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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES-MAIL OPENING
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1975
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE To STUDY GOVERKMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
Wa8hington, D.O.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of
Colorado, Goldwater, and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, ,Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the
minority.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.
Today, and through the rest of this week, we wish to resume our inquiry
into the question of why the Federal Government has been opening
the mail of American citizens for over two decades. It is a policy
fundamentally at odds with freedom of expression and contrary to the
laws of the land. This committee has already reviewed in public some
details of the CIA mail openings while we were considering the Huston
plan.
One provision of that plan was a recommendation to institute a
mail opening program, though, ironically, intelligence officers were
already busily unsealing envelopes in various parts of the country and
had been doing so for years.
We are less concerned this week with the emphasis of the mail programs
than with the workings of the institutions that allowed them to
take root and flourish, even though they violated the laws of the land.
How did this mail policy begin? Who in the CIA, the FBI, the White
House, the Justice Department, and the Post Office knew about it?
What reviews were made of the policies as the leadership changed within
these institutions?
Though mail is the subject of this week's hearings, what interests
liS most are the reasons the AI!ency used to justify this violation of civil
liberties. The question of mail openings, then, will be only the medium
through which we probe in depth the way our intelligence services
function.
As a case study, mail opening reveals the most revealing look of
the inner life of the CIA and the FBI. In the instance of the CIA.
with which we begin our examination today, the evidence suggests
their mail program was allowed to continue despite the harshest criticism
of it from investigators within the CIA Inspector General's
(1)
2
Office, and despite the fact that it was not very productive in terms
of intelligence information.
Moreover, throughout the 20-year period, many senior Government
officials were not told of the mail openings or were misinformed
about them. These are serious charges which have arisen in our research
into the mail opening program of the CIA and the FBI. We
are here today to explore the decisionmaking process within the CIA,
to ascertain how valid these public allegations are.
To assist us in our search for understanding and for ways to improve
the Government, we have appearing before the committee this
morning Mr. Gordon Stewart, ~Ir. John Glennon, and Mr. Thomas
Abernathy, all of whom served in the CIA Inspector General's Office,
which investigated mail opening programs in the sixties, and Howard
Osborn, who will appear after these three gentlemen, who was the
CIA Director of the Office of Security from 1964 to 1974.
Before I swear the witnesses, I would like to ask Senator Tower
for opening remarks that he would like to make at this time.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin with an endorsement of the chairman's statement that
the primary value of these open sessions on mail opening is the
opportunity to gain the insights which can only come from an indepth
case study.
There never has been any serious question regarding the legality
of indiscriminate mail openings. Most of those associated with these
invasions of privacy have flatly acknowledged the illegality of their
actions. The closest we have come to justification for these mail openings
is that they proved to be an invaluable source of national security
information.
Even assuming the need for such information-and I do not believe
that the U.S. Postal Service ~hould be an inviolate haven for those
who would destroy our liberties-the real question is whether critical
judgments regarding the necessity of investigative efforts and the
extent of those efforts, can be effectively controlled in the future to
keep invasion of any person's privacy within constitutionally mandated
limits.
The fault here goes beyond the CIA. It must be shared by an FBI
which was fascinated by the potential fruits of such efforts, a Postal
Service which either willingly or unwillingly allowed it to happen,
and leaders in the executive branch who simply were not in control
of these insidious encroachments upon the liberties of American
citizens.
Let me emphasize again that legislation looks to the future. Rather
than agonize on the question of fault. a question on which there has
already been considerable public discussion. we must fashion recommendations
which will close the door on the opportunity for this kind
of inexcusable, even if well-meaning, disregard of fundamental
liberties.
It is my hope that the candor of the witnesses in these hearings
will not only provide some insights into the mentality of those who
implemented these efforts, but also a genuine appreciation for the
nature of a bureaucracy which allowed it to go unchecked.
The value of public hearings on these issues is that we will hopefully
prm-ide recommendations ,vhich go beyond changes in the formal
3
rules and organization charts. If our pfforts are to have lasting value
in the protection of the liberties of our citizpns, persons charged with
the defense of the national security in the fnture must go about their
tasks with an ingrained sense of the critical balance between protection
of freedom and the sandity of individual liberty in our society.
The issue is not a new one. The framers of the Constitution incorporated
fourth amendment guarantees onlv after an exhaustive public
debate. It is both necessary and propel' 011 the eve of the 200th birthday
of the rnited States of America that we engage in similar reevalnations
to determine what reforms will be needed to keep these vital
principles alive.
Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
The Cri'\IIUL\X. Thank YOU, Senator Tower.
Now, gentlemen. please stand to be sworn.
""Vould you raise your right hands?
Do you' solemnly' swear that all of the testimony you will give in
these proceedings will be the truth, the ,,,hole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
Mr. STEWART. I do.
Mr. ABERNATHY. I do.
Mr. Gr,ENNoN. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schwarz, would yOIl commence the questioning.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'Would each of the witnesses please identify himself.
Mr. ABERNATHY. Thomas Abernathv.
Mr. STEWART. Gordon Stewart. .
Mr. GLE:'C\oN. .Fohn Glennon.
Mr. SCHWAHZ. Are any of yon gentlemen accompanied by counsel?
Mr. STEWART. I am.
Mr. ABERNATHY. I am.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Could counsel identify himself?
Mr. GAIN~;S. Stanley Gaines. .
Mr. ROGOHN. Mitchell Rogovin.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And do you each represent all three witnesses?
Mr. GAINES. I represent Mr. Stewart.
Mr. ROGOVIX. I represent Mr. Abernathy.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You three gentlemen had nothing to do, yourselves,
with opening any mail-is that right ~ Your connection with the subject
is your involvement with the Inspector General's Office?
TESTIMONY OF GORDON STEWART, FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL,
CIA, ACCOMPANIED BY STANLEY GAINES, COUNSEL; TESTIMONY
OF THOMAS ABERNATHY, FORMER STAFF MEMBER, INSPECTOR
GENERAL'S STAFF, CIA, ACCOMPANIED BY MITCHELL
ROGOVIN, COUNSEL; TESTIMONY OF JOHN GLENNON, FORMER
STAFF MEMBER, INSPECTOR GENERAL'S STAFF, CIA
Mr. GLENXON. That is correct.
Mr. ABEHNATHY. That is correct.
Mr. STEWAHT. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Abernathy, I am going to start with you,
because yOIl did a survey in 1963: and then I am going to go to Mr.
Stewart and Mr. Glennon, who did the second survey in 1969.
""Ven' you in the Inspector General's Office in 1960?
4
Mr. ABERNATHY. I was.
Mr. SOHWARZ. And did you do something in connection with the
Office of Security at that time?
Mr. ABERNATHY. I participated in an Inspector General's survey
of the Office of Security in 1960.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And in connection with that survey, did you look at
a mail opening project ?
:\fr. ABEHNATHY. I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Fine. Where did you go? Who did you talk to?
De~cribe generally the process followed by the Inspector General's
Office.
Mr. ABERNATHY. The discussions were conducted in New York City,
in the office maintained there by the Office of Security. During the
survey. we talkPd to all of the people who were involved in the project
and who ,,'en' available at that time.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And did you talk to anybody who used the material
obtained from the project?
Mr. ABEIDL\THY. I don't recall any such conversation.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, what were your general conclusions about the
project? First. did you form a conclusion as to whether or not the
opening of mail was legal?
