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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
83
Senator SCHWEIKER. I just want to say I agree with your point that
when somebody from an FBI agency or CIA agency comes in and
tells you a project is secret, immediate assumptions are formed in your
own mind, and I think this is what is wrong with the system. One
assumes that if a project is secret, somebody up there knows it and
somebody else approves it, and obviously this is not the caiole, but I
can understand that assumption. I think this is what we have to deal
with in the committee.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. MONTAGUE. ~\fay I make just one comment, Senator?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Montague.
Mr. MONTAGUE. Along the line of the Long hearings that Senator
Schweiker asked about, according to my recollection during that
entire hearing there was not one direct question to me on CIA, FBI, or
other intelligence agency mail coverage.
The CHAIRl\fAN. Time and time again in the course of this investigation,
we have had agents in the CIA tell us-and I think honestly sothat
what they did they did because they assumed it was approved.
But as we trace the line of authority upward, we often find that the
men at the top were not informed and had not authorized the
activity.
That concludes the hearing this morning until 2 o'clock this
afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 12 :58 p.m., the select committee was recessed, to
reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing win please come back to order.
Our witness this afternoon is Ambassador Helms, formerly the
Director of the CIA during- much of the period under investigation.
Mr. Helms, would you please stand and take the oath?
Do you solemnly swear that all of the testimony that you will give
in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
Ambassador HELMS. I do, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schwarz, will you commence with the questioning,
please?
TESTIMONY OF HON. RICHARD HELMS, AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AND
FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Helms, as I informed you during the luncheon
recess, the line of questioning I am going to follow will trace what
disclosures about the CIA mail-opening projects were or were not
made, first to Postmasters General, second to Attorneys General, and
third to Presidents. 'Ve are going to start ,,,ith Postmasters General.
Have you before you the chart headed "Postmasters General"?
Ambassador HELl\IS. I hare. Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. SCHWARZ. First, focusing on the not-informed individuals, is
it correct to the best of your knowledge that Messrs. Gronouski,
O'Brien, "Watson, and Klassen were not informed of tImt project?
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Ambassador HELMS. To the best of my knowledge, sir, that is
correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'With respect to Mr. Summerfield. who was the Postmaster
General from 1D53 until the end of the Eisenhower administration
in January of 1961, is it correct that you and Mr. Dulles went
to see him in 1954 to tell himsomething?
Ambassador HEL~rs. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'What did you tell him?
Ambassador HELMS. Mr. Schwarz. may I note, I think it would save
time for both of us, I will assume the dates on your paper are accurate.
I mean, I don't want to have to verify them each time. I would
just as soon we got the dates straight, but I don't want you to hold
me in jeopardy if one of them is wrong.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. 'Ve never tried to hold you in jeopardy,
Mr. Helms.
You went to see Mr. Summerfield along with Mr. Dulles and told
him something. What did you tell him?
Ambassador HELMS. 'VeIL I wrote a memorandum after Mr. Dulles
and I had been to that meeting, a memorandum ior the record I guess
you would call it; and I believe. as was the custom at the time, that I
sent the memorandum to Mr. Dulles so that he would see what I had
written about the meeting, and that was so long ago that I can only
say that what is in that memorandum I would be glad to vouch for
today.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. So. you agree then, that based upon the
memorandum, what you told Mr. Summerfield was that the Agency
wanted to photograph the backs and fronts of first-class mail to and
from the Soviet and satellite areas?
Ambassador HELMS. I think it was in that general ball park. that
kind of conversation; but the details of it, I am sorry, I cannot go any
further than what the memorandum says.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And the memorandum indicates that you did not tell
him that mail was going to be opened, is that right?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you say that I was correct when I said that?
Ambassador HELMS. What I'm trying to-the only thing I'm trying
to correct is that most of the talking at that meeting was done by Mr.
Dulles and not by me. I was very junior at that time and very young,
and Mr. Dulles was a quite articulate individual, and he carried the
burden, there is no doubt about that. So, when you say did I say this.
that would not be a correct description. It was he that was doing the
talking.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. But. just let us make the point clear. What
was told by Mr. Dulles to Mr. Summerfield was that the Agency
wanted to photograph the fronts and backs of envelopes and not
t~at the Agency had photographed or wanted to photograph the inSIdes,
the letters themselves.
Ambassador HELMS. It is my opinion today from reading the records
that he was not told the mail was being opened or would be opened.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. And, he was never told. as far as you
recall, and as far as the CIA records show between 1954 and leaving
office in 1961, is that right?
Ambassador HELMS. I just don't know, sir.
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Mr. SCHWARZ. Or you don't recall.
Ambassador HEUIS. I haven't seen any record.
Mr. ScmvARZ. And you don't recall doing it?
Ambassador HELJIS. I don't recall doing it. But whet.her Mr. Dulles
did or not, you seE', is something. He used to see a lot more of Mr.
Summerfield than I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And you don't re{'all Mr. Dulles telling you that he
did any such thing?
Ambassador HELJIS. No; I don't have any recollection.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
Now, when Mr. Day took oYer at the start of the Kennedy administration,
did you go see him?
Ambassador HELJIS. Yes; we did. I believe there were three of us,
the memorandum [exhibit 10 1J shO\vs, that we went to see him. Mr.
DullE',s was the Director 'and ~rr. Roosevelt, Cornelius Roosevelt in
this case, who was ChiE'f of the Technical Services Staff, and myself.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
Then you wrote a memorandum about that mee1Jing indicating that
you had brided, or that the group of you had briefed Mr. Day and
that you had withheld no relevant details. 'V"hat did you mean by
that?
Ambassador HEL~IS. 'VeIl, it is 14 years 'ago, and I have to 'be fair
enough to say that this conversation is not all that clear to me anymore.
If I wrote that memorandum the next day, which I believe I
did, it would haw been much more accurate, and I would like to stand
on the memorandum. I think what I said ,vas at our meeting any
l'E'leyant details, we told him the truth about the project. I think Mr.
Dulles did tell him the truth about the project.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And by telling the truth, you mean that in the case
of ~Ir. Day you told him mail "'as being opened?
Ambassador HELJIS. It is myimprpssion today-that is the way
I interpret it. But I can't go any further and I would not want to
say that mv memory is that infallible.
·Mr. SCliwARZ. Lees skip the people who followed in the Kennedy
and .Johnson administrations that weren't told about the mail-opening
project.
Approximately when did you meet with Mr. Blount? "Vas it June
of 1971. as the records show?
Ambassador HELJIS. Right.
Mr. SCHWARZ. That was about 3, 3% years after he took office?
Ambassador HELJIS. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. NO\V, you heard his testimony this morning, did
you?
. Ambassador HELMS. Yes; I did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Is your version of the facts the same as his?
Ambassador HELJIS. I think basically yes.
Mr. ScmvARz. Well, he denied thiit" you told him that the mail
was being opened.
Ambassador HELJIS. 'VeIl, I'm just coming to that one point. He
said a lot of things this morning and I wanted to try and be as factual
as possible.
1 See p. 210.
86
I no longer know exactly what documents I took along with me or
what pieces of paper, to be more precise, that I took along with me
when I went tl) brief ~1r. Blount. But I thought I took along a couple
of pieces of paper that would have indicated what we got out of this
mail in the way of information and so forth.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You mean actual letters, not just photographs of
envelopes?
Ambassador HELMS. ·Well; I think this was-I just don't recall anymore
what the pieces of paper were. There may be somebody in the
Agency who provided them to me, you know, at the time, ·who might
have some recollection of what they were. But I thought I had some
typewrit~n documents that would have indicated that we had seen,
been reading correspondence between certain individuals in the United
States and certain individuals in the Soviet Union.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You mean typewritten documents but not photocopies
of the opened letter?
Ambassador HEL~IS. I think they were just copies of the con~nts,
if I recall. Or it may just have been a memorandum in which there
were a group of headings saying we got this, we got that, we got the
other thing. And, since I don't remember, and since Mr. Blount's
memory is different than mine, I don't want to get down to the degree
of precision here that I can't support because he is a very honorable
man, Mr. Blount,and I would just not want to be in the position of
making assertions that I couldn't demonstrate that were contrary to
his.
But I do recall taking something down there because I was interested
in persuading him that this was an interesting and worthwhile
operation, even though very sensitive.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Is it your testimony, or isn't it your testimony, that
you told him that the CIA was opening letters?
Ambassador HELMS. Well, I thought so, but maybe I wasn't specific
enough about it. I don't know-I thought that this was the general
purport of it and that to get information out of the letters you would
have to open them.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, turning to the Attorneys General, was Mr.
Mitchell the first Attorney General, to the best of your knowledge, that
was informed about the CIA's mail-opening project?
Ambassador HELMS. To the best of my knowledge. But I think it
is only fair to say that I didn't know what Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone,
and Admiral Rayburn might have been vis-a.-vis various Attorneys
General and what they might have been talking about. So, it is only
my recollection that he was the first one.
Mr. SCHWARZ. But you weren't told that anybody else-Ambassador
HELMS. Not that I recall.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, what did you tell Mr. Mitchell?
Ambassador HEL!dS. ·Well, my recollection is that I went to see
Mr. Mitchell, as I did on various occasions because, as you will have
noticed in my deposition, when I went to see then President-elect
Nixon in New York and was asked to stay on as Director of Central
Intelligence, he had Mr. Mitchell sitting with him, and I had never
met Mr. Mitchell before, and he told me on that occasion that anything
t~at I could say to him, I could say to Mr. Mitchell, either in front of
hIm or separately.
87
Then, when Mr. Mitchell came to 'Washington and became Attorney
General, it was quite clear that he had a particular role for the
President in sort of keeping an eye on intelligence matters and on
covert action matters, and just a variety of things. He was sort of, I
think, a watchdog for the President. So~ I have consulted with Mr.
Mitchell on a variety of the problems affecting the Agency over time
that I would not have gone to the normal Attorney General about,
nor would the normal Attorney General have been necessarily privy
to these things.
So, on this occasion, as I remember the unrolling of the circumstances,
Mr. Cotter and I had had a conversation about this operation,
and one of the points that he made and I thought the principal point
was, that pretty soon the Post Office Department was going to be
changed to the U.S. Postal Service.
Mr. SCHWARZ. He denies, incidentally, that that was his reason. But
that is beside the point.
Ambassador HELMS, That's all right. I'm just telling my story as I
recall this, and this occurred to me as being a perfectly sensible and
desirable thing, to try and find out if under a new management and a
quite new series of guidelines this operation was going to be viable.
So, I went to the-as I recall the thing, and I am supported by a
memorandum that somebody wrote near that time that the Attorney
General first, and I think maybe among several matters that I had to
take with him on that occasion-I told him about this operation, what
it was doing for us, that it had been producing some information on
foreign connections, dissidents, and terrorists, a subject in which he
was intensely interested, and that we might have a problem when the
U,S. Postal Service was founded. And I asked if it wouldn't be a good
idea that I go and See the Postmaster General, Mr. Blount, and talk
with him about this and see how he felt about it and to get some advice
from him. And, it was my recollection that Mr. Mitchell acquiesced
in this and said, "Go ahead and talk to Mr. Blount."
