist activities. It \\0 uld be safe to project that racial strife and student turmoil fomented b~r black extremists will definitely increase. 3. BPI> Propaganda Appearances. Despite its small memb~rship, the BPP has scored major successes in the propaganda arena. In - 9 - 155 1969, 13PP representatives spoke at 189 colleges throughout the Nation, wliile in 1967 there were only 11 such appearances. Although no direct information has been received to date indicating that the DPP has initiated any large-scale racial cliso)"(Jers, the year 19.70 has seen an escalation of racial disorders across the Nation compared to 1969. This fact, coupled with an inc rea sing amount of violent Panthe r activity, presents a great potential for racial and civil unrest for the future. 4. Appeal to Military. The BPP has made ~ointed app~als to black servicelilen with racLst propaganda. High priority has been placed on the recruitment of vderans with weapons and explosives training. The BPP has also called for infiltration of the Government. These activities, s~ould they achieve even minimum success, present a grave threat. 5. BPP Philosoplly and Foreign Support, The BPP relies heavily on foreign communist ·ide-olosytoshape 11.3 goals. Quotations from·· Mao Tse-tung were the initial ideological bible of the BPP. Currently, the writings of North Korean Premier Kim n-SUIl£; are followed and extensive usc of North Kor~an propaganda mate !'ial is made in BPP publications and training. ,The IvIarxist-oriented philosophy of the BPP presents a favorable envinmment for support of the Panthers from other communist countries;-; BPP leaders have tra\'eled extensively abroad including visits to Cuba, Russia, North Korea, ;>.nel Algeria. International oper<l.tions of the BPP are directed by Eldridge Cleaver, a fugitive from United States courts. Cleaver has established an international st;>Jf in Algeria, from where communist propaganda is constantly relayed to the BPP headquarters in Berkeley, California. f.:He has also established close ties with Al Fatah, an Arab guerrilla organization, whose leaders have reportedly extended nvitations to EPP members to take guerrilla training during 1970. Cleaver, n a recent conversation, indicated that North Koreans are conducting similar training for BPP member's] Radical white students in Western Europe and the Scandinavian countries have organized solidarity committees in sL:pport of the BPP. These committees are the sources of financial contributions to the Party and provide outlets for the BPP newspaper. 6. Other Black Extremist Groups. The Nation of Islam (NOn is the largest single blac~ cxtre:misforganiiation in the United States with an estimated mernbcrsi1ip of 6,000 in apprOXimately lOr; Mosques. The Nm - 10 - 62-685 0 - 76 - 11 156 preaches hatred of the white race and advocates separatism of the races. The NOJ as a group has, to date, not instigated any civil disorders; however, the followers of this semi-religiuus cult are extremely dedicated individuals who could be expected to perform acts of violence if so ordered bv the NOI head, Elijah Muhammed. When MuhammE:d, who is over 70 years of 'i~e, is replaced, a new leader could complI:tely alter current nonviolent tactics of the organization. For example, ;( Muhammed's son-in-law, Raymond Sharrieff, now among the top hie,:al'chy of MOl, could rise to a leadership position. Sharrieff is vicious, domineering, and unpredictable. There are numerous other black extremist organiz'1tions, small in numbers, located across the country. Tbere is aiso a large number of unaffili:lted black extremists who advo::ate violence and guerrilla '.'larfare. One particular group, the Republic of New Africa (RNA), headquartered in Detroit, Michigan, calls for the establishment of a separate black nation in the South to be protected by armed forces. These groups, although small, are dedicated to the destruction of 'iur form of government and consequently present a definite potential for instigating civil disorder. or guerrilla warfare activity. 7. Black Student Extremist Influence. Black student extremi5t activities at colleges and secondary schools have increased alarrr.ingly. Although currently there is no dominant leadership, coordination or specific direction between these individuals, they are in frequent contact with each other. Consequ€mIy, should any type of organization or cohesiveness develop, it would present a grave potential for future violent activities at United States schools. Increased informant coverage would be particularly productive in this area. Black student extremists have frequently engaged in violence and disruptive activity on campuses. Major universities which made concessions to nonnegotiable black student demands have not succeeded in calming extremist activities. During the school year 1969-70, there wcre 227 college disturbances haVing racial overtones. There were 530.such disturbances in secondary schools compared with only 320 during the previous school year. B. Foreign Influence in the Black Extremist Movement. Although there is no hard evidence illdic"ting that the black extremist mo\'ement is substantially controlled or directed by foreign elements, there is a marked potential for foreign-directed intelligence or subversive \ activity dmong black extremis~ leaders and organizations. These group's arc highly susceptible to exploitation by hostile foreign intelligence ,_ services. - 11 - 157 Currently the most important foreign aspect cf the bbck extremist movelWent is the availability of foreigr; asylum, especially with regard to black extremisis subject to criminal prosecution in the United States. Some foreign countries, such as Cuba, provide a temporary safe haven for these individuals. C~nformation has been received that passports and funds for travel havi" a'so been furnished by countries such as Cub:!, North Korea, and . . Communist intelligence services 00 not, at present, pl;)y a m;:jor role in the black 2xtrf'mist movement; however, all such services have established contu.ct with individual black militants. Thus, the penetration and manipulation cf black extremist gToupS by these intelligence services remain distinct possibiiities./ Communist intelligence services are capaole of usin::; t.,eir personnel, facilities, and agC'nt assets to work in the b~ack extremist field. The Soviet and Cuban services I)ave major capabilities available ..! B. Assessm ent of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures There are some definite gaps in the current overall intelligence penetration of the black extremist movement. For example, although there appears to be sufficient live informant coverage of the BPP additional penetration _ is needed. High echelon informant coverage cou ld conceivably pre ont violence, sabotage, or insurrection if such activity was planned by BPP leadership. Insufficient coverage of BPP is offset to some extent by technical coverage Penetra tian of Leadership levels has been hindered'in part by current BPP policies which p:ce','ent rank-and-file members from advancing to leadership roles. ,/ Improvement in coverage of BPP financial activities could be made, particularly with regard to sources of funds and records. Information received to date indicates that fi!'.2.!1cial support for the BPP hae been furnished by both foreign individuals and domestic sources. Thus, a deeper penetration and correlation of foreign and domestic informatiol1 received is essential to a full determination of BPP finances. Coverage of BPP finances has beE:n hampered by fact that B?P leaders handle financial matters personallv. In view of the in:::reased amount of foreign travel and contacts by BPP leaders abroad, tllere is a clear-cut need for I1D1'e complete Coverage of for.2ign involvement in BPP activEies. - 12 - 158 1. Other Black Extrem:st Orr;;,nizations. Informant coverage of the 1\01 is substantial, cnabliilg-its actI\:-iiies to be followed on a current basis. Coverage of militant hlack student groups and individuals is very limited because or the sensiti'le areas involved. An effective source of such coverage would be l'cliable, fonner members of the Armed Forces presently attending college. Live informant coverage, particularly with res~ to tlte activities and plans of unaffiliated black militants, n2eds to be increased. More sources both in the United State s and abroad in a position to determine the amount of foreign involvement in black extremist activities need to b~ dev~l()peC:. Maximum use of communication interceptions would materially increase the current capabilities of the i!1telligencc community to develop highly important data regarding black extremist activities. - 13 - 159 III. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES A. Assess~1ent of Current Internal Security Threat The threat posed bv the communist intelligtnce services must b2 assessed in t\\'o areas: (1) direct interventiOl~ in fomenting and/or inflller,cing domestic unrest; (2) extensive espion:tge activitlCS. Taken in complele context, these services constitute a grave threat to the internal security of the United States oec:luse of their Size, capabilities, widespread spheres of influence, ane targeting of the Unite':; SLates as "enemy number one." The largest and most skilled of these services is the Soviet Committee for =:late Security (KGE) which has roughly 300, oao personnel of whom some 10, 000 are engaged in foreign operations. i 1. Intervention in Domestic Unrest. There have been no s~\bstantial indications that the communist intelligence services have actively fomented domestic unrest. Their capability cannot, hov0ver, be minimized and the likelihood of their initiating direct i:1terventicn would be in direct relationship to the deterioration of the political climate and/or imminence of hostilities. T1Je ingredients for a firf,trate capability are present, including both. the personnel and the ingrained philosophy and know-how for using such tactics. Communist intelligence has shown a real capability to foment disorder in a number of trouble spots. The dissidence and violence in the United States today present adversary intelligence services with opportunities unparalleled ior forty years. While fostering disorder and rebellion through communist parties and fronts is a potent weapon in the communist ursenall their past success has been evident in clandestine recruitment efforts on campuses during times of unrest. H. A. R. (Kim) Philby, Guy Burgess, and Donald MaClean were all students at Cambridge during the depression period of the 1930's and were in the vanguard of what was then the New Left. Their recruitment and cooperation "vith Soviet intelligence wreaked havoc on British intelligence .and also compromised U. S. security ir. those sectors where they had authorized acceSs. - 14 - 160 , For instance, about 900 members o[ the VencerelT()s Brigade;-a group of American youths, recently completed a round trip to Cuba. This travel was financed by the Cuban Government. While in Cuba, they were exhorted to actively participate in United States revolutionary activities upon their return to the United States. A sabotage manual, prep:ued in turned up in the hands of individuals responsible [or recent bombings . While the potential for widespread, well-organized incidents 01 violence generated and controlled by the Cuban intellig~nce service is considered minimal. isolated occurrences of this nature must be considered probable. ':The - services appear to have assumed the passive roles of observers and reporters. The communist intelligence services maintain contacts and exert influence among a variety of individuals and organizations through the exploitation of ideological, cultural, and ethnic ties. Most of these liaisons are maintained with some degree of openness with individuals associated with the Communist Party, USA, various of its front groups,(ether pro-Soviet organizations; nationality groups, and foreign-language newspapers. These contacts are exploited as sources for and propaganda outlets of communist intelligence services. Regarded individually, these efforts cannot be considered a major threat to our internal security; however, in total, they represent a sizable element of our population which can be influenced in varying degrees by communist intelligence service operations. 2. Intelligence Operations. Persistent and pervasive intelligerce operations \\l1icfillave therr inspir<:.tion and direction supplied by communist intelUgence services represent a major threat to the !I1ternal sec~.rity.' ' , ~ 15 - 161 (DELETED) -16- 162 B. Assessment of S;urrent rntelligenc~.9_oJlecti0!2. 1. ""S't6pe and Effective'11'ess:-The scope of overall ir:telligence efforts is encompasscdfn the threefold goals cf penetration, intelligence, and prosecution. Dome;;tk implementation of these goals is delimiled by agreement among United States intelligence agencies. Intelligence components of the United States militaTy services arc immediately • concerned with protecting the integrity of their personnel and inst~lations. I Methods useQTr1t!12se enCleavors, employed in varyin~ degrees by U. S. intelliger,ce agen.cies d2pcndent upon their specific tasks are: penetrations; defectors; double agent operations; physical, technical, and photographic surveillances; examination and analysis of overt publications; information supplied by friendly intelligence" services;i and COMINT.· '" " 0' - 17 - 163 (DELETED) 2. Gaps in Current Coverage -18- 164 (DELETED) '1 165 IV. OTHER REVOLU.T.,IO-N-A.R,.Y-GROUPS. A. Ass~ssm~nt of Current Internal Security Thrf'at 1. Corr.munist Party. The Communist P,wty contilllH~s as a distinct th~ot to the ~nternal security because of its 0xtrc~n,ely close ties :lnd total con,mitn~ent to the Soviet Union. Tllcre are many thou'g'fnds of people in the United States who adhere to a Marxist *" philosophy and agre'e with th'e'" b~s!c objectives of the COJn'11unist .. Party although they do not identify themselves specifically with the" organizatiun. The Party rece ives most of its fiI13.nce s from the Soviet Union, adheres to Soviet policies explicitly, and prc':ides ,: lTajor out·, let for Soviet prop:tganda. The Party will without oue sUnn continue to implement whatever orders it receives from the Soviets in the future. There is little likelihood that the Communist Party, l~A, will instigate civil disorden', or use terrorist tactics in the foreseeable future. lts strong suit is propaganda. Through its publicatio:,:> and propag2.nda it will cO:ltinue its efforts to intensify civil disorders, and foment unrest in the Armed ForCES, labor unions, and minority groups. The Party is on the periphery of the radical youth movement alJC] is; • striving to strengthen its role in this mo\'ement and to attract new i' members through a recently formed youth organization, but it does not appear this group will achieve any substantial rceults for the " ; Party in the future. "Z. Sdcialist Workers 'Party and Other Tro~ Groups. ". These organizations have anes-tllTIatecGnembership of "{'-he-- major Trotskyist organization, the Soci:llist Workers Party, has attained an influential role in the antiwar rr.ovement through its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance, which dominates the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam and which has more than doubled its sizl] on college campUSES in the past year / Trotskyist groups have participated in maior confrontations with authorities both on and off catnpuses and have consistently supp,JrteQ civil disorders. At this time they do not pose a major tl1.reat to instigate inSUrJ'0ction or to commit terrorist acts. The pl'opag,mcl:l. of these groups, whi] e emphasizing student unrest, is also :-:.imed at creating dissatisfaction in labor organizations and in the Armed Forces. The Trotskyist organizations n:aintain close relations with the Fourth Intemation:ll, a fore;gn-based worldwide Trotskyist movement, - 20 - 166 4. Puerto Rican Nationalist Extremist Groups. The radical Puerto nTC-;'Hl independeilcemovement hcts spawned approximately ten violently anti-American groups committed to'Puerto Rican selfQete:- mination. Revolutionary violence is a major aim of the estimated , members of these gr0ups and if sufficiently strong, th,~y WOl!lrl nOt hesitate to mount arrned insurrection. Since July, 1967, some 130 bombings in Puerto Rico and in the New York City area have been attributed to these extrerr,ists. American-owned businesses have been the main targets, but there has been a rec"nt upsurge oi violence against U.S. defense facilities in Puerto Rico. 1. Scope and Effectiveness. Coverage of the Communist - 21 - 167 Co\'cr;:~r uf the Trutskyist ~i1cl - Curren, llvl' In:Ol'lllanl co\'e~·""L' can iurni~h informatio:l on (11[' l:eneLll :lctivitic Clf thc,:r e:rU',:p~ :uld it siwc:ld servr to \I,':\"n of polin' cl1:lilc>:es ill fan,r o[ inS;lrrcct[ril1 or S:l!JO(;l!;", Informal1t )1['netratiO!l Df tlle Puerto Hican illc!,'prndencc E;roups prn\'idcs lIlfornlation nn the obiectin's of most of these Ol"['::1nizatii)nS as \':ell C.S til(> identi:if'S of tlwir tll(·mhers. Howcver, tl18se ~:JU1Tes have limited ability 10 priJ\'ic!c advance ill.fnrmalioll regarding violence committed by L1CS,' brouPS or by individual memb2rs. 2, Gaps in Currenl Cm·c'ra":l'. Closer covera:c;c at the policy-makitli': levels of the Puerto Rican independence groups is needed to GiJlain more comprehensive information on pC'rsons involved in terrorist aclivities. The small memberships of many of these organizations is a major reaSO:1 for the limited coverage. 3. Po%ible ;\1 c;",; u rc s 10 Improve Illtellil,enc e Collect ion. The se Ie ctive u se-(iTe1cilio:l;Cs\ir'\;[>ln:llicc·~\\,(;UTcllllat(:rTillIYc~lGance the intelli!~('n('c coverage of the pulicy-n,:lkil1l; le\'els o[ lhese' ol'f;anizations. A p:ll'ticular l.Ycn2fil of dect;'onie suneill:1llcc ill the Puerto nican ficld could be the c1c\'clopmcd of inform:lli.on identify In,; persons involved in terrorist acti\'ities,' ComJ11i.lnicatio:ls inlell i!;cnce c()':era;e and travel \ control measures could be improved 10 prnviclc greater awareness of ' the travel and olher activities of individuals of security interest'. ThrOlll:;h \ the estahli,;!ln'ent of additiorlal informant covcra~,e Oil colle[':e campuses, the involvement of Uwse ()r;:ani7.atiClns in the radic:llil,ation of students could be assess0d with increased accuracy. - 22 - 168 PART TWO RESTRAINTS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECJ10N The·Committee noted that the President had made it clear . that he desired full consideration be given to any regulations, pl;llicies, '. or procedures whioo tend to limit the effectiveness of domestic intelligence collection. The Committee further noted th::lt the President wanted the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth so that the President will be able to decide whether or not a change in current .. . policies, practices, er procedures should be made. During meetings of the Committee, a variety of limitations and restraints were discussed. All of the ag encies involved, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the three military counterintelligence • services, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the NatfQnal security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), partici- ~ pated in these considerations. In the light of the directives furnished to the Committee by "'the White House, the subject matters hereinafter set forth were reviewed for the consideration and decision of the President. • I. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS A. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence Preliminary Discussion - 23 - 169 Nature of Restriction Advantages of Maintaining Restriction Advantages of Relaxing Restriction (DELETED) -24- 170 -25- (DELETED) 171 B. Electronic Surveilla~ces r~d!~enetration;1 \' --- Pre limi nary Discussion The limited number of electronic surveillances and penetrations substantially restricts the collection of valuable intelligence information of material importance to the entire intelligence communitl Nature of Restrictions Electronic surveillances have been used on a selective basis. Restrictions, initiated at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, arose as a result of the condemnation of these techniques by civil rights groups, .Congressional conce~ for invasion of privacy, and the possibility of their adverse effect on criminal prosecutions. Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 1. Disclosure and embarrassment to the using agency and/or the United States is always possible since such techniques often require that the services or advice of outside personnel be used in the process of installation. 2. 