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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :10 a.m. in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston,
Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater, and Mathias.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O.
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the
minority.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee's witness this morning is the Honorable
Clarence M. Kelley, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a troubled
time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative law enforcement
administrator in charge of the Kansas City Police Department for
over 10 years, and his previous work as a special agent of the FBI,
have made him uniquely qualified to lead the Bureau.
The select committee is grateful for the cooperation extended by
Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over the past months.
The committee is also impressed. by the openness of the FBI's witnesses
before this committee, and their willingness to consider the need for
legislation to clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.
It is important to remember from the outset that this committee is
examining only a small portion of the FBI's activities. Our hearings
have concentrated on FBI domestic intelligence operations. We have
consistently expressed our admiration and support for the Bureau's
criminal investigative and law enforcement work, and we recognize
the vital importance of counterespionage in the modern world. But
domestic intelligence has raised many difficult questions.
The committee has also concentrated on the past rather than on
present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light in our hearings
occurred years and even decades before Director Kelley took charge.
The staff has advised the committee that under Director Kelley, the
FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous policies and to
establish new safeguards against abuse. The FBI is now placing
greater emphasis on foreign-related intelligence operations, and less
on purely domestic surveillance. The FBI is working more closely
with the .Justice Department in developing policies and standards
for intelligence. These are welcome developments.
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Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved. Therefore,
we have invited Director Kelley to share with the committee his views
on some of the considerations the Congress should take into account
in thinking about the future of FBI intelligence. Among these issues
are whether FBI surveillance should extend beyond the investigation
of persons likely to commit specific crimes, whether there should be
outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain
types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques, whether
foreign-related intelligence activities should be strictly separated from
the FBI's domestic law enforcement functions. and what should be
done to the information already in the FBI files and that which may
go into those files in the future.
The committee looks forward to a constructive exchange of views
with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney General Levi
tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice Department in
the next months as the committee considers recommendations that
will strengthen the American people's confidence in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. That confidence is vital for the effective enforcement
of Federal law and for the security of the Nation against foreign
espionage.
Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you; and if you would
have a prepared statement you would like to lead off with, please
proceed.
TESTIMONY OF RON. CLARENCE M. KELLEY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. KELLEY. Thank you very much, Senator Church and gentlemen.
I welcome the interest which this committee has shown in the FBI
and most particularly in our operations in the intelligence and internal
security fields.
I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the Constitution
and laws of the United States. Throughout my 35-year career
in law enforcement, you will find the same insistence, as has been
expressed by this committee, on programs of law .enforcement that
are themselves fuIly consistent with law.
I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative oversight.
In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of the FBI was
being considered by the Senate .Tudiciary Committee 2112 years ago, I
told the members of that committee of my firm belief in congressional
oversight.
This committee has completed the most exhaustive study of our
intelligence and security operations that has ever been undertaken
by anyone outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General.
At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and promised to b(';
as candid and forthright as possible in responding to your questions
and complying with your requests.
I believe we have lived up to those promises.
The members and staff of this committee have had unprecedented
access to FBI information.
You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type investigations
and who arp ppl'SOIlUlly involwd in pvpl'y facpt of our dayto-
day intelligence operations.
283
You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who have
sought to familiarize the committee and its staff with all major areas
of our activities and operations in the national security and intelligence
fields.
In brief. von han>, had firsthand examination of these matters that
is unmatched at any time in the history of the Congress.
As this committee has stated, these hearings have, of necessity,
focused largely on certain errors and abuses. I credit this committee
for its forthright recognition that the hearings do not give a full or
balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.
It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus on abuses to
the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the organization.
The counterintelligence programs which have received the lion's
share of public attention and critical comment, constituted an infinitesimal
portion of our overall work.
A ,Justice Department committee which was formed last year
to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's counterintelligence programs
has reported that in the five basic ones it found 3,247 counterintelligence
programs were submitted to the FBI headquarters from 1956
to 1971. Of this total, 2,370, less than three-fourths were approved.
I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were being devised,
considered, and many were rejected, in an era when the FBI
was handling an average of 700,000 investigative matters per year.
Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed regarding the
counterintelligence programs is most legitimate and understandable.
The question might well be asked what I had in mind when I stated
last year that for the FBI to have done less than it did under the
circumstances then existing would have been an abdication of its
responsibilities to the American people.
·What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is that the
FBI employees involved in these programs did what they felt was
expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress.
and the people ofthe United States.
Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings;
rioters led by revolutionarv extremists laid seige to military, industrial,
and educational facilities; and killings. maimings. and other
atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England to
California.
The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women, and children.
As is the case in time of peril, whether real or perceived, they
looked to their Government. their elected and appointed leadership,
and to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to protect their
lives, their property, and their rights.
There were many c1l11s for action from Members of Congress and
others. but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other law enforcement
agencies ,,-ere besieged by demands, impatient demands,
for immediate action.
FBI employees recognized the danger. felt they had a responsibility
to respond. and in good faith initiated actions designed to counter
conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and
to nputralize violent activities.
In the developmrnt and rxecution of these programs. mistakes of
judgment admittedly were made.
284
Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the counterintelligence
programs, and there were some substantial ones, should not obscure
the underlying purpose of those programs.
'Ve must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and
will arise in the future where the Government may well be expe,cted to
depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative
and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps which
are needed to meet an imminent thr£'at to human life or property.
In short, if we learn a murdpr or bombing is to be carried out now,
can we truly meet our responsibilities by investig-ating only aftt>r the
crime has occurred, or should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to
those instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because of an
imminent threat to human life.
·Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt, the Congress
must consider the question of whether or not such preventive
action should be available to the FBI.
These matters are currently being addressed by a task force in the
Justice Department, including the FBI, and I am confident that Departmental
guidelines and controls can be developed in cooperation
with pertinent committees of Congress to insure that such measures
are used in an entirely responsible manner.
Probably the most important question heretoday is what assurances
1 can give that the errors and abuses which arose under the counterintelligence
programs will not occur again. First. let me assure thf'
committee that some very substantial changes have been made in key
areas of the FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of office
as Director on July 9, 1973. Today we place a high premium on
openness, openness both within and without the service.
I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion in the decisionmaking
process which insures that no future program or major policy
decision will ever be adopted without a full a-nd critica.l review of its
propriety.
Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.
I have made it known throughout our headquarters and field divisions
that I welcome all employees, regardless of position or degree
of experience, to contribute their thoughts and suggestions, and to
voice wha-tever criticisms or reservations they may have concerning
any area of our operations.
The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take full responsibility
for them. My goal is to achieve maximum critical analysis
among our personnel without in any manner weakening or undermining
our basic command structure. . .
The results of this program have been most 'bPneficial to me pprsonally,
to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to the morale of our
employees.
In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past were occasioned
by direct orders from higher authorities outside the FBI, we have
welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's guidance. counsel. and hif3
continuous availability, in his own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect
improper requests."
'Vithin days after taking offic£'. Attorney General Levi instructed
that I immediately report to him any requests or practices which, in
285
my judgment, were improper or which, considering the context of the
request, I believed presented the apprearanc.es of impropriety.
I am pleased to report to this committee, as I have to the Attorney
General, that during my nearly 2:1;2 years as Director under two Presidents
and three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or made
overtures, directly or otherwise, to use the FBI for partisan, political
or other improper purposes.
I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider honoring
any such request.
I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI, I rontinely
bring to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney
General major policy questions, including those which arise in
my continuing review of our operations and practices. These are discussed
openly and candidly in order that the Attorney General can
exercise his responsibilities over the FBI.
I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today is sound.
But it would be a mistake to think that integrity can be assured only
through institutional means.
Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the character of the
person who occupies the office of the Director and every member of
the FBI under him.
I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is my honor
to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism, their standards,
and the self-discipline which they personally demand of themselves
and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate assurance
of proper and responsible conduct at all times by the FBI.
The Congress and the members of this committee in particular have
gained a great insight into the problems confronting the FBI in the
security and intelligence fields-problems which all too often we have
been left to resolve without sufficient guidance from the executive
branch or the Congress itself.
As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been made. But
no one who is looking for the cause of our failures should confine his
search solely to the FBI, or even to the executive branch.
The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for FBI oversight;
yet, seldom has it been exercised.
An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the Committee
on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings
had been commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum
participation with the members of that subcommittee.
I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very recent origin
in terms of the FBI's history.
One of the greatest benefits of the study this committee has made
is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex problems
confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that those benefits are
wasted if they do not lead to the next step, a step that I believe is absolutely
essential. a legislatiw charter, expressing congressional determination
of intelligence jurisdiction for the FBI.
Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the security and
intelli~ence fields is ur~ently needed; and it mnst be undertaken in
a forthright manner. Neither the Congress nor the pnblic can afford
to look the other way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done,
as too often has occurred in the past.
