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I\TEUJGENCE ,\CTIYITIES-THt~ XATIO"\AL SECfHITY AGENCY AXD FOl3RTH .UIEXDjlE~T RIGHTS THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1975 U.:-;. :;';EX,\TE. SELECT COJlDIITTEE To SnTl¥ Gon:Rx:\IEXTAT, OPEIUTION5 "T1TI £ nE~PECT TO I XTELLWEXCE ,\('TrnTms. 1T'(l8hingfoll, D.C. The ('Onilllittrr lIlet. plll':-'lIant to !loticr. at 10 :0;) a.Ill., in room i11R. l{ussell Senate Officp HuildiJl!!, Scnator Frank Church (chairman) jJl'e:-,i\ling". C Pl'p:"pnt: ~('llatol'S Church. To'H'I'. Hnddlpstoll. Hart of Colora(]o, Goltl\yatet'. ;\Iathias. and :-;clnYcikcl'. .\1,,0 nrc,sPllt: ,Yillialll (~. ~Iill('r. staff <1irrdOI': FrNtrrick A. O. :-;I'h\\-nr;~ ..11-.. chief cOlmsp]: Clirtis H. :-;lllotlH'r,;. COli Il scl to the 1I1inorih.': aIHl Char]('s KirllmL prof('ssional stafl' Ilwm!>PI'. 'I'll(' CH.\lR)L\X. The t'ollllllittre ,,,ill plPa,,(' COllI(' ttl {)l'(irI'. Last week, it will be remembered, a question develope(] onr Ir}wthrI' or not thr eOllllllittpr shonld make a pnhlic (liselosnre on onc op('l'ation bat hall I)('en ('oJ1(luf'fpcl in the past Ii,\' the :\SA. The committpp took that question umlpr adviwlllpllt aIll] had the statement that it was proposed for the chairman to rea(!, earcflllly checked for ~IC('lIracY. all(] cardllIIy chrcke(l to make' cprtain that it wonld reyeal JlO llletilOrl or tpchnol;Jg"y that 'yonltl he harlllful to tl~r intrlligence op('J'atiol1:' (,f the l~nitp(l :-;tatcs. Till' COllllllittpe tlwn yoted OIl ~Iolllla,\'. ~o\"('nd!('r ;;. hI' a yojl' of "pl'l'n to th1'pe. that thr informatioll shonlc1 1)(' marlr puhlic'. slIhjr('j to confirmation hy the ~enate Parliamentarian tllat lloin:: "n ,youlc1 !lot l'on"titutr a ,-ioIntion of tllr Sruate nIles. TllP ('ol1l1nitt,,(, rpcein'd "llCh confirmation from the Parliamentarian YC,,,t('l'<lay and that ,,,a,, 1'ead to thl' COllllllittpr ill the "pssinn yesterday ;1 ftPl'l100;1. ' • TIle' ~·(;~;"nns. it sepms to lllP. fo!' til(' tliseIoslIre arr clear. The program cPi'tniJ;;y ;11']1ca1'5 to "inIatp "ectioll flO:; of thr COllllll1mications Act of };J;\.L a" v.-e 11 as tll(' fOl1rt 11 a lllpnc1ment of tIl(' Comtit-ution. That pI'O~Ta!l1 ~j:l" 1,('en teI'l1linatPd a" of now. anll the statelllent to be given j ncby doc:, not dintlg'(' trellllology oj' sellSiti,'e intelligence methods. rnt!pp(l. u) pa l'~ icnlar tce]}no]og"y mlS eYer in \'()l n'd in the procedul'C ; hat -,";a" n~('d. It- amollI!tPll to a simplr tnl'llo""r of telpgraph traffic to t lIP Gnn'l'nllwnt. Thl' COlllJl1ittpl' hellcn's that seriolls kgal aIHl cnllstitlltional questions are raj"l'l] hy this p!'ogram. For that reason. the committee "ote(l to r]i"c]ose it. TIl(' fol1o\\'ill!!.' statelllent is thl' one that has IWf'n re"ie,wd by tIl(' ('ojJllllittpe and "otN] on for rlisclosul'p this morning. :-;IL\?lfHOCK wa" tl\(, ('o\-rr name g:iycn to a Ilwssage-coll('etion p]'opTam ill ,,-hieh tIJl' Go"ernlllent p('rs11all('(l three international tpkgraph ccompanies. HC~\ GlobaL ITT "'orId CommunicatioIls. and (57) 58 ,Yesterll Union International. to make available in various wavs ccrtain of their international teleg-raph traffic to the U.S. GonrmneD:t. For almost 30 ~wars, copies of most international telcgrums orig-inating; in or forwardeel throngh the United States ,vere tnrned onr to the Xational Secnl'ity Ag-elw,v and its predecessor agencies. ~\s "'e discuss more fully belmv, the evidence appears to be that in the midst of the program, the Government's nsr of the material tlU'ned OWl' by the companies chang-eel. At the ontsct. the purpose apparentl~' "'as only to extract international telegrams relating to certain foreig-n targpts. Lat~r, the GOWl'llll1ent Legan to extract the telegrams of cE'rtain U.S. citizens. In de-fpnse of the companies, the fact is that the GovcrnmE'nt did not tE'll tlwm that it ,vas spleeting out and analyzing the messages of certain U.S. citizens. On the other hand the companies knew they were turning over to the Government most international telegrams, including those of U.S. citizC'ns and organizations. Tlwl'e is no evidence to sU/l!.':C'st that they evC'r asked what the GowrnlllC'nt "'as doing with that material or took :::teps to make sure the Govermnfmt did