3. Certain elements of the press in the United States and abroad would undoubtedly seize uoon disclosure of electronic coverage in an effort to discredit the United States. 4. The monitoring of electronic surveillances requires considerable manpower and, where foreign establishments are involved, the language resources of the agencies could be severely taxed. - 26 - 62-685 0 - 76 - t2 172 Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 1. The U. S. Government has an overriding obligation to use every available scien:ific means to detect and neutralize forces which pose a direct threat to the Nation. 2. Every major intelligence service in the world, including those of the communist bloc, use such techniques as an essential part of their operation~and it is believed the general public would support their use by the United States for the same purpose. 3. The President historically has had the authority to act in matters of national security. In addition, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides a statutory basis. < ""'- 4. Intelligence data from electronic coverage is not readily obtainable from other techniques or sources. Such data includes information which might assist in formulating foreign policy decisions, information leading to the identification of inte lligence and/or espionage principals and could well include the first indicatio:1 of intention to commit hostile action against the United States. 5. Acquisition of such material from COMINT without benefit of the assistance which electronic surveillance techniques can prOVide, if possible at all, would be extremely expensive. Therefore, this approach could result in considerable dollar savings compared to collection methods. .. - 27 - 173 DECISION:. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations Present procedures on electronic coverage should continue. Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security. Present procedures should be changed to permit----I intensification of coverage More information is needed. NOTE: The FBI does not wish to change its present procedure of selective coverage on major internal security threats as it believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The FBI would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of the Attorney General for coverage required by them and thereafter instituting such coverage themselves. ( - 28 - 174 C. Mail Coverage Preliminary Discussion The use of mail covers can result in the collection of valuable information relating to contacts between U. S. nationals and foreign governments and intelligence services. CIA and the military investigative a;:;encies have found this information particularly helpful in the past. Essentially, the re are two types of mail coverage: routine coverage is legal, while the second--eovert coverage--is not. Routine coverage involves recording information from the face of envelopes. I1: is available, legally, to any duly authorized Federal or state investigative agency submitting a written request to the Post Office DeDartment and has been used frequently by the military intelligence services. Covert mail coverage, also known as "sophisticated mail coverage," or "flaps and seals, " entails surreptitious screening and may include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail. This technique is based on high":,level cooperation oftOp-echeI6i1-posfai officials. Nature of Restrictions Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal proceedings and publicity afforded this matter in Congressional hearings involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy. Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions Routine Coverage: 1. Although this coverage is legal, charges of invasion of privacy, no matter how ill-founded, are possible, 2. This coverage depends on the cooperation of rank-and-file postal employees and is, therefore, more susceptible to compromise. - 29 - 175 Covert Coverage: 1. Coverage directed against diplomatic establishments, if disclosed, could have adverse diplomatic repercussions. 2. This coverage, not having sanction of law, runs the risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government agency. 3. Information secured from such coverage could not be used for prosecutive purposes. Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions Routine Coverage: 1. Legal mail coverage is used daily by both local and many Federal authorities in criminal investigations. The us' of this technique should be available to permit coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a threat to the internal security. j Covert Coverage: 1. High-level postal authorities have, in the past, provided complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program. 2. This technique involves negligible risk of compromise. Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence, and personnel involved are highly trained, trustworthy, and under complete control of the intelligence agency. 3. IThis coverage has been extremely successful in producing hard-core and authentic intellig':mce which is not obtainable from any other source. An example is a C;;lse involving the interception of a letter to a --- establishment in • The writer offered to sell information to the .nd enclosed a sample of information available to him, Analysis Cletermined that the writer could have given information which migl~t have been more damaging - 30 - NOTE:' 176 DECISION: Mail Cover<J.ge Present restrictions on both types of mail --coverage should be continued. HestrictiollS on legal coverage should be --removed. Present restrictions on covert coverage should --be rela.:..:ed 011 selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest. More information is needed. The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal and it is likely that, if done, information would leak out of the Post Office to the press and serious damage would be done to the intelligence community:.J The FBI has no objection to legal mail coverage providing it -is done on a carefully controlled and selective basis in both criminal and security ~:itters. f!J.",,- ." - 31 - 177 D. Surreptitious Entry Preliminary Discussion Nature of Restrictions Use of surreptitious entry, also referred to as "anonymous sources: and "blac-k baci jobs, " has been vil·tually eliminated. ~ Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 1. The activity involves illegal entry and trespass. 2. Information which is obtained through this technique could not be used for prosecutive purposes. 3. The public disclosure of this technique would result in widespread publicity and embarrassment. The news media would portray the incident as a flagrant violation of civil rights Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 1. Operations of this type are performed by a small number of carefUlly trained and selected personnel under strict supervision. The teclmiCjue is implemented only after full security is assured. It has been used in the past with highly successful results and without adverse effects. - 32 - 178 2. Benefits :Jp-cruinr, from this technique in the past have been innumer;Jh1 " 3. In the past this technique, when used against subversives, has produced valuable intelligence material. DECISION: Surreptitious Entry Present restrictions should be continued. Present restrictions should be modified to permit --- procurement' . Present restnctions should also be modified --- to permit selective use of this technique against other urgent and high priority internal security targets. More information is needed. NOTE: The FBI is opposed to surreptitious entry - 33-=- 179 E. Development of Campus Sources Preliminary Discussion Public disclosure of CIA links with the National Student Association and the subsequent issuance of the Katzenbach Report have contributed to a climate adverse to intelligence-type activity on college campuses and 'Nith student-related groups. It should be noted that the Katzenbach Report itse if does not specifically restrain CIA from developing positive or counterintelligence sources to work on targets abroad. Restrictions currently in force limit certain other elements of the inte lligence community access to some of the most troublesome areas: campuses, college faculties, foreign and domestic youth groups, leftist journalists, and black militants. It is recognized that these are prime targets of communist intelligence services and that the opportunity for foreign communist exploitation increases in proportion to the weaknes's of a U. S. counterintelligence effort. . Nature of Restrictions The need for great circumspection in making contacts with stUdents, faculty members, and employees of institutions of learning is widely recognized. However, the requirements of the intelligence community for increased information in this area is obvious from the concern of the White House at the absence of hard information about the plans and programs of campus and studentrelated militant organizations. At the present time no sources are developed among secondary school students and, with respect to colleges and universities, sources are developed only among . individuals who have reached legal age, with few exceptions. This policy is designed to minimize the possibility of embarrassment and adverse publicity, including charges of infringement of academic freedom. - 34 - 180 Advan:'H.';cs of W-aintaining Restrictions 1. Students, faculty members, and others connected with educational institutions are frequently sensitive to and hostile to\vards any Government activity which smacks of infringement on academic freedom. They arc prone to )1ublicize inqUiries by goven,mental agencies and the resultin~'; pJblicity can often be misleading in portraying the GO\'Cnllnent's interest. 2, Students are frequently immature and unpredictable. They cannot be relicd on to maintain confidences or to act with discretion to the same extent as adult sources. Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 1. To a substantial degree, militant New Left and antiwar groups in the United States are comprised of stUdents, faculty members, and others connected with educational institutions. To a corresponding degree, effective coverage of these groups and activities depends upon development of knowledgeable sources in the categories named. In this connection, the military services have capabilities which could be of value to the FBI. 2. Much of the violence and disorders which have occurred on college campuses have been of :. hastily planned nature. Unless sources are available within the student bodies, it is virtually impossible to develop advance information concerning such violence. 3. The deve lopment of sources among students affiliated with New Left elements affords a unique opportunity to cultivate informant prospects who may rise to positions of leadership in the revolutionary movement or otherwise become of great long-range value. 4. The extraordinary and unprecedented wave of destruction which has swept U. S. campuses in the past several months and which in some respects represents a virtual effort to overthrow our system prOVides a clear justification for the development of campus informants in the interest of national security. - 35 - 181 5. Contacts with students will make it possible to obtain information about trave I abroad by U. S. students and about attendance at international conferences. DECISION: Development of Campus Sources Present restrictions on development of campus and student-related sources should be continued. Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups. CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling abroad or living abroad should be increased. More information is needed. NOTE: The FBI is opposed to removing any present controls and restrictions relating to the development of campus sources. To do so would severely jeopardize its investigations and could result in leaks to the press which would be damaging and which could result in charges that investigative agencies arc interfering with acad~mic freedom. - 36 - 182 F. Use of 1\1ilitZlry Undercover Agents Preliminary Discussion The use of undercover agents by the military services to develop domesUc intelligence is currently limited to pCl\C'tration of org:1llizZltions whose membership includes military personnel and whose activities pose ;t direct threat to the military establishment. For example, although the :\avy has Zlpproxinntely 54 :\avZll HOTe units and numerOllS classified Government contraet projects on vario;]s campuses across the cour.try, the ~~l\-alll1\-estig:ltiveService conclucts no covert collection on college campuses. The same is true of the other military services. Nature of Restrictions The use of undercover agents by the military investigative services to de,'elop domestic intelligence among civili8n targets is belie':ed beyond the statutory intent of the Congress as expressed in Title 10, U. S. Coele, and in current resource authorizations. The Delimitations Agr'eement (1949 agreement siGned by the FDI, Army, Nztvy and Air Force which delimits responsibility for each agency with regard to investigations of espionage, counterespionage, sub\'ersion and sabotage) reflects the current missions of the FBI and the military services. Further, there is a lack of assets to undertake this mission unless essential service-related counterintelligence missions are reduced. There is also concern for morale and disciplinaxy rea.ctions within the services should the existence of such covert operations become known. Advantages of Maintaining Restri ctions 1. If the utilization of military counterintelligence in this mission is contrary to the intent of the Congress, discovery of employment may result in unfavorable legislation and further reductions in appropri ations. 2, Lacking direct statutory authority, the use of the military services in this mission could result in legal action directed against the Executive Branch. 3. The use of military personnel to report on civilian activities for the benefit of civilian agencies will reduce the ability of the military services to meet service-connected intelligence responsibilitie.:o. - 37 - 183 4. If expansion of the mission of the military services with regard to college campuses is to provide coverage of any significance, it will require corollary increases in resources. 5. Prosecutions for violations of law discovered in the course of military penetration of civilian organizations must be tried in civil courts. The providing of military witnesses will require complicated interdepartmental coordination to a much greater extent than the present and will serve, in the long run, to reduce security. 6. Disclosure that military counterintelligence agencies have been furnishing information obtained through this technique to nonmilitary investigative agencies with respect to civilian activities would certainly result in considerable adverse publicity. The Army's recent experience with former military intelligence personnel confirms this estimate. Since obligated service officers, first enlistees and draftees are drawn from a peer group in which reaction is most unfavorable, morale and disciplinary problems can be anticipated. Advantages of Rela..'Cing Restrictions 1. Lifting these restrictions would expand the scope of domestic intelligence collection efforts by diverting additional manpower and resources for tre collection of information on college campuse~j and in the vicinity of military installations. 2. . The use of undercover agents by the military counterintelligence agencies could be limited to localized targets where the threat is great and the likelihood of exposure minimal. Moreover, controlled use of trusted personnel leaving the service to return to college could expand the collection capabilities at an acceptable risk. 3. The military services have a certain number of personnel pursuing special academic Courses on campuses and universities. Such personnel, who in many instances have already been investigated for security clearance, would represent a valuable pool of potential sources for reporting on subversive activities of campus and student-related groups. - 38 - 184 DECISION: Use of Military Undercover I.gents Present restrictions should be retained. The counterintelligence mission of the military services should be expanded to include the active collection of intelligence concerning studentrelated dissident activities, \vith provisions for a close coordination with the FBI. No change should be made in the current mission of the military counterintelligence services; however, present restrictions should be relaxea to permit the use of trusted military personnel as FBI assets in the collection of intelligence regarding studentrelated dissident activities. More information is needed. NOTE: The FBI is opposed to the use of any military undercover agents to develop domestic intelligence information because this v,Duld be in violation of the Delimitations Agreement. The military services, joined by the FBI, oppose any modification of the Delimitations Agreement which would extend their jurisdiction beyond matters of interest to the Department of Defense. - 39 - 185 II. BUDGET AND MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS The capability of member agencies, NSA,· CIA, DIA, FBI, and the military counterintelligence services, to collect intelligence data is limited by available resources, particularly in terms of budget and/or qualified manpower. For some agencies fiscal limitations or recent cutbacks have been acute. Budgetary requirements for some agencies, oth~r than the FBI, are reviewed and passed upon by officials who, in some instances, may not be fully informed concerning intelligence requirements. The military services noted that cuts in budget requirements for counterintelligence activities have the effect of severely hampering the ability of these services to accomplish missions relating to coverage of threats to the national security. Budgetary deficiencies have occurred at a time when investigative work loads are increasing significantly. Manpower limitations constitute a major restriction on the FBI's capabilities in the investigation of subversive activities. The problem is further complicated by the fact that, even if substantial numbers of Agents could be recruited on a crash basis, the time required to conduct background investigations and to provide essential training would mean several months' delay in personnel being available for use against the rapidly escalating subversive situation. - 40 - 186 In tr.e event, as a result of ~his report, addition8.1 collection requiremenls should be levied on the agencies involved, it would be necessary to provide for cssenti"l funding. For example, - ",I DECISION: Budget and Manpower Restrictior.s Each agency should ~l\bmit a detailed estimate as to projected manpower needs ar.a ether cost~ in the event the various investigative restraints herein are lifted. Each agency must operate within its current budgetary or manpower limitatio:1s, irrespective of action required as result of this report. More information is needed. - 41 - 187 ~T TEFEE EVALUATION OF IN-T-E-R-AG-f-::-NC-l-' C_O.O_RD-I-N-,\T-I-ON- 1. ·CU~Rt~.nOCEDUnES TO EFFECT COCI':DINAnO!'l' There is currently 1'0 Op(T:ltional bvdy or mer;hanism specifically cha:rged v.ith the overall <In<dysiG, coordination, and continuing ev"luation of practices and pohcies governing the acquisition and dissemination of intelligence, the pooling of resGl:rces, a.nd ll)e correlation of operational activities in the domestic field. Although a substantial exchaBge of intelligcr.ce and research material between certain of the interested agencies already exi:::',s, much remains to be done in the following areas: (1) the preparation of cGordinated intelligence estimates in a format useful for policy fOl'Dluiation; (2) i'he coorclir.ation of intelligence collection ref;ources of the Dl':TIlber q;cncies and the esta.blishment of clear-cut priorities for the variol:s agencies; and (3) the coordination of the operatioD?l activities of memiJer ager:cies in developing the required intelligence. II. SUGGESTED W-EASURES TO n,IPROVE TIi'Z COORDINATION 07 DO:'lESTIC INTELLIGENCE COLLZCT!ON It is belie,'ed that an interagency group on domestic intellig~nce should be established to effect coordination between the various mernb'2r agencies. Tins group -"auld c:cfille the specific require,ments of the various agencies, provide regular evaluations of Gomestic intelligence, develop recommendations relative to policies governing cperatior.::; in the field of domestic intelligence, and prepc.rc periodic domestic intelligence estimates which would 'incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the entire intelligence community. Membership in this group should consist of appropriate repl'esentc,tives named by the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Inves,tigation, the Central Intelligence Af,r;llcy, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the cQunterinidJigeneeqgencie:; of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, an - 42 - 62-685 0 - 76 - 13 188 appropri;1.te represp-ntative of the White House would have membership. The committee would report periodically to the While House, and a White Ho1.:sC staff representative ':lould coordinate intelligencE: originating with this co:nmittec in the: same m;",ner as Dr. Henry Kissinger, AssL3tant to the Presirli'::nt, coordinates foreip;n intelligence on behalf of the President. TI:e chairm;;.n wO'J.ld be appointed by the pj'esident. This interagency group would have autharit:,' to determine appropriate staa requirements aad to implement these requirement:::, subject to the <i.ppraval of the PreSident, in ordcr to meet the responsibilities and objectives described above. DECISION: Permanent Interagency Group An ad hoc group consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence ag'.meies shonid be appointed and s!1ould serve as lO:1g as the President deems necessary, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry out the other objectives indicated above. The ad hoc group should be tasked to develop a permaner.t organization to ,carry Gut the objectives ot this report. A permanent committee consisting of the FDI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should be appointed to provide enluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry out the other objecti.ves indicated above. No further action required. More information is needed. NOTE: The FBI is opposed to th~ creation of a permanent committee' for the purpose of pro~iding evaluations of domestic intelli:;'cnrc, hm'lcver, the FBI would approve of preparing periodic domestic intelligence estimates. - 43 - 189 EXHIBIT 2 752 Documents DomE:stic Intellifienc8 Gathering Plan: Ancl)'s;~. arid Strat2gy Jvl)', 1970 },!cmC-.l"G:·;], :\)~. H. f\., fb;,'~r;l;'" F'l)~l: 1 ,H:: (':~:uie'i r;u.':0'l S~lbj~ct. :)0;]1~,tic j.nr.dlj~~r,,'~ rc\ :",'1 J.... v-·0:-;~~:-~ ~r.