Mr. SCHWARZ. No, Mr. Helms, in that answer you used a vague
term. Let us try to clarify it. You say you told him about this operation.
Now his recollection of the meeting is that you told him about a mail
cover operation. Now, is it your testimony that you told him about a
mail-opening operation ~
Ambassador HELMS. 'Well, I can only say, Mr. Schwarz, to be
fair to everybody concerned. that I am not sure that everybody in
Washington is as nearly familiar about the distinction hetween these
two things then as they are now. I mean, everybody in this room
knows exactly what the two things are. but in those times, I am not
sure that necessarily the Attorney General would have known the difference.
I do not recall. therefore, being in a battle of terminology
with him. I thought I had gone down to explain something that was
going on and the usefulness of the information we had, and, in fact,
we would like to preserye the operation, that we were going to have
a problem.
Mr. SCHWARZ. That iust is an unsatisfactory answer. Did you tell
him you were opening the mail or not~. .
Ambassador HELMR. I'm sorry you find it unsatisfactory because I
don't recall whether I said specifically we are opening X numbers of
letters. but the burden of my discussion with him-I don't see how it
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could have left any alternative in his mind because how do you find
out what somebody is saying to another correspondent unless you
have opened the letter?
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right, so, you did tell him.
Ambassador HELMS. That is my recollection.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you tell him information about what could only
have come from the contents of the letters?
Ambassador HELMS. I thought so, sir. If his perception is different,
then I'm sorry. Maybe legitimately so.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Other than Mr. Mitchell, no Attorneys General that
you know of were briefed on the CIA's mail project?
Ambassador HELMS. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. On the subject of Presidents, did you speak to
President Eisenhower?
Ambassador HELMS. No; it would have been most unlikely that I
would.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did Mr. Dulles ever tell you that he had done any
m~ili~' .
Ambassador HEL~IS. I don't recall any more. I must say that I have
been under the impression for a long time that I would have thought
Mr. Dulles would have told President Eisenhower or possibly his own
brother, who was then Secretary of State, with whom he was in constant
communication, but I do not recall ever seeing it in writing, nor
do I recall Mr. Dulles taking me aside and saying, "I have cleared
this with President Eisenhower now." But then that is a long time
ago and it would not have loomed large in my life at that time, if he
had said it one way or another. .
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did you speak to President Kennedy'
Ambassador HELMS. I never recalled discussing it with President
Kennedy.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did either Mr. Dulles or his successor. Mr. McCone.
tell you he had spoken to President Kennedy about the CIA's mailopening
project'
Ambassador HELMS. I have no recolledion of being told any such
thing.
Mr. ScmvARz. Did you speak to President .Tohnson ?
Ambassador HEL~IS. I have often thought, as I have mused over
these things for the past month. that it was an item that I mentioned
to President ,Tohnson on one occasion when I was going over some
sensitive thing the Agency was doing. But I have no written record
of this. I have no piece of paper on which I jotted notes or anything
else to support this belief of mine. So. I can onlv iu<:t tell you that
it was a belief I had. And, one of the reasons that this lingers was thnt
Postmasters General in President ,Tohnson's administration, except
for Mr. Gronouski, I knew quite well. I knew Marvin Watson
well; I knew Larry O'Brien well, and if I felt there was some rea]
need to talk to them about it, I wouldn't have hestitated.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
'\Vould you look at exhibit 7 ' please, which is a memorandum for
the files dated April 23, 1965'
Ambassador HELMS. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You have had a chance to sre these before. I narticularly
want to call your attention to parag-raph 7,and ask whether that
1 See p. 203.
89
paragraph of the document does not at least strongly suggest that
if you had any such connrsation with President Johnson as to which
yon ha"e giYen your best e\'idence, it conld not han been until after
April 23, 1965?
Ambassador HEL}IS, "'Yell, as a matter of fact, if I discussed it with
President Johnson, it ,,'auld haye been in the context of a particular
private meeting I had to discuss some sensitive things, and it would
haye been a good 2 years after.
Mr. ScmvARz. A good 2 years after 1965?
Ambassador HEL}IS. After Hl65.
Mr. ScmvARz. So. if you discussed it with President Johnson, it
was at the earliest 1967, which \YaS 4 years after he took office?
Ambassador HELMS. I think it was in the spring of 1967.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
Now, with respect to the last President in office during your activities
at the CIA, did you disclose to President Nixon the CIA mail-opening
projects?
Ambassador HEL}IS. I never recall discussing it with President
~ixon Hnd what PresideJl.t Xixon knew about it, I don't know to this
day. He was Vice President for 8 years; he was involved in a lot of
things in President's Eisenhower's administration and saw a good
deal of Mr. Dulles. and what matteI'S he was specifically briefed on by
Mr. Dulles and which he was not, I don't know. I do know that he
ne,'er got into these matters when he became President; at least, he
never got into them w·ith me. And, as far as I was concerned, when
I got around to talking to the Attorney General, Mr. Mitchell, I felt
that if he felt any need to go to the President, he would have told me so
right then and there and would have taken care of it with the President,
which he did on other matters.
You will recall, that when I was talking to him about the Huston
plan. and he said. "well. I had never heard about this until this morning
and so forth, now let us wait until I have a chance to talk to the
President," it is quite clear that he had that option any time he wanted
to, and it was my feeling, if not my understanding-I never got this
regularized with him-when I went to him and talked about any matters
affecting the Agency. that if he wanted me to halt, cease, or
desist, he could do so and talk to Mr. Nixon.
Mr. SCHWARZ. So, in any event, you didn't yourself speak to President
Nixon?
Ambassador HELMS. No.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Thank you. ~fr. Chairman.
The CHAIRl\fAX. Mr. Smothers, do you have any questions?
Mr. S}IOTHERS. Is it your belief that Mr. McCone was aware of
the mail-opening operation?
Ambassador HET,}IS. ",VeIl, Mr. Smothers, I have been told in the
last several days-as a matter of fact, I don't think I have been told,
I think I heard it asserted here yesterday, that it was Mr. Osborn
who was testifying, or someone that Mr. McCone says that he was not
informed about the mail-intercept operation. I can only say that
I don't know from my own certain and specific knowledge whether
he was or he wasn't. He was Director for :3 years, he was a first class
executive. I think he had a reputation for that. He certainly had
aceess to eYerything that was going on inside the organization, and
I just find it difficult to think that he didn't know anything about it,
90
although there is always the plausible explanation that things he
saw-he wasn't an expert in the intelligence business necessarily, he
might not have knmYll where these things came from. But that is
merely a supposition on my part, which might give rise to these
explanations because at this time, as I recall, there was a lot of going
and coming in the Agency about the Kim Philbv case, where it was
a question of it's being ascertained beyond any doubt that It member
of the British Intelligence for many, many years, a man who had
also been liaison officer here in vVashington with the CIA, was a
Russian agent. And some of this showed up in this mail intercept
business, and I'm sure that Mr. McCone would have been briefed by
Mr. Angleton who saw him constantly on matters of one sort or
another. But, he may just have forgotten this was where it came from.
I don't know.
Mr. SMOTHERS. You are probably as close to an expert as any on
both the question of how the Agency operated and indeed the nature of
the way Mr. McCone operated. vVould you consider it more probable
than not that McCone knE'w about thE' mail-opening OPE'ration ?
Ambassador HELMS. T think it is a little unfair to ask me that, Mr.
McCone can speak for himself. One of the problems, I think. with this
hearing is that so many people have died; but he certainly hasn't, and
I would rather have him speak for himself.
Mr. SMOTHER.<;. We will try to do that.
Let us pass on to your meeting with Mr. Day and your memorandum
of February 16, 1961 rexhibit 10 1 ]. This memorandum was directed
to Mr. Angleton, wasn't it?
Ambassador HELMS. This was to the Deputy-in-Chief CI. I would
have thought at that time it was a man named .Tames Hunt, but I am
not all that good on dates, Mr. Smothers.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Sure.
Ambassador HELMS. I felt Mr. Angleton was Chief CI.
Mr. SMOTHERS. That is not critical to my inquiry.
Ambassador HELMS. OK.
Mr. SMOTHERS. What was the purpose of this memorandum? 'Why
would you have written down the results of your meeting with Mr.
Day?
Ambassador HELMS. Because the CIA staff was in charge of at
least the planning and the carrying out of this operation, and this
was to make official the fact that we had had this meeting and that they
had permission to go with the operation, had permission from me to
go on with the operation.
Mr. SMOTHERS. So you were trying to give your managers in the
Agency as full an amount of information as they needed to go ahead
and carry out this letter-opening function. Is that correct?
Ambassador HELMS. That's the idea.
Mr. SMOTHERS. In that connection, then, it would be highly implausible,
would it not, that you would have communicated to them
information that was in error or not true?
Ambassador HELMS. There would be no reason for me to do that.
~fr.Smothers. .
Mr. SMOTHERS. Then this memorandum [exhibit 10]-and I think
you heard some of the testimony this morning-also indicates that
1 See p. 210.
91
after you made your presentation to the Postmaster General, :Mr.
Day, that you \\"ere joined by the Chief Postal Inspector, :Mr. Henry
}[ontague. Quoting from that memorandum: "This gentleman"-referring
to ~Ir. ~Iontague-"confirmedwhat \yc had had to say about the
project and assured the Postmaster General that the matter had been
handled securely, quietly, and that there had been no 're\'erberations.'"
'Vas it your impression when you wrote this memorandum that ~Ir.
.:\Iontague was in on it, that he knew that letters were being opened 'I
Ambassador I-lEL:\IS. Sir, I can only stand on that language. It was
\\Titten 14: years ago. It was written, I guess, a day after we had the
meeting.
:Mr. S:\IOTHERS. Is that what the language says to you?
Ambassador HEL:\IS. That's \vhat it says to me.
Mr. S:\IOTHERS. I realize the difficulty in recollection. 'Ve discussed
that meeting an awful lot this morning.
,Yhen you, the Director, and ~fr. Roosevelt, \vent down to see Mr.
Day, you were then the DDP. \Vhat was lfr. Roosevelt's job?
AJnbassador HELlIIS. lfy recollection is-\vell, I don't even have to
recall it because it's written here. He was Chief of the Technical Service
Division, and the Technical Service Division was that part of the
DDP Office of the Clandestine Service or whatever you want to say,
\vhich would have carried out the actual physical opening of the letters,
which after all, I might say, is a difficult thing to do properly so
there are no complaints about it.
Mr. S:\IOTJIERS. Did you take M1'. Roosevelt with you to insure that
this matter of the mail opening would be clearly explained to the
Postmaster General?
Ambassador HELl\fS. I don't recall why Mr. Roosevelt went on this
particular occasion, Mr. Smothers, but I can only assume that since
this was his role, that maybe we thought something might come up
about it, ana we \\'anted him there to answer any questions from the
technical standpoint.
:Mr. Sl\IOTHERS. I know it is 14 years later, and I am asking you now
to look both at your memorandum and the very high-powered cast of
chameters that \vent down to visit the Postmaster General. Is it at all
likely, Mr. Helms, that all that took place at that meeting was merely
to say. "we have something secret that we might want to tell you"?