not read the prinlte communications of Americans. The select committeE' made its first inquiries into this operation last Mav, It was not until early September, ho,,'ever, that the sdpct committee I'€ceived a response to its questions. At that time, we obtained preliminary briefings from NSA operational personnel. Subsequently. we examined three NSA officials. incll1din:r former Deputy Director Louis Tordella. These persons were the only ones at NSA with substantial knowledge of the SHAMROCK operation, The committee also reviewed all existing documentation relating to the operation. The select committee again examined NSA officials in executive sessions. Subsequently, the companies which had participated were contacted. Sworn testimony was taken from officials in each company, and company counsel have worked with the committee to reconstruct, as nearly as possible. what has taken place onr the last 30 years. Dnring World War II, all international telegraph traffic was screened by military censors, located at the companies, as part of the wartime censorship program. During this period, messages of foreign intC'lligence targets were turned over to miEtnl'Y intelli/lence. According to documents in possession of the Department of Defense, the Department sought in 1947 to renew the part of this arrangement whereby the telegraph traffic of foreign intelli~ence targets had been turned over to it. At that time, most of these foreign tar:rets did use the paid message facilities of the international carriers to transmit messages. At meetings with Secretary of Defense .Tames Forrestal in 1M'7, representatives of the three companies "'ere assnred thnt if they cooperatecl with the Government in this program they "'oulcl suffer no criminal liability and no public exposure, at ]rf!st as long as the current administration was in office. They "'ere told that such participation was in the highest interests of national securit~·. Secretary Forrestal also explained that the arrangements had the approval of President Truman and his Attorney GeneraL Tom C. Clark. Forrestal explained to the companies, howeYer, that he could not bind his successors by these assurances. He told the companies, moreover, that Cong-ress would consider legislation in its forthcoming session which would make clear that such activity was permissible. In fact, no such legislation was ever introduced. 59 In 1()4D~the companies sought rene,,-ed assurances from ForrestaFs successor, Louis D. Johnson, and were told again that President Truman :md Attorney General Clark had been consulted and had given their approval of these arrangements. As I will explain later in this statement, neither the Department of Defense nor any of the participating private companies has any evidence that such assurances were ever sought again. The Army Security Agency (ASA) was the first Government agency which had operational responsibility for SHAMROCK. When the .A.rmed Forces Security Agency was created in 194D, however, it inherited the program; and, similarly, when XSA was created in 1952, it assumed operational control. . There are no documents at NSA or the Department of Defense ,,-hich reflect the operational arrangements between the Government and the telegraph companies. The companies decided at the outset that they did not want to keep any documents, and the Government has none today other than those relating to the 1947 and 1949 discussions which I previously covered. According to the testimony given to us, it appears, however, that the compames were given to understand at the outset that only traffic of foreign intelligence targets would be gleaned by NSA. In practice, thc arrangements with each company varied somewhat. RCA Global nnd ITT "World Communications provided NSA with the great bulk of their international message traffic, which ~SA then selected fol' traffic of foreign intelligence targets. 