~~r :\-In,is~in!! ,,-if ~he :or .~,.'I:-,,:.,,~;,: intt'lEgC'1"i::: c·ri._i:-l:~ \r :~c? flil C:.~. DL.i.. 1'o',,,\S. (~nJ ~J_-:; l'!- ;':: jnn:~";-i ser'.:~~... ::.~: :t'':'~::~J'''~' ~~rou.::h.::·.l: 3ti fl.L to d:, ..... i.l<,:·) a,;.., ~'-l.)bk;;~s O:..lt~ lir:..:d h~' ~~~, ~ . ..:sL..J .... ~lt ~tl ~ t.) Jr<~i-t t[-~\; .ltt3ch~'J r~tx)rt. The ...~isr:~! c. ;:.'~\ -.l"·::rt: f: -.l~-.!.: ;:.r.d rt-:e q 13.: :' of v"crk ~!j~t-r~i.L. CC0perat;0f: \"':i· \~x ... t .:~;'~ ..inJ 3:i were delig;}~t:'d tr:d! :I!1 cr;-~ ...itur.jty ~as t;:1~_I!y ::' :':"l11l~ to ;; :·jf":~'-\ !h('~lSci\t'''i joi~H}"" ~J th~ xrious inte:nJ.~ ~el'llrit)· thrL·.·.t v:hiril e\'i ... ts. I r'~rtt ..: ;-,'_tt.i in ail ni;,"~[inF:l. but rc~:ric. '.1 my in';ctvcment to k~cr;:~g t::~ Ci'\:-:Jl~"';~~C~ on the tar~,~! th~ Plt"S:jCilt est;,;,21ish~d. ~J)' in:rreos:ol' :il~l th~ :e;1ur: woule; ::>e IT:or;: :,":Cl,,~t~ and the recomr. le!"~lht:·)n,> !TIO:-': t-(ojptut.. :: the ~:;(n..:ie~ '.\'(':-c= al~0"''' ~d ",ide Inti· tude iIi ,:"x::-';~5sir.; t:...eir C-PL1!0ilS :U:iG wori-::nf: OU: 1fLlrIgements v. hi:ll {~~\ ~dt r~lt:: th~ P'-t..'<,':;:n:·, ; .-{-=11 :T'~~m\·,:t~ C0: ,sistcnt Wit!l tlH.~ =-.~~.:·Tr{,;,:~ :n\~ u:;·jc:.... of t~c :1~·."rrlbLr ;lg(.:r:..... !~~. 2. Mr. H(;~,'t'r J v;ent into this e::crcise f( '>riul that C.l.A. woui::! refuse to C(\vpc~3;e. iI. f:ll:t, D:.k I-ielms [P.ir.:ct·:Jr d Central intelli;;encc] v;,,~ most coopcra,jve "nli helpfL:l, ar.d th~ only stumbling bloc': W~~ Mr. }-h)uv~r. B,' ;,ttcmrtd at tI,e first me~t;ng to divert :h~ cor.l:niltee [IOn: orer~:io1ial ~"JClcms and redirect it, mand:lte to the prep~rJti(\n C'i aoolher an~lysi, 0: existing inte!I'gcnce, I d~eliI'M te ;.'~qLic,ce in :his apprvlch, ar.d s:I':cecded in getting the committee t.lck on target. When th~ working g:c:Jp ('Qmpl~t('d it.; report, ~ir. Hoo,a reo fuseJ to go al00g with a single conc1usi::m drav.-n or ~,upport a single rec(\Mnendation m"de. His position was tW0fold: (I) Current oper;ltions are perfectly s",i,L·:tory 3nd (::!) No one has any busines~ commc!1ting on procc,!llre' he h~s e'.ubii,hed for the collection cf inld]igeroce by the F.B,1. He 3t!empted to modify the bud}' of the report, but I successfully opposed it on the 190 Documenu 753 grounds that the report was the conclusion of all the agencies. llOt mer~'r the F.B.I. Mr. Hoover then entered his objectiuns a~ footnotes to the report. Cumulatively, his footnotes suggest thal be is p'2rfcclly satisfied with current procedures and is opposed to a.n\' ch~ng"s ",.hatsoe\'<:r. As you will nore from the report, his objections are generally inconsi~tent and frivolous--most express CC'ilcem about possibk embarnssment to the intt:lIigence commllnit)' (i.e., Hoover) from public disclosure of clandestine 0perations, AJmiLtI G ~ykr ~nd General Bennett were greatly displeased bv ~fr. Hoovcrs atti'ud" and his insistence on footnoting objectior,', They wi<:hed to r"iJe a fo,en'll prot'?st and sign the report ('Illy wit~ th~ undn,tanding tbt they opposed t'le footnotes. I pr~",,;led lIpon them not to do so since it would only aggravate Mr. HOl1'.er i:nd further complicate our efforts. They graciously n;rccJ to ~o alon; with my su;gcstion in order to avoid a nasTy sc<'l'e ,'no jeo;,"rJize the possibility of rositivc action resulting fro:;, the I cX'rt, r assureJ them thc,! t'leir opinion would be brc lfbt :<' :':~ :;ttcnt:on L'f the Prel:dent. 3. Threat Assessmer.t TI,e f;F: ~3 raf.'~s of the report cowtitllte an assessment of the ('\i'::i[l~ ir!crnal ,.:~urity threat, our currcnt intdlig~nce covcrage of I',;" thrc:ll. an::! a!'e~s where our coverage ;s inadequate. AU agenc';cs con~lIrrt'd in thi, asses-mer:t. and it serves to explain the ir.Jp)rtJ...-,c·: 0' ex,.and~,l lfltelliltence coIle~:ion efforts. 4. Ro;>strcints on Intelligence Collection P:ut TwCl of the report discusscs specific operational restraints whi.h ccacntl, r,'str:ct the capabili:y of thc intelligence communi1Y to collect the Types of information nccessary to deal elrCCtivcly with the ir.ternal security threat. The report explains the naturc of the restraints and sets out the arguments for and against moctifying th~r:1. My CO;Jcem was to afford the President the ll1rongest arbUmems on both sidcs of the question so that he could Ibi~e an informed decision as to the future course of action to be followed by the intelligence community. I might point out that of all the individuals involved in the preparation and consideration of this report, only Mr. Hoover is satisfied with existing procedures. Those individuals within the F.B.I. who have day-to-day responsibilities for domestic intelligence operations privately disagree .... ith Mr. HoO\'er and believe that it is imperative that ch~n:::cs in opera!ing procedures be initiated at once. J am attaching to this memorandum my recomrnenjations on the decision the Presid~nt should make with regard to these operational restraints. Although the report sets forth the pros and cons on each issue, it may ~ helpful to add my specific recom754 191 Document! mendations and the reasons therefore in the event the President has some doubts on a specific course of action. 5. Improvement in Interagency Coordination All members of the committee anel its working group, with the exceptio.. of Mr. Homer, believe that it is h"Tlperative that it conlin~: n(l mecbnism be established to etfectuate the coorJin,}t:on of do~estic intelligence e:forts and the evalu'ltion of domestic int~ llig~nce d~ta. In the past there has been no systematic erfort to mobilize the full resour,es of the intelligence community ;n the in:cmaJ ~curity area :lnd there has been no mechanisn~ for r~~paring community-wide dOIT'estic intelligence estimates sr:,h as i, don;> in the fordbc} intelligef'ce area by the United, States Tntel~ig~ncd BOJrd. Dcr::estic inttlljg~nce irJormation coming into the White House has been fragmentary c.nd unevaluated. We bve not had for example, a com~m;nity-wjje est;mate of what we mi,::ht exrect shon- or long-term in !be ctties or on the campt;s~s cr v.ithin th~ military estab!isbnenl. C nlike most of the hure:'llcracy, t~e intc!lig"nce co:nmu:lity we!coUles direction and Je:lde~,hip froL; the \\~ite House. There appc:trs to be agreeme~t. with the cx-:et'lion of ~yf[. Hoover, t':at etfective coordinatio;1 wi,~:n the cCl!lmu'1ity is possible o:lly if there is direction from the Wnite House. '·!oreovcr, the commll~ity is pleased th.it the \Voite House is h'1:tlly sho's;ng interest in their activities ar.d aa awareness of the threat which they so 2.cutely re~ognizc.. . I b·?!ieve 'hat we ',-il! PC m;'.king a major contribution to the s-:.:nrity e,f t!1e cOiJn~;y if \\~c: C3.n '\\'ork out an arran~cn~cnt whi-:h rf<.·vic,es fL·r i:mitutic·nalJzed c00rci.iuti0n within :he i!1telligence cot='uci,y aLd elfectivc leadership fr0m the White House. 6. rr.1!Jlementation c:f the Pr",sic~~t's Dec':;;ons If the PresiJ'"nl ,h0uld decide to lift scme of the current restri0, ion, and if he ,houlJ d~ciJe to ,,~th0fize a formali7ed domeqic irttellic;cilce struc"~e, I ,'ould rc~on:mend the fol!owing S~l:ps: (A) Mr. HO<.'ver shm,ld be c:t11ed in privately for a stro:':ing se>sion <it which the Presid~nt explain, the rlecisian h~ has made, t1an1.s Mr. Hoover for hi~ CJrl<lid advice <lnd past covperation, <:.,J indi0ates he is counting on Edgar's 0oo!""ration in ifYlplen"::lti.i.tg the new elecisions. (B) Following this Hoover sess:Qrl, the s:une individu;ds who we,e present at the initi31 ::;ession in the Oval Office shl1u;j t,e im'iteJ back to meet with the Prc5ident. At that time, the Presid~ nt should thank thef:l for the repan, anr-ounce his decisions, i.'ldicate his desires for future activity, and present each with an 192 DocumentJ 755 auto!!raphed copy of the photo of the first meeting which Ollie took, (el An official memorandum ~ettil'g forth doe precise decisions of the P~e~iJent should be prcparcd- so that there can be no m;sundersl;",Jing. \Ve should ,liso incorp;xa,e a review procedure whkh .. iiI enabk us to ensur,;: th;l! the 1e·;i,;;ions Me fully implemented. I hate 10 'U~[!,;:st a further imj.ositic:n en the President's time, b'lt think these steps will be ne:essary to !'c.ve O\'er ~ome of the ohvious problems wh kh m"y :>.ri,;e if tfoe Pr~~iJc~t1ecides, as r h,)pe r.e will. to vverro.:le ~,1r. HOv':er's o:'-'.ectio:ls ,0 many of the prorvsals made in thi, report. H2\'~n; seen' ~";e ?r~si.j,,!Ot in action with \1f. Hoover. I am cor.:jde~r that he car. h;mdle this situation in such .1 way that we can get what ·...·e want without putting Edgar's no'>e oilt of je-int. At the '2.~C :;""1'~. '·\·e can c~pitalize on the good" ill the Prt:'ident h"s cui1t ttp "it'; :he ::>ti1er pr:ncipals !:.nd P.1in!miz~ th~ risk that t".ey r:12.Y :eel t.'.e:: are being forced to take a back scat to Mr. E vJ\'e., . 7. Cc;'lCil:~iGn I am delig;l:ed with the ~'l~s::::':~e ,~·f :::;5 ~:~or! and 1:-t:lieve it is a first-rate job. I have l;rcat r~'f"'c! fer l':~ i,,:e::r:ty. loyalty, and comp~tcn:e of the men wh~) rtr~ (lp-:::?:;,-;:.~lly rec;;~\lnsihl~ for internal security matters ad oe:ic"'c ''1a, we are on L'1e threshold of an unexcelled opportunity :0 C(,::>e ":th .. ver}' serious probl-::ro in its germinal ~lages when vee co.n ;,void t;,,, neces,ity for harsh measures ,",y acting swift. discreetr\', a.'1,i d~cisi\'eiy to deflect the threat before it reaches alarming prcr0rions. T might add. in conc1m:on, t.r.;.t it ;s ~y re~on~,1 cpinbn that Mr. Hwver will not hesit?tc to ;>cc~cje :0 any dt'c:sion whkh the President makes. ar,d the P~CSi:knt $i ..::>,:I,l not, t~erefore. be reluctant to overr,lle ~r. E'~\,J';er's (-!bje~:ivns. \1r. H00ver is se~ in his ways and can be bull-headed as ;:eii, but he is a !eva! trooper. T"'enty years :igo he woulJ ne·er h,,"c ~2i<el :"c type of .objectiurls he has he~e, but he'~ ce!ljn~ old ;,~d ":,,rr:d aoout his legend. He make, life tOI1<:'1 ;; ,~;~- 3-e;\. """L n.:: ip";:'O"ible--for he'll respond to direction 0:: ;~,e r, ...,i,:cr,[ "nd the.t is all we need to set the dOI:leslie inle~!i;e~:e t'ou,c i.el o~Jer. 193 22.1 Tom Hustom memorandum Prc.sc:;:~ i::~«:-J:(:~~..:~:'G;. 5:.0'-.::-:: be brouGct.cd to ?..::r~-.• -I,. and p:':·o;;;~·z~:-.-. :2-"~ cv·.,t..::-::"~L' '-:JJ ='\SA 0; :;;,:; con·,rr.L:.~·.. C<.~.V of U. S. c':'tjzC:-,5 :..:.,;::-.; i::i..~:-:-.aJ...-ion~: iaci:i\:ics. R;..:.tio;lZl.l(;: The l~E~ GO.::::; ;",0 ... :~c.. ..r~ ::-.c c~<-laDil~~y ~o :7',o~.;.-.:o. ir:..lC:-Il2.~icl:-,2~: cc:::.:-;--...-..:.::.:c.:.:.:':'o::s. ~S/l.. i~ Cc.:'::rc::,.L.~· uOini.: so 0:-. <J.. :;:(;S7.~:ci:cci b;;:'ls:s, a.:'.d i:i;.c i.--.fo:':;"'-l<="' liOn .l-=, h;c5 ?~OV:C'-;G ;..... ~s -uCC:l r.A.o.s~ I'lcl~{-:....;.l. :-\':~c.. of thi:~ info:;:r:la~~o,. is ?.<i:-;,:~cul~r~,/ useful to ~:~C \\'hi~c 1:0',-:32 <enG ii: ·.... OG.le. ":.JC -':0 our dis;~c'/.:::..:-.to.;c· to allo\': t;-.c ?EI to dctc.:::-: .... i:-,c w:-.at l'\SA 3!-,o1..:1-:1. GO in this ~:·cz... \Vi;;".:',,0Lt .:.-c;;arc.;;o 0<..:.= 0'.'.'", ::-cc;.\...:.i:Lemcnts. ~:o ;:,??::ccic.":>lc ~isj~ is iavolvccl in s'ois COUT':;C of ac~io;:. Present ?roccLL.:c1 s~o;,~:c. Do chti'1;ed:o :jc~mit intcn::>iLc.:l ..io;--. 01- CO\"c:-;-';SC o[ L.c>:icii...l.u.l~ <ltLJ groups ir. ;.':1c L-:l:t..::r!. S~<::.-..:c~ \vr....o :.)Ose 2. :r.ajo:: t.hreat to ~r.c i~):c ::";lul sccuri'<i. j)C TI".i:: i;'.;''-~;.;.;i~':'c':'~:0l·. 0:" CO\'L' ..4~,:::.",:- 0: i',.":I.:ci.;;-. 1l,'llicllJ.l:.; ~,;.(~ ,-;~~':';(j.ll;::.;':;C ~_s).';::,~""':;;':,,""'I.~S i,: ~;-l":: unitcu ~l..');,e:; .::..:. l.,...... ..:; :-L~''':' '';'0 -..;;.• ..:: ~r.;,;..:~~i;;cr . .::(: COlnn1I..Uli·~'i' pCl·,c't;;";"~;0::':, ,_~-(' c~~c .. :.,,; ..·~" -:;";~is ;':--.ch;dcs CO\'..;i.·"u'--' 01 ..... c:: \.:j~; ...~/,. ,,'.\~ 0:-<:~;-.;-.i/.('ti (::-::1"':: {arC"'-\'::, \':~i.;'. '-'" ... ...:'.'," :.;,;,~::o:·i~~,",(.<.:-~~\.i:.~;·,: f,UUj('L~:: 0:' :):''''.~: .l __~ .,'.~,:;':-:; .. ~,l.'::~;r1"11;·.i."':"·(;Jt. ,,//-'. : 194 1'/.1". Hoover's ::.ti'.'c.c:;ncr.'c. t:lu'i.: t~e F13I \'/ol:ld not O??OSE: o~llc:r ~~~c:l.cic:.; sc(;~':'ng ,:",??roval for a:-.u o?t~rati:1g clc:ctrc;.ic .su:::vc:illilllC(;S is grab.:t:oi.:s since no ot:--.er agencies ;1.J.vc ~;:c c<:.pabiliL)'", Evcryo:J.c k;,.o\':lcc2.;;a~lc; in ~l-1c field, with thE: cxcc?tio:'"', of Ivir. }Ioo~'er, co~-:.cu:s that cxistir.:;; covcri:.';c is g;oo5sly inaclc(ic.2.-~c. Cl./'.. ~:-..cl 0:SA note: tr.at tnis is ?a:-tic\.:.l~:-ly true of c.i?lo:i;'.:ij~:'c C5~2..'::;l~s::.:Tlcn:s, a~d vie r.avc lear-;:ed a: the \\'Lite }IOi..:.SC tn<:lt it is a.lso true of ~ew Left grol:.?s. , Restrictions on l.cga'l COve rage should be removed. ALSO, present ~4cstrictio:ls 0::. ~t cO~·lcrage shoulc1 be relaxed on sel.::ctcd ta::gets of p::-iority iorcig:l. i:'1telligc:lcc arIa ir.ternal scc'lj,rity in'.:ercst. Rationolc: There is no valid argu:-::,c:1t against: use of lcga.l r.1ail covers cxcep~ ;\'i=..,:.. Eoover;s CO:lCer:1 L'1.at ~:-.c ci'\'"il libcrtL~5 ?co?lc n1,:\.y D0cD:":":c U?SC~. Tnis :::'is~ is surely an accc:.J::J.blc o;-'.c and !1.a:-dly se :rio~s CI"'.o~g:"1 to jt:.stif:l d~nying our~clvcs ~ vah:able and lcg~l intclligcOlce tool. Covert covcranc is ille(Y2.1 and there arc se~:ious ris~.s. involvcG.. HO\\i~vcr, t~z..civantagcs to be Gc:-ivcci fro:':'1 its usc out\vCi~.:<ll t:tc: ri~ks. T:1.is tcci1niquc is Fa:,~ic·..:~arl,/ valuable in idL';1.;.;i:\i;:g cspion~;c agent~ a'Hi o~i~cr co.-:.t'lC:S of fOl"ci,;;n il:.:clli~c:1cC services. Pl·0·scr.~ rcst.:-ic:'::o:ls si:.ouicl be =~""0(Efi~"'(: :0 ?C'::.-;.)it p:-oC~\]'(~ II1(';:'~ of \'i~~.:~)· l:'CL'Lcd forci;;',. c;-:·~)::0;:·J.?;·.ic ;;.... u(crl<:.:. ALSO, ?:-c~~.~nt r.:::~;~ricti0:'.S :;i:0:.!~d ~("' :':.1.o(;iticcl Lv 'i)CI":-r.:t ~cl('c~i·.·.: U~~~ ...,. [ (;\j-: lC""':;d::liUC .l.i:;!.i;,·,t 0:..iH:r ur~;cl:.t ~:--.c.i hi/:L p:·;,:):-~i'/ i~~'~l::~';l~ll !,\;c'_iriLy t.:lrt: ....·i,;.::;. ,I,-// ..·~·-.,/ 195 Usc of ''':>L~~ tcc:.=-.:(>~c :s C~..:.:~~:·:/ ~::~l: i ... 2:-.LO~~l::; to burzlil-::Y. it. is <Llso :-.1.;;:1,/ T13.--;.Fr,tl CCL.:.ld re:sulc in gI·C;j.~ crr.ba:-r2.s':;;':lC:-:>::[ C::<;J..:J,secl. I-lo\'/cvc::-, i~ is also ti:c r:-'.OS"C £;:--.1i\:i\.:l 'cool J.;,.d C2.~ ?~'oduc~ tr.c type of intclli,;c::.cc \'.'';'1ic:1. C.J.01;10: bc oDtair..ccl in any other [ashio:1.." The F'B1, in ~ )..~~. hoave:-' 5 younge:- C;-l.'/S', used to conc1u<.:t such o?er2.tio:-.,s wiG J:,ca: success c.:ld with no cXLJosur~. 7hc inform~tion secured was i ..... yQ.luablc~ ~ lIas a. pa:-ticula~ interest ~ince i.t ,i~ ~~s.sib:: by thIS ".;CCh:-.1S'--~C :0 secu:oe materlals w ...ta W:He:l !'\SA ca:"'. break [0:-C16 :1. c:L''{?-.:ogra?;-.ic eocles. \\'c spc:nd Thillio:i.s of doll<..rs e.-'::C;-li?i::l::g "::'0 tJ:-Ccl~ t:-..ese ,coocs by rn2.chine. Oile 0l1.r.cesslul fiur:,c?d~ious e;--.try can do the job . successfully ut >10 dalle..:, cost. Surr('pti~ious entry of i2..c::li~ics occ:u?icd br subversive clen1Cr.:s can tU:':1 l..:? i:1:o:L~~:io;1 a~o-...:.: identities, rnclhocls of o?cr<l'bo:l, ~ad othc::: il',vulu<::.blc ir:.vcstiga.tive in.forrn2... '~ion \'/:-:ici::.:s r.>O~ O::lCT\':isc 00:e..::;..:"";)1c. ':':-.is tcchniqt:.c \vo'Uld bc.-pa::-tic'i.lL::;ly ne1iJ£ul if used agi:l.i;-.s;; the \','C2.:'hc::::-mcn 2.:1G 3~<lc~: P~~;:t~c:rs. The dCi?loy::-:-:.c:l.'..: 0:" the :::=xccutivc ?roteci:o:' :Force h<\3 incrcas cd ~lC ris;,- 0: su:::-:-c?tit:'ous e:".t:,'/ of <.li?lo~i."'<J.tic establis;l:7lC~~S. }-lo\V2ve:" Ii: is t.".-:c Delie': of all CXCC'iJt l\.fT. Hoa .... e::::- t::0.: th~ -:=cc:-::;.iquc c<-:.~ still be suc.:ccss:.... lly USCG on a selective ·o3.sis. Pres en::' r0s'..ric::'o:-.s 3r'.0\112 be ~cl.~xcc. t.O ,?C":,:-.-,it (':\:22.:-·LC':' co\'c;-:l~L' Q:' \'iole;~cc-?ro;'.c C~d'":."'~)\.lS .1t"\d st1.:G.0:".t-:::cl.1"':c.::l AL.s-:J, C:.\. C(,\",' ;.<!~;(; 0;· .\; ;-,(: :"~I." ;.~ :,:",:C ..:-;", :~: (:\;:(~ 0~:,l:' : . .< "tr':-l\'cii:.:: 0;: 1:":~ ;l.~:-().:.l.; "~;~u-...:.i.d .~)(: i:h-:~·C<\.Sl"C" 6;/-')-./7 -: 196 ?a;;\: The F:2.1 2.oc.s :;.0:: c ...~:·:-c~:~l·/ ::-ccn,lt u~y caii~~..)\~S SO\l:-ccs ~unoi1g ir.<.1iv~<l~2.-1s below 21 ycz..rs or age. Tj,is c.l~2.mat:cc..l~~: reduces lile ,?ool [rO~~i \':i1ich :30\.: .... Ces rr.a'!"'::>e ara.\'r.1. :\.~::. :-:00'.-::: is afraid of 2. yo-.:.n; st'-l0.C:r'.t sli.={2-ci~g i:1. ;;;::c p~c~s as 2.;1 ?3~ r:ourcc, J.l\:~·,o,:,:;~ '..:r.c :-c~ct:O:-l i:1 ~:"e ?ast t~ sucr~ CVCr.~5 f:.c..s been n-unir.--.z...l. Aitcr all, everyone ClSSGr..lC5 t:::c FBI has such sources. The calnpus is the battl(:-~roGnd of tae Z"cvoh.:tio:1aryprotest IOlOVC:-nC:l.t. It is im?ossib)c to gati-.cr effective intclligcn.cc a~ou';: the rr.ovc......-:.,cnt unless we have ca:71?li.'::' SOurces. T~c ris~, of Cy'?OS",,1TC is rr.inimJ..l, a:1Q wf-.e=c cx?osurc occu.::s the auverse publicity is Inoucrutc ",no short-lived. It is a price \'Ie must be willi:lg ta pay fo':' effeclive cO\'Qragc 0: -;':1.C carnpus .5CC:le. The intclligc:-.. ;:e commu;1i1.y, \vit.... '.::hc cxcC'?~io:l 0; :"::::-. ,:-:OOVC~I feels strongly '.::"ha: i: is ir:.... ?<3:·a:ivc the we ir.c:C<lsc t:'c '.\1:71~~:- of car.1rJi...s sou~ccs this £z.11 in order to .fo:<:'est~ll wici.eS?:.-e2cl ·violence. CIA claims Sicrc al'e no existing rcst:.-aints on its cove:-2.gc of over-seas <:.c~iV"itics of US nationals. EO\','cve::, Clis cover(~:;;c has b(;l.~;~grossl,/ ir~adcquf'.te si:1.cC 1903 ~r:.ci 2.!"'~ ex.plicit clirccti\'c to increase coverage i::; rcqui::rec... Present rcst.::ic::iO:1S 5:-to',.;1c1 be ret:ai:1cc1. l~ation:'.l(': The il~~-(:11i::~';,:C2 CG;:"'..:1Ii.:r:.:~y is '::':2,Tt:cd t:1:lt ti,~~ :-~~ks . of llttl::' ' ~ .. 2-->~ re > .... ~ : •• ~~ ;trc ~~C',,';,.\"";" to'.,'-·: (;... c \"~\:u.:~ of ;,:'.~" :)0 ,.,.2 i;·. ..:I:.>.C:.:<...:..:..:· \':.'.1\:~ .,:;;; ...~:(~ :J"': .'.C',-.. "_ ~~'<2(: L,./ d:-Jl.'., ~ v. :..')// '/. /1 ~. /~~';";:_~- ::..--/ 197 :5 VOGEl ...'-XC .\-: ."-.;\TT->;)','/;: ~.:. ~::";::S'~' rc~CT;O>;S (1',1. ·;0--,1) rtc C 0:";"1 :J: (.:;~:; <.~: (;:l.: Each <:'~:CLC:I ~:lol;~_(l S\.~:J~l:t tl. ecL;':'l(;cl C::;~il:",c..I:...:: .:i.::; ~o . p:rOjC:C_~l"'(~ L:.l(l.;·l~U"':2.:· liccds (~ •• d o",;:"'(~r COS~5 i;-;. ~h(: evcr:..t.: the V.2.:riO'..l3 i~.VC3:i,gatiV(; r~straiEts h(;~cin arc lifted. Ratio~ ~l~: In the e\'~"'i1t ::--"~t tL0 ;~bove Tecomn~,~nc2.tiG;1S Ere co:-.Ci-,:-r'.>:i in~ it \I,i'ill ue .-:l:ccessary to lYio2iiy cxisd:1g D<'ici 6 t:rs to y,ro',"ide the monel' 2.;1d :-na•.?o'.'/cr ncccss2.Ty for t::ci:r i;-J;?lc;nc;-':;:>.~io:-:.. TJ:1c i:ltclli~~0ncc co;-:.... :.,u;,ity h~s oec;l. badly hit ~Ii. t;(~e b\.:c.l~(:~ squce~:c (I su.<;?c:ct the {orcign intclli:ojc:l.cc 02C1':..tion:; i<re: in the ~~~rr.c 5~o?c) 2r.d it r:iD.Y "l.~'1- \/.'8.1 be ncccssar'/ to rr.u.i~e SOlnc n:.o:i~{ie;.:..~io:'.s. The ?;-ojcc~tci iigure::; t;;:o~lci 0.:: Tcaso;1::o1c. but v..ill OC subject ",;0 i:1divicluiJ.l review if t:--;,is :reconll-:;)end~Lio&1 ;:;; ~cccpt~d~ IvfE ..