286
This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role not in
the initial decisionmaking process but in the review of our
performance.
I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the courts to do
our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that have been advanced
during these hearings would extend the role of the courts into the
early stages of the investigative process and, thereby, would take over
what historically have boon executive branch decisions.
I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would seriously undermine
the independence of the judiciary and cast them in a role
not contemplated by the authors of our Constitution. Judicial review
cannot bea substitute for congressional oversight or executive decision.
The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination of our
jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional statement that
the Congress finds to be responsive to both the will and the needs of
the American people.
Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a career police
officer. In my police experience, the most frustrating of all problems
that I have discovered facing law enforcement in this country-Federal,
State, and local-are when demands are made of them to perform
their traditional role as protector of life and property without a clear
llnd understandable legal bases to do so.
I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative charter will be
a most precise and demanding task.
It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle the FBI's effectiveness
in combating the growing incidence of crime and violencE'
across the United States. That charter must clearly address the demonstrated
problems of the past; yet, it must amply reco~izethe fact that
times change and so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and
subversive challenges.
The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced the formulation
of operational guidelines governing our intelligence activities does
not in any manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility
for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.
In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which question the
need for intelligence gathering and suggest that information needed
for the prevention of violence can be acquired in the normal course
of criminal investigations.
As a practical matter, the line between intelligence work and regular
criminal investigations is often difficult to describe. 'What begins as
an intelligence investigation may well end in arrest and prosecution
of the subject. But there are some fundamental differences between
these investigations that should be recognized-differences in scope, in
objective and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a
crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to identify
the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution. Since
the investigation normally follows the elements of the crime, the scope
of the inquiry is limited and fairly well defined.
By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of information,
not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but
to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has enough information
to meet any future crisis or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily
287
broad because it must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also
whether the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the means
by which the threat will be carried out. The ability of the Government
to prevent criminal acts is dependent on our anticipation of those criminal
acts. Anticipation, in turn, is dependent on advance information,
that is, intelligenc~.
Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues. Given the
opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need for intelligence
work can be documented to the full satisfa.ction of the Congress. 1Ve
recognize that what is at stakP here is not the interests of the FBI,
but rather the interests of every citizen of this country. 1Ve recognize
also that the resolution of these matters will demand extensive and
thoughtful deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the
complete cooperation of the Bureau with this committee or its successors
in this important task.
In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as Director that we
will carry out both the letter and the spirit of such legislation as the
Congress may enact.
That is the substance of my prepared statement.
I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note that on this
panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary Committee which
heard my testimony at the time I was presented to them for.candidacy
as Director of the FBI. At that time I took very seriously the charge
which may possibly result in the deliberation of this committee and of
the full Senate. I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI
since that time. I have also been we]] aware of the capabilities of the
FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take them lightly. I am
of sufficient experience and age that I have pledged myself to do what
is good and proper. I say this not as a self-serving statement but in
order that we might place in context my position within the FBI. I
could seek sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during
the period these things occurred I was with the local police depa,rtment
in Kansas City, Mo. Prior to that time, however. I was in the FBI.
During the time I was with the FBI 'and during the time I was with
the police department. I continued throughout that period a close
acquaintance with. and a strong affection for the FBI.
I only want to point out that based on those years, based on those
observations, we have a very fine and very sensitive and a very C'apable
organization. I feel that there is much that can still be done. I
know that we are not without fault. I know that from experiences I
have had. We will not be completely without fault in the future. But
I assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any mandate
which you may feel you have as good and proper. I only want to
place in your thinking the fact that you have here a matchless organization,
one which. I continue to say, was motivated in most of these
instances. I cannot justify some. but the motivation was of the best. I
am not pleading. as does a defense attorney. I am only putting in your
thinking my objective observations as a citizen who is somewhat concerned
about the future of this organization. It is too precious for us
to have it in a condition of jeopardy.
Thank you very much.
288
The CHAmMAN. Thank you, Director Kelley.
I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able to remain
through the whole morning. I think he has one question he would like
to ask.
Senator HART of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator
Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10 :30.
I have several questions, and I'm sure they'll be covered by others,
but the one that I have as a result of reading your testimony and listening
to it this morning relates to your comment at the foot of page 10
and at the top of 11.
There you indicate that you caution us about extending the court's
role in the early stages of investigations, suggesting that this might
take us beyond the role contemplated for the courts under the Constitution.
Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national security wiretap
problem, the main focus of our discussions and concern has been
on the possibility of requiring court approval for the use of informants,
informants directed to penetrate and report on some group.
One of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen, pointed out that
really those informants are the most pervasive type of an eavesdropping
device. It is a human device. An informant is really more intrusive
on my privacy than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere.
He can ask me questions to get information the Government
would like to have.
Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the wiretaps for
physical searches with the intent of the drafters of the Constitution to
have a neutral third party magistrate screen use of certain investigative
techniques. And the informant is such a technique. He functions
sort of like a general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval
would violate the role envisaged for the courts.
And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to my feelings.
Mr. KELLEY. I do not feel that there is any use of the informant in
intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable. The concept of the
informant has been approved by numerous court decisions. Let us now
go to the moral connotation of the use of the informant.
I think. as in many cases. it is a matter of balance. You have only
very few ways of solving crimes, one of which is the use of the informant,
I think, the protection of the right of the victim to be victimized.
You have within the Constitution certain grants that are
under ordinary circumstances abrogation of rights. The right to search
and seize, which, of course. can't be unreasonable, but nonetheless,
you have the right.
I think that were we to lose the right of the informant, we would
lose to a weat measure our capability of doing our job.
Now, I'm not arguing with you. Senator. that it is not an unusual
procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not an intrusion. because
it is. But it has to be one, I think, in which virtue of the benefits must
be counted.
We don't like to use it. 'Ve don't like the problems that are attendant.
We take weat care.
Now you mention the court pO&'3ibly ha,-ing jurisdiction over them.
I think that possibly we could present the matter to the court. but
289
what are they going to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they
going to han to follow it all the way through?
Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts. Must the
court be contacted for each and approval of the court given for each
contact?
There are a great many problems insofar as administration of it.
I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my idea-that
there is a satisfactory control over the informants as we now exercise
it today. Yes, there are going to be some ,vho will get beyond our
control, but this is going to happen no matter what you do.
Senator HART of MIchigan. I appreciate your reaction. I was not
suggesting that there is consideration here to prohibit informants. I
was reflecting a view that I felt and hold that the use of an informant
does require some balance, as you yourself said, and I would be more
comfortable with a third party making a judgment as to whether
the intrusion is warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do
understand your position.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hart.
rSenator Hart of Michigan leaves the hearing room.]
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker, do you have questions ~
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman. thank you very much.
Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your organization
and I personally regret that the organization is in political distress,
but we've both got to recognize that it is, along with other agencies
and departments of the Government.
I think you probably would agree with me that even though that
is extraordinarily unplell.sant ll.nd in many respects unfortunate, it
also has a plus side. That is, it gives us an indication of our future
direction and the opportunity, at least, to improve the level of competency
and service of the Government itself.
'With that hopeful note. would you be agreeable then to volunteering
for me anv suggestions you have on how to improve the responsiveness
of the FBI, or indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the
Government, to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President
1 Beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on
how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents, the
records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its essential, I
believe, eccsential oversight responsibilitv to see that these functions,
these delicate functions are being undertaken properly 1
And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things I am
concerned about.
It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not even confirmed
bv the Senate of the United States. I believe you are the
first one to be confirmed by tbe Senate of the Fnited States. I think
thll.t is a movement in the 'right direction. I think the FBI has taken
on a stature unO. additional importance that requires it to hll.ve closer
supervision and scrutiny bv us. At the same time I rather doubt that
"'e can become involvpd in tllP daily relationship between you and the
Attorney General. Therefore. I tend to believp that the Attorney
Gpneral needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the
FBI. I wOlllel appreciate any comments on that.
290
Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the intelligence
community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so that the Congress
can, if it needs to in the future, take a look at these decisions and the
process by which they were made to decide that you are or you are
not performing your services diligently.
I don't think you can have oversight unless you have access to
records, and in many cases records don't exist and in some cases the
people who made those decisions are now departed and in other cases
you have conflicts.
How would you suggest then that you improve the quality of service
of your agency? How would you propose that you increase the
opportunity for oversight by the Congress of the rnited States?
What other suggestions do you have for improving the level of law
enforcement in the essential activity that is required?
Mr. KELLEY. I would possibly be repetitious in answering t?is
Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling what I thmk
is necessary and what I hope that I have followed. One, which is
beyond my control. but which I think is very important, is that the
position of Director, is one to which great attention should be paid
in choosing the man who will properly acquit himself.