'Western Union International sorted the traffic itself and provided NSA only with copies of the traffic of certain foreign targets and all the traffic to one country. In the beginning, the Government received paper tapes of messages that had been transmitted by overseas cables~ as well as microfilm copies of messages that had been sent by radio. These were, at the out· set, sorted by hand apparently for certain foreign intelligence targets only: such traffic could be readily identified by special codes in the heading of each telegram. As a practical matter, the inherent limitations of malllUlI sorting precluded the traffic from being sorted on its content. In the early 1D60's, there was a change in technology which had a significant impact upon the way in which SHAMROCK was run. RCA Global and ITT ,VorId Communications began to store their international paid message traffic on magnetic tapes, and these were turned over to NSA. Thereafter, the telegrams were selected in precisely the same "'av in which DiSc\. selects its information from other sources. This me~nt, for example, that telegrams to or from, or even mentioning, U.S. citizens ,yhose names appeared on the ·watch list in the late sixties and early seventies, ,Yould have been sent to NSA analy~ts, and many ,yonlcl subsequently be disseminated to other agenCIes. The NSA officials examined by us had no recollection of NSA's r,'er informing the companies how NSA was handling the information they were providing. They furthermore had no recollection of any of the companies making such an inquiry, even after KSA began receiving magnetic tapes from two of the companies. Several company officials corroborated this testimony, stating that they had no knowledge of any inquiry by their respective companies or that NSA ever ,-olnnteered any information in this regard. 60 OJ;]} tllP Dirt'f'tor. Depnty Director. and a ]ower-]pvp] managt'l' at XSA had oppJ'ationa lrpsponsibilit~· for SILDIROCK at any onl' time. Jforpovrl'. tJipir ('ontacts ;"itll company officials wpre pxtremely ral'p; in fnd. n,r DiJ'ector lJP\"('r mpt ;\-ith rompany rppre5Pntativps and tllp ]l{'plliy Din':'tol' only mf't once \"it11 a company official. Any COl)]llllllJicatiOlb with the ('oll1panies ,yere mmally relayed by NSA c011riers \\'ho mad,' routine pir'kllps a))(l dpliwries at the companies. Xo nne ('xnmillml from XSA 01' the companies knew of any pffort by tJw ('ompnnjps sincr l!\~fl to sppk rene;wd a"'S11l'aneeS from the n,O\,· ernment for their cOl\tinuC'(l participation in SIL\.~lHOCK. Indeed, PHch of ,hr c'ompanips has gi"en sworn statements. to the committee that tJlrv (Ed not think tll(' arr:1ngements ,vith XS.\. were ever con::-: idrr('d hy the executin' len'ls of their n'slwrtin> eomp,tnies. MOI'eon']'. Dr. Torrle.l1a. the former Deputy Dil'prior, told 11S that 11(' w0111d haH' knmvn jf additional assnrances had en'r been sought and t('stified that to his kno;vledgp t1)('y ;yerp not. ~ XSA and company oflicials likewise knew of no rompensation giwn the ('ompa~,i('s by thr (iO\'ernment for their participation in 'SIL\~lHOCK, :md te:stified that the,- lmrw of no incident where fa,'oritism ,,-as shown allY of the partic'ipating companies by an agency of the Federal <iovt'rnnwnt.•\gain. Dr. Tonlrl1a has shttrd under oath that l\(' wonld han' been tolrf about sHeh an incident if it had taken place. XS.\ neyer 1'('eeiwd any domestic telegrams from tl}(',se companies. Tnllp('rl. nOll" of these companies, at least sillcr 1~)();), has had domestie operations. .\pproximatl'ly flO 1)(,1'cpnt of the messa,!!es rollrr!e<l in SHAMIlOCK came from ::-Ie'" YOl'k. Company offices ill \Vashillgton, San Francisco, :l1H1. for a sl10rt ,,,hil,,. ~Iiami. also participated in a similar fashion. In \Va~'hinSnll. the eOl11pani('s turned ow'r copies of pal'tieulur traf· fir' intel1i~('ncc targets to agents of the FBI. These wpre later deli ,-ered to XSA.· . . Of a11 th' ];1('s:"ages llI:lllc :1Yai1ahle to XS.'- each ypar. it is estimated that XSA in recent wars splectpd 111>out 1;.().()()() !111;"S11Q."PS a month fol' XSA an~,l::st~ to re\·ie,v. Thollsands of these messages in one form or another \'1('1'(' ,li~trilmtpd to other ageneies in responsl' to "foreign intc'l1igpJ) c(' ]'!s:nil'emcllts.~' rmil thi' ;'llrl'ent controyer::-:v arosE'. on1\' a handful of officials in 11](' exeentiyp hl'nlwh onr the last ,10 ye:l1's'wel'e apparently aware of the ~1L\:'IHOCK0lK'ration. Dr. TOl'della testified that to the 1)(,8t of hi" kn()\yl('c1:..::(~ no President sinre T!'uman had been informed of it. SIL\).rnOCK tCl'Ininatpd by O1'd(,!' of thp Secl'etan' of Defense on ~Lw iii. 107;.. ' . ~rlwjf)r TUWEH. ~[r. Chairman. '1'110 CiL'. 