\SUR~~S ':to ~:..:?:\..O'i~ :JO:',:=S'l':C E\':ZLL:G=:\C~ OP~~c:~'".:.:':::·~:S (Pl'. Q-~3) A pc::: rrn~~~lCl-, ~ COi-:-:'Lj.it~c c c ar~s isti.,;: of. t:I.C ::':Jj. CiA, ~:SA, DIA, ~dHl i.:-:c I'>:iLt,l.r'/ cc.untc:ri:--.'..:cll:;c':c0 ;<:(:nc~':::3 .~,L()i..":~ be ap:)oi:.. ~c(i to :.)Tovicle c-,,·alu<i.cic'ls of GOI7'.cs·.;ic intcll:.';L:;·~":'c. prC})0.TC pc;-:o(iic t1o~c~tic i-:-.tc11i.;c;'.cc l.:s{::r'l~tc.s, ;:1.~G C2.;-"';'j ou~ the o~.. cr oujcc~ivL:s stJccific-o in ~~..; r(;?0:::-~. The n('('(~ [or in.:::~(~.:~;('.d c(Jorclin~~;o~,. jOi:l~ ('~;L:r;"'.;:~tc:;, z.. .....o resJ)o;:.si\'o.!:"'cs~ ~o ~l·.C' ,,'n:.i~c l'i0li.~.>c i~ O~)\'i,-'HS 'C0 t::,: ii1t<.'lli~;~'l~C(; C():1""'1i...:I.. i~'/. Tli.(·r~: ,-;._":,~~ a I:un.... :'c':- 0r' o:JC'·':~':::;::;.~ p:ro:"d(;1i:1~ w:;:Sl~ i1'--:(~~ ~(l he \\'n~·l~('c! (jut si:'.ee :"::-. ~-:')0\',-':' i;~ fe~lrf1..1l 0: ;,:l'': ;~1CC;1::~ ;i:':l:l \'/[lie:. :r',i. :i~ jco~~:(:·(;i:.>::, l".:.:: i".~:";J:'t.):::::. CIA \,/ol:Jd :":'(,[,:1' ;',:i Z.(; ::GC co:-,:..:ni~~L·(' tv ~c\.'" :-,0'.': ~::c ~<:;~:,::~: . WL"Ir:.::·,:, ~J\-~ :-<:.,:.:~. :':.:.(.; lilt; C~: ~,0: :;: lCi,~ \)~. c~:-; ....' C()'::'l;','; "'::',>J.. :,•.,,---:~ '.~ '--. . ..:. l"::IC\..· CI..':ll'l~~.l.-':' :'f~: 1.-"~l"C .... :,;. pr(li~();'~:O:";': tv ~;.(. ~.,,·<,i;;\:Jl:.{:.' d: ')~:'.'~ n~,,_'~·;~~:l).·.:-. ~r-J~ " •.•.•. ;::ll\.~ ~I'", ..::~ ,;.i.);i~,Lr:;~.':;·~ lJ. ~:-,:'~', i:,:('l'-i1~,l ;'.,~'/ .~;;·"".l'_) -..:; t.:,-,. "" •• 198 EXHIBIT :, July 14, 1970 MEMO.RANDUM FOR: MR. HUSTON SUBJECTs, , _", r Domcotic Intelligence Review The rc~ommendation9yOll have proposed as a result of 'tho review' hay" been approved by tha Preoident. He> does not, however, \'/:ll'It to follow 'the procedure you outlin~d on p"agc 4- of your me1l101"anUUm rogarding in~plcr'O.cntation. lIs would prefer tl1<lt 8,,, thing simply be put into motion On the 'basio of this approval. The form:>l oHicial memorandum £hould, of cou:oe, be prcpared. and that should be the device by which to carry H out. I realize this is contrary to yourJcelinz 0.£ t<:{thc best way to get , thia clone. 11 you feel very strongly thai this p.·occclul'e won't work you had better let me know and we'll take another stab at it. Otherwise let's go ahead. H. R. HALDEMAN ' 199 EXHIBIT c\ 23.7 Tom Huston memorandum TilE ',mITE ,iOUSE July 23, 1970 R1Cll\RIJ In'L:,:'", U1PECTOl{ ceJTJ\l\L H;TELLlr,)~;;C:E AGL:;CY S~jj)E(T: DO:II::STIC I:lTELL 'GUiCE The rn~~~idcnt has carefully studi.cd the: Special Report of t.he 1Iltl'L1~'0ncy C'mirl>1ltCC. on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and r.1ade tllC folluwing decisions: 1. l~~_~~-:..-t)vc. Pc;:;tr,1int on Comsnl!niC:Jtio~~J2-~~~ t\ation,d S"cllri t:; C()~ln,i l Tille Lligencl' Directive- ':umb\.Or b (>;SCID-6) Also, coverage of foreign nationals and diplor;laUc CSLlhlisllrncnts in the Vnitcd States of intcrr~it to the in~clljgC'rJcQ_ COf,li;"]\\llity is to be.intensified. 3. ~~vl~_r~. F:cstrictions on legal coverage arc to be l·crrJovcd. !\2strictiollS on covert cO\'L'ra.o;c arC' to be l"p].lxeJ to permit usc of this LL:chniq,--,C' on selected targets of rrior~ty fOfl>ign illtclligencc a\ld internal sCCllrity interest. 4. Sllrrcrti.~_L~2.::-:~.~. l\cstraints 0n the u~c of surreptitious entry ~rc to 1~L' l'cn'()\'cd. 'lhi.' ~cchniquc is to he used to [1rrmi t pn~c\lr~-'r;ICl1t of viLlI])' ]H'cdcu fl)rl,i~;ll crytugr3.phic ILlat,'ri;lJ C1nd against other urgent zll1d high priori ty intcrn.1.1 security l<lrgcts. lise 06875-70 200 -2- 5. Dcvclonmcnt of CAmous Sourcc:s. Coverage of violence~ prone campus and sttldcnt~related groups is to be increased. All restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad is to be inCrt3Scd. 6. Usc of ~filitnrv {Ondercover Agents. Present restrictions arc to be retained. 7. Budg0t and ~lannO\-'cr. Each agency is to submit a detailed estimate as to projl~ctcd m311power needs and other costs required to implement the above decisions. 8. Domestic lntellir;CllCC Operations. A committee consisLil1g of t[lC IJircctors or other arproprinte representatives appointed by the I)ircctors, of the rnI, CIA, ~SA, DIA, and the military counter-intelligence agencies is to be constituted effective Augllst 1, 1970, Lo provide evalu<Jtions of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates) .carry out tIle other objectives Sl)~cificd ill the report) and perform SllCll other duties as the Pro.siclent shall, from Li~le to tim~) .::lssign. The Dircc\.:or of the rLl shall serve as chairnwn of the conUnittee. Furtllcr details on tlle organization and operations of tllis con~ittee arc set fort11 in an attached memorandum. 1ne President has directed that each addressee submit a deti1i1ed report, due on September 1, 1970, or the steps taken to inlplcmcllt tllesc decisions. further such periodic reports \~ill be requested as circumstances ;erit. Tile Prcsidcllt is aware tllat procedural problems may arise in the ,course of im!11emC'llting these decisions. !lo'.·ever, he is anxious that such problems be resolved \vith maximum speed and minimllnl misundcrst;mding. Any difficulties h'hich rna ....· arise sl10uld be brought to my inlJncdiate <lttention in order that ail appropriate soluti~n may be fOllnd and tile President's directives implemented in a manner consistC'nt \"ith his objectives. TO>I CHARLES HUSTOIi AttnchmC"nt cc: The President H. R. 1i.:l1dctnlln 1. reprcscntaLivc~ a t intcllil;encc ClgcnciL'C Air Force. To 201 ~~jnc.linstinct oririn,11 O.RG/);;l/I\TIO;~ t\:\D OPEPJ\TIO:iS OF THE H;TC~J\GE:~CY GiWLTi' O~: !)U:iES1'IC I:\TELLICC;;CE N;D ErrEr::;'\L SECUI,I'{Y (V\C) Thcrlcmbership .shall consi st of 1 C1,\, D]1\, :iSi\. ,Jnd the' cr'untcrof tl12 !)cporlmcnts of the ArnlY, :Iavy, and the high level cOllsideralion of is,olJCS and problC'.:~" :.:1,(' 'Te:;i,:cnt eZi)(:cts to be before t\1'-":' group, the Directors (If tl:<-' live 8.ccncics should serve per:--:onally. 1l0\,'cv~rl if ncceS~,ilr': Jnd iJ[!i1[Urrialcl thc' Dir(:clol';" 0[ a JTCcmbcr agency l::ay dcsibllate nnotllcr individual to serve in his place. 2. The Director of the. Fin shelll serve as chai rmZl,'. He; te ane tiler i neli viduD. L fro,~ hi s agency tv ,<;crvc a~ thl' FliI rC;H"c~;c'1tJ.tivc on the gr(lt\p. 3. The pl\r~osQ of the ?rOUr is to cffect\li1tc communi de "'ltion Clnd Si?curt> Lhe bCllE:'[i ts of CO:lLfllllni ty- \_'iuc dll'; i~ ,lnu ::;ti\;1.1ting. ',:ilen problems ClrisQ ,.,h~,ch involve arCi1S of il1l_'.:::rc,:t to J.gpncic·s or dcpartr.lcnts not mCr:1 1)('fS of the gro:Jr, the:: ~klJ 1 h,' invited, at the discretion of the eroup. to join the group as O)l,C;(:rvcrs ;,mel participants in those discussions of interest to thC"m. Such nr,t'ncies and dcp;ntme:nts inClude the U<:p<lrtments o[ State (1 [. PI l'i1Ssr-,('rt); (IRS, Customs); Justice (ElmO, Cornrnunity I;clations Service), such othc'r agencies ,,'l1ich ffiZly h;we investigative or li1\~ cll[orCPr:10nt responsibilities touching on domestic intelligence or inL~n17tl security matters. 4. I-Jhi te ~l,lY!SQ LiJi_~_:l. TIl(' President has J!'sigllcd to Tom Ch;=trlf>s Huston starr r(·sponsibiLit::-· for domestic intcllihl'nce anu internal security i1fL)irs. He: \... il] participate in all activities of the gro'.Jp os the personal retJl'csentative of the President. 5. Staftj..!~_. TIle group will establish such sub-conunitlees or :..'orking ~rours ;1.<: it deems ,JiJrropriBtc. It I... j 1] nls0 determine and implcr1]C'llt ~\lch ~t,l[(ing rcquircr:10nL:s i1S it may deem Iwccssary to cllabl0 it to carry alit its responsibilities, subject to tIle approval of the Prcsident. 202 . -Retyped from inclistinct orii'inal -2- 6. Duties, The group will have the following duties: (a) Define the specific requirements of member agencies of the Intcllig.-~nce community. (b) Effect close, direct coordination between member agencies. (c) Provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence. Cd) Review policies governing operations in the field of domestic intclligcllce and develop rcco~ncndations. (e) Prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which incorporate the results of tll~ combined efforts of the intelligence cOlnmuni ty. (f) Perform such other duties as the President may from time to tilnc assign. 7. Hectjn:~s. 1nc group shall meet al the call of the Chairman a member agency, or lhe I','hile House representative. 8. Security. Knowledge of the existence and purpose of the group sh,Jl~il(>d on a strict "need to kno\.J fl basis. Operations of, and__ papers originating ',oJi th, the group shall be classified IITop S~cret-Ilandle Via Comint Channels Only./I 9. Othcr ?rocedurcs •• The group shall establish such othE'r procedures ()s it believera. appropriate to the implementation of the duties set for til above. Retyped fro~ indistinct origi1131 203 EXlIIBIT :j ••' '''I ,~,,,o,, ,,~. c.... ,,(, .." II Ul'rrUl ~l',\ IT: Menwrandum W. C. Sullivan ''0 FRO~I '-.~y Mr. C. D. DeLoaCht-J' , / Keference is ~ade to the enclosed memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach dated June 18, 19G9. Mr. IInston did come in yesterday. The first thin~; he said ,';as Ithat he had made a ~istakc in gOlng to !,ir. J. \'Ialt2r YO:l[;ley as Yca(;ley did not SeCI:1 to kno·,'/ anythin~~ about the 1~C'\'l Left. i.:r. Hu~,i.on then went Otl to s~y that President Ili~on called 11im in nild discus~ad 'lith hitn ill some detail th<:] need for the Presid\."nt to J:no',y' in ~~l·C'::t..:r ,depth the ctctail~3 co:",ccrning the.re\'o~utionary activitj·:.s stcra~~j~~'; lirorn the H(>~'i Lett. 1n p<tl.'tic1l1ar, salu Hr. }!ustOD, Pr('~;:!..:lent NJ.;;nn lis i.ntcl"Cst·C rl .in ..,11 ;pfor·'· ... tion possible rcl:ltinr; to 1o~~':i:;n I nIl-tiel S ;\If l.IlC i.ll1alH;.lng oi Lilt.:: j'~\ .. i.-C.i'L. Ii...: ::>a .... u Ut,; \requcstc<1 tlY th~ ~rcsi en ·0 a so go 0 0 er r\em~ers Oi tile 1i.ntclli::CllCC Comrr.unitjO to develop vthatevcr nl:\terials t!lCY may hav0 ithin tllcir jurisdiction. Mr. I~Rton smid that on complctinR his work, ~t will be presented to the Pr0sidonl tor his usc. 1 I told I,;r. I!uston t'hat I was not in any position to rr.ake commitments in this matter, that if he had such a requesL to ma~c i.t would be necess~~ry tor hila to put it i~ writing and ~~ddrl!ss his letter to tIle Director ~ho I:l~d~ the dccis10ns in such ilrCnti. ~tr. Hu':;~Ga !:"id tL!1~ Ile wc~l\~ ~~o Ul..i.S. -~-== --+- --- - -.--:...:..-.-._--- n ECOlI~I).;lm.',T 1011 : Enclosure wcs: Imll I (5) \ \WJ\~ " f\ll\3 ;, l~i'5 ffH 02-685 0 - 76 - 14 \ 1,/ {O/' It' !.,':.;i?Hli111,;('(_ uIiJlf/.·; by ill lllddL!lWI'i;,,(A lJ(;fSOif.-o 204 EXHIBIT Ii TIlE WlI IT 1', 1I0USE WASH [N (: TO:, JWle 20, 1969 HEMOlCi',tlDU:1 FOR -TEe DIReCTOR OF TlIE FEDERi\L BUREAU OF IllY.:: FR011; Tom Ch~rlc~ Hustcn Staff j\SSist"",C to the president The Prccident h"c directc·d that a rc'port on foreign COITL.:v,unist su::-..>?ort of r;;~volutio,1l\ry protest r,~o·.Jer.\~nt:.; in this country be r?r2~)ur~d for his study. He h~~.s sp2cific~11y rc-:::'..:csi:,::d that the rcnart dr.:-;·,¥ U':JO:1 all th2 resourC3S availc.blcto tho::: inteJ.liCj2nc~ conuf.UClity- wod that it b2 as d8tailed ;::c possible. 'Su9port" should be liberally construed to include all nctivi tics by forc.isn COffi.11unists desig:lcd t:O c~1COUrD.g,~ or as!;iist ravolutic:1.J.ry pro~c:3t ItlOvan:cnt5 in tIle UGil~J St2.tc..i. On the basis of earlier re'oorts Gubmittcd to tho Pr8sicJcnt \ on a IT.ore lil;,,:'tcd o.Sr3ct of thi~_; prc;:;lem, it apPQar~ th<:!t O~r . IpI·e5c..~rn:. iU'Lei.ii.SL:;:H..:~ (;u.i..,i.t:.;l.,;i...i.uu l.,.'-'!Ja..u..i..i~~.i.\;:.:.. ';'U ~:J:;"'-:.o l:.....:..:..t:.. -':';",i tbe inQ(I:!quatc.. 'l'hc Prcs~c.~nt \'JOl!ld lik.~ t.o kn,:';l./ ',:i:o'·l,:. r~50\..lrC25 \-/e prc~.~cntly h~'!,~ t2.rS'::-~tc:d tOHhnl r.loni tori l"'.! c:! fO::."'"I'::i.911 Ccr.,I':'",',..:Jd.st. support of rcvolution.:.tr:! :louth 2ct.ivitics i~1 t~li!; ccu::"cry, :·.c'.1 effective "'.:.hc"..l arc, vlh2.l: c..:ups in cur intclliS~41CC C%.::..;t bt..:.:r;,-.;;.:.:c of cithQr inu.d:~(.:uute r-~~ot.\rc~s or a lad prio!:'it:i cr dttcL·d.on, and \·.!hJ.t stor)::; CGu:'d D(; ';:~'~~an, ii h~ directed. to provic.e the ma}~mum possible coverage of th~se activities. J Ito me -.;ould ; 4a1:P._ ! have asked Clh, IlSA, and DIA to submit thei r con tri but,::'C:1CO by I-!l)ndQY, June 30"t..'1. I "Jould a~~')~cciate it if tJ12 Hur::ilU provice ~hcir r2spon9C to the Prcsi~2nt's rcq~est by ~lat Sinc\::: 1-h~ 3urca'..l ;-,Z\S pri~~rj :,,:espmlsib1.1i tv i~ t;.hi5 !.:::.rca, I h'o~ld llke t~ discU3S t:hc mattt.·r further ;-,T.i ..::2 '-'our stJ.if !after ! ha'/(' ho.~ 2..n o:'Dortl:.nit" to e~.'alu2..t2 the initial _ ·:.C0~~=~~~:-:ivnG~ ':'he i.~-'·~'sice!"!t h::.:: :::.ssiS:·:~-= ~ higrl pJ..:.C:"-if;:.r to / tnir> project, and I ""nt to insu::.-c that he receives th~ rr,o:;t conplete report that it is po~siDle to ass~~~lc. -_... - __.:~.:. ..... _";"';~;." ..... .Yo TC&r- "'10m Ch'lrles liu:;ton 205 EXHIBIT 7 O"'U"" '0'" '.., I~ .. ···"IIO"'C. ... " .. ~t .. Ole. '_0 lJ lvlemorandurrl TO ~r. n. C. Sullivan DATI'.: June 30 I lSG9 fRO..... l c. D. Dl'cp.nan\ --,\/ SUI\JEC"I?,.:.~():~];J(;:1 EU~.lfO~'i' !"8:n, ir~·C\'')LlJTJO:!.\ny rncn,'r;,s.1' }.t·'\"J-:~,1E;'iT;-·) Xl; 'J\j:l~ U~Hfir:Q srl'j~'j':CS Tile Di)'(:e:tul' :1IJpl'O\10U r,~y l:1'Jr.~Gi·:ln(~Ulrl of 0/23/G8 rillicIl ;alv;.f,ct.1 ':I;.] \,'c;.~e 1'J."cp:lrin3 n l'C~)(J::..·t f01,' I.jl~. 'i'a:;l C[l;-:l·J.C~~ nl1:-;'~Oi1t f~:-l.;\;; f;:;:;:i.:::;t~;nt to "i.:bo rl'c~d(~C'll"t, nt IUr; l'C(!Il(;~;t rCG~:}.·(:j.r(~ OP~.· c(',\',:."l·~'r::.~ of' fO:J!~..d.Gn cO,.~I.;!Jld[;t SUr;l}ul't 0:( r(!\'LJJ.lft:j,~nr:r·y y,.,;.t"Lh ~(:'~J.V~.t:j.c:_; il~ tile Uilitcc1 [;U',tCf) to }'c:",eh hi1.1 ty G/:~.o/~<:. ,"'..; ~;(:\':i.:--icd l1r o lIu;;;tO!1 f.;L~cll :; l-'\d)O,.~t \:0:1).<.1 l;~ Ic);.' L11c:l':.!iJ~~: 0 Oln' J.'(.·lJ-:,·:,'L ~~c'i;~:.; f()rth tlll.~ tJ.'~;r;.:i.'c:i.(ln;l! erlajiL·.~). 'iv·"'" c(J:.• ,.~',)j~~~~'~ ~:..,u~~~ :~·:t O~~ l'()'.'olutio.l"Y:.' ~~(;t:iv:~'~Y in ~:h:;~; CO~~,;llYY 1,/ l!i(~ C,-;t:tl):t.lr,h.:::(i b:1~';:i.C ).'C·,,:c,1 t',';';)'c;;{',:I:y [. t:i: ~~~'j.' ::r.o~·;:"·j.r:!; (:o:·li\:<,.'\.-jc,n r.\<:ll Hfj ·t;\'.c Cv~,',1'prl3_"""t );~~i~'~'J, f'Y".~ tl',': i~~:~ ::.~:~, ;.(;:;;11 ~~.~\ ~f '; : "~-~ 1:;~ ~'-' ~~~:~: ~,,:: ~ti? ('~;~ c~ J, ~ ~'~:7'~: (~·t; ':'~~ ~ ~ ',_~: lJ': j. 'u': '.~ ;; -[:~ :~' ~ 1;y tJ,r: ~-~;-,·/.i.c~ l';l:i,r;:;, Cll.J~:-( anc! C0',~:qJ)ir.;;: C;;.iL::, I)c;~'~ .\,';~ r.:i!c,' the ll:--~''',''::;)''J l:~l~l:'::.j· '·,r,::i,l;'-.~_; c,f :~.,. ::i:'1 (l:j·,.'c'..:'i.:~;.cn L i.lt:: l~L:i_Jj:;,;c.:1 b:,' rcvc,ll~~:;(.\~)~'j-.i.(;" (,~"'i \;::.·t~ll,;· i: ;'J'y '-:-"t 'L to CO:jC(';~J. tIle):,' IJ~l':l)(l~~"~. ;; I,('ll'~::"'" j,n';';' ";i:~t:;,ll;';~:J \,';t:icl1 ill tl',:i_~~ l<):,.':lc:i (;': );:;"i r :~:,:,: (l;,-;,"\" :,'t,,< r"';'c:,<~ in V~etr';;l' l'~~t \i;L;.ci~ :,):;(~ J.'" 't: '''; P~;l' '~_ t:.i:' r"l.~~ J of.' &::;>,:.·c,/.i_;:~J; Un',j ';','_:(1 ~':1 ;'[1 J' l ',;, j,I, ,."j.l~: .;.. ~;; .',.' 'l';::,' ('.~.~',(' or :.i,!1"t.( "(' i::i ("'~'::: 'i .. " '. J ;',' CC: '·.:i.;.( :;J \,,; JI J'(' ,'c-) t'.l::i (.;l::r~.' ::,j,'lr:,t, ~ ll,.' J> f,' L; l' c~-(,'( ,; ,_, t'< ',:"J'c: .. ,,: '.) th;.;.t;.'''"~ ;~\·;,,'t,c.~ :,1' ,,:',',\' ,'; '~j" f:-:-:'i. ,'I'e il,-,1'( 7.:: t,.',.: (" J:, ')'il:': ':;.~' c' ::'.:r,~ !<~' ',.':i i,l· (', ':>/' ~'::-,; i ~. t '.' (~'-'" :1:..: i' ',.':. : (: ,-. r.;1' l ; . i . .; \ ,; j) ~ , ~ ('(", :.r: II (. /n 1 ( , ~ II / CII ( HjJl)i'('l:u! the F~l ~ : " ' 206 Memorn"c1uD to Mr. n. C. SuIliv"" RE: FOrmiCI SUpr0:~'1' FOIl 1:r;voUrno::MlY pr:OrLST 1l0VEiD';i; 1'5 In 'nH'; V;Yl'iTD S'lJ:,'i'i:S Our rcpo~~t sl!ovs tllat tIle FDI h~s bOCI) aware fro]~ the il1ccptiol1 of tI:e new Loft rtnd blncl: cxtrOJ:dfjt r::OVCl.iCl'lts th,a t tl 1 ('y pO:-.>;J now ~:Ilc1 unique tlD:C..'~l ts to Ollt' intcl"Jl:1 1. scc:.n'i ty. It shO',,';::i \:.:::: b:::.vc l'C:\(1jl\E~lC'cl our invcst:i,catj,V0 intc~lli~encc cffu)'t" to C()P~ ,:,i ti> tile ncw proble",,:; C)'c;',tcc1. It c:tl·c';~:CS tile :L.';l.r;t tll::.t these.: J.10VcI:l':'nt~; al~C clcvc:top:~jl~ inc)'.·c:-(;:.iill:~ly into J):,rd~,co.L'C r(;vc,ll1tiu;l~l'Y cleJ;)ciltf3 Y/hich \'!:l.ll <:Cl":"\.lHl ~ti.1J. C\'c~1c).' il.~~tc.:nLi(u ill the :[01.'11\ of inc!'c~l.scCt C()\'~:t~tL() as it ~PPC~)·f.; the_\'(~ viil be incl'c~'fjln~~ly c],o;.:er Ij.n;;:r; 1;~;L;:/ccll th'.:DC JI~ovc::,:-.:'nt!; :'.nd IOl'ciC"ll ca!;;;:nnjsts in tIle JU·tlll'Co Yia hc~vc 1n'';';[":11'(;(1 f\ t:.:~ni-;;'tlit-U,~l lottt:l' to i,;r. J!.T.'.:-;l-t·n sLd:;::U:.i:Jn: (j','L' rc~"'c\~_'l. In'\8!lL1.<.:h r.~; th:l0 {1(~~t.·;~':;'J.t, j,~.: no~ [;o:1..n::,: (;j).'C[;t.l_~, ~LO U:r; l",~:c:' U:.Clj-~.; no COL})' i~;: L:..:j,n.=:; ;0).'r:.:~r{:cd to the l\tt(l:"·LI-"~:>1 Gcr:~~:'.';ll r'. '\., thir;; t:i.l::~ 0 '1ith yo~r,' ~.;"·;lY'.·C·,.':'.lJ the ntb,chcc1. l"_·P~.Y~.'~: ~~!':l lc·Ll.(;I.' ,)ill L:.: J.cI\"""-':"L~C;(; -LO ]:\'0 lJ.l":~~~:O;lo 'jJ J i :1) DATE, June 5, 1970 .,,-'- J TO fROM SUBJECT- 207 EXHIBIT rI 0'''0'''\ _co., ..", 10 ...... ·"1 IO"'.~·' ,a"Cl" "_,, .", l' UNiTED STATES GOVLR:-<~lENT Memorandum -~~ ~Ir. DeLoaChi--- W.C. sUllivan~\0 r~;TEIlt'\Gr:~;CY CO:.~~IITI=I': 0\' I::T:::LLIGE~iC;: (EST,\DLISJiLlJ DY THS PRiSIDL;;T 0:. JU;;L 5, 1970) This memorandum is for the record and for possible reference use by the Director. Followin~ his conference with the President this morniilg, the Director advised me that the President had appointed him C!lairmall of a special Intclligcllcc Co~mittec for the pUI"rOSe of coordin~tijlg u more f?ffcctivc intelligcf!cc- ~~~~~~irit~ ~ ~-~ ~~%:;:~s~i-"-~~'f-( 2~1:0-;~,~~Ti~~:f'-:~:,,~~;;~~-;;~~~:-='~u.. (NSA) and the DefC:l~so Intelligence .-1gency (DIJ\) t_QJp~':':~-.-I.l!2J_ comprehensive in~ormati~n is bci.nt; obtai~~ed fDr ":l1c :?r'c3iG(:~~~ 'IS ""ii"SC\~'j)ich-'::1:rr-p;:»vici0"lii;--wi ill"~ '~'orld-~'."icle pic t'...ir2 --of ~:cw Lpi t ~ersu5Verslve~-;'Ci'J.:'i1t·i2-s. .; ..._-".....-.- ,' .................__._. _._. The Director advised r.1e that among those present :>t the meeting 'i'tith the President \"/ere Rich~rd Helms, Director of the cn; Adr.1iral ;locl A. ~.I. Gayler, head of tile ::5A; General Donald V. 8ennett, head of the DIll; and :.Ir. T. C. Huston, White Staff. Assistant. all of whom the Presid",,,t had designated La serve on the Co,wittee under the direction of the Director. .\ddi tionally. there v,a:e present A",sist~nt to the President H. R. Haldeman; John D. Ehrliehmlll1, ,\ssistant to th,e President for Do~stic Affairs; ~rld Robert H. 5incil, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The Director stated he waI'ted immediate action on this. He advised me that he wanted all of the men on the Committee contacted and instructed to be in his office for a Committee r:Jeetin~ at 11:00 a.m. "londay morning, 6/3/70. This has been arr~nged and has been made the subject of a sely~ne memorandum. IIlIb ;) 1975 FBI, '-I' 'Cf) Fno~ ~ .. C \' ,- 1\ It"lI:') document is prepared in nspnli.''I(' to you)" rUTII("" (t1lrf is not for di:!~(mi- ?1nfiou nllf.~idr. 1/0 11 " COJl)/lliU('I'. It.::; /'.'-:/' i.~ hli,:"fn11fl 'J/:'j,'iul JU·(J('erdiilf}., by YOllr CIl/lUI/,",'I'( ((/lr! thr (lJ,'I!"'lt nil!.!! liot ;1( 1/,:,,(",108/:1 t.!! u"l(l,'illturi~LJ ))1:1"::1)1;'. lid .lriU/Jjut Ihe C,i:!)},f':;',-j Ui'iJ1·01:f(l of the FDI • 208 Memor~ndul" to :.11'. DeLo~ch fiE: I:'ITEI:Ci GE:'ICY CO:.::.j ITTEE ON gTELLIGE' Ii:; (ESTABLISHED 131' TlIE PllESIllE:;T 0;.1 J1J,;j. S, 1970) The Director also instructed that a working committee meeting comprising the same individuals should be scheduled for Tuesdny, June 9, and he instructed me to serve in his place at that rlc~tin~ to illSU1'C that the instl'uc:tions he issues to the C0Plr;lit~..... t'0 ()il ':o!ic.L1Y ~!l"e c~l1'l'icct thr()t';;ll in sr;ecif.ic Jct.:1il by mcn~)cl's of the Committee on Tu()sday. Arrangements have also ) been made for this meeting to be held Tuesday afternoon at 3:30 p.m. utilizing the facilities of tho United States Intelligence Board conference rooms. The Director further instructed that this working \ committce should henceforth meet each Tuesday and Friday for the purpoGe of implementing his instructiO. ns with the aim of cOf,'plctil1;; a draft paper by June ~2. 1970, which the Director and others may review £02' approval afid 8i;:;n prior to its presentation to the President on July 1, 1970. Arrangements for this will be imple~ented at the working committee meeting on Tuesd"y, June 9, 1970. The Director will be promptly furnished with a report on each meeting. . RECO:.;:.IEmJi\TION: For the information of the Director and for the record. !it.Cu.. - 2 - FOI 209 EXHIBIT ~I 0";0"·"0'''''0 .Q .... ""ID'''C .. O~ClI" lie; "0 11 UNlTED STAITS GOVLR",\lE:'<'T M er[wrandurn ROUTE IN E~VELOPE DATL " TO FROM 1lr, DCLoacrfG"~ \ W" '6, S~;liv:n .