Mr. Am:RNATHY. No, we never discussed whether it was technically
legal or illegal.
Mr. SCHWAHZ. Did you have an impression that it was illegal? .
Mr. ABEHNATIIY. It was dearly apparent that there were very serIOUS
questions of public interest involved.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And when you say serious questions of public interest
involved, that is a way of saying there were serious questions about
the legality of the project. is that right?
Mr. ABEHNATHY. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Exhibit 11 is a study done in 1960. Mr. Abernathy,
do you also have the Inspector General's Survey of the Office of Security
Annex in front of you?
Mr. ABERNATHY. I do.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Would you read from it into the record
vour conclusions with respect to the value of the projeet, as you saw
it in 1960?
Mr. ABERNATHY.
The SR Division is the project's largest customer in the Agency. Information
from the CI Staff flows to the SR Support Branch and from there to the operational
branches. It may include • • • items of interest on conditions inside the
country.
In our interviews, we received the impression that few of the operational
leads have ever been converted into operations, and that no tangible operational
uenefits had accnled to SR Division as a result of this project. We have lloted
elsewhere that the project should Iw carefully evaluated and the value of the
product to SR Division should be Ollt' of the primary conSiderations.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. N'v, in making your recommendations,
did you make any recommendatIOn based upon the language that you
just read into the record, that as far as you could see, no tangible
operational benefits had accrued to the SR Division?
Mr. ABEHNATHY. One of the two recommendations in the report was
that there be a thorough evaluation of the project.
1 See p. 175.
5
Mr. SCHWARZ. Incidentally, SR Division stands for what?
Mr. ABERNATHY. Soviet Union Division.
Mr. ScHWARZ. So you were saying no tangible operational benefits
had accrued to the Soviet Division of the erA ~
Mr. ABERNATHY. I think that I need to qualify that. We also pointed
out in this report that we· did not extend the survey into the operational
components who were the primary customers.
Mr. SCHWARZ. But as far as vou were able to determine, there had
been no sueh benefits ~ .
Mr. ABERNATHY. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And you made, as one of your two recommendations
a suggestion that an evaluation be made of the worth, the usefulness
of the project ~
Mr. ABERNATHY. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And that was made in 1960~
Mr. ABERNATHY. I think the report was actually submitted in February
1961.
Mr. SCHWARZ. After working in 1960~
Mr. ABERNATHY. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you make another recommendation in connection
with this project?
Mr. ABERNATHY. The second recommendation was that the Agency
should be prepared to explain the project, if it should ever become
public knowledge.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, would you characterize that as a cover story~
Did you? .
Mr. ABERNATHY. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'Vhat did you mean by a cover story ~
Mr. ABERNATHY, Plausible explanation for what was happening.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You mean, a misexplanation ~
Mr. ABERNATHY. In this particular case.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. So it was a general undersbmding, as you
testified earlier, that there were serious public problems, or as you
then agreed with me, serious problems of legality, right?
Mr. ABERNATHY. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. But your recommendation was simply that a cover
story be prepared; is that right ~
Mr. ABERNATHY. That second recommendation addressed itself only
to the cover story; that is corred.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. You did not recommend that the project
be turned off.
Mr. ABERNATHY. No.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, Mr. Stewart and Mr. Glennon, when
did. you do a second review of the mail opening project?
Mr. STEWART. In 1969.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And how was that done ~ Mr. Stewart, you were the
actual Inspector General, is that right ~
Mr. STEWART. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And was Mr. Glennon on your staff?
Mr. STEWART. He was the head of a team, composed, I think, of
three men, who conducted the inspection of the counterintelligence
staff, including this project.
6
Ml'. SCHWARZ. All right. ,Ye shall start with l\Ir. Glennon then. Mr.
Glennon. if YOU ('auld briefly describe what vou did and what vou
concluded. alld then we will tnrn to you again'. ~1r. Stewart. •
~1r. Gu;xxox. ·With relation to just this mail project. in the course
of our surwy of the counterintelligence staff we came across this
mail opening project conducted in Kew York. The team of three members
was quite surprised to find such an activity going on.
)11'. SCHWARZ. You had not known about it in advance?
:\11'. GL};xxox. Xo; I had not. And we interviewed all members
of that section. ,Ye inteITiewed all of the customers-well, not all of
the customers, but most of the customers who got the take from the
mail openings, including the liaison officer from the FBI.
Then we recommended that it be terminated, because we were aware,
ourselves. that it was illegal. ,Ye thought that the take was not sufficient
to warrant such a continuation, and that obviously, it would
get the Agency into a very embarassing position.
Mr. ScrrwARz. All right. I want to come back to your recommendations
on the legalit:v point; hut to focus with you for a moment on
your conclusions with respect to the worth or lack of worth of the
program. how did you go about analyzing that subject? And would
you state in somewhat more detail your conclusions?
Mr. GLENNON. The project members kept a list of an of those
people who were clenred to receive the take from the opening of the
mail; and of course, that list went back for a number of years. In that
list, they had the names of current members or the other operational
units in the Agency. 'Ve took those names and went to interview
those people and asked what use they were getting out of the take.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And what did thev say to you?
Mr. GLENXOX. Well, we found that there was very little use being
made of it, except by the Bureau.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Exce'pt bv the FBI?
Mr. GLENNON. Right. •
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, I will just read into the record
from the ultimate report that you, I think, Mr. Stewart, prepared
the following quotation:
Most of the offices we spoke to find it occasionally helpful, but there is no
recent evidence of it haVing provided significant leads or information which have
had positive operational results. The Office of Security has found the material
to be of very little value. The positive intelligence derived from this source is
meager.
Now, that is Mr. Stewart's summarization of your investigatiol1,
Mr. Glennon. But does it accurately summarize your investigation ~
Mr. GLENNON. Well, it's joint. We get together after the survey is
completed. The inspectors sit down with the Inspector General and
write the report in the final form. So that this was--
Mr. SCHWARZ. It was an accurate reflection or what you round in
your investigation.
Mr. GLENNON. I would argue there was a little bit less use being
made or it in most offices.
Mr. SCHWARZ. In other words, you would make the criticism of its
value even more critical than the language I just read?
Mr. GLENNON. I would.
Mr. ScmwARZ. You would ~
7
Mr. GLENNON. I would.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, on the subject of legality, did you
mak~ a recommendation that the project be terminated because it
was Illegal?
Mr. GLENKON. No, we did not mention the illegality of it, because
we assumed that everyone realized it was illegal. The very point
that we were trying to make was the Agency would be in deep embarrassment
if they were caught in this activity, unless it was legal,
so we just assumed everyone realized it was illegal.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Let me turn now to you, Mr. Stewart. Is
it correct, do you agree, that everyone assumed it was illegal?
Mr. STEWART. Yes, certainly. Those who were in on the project,
from my understanding, knew tha,t it was illegal.
Mr. SCHWARZ. To whom did you report in 1969?
Mr. STEWART. Officially, I repmted to the DiI1'ctor of Central Intelligence.
On a day-to-day basis, I reported to the Executive Director,
Col. Lawrence K. White.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, on this particular subject, did you report, in
fact, to Director Helms?
Mr. STEWART. I provided Mr. Helms with a 15- or 20-minute briefing
on the whole Counterintelligence Staff survey and in that briefing
I, as best I remember, did cover this project.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And in that covering of this project. was it your
understanding that Director Helms also knew that it was illegal?