Then tIll' Postmaster General replied. "I (lon't think I want to hear it."
And after that. the east of characters simply got up and left?
Ambassador HELMS. That w'asn't quite my impression of the meeting,
M1'. Smothers, no. \Ve had gone to see Mr. Day because this was
a new administration. President Kennedy had just been sworn in. It
was also a new party. The Republicans had had the 'White House and
the executive branch before, and now the Democratic Party had it,
and I think Mr. Dulles felt under the circumstances that it was desirable
to speak to the Postmaster General, because if it was to go forward,
we needed some suppOli for it. In other words, this was not a
social \'isit in any sense. It was desired to see if the operation could be
continued.
Mr. S:\IOTHERS. You did not go down trying to hide anything ? You
went down to try to convince the Postmaster General that he ought
to go along with what you were doing; is that correct?
Ambassador HEL~IS. It was Mr. Dulles who did the talking on that
occasion, as he did on e\'cry occasion that I went with him, and I
92
think-I know that was the purpose of our going down there, at least
as lwst I recall it.
Mr. S~IOTJIERS. I han nothing further at this timr, Mr. Chairman.
The CIIATR:\L\X. :\fr. Helms. undl'r "'hich Prpsidruts did YOU senoe
as Director of the CIA? .
Ambassador HEL:\fs. I was appointed, sir. by Prrsident ,Tohnson
and I served under him and under President Nixon until early Frbruary
1973.
The CHAIR:\IAX. And as Director of the CIA, YOU told neither of
these Presidents about the mail-opening program?'
Ambassador HEL~IS. I haY(' explained what the situation was as far
as President ,Tohnson is concerned. As best I can pull this together
I don't recall sIX'aking to President Kennedy.
The CHAIR~fAN. And when did you speak to Attorney General
Mitchell about the mail-opening program? "'Vas that at the time that
the new administration came on. and vou wanted to inform the new
Attorney General of what was going on, or was that a good deal later?
Ambassador HELMS. It "'as a good 2 years later.
The CHAIR~L\N.A good 2 years later. You were aware that the mailopening
program was illegal, were you not?
Ambassador HELMS. Mr. Chairman. I am not a lawyer. and I think
it would be unfortunate to take your time and the time of the committee
to get into a debate on matters that are a little bit-well, not only
a little bit, but a great deal beyond my purview.
I only want to say that we were given a charge back in 19- the late
forties and early fifties. It has not come up in the hearings, at least
as far as I know. the ones I've been listening to, and I would like your
forbearance for just a moment to explain something.
",Vhen the remnant parts of the OSS were picked un and placed as
a sort of secret sen'ice under the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency
for cover purposes-after all, the Central Intelligence Agency was
never designed by law to run espionage or anything of that kind-the
National Security Council gave this organization. through the Director
of CIA, some specific jobs to do, and in the intelligence field a more
specific job was given in the area of counterespionage and counterintelligence,
if you would like to call it that. the National Security
Council intelligence directive gave the Agencv the job of analyzing,
collating, and evaluating the counterespionage information.
It also gave it the job of maintaining the basic files for the whole
Government on counterespionage cases and in addition it put upon it
the job of protecting the U.S. Government. the CIA and its installations,
and so forth, from penetration and from any hostile inte1ligence
services or even friendly intelligence sen-ices, as far as that is
concerned.
Now, this charge was a difficult one. and th('1'(, ,,,ere very few methods
available for carrying it out and carrying it out with any reasonable
chance of success. One of those things is to penetrate another
fellow's intellig('nce service and find out who his agents are. a most
difficult job. A second is to find out about foreign agents from defectors
from their service. Third are intercepts. signals. telephone calls. mail.
anvthing that one can lay one's hands on. and then overseas there are a
variety of surveillance techniques which mayor may not work, but
those things are always available.
93
Each one of thrm is wry difficult and tricky in its own right, and I
would like to point out that wr haH' rstahlished bevond any doubt the
number one target of thr KGB and the GRF, the' t,vo So'viet intelligence
selTices. is tIl(' Cpntral Intrlligence Agency. So ewry Director
was ,'ery conscious of how seemingly unprotected he was against this
prnetration, but also to hep from ha\'ing any agents get into this
organization, because a great deal of Government information can be
tapped by just having one person within the CIA.
The CIIAIR:~L\K. ~rr. Helms, giwll the difficulties that the Director
faces in connection with counterintelligence responsibilities, do
yOll believe that this is an Agency that need not obey the la,d
Ambassador HEL)IS. Xo; and I don't think ~Ir. Chairman, that you
would find \'ery many of those fine, patriotic people in the CIA that
would feel that way. 'Ve are trying to get on with our job. We are
trying to protect our form of gowrnJllent and our way of life.
The CIL\lR)L\K. "~e are not talking about moti\'e. 'Ve are talking
about a plan that ,vent on for 20 years that everybody recognized was
against the law. I am trying not to talk about motives, good purposes,
and patriotism. I am trying to find out ,vhy a program like this went
on for 20 years, was against the law of the country by every indication
we haYe, statutes, the Constitution, the decisions of the Supreme
Court. and all I am trying to find out from you is whether you believe
that the CIA does not have to abide by these laws because of the
problems that the CIA faces. Is that your position, or is it not your
position? You can answer that question yes or no.
Ambassador HEL)IS. 'VeIl, I think my position-I don't think things
are black or white in this life, and I just simply have to say that I am
not a lawyer, and I get a bit confused when I read articles like the one
that Alexander Bickel "Tote in Commentary in .Tanuary of 1974 about
the various categories of laws in this country, that one supersedes another,
and so forth, this all having to do with whether the antiwar
movement was illegal or not. I am not a lawyer. I just have to say that
I ,YOUld rather let it go at that.
The CUAIRl\L\K. Mr. Helms, I cannot let it go quite at that because
I think most anybody in the country whether he is a lawyer or not
would have a very active suspicion that opening the mail was probably
against the law. You do not have to be qualified to argue the case before
the Supreme Court not to have that suspicion, and as the intelligent
man yOll are, I can hardly believe that you would not have suspected
that this was against the law.
Did you ask your General Counsel in the CIA for an opinion as to
whether or not it was legal for the CIA to engage in this kind of
activity?
Ambassador HELMS. No; I don't recall having done that, and there
are plenty of memorandums, Mr. Chairman, in this record here from
various people that claim that this was illegal, so it certainly came
to my attention.
The CH~IRMAN. So then it did, and it must have come to your attention
that this was very questionable. In fact, the Inspectors General
of your own Agency who looked into the program said that in
their estimation it produced very little worthwhile intelligence. They
were concerned about its illegality, and at one point recommended
that it be discontinued.
64-663 0 - 76 - 7
94
Ambassador HELMS. 'Well, sir, I heard the testimony yesterday
about the lack of value of the operation, but I had-each time that this
question came up about continuing it. I amonO" other thinO"s asked for
an opinion from the FBI, and I was told on>--each of th~e occasions
that it was quite valuable to that organization, and I can only say that
this is what motivated me to continue, because when I listen to ,,,hat
was said yesterday, if that had been my total appraisal, the operation
would have been stopped a long time before.
The CHAIRMAN. So you were conscious of the serious questions of its
legality?
Ambassador HELMS. I was, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And nevertheless, you continued to pursue the program
because the FBI indicated that it was interested in the information
to which you were referring. Is that your position?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir. You see, the FBI has a job of internal
security.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I know that.
Ambassador HELMS. Of providing a protective screen for us all, and
we have to collaborate with them.
The CHAIRMAN. ·Well. knowing or suspecting its illegality, why did
you never raise this question with the President?
Ambassador HELMS. 'Well, that's a good question. I think that I was,
through the years, affected by the fact that it was Mr. Dulles who
started it, that he was a lawyer, and he had a brother who was a
lawyer. I believe they were both partners in a distinguished law firm
in New York, and I assumed that somehow he had made his legal peace
with this, and I must say I just never went around asking for opinions
about it later on.
The CHAIRl\L\N. 'VeIl, you were aware in .Tune of 1970 that President
Nixon was concerned about the quality of intelligence he was
receiving, particularly with reference to antiwar protests in this country,
and that he asked the intelligence agencies, including the CIA
and the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security
Agency, to prepare some recommendations as to how this intelligence
effort could be improved.
A special report which bears your signature and that of .r. Edgar
Hoover, General Bennett. and Admiral Gayler. the heads of the four
most important intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which is
e.xhibit 11/ was prepared for this purpose and sent to the 'Vhite
House, where it later became thr basis for what came to be known as
the Huston plan.
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIR)L\X. Now, if you will turn to page 29, having to do with
the question of mail coverage. I read this from the report which bears
your si,g-nature. It first of all distin,g-uishes between routine coverage
which is legal, that being simply the photographing of the information
on the face of the envelope, or the taking of that information
by other means, and what was called "cm'ert mail coverage,"
which had to do with opening the mail itself and surreptitiously
screening it, and may include the opening and examination of domestic
and foreign mail. It says there. "This technique is based on
high-level cooperation of top echelon postal officials."
If you will look on the second pa,g'e. the next page. No.2: "This
coverage, not having the sanction of law, runs the risk of any illicit
1 See p. 211.
95
act maQilified by the involvement of a Government agency." Then in
a state~ent in which the illegality is acknowledged and sent to the
President, the follo\ying statement also appea~s .back on page 29,:
"Covert coveraae"-which has been defined as thIS Illegal type of mall
opening-"Cov~rtcoverage has been discontinued." Do you read that?
Ambassador HEL::\IS. Yes; I have the place. .
The CUAIRMAX. That was the information supplied to the PresIdent
on which he was requested to make some decisions for, among
other things, authorizing the opening of the mail. That statement,
"Covert coverage has been discontinued," was a lie, was it not?
Ambassador HELMS. Well, sir, you asked me this question in executive
session some months ago, and I was really astounded that that
should have occurred to you, and I have been thinking about thi~ and
inquiring about this passage ever since, and the only explanatIO~ I
have for it was that this applied entirely to the FBI and had nothlllg
to do with the CIA, that we never advertised to this committee or
told this committee that this mail operation was going on, and there
was no intention of attesting to a lie. This was broad mail coverage.
And if I signed this thing, then maybe I didn't read it carefully
enough-if you want to say I should have had them change the character
of the language. 'When this report was submitted to us, it came
from a working group which had sat on these matters, and they were
FBI activities that were being discussed, and I believe to this day that
that is what was intended here. There was no intention to mislead or
lie to the President.
The CHAIRMAX. If you had been the President of the United States
and had asked for recommendations coming from a report that was
signed by you, the Director of the CIA, by the Director of the FBI
and the two intelligence agencies. and yOIl read in the report that
opening of mail was unlawful, and it had been discontinued, what
would you believe?
Ambassador HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have to concede that
on the record here, without the discussion that went on at the time,
it certainly looks that way, and I'm sorry if I made a mistake at that
time. If I had it to do over again, I think I would have had this language
very substantially changed.