'J::;\[.\X. Senator Tower. Senator TOWER. Thank you, ~fr. Chairman. "\.lthcu~h I han consistently endorsP(l tlw aims a1Hl !'trods of this committ0c and have pledgrd rr~yself to an cxhaus6vc and responsible eyalmtion of all aspeets of our jntelligenec community, I mnst state m:v ,finn oprnsition to this nnilaterall'elease of classified information. I nm !!rcat]y concerned that any un'Y11rranted diselosures could seYen·l~- cripple or ('Yell destroy the yital l'upabilities of this indispensable sllfecnwrc1 to ollr Xation'::; seenrity. 01 Despite the Yery best intentions of this committee, and despite its established record of sensitivity to the delicate nature of national security, I cannot assent to its decision to declassify information whose disclosure the Director of NSA has consistently asserted would hamper the NSA mission. The NSA has furnished the staff in executive session with aU requested documents and information. General Allen and his colleagues repeatedly made good their promise to keep this committee funy informed. They have comprehensively briefed this committee in executive session and have ans\vered aU our requests and questions. I simply see no purpose to selected release of classified matters about which \,e have already been fully briefed, thereby running the very real risk of compromising the \,ork of this extremely important, but exceptionally fragile agency. I say again, the public's right to know must be responsibly weighed against the impact of release On the public's right to be secure. r must therefore take strong exception to thf\ action this morning which, in effect, unilaterally releases classified information. Such a clecision does not comport with the stated aims of this committee, nor further the objectiHs of this investigation. Indeed, it may very well contravene the resolution establishing this committee by improperly promoting disclosure outside the select committee of information which "'ould adversely affect our intelligence activities in foreign countries. Therefore, I voice my concern and my dissent. Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIR~fAN.Senator Goldwater. Senator GOI,DWATER. Mr. Chairman, I support the statement of the vice chairman. I was one of the three in the committee that Yoted against releasing the SHA~fROCKinformation. I believe the release of communications intelligence information can cause harm to the national security; moreorer it can lead to serious diplomatic problems with our allies. The committee has all the information it needs to recommend legislation on communications intelligence, and I believe \ye ought to get on with the job. Up to now this committee has had a very commendable record for maintaining secrecy, and I hope we are not going to stray from that good course. The fact that the other body, the House, seems to be irresponsible in its treatment of the subject is no reason in my opinion for the Senate to try to use that as an excuse for disseminating secret material, nor to try to copy irresponsibility. The American people expect the Congress to take remedial action when necessary. The American people also expect the Congress to act responsibly in maintaining our national defense. The CHAnDL\x. Are there anv other Senators who would like to comment? Senator Hudclleston.. Senator HUDDLESTOX. ~Ir. Chairman. just very briefly to comment on the action of the majority of the committee in releasing this report. This is certainly the kind of judgment that this committee has had to make on numerous occasions since the beginning of our inquiry. I might say prior to this decision there was a great deal of effort, n. great many meetings bebvcen the NSA, the ·White House, the com- 67-522-76--5 62 mIttee members, and the committee staff as to just precisely how the people's right to know might be balanced with the need for security. I believe the manner in which this has been done has revealed to the public certain elements of activities that might be considered to be incorrect. I do not see how you can pass legislation in a vacuum. I believe that there has to he a certain