Mr. STEWART. Yes. It was my understanding, and although I cannot
swear that he did know, I didn't ask him.
Mr. SCHWARZ. But, it was the general understanding of everybody
that this was obviously illegal; is that right? .
Mr. STEWART. That "was certainly my understandlllg.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, in light of that, what did you recommend?
Mr. STEWART. We recommended that the projed be turned over
to the FBI, since. as far as we knew. they had the primary interest
in the take from the project. If the FBI were not to accept it, we
recommended that the Agency consider closing the proiect.
Mr. SCHWARZ. That is kind of a curious recommendation to make,
isn't it? That you conclude it's illegal. and then you decide it ought
to be turned over to the FBI, which has responsibility for enforcing
the law. What is the logic in that? Can you explain that? "
Mr. STEWART. The FBI was verv much interested in the take of
the project, and as Mr. Glennon reported, and I put in our report,
that the Bureau had, in fact, rnn a similar project themselves. So I
did not know whether thev would be at all interested in taking it, but
I thought that, under the circumstances, and since they were interested,
before we simply summarily closed the project, we should at least take
it up with them.
Mr. GLENNON. May I say something at that point? I did talk to the
liaison officer with the FBI.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Someone from the FBI?
Mr. GLENNON. That is right, and he gave me a flat statement that
the Bureau would not be interested in picking this up, so our recommendation
actually amounted there to a recommendation that it be
abandoned.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, that is interesting, because, in fact, it was not
abandoned for 4 years, was it?
8
MI'. GJ,}~NNON. I don't know.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Do you have any knowledge of that, Mr. Stewart?
Mr. STEWART. I have learned since coming down here to give a deposition
that it was carried on for several years after we made our
recommendation. .
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. .Just OM final question. In your meeting
with Mr. Helms, how did you understand he was going to proceed,
after you made your recommendations to him ~
Mr. STEWART. I simply assumed 'that he would follow the usual format;
in other words, he received the briefing as a matter of information.
I would hlwe assumed that the action officer, Mr. Karamessines,
"'ould, in due time, take un with him his proposed action with regard
to our recommendaton. The recommendation was addressed to the
Chief of the Clandestine Service. Mr. Karamessines.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I have nothing further at this time, Mr, Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers, do you have questions?
Mr. SMOTHERS. To clarifv the point that I believe the chief counsel
has been raising, if we look back to Mr. Abernathy's report [exhibit
11] we see there at page 10, paragraph 16, essentially the conclusion
that coordination of the project within the Agency was out of hand.
'Vould that be a correct characterization, Mr. Abernathy ~
Mr. ABERNATHY. I am not sure. I would say it was out of hand, but
the various components who had an interest operated in their own
areas without a great deal of intercourse with each other.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Your recommendations, then, called for an evaluation
to follow your own study of that. To the best of your knowledge,
was that undertaken?
Mr. ABERNATHY. I believe there was a memorandum dated the end
of 1962, which does indicate that such an evaluation was undertaken
by the Office of Security and the CI staff. But I was not personally
privv to that evaluation.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Glennon, when you conducted your inquiry in
1969, did you find any indication that the problems raised regarding
coordination and liaison has been dealt with effectively ~
Mr. GLENNON. I don't recall, really. All I know is, as the project
continued, we made another evaluation ourselves of the use of it.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Do you recall your assessment regarding the degree
of control within the Agency in 1969 ?
Mr. GLENNON. The degree of control on my project?
Mr. SMOTHERS. Yes.
Mr. GLENNON. I think the control of the project was in the hands
of the Counterintelligence Staff; that it was not formalized as a project,
which was subjected to the review of the proper officials. So in that
case, it just went on year after year without, I guess, a budget review,
an authorization review on the part of the program staff or Mr.
Karamessines.
Mr. STEWART. I would like to say something on that. We recommended,
of course, that there be established a procedure which would
assure regular and periodic control and review of the project. We
also recommended that the man in charge be relieved, and that a 'better
qualified person be placed in charge of the project. I think that bespeaks
some question about the effectiveness of control as we witnessed
it during our survey.
1 See p. 175.
9
Mr. SMOTHERS. Would it be fair, then, Mr. Stewart, to say that it
was your conclusion that the project was not only being poorly controlled,
but indeed, that it was producing only marginal value in terms
of the information received?
Mr. STEWART. I would say yes to both points, yes.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Can you then give us-if not directly, at least your
impression-of the response of Agency officials to these kinds of recommendations
by you? Essentially, what you seem to be saying is it is
out of control, it is worthless to us, we ought to drop it. 'What kind of
response did you get to that?
Mr. STEWART. I cannot be very helpful on that, because the Inspector
General's Office is not an office that follows up and makes sure the
recommendations are followed. That responsibility rests with the
Executive Director, or did at that time. His office kept a particular file
on the recommendations that were made on this, and all other surveys
that we drew up.
We got into these responses only when they were received by the
Executive Director, who would then refer them back to the Inspector
General's staff for further comment. In this case, I simply do not
recall what, if any, response we got to these recommendations.
Mr. SMOTHERS. One final question. There seems to be some concern
here for both your efforts and, at one point in time, the parallel efforts
of the FBI in the mail-opening area. Do you believe that the continuation
of this project was in any way needed or motivated by the sense
of competition between your agency, the CIA, and the FBH
Mr. STEWART. I would have said the opposite. I had the impression
at the time that we were conducting the operation, and we surveyed
it, that we were very much motivated by a desire to make sure that the
FBI got good information of a counterintelligence nature bearing on
internal security matters in the United States.
Mr. SMOTHERS. So you were essentially trying to help the FBI, and
after you concluded that the take was not important to the CIA, your
position was that if the FBI wanted the information, they should do
it themselves?
Mr. STEWART. That's right.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Thank you. I have nothing further at this time, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. 'Ve will turn first to Senator Hart of Colorado.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abernathy, in the Inspector General's Survey of the Office of
Security in 1960 [exhibit 11]; there is reference to the "overall potential
of the New York mail operation." And that paragraph states as
follows:
It is improbable that anyone inside Russia would wittingly send or receive mail
containing anything of obvious intelligence or political significance. It should
also be assumed that Russian tradecraft is as good as our own and that Russian
agents communicating with their headquarters would have more secure
channels than the open mails.
In that connection, do you have any reason to change your assessment
of the potential evaluation of mail openings today?
Mr. ABERNATHY. No, sir. I've had no contact WIth it up until today.
Senator HART of Colorado. But with your experience and judgment,
would that still be essentially your assessment of the situation?
1 See p. 170.
10
Mr. ABERNATHY. I'm not sure I would be in a position to make such
an assessment to date, but I do not have any information that would
cause me to change my view.
Senator HART of Colorado. Therefore, you would still believe, as
you apparently did then, that there would be little intelligence or
political significance contained in the mail ~
Mr. ABERNATHY. Again, I'm not sure that I have all of the facts
available that would enable me to make such a conclusion. But on the
basis of the information I do have, I would say that my views would
be the same.
Senator HART of Colorado. Following that statement, the report
went on to say that:
On the other hand, many seemingly innocent statements can have intelligence
significance. Comments concerning prices, crop conditions, the weather, travel
plans, or general living conditions can be important.
In this regard, do you believe that these "innocent statements"
justify the opening of mail illegally?
Mr. ABERNATHY. No, sir. I cannot say I believe that.