-/''\ INTE[u\GE;:CY CO:,f:,:ITTEB 0'1 n;TELLIGE:;CE (ESTABLISIIED BY THE PRESIDEii1', JUNE 5, June 5, 1970 1970) Pursuant to the Director's instructions and relative to his role as head of the above-captioned Committee, I have set up a meeting to take place in the Director's oifice at 11 am -Mon-d--a-y.,_-6-/-8-/-70-. ------ I talked personally to the following individuals who will be there; ;,Ir. Richard Helms. Director of the Central Intelligence A;ency, General Donaid V, Dennett, Director oi the Defense Intelligence Agency; Admiral Noel Gaylor, Director of the National SeCUrI,ty Ji~ency; and ;"rr, Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to the President at the White House, The first three mentioned indicated they would like to take one of their assistants with them; however, they had not decided which one, therefore, the names arc not available. As soon as they make the decision, 1 will submit the names of these assistants in a separate memorandum. The details for the worked out, At this point it 3:30 pm on Tuesday aiternOQn, 1;cpara te memorandum. -"-'- RECm,MENDATION: meeting of the workin~ grou~ are beinb is expected 'it'will be' held at This also will be the subject oi ~r the information of the Dire~tor. , ~ I'/CS:chs' 5) r: f{ I' u v' 210 , '="'UO-< .... Kl·· ...O':; --__"Ul.e",,,.. . OLo. at .. "" "0 P UNITED ST.\TLS (;C :IZ~~IE~T TO Memorandum ;- Mr. C. D. DeLoach DATE, 6/6/70 FROM SURJECT: , /" W~,\' Sull~ rNTER.\GE~:CY I~rT::'!.JLI C=;C::; Cr;~j~·lITTE'C (Established By The President June::;, 1970) Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated June 5, 1970, c~ptioncd as ~bove which indicated that the Director will meet with the heads of the Central Intelli~ence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and a representative of the iihite l!ollse staff in the Director's off~ce, at 11:00 a.m. 6-8-70. In accordance with the Director's instructions I will be present. Unless there is an obJection I will have with me Mr. C. D. Brennan, Chief of the Internal Securitv Section which w111 have the responsibility of preparing o~r portion of the report on the New Left and related matters. I believe Mr. Brennan should hear and will benefit from the Director's remarks. I have been advised that as of this date the headS 1 of the other a~encies do not now plan to have any of their assistants with them. excent Admiral Gaylor Of NSA who will bring nn assistant, Benson Buffram. It occurred to me tbat in addition to the remarks Ithe Director has in mind he may wish to give consideration to some of the major points in the enclosed statement prepared for him. . _ RECmr.H:NDATION: That this memorandum aDd the enclosed statement be furnished to the Director. h A Enclosure ICS:Sal (6) ICEI." f nI , This dnC1I~~l(Ht ,',r; rlOUnn (1/ilsil,'e ~I'!/!i' 1Jour Cl)/)!)liiU((' ~",d ncl ~t'~t1Wilt tJu CXi')'{ ;jw' om,1 is lin! for rlisscmitn nfI:,;d ,ll1f)('('('dill!fS hy )),)[ /.:' l:: l'losctl to llJillllf};ori;l'I.l pcnWllU: e Fi.n • 211 INTE~GENCY INTELLIGENCE COmlITTEE MEETING I am sure you gentlemen will all a~ree with me that our meetin~ with the President on Friday was of very special significance. The President clearly reco~nizes that we are confronted today with unicttn n,nel ('(1~Dlcx ~rohlcms arisin~ fran sub'/c:-si'/e ~cti.viIi'_:s 011 ~'.11 lIll::}l'lJatlUJ1:-tl scale. There is a distinct relationsbip between these activities and much of the disorder and violence which increasingly threatens our internal security. The President made it abundantly clear that he expects us, as memhers of the intelligence community, to do more than we have been doing to bring the worldwide picture of these problems into better perspective for bim. Having been designated by~he President as Chairman of the COl1lillittee to meet this challenge, I feel a special responsibility. First, I would like to state that I agree completely with the President's view of the situation. Consider what has transpired in the 1960s. We have witnessed the emergence of Widespread racial unrest Wllich threaJ;"ns to grow much worse before it gets better. We have also seen the emergence of a new left militancy which has consltuted ~lmaSSive mob rule in a.ction. From what we have learn"d to date 'it is apparent these are not solely domestic problems. There are definite foreign links to our domestic disorders. \ Yet, the foreign aspect of the problem is different than that which we experienced in the past. Prior to the 1960s, foreign-directed intelligence and espionage activities constituted the main thrl!a t to our security. \'Ie in the intelligence community geared ourselves accordingly and met that problem successfully. We coordinated our activities in doing so. But the nature of the problem ~~s such that it left us to a marked degree free to operate independently in regard to our respective problem areas. Today, it is mandatory that we recognize the changed .nature of the problem confronting us. Unless we do so, ~e will be incapable of fulfilling the responsibility levied upon us by the President. The plain fact is that there currently are thousands of individuals inside this country who want to see our form 01 government destroyed. They have in fact pledged themselves CEIVE,yu~~toWJto achieving this goal. They have put their words ~JG 5 1':J/,) r n I 212 into actions constitutillb revolutioDary terrorirt!n, and thetotal effect of their ac~ions to date has been disasterous. In addi tion, they are reaching out seeking supportfrom this nation's enemies abroad to further their objectives. Thus the links to Cub,,-, Chiua, and Iron Curt"in countries already have boen established and pro:nisc to ~row because of the equa.l de tf..:'rmj.i~~tjon of various :i.~ tC:"T~:itiJJIl:ll COJil.'"!Jcnist elements to destroy our form of government. In contrast to the rigidly structured subversive organizations of past experience, the current subversive forces threatenins us constitute widespread, disjointed, and varied autonomous elements, the destructive potential of which 16 manifold. Individually, those of us in the intelli~encc community are relatively small and li~itcd. Unified, our own combined poten~ial is magnified and li_:r:itless. It is througb unity of action that we can tremendously increase our 1ntelligence-r;atherinr,- potential and, I am certain, obtain tbe answers the President wants. I RIll establishing a working COIiilili ttee to insure that we achieve the desired unity. It will be the job of the co~nittee to (1) assess the overall nature of the problem as we know it today, (2) examine indiVidually and together the respective resources of each Agency to inS1Jre fU].l utilization of them for the benefit of all, and (3) devise coordinated procedures desi~ned to penetrate the current nebulous areas of subversive activities here and abroad as they relate to our domestic_problems. The first meeting is set for tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, June 9th, and you have been furnished the details as to the time and place. The working comnittee will hereafter meet each Tuesday and Friday for the purpose of preparing a comprehensive studym be completed in rough draft form by June 22, 1970, for presentation to the President on July 1, 1970, 1n final form. ThIs should serve as the foundation of our conunittee's existence and purpose and as the basis for a coordinated intelligence effort best sui~ed to serve the country's interest at this time of crisis • ..~~EIVED FROM ') AUG ;) L-Jlli' - 2 - 213 EXHIBIT 10 0"10'''',,1 ro.....o 10 out '''I """0" 0 .... 010.1110 N'J If UNJTED STAlES GOVER0i,IE:-iT Mr. Melnorandum DeLD1v-' r DATE: JUlie 8, 1970 fROM W. C. Sullivan JSUDJfGT: INTEllAGE"CY CO: ::.lITTEE 0:, I::TELLI C:;:'C;:; (ESTAI3LIS:lliD I3Y THE PllliSlDSl'T, JUNE 5, 1(70) lIEETING IN DIRECTOR'S Ol'FICE, 11 AM, JUNE 8, 1970 This memorandum is to record meeting of captioned Committee in the Director's Office 11 am, nlonday, 6/8/70, which was chaired by the Director ,vi th the following persons present: j\lr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence A'?;ency (CIA); General Donald V. Bennett, Director of the Defense Intelli~ence l\geney (DIA); ,\dmiral Noel Gaylor, Director of the National Security A~ency (tiSA); and his Assisto.nt ~,rr. I3~nson K. Buffham; ~1r. Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to the President at the White House; as well as Uacial Intelligence Section Cllief George C. Moore and myself, The Director pointed out to the Committee that the President, in establishing this special intelligence Co~~itt~e, recognized definite problems arising from subversive ac~ivi~ics on the intern"tional scale and expect:ed the tommittee to coordin"te and plan so th"t the world-wide picture could be better brought into perspective for the President. The Director stated that he well recognized dIe importance of the worl, of this Committee and he state(, that along wLth organized crime this is equally important," The Director further cOJ11Mented concerninr, the foreir;n aspe of today's subversive domestic problem aLQ stated that prior to the 1960's, the main threat to our security vns foreign-directed intelli gence espionage activities but today we iliave a differGnt problem marked by hi~nly organized dissident groups seeking to destroy our form of Government. r.·r < ','):: !.:~'... ~ : -' J.,j < '·'''~~1i.'C' NAllO:,'.\L :;,. .. ,-- :11 ; 1:: : •t ~ ,I Sliljcd to Xu-outlining the work of the ODmmittee, the Director poin' lout: (1) The situation should be thorau g. hl.y explored to determine, exactly what the problem is. (2) E"ch agency must explore the facili ties whicll must: and can be used UJ oroer to develop facts for a true intelligence picture. The D~rector noted the President l!Ientioned restrictions which were halnpeJTi.nr, our intelligence opera;: and; accordingly we should list for the 'resident in detail such /lOti;>, t}"/ ·WCS :chs t5). \·'1fV" ';'.'=--":.A.. ", ' ~.\, . d,,; I: l L'X, (".lli'r',lry' a.,,; u. "~'l ... ,,, •.•• .I .• ~ .. 11'.I ..d~~ ------- .........\ ..... ,.I,.',l,,,,l 214 Memor~ndun to \~. DeLoach RE: Il;TERAGE;;CY CO:,-'IITTZE 0:; I:iTELLlc,ncr; (ESTADLISI';::D BY TIrE PICESID':::T, clUNE 5, 1070) MEETING IN DIHECTOn'S OF1'IC;;, 11 AI,!, :1,';'1' 8, 1970 restraints and restrictions to~cther with tp, pros and cons involved so th3.t th~ 1>'"·,:sic1.':::!1t ('::.n n:.:kc :t r~:cci~:io;l ~~ .,0 \'.'hich or.03 :)houLd '.Jc utilized. (3) Til" Director s""ted it \'1"'; "'c:ot il"portant t:l"t tile foreiGn connections of domestic problems b~ ~cternlincd pointiJlg out that we know Cuba, Red China and the Soviet-bloc are deeply in the picture. The Director also co~~cntcd the i,p~rtance of ascertaining what is h:J.ppen~ng in foreign countries conc~rrling this same subversive problem a.nd ho~'; it has been denl t \Vi th by ~J!,);:;a countries; for example, the Director mentioned that tl1e W::-"~Li..~l· cannon had been used most effectively against the hippies in Pa~is, as well as elsewh"re and maybe the application of this tactic si:ould receive consideration. In this rebard, th0 Director cOtu"ented the-,,~cture of what ceoes on abroad woula more appropriately come within the purview of the CIA, VIA and NSA. The Director stated he was esta hI ishing a\yor1';~ing subcommittee hCide-d-b~r--11s'sTsiant-Dlrcctor\/illi::;:l C.--Sullivan ~nd composed -of'" dcsi;n;tcd representatives of tile G-ther 3f-:,encies present d'mltTlc-fi-rst'"c0tin~would' he at 3:30 prn; G/9/70 at the U. S. rnl:~(frlt~cnce 'Co::ll'd ~rce t in::j Roon and subs011u0nt there to 3 me0 t:i nfr womd-ba,t:"lcl cvcn~ Tuesday <lnd .!'riday in ord0r to d,-aw together the raw'material in order to' present a final report to captioned CO',lJ'll.ttee ror- scrutiny and evalLla tion Oil 6/22/70. The submission of the final repareto-the President will be on 6/30 or 7/1/70. The Director emphasized it was most vital that all agencies give this ma~ter top priority. Following the Director's initial remarks, those officials present commented that the aims and :joals presented by the Di"'ec~or were realistic and that all present would cooperate in the fullest in getting organized and getting on with the highly important task which faces the special Committee. ' During the discussion all agreed that the initial primary problem facing the Committee was to concentrate, upon methodology in intelligence collection. The Director stated althou~h brevity is the ReY;-ll detailed listing of all the ite'11s which are currently obstructing the FBI and other intelligence agencies in attaining their goals must be set out clearly with pros and cons so that the President is able to make a determination as to what j:e is willin~ to let us do. 'I' Some.?f ,the,nl1\a tters to be considered in this regard mentioned by the \.}~_I ;':' :.J I;; ':.: j''il ~ BI 2 CONTINUED - OVEn 215 Memorandum to :,lr. DeLoach HE: INTElL\GE;;CY CO'::IITTZE ON INTELLIGE;;CE (ESTABLISHED BY TIl!: PJ','.:SIDI;;;T, JU;m 5, 1970) MEETING INDIllECTOfi'S OFFICE, 11 AM, JUNE 8, 1970 Director were: ___ (2) limitations on telephone surveillances and It was agreed that the President is extremely anxious for the utmost degree of cooperation among all the agenc~es in COOrdination of this matter and the Director pointed out that there is certainly no problem with respect to coordination and the Director wanted it understood that the President expects t~_gro_uI:._,!.?_wo,:k together_.ll~~y,a~~ ---------. At the close of the meeting, the Director n~ain emphnsized that the importance of this matter dicta-fcd that ,,~ch agency put its top llXperts to worJ, on this ma tter and thn tit be ,:iven the highest priority in order that this deadline is met as expected by the President. ACTION: You will be advised as to the results of the meeting of the working committee which taJ,es place tomorrow, 6/9/70, at 3:30 pm. /~;~"- - 3 - 216 on'O'O.&I .0..... 0 ,p ..... \.. "0'''0.. O"'C;'" ,j<;"O 11 UNITEll S'L\TES GOVERN~lENT Memorandum TO 6/8/70 FROM 11'. C. SULLIVtgi, ~P SUBJECT INTEMGF.?lCY co:·::! ITT:;r; 0:, !:!T:LLIGE:/CE (ESTABLISHED BY TIlE PIlESIDl::NT, JUNE 5, 1970) , i My memorandum 6/5/70 advised that the details for the meeting of the working group of captioned committee are being worked out. Arrange~ents have been made for the working group to meet in the United States Intelli~ence Board Conference Room at 3:30 p.m., Tuesday afternoon, 6/9/70. -As of this time, the folloWlng members have been designated: FBI - Mr. William C. Sullivan .••.Aetin~ for the Director CIA - Mr. Richard Helms, Director of CIA Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA DIA - The Defense Intelligence Agency lOlA) member has not yet been designated. In addition to the DIA member, there will be representatives from each of the three military services - Army, Navy, and Air Force. NSA - Mr. Benson K. Buffham. White House - Mr. TOOl C. Huston, Staff Assistant to the Pre~ident. Arrangements have been made for use of the Conference Room and all of the above members have confirmed their attendance. When the DIA representatives arc designated, you will be advised. ACTION: For information . . ,.1, . Ratl:hke I ' (6) RECL! ThL"i d(,c~II))rd 1''<; ,Jotio/l o[/lsi·,If' ~ l.'1('~ !I,l/l/' c;0ii/ ,;; i 'I, - ud j('dltold ti,e FiB Yflp/od (Iud is /lot in/" <!isscmi( ·,·".'.:'I'.! til nf/;"cil:! i)J'(l('udiw/s by iJ,';1 "I,' ,,'i;;d;'~C(l to 1I/:'-I1IUtOri:I.;t! IlCj'SOnUI": FiJi. 217 .... ".,· .• " .• _··v ...... 'fOllo"'O" 1Il1AC.1 .. IIO:;"O " UNITED STATES L,J\'El{i'i~IENT / TO DATE, 6/9/70 FROM W. C. SULLIVAN SUBJECT . INTEMGEl\CY Cml'.nTTEE ON IliTELLIGENCE (ESTAI3LIS!iiCu BY THE Pi'.ESIDEIIT, JUliE 5, 1970) My Dlcmor;lndum 6(8(70 set forth the membel's of the working group of captioned committee, which will hold its first meeting in the United States Intelligence Board Conference Room at 3:30 p.m., Tuesday, 6(9(70, with the exception of the Defense IntelLigence Agency members. Set forth below are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) working group member and the member from each of the three military services. The additional names listed ar~ the alternates for each of the agencies. DIA - Mr. James E. Stilwell, Deputy Chief, Office of Counterintelligence ,and Security, D!A Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Philbrick Army - Colonel John W. Downie, Director of Security, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army 111'. Elihu Braunstein Navy - Captain Edward G. l'lifenburgh, Director, Naval Investigative Service, Naval Intelligence Command 111'. Harry Warren Air Force - Colonel ,Rudolph C. Koller, Jr., Commander, 1127 U.S, Field Activities Group, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air force Colonel D. E. Walker ACTION: ~l.clI! ill i'('~j;)~:_,:;;r In '1I;;li' I'r~,~."1;~~ ~',//~:,;:~~/,~:~r\~~I;_';:':'~;~,:I;~;i; (r, I:,' I,IU" ;,"1),1,' i::Lhs(;,~ to Uj;~ULUiOj'i;.cl ;;<;/,SO/JC? l)r(,j~' (I!)/),'o,:al o[ iiie FiJI. -' i Ex2JlSIT 11 .~c.~.("""G .. ~1f 'Jt'ITEl) ST,\ITS (;, 1:J~·'A ,~,,,~- Nfemorandjm -- ) Sf'~ Mr. C. D. DeLo'lQ) JUllC 10, IS70 .',OM Mr. 1';. C. Sullivan f? ""JECT, -INTET',,"GE::CY CO:::HTTEE 0" INTELLIGENCE (ES'l'I.LLIS:I~S ~.~' 'IT::: r:~:~SI[;=:~T ,!L'::~': 5, lcno) MEJ::'i'Il;G Oi" Till: ;;Oi'.KING SUDCO;,;;,iIT1'EE JUlIE 9, 1910 (" This memorandum records the results of the Workin[ . Subc'ommittee meetinrr on June 9. 1970. l.lr. Tom C. Huston, \'lhitGlro-us~spelleQ-out-tlfe'des1rcs of the President, iurnishin~ members with 3. IlTop Sccrct ll outline (copy "ttached), This outlino adc.Jl'esses itself to the Purp""", Membership, Pl'OCeClUl'eS, and Objectives of~the Committee's Revi!?\'!. In his 02'al pr-(?sent~tioll, Huston clilphasizecJ the President was not interested in bein~ told what the current problem is, but rather what the iuture p:'oblc:7Is will be and whnt must. hp. rlnnp "tn ("'("'\l1n"l:",?!" them. Be stressed tile Corr,mittee should orovidc the President with the pros a:-ld COIlS of any restraints so that he can decide ,"'),at action is to be t~ken. It was aGreed that all papers and reports prepared by the COP'J7li ttee will be classified "Top Secret - irandle Via COl~int Channels Onlv" bec3use of the President's desire that the existence and worii of the Co",,,,i ttee be tightly controlled, (The' refercl"ce to Comint Channels reters to cor:J..111unicntions intelligence and insures that this natter will be handled in a secure manner.) At the meeting various members discussed the restraint! currently in eifect which limit the community's ability to deveioD the neccssnry intolli;cnce. In accordance with the Presidcil~IS . instructions, the next meeting of tIle 'Jorking Silbcomlnittce w111 consider all res,r~ints rescricting intelligence collection efforts across the board, as well as sub:nissiollS on defining and asseSSIng the existing in~ernal security threat, both dO::lestic and iC'l'eiga. It was agreDd that the Worl,ing Subco:,lnittce would next ) meet at 1;30 p.m., June 12, 1970, in the Confer-ence Room of the U. S. Intellic;conce Goard. Results of this meeting will be promptly furnished the Director. ~ ~~. '. - , 1,,:dLI\;'tl.. l.l ; •• ..; .... ..J 21\) t"~}~r:-:.3 (l7":C-7 lliI';';;:'W.::5;';' C:'~.::J II.')=~ G:'l I)(f:':L.LlC '-,let: (l:.a of 10 • • !Ii" , ';U04 9, ] :17' Ttll I PJ", u1.11L:"':1 C. ~>~11~..:~n 2J):'.. LI')~: '. l ;i .:' (.-: ~;::;: :'J i~ro r~Dl':~C c~ Z;n~!~ Ur. \lilli:~", o. C~r Ur. FN<! J. G.c:>1dy / Colol101 Jo14~ 1l ~nlo LXII""' t't",:;:nt vt tt'~:J r,," ,;,,'1" '; C:p't,.'l,ia M~ ..<f Q. P,1f~bur:lb JI i' ,j j .' ' , ,iJ(j 5 19l.atr. l!clrry ii:\rNa I r 8,1 ,;, 'ClIilll'id is 'or alii :;d,. 62-685 0 - 76 - 15 )10,' fnr II) "'r!'rii,'" to /l,;r((It)'Oi'i~~l:'o:zrrnrol'J) _ \JYU · 220 :""'p"rt::"ut of too AIr L"orc-e / Col'-,nol !hIdolph C. l,n1..", Jr, nil t lOW' 1 ~"QtJ ritz A,,,>n.cZ 'IIr, 'DaI1flO<l K. EUf!halll Ilr. J .....os Olrn"!"1c:rr IIh 1to llo\l:lt'l ~ ~r. Too C, tt4~ton Phaoo: CaGe 14~. J:xtemllon ::l~,~7 ,: I '. 'J 1-1)01111 11._ ... _11_'. \ 111 f.U I. 221 lCI -I June 10, 1970 IIITERAGKllCY CO\UlITT&~ Oil INTELLIGEliCE 'II0RlUl'(i SUD(X)I[}lIrrn Il1nut ... of Flr.t It""tlni Roo. 7&-26. CIA Ulladqu.rt .. r. Bulldlni June 9, 1970, 3:30 to 4 p .•. 1I'1l11u C. Sullivan A•• ll1'tant DIrector, Fed'll·.l Bureau of Inv•• tIgatlon Pruldlng IIn1BJIUl PR.ESIiNT IIr. RIcbard Hel.II, DCI Mr. J~. An~l~ton, CIA IIr. J ...... StII ...ell. DIA Col. John Doon,le, Aruy Col. Rudolpb r.olillr, Air Yorce ~r. To. C. Huston, ~it~ Ho~se Capt. E~ard Rlfenburgb. ~avy Mr. BonAon r.. Buffb •• , N3A IIr. Goorie C. ~oor", FRI IIr. Donald Ii. lloor~, rBI IIr. 'IIllll~ O. Creiar, rBI, Secretary Ob.erverll: IIr. Charl .. 11 Bither, OSI Lt. Col. Donald r. PhIlbrIck, DIA IIr. ElIhu Br~uDllteln, ~rwy IIr. Harry ~arren, Hav7 Col. D. K. 'IIal~er. Air Force IIr. Ja.e. ~n~ler, H3h IIr. Leonard J. Nunno, ~3A IIr. Fred J. C.IIDldy, YBI I) i~ "[:1' li~ ') f.!)OM 1\,_" _I \s L.' \ I,V') 'oJ l'J1i FB I' Gro\H' 1 Excl~d.d fro~ nuto•• tlc dOYDgrad'ni. allfl d..cl~ .... I!1catlon NATIONAL SECUTIITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal S~nctions ( I 222 ICI-II-1 ,JlIlle 10, 1970 I. Pretatory.Rem.rk • . Pr.ofator,. r"...ru ot 1l'1l11 ... C. Sulllv.n clrcu!at .. d to .11 ~ea~rR at the "oetlng. 