And may I say, Mr. Chairman, let us not be-well, let me draw
back, but I just simply want to say that mail coverage here is a very
broad term, and what we were doing was mail coverage in a very
specific area, ll;nd it is n?t so fantastic that it might not have occurred
to me ~hat thIS was gOlllg to lead to these questions today. Just let
me put It that way.
T~e CHAIRMAX. ~ut ~he President was being asked to give his authonty
to do certalll thmgs that were acknowledged to be illegal in
what has come to ?e kn~nm as t~e Huston plan, and one of the things
he :was asked to glVl:~ Ius authorIty for was to open the mail. Yet the
mall was already belllg opened before he was ever asked for his auth~
rity, and w~en he rescinded his authority 5 days later, nobody
paId any attentIOn. The mail continued to be opened.
How doe~ a President exercise any control over the CIA or any of
these agenCIes when he gets a memorandum of this kind and first
agre~s to authorizing mail openings and then rescinds the authority
and It does not matter? Either way, it continued. '
96
Ambassador HELMS. ",Vell, sir, you can make me look bad-The
CIIAIR~L\X. I am not trying to. This record makes you and
everyone connected with this report look bad.
Ambassador HEL)IS. I just want to ask one question. Do you know
that Mr. Nixon didn't know about the CIA mail-intercept operation r
The CIL\IR)L\X. If he did, I do not knmv why he ,vent through the
exercise of asking for a recommendation and then appro\'ing it and
then rescinding it, and if he did, there is no one, including you, that
has been able to tell us that he did.
",Ve had }Ir. Huston here. :Mr. Huston said that nobodv told the
President that there ,vas a mail-opening plan already going'on despite
the meeting at which the CIA participated. He was the President's
representative charged with the responsibility of advising the Chief
Executive himself.
Ambassador HEL)IS. On domestic intelligence. ",Ye thought ,ve were
in the foreign intelligence field.
The CIIAIR)L\N. Howenr YOU draw these lines, it comes out bottom
line that the President was 'given a document that did not tell him
the truth.
Ambassador HEL)IS. Can't you ask President Nixon whether he knew
or not? Or I ,vill be guilty as charged.
The CIIAIR~IAN. ",Ye are trying very hard to bring )11'. Nixon to this
committee to get his testimony; and if there is any way to do it, we
,vill.
Senator )10ndale?
Senator )IOXDALE. )Ir. Helms, we have two memorandums which
purport to be reports dated almost contemporaneously with conversations
between the CIA and the Postmaster General, both of which state
that the Postmaster General was told of mail being opened. Both have
been referred to earlier today. The first is a memorandum prepared
by you the 16th of February, [exhibit 10 1 ], reporting that you-and I
gather, Mr. Dulles-had advised the then Postmaster General, Mr.
Day, that you had briefed him and "withheld no relevant details." As
you know, this morning we heard from Mr. Day, and he remembers
nothing of that kind. How believable is this memo? What would be the
circumstance that would cause yOll to write it? "Would there be any
reason to falsify in this memo? ,\Yould it be fair to say that this would
be your way of trying to establish for the CIA what had happened
for future purposes, and so on?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes. sir. It would have been written to tell the
people that were working·on this matter that we had this session,
and that they were permitted to go ahead. They were aware that we
were going down to consult the Postmaster General, and it seemed to
me quite normal to let them know the outcome of the meeting and,
since it was written, I believe, the day after the meeting, I would have
thought that I would have stated quite honestly what had occurred.
I can think of no conceivable motiy(~ that I could have had for (~hanging,
or trimming, or adjusting the language.
Senator MONDALE. '\Ve often hear witnesses claim that this is 14, 15
years later, that they can't remember clearly. This memo was written
the day after the meeting.
Ambassador HELl\1s. I have to stand on what the language says.
1 See p. 210.
97
.Senator M:O~DALE: vVould :you not agr.ee that this is probably a
hIghly persuasIve pIece of eVIdence, bearmg on what was discussed
WIth the Attorney General the previous day1
Ambassador HEL~IS. I thought it ,,'as. It was designed to be so.
Senator MoxmLE. And you still think it is?
Ambassador HEUIS. As far as I know.
Senator MONDALE. Now, let's turn to the memorandum [exhibit 4 1],
date~ June 3, 1971. I don't know who prepared it; it is unsigned,
but It does sax that Mr. Helms reported on a meeting to report on
the recent actIOns on the HTLINGUAL operation in New York. At
that time, on June 2,1971, which is the day previous to this memo, he
has seen Postmaster General Blount. Blount was entirely positive regarding
the operation. He had no hangups.
He was entirely positive regarding the operation. He opined that
nothing needed to be done. He rejected a momentarily held thought
that we should check the legality. Would you similarly agree that this
memorand.um, made the day following the briefing of Mr. Blount, is
likely to be a very accurate description of what took place?
Ambassador HEL~IS. Sir, I don't know who drafted this memorandum.
I want to say that at the outset. I don't know who did it. It was
obviously based on a meeting that the individual attended, in which
I debriefed myself about the conversation with the Postmaster General.
I think I would say that the language looks to me a little bit more
enthusiastic than I would have written myself, but then that is what
often happens in memorandums of this kind, taken from meetings.
But I would have hoped that the basic information in it was accurate.
Senator MOXDALE. Once again, you would have no reason to doubt
the validity of this document or to see any reason why it would be
falsified?
Ambassador HELMS. 'Yell, I can't figure out why-who would want
to.
Senator MOXDALE. Because both documents were not intended for
public dissemination?
Ambassador HEL~IS. They certainly were not.
Senator MONDALE. They were private memorandums designed to
place in the record a clear understanding of what had happened.
Also, wouldn't there be a reason to bring along some examples of
what this mail cover and opening program had disclosed? Doesn't
that make sense? If you wanted to brief a new Postmaster General,
and you wanted to show him that things of value were being obtained,
wouldn't it make sense for someone new to show him something
tangible?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir. It's like a salesman, showing you
samples.
Senator MONDALE. That's right. That too would lead one to believe
this description of what happened. .
You mentioned earlier the mood in the forties and early fiftIes that
led to some of these directins by the CIA designed to deal with what
was then called the counterintelligence needs of the Government as
perceived by its leaders. There was a sense of urgency and pressure
placed upon you and the other agencies to achieve this objectiv:e.
'Vould you not sav,·looking back now over these last 25 years that, m
effect, y'ou developed a new strategy, a new concept for American life
1 See p. 197.
98
called counterintelligence, which tended to spill acros:;; normally restricted
areas, legal channels, and departmental lines. This strategy
had a tendency to develop in secret, often with very closely control1ed
groups being familiar ,,'ith what was happening, and with many
believing, as we have heard time and time again before this committee,
that national security, or some other higher purpose,
justified whatHer was thought to be necessary in the iudgment of
whoever \vas ill\'olved--opening mail, tapping lines, breaking into
doctors' files, whatever. This counterintelligence strategy sort of grew
by stealth) perhaps under direct orders of the President or people
under the President, but it \vas something that grew over the years
largely unrecognized by the la\v, and unknown outside of these agencies.
It was the sort of thing that was very difficult to try to get approval
for, so it just operated and grew in this strange, extralegal
way into what has now been spread out on the record before this
committee over the last sen~ral weeks. 'Vould that be an accurate
summary? •
Ambassador fuLC\IS. I think that is a rather good description, sir.
Could I add a couple of points to it, with your permission?
One, the concept of a secret service was brand-new to this country
in 'Vorld War II-and may I say, alien to it, in many respects. This
country doesn't like secrecy, by and large. And when you consider that
a new concept was taken and put into the Government, it is sort of
almost like a foreign body. Then it had to find its way, at its own level,
and its method of operating, and all of the rest of it, and having
brought with it a wartime concept of how you do these things. During
the war, it was to kill Germans and to do as much damage to the Germans
as possible.
And it wasn't very long after President Truman got in that we discovered
there was no way of getting along with the Russians, so the
next thing was how do you not only settle this organization which has
been taken from the ass into the Government, but there's another
interesting problem, and that is, there are a lot of Commur.ists and
Russian sympathizers in the ass as soon as we started working against
the Russians, and that had to be taken care of, and if you have some
experience in this yourself, you know that's a rather delicate and difficult
thing to do. And it was in those days that :Mr. Hoover was very
disapproving of some of the people in the CIA, and we had that problem
to contend with.
Senator :Mo~mALE. So there were many difficulties in trying to bring
before the appropriate authorities, including the Congress, approval
and guidelines and standards that you could be governed by in your
activities. Would you say as a result of this shadowy, murky, and
sometimes dirty business that was undertaken, that you were substantially
handicapped by the failure to have such standards? Would you
say that perhaps the important thing this committee can do, before we
are done, is to put this genie back in the bottle, to define the law precisely
and clearly, and to get away from any future suggestions that
people can, in any level of government, act beyond the law for any
reason whatsoever? Does that make sense to you?
Ambassador HELMS. I think it is a most praiseworthy aim, and exactly
how you put this all together, I think, is going to be a lot more
difficult than it seems on the surface.
99
Senator MOXDALE. But now that we know, can there be any turning
back? :Must \VO not absolutely pin this clown so we know exactly what
is going on?
Ambassador HEL~IS. I don't think there is any turning back. I agree
with you.
Senator Mmm.u,E. Thank yOll, Mr. Chairman.
The CIIAIR~IAX.Thank you, Senator Mondale.
Senator Goldwater.
Senator GOLDWATER. First, I just want to make a point that the
documents we have been talking about, I think, are highly reliable,
because they were prepared contemporaneously with the meetings before
time had had the opportunity to fog memories. There was no reason
not to be candid in memoranda, no indication that the mail program
would be an object of congressional or other investigation.
Now, Mr. Helms, I am sorry that you didn't get to finish your dissertation
about the beginnings of the CIA, because I think in that
statement, you \vould have cleared up a lot of the doubt that seems to
exist on this committee and throughout the country. Your explanation
of its youth, of our having practically no intelligence prior to "Vorld
"Val' II-the fact that the CIA grew out of the ashes of the OSS, and
grew wry rapidly, I think, explains why a lot of the things were done
in the manner in which they were done.
Had I been the President of the United States-which I tried to be,
but by a very small margin I was denied that pleasure-I would have
been very critical of a CIA that didn't come up with ideas of how to
find the enemy, if there were an enemy in our midst. And I see no reason
to suspect that the antiwar groups, anti-America groups, antianything
groups in this country are not motivated by outside activities
or by activities that are formed by our concept of government. So,
while others may disagre-e with me, and while I will recognize the
legality and illegality of certain methods of scanning mail or unopened
mail, I think there comes a time when the protection of this
country probably takes a very equal importance.
Now, you testified, I beliew, that you talked with Attorney General
Mitchell :lbout the mail.
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. I have been scanning the testimony before me
that involves Mr. Mitchell, and I can't find any place in it where he
recounts your discussion of mail with him. Did he tell you-is it your
recollection-that he felt this \vas legal or illegal?