Senator HART of Colorado. And if these "innocent statements" on
crop conditions, the weather, and general living conditions are important
for us to know, do you not believe this information could be
collected through overt rather than covert means?
Mr. ABERNATHY. Certainly. That is true.
Senator HART of Colorado. Most of this kind of information could
be collected overtly~
Mr. ABERNATHY. Yes.
Senator HART of Colorado. In the same Inspector General's Survey
of the Office of Security, that same document we are referring to,
there is reference in paragraph 6, on pages 3 and 4, to the random
selection of letters to be opened. That paragraph states as follo\\'s:
Of the total items opened, about one-third are on the watch list and the
others are selected at random. Over the years, however, the interceptors have
developed a sixth sense or intuition, and many of the names on the watch list
were placed there as a result of interest created hy the random openings.
Could you describe briefly for this committee your understanding
of this "sixth sense or intuition?"
Mr. ABERNATHY. Well, when someone does something for a number
of years, he begins to develop a feel for it. In this particular case,
perhaps the addressees' mail address to Soviet officials perhaps would
have been of more interest. I'm sorry that I don't have the recall necessary
to go back 15 years to bring up facts that might have been available
to me then, but it is purely intuition as I see it.
Senator HART of Colorado. And these individuals who developed
thi~ uncanny ability can scan envelopes, or the exteriors of pieces of
mall, and somehow through these vibrations or instincts determine that
th.ere may be something there, and therefore open them? If their instmcts.
ar~ wrong, of cou~e,.they have invaded somebody's privacy, as
they dId m any case; but It IS the random nature of the operation that
I think interests us here.
Mr. ABERNATHY. Yes, sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. vVas this intuition based on sound counterintelligence
judgment, like that of the CIA inspectors or on their
own personal dislikes of individuals or organizations? '
11
Mr. ABERNATHY. I do not think that their personal likes or dislikes
entered into it. I think it was purely random, the selection of the mail,
except for those on the watch list, and I am not sure that they had
any particular means of specifically identifying documents they were
looking for.
Senator HART of Colorado. So 15 years later, you cannot sharpen
for us the kind of elements that went into this sixth sense?
Mr. ABERXATHY. That is correct.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Stewart, I would like to ask you,
as former Inspector General, a couple of questions in this regard. In
your interview by th~ sta~, you m~ntioned that despite yo~r understanding
that the mall proJect was Illegal, you never took tIllS matter
to the CIA General Counsel, Mr. Huston. Could you explain to us
why you never did that?
Mr. STEWART. I can merely say that I did not at that time feel it
was necessary to explore it with him. I didn't think that the question
of its legality was that tricky.
Senator HART of Colorado. In other words, if it is a matter that is
clearly illegal, you do not have to consult the General Counsel?
Mr. STEWART. "'Yell, in drawing up my report for the Director, I did
not feel I needed to.
Senator HART of Colorado. You only consult the General Counsel
when it is a marginal question? In other words, if it might be illegal?
Mr. STEWART. I can give you an illustration of that. I did consult
the General Counsel on a matter having to do with the CIA's responsibilities
in the general field of arms control at one time. This was to
get an interpretation of the 1947 Act which he gave very handily,
and I didn't feel that this ,,'as that kind of a question.
Senator HART of Colorado. Do you know if the General Counsel
was ever informed of the existence of the mail opening projects?
Mr. STEWART. Well, I was told by Mr. Paul Wallach of your staff
that he was not so informed.
Senator HART of Colorado. But you had no information during the
time?
Mr. STEWART. I had no information at the time.
Senator HART of Colorado. Do you know from your information,
either at the time or since then, whether information on the mail
projects was deliberately held back from the General Counsel?
Mr. STEWART. No; I really don't know the answer to that question.
Senator HART of Colorado. In a general policy or organizational
sense, could you describe for us the relationship within the CIA between
the Inspector General and the General Counsel?
Mr. STEWART. ",Ve were both staff members under the Director. He,
o~ course. with his set of responsihilities, and the Inspector General
WIth another sct of responsibilities; we worked together on matters
that called for, let us sav. investiO'ation and also leO'al )·udQ1llent. In
I .' ~ ~ ~ ot leI' matters, we rarely consulted him where there was no need to do
so.
Senator HART of Colorado. Are there, ·within the CIA, formal procedures
by which the Inspector General reports to the General Counsel
any questionable activities that he may run across?
Mr. STEWART. I should say only conflict of interest comes to mind.
He certainly is in on that whole aspect. but I don't recall any other case
12
where I would be called upon to report to him. And I should say on
an operation, particularly a very closely held one, I would have authorization
to expand the number of people briefed on the operation before
I did so.
Senator HART of Colorado. Rut on other judgments and other matters..
it is pretty much an ad hoe judgment if things are to be referred
to 111m?
Mr. STEWART. Yes. For example, personnel matters; if there were
illegal aspects of some action taken in the A~ency with re,gard to an
individual who had then placed a grievance before us, we naturally
would go to the General Counsel on a matter of that sort.
Senator HART of Colorado. A minute ago, Mr. Stewart, I asked if
you had any information about whether the mail opening projects had
been purposely withheld from the General Counsel, and I think your
indication ,,'as that you thought it had not been. It has been called to
my attention that in your interview with the staff in response to this
specific question. you said, "well, I am sure that it was held back from
him on purpose."
Mr. STEW,\RT. I had in mind there the procedure that we had on any
closely-held project; that is, to name the people who were authorized
to know about it. You can interpret the absence of his name from that
list as a positiw decision not to let him know about it. You can also
interpret it as a decision that there was no particular requirement that
he know about it.
Senator HART of Colorado. 'Vhat would have been the response of
the policymakers in the CIA if this matter had come to his attention
as the General Counsel? And if he had clearly stated, either orally or
in writing. that it was illegal, would the project have continued?
Mr. STEWART. I really don't know. That is simply a matter of guesswork.
Senator HART of Colorado. Has that kind of situation ever arisen in
the CIA, in your experience?
Mr. STEWART. Not directly in my experience, and I really would have
It hard time thinking of an operation that had been dropped because of
such objections.
Senator HART of Colorado. Rased on your experience, do you think
this is one of the dangers of compartmentation that the committee has
run into on a number of occasions, where tlw so-called "need-to-know"
has been a device to avoid directly confrontin~ questions of legality?
Where the question of legality arises, you merely bypass the office that
has the responsibility for raising the question of legality and therefore,
it nerer has to surface or be confronted by the policymaker.
Mr. STEWART. 'Well, I hare a hard time believing that the question of
lrgality was not confronted in this matter. I feel that those responsible
for the operation understood its status as something outside of the law;
that they had determined that it was necessary to go ahead with the
project despite that, and had sought such clearances as they thought
necessary at the time. So I do not feel that the question of legality was
actually swept under the rug, simply because you do not include the
General Counsel in on those who are briefed on it.
Mr. Karamessines, of course, had legal trainipg and practiced law,
so he is not entirely unknowledgeable in the law. And certainly Mr.
Hplms. I should say~ is a highlvintelligent map, and also understood
,,~hat i" • :~rt \"Vfi Q ~~n t!"
13
Senator HART of Colorado. Well, that is considerably different from
th~ <?fficer in the Agency charged with the duty of rendering legal
opmIOn.
Mr. STEWART. You are quite right.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sch\veiked
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stewart, the
two Inspector General surveys, which have dealt in part with the
mail problems, provide our committee with a chance to examine the
internal workings of the CIA. 1Vould you tell the committee how
many people were working in the IG's office when you were Inspector
General?