2. Bacl:grouod to the Crnntlon ot COllZ11tte" '. Hr.. Toa C. Hu~ton ot the White Hou6e brlefed the Co..1 t tee on the PreA 1den t "8 concern over the eme r Renee 0 t the threat (ro. sporadlc violonce and a08rchls. !ro. the New Lett, as well a8 the Pre~1dcDt'B concern a8 to whether the Intelligence coaauolty l~ doln~ everythlnR po~~lble to cope vltb the problem. Ur. HURton "aph.slzed thal aD effort QURt be Dade tor co~unlty-v1de analys1s and a88e88~eDt of lntor~. t10D 80 as to be in a position to .dvl~e the President QA ~o _hat 18 KolDg to happen In the Cuture and .hat PODltlon the Intelllgence co~munlty will he In to be ••are of thoRe' dovoloPDBntn. ~n outline deClnlng the purpose and aeaberahlp at the COg~lltee, as well 88 procedures and obJectlve~ or tbe Comalltec's review, WaB dlDtrlbuted at the meeting by Ur. Ruston. 3. ClaDeltlcatloD U.ttors The Ch.lman .sked tor co~meDte reg.rdlDg the level at ClasslflcatloD for pa~rs or reports prepared by the Coumlttee. Yr. Buttha.. oC NSA suggoRted the adoption at • code word. Art~r no.e dlscuRRlon, Yr. HelDA, Director of CI~, reco.....endod the cl.ssUlcatfon "Top Secret - Handle ·U. Co",nt Ch.nnels Only." In addition, Ur. Rolea Bu~~eBted the M.'nteaaace or a "BIl!"ot List" reflecting the nUl"" of all per"onn In each .eaber _gency or depart~ent who v111 .ork on or have kaovledge ot the work of the Co..111ee. The CoUftlttee unaniDously concurred In adopt1ng both euggestlona." -lIe.bers "re requesled to furnl"h their "Blgol List" to the Secretary .t the aeotlni ot June 12, 1970. R~f.EI\frn mOM ( - 2 - FBI 223 4. Requlro~~DtD tor Hoxt B~otlnR l~ wa~ .Rr~)~d tb&t ut the uext m~etlnR ~~nberi ~\ll ta~le a liBt ot tho~e rfl~tT.iDtR ~hicb tbey cOnBtdcr b~por their lnt~lll~enco-collection Actlvltl~~. Tue lIst 8ho~ld include the pros ~d co~ ot theee reatralnts <.lIr. Butth •• noted that In the outlln" dilltributod by IIr: Huston the Co",.tttee "<U'I called UPOn to define nud atJGess.the eXlntlc~ internAl Aocurlty tllreAt ~lr. f"hJrrbn...:3 Celt tblu 'ifll~ pon... tht:1"': th."l.t ~)'h)'Jld b,) ~~C':--~~~'d un In:::'i~dlRt(tlr by tho e;o:p-orts fro~. r.ha r:-.")nl~CT ~r:c.ncl(\A or depfl.rt::aentlJ. IIr. UURton sUKKoated that the FBI prepare 8uch a paper from tho doaeGtlc st~ndpoint and CIA tro= the foreign standpoint. All .e~bor8 concurrad. and it _as aKreed CIA aod fBI .111 d1stribute theme pK~r9 tor tbe Co-mittee'B conslderatloQ at the next .eeting .. 5. Security ot Co~lttee'a Work UellberB ton\;( co~nl7.1\nce of the nece~H~ 1 ty tor t.iErtlt 80curlty to iouure the eXl~tcnce and vork of the COftA1tt~e not be-collo ~DOttD to uoauthor1.2:ed POI'AOOB. As a rePiult, it WLII aKr~ed that the COQ~itloe Yould continue to meet 10 the CIA Headquarters Ouilding. 6. Next tlcet lng The next .. oetinll ..,ill be at 1:30 p .•.• June 12, 1970, Rooa 7D~6~. CIA ll.adqu~rters Building." .WeBbers plcae~ note (:h~nga 1n roo_ Dunber. ::i~EIVED mOM - 3. - 224 EXHIBIT 12 TOP SECRL USIB SUB-COM}'lITTEE ON DOMESTJC_lJ"iT..F:LLTGEN<?E 1. Purpose (A) To defi'le and assess the existing internal security threat. (B) To evaluate the collection procc()ures <'nd techniques presently employed. and to assess their effectiveness. (C)· To identify gaps in our present collection efforts and recommend steps to close these gaps. (D) To review current procedures for inter-community coordination and cooperation and to recommend steps to improve these procedures. (E) To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence data and to recorr1!Tlcnd procedures to increase' both its timeliness and usefulness. \ \ (F) To assess the priorities presently attached to domestic intelligence collection efforts and to rccolnmend new priorities where appropriate. II. Mem~ership (A) FBI, Chairman (B) CIA (C) NSA (D) DlA (E) (F) EG] Military Services The White House NATID:\.-\T, ~'::r~~;~~~Y IN~Orr(~·~""~~"T L;y'.~, "I .~-;'.,_.(l D;,:-;',:l'·'j;'.' Suoj:::·;,:t. to Crimin~l Saitc:U;j'~" 225 -2- III. Procc:dll:-cs (A) Although the sub-committee will be officially constituted within the frarn~wol'k of usn~, it 'will in fact be:: an indcpcnd~nt~ J.cl boc, illLCr-agcr~_cy \'.'orkin~ group with a limited D1andate. (B) Operational details will be the responsibility of the chail"mJ.n. However J the scope and direction of the -\ review will be deterrnincd by the 'Vhite House ml3mber:.---, (C) The sub-committee \\'ill suhmit its reports to the Wi,ite House and not to USIB. Report will be due by July 1, 1970. (D) To insure that the President has all. the options available for consideration, the \\'H rn~~mbcr In.::ty ~:Hrcct detailed interrogatories to individual d.gcncics in order to ascertain facts relevant to policy cvalu:::..tion by the Pi·csiclcn1:. Informlltion resnlting [rotTI snch intcrror,ator~.-~~s wiD. if the contributing agency requests, be treated on a confidential basis and not be considered by the subconunittce as a whole. IV. Objectives of the Review (A) (B) :TE1:;: I ,/?OfII{C) '''J<J "i975 FDI lv1axim'.11n coo;dination and cooperation within the intelligence community. The sub-committee m"y wish to consider the creation of a pcrmJ.nc:nt Denncstic Intelligence Operations Doard, O.!.· 50n1.C other ClFpropriate mechanism to insure community-wide evaluation of intelligence data. Higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal security collection efforts. Maxin1U1TI use of all special investigative techniques. including increased agent and infonnant pcncLratlvn by both the FBI and CIA. 226 - 3- (Dl Clarification of NS/\ 's role in targeting against communication traffic involving' U. S. revolutionary leader::i and organizations. (E) Jv1;:lxlrnUrn cove raSe of the ovcr:.;cas activities of revolutionary leaders and of foreign support of U. S. revolutionary activities. (F) Maxim'..lm coverage of can1.p~s and student-related activities of revolutionary leaders and groups. (Gl More detailed inform;ction about the sources and extent of financial support of revolutionary organizations. (H) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence role of the A TIned Services. (I) Dcyclopn1cnt of procedures for translating analyzed intelligence inforl11.ation into a fennat useful for policy formulation. f;\nI".L\.i- ."'1 AUG [; "ji:, rUl E\HIHIT i., [0 iv!em0 (a JZdUJll r~~ Mr. c. D. DeLoa,ch DAll June Hi. 1970 ~, W. C. Sullivan~ i . r llr. r' INTrr..\G::~;CY CO"~\ITTEE O~l IllELLIGT::,CE (EST!ILJoJ .l:';':::,l) ~--i .'~.~:~ F:'::,-;l~J:- i, ,I; ... v~ !.~'·"iG) tlFF,HiG OF THE WORKING SUI3CO:,[;!lTTI;E Ju:m 12, 1970 FRO\t This memorandum records the results of the Working Subcommittee. At the meetin~ of June 12, 1970, the Co~ittee a~reed I on an outlino for the report to be furnished to the President by July 1, 1970. This report ...,il1 co\"er three s[Jeciflc ~r"as I of. interest: (a) an asseSSli1en1; oi 1;he current intc,-nal security threat alon~ with the likelihood of fu~ure vlolcllce; (D) B listing of the current restralnts which deter the development of the type of information the President desires; (c) an evaluation of interagency coordination. With re~ard to an assessment of the current internal security threat, the Committee a~reed the Pres1dent does noc desire a recitation of history but ra~h~r aCS1res 1niorn~tion ali_to what the problem ,is and "!l_e".,timate _of what_ the fu"ture p!oblelll wi 11 be. The White fiouse representative advised the restraints portion of the COD::!ittee report 1;0 the President should include, in addition to identifyin; the restraints and a listing of the p~o:s.. and_cons of reQo·...·ing or modifyinv. the restraint:s, a brief [ paragraph allo~ing the President to indicate ~nat action he desires be t~en. Specifically, this ~ould provide the President tbe opportunity to indicate ~hether he desired the restraints to be continued, relaxed, or that he needed additional inforIlation upon which to make a decision. It was the sense of the Committee re~ardln~ the third portion of the report that a pormanent operatlons committee was needed .0 coordinate onorations. prepare estlrnates of potential violence durin~ future dcm~ns.ra- ' tions, and to develop new policies. The creation of such " committee was endorsed by the White Ilouse reprosen1;ative who indicated such a commlttee would probably be desired by the .-C President. 1]". J[IVFn [Pt"A'l Th?,<; dOClI))l(J1t 1'S (III" is i/ot [n.,. disS(,lJ/i- . . lfCS: l'agJ J~' ~;~;}~~11 O/lfc:.i,l," 11~/,I/r~ n(l/ciu' }JI'nr,'rdi"'fJs !):~ AUG 5 ~~~ 1ld Ii:r' FJ,'I to lIJlauUuri::'t.d J)I;(3011- F81 COIITHlUED - OVEn' 228 ~ llemorandum Sullivun to DeLoach Re: IllTJ::RAGE,iCY CO:.I11ITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE The next meeting is scheduled for June 17, 1970, at which tit'" the ComIllittee will consider the first draft of the report. -.------- ACTIO:l: For information. fBI - 2 - L: 229 (. :.: lr:ll t(·r. of COil [c- ('("1"1' !'r:I:;~ 'i ~'·_J'!I CI:'. l:t~;IUI '-'r~C'r~ r' ':.~. J\lni.~ l~, l~:'i(~, 1 ::10 tv :~ ,;. W111i;1Dl C. S'.'11iv.ln A~sl:.t1:1t Dircct~r, V'c!eral 1:,1':', "·Il uI l:.\-l",tl;.::f ion Prcslfllli~ !r. J't"; C. llu:c,ton, hll1tC Irou:;£' I~r ••1 ~-n. :'n·:lp~.Oi1. (,I.~, Lir •.1;, ...•, :.;t 1 b',' 1_' 1 1 , DJ.,\ CuI • .11'.• :.. \ LJJ'.:n10 , ."'rr.." ~'I'. C\'::~'lt:-:, :Jlthr-r • .\1 .... FnTce C:lpt. J.-.· ...... r~i itl f(~l1hl1r· ;1, !'<';lYY ~:r. f:l":')T'". ", ;t-JfIl:;::J. : ..~/l !-ir. ( ...·(\j·I·.L· C. !'00l"C, i i:[ '!r. ;~.)l:·· .ri ...;. !~oorp, r,11 t.~r. T,'iJliaC't O. Crcl:ar, fP.I, S~crctary Observe' ro:: Col. l:~(!o\:)l, Koller, AIr F'orrt Lt. Co). l~on;l1u F. Phi l:lrick, OIA l!r. rJ 11111 >:r.,ul,,,teln, ',rmy ~,~r. IL":.]";j" Y:~rr·.'il, L~;";vy Mr. J:l~.1:-"~ Gf'~':lt'r, r;.)M. v.r .. Ll'n:1:~rd .T. ,;:tnr.0. ;~SA I'r. It i ,::, .• ,' tl () i),_, r, C I ,\ llr" Fr,'d J. C.,·; 1 t.Iy, Fill REC~IVED FROM . FB I Grn1lll'l F.XI'}U'.iI,d f.···,..' :·ut(l:·,~:'.t±· ~ d,,··:"'-'·\"''" ""d ,L\LlONAL SECUInTY INFORllATIO d,'<,: L .', l 1 it: ,l i-Ill Unauthori;:cd Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 230 l'. " \.j .... ; -\0. ~ ,;r ··I~·:li,'.·~ l)[ tt-;.... l~;r:~i. ----- - ----- -_._- • ~'J,., ~Ii:lutco.; of the first l:t·C.· ·-,Lt~ ('I:> ':.~h;I'!1 .~ .. ~:'. 2. Di:.:..t~·, l... ·.'t '.()~\ of f.1n ~'\lh":"i ..:-.!: inn F:i.t i I l'rl "".' '1 n~ rnrl 1.7;~-;::·:;;-;~:- ~-il~i-::-;-tl~~;:-{J~t-,;-~::;;-l--,-- :. -•.:" ..- ", :",r. - ; '\"1.·c:"'1~'· Til(1'rnI c:ontr1but1on w;,s eirc',!';:!''':'''' :0 all r:1l',~hf"'rq. It ",a", ""·I:I:·,~t('d hy ~Ir. llu,:ton of the '.h,·,c "":t',,, thot .. rcpQ":'t 1>2 t',lJ1C'd to pf'r:-,\i.t an in-derth 1",', ',li ," I, .., 3,]1 i.:(:.,l)prs :\nd th?tt tl~<, contcnt~ of the su.Ltni5~io:l ~;! r. L .•~,;' . ,'~d ~t. tbc nCj;t ::1':'l'tinz. In th1s rchurd, ~·ir. lIu,c;t.(llI rCll..:~l·;\~cd th:d the ;\!;se<;s:::ent p:.;.0r shculd root b~ lcnr.U1Y: c::;;,uliJ ;.·'-""' ... s the curr"nt thre:>" :>nd estlll~nte '.-hat the tutUl"C threat \'1111 !le. The CIA rcprcscntativ(' advi~(!d hi:; ;'~"t.'J1~y'r; sl1h:li!;s1on would be circulated to nil mem~ers in l1me lor an 1n-depth di:;cl1~sioD at the next Committee t1cctin!-:". 4. Distribution and Di,...cussion oi "Li,..t of Pc<:tr::ints Illhihltl:l~ I!ltcl1ir:l'lIcc-Coll(~ctJon J.!Jort:~" The rc"trnlnts p:>pers sullmltted were r('ad by :>11 ""lIibers. Mr. Ilu"ton indlcated dlat th<1 I'm O;t,r.~l,,:;ion t:as in the forn he d""llrcd. Ite sUJ::r:e"ted th" r<·"tralllt,; oort10n of the report be patterned After the FnI 'oUb"l"~1(,n t'lth a ,~"ne1udinr: paral:r:>ph after eaen indlviriu:l1 restr, wt prov1d1n;:; t!le I'r(!sident with the option of contlr.u1:1r: or "'0,11 fyll,': the r,'~trp.int or a~;king for aJdi tional ul.tor~<tt.10I\ on wjli.c:.:h to b.,~c· a dcci!Jlon. S. Prepar:>tion of ncport A sun:ested out] ine di<;trib.:trd to nil "'r'.:h,·r" '.'0'; ~1:.'e~I~tCVa~p~?Jrh' It \IIa9 agreed tllat the fOI would prepan' AUb ti 1.9,:. FBI _ 2 _ 231 . tllo iiI" f "",' ft t() he <:ircul:ltod to ,," ltno, l.ul-;'~;',!.... ~)~: !~\..lU,·Jl!;~i()j} of \n~\)t~) lAter t!,"," 10 a.m" JUlle 15, 1970. 0:1 Jl1r·\~ IG, ' .... :-\·,e)'·:.... no CC'"",,.,t t t ...., l'OOnh0rn di"ctls~cd \ :." \;', i 1 j 1 j' of rCCoitz";t.'ndi:':.f,,:" <\he c~)tauli8b;-:lf:'nt or a ""1-,. I~' jll~ "J"1 ir:C:lce opcr::.tl"r."; c'.:'1:J~:::Jitt('e. ~rr .. HU"1ton c:nr··..,.L·~;I'·~.i. " . r( 1"O\.·t auLlrcg!l 1t5clf to ·th1~: nild 1!!clu1c (1) 11(;\" tho..: cr:-' .' "ulll<l be constit<ltcct. (2) te', ';":;::)'":1 ~.:. ·y.. r,~~lld rr:'.':()1 9 t • .::,/ I r'('C'(~,lur:\l l:l;'\tteTO:>, ~nd (1) th(j cO:~I1),ttt?G'la arC':l of r; .jlI1n·'ll.Jl1ity to incltlde opcrn.tion!!, rrep:U-J.tlao at e"tiClll.t"s, and dcvclop1'l"nt or p~licy reco~rnoodations. The noxt lllC'Ctlnl\' ~111 bl) held on \i~dnC6(!Jy, Juno 17, 1970, in tne U. S. IntclUr,cDce Bo",rd CO~Dll'r"IlCC !loom 7£-20." .U~mbDro please note chanKP In roo~ numl~r. lECE/VEI I FfWM ~ ~lli15 232 EXHIBIT 14 I I l ~'7u . :-~Ti:;:,·;·~. "::;C';' C:,'··.~qT'd·F 0': 1" I .. k·).I;·"~ 1 ';. 5Ur..cX:-r~! l'l'j; ";;E~H~,' 'j'l\~rd ;'·(:pti,~,: l;SIi; (':;1f.~t'l·n('p ~~ll'·' ;1 on \,;,.d,!1(.::;.j":'" J'tr..:" 17., l~")'irJ, at 2. nJt~">l~;';lO:l ct DoCH',~""nl<; hy 'ff~-I ·.;:;r;7j-l:': l-,~-~-:-;: tj"t~'I'"' "., ') ( 1 r.:i ,~~ nnd 1\ :''''~S'''ll1. ~~lf! 1 .:!.·;t~flP.' ~t ~;1-;:;1-S;;-~1-~·~··-j-·~; ~:i L" 3. Dl:'Cu.,si~-;) cf- I)OCUI_I"i'l·:.S ~H~l- ~'.l tt-~-:-J-·!-;-~.~· ., i ':- ;.~~.<-;~.;,- ~, (' ~ L,! tit J ,-'u "!~ l~j· r-- ~, i - :.~.;;~-t ~~~-~ 1-;; ~~ _.. -~-,'l-:'l'1-\)"1 -C;-n-~" .1;0 Ef.ort:·· , "'\.1 i 1;ul C. S:..:.111\';".n NATIONAL SECURITY INFomlATION Unauthorized Disclosure I Subjeet to Criminal Sanctions ~BJ 233 lCl·· ":1 .1 111h' lV. l~I;O , I \ l:. ~':"I: t i :L j ('0, .. f.-:. (~,(q~. ;i.,-,,,~:, ,'I,;-".:.) C~A 1;.\" \;I'.Lt:-"1e'-' ·l'.i.:dl~1 .JUll':~ 1,. 1~,70. '1 t~ C, r '!:. C :".\j 11', V'tTI ~ I • J" ;;;. ,~". ,{'; , f !!~' !T(...·:i<j,jn, 1'0',1 C. 1tu~t0r" ';'lh~ \." ,1, ..U :-ll' J;J. :~'I:;" I~ r'.;' i' (lU l :.: I ."\ J ,,, .. ,. '; t; ]-'I!, Pi,' 1\,.. I:r, ·'r. ___:'11 .•I,...:~n Ll.)1.V1) L,', ,.... 1·)'"..;/ {"i'--Ct' -' ~=; /:,;~~\: ~;1" ;,1, '::;,',,, ;:;;', ','1" ~r. BCD';0D ;\. ·;llU::'IOi. : \tc". CI1;lrl~'i n ;:;·t.·t:";IJ~. t':;; 'iI·. G"Ot'~f> C. ;\· ..... ');'i l Fr '.... S~.cr':"'t:~ry ~r. ~illl~~ G. (r!~~l _ _ <: ~ OhS~I'V('l~: C'"l. fJ. E. 'i:JK("', ,!"l~ ~. "\'f' )4\", F:llr.u h't;~'l;-'~~~l-~ ~rl, .~: fl(r. lJ~.r)·y ,.,.:"\ .... rt':I, lot ;l,";j ~r. O. L. W: 1 i ~.• ·rl. no;'.', ~r ..1~1",,(,C:; rr-'I~~ 'u-'r. N~;~ Mr. L~")n:~rd .~. t:~I!1ti(l. ,>. ~r. Illchord ""r .. (lA }f:-, Frl'd J. L·,t·.. fJ\(l)", /1"; RECEIVFl") f-R8M !' nI ~x(~· \. dn2":;I.· d('~ 1,·, ,~ 1'''''.0\,::,".",\ .NA1iIONAL SECUIUTY J1'rFORMAT!\ " ! "(~ ''',d UnaulhuJ'i?ed DiscI:JSllJ'e ~. ~ c. ( l "" Subject to Criminal Sanctions 234 lC,-Il-:l JUDe 19, 1970 1. Approval of Ilinutes of Second ~()etin': The minute6 of tho aecond ",eetln,: «ere ,lpproved witb,no chan~c6~ 2. Ite~B ~o and Thr~() on ~~endn The Chairenn 6u~~ested that it()m~ two and three .ppcnrin~ on the aRendA for the third D\()el.n~ not be dlgeU8S0~ lnasmuCh ai the information contained ther'"n had been incorporated Into tho draft report. The Co~mlttee concurred in tbls BU~r:Ogtlon. . 3. /lovic" of First Draft of Coc",tttce l1"p",'t Detailed discus<;lon developed r<:r':"nrdlnf.: tile draft, All ~e~bers c()ntrlbutcd valuable fiU~KcstJOns In ~~y~ to Improv~ tbe report, It was R~reed that the FBI ,"auld ott('::Jpt to incorporate 6ur:~ested chnn~eq into n second draft, '1'1'1.5 tlralt 19 to be circulated to all oembors as fioon RS pos,"ble, aft"r .... hlch tho rlX:lpientfl "Ill attempt to obtain Rppr0prlRte 111,,:,-1,,0:,,1 eOn,,-, rrcnce "Hhin tbeir respective Rgenele" or depRl'tccnts. -' 4. D~te and Place of Ne~t "eetin~ Tho next ~eotin~ "ill be held on Tuc~day, Juno 23, 1970, in the U. s. IntC!l:igC!nc~ Board Conferellce hoom 7F:-2li. ;~lCUVE[) mOM FB I 2 _ 689 235 EXHIBIT );; UNITED STXrES G()\'I:R;'>;ME~T ... TO " fROM Mernorandum ~( Mr. C. D. DeLoach\~ w. C. SUlli~ DATE; June 19. 1970 SUBJECT; U INTEnAGE~CY CO',!lIITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (ESTADLISl::D BY F: ;;,1:,:sre::::T JU:::: 0, 1970) MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE June 18. 1970 In two previous meetings of the above-captioned co~nittee general discussions took place and the grollnd w~rk was prepared for dealing with the substance of the report:" Yesterday, a third ~eeting was held which extended throughout the afternoon and into the early evening. Memoranda has been prepared and submitted to the Director on the previous two meetings. YF~terday. the members of the four intelligence ori:anization. wor!led _Ollt the report. I received "he impression that Admiral lioe1 Gaylor 'of Nat lonal Securit.'r Agency may have been a moving force behind the creation of this r !eOmmittee. The Program which we discontinued a few • years ago was raised immediately and figured prominently in the, discuss ion. 'Q..,-'-:---- At the very beginning, the White House representative ~made it very clear to all members that the report had to be a working subc9mmittee reoort and~y ooinions, observatiollS, con2..,! s,io."s()r _::ecommendations "O,:Li,n,-,Oividual.·ri:gericies 'should n,ot_a.n'!... could not be set forth with one exceptiQ!l.. He said that 1:hr;., \~Sident-did "ant a-definitive' recorr.mendation relative to creatin~ :a-group or com8i ttee- wh lch could deal.71i th operational problems a"i O_bj",ctiyes_ of the member agencies_and present estimates, cva.luation~" ,and interpretatiors on the-current security threats and problc""L_ /resiJlt lng from the student-professorial revolutionary act i vities ._ ~lack extremlsrn and related security matters,- He said. the President \ is of ' the opinion that all government agencies involv~~ in intelligence activities would have something to contribute and that througo such a group or board authorit~ would be exercised to better .1 coordinate the collection of i~ligeRr~~ The men representing the Army, Air Force.~Ay~~~ronal Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency went into great detail concerning intelligence operations, techniqu~4,,1!prOceoures, "ECE1\ldeVices and et cetera, following a detailed discussion concer~,i..n:.. '. \ , _I the nature of the securi ty threat to the United Stat-eto;-teraay. , 'f(i{l; !' "~IIi While all present were very friendly and cooperative to ,each other ....!Hov-.er_the;tess, the fac_t remains that in such a_compLex !~-2.-I"!t?ll_i~ence__opcrat~ons I difficult and s~rious ·issues arC t?s>~nt:L ~.O.... ~..9me· up conce_r_n_ing which. there will. be _disagreGiTl?fll:S . .....,.tvC//I.'JUi[ ;-, I "", I ';',:',.' /, ./ I> ilflt fnr 1,~i'<:-"\(:,1f,1i- 1// ;, Ollis/lic ' . /i .. ," I.d !)lII('('((/,,)I j/h1f V . Cl)ulm,:U,c (/1'; ":1' I" "> 'i~dv.,((l to ullu(Uhoi,C01{IJ~'iUZD - OVER ;':iU;v;;t the CXl'/"L~; (.".',(ul'ul J" j'L'l • 62-685 0 - 76 - 16 236 Memorandum to :,1,-. DeLoach RE: INTERAGECiCY CO:,i!.!ITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT ,JUNE 5, 1970) MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCObL\lITTEE June 18, 1970 In view of this it is probably fortunate that no member was permitted to make any decisions, recommendations, or conclusions, et cetera, in that the ?resident reserves this riRht for hi,,,sl~lf only. Each __l.'() ....ltl~J·/C'c.:;i_:'.l. is.::l.~'.:.'. :1~~S up-ell so set up in writing that the President may quickly ana simply indicate whether he wants or does not want any changes made. \1 Contingent upon what the President decides, 1t is clear that ttie'r'ecould bi'problemS'in\,olved for the Bureau. ~~~ple, the reactivation of the Program, et cetera. \ We are completing the first draft of this report now. As soon as this is done, the report wi1h a cover memorandum explaining the various issues involved will be furnished to the Director either late today or early tomorrow morning. RECOlllolENDATION: For the information of the Director. HECEI'." .) : IU1M - 2 - 237 O"'OM.' .0....0 10 ..... 'UIIPI':.. 