I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going over me, did
a pretty good job. I feel that it is most necessary jhat care be taken
that his philosophy, his means of management, hi; facility to adapt
to change, his tendency toward consulting with othor members of the
official family, that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight
with no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very
carefully.
I think further that he should be responsible for those matters which
indicate impropriety or illegality.
Senator BAKER. Could you stop for just a second? Who does he work
fod Does the Director, in your view, work for the President of the
United States, for the Attorney General, for the Justice Department,
for the executive branch?
Who is the executive of the FBI, the Director of the FBI, responsible
to? Who should he be responsible to?
Mr. KELLEY. Jurisdictionally, to the Attornev General, but I think
this is such an important field of influence that It is not at all unlikely
that we can expand it to the judiciary, the legislature, and of course,
we are under the Attorney General.
Senator BAKER. Do you have any problems with the idea of the
President of the United States calling the Director of the FBI and
asking for performance of a particular task? Does that give you any
difficulty? Or do vou think that the relationship between the FBI
Director and the President is such that that is desirable, or should
it be conduited through the Attorney General?
Mr. KF:LLEY. I think it should be in the great majority of the cases
conduited through the Attorney General. There has been traditionally
some acceptance of the fact that if the President wants to see and
talk with the Director. he may call him directly.
It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter report to the
Attorney General, whoever it might be. that I have been calle,rl over
and what I discussed and was told. And this was revealed in -fun to
them.
291
Senator BAKER. I suppose we could pass a statute that says the
President has to go through the Attorney General, although I rather
suspect it would be a little presumptuous.
But to go the next step. do you think it is necessary for the pursuit
of effective oversight on the part of the Congress, to have some sort of
document written, or at least some sort of account of a Presidential
order or an order of the Attorney General given to a Director of the
FBI?
Do you think that these things need to be handled in a more formal
way?
Mr. KELLEY. Personally, it would be my practice in the event I receive
such an order, to request that it be documented. This is a protection
as well as a clarification as to whether or not it should be placed
as part of legislation. I, frankly, would like to reseITe that for some
more consideration. I don't know whether it would be, but I think that
it can be worked very easily.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I believe, has
already established some sort of agency or function within the Department
that is serving as the equivalent, I suppose, of an Inspector
General of the Justice Department, including the FBI. Are you
familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has taken in that respect? I
think he calls it the Office of Professional Responsibility.
Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.
Senator BAKER. Do you have any comment on that? Will you give us
any observations as to whether you think that will be useful, helpful,
or whether it will not be useful or helpful, how it affects the FBI,
how you visualize your relationship to it in the future?
Mr. KELLEY. I don't object to this, which is to some extent an oversight
within the Department of .Tustice under the Attorney General.
Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it completely, but
to the general concept, yes, I very definitely subscribe.
Senator BAKER. How would you feel about extending that concept
of government-wide operation, a national Inspector General who is
involved with an oversight of all of the agencies of Government as
they interface with the constitutionally protected rights of the individual
citizen? Would you care to comment on that, or would you
rather save that for a while?
Mr. KELLEY. I would like to reserve that one.
Senator BAKER. I'm not surprised. Would you think about it and
let us know what you think about it?
Mr. KELLEY. I will. rSee Appendix B, p. 992.]
Senator BAKER. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAX. Senator Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank YOU, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kelley, in your statement you describe the conditions that
existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during
this inquiry occurrl'd. indicating that the people within the Bureau
felt like they were doing what was expected of them by the President,
by the Attorney General, the Congress and the people of the United
States.
Does not this suggest that there has bl'en a reaction thPfe to prevailing
attitudes that mi,O'ht have existed in thl' country because of
certain circumstances rather than any clear and specific direct in292
structions that might have been received from proper authorities ~
And if that is the case, is it possible in dewloping this charter, thi;;
guideline, to provide for that kind of specific instruction ~
Mr. KELLEY. I think so, yes. I think that they can logically be
incorporated and that--
Senator Hl;DDLESTOX. You can see there would be a continuing
danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the attitudes
may be at a specific time in this country because--
Mr. KELLEY. Senator. I don't contemplate it being a continuing danger,
but there certainly could be a \'ery acceptable g'uidepost whereby
we can, in the event such a need seems to arise. kno\v what \ve can do.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. \Vell, in pursuing the area which Senator
Hart ,vas discussing-whether or not we can provide sufficient
guidelines which would replace a decision by the court in determining
what action might be proper and specific in protecting individual's
rights, can't we also provide the restrictions and guidelines and
the various techniques that might be used ~
For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as has already
been done, that informants are necessary and desirable. How do we
keep that informant operating within the proper limits so that he in
fact is not violating individual rights ~
Mr. KELLEY. Well, of course, much of the reliance must be placed
on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure that there is no
infringement of rights.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But this is an area with which we've had some
difficulty in the past. \Ve have assumed that a particular action was
necessary, that there was a present threat that some intelligence programs
should be initiated, but in many cases it has gone beyond what
would appear to have been necessary to have addressed the original
threat. How do we keep within the proper balance there ~
Mr. KELLEY. Well, actually, it's just about like any other offense.