Mr. STEWART, Oh, I think about a dozen staff members. And then,
we had secretarial help.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you know how many people are working
in the IG's office now? ,Vould you be surprised to know that by 1973,
your dozen had dropped to about half a dozen in the midst of some
very serious accusations and charges about the CIA?
Mr. STEW.\RT. Yes, I heard about that, and I was surprised that
thev had cut it back.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you feel, with 12 people, you had the staff
to do the IG's job as you envisioned it?
Mr. STEWART. Sir, any job is almost limitless, and I could easily
have managed more people on the staff. Bnt I felt that we were able
to cover the essentials with the team that we had at the time,
and in the frame of reference we had at that time.
I think I explained, in my deposition, that we were aiming toward
a review of each entity in the Agency on about a 5-year basis. More frequent
inspections, I think, would be counterproductiYe. Less frequent,
I think, really would show a weakness.
Senator SCHWEIKER. As a matter of routine, did your IG reports
go to anyone outside the Agency?
Mr. STEWART. No, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. In other words, the President or the White
House never received a copy unless specifically the Director of CIA
might pass on such a copy of his decision?
Mr. STEWART. Not to my knowh·dge.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. And did the Q\'ersight committees of the Congress,
to your knowledge, ever receive, on a routine basis, any Inspector
General reports?
Mr. STEWART. They did not.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Would you not think, in strengthening the
Inspector General's office and position and role in the CIA, that the
ft.ow of information on a regular basis, both to the "Thite House and
to the responsible oversight committee of Congress, would be a very
essential element?
Mr. STEWART. 'Yell, I have read of snch a proposal recently, and
it has giYen me a great deal to think about. It would certainly, in
a way, strengthen the Inspector General's role. I do not doubt that at
all. It would also, I think, change his role wry significantly within
the Aw'ncy. There is a great deal of difference between going to an
entity in the Agency saying, we come here on behalf of the Director,
and we want to have you open up everything you've got, and tell, us
and talk to us on a professional lenl and person to person and bemg
quite open; and going in as an outside inspector. And we, of course,
64-6G:; - ii, - ..:.
14
have had outside inspections in the past-by the Clark report years
ago-and I think there were one or two others which had a different
quality. Now, this is a question, I think, that would have to be resolved.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you consider it part of your job to ferret
out illegal activities ~ Is that your concept of what an Inspector General
and the staff is supposed to do-ferret out activities within the
Agency that violate the law? Is that part of your mandate as Inspector
General?
Mr. STEWART. Oh, yes, indeed.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And you did put the mail opening in that
category?
Mr. STEWART. Yes.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And you fairly well recommended that it be
discontinued, is that correct?
Mr. STEWART. Right.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Obviously, they did not pay any attention
to your recommendation. And my question is, how many times did
you make a recommendation of some illegal activity to which they
did pay attention as opposed to the times they did not? This is a fairly
clear-cut violation yet the decision was made up above not to respect
your views. My question is, how many times were you thwarted in
this way, and how many times did they back you up in pointing out
something that was illegal?
Mr. STEWART. 'While I was Inspector General, I really don't recall
that we touched on other clearly illegal activities. It may be that it
doesn't come to mind right now.
Senator SCHWEIKER. 'What is an Inspector General for? Maybe I
have an erroneous understanding of how an Inspector General is used
in other parts of government, but it would seem to me that one of the
purposes of an Inspector General would be to ferret out illegal activities.
In fact, one of the rationales as to why the Congress has not
looked into the CIA before is the view that it polices itself and it does
not need 'any outside supervision. because the CIA has its own methods
and does this itself. I assume that policing mechanism would be the
Inspector General.
The point is, and I am sure the same argument was made to the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, that you really have an intemal
policing mechanism and yet you do not see it 'as a mandate to ferret
out illegal activities. I have great difficulty understanding what the
purpose of the Inspector General's office is.
Mr. STEWART. I think we misunderstood each other. I would certainly
say that as I came upon illegal adivities. it would be my job
to bring them right to the top. to the Director's attention, and we did
that in this case. What I said was that in the survevs that we ran
while I was Inspector General, I was not aware of other illegal activities
that we had come upon.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. You never came across any other illegal
activities ?
Mr. STEWART. That is quite correct.
Senator SCHWEIKER. During your tenure?
Mr. STEWART. Not that I can recall.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. How do you account for what we are finding
now in our House 'and Senate Intelligence Committees? 'Was this a
15
lack of communication or compartmentalization? 'Vhere did the breakdown
occur, if what you say is correct?
Mr. STEWART. Could you be specific?
Senator SCUWEIKl<:R. 'Vell, we have been holding a number of hearings.
'Ve had a hearing here a while ago where a Presidential order
was violated on shellfish toxin. 'Ve have been holding a number of
other hearings where the CIA was not complying with the law of the
land. And my question is, how do you account for the discrepancies
that are now coming to light, when you are saying that during your
tenure you really did not find 'any other illegal activities? I am a little
bit confused. You are saying obviously that you did not know about
them, but are you now maintaining there were no other illegal activities
going on during your tenure as Inspector General?
:l\fr. Sn:wART. No, sir. I'm not maintaining that. I simply say that
in the course of our surveys, which, I explained, we took about the rate
of one every 5 years, we had in fact not come upon other megal activities
that I recall and about which we reported.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. Did the rotation of component service stop
in 1973, and were you aware of this situation?
Mr. STEWART. Well, I had heard that, yes. I was retired at that time.
I had no voice in the operation of the Agency.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you consider it part of your job to see that
the Agency lived up to its charter?
Mr. STEWART. Yes. indeed.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Then I gather that you probably would assume
that mail opening, in addition to being illegal due to the mail laws,
was also a violation of the charter's ban on internal security functions?
)11'. STEWART. That is quite correct.
Senator SCUWEIKER. That is corr-ect.
Do you think it is appropriate not to have written authorization in
projects of this kind and would written authorizations from people
above you be a factor here in helping thc Inspector General to have his
finding implemented instead of ignored? In other words, would it help
you do your job to pinpoint responsibility in writing, which you say
apparently did not occur in many of these instances, in order to clarify
who was contravening the IG's recommendation?
Mr. STEWART. 'Well, I explained it was not our job to follow up on
recommendations that we made. That rested with the Executive Director.
I have the feeling that our recommendations were clearly addressed
to an individual. In the case of this project, they were addressed
to the Ohief of the Clandestine SelTice, Mr. Karamessines.
There was no doubt in my mind as to who had the responsibility to
act on those recommendations or give reason why they had not done so.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. One final question for Mr. Glennon. Mr. Glennon,
how and when did the FBI learn of the New York mail opening
program?
Mr. GLEXXOX. I believe we put in our report in 1958.
Senator SCHWEIKER. How long had the program been going on prior
to 1958?
Mr. GLEXNOX. Several years.
Senator SCHWEIKER. All right. Now, why didn't the CIA tell the
FBI about this program?
Mr. GLEXXOX. I havl'n't the slightest idea. Perhaps they did.
16
Senator SCHWEIKER. 'Well, our information is that they did not.
They came upon it inadvertently, so it just strikes me peculiar that we
have an agency that is charged with internal securIty; that is, the
FBI, and while this obvionsly was an illegal procedure, the CIA did
it for a number of years without even telling the agency responsible for
internal security that such an event was going on.