amount of knowledge made available to the public and made available to the Congress before reasonable and meaningful legislation can be processed. I believe that this has not in any way jeopardized or compromised the security of onr country or the activity of the NSA or other intelligence gathering agencies of our Nation, that they can go forward just as effectively, perhaps more so, following the result of action of this committee in developing the proper guidelines and proper procedures for our entire intelligence organization's policy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston. Senator Hart. Senator HAnT of Colorado. :Mr. Chairman, I agree with the action taken here thi~ morning, even thongh, as yon know, I was one of those who originally opposed puhlic hearings on this matter. This project involved soliciting and obtaining cooperation of certain international telegraph companies in providing large volumes to the Government for nearly 30 years, in some cases all of the international traffic pa"sing over their facilities. Project SHAMROCK is improper it seems to me for many reasons, including. first, that it appears unlawful under section 605 of the Communications Act of 193-1:, and the fourth amendmenL although there is no case exactly in point. Se~ond, it placed the Government in a position to request illegal acts of the companies, contrary to the proper role of the executive to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Third, it resulted in the Government promising: the companies immunity from criminal prosecution to obtain the cooperation. It raised the possibility which did not occur insofar as our effort :ohO",1'8, that the companies might some day terminate their participation unless the Government gi'anted some'benefit, withheld some penalty, or halted some investigation. It resulted in the invasion of privacy of American citizens whose private and personal telegrams were intercepted as a result of their being on the NSA watch list from 1967 to 1973. It resulted in cOJ.npanies betraying the trust of their paying customers who had a nght to expect that the messazes would be handled confidentially. It was undertaken without the ~ompanies first ascertn, ini~!2: it:" legal~ty. It w~s not c~iscJosed t? the Congress until this year. FmaJly, It contmued WJthout mterruptJOIl foi' nearly 30 years, even thou.Q'h apparently no express approval of the project was obtained from any President, Attorney General, or Secretar): of Defense after 19+9. The CUAm)fAx. ",Voulcl any other Senator like to comment? Then I might just add to' what Senator Hart said, that after 1947, the program chang:ecl without notice to the companies. It chanO"ed in ways that really placed the responsibility on the Government to ~otifv the companies of the change in character of the program, and th{s apparently ",vas not done. . I do not think that there is ~nv purpose to be s?rvrG debating the Issue any further, hut I would lIke to say that the lack of any statutory 63 base for NSA. estahlishing its proper limits, is one of the problems, and there came a time ,vhen e\ren the NSA had doubts about the legality of this program. and also whether it extended beyond the scope of that Agency's own pnrpose and authority. For that reason, the Agency itself finally termin[tted the program, but such programs can be reinstituted aft('r inve,::tigations of this kind. I think it is clear that laws are ne(>ded, a basic la~ for the NSA, just as we have a basic law for the CIA. Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman? The CHA1Ul\IAX. Senator Tower. Senator TOWEr.. I wonld simply like to say that my remarks were not intrnrlrd to en,:lor~e or COTI:10nc the activity i" qnestion beca1lSP I (10 not endorse or condone it. B'lt I strongly objed to the discIos1Il'c because I think it sen:es no useful pm·pose. The Agency has been very cooperative with the committee in HUlking disclosures to the committee to enable leS to pnrsnC' our i~lvestigationeffectively. I think th:lt disclosure scrves no nsdnl purpose, and I think that "'hen we get to the question of pnblic (lisclosnre. th[tt if we err in terms of withholding information or pnl)lishing information, that ,ve should err on the side of safety and I think that WI' haY(' not done that in this instance. I think that at this point, sho11ld this be considered a precedent, and should WI' pnrsue this pattern of disclosure in the f11t111'(,. then this committee will have effectively crippled the intelligence-gathering capability of the l"Tnited States of America. S;nntor GOLDWAT~R.:.