0. .... " ..... " "0 H • EXHIBIT Hi • TO UNITED STATES GO'vt:RNMENT Menwrandum 'Mr. C. A. Tolson IlAn, 6/20170 - OVER fROM 'w. C. Sullivan SUBJECT INTEIL~GENCY CO:,lmTIEE ON INTELLIGENCE (ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 19'.'0) Attached for the Director's consideration is a copy of a first draft of the report prepared vy the working committee 1n connection with captioned matter. The first 36 pages of this draft present an assessment at the present internal security threat under appropriate captions. This is material with which the Director ~s thoroughlLfamilj,ar and it is not tlelieved he need spend too ,much time reviewing it unless he so desires. There is nothing [controversial in this portio~ of the report. Material relating to investigative restraints and 'Umi ta hons discussed by the working commi ttce is set forth in' Section V (pages 37-59). This material is set forth in 'accordance with the President's request, with the pros and cons outlined and with no recommendations of ",ny kind made by the committee. It is clear that in this portion we_have controvcrsial ,issues aff.ecting,the Bureau as well as the other agencies on ,the ,commi t tee. ' The final section of the report: (pages 60-65) sums up, in accordance with the President's request, the committee's observations concernin~current procedures to effect interagency !coordination and su~gested measures to i~prove coordination of intelligence collection through the establishment of a permanent \lnteragency committee chaired by_theDi!eee~Cl.:;;: or a person ~eslgnated to act for him. I do not agree with the scope or tnis proposed committee 'nor do I fcil'that an effort should be mzde at this time to.engage in any combined preparation of intelligence estimates. I can see • that a committee could be helpful if it ~as limited to meetin~ D~rCI\IFI~~l~~i~.llY to determine how to bett~r coordinate operational \\r:,,~1:: .. l'lC!!.~iJ}\!ts against particu].~.!_tar,;ets in the intelligence f1elcr.- - '\~ ~ ~IJ The working committee is schedtlled to meet again at ":'(,1'-3 P"III" 1\tesday, June 234 in order't'o re..?,chagreemen. t on a ,\.~~nal draft of\ this report., , :" : ~ TI,;, d<1iCS~bs! '" , ," 1'«"""", t'l 1', 0:' rI " '", ,r "', "i, ".Iion 01l!\3) "'i' ('" '" J:, ,,'" ;, I,,,i' 10 ("i";'" ""co:n:J11ll,:ED lIltllr Cf')mmlti,~( PI"? /,'/. ilO!' iu ! .... ,~,df'.:jcd 1o Uii'U.IlUltu<.~ul Ji~:rsollt- 1:cllci~.il.~~~. the. C.':::1'(0,; 1.::J;nurul the F1Jj~, 238 Memoranrlum to ~r. C A Tolson RE:. INTERAGENCY COM~nTTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OBSERVATIONS: If cammi t tee a greement is .not._reo.ched at Tuesda y s meeting on the controversial points involved, it would appe~ we have four possible courses of action: (1) We can offer no objection to the roport and wnit to see whot the President decides (I think this would be unwise (2) The Director can voice his objections to the President verbally (3) The Bureau can take a position in writing in the report opposing any relaxation of the investigative restraints discussed on the grounds that the ar~lments supporting these restraints outweigh the arguments opposed (4) The Bureau can take a pOsition in writing in the report that it is opposed to the extensive scope and ramifications of the proposed new committee, while at the Same time noting that we would have no objection to a committe·e which would be limited to meeting periodically in order to effect a better operational coordination among member agencies with regard to particUlar targets in the i~telligence field RECmll!ENDATIONS: (1) That approval be given for the Bureau to include in the final committee report a statement opposing the relaxation of investigative restraints which affect the Bureau. (2) That the Bureau take a position at Tuesday s meeting of the working committee that it is opposed to a new committee of the scope described in the attached draft. but that we would not object to a committee limited to better coordination specific intelligence operations or problems. fBI - 2 - 239 1lemorandum to ~:r. C. A. Tolson RE: INTERAGENCY COI1idITIEE OJ'{ INTEI"LIGENCE RECWMENDATIONS CONTINUED: (3) That, in addition, the Director give consideration to expressing his objections verbally to the President. (4) That, if the Director's schedule permits, final 'meeting of Director's co~~ittee take place in his office at l!._a:"".1_Thursday, June~. At that time the Director can Inqulre if other co"~ittee members have any further comments and, if not, he can present them witQ a copy of the final report. (If the Director does not wish to pr~sent this 'report personally to the PreSident, we will prepar~ ~~~~pr}~~~.~mittalletter for liaison to handl~) FR' - 3 - 240 £XHIHIT 17 lCI··/I-J Juno J.~). 1970 INTERAGENCY CO'CHTTEE on YNTlOLLIGE};CE \fORKiNG SUOC01.uJIT1'EE AonmA Fourth llcotlu;: . • USID Conforenco Roo~ 7E-26 on -Tuosday, Juno 23, 1970, at 2 P .... 1. ApprovAl of HlnutflB or . Third ~:o~t In" Willinn C. Sullivan 2. ) Bovio~ of Second Dr&Ct or Cor-.rnittee Roport to OA Circulated toi\l~cra Willin~ C. Sullivan 3. Date and Place of ~e~t "ooting llM> \{~yl~ /.J.-,l~.';~ NATIOK~L SECUmTY INFORMATTO~, lJnulllhol'izul Di"c!osu]'l' Subject lo Cl'imiJlal SUllctions Group 1 Exoludod f~on Automatic dOTDgrading and d&clasBific~tion AlJ(; ;; 1')(5 CtlVED FIWM 241 UNITED STArES GQVERNMENT Memorandum TO , Mr. Tolson DATE, June 24, 1970 fROM All'. lV. C. Sullivan I SUDJECT,OlUTE'l.'.GG;CY CC:,I;,lITTSS at; WTlCLLIGm;CZ (AI) noC) (E'iTADLISlIED IlY TilE FHESIDENTI JUNE 5, 1970) The final meeting of the working committee was held on 6-23-70 and there is attached a proposed final draft of a rcport for the Director's review. During the final working comnittee session, a numbcr of changcs wcre made in the prior draft which the Dircctor has scen. Signifi0lnt changJ~s include the following: 1. ~"o of the investigative restraints previously listed have now-been co~g~~!y__cJi~l~ated. 2. The FBI's objections to the ~ix rema~n~ng restraints havc been sJ2§'J,Jed o_u,t,,_sp..eeiU.£...ally., in .appropriate {aotnotes which include the basis for ourTJosi tion. In a ditTOn, SOl~e of the key wording in the marrati ve has been' ~ed in accordance with the observatia.ns the Director made to me Monday. For instance, the term Itrestrictions" in the dccisions section ~lating to electronic surveillances (pagc 28) has been changed to "procedures. " In the saInC write-up (page 26), reference to electroni~ surveillances having been "substantially reduced in recemt years" has been takcn out. C[w: AUG 3. In the section dealing with ~valuation of interagency coordination (pages 42-43), t~J:,eierence .to J:~".trictions on ?BI and CIA Headquarters Liaison contacts has been removed and the snecific reference to, the Director as t!'c proposed chairr.lan Ofan'interagcncy COiI.mittee has been, :qel~tff-""~I rns"tca.d., the report merely indic;ates that the . cha~rmanl would be named by the President . .. ~};;;glosure t' ~ I. ~,.- WCS:mea:ijz (3) ~;enor;lr' ·Il. C. ~;ullj'/::.n ~,O :<1' l'o1s(l[l HE: I:iTJ~I~:,C;~~:'~~Y CO:,~;_:I'~-T;::~~ U~~ l;~'.i.lJ,LIGL~;CE L;D :IOC) tt~cse nUr',bcr 0 f cnf):1'1 it tr:c Ul£: v:ll"ious 4. Tile pri(,l' ,:raft cOI,:t;1.incci propc::~~,l:::: rc:';,:t;\'C to ;~ ;;(;nl~ll"!,t ,~rcw'·n,·" inclt:clln:: ;l iUl.l-LirJ' \',10rl~~;1~~ intclll prop'~J';~l. full-:'" y lIt I \~j:::,J ;;;., a POS:;lU ~;:lli-L:Y.* III JJ..cL, ai'-:"ol' (~)_hl';l~'r<tble ~:X"-, l~)!J L:if; ~>~_(:ilj::'; 01 thi~~' '(:hole section w.:1~ -{l--=~\:~;L·d with a view uf climinntinR ony su~gestion that the proposed lJ1ter;1.[~ency cOj'n:ittce would intcrLcre with the internal oI)Cr~tl(JllS of ~IIY irldividLtal u;~cncy. In addition, a footnote ·".'as a(j:..~(;d (':(0rcs.'-;in~~ tl:e: 13urcau' s specific views concerning any such cOf.l.;~lit'tl2e: or group. 5. TLC' section on b~lc~rcet <U1cl nanno\,'cr restriction;.:; (~-:~l!',('S 40-·11) "'.':ts-l~~~·ised to ;7",~~l;:c it clear that the FLI d~)es I:ot have, al~Y prohle!'I_\lIitl1 rC'~:ard to review-~2.~pr-oval-of·itsbudgetary requests. Copies of this proposed final draft 31'e hcing furnished to tile memoer :.1[';eDcies for their revic'.'l so that nll intcr0~;tcd parties will be flilly CCgllizUJlt of its content::; in .:-tdvnEce of the final meetinG" of the Dircctor'~c; Co~',-nittcc in his oifice .:.1t 3 p.Ll., Thur~-;day, June 25, 1070. Those present will be ;.lr. Hichard He} 1~::;. CIA; Lt. General D. V. Bennett, DIA; and Vice A~nirnl Noel Gaylor, NSA. Each man will ho doubt be accompanied by an aide. ACTION: Upon appruval, this report will be printed and assembled and then delivered to tne Director's Office with a transnittal letter to the President in time for the Director's l:leetin(i. Due to the extremeJy sensitive nat:'lre of the report, each copy is beingnuI1lbe-r~dailct-:'1-rCZol:ciwill be I:ept of each recipient. The Director w111 note that at the bCL~inning of tLe President's copy there will be a form to 1)0 sigIled by caell agency's head indica~in~ aDDroval of the report. *Since tl.e concept of a full-time working staff was all but eliminated, a footnote was ~t taken regarding this item. RECEI\,'\ c :;J'~ - 2 - 243 EXHIBIT lH o"'.e.. ,,IO.....O. l , ..... .'.' .~",.? ;;~'I~r'~~I)..os;'ArFs cu ,'ER N.~IENT Memorandum ddr. Tolson Dt\TE: June 26, 1970 sUI~:Vary~i ',Mr. 'II. C. o INTErU,GEECY Cml'lITTEE 0;; INELLIGEXCE (,\9 HOC) (ESTABLISHED BY ThE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970) 10 "l't1JECT The Director, as Chairman of captioned committee, held the final committee meeting in his office on the afternoon of 6/25/70. Present were the other committee members; namely, :.11'. Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence Agency; Lieutenant General D. V. Bennett, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; and Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, Director of National Secm'ity Ag-cncy. Also present were Mr. Tom C. Huston, Ilhite House l'residenticd Assistant who had served in a liaison capacity with the committee; Assistant Director designate C. D. Brennan of the Domestic Intelligence Division; and the writer, W. C. Sullivan. The purpose of the meeting was to review in final form which the President had instructed the committee to prepare to assess the current internal security threat to the IDuntry and evaluate the capacity of the intelligence community to deal with that thr~at. "d~ The Director opened the meeting by, commending the com.rnittee members for the outstanding effort and cooperative spirit they had displayed~n working together to compile the comprehensive report. The Director then furnished each committee member a copy of the report and carefUlly covered in a concise manner all of the items dealt with in the report. On each and every point the Director solicited observations by each committee member to insure that they fully understood every issue analyzed and were in complete agreement with the contents of the report. In this connection, Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler suggested three minor additions be marie. After securing the concurrence of all committee members, the Director instructed that this be done immediately. ' I "l ',) ,l l 'ldV0lU OJ tit.' Fill. CONTINUED - OVER 244 lfumoranduD to ~r. Tolson RE: INTER,\GeICY CO:l:,iITTEE O}l INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC) (ESTABLISliW BY THE PRESlDEiiT, JUNE 5, 1970) With that, all committee members signified their full and unqualified a~proval of the full report and so indicated by nfflxinG their signatures thereto along with the Dircctor's as (;!;ail'l:w.n of the cornrlittce. The DIrector stated t!l~lt l:~ ~iouJd a~r~n;c ~o~ l::2 traI15init~al of the report to the White llouse proIaptly on 6/26/70. The Director instructed each committee member to insure that all worJ'ing- copies of the report at the agencies involved should be destroyed and fixed this responsibility on the agency heads who \vere members of the corruni ttec along with the responslbility of insuring that copies of the final report retained by chern for reference should be afforded the utmost security. The Director thenroncluded the meeting by thanking the respective members of the committee and so dismissed the committee. REC01t:,IENDATIOil : For information'/ r8~ . - 2 - 245 June 25, 1970 The President The Whitc !couse WashinGton, j). C. Dear Mr. Presld:mt: n The'lntcragency Committee on InteUig:enee (Ad lIoe), which you established on June 5, L(l'lO, h:l3 completed its assessment of the current Inlcl':l:ll security threat anl rclatcd l!",atters. A special report sCttillQ; forth ti,0 linaings or the Committee is attached. This l"eport Is divided into three parts. Part One sets forth a summary of the current internal security tJlreat. Part Two summarizes various operational restraints on inte1li6ence colJ.eetion and lists wth the aJvantages of maintalnin:-; these restrictions and U,e advantasc5 of rel:utinf:( Ulom. .?art. Three _ provides an evabJation of intora<;ency coor,jnation, incluuing suggested measurC3 to improve the cooruiI:at1ou 01 domestic intelligence collection. This report has been approved by all of the members of the Committee representing- tilO Centrallntc-lIi;ence AGency, the Derense Intelligence Ar;ency, U],e National :Security J\genc.y. and the Federal Bureau oi Investigation. -, Sincerely yours, F131 J:nc10sure ~Jl '; WCS/mea (4)•./ rJI ,IWM 246 EXIlIBIT 1~I Jucy9,1970 MEMORP~NDU~vl FOR: ?l.lr. Richa=d 3clm:, Director J Central Intelligence J\gency SUBJECT: Dc;",estic Intcllisence 2.nd Internal Securi:y Affairs In the future) I would ap?reciate it if you!" agency would address &11 :r::'-i.tcrial relating to matters or do~::;stic intclligc:1cc or i:--,"~cn:'2.1 5ecl..:.rity intCl"E:5t to my exch.:.sive attention. The President is ar-.:<iou5 ~o c€;n'~ra!ize the coordinatio~ ~t t'C.e \'r:-:'it~ B01.:5~ of z.li informat:'on of t:-;.is type) and your c:oop8rz..tion i:l I.his regz.rd w',)uld be ap?rcciated. Dr. K-lssinger is aware of this new procedure. / 247 EXHIBIT 20 24.3 Ricllard llelms memorandum _....... SEc;lZi'/SZ:-:3ITlVE ~ .. ·SJS-.J-:'C:: :'l::;';~:J3i.Q;"1 ~.. i ~h A-:'t'J'~~~' C;::~;-al :·ji tG':1~ll O:'l DO~~3t:~ Int811i;2~s~ ., 1. :';'..!:-~~;:t r-:-:'";"2~~ ;-,~~::.:,::; ....:.::~ ~!;~ -,.. ~::a:--::~/ C~,,~:.:L2. O~ 27 J;..:ly :1.970, i~ cC!C:"J...:".e Cl~3[" to ;-:-.T i;:-e?i:. :i::!'~:-i~3, t:-:~~ ;:a . h.3.d r.-?~:i ;-lQ::':-t:..-;; ~"::-J.:2T~:" Z::,T:':':' t:;.~ 2:-es:'C:2:-.S',:; :l:3t~jr:::'i.J:;::; C~1. !!J:'I-':~3t:.C Ln~o.]l:!J..b~r:.::ell u...Tcil t:-_J.~ 7~r7 :-,Ot7"':"U;. In O;:'~l~r" ~O~d3J :~~ At~s~~~J C~~~~~l ~~C ~O~ cee~ tQl~ DE t~~ ~e~ti~~ ~t t;l~ ~'[::l ~c ~Q'13 3 0::::' 5 Jl~"";'2 1970 0::- of +J23' ad :-:':)0 c8~if-,~e N,=et.i~ 1.s3 ::hO!...!..:,~':' 'oj ~h3 :3I ·r."~icr~ :-.. a:i .:~ol~d·..:~d 0:- ~J:y.:.t t:-'~ ~~;::'Jrt. ·...h:.ch ',;:l3 5:!nt ~/J t:--.~ ?:"~:;ic~:'.f-~ 2G·~i.'i 1 J~11:r) :i'}!:.:'ir:5 fc:-th . CO:1.5~.~J.ir.~s c':\ c.a::'~3":.ic :':1~.~ll.i;;2:'.~:: c·3l2.~c~:'o'1. .~3 I c..:."1C.~:"3~.2-"1.d.. it.J t':-,-:; ,.!.t.:O:":l.·JJ' C2:".~:-::!.1 fi.:-s:. h2J.:'C. ::,s')lj7. ~:'33~ ;:",,3.~.t·27S ~"~C;1 ~/r.~ , Dir~·: ~,);:- 0;.."' t~,~ :'31 cC;7.?l:?i.;-,:c ::':J ~,:":1 ;'::',T';'v ~ ;-,=l.::J,~.:",-'1c".::7. ;:';);:'; ;:1', :':>:;1 C;--',J.:,l·]"1 r;':~~l)n ·,·;r,.i.:n ;:-:":37. '.:-:: ':;JS3::I:':::J.llv ~J:-t~ 3?_-:;~ ~3J"t. :'\".3. ~h<) ()l!J ~ r']c2i ,~d ll.:';,?!' Ga~2 oi' 23 ~':.ll 1J70 Cij3C GjS75-~/o). i~to ~;~iSI~ ~~;~i~~: ~~~~~;7",;~~~:~~~~.~~:~t~'"~:-,~~dr.~~:~~~~~~~c~~ot:t i td...:;::l "I[U c:?ol;--,t.: :. ~. r::-:d.l.::' ~.-:;~ ~7 r~a:'~:-21 ",,'2.5 :;'?.!:~{ ;·.. i t:l .-,-,~. In ;:.'::;'d3..t,::J:l, h-.? :?..-:c t;~2~ ;-,';-:1?,i t.:);"i :,~•• ~:.-:;J7~~ ·~o '~.3it rJj.;-:-:~!' .u.• ~:l h~ (~r.~ .~.·::.t8~-:'7 C:;;:-;~i"~2.) f:.3.:i ::_'"! o?;:,a:-::;..-1i.t:r to Ci:;C"1l33 t:-:i.j :'::,Q12 :::.J.~S-?: ~.,.:, ::"1 :.::~ ?;-'~3ir:2!'::' !.l~t;;~ h:'s !"e;-,:.l:71 t'J ~·,·2.':;:li;;;~~:·n ,[~v,., S~"1 Cl3:::-'!,,:~ ;-:"2:~--t .....~2!~:.:. 3. Ii~ c·:r:"~-~·::':''Jn :..i~,:l :::--:.~ P:'J'i:~--:3 ~::'''117~:i in ci':'.-.l~.:;t:G 1~1j~1~i,;3,:3 r:'J::'::':!::~/io:-:J I .?~.;J.:l 5'':'1'~~.:;tZ'li ~:) ·c!':~ ).~:o~·;.::!l C30··~:.-.!1 ~!12~ :.J ;'"',.::-:~ 1 ~::::< ~":"t,:l X:. ,j-~~ J. ?;::::.:.c:--: ....<~,JJ ~ ;'-1i.,"l~.~i O'JC; (;3.3 I~~:; 1'::12; ::,-?~/,:,:-,;::, .:':OC'."":1 t~~ ?2I. 7;:£1 A:':.c:l:-;-';?7 G3;J2:'2l .16J.:'n :;Z'0~'J a?:;., ?~~.... f'2.:Ji:n '::; ;--:.?,;:~2. ",' j)~ <; '. CL':,', '. '''', O~i..:; - C:":l '.:; (iL~ ). f:; '; - ~:I, ',//3'; ('.~:.\'~~ - ;:) Sr:Cl~[T/S~:;S;l.·l'/r: 1/ v\J 1.~'::h{:·:~ t:~:~1.; D~~O'::~0. 25.3 Richard l~lms memorandum , . ,~)"w~~' j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j I! t.l.JI 248 EXHlfHT :!l ,. t,i::~iO?i,~;OU~,1 FO;i; ~'~- .. ~·:c:~~~.-us Per 40'.lt" tC'le?~o:-.~ ;-eqt.:.~3tJ' I \:'.."1. r~t''::-l1i!"':g-' he-:-~~.....i.t:'1 ;.:;- .. :1\.lS:O~15 l:".:::;:o:-2.~~'.:."",:( t',) :.-:-=~ S''':'''oj~ct~' Do~~st~c I~telli~~~~~) ca~ed J~ly 2}J .1970, 23 Jl~~T J-570 ~:-:-;;-__:::-::-~-:-::--:-~ ~~.=<_D_'"·_(c_J__----.J1 ~u::,:(...'~~ 10l .~_~';~~;:~~/~;v~~~;~JI. 249 EXHIHIT 22 25.7 Tom Huston memorandum THE \'.'Hlre: ·:-\OUS=: \"/AS~ll;-;GION Auzuct 5, ,970 EYES ONLY SU3J£GT: DOl,lESTIG lliTELLIGENGE In anticipation of your meeting v/ith NIr. Hoover anti t~e .A.tto:r'ncy GCi1eral, I ,would like to pass on these t~~ougl~ts: -1..- 1\1'orc th<>.n the FBI is Ll~ol\'cd in "this op~::'[:.tion. !'~5-"\J I DIA, CLi\, 2nd the military sel'vices 2.11 h2.-"re n g:r2~t st::.~~~ t!.=:.:! 2. -erC.2.t in~crc3t. ,i\11 oi these age;v:::ies supported the ~;:.:io~z selected by the Prcsicent. For. your p:-ivc>.te in!ol';n~ti0:l, so C.:3 "C).ll the m~:y.'S~!'5 of ~\h·-. Hoover's sta.ff \vho y"rorkcd on the =c,:--~:.... t (herd, firz E'1cm if h'3: k\lc\v this.} :250 -2- 3. \'/ '.~ i~ l;,< ~:l ~ 0 ~i tel (-'~'1- {1o:-_'--:-~'~.;~_i;::: il\!('11-i~',,:,-,cc O~)(:l·<'~;O;'.S. Ir.. ti\r: ;J?3: ~,;:o '.'IC~~-:S, .h;~ 1:~~.~ -~c-:r~,ir','..~2;1 ;,-~_L "t':")l ;-:'2isc,"\ \--;i.~, i<5_'\, D:/\, tLl~ ~nili.t::""i ~cr\.·l~'c'-;J S r ':::;c '\<C~ - - (;yc:<·yor;.,~ C':C~'Ft t}l~ '\;n'.i:e HCl\..'..S~. L:~~ t~~,-di; -<2cl jiz.i':::"'i' \:~~h C1t'. i'l. ?\l2.'{. T;~is is b~);~::c~ ''':CJ ll;::~\-c ~ (~ri~)~]ing cf;·. i..;'.c c:·.~i::c cO:-:'.~ji.ll~ .... i~j· ?_nd is co:'.::-.?":>:,y t::J h;.0 l-;\.'~)E:: 2 ~C). ~>;e =-).::C"s:clc;-,~ ;:c~ ~hc :i:""-,1.C'2~i:l;; th2,t t:-::::::-c 11,)~ji~i\'(; <:,:,c_: ~~jl'(:d 2l:-:cl I~c;c),,.,-";r h2.::> "-0\-/ ::;\.'C::C'.~d2ci :~~ fQ~:-ci:::; 2. ~·('-,,-i,.:.\':. Ii.' ~ ~:.:.:~.:; ~1i::; \,.r~'.·j- l~ is r;oi~.z -::0 1:1::';, l:~e >'2 is :o.7~J:·L' P;y,O::::;:-fl'.l t:'l~:l L>"~ P:::25:c1cr'.t. E2 1-,::\~ h~s s.::.y i~ th~ fool;,ot>2s <1nd H~~ (1~( i(:ret ~l.~;c'.inst hi:-::1. ThO'.::: ShOl:L:: close t;"H'~ ITl<'.:te:- CI.<1d I canit l,~(:2:::'st,'_nJ -".'<Iy t>, AG :i3 2. p;::rt)' to rco;:2:-:'!.:l2: it. All 0: l.2~ 2.rc b,Ji:;~; ~o loo~: dc".. T"f1_:l ~ii:'> in'th~ cY'2S 0[ ~L:lr:-:s, C2.j·1'2:-, HC2"'..i"l·2:t, "'ld ~1~2 :J:--.i~.:L~U.:··i Cl:~2~S if ~I ,'c:!..· C2.a l.l.:·.ilc>.tc!'Zllly :-:::·."C·"-':;C ? 2::J-,-4::;3idc~--.~i:'.l '~:;ci.:>ioi·. b: ~;.::d un 2.. :;:~"I::::rt t~E".t :;":c:'.::-,:,.- pC0~')lc '::0:'~-:'~-:~ tl~~l:" Z'.::;::;;..~s oii ~(J ?j,'ro?'_~2 2.:l·-:.! ·,'/hi..:::h. 0'1 -its ;n,:>:i;:;:;;) \'/Z'.,J 2. ll":~'::::::.~:~:", ,O:)JC~:~;-"'~ '[1:). 5. T;~:::· l.<;:-::,.:s~ ;-;'.,,:~ ';:-:: C(,l,~(~ ':0\2 ;n 1:'.' O:.'l:'r-,:'c-:l} is ~,"l c·:::;_-:':.:.:-, .. _ to l.-c:'<.... !",:,! J~1,,--: -,"l~ ~'".. : ,"":2 c:'.. ~ :: :::'.1·!'L~ '." '" .,'.~ i:"'. t'·,·~ ~~:: ...::.s ;:\s .~. '~:,=--:-.~_' -::...-.:..../ ~.~n~.::::,.,:::~.·.:!~ 11"-,,,'>" i.l.~ :.~ ~'.r ;!) <'. .-. .:.': ~.:..~ :.::,:):.~ .' :;-',~ S.:: ,,'Z',,:-."::::: C·:~-·,.::~ _.::i.;~l),," ~.;_ .'"'~ :-)',~,~. T:10 ::-':'.~... ~.~:.':.2':\.~' '.•. ;\::~ ~'"'..~:~:"'..~~ IJ~... ·.-:.~ 251 -3- G;~n.cr2.1 ,\;:'cS l~ir>,:i(tG hir.n...s~l[ \'.'n::::n be :;::'..;'·1 n'.,~ c".:"':'""'.pu~es -:!01.1:l..~ ~'")~ qui,::t t~1£5 b,ll. D'-'.'/i5 ~rc(~i':,,:~~c. ~:t':-::~ 2~ L·:;.st 30 '::01.:1-1 ~e c:()~cd deY...';:' i~ S2;~,~;1"_~~2T". I ccn't E~~e 'e.o :..,::-,?.>~r:: p:'..:~li-:..:t:o;,~" be: I 2-:"";1, n2~ 2.t l'..ll c:Jri.'ti:-1C2 f2, :>ll. ~:~Q bZ":;,~s of th<:: ~:-::~l~j~2;"CC I }:2-,'2 5-:;2':"l, t~l2.~ ,,'ie <'.:',? 2~1:."--;/<.l-Y ,-,',>!";: O·,f·=.: .... t}-.c ~,,~.--,",::") (;,"1 t:,~s i1:"ocl2:!n, 2.22 I '::~::1' c~):~vi;-:r:t,(~ ~~,z:~ rl·, ..... ~·;o::-?,l~i~_l lui' r;e,-c:"! Bl""l.~~~~· viol~ .....~ce :5 p':.:-e~;2;1~) ;~~(l \-:c };.:-,\'~ c:' !?o.:;;~i.\'C' c~liZ,'.t;,C:l to L"_:~:,~ L:\·~:.:Y stc,? 6. l-rOO·.r~T C2:J. b~ C}:p~ctr;d to r2.isc 'U1C iollo'.'ling P::J~:-:ts ~n you;: nl.(':c:;~i;lg: (3) "0U :;:- p:-".",;(',,'t efforts 2.;:2 CJ.dCSt~C'.. :~.'1 Th3 ar:J~.;,·e::1:,: 1)'L:ll'shi'.:.l 'l'i)~3 i5 p~rtic'L11'l::.-li t:lU~ \'/ith ::-c[;?t-(d ta lTB1 C2..8i::.:n Cb) 11·';:'J1C 1"ls\:.s 2.-;'·C too g:'C::~~; th,cse fo'~",s ;:'!-"~ go:":g :~O f,ct U~'2: ~::.. cs~(1 :~'-: ir'_to ~~'oubL~ ~,C\d ?~N i:,,_cl b-2ttcr Est~~ tv ~...~.[; 'I'he 2.,,:1"-/0:' i~ thClt. \':'~ h:o.',-e: C0:1:-;iC2I"cci·th~ ris~:s) ..';~ h.:;Ec·.r~ :0_~j' ~l~ ~ll~~~c ~~~-;'~: ~<'~~ /~' Cc:~~i:;~ ic~r~~,~;y ~~:"~\~ ~~~01:;~: ~;,so', ~~";,:?:C -C::'C:it3) ~Hl: t!:1(~ Director" of the Y31 is ~2.i(l to t;;.~~c :::is~;,:.s ",,,r.2:::C ths- s~ciJ::it/ 0:' ~;1~ coc~I.~rJ' 1":; at sti'.;:e. Xot~inb \'v'~ lJi"o;)"]se ::'0 (10 }:~3'n\:)t bc-C:"l dO_Ie L-i. ~~lC p?'cS: -- ~_l~ci in tl-,,~ [,;':.:>t" it "-:~.5 ~h";2.;·3 (~"-)=-'-c ·~;\.lccr~.'1.s~·t.'_lly.. (c) III c10;)'t h~'v-c the pc:-son".~l to 20 th:3 jc~ ~~c . P::2sicCI'.t ~.~'2.r,-t3 0..0;\c. 1I The 2'.ns\':cr 5.5 (~) ~~ h:ls the ?2o~1~ 2.~6/o:: (2) h~ c ?