And it would seem to me that because, again, you are in the matter
or who handles intelligence internally, that here again was something
of which someone in the IG's office should have been aware. You do
not feel that it is part of your responsibility to keep the right agency in
the right job and to see who follows what internal security law~
Mr. GLENNON. I certainly feel that these programs should be coordinated
in the intelligence community. Now, this project, I believe
started out just as an operational effort of our Soviet division. It had
nothing to do with internal security, but looking for operational leads
against the Soviet Union. So, the internal security aspects apparently
became important later on, when the Bureau, I don't know how
they--
Senator SCHWEIKER. All the mail coming back to this country was
opened as well as the mail going out, so it is a little hard to conceive
how you cannot say it is not an internal security function.
Mr. GLENNON. I didn't say it is not. I just said it started as an
operation.
Senator SCHWEIKER. 'When it first started, mail was read both ways.
It was not just read one way. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Senator TOWER [presiding]. The committee shall stand in recess,
subject to the call of the Chair. It should be about 10 minutes.
[A brief recess was taken.]
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The hearing will please come back to
order.
I believe Senator Huddleston had been recognized.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stewart, in your investigation, what type of people did you
find was in the Agency who were actually performing the mail opening
~ What was their general experience ~
Mr. STEWART. I refer that question to Mr. Glennon, because he was
the one who talked with the people doing this job.
Mr. GLENNON. I believe that the people actually opening the mail
were security officers.
Senator HUDDLESTON. They were not in counterintelligence ~
Mr. GLENNON. Not to the best of my knowledge.
Senator HUDDLESTON. They had no experience particnlarly in counterintelligence
~ .
Mr. GLENNON. No, sir. One of the r~ommendationswe were making
was to improve the personnel, analyzing it, in an attempt to improve
the product.
Senator HUDDLESTON. So, for a project here that was designed primarily
for counterintelligence, we had people who had no experience
in counterintelligence ~
Mr. GLENNON. As far as I know.
Senator HUDDLESTON. 1Vho were randomly opening the mail without
any guidance or without any substantial guidance, even from
within the organization; is that correct ~
17
Mr. GLENNON. I might defer that question to Mr. Abernathy. Do
you have any comment?
Mr. ABERKATHY. I would say that is correct, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. They had no special expertise in being able
to assess the value of the contents of any letter that they might open.
Is that correct?
Mr. GLENNON. I believe they would. They were trained security officers
and would be aware of activities which would be subversive and
dangerous to the security of the United States. .
Senator HUDDLESTON. But would they be aware of any countermtelligence
implication?
Mr. GLENNON. No, sir, not especially.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Are you aware of exhibit 2/ the memorandum
which sets out the description of this project? Do you have a copy
of that? This is a memo dated November 7, 1955, Subject:
HTLINGUAL.
Mr. GLENNON. Dated November 21?
Senator HUDDLESTON. November 21 was the cover memorandum to
this project report. The project report itself, paragraph 6, under "Security,"
down at the very last few sentences indicates there will be
special briefings of those to become knowledgeable and that a record
kept of those so briefed. Did you find such a record?
Mr. GLENNON. There was a record; yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Indicating the individuals who actually were
participating and the fact that they had been briefed?
Mr. GLENNON. I never saw or held a list in my hand because I figured
we could complete our inspection and make our recommendations
to abandon that project without knowing all the names of the
people involved. In the Agency we knew those obviously on a basis
of need to know. We would really need to know who was cleared in
this case for years past.
Senator HUDDLESTON. On this matter, then, discussing this project
with the General Counsel and with other responsible individuals,
was that neglect, in your judgment, because of this "need-to-know"
policy that no person, even within the Agency, ,,,ho did not need to
know about it would be informed of it?
Mr. STEWART. As far as I am concerned, sir, the reason I didn't
discuss it with the General Counsel was because I didn't feel it was
necessary to do so.
Senator HUDDLESTON. From the standpoint of its legality?
Mr. STEWART. Correct.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You had no intuition that he already knew
about it?
Mr. STEWART. I didn't know one way or another. It is a matter of
fact; I did not discuss the project with him.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Would the subject of maintaining a policy of
plausible deniability enter into the matter of whether or not there
would have been broader discussion of it?
Mr. STEWART. Well, the reason for a list of people cleared to know
about the project is to simply control a secret; that is, if you just have
a few people who know about something, then you have better control
1 See p. 187.
18
of whether this knowledge leaks out to other people. And, we always
endeavored to keep those lists as short as we could.
Senator HUDDLESTO~. Wasn't there also an interest within the
Agency, if not on this project, on other projects, of operating in such
a fashion that should it become public knowledge, that certain persons
could be exempted from any blame, so to speak, on the basis that they
did not have specific knowledge of it?
Mr. STEWART. I don't know how that would operate in this case. I
haven't thought about that.
Senator Hu'DDLESTON. You don't believe that was a factor in this
case? In that same paragraph in exhibit 2 1 that I just referred to, paragraph
6, headed "Security," there is this statement:
In the event of compromise of the aspect of the project involving internal
monitoring of the mails, serious public reaction in the United States would probably
occur. Conceivably, pressure would be placed on Congress to inquire into
such allegations, but it is believed that any problems arising could be satisfactorily
handled.
Do you have any idea or knowledge of what that phrase means and
just how inquiry from Congress would be satisfactorily handled by
this particular operation?
Mr. STEWART. This is the first time that I have read this memorandum.
I don't know what was in the mind of the person who wrote it"
Public inquiry that would be raised publicly by the Congress"-I
should have said would be very difficult to handle. Private inquiry, if
it had been raised by a congressional committee with the Director,
might have been another thing. I just don't know what they had in
mind when they wrote this.
Senator HUDDLF..8TOX. Do you have any knowledge as a result of your
inquiry into the Agency of what method had been used in any other
instance, or in this particular instance, relating to the handling of
congressional inquiries into such matters?
Mr. STEWART. I always understood-I never had direct knowledge
of this-I always understood that the Director of Central Intelligence,
in dealing with the oversight committees as they existed at that time,
felt at times called upon to take up with those committees matters of
considerable sensitivity. Rut that was certainly not one area of my
responsibility. I never participated in any such talks, and that is about
as much as I can help you on that.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. The record would indicate that the Director
had been pretty successful over the years, would it not, viewing the extent
of congressional oversight into this kind of operation?
Mr. STEWART. That was my understanding.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Let me refer you to exhibit 3/ which is a
memorandum for the Director of Central Intellig-ence through the
Chief of Operations, relating to this Project HTLINGUAL. This
apparently is a summary. This is dated May 4, 1956, some several
months after the project had been in operation. It appears to be an
update or a revie" of just what the project is. It says in the second
paragraph: .
You will recall that Project HTLINGUAL is a very sensitive project involving
the analysis of mail entering New York City from the Soviet Union. While the
project was originally designed to examine and record information from only
1 Se.e p. 187.
• See p. 195.
19
the outside of the envelopes, for some time selected openings have been conducted
and the cuntent~ examined. This is, uf cuurse, withuut the knowledge of the postal
authorities.
Does it seem there that since this is such a perfunctory phrase, "This
is, of course, without the knowledge of the postal authorities," that
there must have been an awareness that the operation itself then could
not be approved if postal authorities were aware of itl
Mr. ,sTEWART. I think that would be one logical conclusion to this,
yes.