\11'. Chairman. The CHAITDL\X. Senator Goldwat{'l" Senator GOLDWATER. I guess a lot of 11S are guilty of operations like this because many of us censored letters during vVorld ,Val' II, readin~ those letters. So I think I would have to join the guilty as you would have to. also. The CJUTR:lfAN. I think that we should recognize the distinction between W1'.r and peace. It poses the question whether this country in ppacetime wants to live always under the customs of war. This w'as a peacetime operation. Senator )L\TJIL\S. "Mr. Chairman'? Senator TOWER. )11'. Chairman. The CJIAJR~L'.X. Tn nnv (,'1S('-Senator )fATIlL\S. Jh': (,hai rman. The CHAIRJL\X. Senator Mathias. Senator )fATHL\S. Senator Goldwater indicted those who had that long and tedions rluty of rending letters during vVorld ,Val' II. I certainly read at l"ast my share. and I expect a little more than my share. I would say it ,,'as perhaps the most boring duty I had in the entire period of service in the U.S. Navy, but I would have to plead not guilty because I think the circumstances were very different. One of the different circumstances is the fact that what was done there was done in accorrlance with the law. The law provided-in fact, the law compelled Hi') to rracl those letters and to make the appropriate changes that. w(']'p ref]uired. and it is the law that I think is important here. I th111k tlwt the law does not extend to the activities of the NSA. The law must be made to extend to the NSA. That certainly is fToin<r to be one of the cardinal recommendations of this committee at the ;-onclusion of its work. 64 The CIIAIRUAX. Thank YOll. Senator TOWER. Mr. Ch;tirman. The CIIAIR:~IAX.Senator Tower. Senator TOWER. I think to make fine distinctions on a matter of war and peace ignores the fact that we are confronted in this world by a very powerful ad"ersary that would not hesitate to resort to military !Ueans to achieve its political objectiyes. A powerful adversary that Itself, through its clandestine acti vities and overt activities, generates military acti vity all over the l,odd to accomplish political ends, thereby jeopardizing the peace and security of everybody in this world who aspires to self-determination and wants to have some reasonable hope of the real izatiol1 of that aspi ration. So I think that lye cannot draw this in strict terms of war and peace, in tcrms of whether or not the United States is actually at war. 'Ve a1'8 in eifect in a war of sorts. That is a war of the preservation of the climate in this "worlel where national integrity will be respected. The CHAIR~IAX.Thank you, Senator Tower. I would only make a final point. Since we are trying to preserve a free society we do not want to emulate the methods of the Russians in the name 'of defense. The actions ·we do take of a proper security nature and proper intelligence nature ought to be within the confines of the law. There are ways that we can write the law and preserve freedom in this country and still maintttin our security against the Russian threat or any other foreign threat. And 200 years of American history testifies to this. Senator TOWEll. May I say I do not condemn the investigation, nor do I endorse what was done. It \vas wrong and without the law, but what I object to is the disclosure because I think it serves no useful purpose and is helpful to the adversary. The CHAIR~IAN.Thank you, Senator. I would like now to invite the Attorney General of the United States to come in. Mr. Attorney General, if you would please be seated at the witness stand. Before I introduce the Attorney General, Senator Schweiker has a comment. Senator SCInYEn~En. The debate that we just had points out very clearly the lack of law in a Yel'Y critical area. I hope the debate will hi!!hlight the fact that la\ys are needed and that there is honest room to dilIer 71mong members of this committee. I think