Ambassador HEL~IS. No, sir. And I regret he does not remember the
conversation, but I understand he was a busy man. I suppose I took
up some other things with him on that day, but the fact remains that
I went to see him for a purpose, and I felt that I had accomplished my
purpose when I left his office. And my purpose was to get his advice
as to whether it was desirable to see Mr. Blount, the Postmaster General,
on this mail operation.
Senator GOLDWATER. I have just been informed by Mr. Schwarz that
Mr. Mitchell will be called, and I think it is most important that he
be called, because a lot hinges on his memory and what he tells us, I
think, can be of great value in this particular area.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it is essential, Senator, that we have Mr.
Mitchell.
100
Senator GOLDWATER. Fine. Xow, I just have a short statement to
make.
r believe that Ambassador Helms has appeared at least se,'en times
before this committee and other committees of the Congress that ha,'e
and are requesting his testimony. The ambassadorship to Iran, at this
time, has to rank "'ith one of the most important diplomatic assignments
an American can hold. Iran occupies an important position in
the solely troubled ~Iiddle East. Awl I hope SOme way can be found
to cut down on the demands for appearances by Ambassador Helms.
I think part of the problem lies in overlapping jurisdiction among
the committees of the House and among the committees of the Senate,
and some of the problem is just plain encroachment of jurisdiction. It
seems clear that it is time for the Congress to realign its committees,
so that we don't take the same testimony in many, many different
ways. Officials ,vith important responsibilities spend too much time
rushing up to the Hill.
And personally, Mr. Ambassador, you have had a long record of
distinguished service to this country, and I hope the Congress will let
you get on with your \'Cry important ,vork in Iran, and I hope this
is the last time ,ve sce you in ·Washington.
Ambassador HEL31S. 'Yell, I hope I come back someday, Senator
Goldwater.
Thank you, sir.
The CHAlRl\L\X. Senator Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLEsTox. lYell, I'm not ready to banish Mr. Helms to
the far corners of the world.
Mr. Helms, did you know lVilliam Cotter during the period of time
you served in the CIA?
Ambassador HEL3IS. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, though, to be
precise about this, if I knew Mr. Cotter, I had not had very many
dealings with him at the time that he ,vas recommended to go to the
Post Office Department. lVhat I did at the time was ask some recommendations
from the Director of Security, and Mr. Cotter was one of
the individuals ,vhom he recommended. Prior to that time, I had not
known him well.
Senator HrDDLEsTox. And vou merely fonvarded that recommendation
to ~fr. Blount, who at tlult time ,vas Postmaster General?
Ambassador HEL3IS. Yes. sir.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. To fill the position of Chief Inspector of the
Postal Department?
Ambassador HEL3IS. That is correct. sir. .Mr. Blount had asked me
for recommendations. and I sent them to him.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. lVere you a'Yare that Mr. Cotter had some
knowledge about the mail-opening project?
Ambassador HEL3IS. At the time I forwarded his name, I did not
have that knowledge. As a matter of fact, when all of this testimony
came up, I was surprised to learn this.
Senator HFDDLESTOX. During the performance of ~Ir. Cotter's new
duties as Chief Inspeetor, ,vas he in touch with vou personally about
the mail-opening project? •
Ambassa(lor HEUIS. Yes, sir. I remember one eonversation with
him personally, and I believe-I am not sure, but I somehow have in
my memory that I got a couple of messages from him via other mem101
bel's of the Agency that knew him \wll, that had seen him somewhere,
and he passed me some kind of wonl or other. "That this \vas, I don't
recall clearly, but I just \vallt to he responsive to your question.
Senator HL'DDLESTON. You don't recall his expressing specific concel'llS
to you about the propriety or the legality of this particular
ope.ration and the Post Office Department's ndnerability in relation
to It!
~\Jnbassador Hn,3Is. Xo. sir. .:\Iy impression of the-well, early on,
I don't recall-well. carlyon his stmvar<lship I don't recall \vhat his
point of view \\'as. It was Illy impression that later on, he did become
concerned about this transfl'r from the Post Office Department to the
Postal Service. I am informed this afternoon-he testified this morning
that he does not recall seeing me. I'm sorry; it's just my recollection.
Senator HuDDLESTON. You don't recall being curious that he brought
these concerns to you, rather than taking them to the Postmaster General,
who at that time ,,'as his superior?
Ambassador HEL:\Is. No, sir, I could sympathize with his desire
to have me carry that detail.
Senator HuDDLESTON. Do you find at this time, in retrospect, and
also at the time this operation was ongoing, any highly desirable or
necessary reason for the CIA or the FBI to enter thIS kind of an
operation and not make the head of the Department, which you were
using to accompliSh your purposes, aware of what you were doing?
Ambassador HEL3IS. I think it is quite proper that he should know
about it, Senator Huddleston. I think this is one of the problems
that one has in the \vork that you are going to be doing in the future
here, is how you outline these things and what elements of control
you build into them.
Senator HUDDLESTON. 'Ye have a memorandum [exhibit 2 1 ] that
was written early in this particular project which states that not
only was the mail cover going on, but for some time the Agency had
also been opening the mail and copying the contents. This memorandum
stated that postal officials, of course-and this is a direct quote
from the memorandum-are not aware of this, as if it were a perfunctory
thing, that this type of thing would be done without advising the
postal authorities and for a purpose, and I am just wondering whether
or not this is part of the plan to deliberately withhold infol1llation
from the Postmaster General.
Ambassador HEL3IS. I don't know. You remember Mr. Dulles was
the Director of the Agency then. I would have interpreted the meaning,
of course, slightly different than you would. I think it would
have been in reference to Mr. Dulles saying, "you know this, I am
just reminding you of it." Now, why it went on that way, I don't
remember any more.
Senator HuDDLESTON. I would have thought maybe you would
have reviewed the previous correspondence and memorandums relating
to this project, because there is ample evidence that many
of them had thoughts at times about the legality and propriety of
it, and certainly you were aware of the flap potential, as it is sometimes
called, relating to this problem. So, it would seem to me you would
have been well aware that, at least until you became in charge, the
1 See p. 187.
102
Postal ,Department had been denied the knowledge of precisely what
wasgomgon.
Ambassador HELMS. That's what the memorandum says, sir. I
don't recall the precise facts myself any more, and I don't want to
go against the memorandum. I'm just saying I can't be more helpful
than what it says.
Senator HUDDLESTON. SO, your judgment now is that it would not
be proper~
Ambassador HEL)lS. What did Mr. Angleton have to say on the
subject when he appeared before you ~ Didn't he draft the memorandum,
or was he involved in this at the time, or was that before
he got involved ~
Senator HUDDLESTON. The one I ,vas quoting ,vas written by Mr.
Angleton, on the 4th day of May 1955-1956 I believe it is-or
very shortly after the program started. It seems clear to me that
everybody just accepted the fact-everybody in the CIA, or at
least the person to whom this memorandum was directed, accepted
the fact that the Post Office Department ,vas being denied the information
on the precise nature of the operation.
Ambassador HEL)lS. That certainly is the way it reads.
Senator HUDDLESTON. ",Ve also have a memorandum of approximately
the same time, describing some of the information that had
been gathered by this opening process. An analysis of some 20 letters
was prepared in which it was pointed out that of those 20 letters
coming from the Soviet linion, 8 of them made some religious reference.
Is this the kind of intellig'Cnce that seems to you to be
desirable or valuable enough to justify a program of this nature ~
Ambassador HEUIS. No, sir. Senator Huddleston, this program
was just getting going, and back in those days we knew practically
nothing about the Soviet Union. I heard the conversation yesterday
that wouldn't there be easier ,vays of getting such information and
so forth, and all I can say is there weren't any easier ways. I don't
mean to disagree with my colleague. Their memories seem to be very
short because back in that time the amount of information in this
Government about the Soviet Union was so small that three successive
investigative commissions that were sent to examine the CIA,
one under General Doolittle, one under Mr. Dulles, Mr. Allen Dulles,
just before he became Deputy Director, one under Gen. Mark Clark,
who were all preoccupied with pushing us harder and asking us
why we weren't doing better on this, that we didn't know anything
about the Soviet Union.
Now, this wouldn't justify these particular letters, justify this
operation in and of themselves, but it was just beginning at that time.
Frankly, all through this thing I personally was much more interested
in the human aspects of it because it was in the hope that we would
find some penetration or some agent or something of this kind that we
were concerned more than later on getting information about crops or
religion or cultural things or whatever the case may be.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I believe Mr. Osborn t€stified that he thought
the FBI gained a great deal more helpful information out of this
operation than did the CIA. Do you agree with that ~
Ambassador HELMS. I heard Mr. Osborn say this. I don't know what
he was basing his judgment on.
103
Senator HCDDLESTON. Do you have any knowledge of the kind of
material that they developed ?
Ambassador HELMS. I think the FBI did get useful information
out of it, and I thought from time to time the Agency got useful
information out of it.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I think that's all, Mr. Chairman.
The CIIAIR~1AN. 'Ve have a vote on the floor at the moment so I am
going to declare a 10-minute recess in order that members of the
committee may go over and vote.
[A brief recess "as taken.]
The CHAIR~IAN.The hearing will please come back to order.
Our next member in line to question is Senator Schweiker of
Pennsylvania. Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. ChaiI1llan.
Ambassador HEL~IS. Good afternoon, sir.
Senator ScmvEIKER. Mr. Helms, do you recall being presented in
1969 with the results of the IG's report on the counterintelligence
staff in 1969, which criticized the mail-opening program?
Ambassador HEL~IS. Well, I can't say that today I remember the
report, Senator Schweiker. I heard the statements that were made
yesterday, so at least I am familiar with the content of it now, even
if I don't recollect independentlv what else was in the report.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Have you seen the IG's report on this recently?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir. There was a section of the IG's report
that was shown to me.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Relating to the mail openings?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes; I think so.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Given the criticism of the Inspector General's
report in this regard, why did you at that time decide to, in essence,
override the recommendation of the Inspector General?
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, as best I recall it, we not only took into
consideration the Inspector General's report, but I also asked to have
the FBI contacted to find out their feeling about the value of this
operation. I was told that they thought it was valuable and would
hate to see it terminated. If that language is not there exactly, the
language is a paraphrase of the fact that they would like to see it
continued.
Therefore, in weighing various considerations, including, I must
say, importantly, my own responsibility as Director to prevent the
penetration of the Agency, that I felt that any lead we might get
from this operation might be very important in that field.
So, putting these two things together, it seemed to me we had good
reason to continue in terms of the quality of the operation and despite
the fact that two or three of the officers who were recipients of the
information in the Agency apparently did not think all that much
of it.
Senator SCHWEIKER. ·When the program was initially set up, a number
of years went by when the FBI wa." not even told that the operation
was going on. They received no benefits from the "take," and
actually had to stumble into it themselves. Is that not correct?
Ambassador HEL~IS. I thought they were recipients of the material
from 1958 on.
Senator ScmvEIKER. When did the operation begin?
104
Ambassador HEL::\IS. 1953, I think, something like that.
Senator ScnwEIKER. So, some, 4 or 5 years went by when they
weren't even told about it, and if they hadn't decided to do something
on their own, ,ve might either have had two separate operations
to this day, or no operation.