,senator HUDDLESTON. This memorandum goes on to indicate the
types of some of the mails that are heing opened, and in paragraph ,)
it says:
It is interesting to note that of 20 letters which were in the analysis, one
mentioned that a brother was a priest, two had Christmas greetings, four
starting out with the wording ":Praised he Jesus Christ," one used the phrase
"'I'hank God"-for a total of !:l out of :20 with some religious reference.
Would yoU consider this mail coming from the Soviet Union to be of
important foreign intelligence I
lVIr. ,sTEWART. No, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Would it be important counterintelligence
information ~
Mr. STEWART. Not in my view.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The tinal paragraph says:
It is hoped that when we are better staffed to analyze this material for other
than counterintelligence purposes, other and perhaps more significant data may
be obtained.
Does your information or your inquiry indicate that there were
serious efforts along the way to evaluate the product of this operation
and whether or not it was, in fact, providing any kind of intelligence
that was worth the infringement upon the privacy that it involved in
the random opening of thousands of letters?
Mr. STEWART. My feeling about it is that when you have available
a source such as this, it certainly is incumbent on the Agency to try
to tind out whether in the materials received there are things of
potential positive intelligence value. I suppose that paragraph 5
could be read to say that despite the antireligious policies of the Soviet
l;nion there is a survival of religion, I think a very minor subject, but
that is apparently what was intended here. Other such minor matters
might have been derived from these letters. But beyond that I would
only speculate. I never read any batch of them. I don't know what this
kind of thing contained or could possibly have contained.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It seems to me the tenor of the entire body of
memoranda that were made before May 1956, was that most of the
information received has been very insignificant and has knowingly
gone into an operation that just randomly infringed on the privacy
of many, many citizens and the opening of their private mail. It
seems that just a cursory examination would dictate that we ought to be
getting something pretty significant that is pretty earth shaking in
order to justify that kind of operation.
Mr. STEWART. Mr. Angelton makes it clear that he is talking about
something-let us say, an added bonus-to the basic counterintelligence
value of these materials. He, of course, was the CIA's Chief of the
Counterintelligence Staff.
20
Senator HUDDLESTON. He indicates that he hopes within the future
they would be able to derive something more significant from the
operation. The memorandum seems to me to express a hope.
Mr. STEWART. Yes; well, you could read it that way. I would read
it that he is satisfied with his counterintelligence data and perhaps
something more significant than what you have in paragraph 5 might
be obtained.
Senator HlTDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Goldwater, do you have any questions?
Senator GOLDWATER. I have two short questions.
Mr. Glennon was Mr. Stewart's IG. I believe, at one time, and I
think he conducted a survey of the Counterintelligence Staff and reviewed
the New York mail project. Is it true that you testified that
you knew of no agency consumer who was satisfied with the results of
the operation?
Mr. GLENNON. That is right, sir, no internal CIA component.
Senator GOLDWATER. And, notwithstanding this, the operation
rontinued?
Mr. GLENNON. Yes. sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. This operation continued for 20 years at a
substantial risk to the Agency. Isn't it likely that some high officials in
a position to evaluate its worth found the intelligence "take" to be of
overriding importance?
Mr. GLENNON. Yes, sir, it is possible. Unbeknownst to me, it is
possible that the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, the Director,
and other senior officials might have discussed this and decided to
keep it. I have no idea. All I would know is people I talked to, the
customers within the Agency, work day-to-day people, found very
little use for the material.
Senator GOT,nWATF.R. Is that the practice in other countries, to have
mail intercepted?
Mr. GLENNON. I think this mail that we are bilking about has already
been intercepted by the Soviet Union and the Russian intelligence
service. But our situation was to see what was already known to the
Russians. Personally, if I had a letter opened from the Soviet Union,
I would not object because I would not mind the FBI knowing what
the Russian intelligence service knows.
Senator GOLDWATER. One other question.
Mr. Abernathy's 1960 review of the New York project revealed
no documentation of authorization for openinrrs from within or outside
the Agency. The report states that the DCI, the DDP, and the
DDS were aware of the proiect from inception and that their approvals
may therefore be implied. My question is, for an operation of
this sensitivity, is there anything unusual about a lack of
documentation?
Mr. ABERNATHY. No, sir. I would not say it would be unusual in
this case.
Senator GOLDWATER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIR;\fAX. Thank you. Senator Goldwater.
Senator Tower?
21
Senator TOWER. JIr. Glennon, in your 1969 re\'icw of the New York
project, did yon disconr or find any documentary evidence that
authorized mail opening (
Mr. Gu-:xxox. Ko, sir
Senator TOWER. Mr. Ste,,'art, you have told the staff that your
reason for not tf'lling the Genrral Connsrl of the operation was that
your responsibility was to the DCI. If the DCI \yanted a legal opinion,
that was his prerogatiw. But you neyer raised the illegality of the
question with the DCI or notify him that such an opinion should be
solicited. Why?
Mr. STEWART. I certainly did not raise the legality question in the
written report. I assumed that the Director knew of its status as a
projl'ct that \yas beyond thl' law, and in my deposition I said that
if he had a reason for exploring this problem with the General Counsel,
that \yould be np to him. I did not feel it was up to me to take it up
with the General Counsel.
Senator TOWER. You felt it was illegal?
Mr. STEWART. Yes, indeed.
Senator TOWER. Bnt you did not make any recommendation to the
DCI on that?
Mr. Sn:w.\RT. I rf'commended that we consider closing the project
because of its flap potential.
Sl'nator TOWER. Do YOU have any rf'commrndation, short of an
independent Inspector 'General, that would prevent the institution
of illf'gal projects of this kind or, do you think that the only way to
prevent it is to have an iDdepl'ndent Inspector General?
Mr. Sn:w.\RT. 'Vell, I can imagine many \vays that you could do
this. I think one \yould be perhaps looking at the basic law that authorizes
the oprrations of the CIA and specifying those areas in which the
Agency could not deal in some greater degree of exactness. Certainly
ha\'ing an independent Inspector General would provide another
check on the operations of the Agency. I think if you did have such
an Inspector GeneraL it would be absolutely ne~ssary that he be included
in all operations. that the need-to-know principle not be applied
in his case. that he \vonld have a need to know of C\'erything that was
done if you expect that he will operate in this \Yay. Those would be
the \vays that come to mind, as far as I am concerned, in avoiding
repetition of this sort of thing.
Senator TOWER. Xow, from the mid-fifties until 1966, both the CIA
and the FBI \vere opening mail. Are either you or Mr. Abernathy
able to shed any light on the nature of the liaison, if any, that existed
between the CTA and the FBI?
Mr. STEWART. I really can be very little help on that. I knew that
wo had a regular established liaison channel, and as we state in our
rl'port. by 1969. when we got around to it, their liaison officer said to
ns that the FBI wanted very much to have ns continue the project
and provide this take to them. But the history of this is something
I haTe not mym>lf gone into. I cannot help you much.
Senator TOWER. Can you add anything to that, Mr. Abernathy?
Mr. ABERXATIIY. No, sir. I cannot.
Senator TOWER. To the best of your knowledgl', did either the CIA
01' the FBI recommend that yon limit the scope of the openings to the
mail of probable violators of the espionage la\vs?
22
Mr. STEWART. I know of no such action.
Mr. ABERKATIIY. Nor I, sir.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIR:\L\N. Thank you, Senator Tower.