that is our first and most significant aspect of the discussion. I happen to decide this issue on the basis that the public's right to know outweighs any danger that might exist to the Government. III this case I think it was a matter more oj' embarrassment to the GO\'erllment than a matter of damaging security. But I think it was because we dicInot have law, and because the area \,as in a vacuum, that lye got into this kind of debate. I believe because it \las the kind of Government snooping that I personally could not condone, that the committee anclmv standard in this case was that silence is consent. I thonght that the committee find I had a right to speak ant on this matter because I believe to be silent would be to give consent. That is why I Yoted consistently to release this. Thank you. 65 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Schweiker. And I would hope that corporations in the future may find it possible because of the ways the laws are written to cooperate with the Government in the public interest. I think we all agree on that. The Attorney General or the United States has been invited to appear before the select committee today to discuss the fourth amendment of the Constitution and its application to 20th century problems of intelligence and surveillance. In the case of the NSA, which is of particular concern to us today, the rapid development of technology in the arca of electronic surveillance has seriously aggravated present ambiguities in the la,Y. The broad sweep of commlmications interception by KSA takes us far beyond previous fourth amendment controversies where particular individuals and specific telephone lines ,yere the target. How can we control this sophisticated technology allowing NSA to perform its legitimate foreign intelligence task without also allowing it to invade the privacy of Amencan citizens by sweeping in messages unrelated to the interests of national secunty ~ vVhat are we to do about communications that fall outside the realm of traditional intelligence concerns, such as the vague category of economic or business intelligence? Are we to allow communications to or from U.S. citizens regarding economic matters to be intercepted, analyzed and disseminated by KSA? In an era of economic crisis are the international phone calls and cables of American businessmen fair game for government computers? If so, should warrants or some other special procedure be required? These are matters of the most serious concern. The central question is: How should we balance the right to privacy against the need for national security? :Mr. Attorney General, your appearance here marks an important step on the road to more effective controls in these areas. As you know, in addition to practices of the NSA, the committee has also received considerable testimony on the subject of break-ins and mail openings and other such factors. 1Ve are hopeful that we can explore all of these subjects with you today. 'Ve value your views on the basic principles at stake and w'e look forward to working together with you to develop legislative recommendations which will help solve these dilemmas. I understand that you have prepared a statement and have given very careful thought to this question, and I recognize that the statement is somewhat lengthy because of the subject, that can hardly be treated in a truncated fashion. So I invite you now to read your statement. Attorney General LEV'I. Thank you, ~Ir. Chairman. I have a lengthy statement that I have shortened somewhat, hoping to help the committee in that respect-- Senator MATHIAS. :Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether the Attorney General would yield for just a moment, so that I could request that his statement in its entirety be included as part of the record because I believe that it 'Yill be a very valuable part of this record. 'Ve need the benefit of all of it, although he may be inclined to somewhat shorten it in his oral presentation. The CnAm~rAN. I fully agree, and without objection the original statement in its entirety ,Yill be included in the record. [The prepared statement of Attorney General Levi in full follmys :]
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