Ambassador HEL::\IS. ,Yell, Senator Schweiker, has anybody brought
to your attention the fact that back in those days in the fifties, there
was some bad blood betwe-en Mr. Hom'er and the Chief of the Postal
Inspection Service and that, therefore, there was some psychological
reasons, if you want to put them that ,,'ay, for not bringing the FBI
into it at that juncture?
Senator SCHWEIKER. I understand. But this question was in response
to your saying that even though the CIA said it was low quality
material-it was a testimony we have heard a number of times-one
of the reasons for doing it was that the FBI thought it was great,
not pointing out that for 4 or 5 years they didn't even know it was
going on. So, there is a little bit of tangential argument here as to just
what happened for those 4 or 5 years.
What role, :Mr. Helms, do you think the Inspector General should
play in situations like this? You have an Inspector General and he
makes a recommendation, and he is the watchdog of the Agency. You
overrule the Inspector General. ,Vhat is the sense of having an Inspector
General?
Ambassador HEL::\IS. 'YelL sir, it is my belief that an agency of this
kind or any kind needs an Inspector General. He goes out and examines
what is going on, not only in the headquarters unit, but in the field,
and brings back information and makes suggestions and recommendations
as to what he thinks might be done to improve the service. But
unless a Director wants to abrogate his authority to the Inspector General
and make him Director of the Agency, I think since he is ultimately
responsible, he has got to either accept or reject these recommendations.
On the day that one decides that the Inspector General is
more powerful than the Director, then I think it is going to be extraordinarily
difficult to find any American who is going to take the job of
Director.
. Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you agree with some of the recommendatIons
that are being talked about now to strengthen the Inspector General's
office and to give him a larger responsibility in these very areas
of possible illegal actions?
Ambassador HELMS. I think it would be desirable to strengthen the
Inspector General's staff. I was surprised at figures yesterday that had
been reduced in the year 1973; if I understood the testimony accurately,
I think one needs a strong Inspector General. But I have seen
somewhere a suggestion that the Inspector General be outside the
control of the Director. I think that would be a rather unfortunate
arrangement.
,Yould you, Senator Schweiker, take the job if there was somebody
looking over your shoulder, over whom you had no control, inside your
own organization?
Senator SCHWEIKER. ,VeIl, I have 12 million people outside of my
own organization looking over my job.
Ambassador HELMS. That's all right. That's all right. That's
different.
105
Senator SCHWEIKER. ",Ve have a vote on it every few years. I am not
sure that is the case when you come to secret agencies. So, it seems to
me you need some kind of an internal policeman. I gather from that,
then, that if ,ve did have a different IG setup, you would not favor
passing-or ,,,auld you favor passing-IG reports to the ·White House
and to the oversight committees of the Congress on all occasions when
such reports are made. vVould you faVal' it?
Ambassador HEL~IS. ·Well, frankly, sir, I hann't thought that problem
through, and I think any answer I gave to that would be illdigested,
and I would rather not do it, if you would excuse me.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Of course, one of our committee's responsibilities
is to make suggestions like this and act on them. There has been
some criticism that our committee is hurting the agencies involved.
Yet, if we don't get responsible comments from members of the agencies
who have been critical of actions of this committee, what dilemma
does that put us in?
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, I said my answer would be ill digested.
I won't decline to answer it if you insist on it.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What do you think the role of the CIA should
be in terms of following the U.S. statutes of operations here in the
United States? Is it your personal belief that the Agency should comply
with the statutes for domestic operations and domestic work here
in the United States?
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, I think that as a result of these hearings
and the various inquiries that have been made by this committee and
by its staff, that this dilemma should never be before a Director of
the Agency in the future. I think the whole thing has got to be cleared
up to the satisfaction of the Congress and the satisfaction of the White
House and the satisfaction of the Director of the Agency.
I think it would be unconscionable to have future Directors feeling
that they were not supported in what they were doing, that they were
not operating according to well-understood guidelines. And, I caIi
only say that from this time forth I would hope the Congress made it
clear as to the kind of parameters in which a Director was going to
have to function. This would be one of the guidelines that would have
to be given to him, and I would like to say-and I don't want this remark
to sound gratuitous-but it would be a big help to a Director
to have these guidelines because nobody likes to feel~ertainly I
don't like to feel-that thousands of people who work with me over
the veal'S have been tarnished by the fact that they are accused of not
abiding by the laws of this country; because I know a lot of these
people very well, they are very loyal to this country and as patriotic
as any other Americans.
Senator SCHWEIKER. It just seems to me that if the IG had a stronger
role and had been given a stronger role over the last 10 or 20 years,
I am not sure we would be conducting these hearings today. The intelligence
community has criticized this committee for destroying this and
destroying that. But I think the truth of the matter is that if we had a
strong IG and if they had gotten written opinions from their General
Counsel and followerl those opinions, this hearing may not have
been necessary. So, I think the record ought to show that some of the
reasons we a~e having this hearin~ here today, and why the Congress
is going through this rather unfavorable climate, is frankly because
106
of the lack of IG authority. So, I really think it very relevant to what
we do in the future.
One of the questions I have goes back to 1954, when I believe you and
Mr. Dulles briefed Postmaster General Summerfield. I am referring
now to a memo [exhibit 27 1J around that period of time which was
May 17, 1954. According to the memo, Mr. Summerfield was advised
that a mail cover operation was underway and a mail cover operation
would amount to the photographing of envelopes, backs and fronts
of first-class mail. Do you recall such a memo?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes; I have it in front of me now, Senator
Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. vVell, this was sold to Mr. Summerfield on the
basis that it was mail covers only, and it is very clearly specified here,
with no doubt or indecision of the wording, that a mail cover involves
photographing the fronts and the backs of the first-class mail, and not
the insides. That is what you conveyed to Mr. Summerfield and allegedly
a meeting of the mindf' took place to establish these guidelines.
Now, some time later, by 1955 at the latest, within a matter of months
or at most a year, this operation completelv changed its course, and
went to actually opening mail and photographing the contents of mail.
Did either you or Mr. Dulles ever go back and advise Mr. Summerfield
that the operation he had approved and set up as a photographic operation
of mail covers-backs and fronts of envelopes only-actually
turned into a mail-opening photographic operation?
Ambassador HELMS. SIr, I did not go back to Mr. Summerfield. I
don't know whether Mr. Dulles ever did or not.
Sir, I wanted to ask you a question about this memorandum. Is identity
46 the Solicitor of the Post Office Department?
Senator SCHWEIKER. 'What ?
Ambassador HELMS. Identity 46-was the Solicitor of the Post Office
Department present that day?
Senator SCHWEIKER. We don't have it readily available. We are trying
to comply with the Agency's requirements to compartmentalize a
few things and to keep our sources and methods in line, Mr. Helms.
Do you think, in terms of the future, that an exception should be
added to the United States Code to allow for mail opening without a
warrant for intelligence agencies under certain circumstances?
Ambassador HELMS. 'Well, I think if the determination is made that
this is a valuable source of information, that that is the only way you
can take care of this matter any longer, because certainly nobody is ever
going to do it again without some sort of authority.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you see any practical way of implementing
such a suggestion so that it does exactly what it is supposed
to do without violating other people's rights? Do you see any clear
demarcation?
Ambassador HELMS. I think it would be difficult to do. But, on the'
other hand, and I don't want to irritate anybody with this comment,
but during the 20 years as operation went on, nobody ever came to me
with any complaint from anybody about the condition of the letter
when they received it. So, the technical job of opening it and so forth
!Uust have been a pretty good one. In addition to that, I don't recall
any complaints at any time that anybody was disadvantaged by having
1 See p. 257.
107
their mail opened. In other words, this was carefully controlled. The
information "as carefully handled. I think it was carefully evaluated,
and there was a real effort made that the innocent should not be unfairly
harmed.
Senator SCHWEIKER. You did have a situation arise where a Mr.
Osborn came into your oflke, according to testimony he gave yesterday,
and said he was very upset because he had seen a letter from an elected
official come through the system. He went in and blew his stack or
something like that. Do you remember that occasion?
Ambassador HEL)IS. I don't, frankly.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. You don't recall that occasion?
Ambassador HEL)IS. That is not to say it isn't exactly as he advertised
it. I don't remember his blowing his stack. But I know very well
what my own policy about these matters was, and I would have been
concerned about it, and wanted to change the system if this is what
was coming out of it.
Senator SCHWEIKER. There is another memorandum here, and I
wonder if you recall that at some point in time, I believe around 1971,
special procedures were set up for VIP's, elected officials or Government
officials, to insure that their mail wouldn't be put through the
normal mail opening channels. They would be given some kind of
special consideration, and, while they wouldn't be put on our watch
list, in essence they would take their chances along with everybody else
on a random basis. But, once a letter of an elected official was opened,
it would be given to the Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence, and he
would decide whether to dispose of it in a certain way or to disseminate
it. Does this strike you? Does this have a familiar ring to you or not?:
Ambassador HELl\IS. 'VeIl, I have familiarized myself with the
papers in the last few days, sir, so it does now, when you read it to me,
certainly.
Senator ScmvEIKER. Do you think it is proper for the CIA or any
intelligence agency, really, to read these kinds of papers of elected
public officials?
Ambassador HELMS. As a matter of fact, I don't know how this
happened. I have been wondering about it myself because this would
not have been a policy I subscribed to. The only thing I can figure out
is maybe somebody on the watch list in the Soviet Union was getting
mail from somebody, and this was just done, opened in the process. But
I have not talked to any of the people who actually did the opening,
and I don't know how this mistake was made, because I would regard
it as a mistake.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I would like to draw your attention to exhibit 7 1.
This was a memorandum for discussion between the Assistant Deputy
Director for Plans and an unnamed CIA officer. I would like for you
to turn your particular attention to paragraph 3, which is page 1, and
I quote:
Mr. Karamessines felt that the dangers inherent in Long's subcommittee activities
to the security of the Project's operations in New York should be thoroughly
studied in order that a determination could be made as to whether these
1 See p. 203.
108
operations should be partially or fully suspended until the subcommittee's investigations
are completed.
Mr. Helms, how would you interpret that paragraph ~
Ambassador HEL~fs. Interpret it, sir?
Senator HART of Colorado. Yes. Does that sound to you as if a congressional
committee or subcommittee looking into activities of this
sort might happen upon CIA mail-opening projects, and therefore it
might be prudent to suspend them for the duration of the subcommittee's
heanngs so that anyone testifying could deny that they were
going on, and then start them up again?
Ambassador HEL~fE. Sir. I don't know "'ho wrote the memorandum.
That is what the language says. But I don't recall who the officer was
in the Agency. There is no name down here. I don't know what his
standing was and I don't know what led him to make this suggestion.
Senator HART of Colorado. But you have no interpretation you
could offer the committee as to how that sounds to you as former
Director of the Agency?
Ambassador HEL~fs. I just say, I think I understand the way it
sounds and what he has said there. I simply say that I don't necessarily
subscribe to that as a method of approach.