~ get them. (d) III <1o:,.'t o";)j-::-:~~ ~o I(S/\., CO:1(:l';::~i:1g sUi'r~p::~iol..!5 C:i.t'i:Y' E t\'~J \;I.:.;:>.~_t<)~ II T::-'c ·;''':1.5\\i~~· is t~"l.:'_·':. K5A dC~S!",.lt ~r.?;:.:.c t~... ~ ~-20?"...~, <:2.:\:t ~ct t:J..:':-.l: h·~_s n;J z·.I_~'~::(L~i:y ~0 g~: t:""'.;:~.. 2.:-:d ;:-;hw;:.~2:11\: ::;:~j<2" t~ ~~.::-t ~:'2'!1. It is il:-l :t-~31 jo~. 62-6850 - 76 - 17 252 -4- (c) "Ii "'/~ do these things the :j?c~(~ls of the ?"-C:;SI ".n'1 :h~ ·l'~CLT.J y;ill iind 0'..:"";:; '-"Ie .c~n't i\vcid lC2.KS. 11 .!\~.5""/~":: ,'le C2n. 2.vold leZl-!"s by t;.5i...:.~ t4?_ir:~d, tr1).stcc. :\gents ~.!"'.d :-:cs:ri.:ti;oci ~"O''1alcc:gc oi. sensitive cp~:r;ttIo~s o~ a st:::-ict ncccJ. to k>l.cW G2..5is. '·,I/'c do trii3 o~""!..::r::her .5e:::::.sitiv0 o.?0~~.tions e-;e:::y day. (f) Illf I have to do these thl~g:il th~ Atto=n~y Ge~e~<:'..l 'will h2..ve to ~??""'Q·.... e thc:T1 in \"i/ritii1g.·" This is up to the .A.G, "o~t ,I \'lD:.Il~ t~ll i!oo·...-er th~t he h:"s Oe02rl instructed to do thc!Tt by the Pr\~si-:ler,t aT'.ci h~ is to cIa them on that ....·.lthority. He needn't loc'!.::. fo:;:- a sca;>c g02.t. Ec has his at'.thority !~orn the P:~:csj_dent -. and he does~lt need a :.cil·i~cn nlC~~!.O from the hG. To n"l~d......tai:l sec2.~ity, \7C sho':..:ld 2o';oi<1 \<n.-ittc::n co:-r..r!:.t'J'.icatioi13 in this 2.r~a.. (g) ",'/le don't need 2.n Inter-Agency CommiUee on Intel!tgc:'lce Ope:L2.'tion.:; OCC2!. ....·.5C (1~ ~.vctre d~i:1s finc :::.:i~ht r.c)'w -good ccoi"di... ?tion, etc. -- 2.f'.c (2) thci"c arc other existing grou"'J3 Y/hich c?.n h.Zl..o1dlc this assigr'Qcn"t. II The an$\ve'!" i~ t~2.t \'v'e ~ro ':: GO::"'tZ· JD'.lSY :i:"i:;ht no,',' 2nd the:z'c a~c:l't D~h0= groilp.3 y/h5ch C2.!'. •. do the job Yf-e have in mir!::l b~;::.~·~.:~e: (1) they Gon't meet; (2) they tion't hu.~~'e tl;e p.::o?lc 0 .. ~h.i;lT1 ~ve \va;:;.t or h~'/C SOrrl.e p.s-ople "'va .' doa'f\'v2.!",t; (3) t1v~y cO:1 l tha\·c ti.:t..: Cl.u~hor :ty.to ·do v~·h::.::: Y/O WZl.:-'.t 'Gone; <.,;) ultl~:}.~el>- t:~.is nc\': ope:::,?,tion v/ill l-~p:acc thc:n; c.r:.d . (5).'t~:~i' 2:"Z=t:t linked to t:1e \,,rhi~.e }!ousc st.J.ii. Thc~e ?i:C t!ol:btlcs~' c.p..ot:"~i: d.OZCi'l o~ so sp.::-cicus ar:;:t':...-:""_~!":.-!;3 thz.t ;-I')QY~T ~.vill !'"L\.isc, b ..~t t~cy ,,-,:in b~ of. Sinlil2.:" q\.!~!.i,~)'. I hC'.?~ th2.t YOf_i \'/nl be 2blr~ to CO~l:~~C'~ th~ _'~G ,?f t:.C' in1?;Ji-t~~cr; 2.n:i !1~~es~:'ty of Z.C~ti;1; HCQ-;c:- to go r-loilg. ''ore l~.~\'C' Y~·01..!"cd fa:: nc.:'..t"l:,r a YC2-r ~'j rc('..c~ t~i5 po£:-:t; o~h.:::~... .'3 h.:'..\"c v:o:,!;;~cl f2-.i:' Ia;'.;;~!" '. ~r-d ~,,:~.c 2.:>,:!t"!30:112-:! h0:.h~" i ",,)'.:-li-::-\·,,:: \';C 2'.:"C ~:·.l:,,~;,,; a":.:c"_'.:" t:~~ i'.:.tc.:-;:! oft;'~::J -:'J''':':~~!':: .. Ie,": s\.~i'"C"·i' (;\.': .. ·.~~.:ic ";!.::>\~.~...:.:" :'.~~ci ....:~~~.:.· ...2\Jr ~;1:·";.:'".. ~·,,::", t~"!·~ \"c!.':; f'::·.~l!·i..: c:i 0~:'':' ~::;('..;':'~':.r. ·~~,::cl!~~':'fi·:~ 1':; :"'.ct t::~ ~'l':::"~, ~.':.t i~ CJ.":"'. ?":'()";:'''::c -.:>.:: ..:.·: .. ~:~-·.,_';:;i:; t~~.": n::".~·:~3 i\ C::.C--::- ::=>:;51.1:-1,::. :·,~:l·:".~ ~::'.-::::>~~"~;",:~,_y, .:.". '::: ..~ ?;,. .:...... : ..' '.'~ •.;~:::"\ t:-.~ -';''''2:'.:''.:''. t,..:> I'~:::.;~"",:, t;~•..:: 253 -5- d2t8~io~at:o;:. of th~ sitL:z:.'::iCln. ?02rhz:-p.::; lO\'/~rc.:.l vD~~es ~:-~.:l !:.~;:,_.,:~ in 'ri2:!l2.!>l ",;ill (1~~l"':,5~ the ten!;c: ::;i~u2.t~of'. \'/.~ .f"-C~I but l·"/o:':~,:::-.I: ·~/:l.:1t C2 T2.1:l on it c:..:clu~ivcly. . .*.- .Ti1crc is L".~:, fin2.1 po:nt. Fo~ ei~h~e2:":. :ncr.t~-~.::. V:c :l.~~:~ ·vr.2l~checi p~Cl?~e in ~his Gavc~..:.-u-rle:1~ ie;'.o!'~ t"ncP.:csidcnt's o:-d~:-:;, tako::: ~\.ctions to e~b.:;.:-:L'.-:lss hirn .. prornoc(; (h2rr~3~1'/<25... ?t hi.:; c:r::pensc, 2.nd gcncI"z.lly rn2.~(C his job Z':1ore cii.E:'c'.Jlt. It. ::l.:"_~~c:; me figh~!i1g D12.d.. 2.1'.d ,,;"h2.t HOO"i<2r is doing hc!"c is p'_ltti ...g hi:-:n.5cli ?-bo ....:c the P~:csidcnt. Ii he thought the r':.ttorncy Ge::ci"":'..l's ad-.ji:::c s~Q1..tld. be solicited .. he should h2.ve c1c!1c so bcio!'e th.:! report W:l.S SC:1t to t':1e. Prcs~de:lt. ..c'\fte:o ~ll, Hoa-:cr \'12.3 c:.~i:::7'.2:1 of the co:-:1rni.~\:~c and. he COl.,Id h~ve asked the AG for his co:-.-...-..:-.~.:""!.::; .. But no, he (Jicl>llt do so [or it n~v~r Occur reel to hi..:i'l tr.c..t the President \'.'o>..l:d not a 0 1'ce \'/ith his footnoted Obj8Ctio.::s. Ee thougiit ;-..ll he h?~ to do \;/~"""'s pu.t in a footI"!.:)t2' ancl the n1w.ttc!" \"i.:'.!; settled. He had' z:.bsoh1tcly no i:-,tcrest in t~c vie\"/3 of XSA, . CU~, D:....~, c:.n:l t>.e n1i·li~?rj~ services,; ;:;.!"~d ouviot.:.~ly he h2.:5 littlt; i.'·1~C:r~St in 0:.1:' •..riC\VS, or eP?2:-cntly even in the d2Cis~o::.:::; . of th8 P:'~sid.cnt. I c10n l t see how \VC C2.r. t01cr?:~ this, b~~ b~ing 2.. fat?.list, if i1?t ~ ::-c.1.list, I 2.~!1. pl'"epZ\~ccl co 2.cccpt toe .. f.:'.ct .t1:-.::>.t, \"/e ::,"1.2.,,/, hJ.·~ to co so. «" !t;)~. TO~!L CB.r\I1.L2S lIU'STO:·; 254 EXHIBIT 2:) MEMORANDUM THE WHITE I{OUSE WASHINGTON ~" .. 'roNFIDENTIAL ",~..,'i:'".; ',. .. August 7 , 1970 DOMESTIC IliTELLIGENCE REVIEW MD{ORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN ,SUBJD::T: .... l<.";'" ;~,:;1~;;:.:~ "J.:' >-:~ .",...:r~"l'7~ Mr. Hoover has departed for the West Coast where he plans to v,:cation ~',:,c',: , for three weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the problems,,~,;;,,~,t:~::, ,surroundi';" our DOIl)estic Intelligence operations, we will be into the "rie~'/ ;.~,:~,;... , school year without any prep,,:ration. .' ~i. •... ' . "',' The situaUon in Portland is beginning to look very tense -- the AmericllJi :',' Legion Convention could become the first battleground for a new wave'Clf yout~l,;, "'.'i' 'violence. Coming just as the school year begins, it could serve as a 'catalyst>,' , • -"-d for widespread campus disorders. I recommend that you meet with the Attorney General and secure his, support· ..• - , ._." for the PreSident's decisions, ttat the Director be informed that the decision~ :f" will'stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to tmPlementthem, ; at once. ~~ TOM CHARLES IIUSTON ,. .; 255 EXIIIBIT ~.J THE WHITE HOUSE WASHING'-ON Septe~ber 18, 1970 TOP SECRET HEHORANIXJM FOR THE ATrORNEY GBNERAL Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September 17, 1970, I suggest the following procedures to commence our domestic lntelligence operation as Quickly as possible. L InteraGency Domestic Intellig"nce Unit. A k"y to the entire operation will be the creation of a interagency intelligence ., unit for both C2J2"ratinn"l and evaluation purpo~e9. Obviously, I the selection of persons to this unit will be of vital importance to the success of the mission. As we discussed, the selection of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step for several reasons. First, effective coordination of the different agencies must be developed at an e'arly stage through the establishment of the unit. Second, Hoover has indicated a strong opposition to the creation of such a unit and, ·to bring the FBI fully on board, this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee I their proper and full participation in the program. Third, the ~it can serve to make~ppropriate recommendations for the type of intelligence that 3hould be im:nedi[].tely pursued by the vari.oua egencies.. In regard to this third point, I believe we agreed tbat it \lould be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure \lould be to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the reco~"endations of this unit, and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence. To proceed to create the interagency inteliigence unit; particularly th" "valuation group or committee, I reeo~"end that \Ie request the names of four nominees from each of the intelligence agencies involved. ,fuile the precise composition of the unit may vary as we gal. n experience, I think that'{wo tnembers should be appointed initially from each agency in addltion to your personal representative who should also be invol:;-ed,tn the ~roceedings. Beca~sp. of the interagency aspects of thi~ request, it \/Quld probably be best if the request came from the wh:it~ HO\ lBe. If you agree, I will I:lElke such a reCJ.uest of the agency· .. 256 -2- heads; however, I feel that it is essential that you work this out with Hoover before I have any.dealings with him &irectly. 2. Housi ng. We di scussed the appropriate housing of this operation and, upon reflection, I believe that rather than a White House staffer looking for suitable space, that a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task of locating such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that a re~uest be made that Mr. Hoover assign nn agent to this task. In connection with the housing problem, I think serious consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Department. cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We discussed yesterday using IDIU as a cover and as I indicated I believe that that is a most appropriate cover. I believe that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more eXtensive intelligence operation than has been mentioned publicly, and that the IDIU operation COver would eliminate the problem of discovering a new intelligence operation in the Department of Justice. However, I have reservations about the personnel in IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest that they either be given a minor function within the new intelligence operation or that the staff be completely removed. I have had only incidental dealings with the personnel, other than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and loyalty for such an operation. I do not believe that Jim Devine is capable of any major position within the new intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could help perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to you,' the Deputy and other key people in the Department of Justice, despite his strong .links vith the prior Administration. I vould defer to your Judgement, of course, on any recommendation regarding Jim Devine's continued presence in such an intelligence operation. 3. Assistant to Attorney General. We also discussed the need for you to have a right hand man to assist in running this operation. It "WOuld seem that what is needed is a man with administrative skills, a sensitivity to the implications of the current radical and subversive movements within the United States, and preferably, some background in intelligence work. To maintain the cover, I would think it appropriate for the man to have a law degree in that he vi- be a part of the Department of Justice. You suggested the .<.- bility of using a prosecutor \lho had had experience with cases, . this type. Accordingly, I have spoken with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names Qf five Assistant U. S. Attorneys \lho have had experience in dealing with demonstrations or riot type cases and who are Eature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensitive 257 -3- assignment in the Department of Justice. I did not discuss the matter in any further detail with Wood other than to request the submission of some nominees. I would also like to suggest that we request names from the various intelligence agencies involved for personnel that might be appropriately involved in this activity or who mieht serve as your assistant.· In summary, I reco~~end the following immediate action: (i) You meet with Hoover, explain what must be done, and request his nominees for the interagencY unit. (2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task of locating appropriate housing for the operations. . (3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies submit"nominees for· the interagency unit. (4) I request from the agencies names of appropriate per§onnel for assignment eo the operation. Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to monito~the problems as they emerge and to make certain that ve are moving this program into implementation as quickly as posaible. N.B. Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that.if you would ;tike him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he viII be happy to do so. 258 EXHIBIT :Z" ]v[e7norandu7n DEl'AIU:,lr::,T Of JL'STICE TO FROM SUBJECT: The Attorne~::~~3eneral Robert C. Mardian Assistant Attorney General ~~~ Internal Security Division \ Inteiligenc~ Evaluation Committee DATE: Dec.'4, 1970 status Report As a result of my discu~sions with Director Hoover of the FBI and Director Helms of the CIA and in consultation with Justice Sharpe and John Dean, it was decided to limit the firstmeeti~g of the Evaluation Committee to representatives of the CIA, the FBI, Justice Sharpe, John Dean and myself. John Doherty, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Internal security Division, also attended. Director Helms designated James Angleton, Chief of ,the Counter-Espionage Section of the CIA as his representative and Director Hoover designated Inspector George C. Moore, Branch ('~;'7".r r'\r hie: Tnt-~rn;:l' ~prllrtt-y nivi~inn as his ·re9resentative. Our first meeticg was held in'John Dean's office on Thursday, DeceIT~er 3, between the hours of 9 AM and 12 Noon. I indicated that the purposes of the meeting we~ (1) to reach an agreement as to the goal sought to be attained py the Committee, (2) to identify the membership of the Committee, and (3) to define the role Justice Sl,arpe was to play and to reach ,agreement with respect to his housing~nd staff needs. After considerable discussion, it was the unanimous opinion of those present that the goal sought was to provide for access by one authority to all of the intelligence in the possession of the United States Government respecting revolutionary terrorist acti' vities in the United States and to evaluate this intelligence to detcrm"ine (a) the severity of the problem and (b) "what form the Federal response to the problem identified should take. l~ also agreed that this evaluation would, of necessity, disclose the sufficiency of our present intelligence resources, as well as the priorities which the government should attach to the problem. 259 -2- We also ~e~ched unanimous agreement with respect to the auestion ?f the composition, initially ~t least, of the Co~ittee.· Al-· /though We could identify approximately thirteen separate intelligence units within the government, it was concluded that participation by all of them would be cumbersome and counter-productive. Recognizing that we would need to bring in other intelligence units at a sUbsequent date,' we agreed that the Committee would be limited for the present to the following: 1. Central Intelligence Agency 2. Federal Bureau of Investigation 3. National Security Agency 4. Department of Defense 5. Treasury Department (Secret Service) Both the CIA and FBI representatives were in agreement that Colonel lJo',.mey of the Army would be' the most effective person to -....v~~ ,..;:'~:-~ ::;:;:::-. ::.::::::: ~:::::~~:::-;:_~:,:~~f..:. 0f n,?-r.:::>n~p ~r()vioed he would be permitted to report directly to t"e Office of the Secretary of Defense rather than through the chai n of cor,onand in the Army. No reccn®enclations with respect to the representativos of the National Security .:".gcncy or the Secret Servis:e \·./erc. made. The group'agreed that the Attorney General should speak personally to Secretary Laird, Secret~ry Kennedy, and Admiral Gayler and request that tJ;ey desi<jfiate their representatives to the Committee and that a specific request be made for Colonel Downey as the representative of the Secretary's office rather than of the Army. I informed you of this request orally after the meeting yesterday and am awaiting your reply. We agreed that it ,,,as absolutely imperative that there be no discussion or cornrnunication of our activities except between the participants and the heads of their respective agencies and between the Committee and you and the vmite House designees. r Vie also agreed that in the event of I would simply be that the activities a leak the governmental respon' of the Committee were an attem; 260 -3- to upgrade the intelligence-gathering activities of the IDIuJ which had heretofore been made public and that Justice Sh~rpe had been eQployed as a consultant by the Attorney General to· ' a~sist in this endeavor.. The'Co~mittee determined that Justice Sharpe would be house~ in FOB #7 for convenience and ~hat he would be furnished secretarial support from the, Department of Justice and technicai advice as needed from the Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Internal Security Division. John Doherty. The meeting concluded with the further agreement to meet again as soon as possible after designation of the representatives by Defense. NSA. and Treasury. cc: Mr. Ehrlichman ~x. ~~lcem2n 261 EXHIBIT ~Ii e·~l L~'.j '_ ! :'r." '.-:lo. l~ ~ •• y " ~ ,-".,~ ,U'I (,.:', r r~'" ( .. CI "I 1"-1\.' UI'i1T£:O 51'.\1'[5 GOVE:RX~.jE:-rr .. lvIernorandurn TO :Assistant Attorney General Internal Security Division iO*~_:Director, FBI '-. SUBJECT: INTELLIG2,ICE EVJ..LUATION CmlHITTEE nITERNAI.-sS6JRITY----:-~,lIEOUS .T.' ~. 'J 1 :',_ DATE:Fe.bruary 3, 1971 " ~-, .. Reference is made. to your letter dated February 2, 1971, liilich consisted of a draft of a "proposed charter" of the captioned org2TIization which has been provided to this Bureau for review and comments. In this regard it is requested that an appropriate. change be r'lade in the wording of paragraph IV entitled" Staff" to clearly show that tIle FBI "rill not provide personnel for th~ ~ro~ospd peroanent intelligence estination staff. The \101-ding ',:culd then be consist€'r,t \-iith our posltl('n ~s Sl;al:f~<.i in my letter dated January 27, 1971, prompted by manpower and ,budgetary problems. Although He. are. un~ble to provide any personne.l support; you may be assure.d of our continuing full cooperation in providing all re.levant intelligence Hhich might be of as'sistance to the COKJillittee in fulfilling its responsibilities. '62-113887 RE:CEIV2D F:S n' 1971 INT'1i1/1' "[C""" - '" 0 ~il/ TY OIYISIJII 11 fEB 5 1971 l---'_-.::.n"A.O,__I '~.'-; '.'~'" '. 1" ~·;-O""'·""".7'"' .• • rc~ Dj'~l'\) Ll 4-:"'-"~) Ui,lTED ST.\TES. GOVER:--;~lE",T l!1e7norandum 262 ~..--- " D R A F 'T .j DEP,\RDIE:\T OF Jl:STlCr. TO ~._; 1 See Addressees Below /. '.- .-:-'- DATE:Feb~uary 10, 197] FROM Robert C. Mardian~tV\ Assistant Attorney General Internal Security Division SUBJECT: , Intelligence Evaluation Committee I'r~HORITY: ~erdepartmental II. MISSION: ~ I Action Plan for Civil Disturbar.ces. ! To provide intelligence estimates to the responsible Goverl"_'TIent departments and agencies o~ a need-to-kno"" ·~asis in order. to ef£~ctively evaluate and 2!:ticipata problems to appropriately respond to civil disorders. In carrying out this mission, th~ Committee shall have aCCesS to all pertinent intelligence in the possession of the United States Government. III. MEMBERSHIP: Members of the Committee shall consist of representatives of the following departments and agencies: Depar~ent of Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Se~ice; National Security Agency, and, wh~n necessary, rep~ese~tativcs of other departments or agencies designated by the COlluni t tee. .:.';..... IV., ~..¥X: The Committee will be supported by a permanent intelligen( estimation staff* consisting of representatives from me~( * The Fed~ral Bureau of Investigation advised it \olould not pro'l personnel for this st~ff. 263 -2- deparL~ents and agencies and headed by an executiv~ director appointed by the Committee. V. PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS: The permanent staff will perform the following func~ions: ., 1. ~Ihen requested by the Committee, the Departments or Agencies represented shall furnish to the Committee staff all pertinent info~wation relevant to the staLed request of the Committee. Such requests for intelligence data shall first be approved by the Committee. The Executive Director of the permunent stuff may initiute requests for information from member agencies subject to revicw and approval by the committee. 2. Prepare estimates from time to time as directed by the Commi ttee. 3. Report information gaps to the Committee as such gaps are identified. 4. Recommend to the Committee no less often than monthly subjects for intelli.gence estimation. s. Prepare other relevant studieS ~nd reports as directed by the Committee. 6. Provide for the sccurity of information received and the protection of all sources of information;- VI. OFFICE SPACE AND FACILITIES: The Dc·partment of Ju~t'ice shall provide necessary office space, supplies, and incidental ad~i.nistrative support. ADDRESSEES: Inspector George C. Moore Mr. Benson Buffham Mr. Thomas J. Kelley Colonel John i~. Downey Mr. Richard Ober 264 -3-
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