I think it was you, Mr. Glennon, who said that you would have no
objection to the Government opening your mail since the Russians
opened mail. That intrigues me very much.
Mr. GLENNON. Sir, I defend this project of the Agency in no way
whatsoever. It was illegal and should have been discontinued. I am
just speaking of my personal opinion, that I would really not object
unless I had an ax to grind somewhere; then I might. I might make
a lot of publicity about it. But I have no ax to grind.
The CHAIRMAN. It is your personal opinion. I understand you do
not defend this because it was illegal. You just say personally you
have no objection to the Government opening your mail because the
Russians open the mail. That is the thing I wanted to get at.
Would you have any objection to our police coming in and searching
your home without a warrant because the Russian police do not have
to have a warrant?
Mr. GLENKON. Oh, I draw the line. I draw the line.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you draw the line?
Mr. GLENNON. Of course, sir. I don't really support the idea at all.
I'm just saying I wouldn't condemn the Agency or the Bureau if thev
opened my mail. I'm saying personally, having had it done, I don't
think you should make such a big hullabaloo out of it. I think it· was
done-it is not being done any longer-and I think the Agency should
be given a chance to go ahead.
The CHAIRMAN. The Supreme Court of the United States does not
draw the same distinction that you do, between searching a house
and searching the mail. They said, and it has been the law of the land
for a long, long time, that the mail is entitled to the same protection
as a person's house.
Mr. GLENNON. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. But the law didn't mean very much to any of you
gentlemen, did it?
Mr. GLENNON. Yes, it did, sir. We said it was illegal, and we recommended
that it be discontinued. What more can you do? It meant
something, going to the General Counsel, for example.
The CHAIRMAN. When Mr. Stewart testified a few minutes ago, he
said that you recommended it be discontinued.
Mr. GLENNON. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. Not because of the illegality, but because of the
flap potential.
Mr. GLENNON. The flap potential is because it was illegal.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but the flap potential was what worried you.
As a matter of fact, in none of your reports did you even speak of
the illegality.
Mr. GLENNON. It speaks for itself. sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You said it spoke for itself. You were concerned
it might embarrass the Agency. It wasn't your concern--
Mr. GLENNON. That is one concern. sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It was not your concern that the law had been
,-jolated.
Mr. GLENNON. Yes, sir, it--
23
The CHAIR:\IAN. 'Well, if it had been your concern that the law had
bARn violated, why wouldn't that have figured into your reports?
Mr. GLENNON. It did. We recommended that it be stopped.
The CHAIRMAN. You recommended that it be stopped because it
might embarrass the Agency if it had been revealed.
Mr. GLENNON. Sir, I also recommended the 17 ways to improve this
project in case it were continued. Now, our job is to inspect and report
what we find. vVe found that it was illegal. ,Ve recommended it be
stopped. But, if for some other more important reason it was continued,
then we would recommend some steps to improve upon the
operation.
The CUAIR)IAN. Mr. Glennon, in 1960, the first report said "evaluated
and approved." Through the years the evaluation showed it was not
worth continuiQg.
Mr. GLENNON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You recommended that it be stopped. You did not
really recommend in 1969 that it be stopped. You said it still wasn't
worth anything. You were worried about the flap that might develop
if the Agency had been caught having conducted 20 years of illegal
mail openings. You didn't recommend that it be stopped as far as the
mail openings were concerned. You recommended that it be turned
over to the FBI so that the FBI could take the risk. Isn't that right, in
1969?
Mr. GLENNON. They were the principal customers. I recommended
it be stopped, period. Then, if it were not stopped, they should turn it
over to the FBI since they were the principal customer, and ask them
to Serve our requirements if \ve had any.
The CHAIR)IAN. So, all through this period that you were investigating
this program that you, yourselves, evaluated as worthless, or at
least not worthwhile enough to continue, and then recommended
finally that it be stopped or turned over to the FBI, none of these
recommendations affected the Agency. The Agency continued to use
the program.
What is the Inspector General's Office for, and is there no followthrough
with respect to its recommendations? Is there no report back,
so that you know whether or not your recommendations have been
approved or disapproved? Is there no connection between the Inspector
General's Office and the counsel that is supposed to try to keep
the Agency operating \vithin the law? How is it that year after year
after year these reports go in and nothing happens and no reports
come back? What is the matter with the Inspector General's Office that
it is so impotent?
Mr. STEWART. Is that for me?
The CHAIR:\IAN. Anyone who wants to answer.
Mr. STEWART. The Inspector General's Office was a device used by
the Director to bring to the surface problems that he should consider
and that other senior officials in the Agency should consider. We certainly
did not have the authority to' give orders to close things. We
had, however, the authority to report and to recommend. It was then
up to the Agency management to decide how they would deal with
t1wse recommendations.
Routinely, the replies to recommendations-in this case, the r-eply
that )11'. Karamessines would have made to the recommendationR
24
addressed to him-·would have been sent to the Executive Director's
office and then passed on to us. If it were a reply ,vhich said "we don't
go along with this recommendation," the Inspector General would
then have an opportunity to state again, or to state in other terms,
the reasons for his recommendation or his reasons for not agreeing
with our Chief of the Clandestine Service.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that happen in any of these cases?
Mr. STEWART. In this case, to my knowledge-and I have been told
this by Mr. \Vallach-that reply did not come back to us. I don't
know why and 1, myself, in conducting the affairs of the Inspector
General's Office, did not run a tickler on the Executive Director. He
had the followup responsibility. I simply assumed that his office would
take each of the many recommendations that we had, follow up and
be sure that we got some response. How this one happened to fall
through and not be responded to is a question I can't answer.
The CHAIRl\fAN. This program has been going on for some time. I
have the figures here to show the extent of the program, which I will
reveal when the next witness, who is best able to testify on this
subject, comes to the stand. Figures that I do not believe have been
released before will show how very large the program was, how long
it continued, and the fact that it was clearly against the law throughout
that period, even though it was unproductive in terms of intelligence
gathering.
Mr. STEWART. I should like to just say on that that it is certainly my
understanding that the Federal Bureau considered it to be productive
from the point of view of intelligence gathering. That at least is what
their liaison officer told us.
The CHAIRMAN. \Vell, we will have the Federal Bureau here to testify
directly on that score. The point that I wish to make is that I cannot
think of a clearer case that illustrates the attitude that the CIA
lives outside the law, beyond the law, and that, although others must
adhere to it, the CIA sits above it, and you cannot run a free society that
way. Either your intelligence agencies live within the law, or the beginning
of an erosion that can undermine the whole society is put in motion
and that is what we have seen-the erosion of illegal practices
begins with the CIA and then extends to the FBI. We will be seeing
many instances, flagrant instances, of that erosion from the very agency
that is supposed to enforce the laws of this country; then it extends to
the Internal Revenue Service, the Post Office Department, and pretty
soon it begins to permeate the whole Government. That is why it is
going to stop, and I hope that this investigation has something to do
with stopping it.
If there are no further questions, we will go to our next witness.
Mr. Osborn, would you please stand and take the oath? Do you
solemnly swear all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. OSBORN. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schwarz, would you begin the questioning?
Mr. SCHWARZ. Counsel, would you identify yourself, and does Mr.
Osborn have an opening statement?
Mr. DEBELB.8. Yes; yes, my name is John Debelias. I am Mr. Oshorn's
counsel. He does have an opening statement, which he would
like to read. \Ve have provided copies of this statement.

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