Senator HART of Colorado. Do you happen to know of any other
instance where the Agency adopted such a"technique where the Congress
or congressional committees were concerned, suspending certain
operations pending possible testimony and then starting them again?
Ambassador HEL::\fs. No, sir. I have vivid recollection of suspending
a lot of operations when the Presidents and Secretaries of State
were traveling.
Senator HART of Colorado. Yes; we got into that also. In this connection,
if there were a standing congressional oversight committee of
some kind, how could we, in your judgment, best protect ourselves
against that kind of technique or tactic?
Ambassador HEL~fs. I think, Senator Hart, that over the years those
Senators and Congressmen who have been on the oversight committees
have found the Directors of the agencies have been not only forthcoming
with them, but candid and honest with them. I have never heard
any Senator or Congressman allege anything to the contrary.
The fact that there hasn't been more communication between the
Agency and the oversight committees is a matter of history. I think it
is inappropriate to get into maybe some of the reasons and so forth.
They have been alluded to by various members here. But I do know
that under Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone, certainly, and certainly under
me, I never lied to a congressional committee in my life as far as I am
aware.
I just want to make one other comment, not anticipating the next
question, but I just want to say also this is not one of those questions
where if I had the opportunity I would like to be forthcoming. It has
been very lonely, if I might say,at various times.
Senator HART of Colorado. In that connection, parenthetically, I
think many of us feel that where abuses have occurred, Congress also
shares some ~f t~e responsibility for not carrying out its functions.
But the pomt IS that regardless of the past, if we try to correct it,
how do we prevent a situation from arising where someone, such as
109
yourself, wants to tel~ the truth, ~oes not want t~ deceive the Congress,
and therefore a proJect that mIght draw the Ire of the Congress is
merely suspended pending discussions with the oversight committee 1
Ambassador HELMS. Sir, I regard this as an unfortunate sentence.
As I say, I don't know who wrote it, and I don't believe that any senior
officer of the Agency would have gone along with this kind of a
delusion.
Senator HART of Colorado. As a tactic, you deplore it.
Ambassador HELMS. I do deplore it.
I would like to say something further, that I think that since you
have raised this question, that when you do get down to the point of
oversight of matters of this kind, I think that it ought to, in the climate,
ought to be put to a test. I think Senators and Congressmen ought to
see whether they are getting the kind of information they need from
the Agency before they legislate it, because I think it would be a lot
easier to get it handed over to you, than to say you've got to talk about
this and this and this, and then something brand-new comes up that
isn't covered by this and this and this, and then they say, "well, you
know, we've got no responsibility for doing that." So I think it would
be far better to give it a chance and see what happens.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Ambassador, if you would turn to
exhibit 12 " which is a letter from you to the FBI Director Hoover,
dated March 20, 1970, I would like to call your attention to page 5,
paragraph 3, most of which is blacked out, but the extant paragraph--
Ambassador HEUfS. Is it the thing headed "mail coverage?"
Senator HART of Colorado. Yes; that paragraph. In that discussion
between yourself and Mr. Hoover, you were discussing the New Left
and racial matters.
Ambassador HEL:US. Yes; I've got that, sir.
Senator HART of Colorado. In that discussion, you stated: "The
increasingly close connection between these forces in the United States
and hqstile elements abroad has been well established by both of our
agencies."
This is a claim that we have discussed since your last appearance
with representatives of the various agencies, and it has become fairly
crucial to our findings and conclusions to determine just what that
link was. What information can you offer us to substantiate that-I
think what you call "well established link between the N~w Left and
racial groups in this country and elements abroad, hostIle elements
abroad ?"
Ambassador HELMS. Well, I remember a couple of examples. I'm
sure the Agency must be able to produce others, but I rememl;>e.r the
Algerians were training guerrillas in Algeria that were U.S. CItIzens.
I also recall that a group of Mexican terrorists were s~nt all the way
to North Korea for training and then returned to ~exlco to w~rk ~ot
only there. but in the United States. There was eVIdence of thIS kmd
to which I was alluding.
Senator HART of Colorado. There was a link between those agents
from Mexico and elements or groups in this co,:ntry 1 .
Ambassador HEL::\IS. Yes; that is my recollectIOn anyway, SIr, ~ut
I do think that-ean't either the Agency or the FBI come up WIth
more specifics?
1 See p. 219.
64·663 0 - 76 - 8
110
Senator HART of Colorado. No. There are a lot of vague allegations,
but not too many specifics.
Ambassador HEL::IIS. I see.
Senator HART of Colorado. One further reference to a memorandum
[exhibit 13 1
] dated February 1, 1962, from the Deputy Director of
Counterintelligence to the Director of Security. That memorandum
in paragraph 3 states in part that everyone realized from the outset
of the mail project that: "a 'flap' would put us"-that is to say the
project-"out of business immediately and may give rise to grave
charges of criminal misuse of the mails by Government agencies."
The memo goes on to say that it had been decided that "the effort
was worth the risk." And then the memorandum says, "It should be
relatively easy to hush up the entire affair" or "to find a scapegoat to
blame for unauthorized tampering with the mails."
This memo shows the thought process that we have been dealing
with here today. ",Vould you agree with the general assessments and
conclusion of that portion of this memorandum ~
Ambassador HEL~fs. I have read the memorandum, Senator Hart,
and I don't feel that this is a-well, it is a good piece of thinking at
all, as a matter of fact. I don't recall ever having seen the memorandum
at the time that I was in office, but I certainly have read it
since, and I don't understand even what he is referring to in the last
part of the memorandum. All this business about hushing it up. I
don't quite understand what he had in mind.
Senator HART of Colorado. \Vell, presumably, if somebody stepped
forward and said, "my mail did not reach me in time," and it was part
of a project that was recently uncovered, the Agency could blame it
on somebody at the Post Office or someone else. It looked as if they
were trying to lay contingency plans.
Ambassador HELMS. In any event I think it is a poor piece of thinking.
I don't think it would have been satisfactory under any circumstances.
Senator HART of Colorado. Had you seen it as Director, you would
have--
Ambassador HELMS. I certainly wouldn't have agreed with it.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, one other question, if I
may.
At exhibit 1,2 which is a 1960 1G report, on page 4, a continuation
of paragraph 6, we find the following:
Of the total items opened, about one-third are on the watch list and the others
are selected at random. Over the years, however, the interceptors have developed
a sixth sense or intuition, and many of the names on the watch list were placed
there as a result of interest created by the random openings.
How does one develop the sixth sense or intuition to pick letters out
of the mailbag and open them ~
Ambassador HELMS. That's a good question, I don't know.
Senator HART of Colorado. There is no particular training for that ~
Ambassador HELMS. I wouldn't have thought so. I realize what
sixth sense means, but I don't think I would put that in an 1G report,
if I had been writing it.
Senator HART of Colorado. More importantly, would you have
adopted it as a policy ~
1 See p. 222.
2 See p. 175.
111
Ambassador HELMS. They might have learned by experience how to
do their job better. They might have developed an ability to do it a
little more rapidly, but that they would know by looking at it, extrasensory
perception, if you might, that they knew what was in the envelopes.
I don't believe it.
. Senator HART of Colorado. If you take two-thirds of the total
number of envelopes opened, that is a pretty big dragnet. It does
not take a whole lot of sixth Sense.
Ambassador HELMS. I can't subscribe to that, Senator.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you.
The CHAIRlIIAN. Thank you, Senator Hart.
I am told that Senator Mathias was inducted into an Oklahoma
Indian tribe today, which has accounted for his late arrival, but I am
happy to say he has arrived, and Senator, if you have any questions
you would like to ask at this time, please do so.
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, I might just say that for the
record my new name is Istomingo among the Chickasaws.
The CHAIRlIIAN. Senator Istommgo.
Ambassador HELlIIS. vVas there a blood rite, Senator Mathias ~
Senator MATHIAS. No, but we went far enough. You will be glad
to know that I did not have to wear the war bonnet because of the new
act of Congress which forbids the slaughter of the American bald
eagle, which makes it very difficult to obtain war bonnets any more, so
I could not pose, as Calvin Coolidge did, in the full regalia of m'y
office.
Ambassador Helms, we are delighted to have you back again, and
I suspect that this committee combined with your distant post in
Teheran is probably the greatest act of assistance to the airlines since
we began shipping the mail.
Ambassador HELMS. Did you notice that Pan Am has been doing
much better in the last quarter ~
[General laughter.]
Senator MATHIAS. I can understand that. I think since we developed
a mail contract, this is probably the best thing that has happened for
them.
A little earlier today, you mentioned the fact that all of this began
at the time when Allen Dulles ,vas Director and that you had an understanding
that he had made his peace with the law, I think is the phrase
you used. I wonder if you could expand on that ~
Ambassador HELMS. I really don't think I can expand on that very
much.
Senator MATHIAS. vVell, first of all, I think it may be important for
us to know, did you think he had made his peace with the law~
Ambassador HELMS. Yes; I thought he had.
Senator MATHIAS. And not as a personal matter, but on behalf of
the Agency ~
Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir; because he was a much respected figure,
and he was certainly much respected by me, and he had wide
experience after World vVar I, between the wars, and during World
War II, and it just would not have occurred to me to fault him on a
matter of law.
I was a lot younger, I suppose, but in any event when I made that
comment earlier today, that was my way of saying I thought that he
112
had made his peace with this, and he had checked it out with whatever
people were necessary to check it out with.
Senator MATHIAS. And there ,vas no machinery within the Agency
for a review of a question of that kind, once it had been settled, or once
a determination had been made?
Ambassador HELMS. Ii I understand your question, I think the
answer is no. The Agency Directors over the years have, you know,
been in a sense the last port of authority, and when they made a decision,
that was that, and so it was seldom that anybody would have
called into existence a formal review to review the Director's decision.
Senator MATHIAS. And you had been in the Agency a number of
years, and you had S€en a number of Directors come and go. Was there
any regular review, at the time of the changing of the guard, of questions
of this sort?
Ambassador HELMS. ",Yell, there probably should have been, but new
Directors would get themselves-Senator
MATHIAS. The answer is no?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes; all right.
Senator MATHIAS. All right.
'Well now, you mentioned in the time frame of 1954 and 1955 three
commissions that looked into the CIA?
Ambassador HEL::\IS. Sir, I am sorry. May I say that if I put them in
a specific time frame, I didn't mean to. I don't remember when those
commissions were actually functioning, but they certainly were functioning
after the CIA had been set up.
Senator MATHIAS. 'Well, would you say some time in the decade of
the fifties?
Ambassador HELMS. Yes; between 1947 and 1957.
Senator MATHIAS. All right, and this would have covered the period
in which the mail program began?
Ambassador HELMS. I think so.
Senator MATHIAS. And if I understand your previous testimony, it
was that the burden of their report was to increase the pressure on
CIA to increase its product from the Soviet Union.
Ambassador HEL~IS. Sir, the intention of these commissions was,
"why isn't this organization getting on with the job faster and better
than it has been?" and the entire thrust of their recommendations and
so forth was to try and get the job done better, and I don't recall any
particular preoccupation with the obstruction inhibition, nor do I
recall any particular concern with the legality or lack of legality of a
certain kind of operation.
Senator MATHIAS. Let me ask counS€1 if we have the membership of
those commissions in our record.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 1Ve do with respect to one commission. The Doolittle
Commission was General Doolittle, Mr. Hadley from New York,
and another lawyer from New York. I am sure we do.
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that the
membership of those commissions be inserted in the record at this
point, without taking the committee's time, because I think it is
important.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.
The following members of the Doolittle Committee were appointed by President
Eisenhower in July 1954 to evaluate the administration and functioning of
the Central Intelligence Agency:
113
General James Doolittle
William B. Franke
Morris Hadley
William Pawley
As a sub-unit of the Hooyer' Commission's evaluation of United States government
agencies' operations, in 1954 the Clark Task Force reviewed the functioning
of the intelligence community, including the CIA. It had the following
members:
General :\Iark W. Clark
Admiral Richard L. Conolly
Donald L. Russell
Captain Edward V. Rickenbacker
C. F. Hollins
Henry Kearns
Senator MATHIAS. ",Vere you in the Agency at this time?
Ambassador HEL:'IIS. Yes, sir. I joined the Central Intelligence
Agency in 194:7 when it opened for the first time.
Senator }IATIIIAS. Did you receiye the report of the Commission?
~\.mbassador HEL:'IIS. Yes. sir. at the time.
Senator MATIIU.S. Of these commissions, I should say.
Ambassador HEL:'IIS. Yes. I don't recall the differentiations between
them, or among tllPm rather, to use proper English, but I did see them.
Senator }L\TIIL\S. 'Vas the question of legality raised by any of these
commissions?
Ambassador IhL:'IlS. Xot to my recollection.
Senator }L\TIIL\S. Do you th'ink you would have remembered if it
had?
Ambassador HELMS. I think if somebody had said, "that is wrong,
don't do it," I think I would have remembered it.
Senator }fATHIAS. I asked the chairman to hare these lists included
in the record because I think we haye to see this in the framework in
which the people saw it at that moment.
Ambassador HEL)IS. Yes, sir.
Senator }L\TIIL\S. And they may haye seen it incorrectly, and it may
be. our job to try to set it at a different framework, but nonetheless, we
cannot change the framework which then existed.
Ambassador HEL:'IIS. Xo. sir.
Senator ~L\TIIU.S. Xow, is it true that the FBI and its Director, Mr.
Hoover, gave to the CIA certain names and certain categories for examination
of mail? .
Ambassador HEL:'IIs. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I just have seen in
the papers that the last memorandum of that kind from Mr. Hoover
to the Agency was sent in March, 2 months before he died actually, and
that we had had these memorandums oyer a period of years with names
and f'ategories of information that they wanted.
I belieye that Mr. Papich, who I am sure has testified before this
committee, was very familiar with this because he was liaison officer of
the FBI for the Agency for such a long time. I believe the name of the
man who had most to do \vith the use of it and evaluation in the FBI
\vas a man named Donalcl Stewart. I don't know whether he's still
there or not.
Senator MATHIAS. But you say the last one was dated a few months
before Mr. Hoover's death, so that is considerably after their 1966
renunciation of this kind of practice?
Ambassador HEL:'IIS. Yes, sir. I think he died in 1972, didn't he?
114
Senator MATHIAS. So that although they had renounced the practice
in 1966, they ,,,ere asking you, in effect, to do the dirty work for another
5 or 6 years thereafter?
Ambassador HELMS. That is correct, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. Now the FBI is a branch of the Department of
Justice. At the time these requests were made, was there ever any discussion
of the legality or illegality of what they were asking for?
Ambassador HELMS. Not that I recall, Senator Mathias. I was as
close to Mr. Hoover as the telephone and not any closer.
Senator MATHIAS. Although he had protested some aspects of the
Huston plan, did he raise any question about illegality of mail cover
during the discussion that you had collectively with the group of those
who were involved?
Ambassador HELMS. Isn't there some language in the Huston report
about this? I believe the chairman was calling this to my attention
earlier in the hearing, and this was written down, in other words in
the report.
In answer to your question, I don't recall any conversation with Mr.
Hoover about it.
Senator MATHIAS. That was really what I was asking. Yes; we have
the notes which are available. I was just wondering if you had any independent
recollection to supplement that. What is the date of that
memorandum rexhibit 11 11?
Mr. SCHWARZ. June of 1970.
Senator MATHIAS. June 1970, but yet you were still getting requests
from Mr. Hoover until 1972 notwithstanding the renunciation of the
program in 1966 by the FBI and Mr. Hoover's personal rejection of it
as part of the Huston plan?
Ambassador HELMS. That is correct, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. This seems to me a very interesting kind of sequence
of events.
One final question: Did you ever solicit these chores from the FBI
or were they self-starting?
Ambassador HELMS. Oh, I think they were both ways, but you will
recall, Senator Mathias, that the FBI had a liaison section, and
they had officers assigned to the various agencies with whom they did
business, and this man was going back and forth several times a day,
every day, so it is terribly hard to say which was the chicken and
which was the egg. I think it went both ways.
Senator MATHIAS. Sometimes, the existence of the facility invites
the use of it, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAffiMAN. Thank you very much, Senator-what was your
name again?
Senator MATHIAS. Istomingo.
The CHAffiMAN. Our chief counsel, Mr. Schwarz, has one or two
completing questions, and I have a final question, and that should
finish it for the day.
Mr. Schwarz, go ahead please.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Could you turn to exhibit 72? I have a question, to
straighten out something that is unresolved.
Ambassador HELMS. I have it, sir.
1 See p. 211.
2 See p. 203.
115
Mr. SCHWARZ. In paragraph 7, a suggestion was made that if the
Agency was not going to talk to Mr. Gronouski, it might be that the
information about their programs should be passed through Mr. McGeorge
Bundy to the President after the subcommittee had completed
its investigation. Was information about the mail-opening plan given
to Mr. McGeorge Bundy ~
Ambassador HELMS. I don't recall ever having done so. No, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. The second of three ,final questions: As a historical
note on what Senator Mathias said, am I correct in the impression I
have gathered from the documents that you and Mr. Hoover always
referred to each other as Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover, but never got
beyond the "mister" in all the time you worked together?
Ambassador HELMS. That is correct, sir. And if I may make one
further sentence, there weren't very many people in town that called
him Edgar.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Finally, we have provided you with a document
exhibit 14 1 dated July ~8, 1970, referring to a meeting you had with
Mr. Mitchell the day before. It ,vas given to you, a one-page document.
Have you got it?
Ambassador HELlIfs. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. That document reflects a meeting you had with Mr.
Mitchell about the Huston plan after the President's approval thereof
came to the Agency. Is tha,t right ~
Ambassador HELlIfS. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, in that meeting, what were you told by Mr.
Mitchell about the Huston plan? Did he tell you he knew about it or
he didn't know about it?
Ambassador HELlIfS. IVell, my recollection and what the memorandum
says, which is what I "'ould really prefer to stick to, is that I
apparently mentioned this to him and he said that he had not heard
anything about it, and that he wanted to look into it.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
Ambassador HELlIfS. The thing that surprised me, and this I do
recall, was that he hadn't been present at the original meeting with
the President, but I felt that somebody had obviously been in touch
with him about the contents of that meeting, so I was surprised he
knew nothing about the project.
Mr. SCHWARZ. In this memorandum, you give a characterization of
what kind of effort the CIA had put into the document which was produced
in June, which advocated all of those illegal actions, admittedly
illegal actions. And I will read into the record what you said you
told the Attorney General and then will ask you if that is a fair characterization
of the effort the CIA made to support the document
which called for many kinds of illegal aotions in connection with
domestic activities.
You said, "I told the Attorney General that we had put our backs
into this exercise." And then yon go on to say, "because we thought
he knew all about it and was behind it." But is it fair? Is it accurate ~
Did you tell the truth in that memo when you said the CIA had put
its backs into the exercise ~
Ambassador HELMS. The point I was trying to make to him was
that Mr. Angleton, Mr. Ober, and some others had practically
1 See p. 224.
116
dropped everything they "ere doing to cooperate "ith this task force
to write the report.
That is what I meant in putting Our back into it. I didn't mean
that intellectually we had contributed a whole lot of illegal ideas,
or anything of that kind.
Mr. ScmvARZ. You did pnt your backs into the 'Hiti:ng of something.
But you didn't advocate a whole lot ~f illegal ~ctlOns? .
Ambassador HEL~IS. ,Ve put our backs mto meetmgs wInch led
to the report.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You put your backs into the exercise which led to
the writing of the report which advocated all kinds of illegal activity?
Ambassdor HEL")IS. Yes, sir, we put our back into an exercise that
had been ordered by the President of the United States.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And "hat you recommend is the institution or reinstitution
of all kinds of illegal activity? Is that not right?
Ambassador HELMS. That is your characterization.
Mr. SCHWARZ. ,VeIl, all right. The document speaks for itself, and
we all know what it says.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, during the period that you were Director
of the Agency, did you ever tell the congressional oversight
committees about the mail-opening program?
Ambassador HELMS. I don't recall ever having discussed this with
the congressional oversight committee; no. Mr. Chairman. In fact,
I don't really remember the subject ever coming up in any hearings.
The CHAIRMAN. It is not likely that the subject would ever come
up if they had no reason to believe that such a thing was going on.
I remember one time in the Foreign Relations Committee questioning
Secretary MacNamara, and we wondered why he hadn't told us something
that we thought was rather vital, and his response was, "well,
because you never asked." And since we had no knowledge of it, we
had no reason to ask.
\Vhat I am trying to say is this: if this committee, at the end of
its proceedings, were to decide that a joint congressional committee
of some kind shouid be established with proper powers and proper
jurisdiction, and given the duty to exercise a meaningful surveillance
of intelligence operations, wouldn't it be necessary to impose an affirmative
meaning on the agencies as a matter of law to keep such a
committee fully apprised of all significant covert operations?
Ambassador HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I say yes. And I add one further
thing and that is that there are two sides to every coin and it
takes two hands to clap, and the committee has got to make itself
available for enough time to get all of these things set.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; with that, I agree. And I think that if Congress
is to play its role in the future to make certain that our intelligence
operations are not only lawful but that they are given as
much strength and public confidence as possible, then a committee
needs to be established that will devote sufficient time to the work.
And it can't be simply an adjunct of some other committee that has
a verY.large responsibility in some other field, as the Armed Services
CommIttee, 95 percent of which is devoted to the armed services and
not to the special problems connected with intelligence.
Ambassador HELMS. I certainly agree, Mr. Chairman. wholeheartedly.
'
117
And I do think that every Director does need guidance from the Congress.
And it needs more than they have had in the past.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr.
Helms.
Ambassador HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRl\IAX. That will conclude this hearing.
The committee will reconvene at 10 o'clock on Friday morning in
this room when the FBI's part in this mail opening will be examined
and when, hopefully, we will hear from former Attorney General
John Mitchell.
[vVhereupon, at 4 :33 p.m., the committee was recessed to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Friday, October 24,1975.]
 

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