It is an invasion of the other individual's right and it is by an officer
and an FBI agent is an officer. There's the possibility of criminal
prosecution against him. This is one which I think might flow if he
counsels the informant.
Now insofar as his inability to control the informant, I don't suppose
that would warrant prosecution, but there is still supervisory
control over that agent and over that informant by insisting that
control is exercised on a continuing basis.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It brings up an interesting point as to
whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be very alert to
any law violations of its own members or anyone else.
If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do something
unlawful, the question seems to me to be whether or not that is a
violation that should be reported by the FBI.
Mr. KELLEY. I think that any violation which comes to our attention
should either be handled by us or the proper authority.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But that hasn't been the case in the past.
Mr. KELLEY. Well, I don't know what you're referring to but I
would think your statement is proper.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, we certainly have evidence of unlawful
activity taking place in various projects that have been undertaken,
293
which certainly were not brought to light willingly by the FBI or by
other law enforcement agencies.
The question that I'm really concerned about, as we attempt to
draw guidelines and charters that would give the aglmcy the best
flexibility that they may need against a wide range of threats, is how
we control "'hat happens within each of those actions to keep them
from going beyond what was intended to begin with?
~ir. KELLEY. You're still speaking of informants?
Senator HUDDLESTOX. Not only informants but the agents themselves
as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or other intelligencegathering
techniques.
The original thrust of my question 'was, even though we may be
able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do we control the
techniques that might be used, that in themselves might be a serious
violation of the rights?
Mr. KELLEY. 'V"ell, first, I don't know whether it's germane to your
question but I do feel that it should be pointed out that the association
to, the relationship between the informant and his agent handler is a
very confidential one, and I doubt very seriously whether we could
have any guidelines. where there might be an extension of any monitors
here because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.
Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others which
may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of violations of the
law on the part of informants, and either pros(lcuted ourselves,
through the reporting of it to the U.S. attorney, or tumed it over to the
local authority. We have done this on many occasions. Insofar as our
own personnel, we have an internal organization, the Inspection Division,
which reviews this type of activity, and if there he any violation-
yes, no question about it. we would pursue it to the point of
prosecution.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But it could be helped by periodic review.
Mr. KELLEY. We do, on an annual basis, review the activities of our
59 offices through that same Inspection Division, and they have a clear
charge to go over this as well as other matters.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Kelley, you pointed out the difference in
the approaches in gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.
Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to attempt
to separate these functions within the Agency, in the departments, for
instance, without mixing gathering intelligence and gathering evidence
~ Are the techniques definable and different ~
Mr. KELLEY. Senator, I think they are compatible. I see no objection
to the way that they are now being handled on a management
basis. I think. as a matter of fact. it is a very fine association whereby
the intelligence, stemming as it does from a substantive violation, is
a natural complement.
Senator HUODLESTOX. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes information
to numerous government agencies. Is this properly restricted
and controlled at the present time. in your judgment, as to just rwho
can ask the FBI for information. what kind of information they can
ask for, and probably even more important. what restrictions can be
put on the use of that information once it has been supplied by the
FBH
294
Mr. KELLEY. I think so, Senator.
Senator HeDDLEsTOX. You think there are proper restrictions now?
~Ir. KELLEY. I don't know that we ean ourselves judge in all cases
whether or not there is good and sufficient reason for an agency to
inquire. I think that there should be a very close delineation by the
agencies as to what they're going to ask for. but I think that we do have
sufficient rules that are satisf'actory to us.
Senator HtmDLEsToX. You're confident that the information your
agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment of the rights
of any individuals.
Mr. KELLY. Senator, I'm only confident in what I do myself. I
would sav that I am satisfied.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I was wondering whether some inclusion
ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to who specifically
can request, what limits ought to be placed on the request, and what
they can do with it after they get it.
Mr. KELLEY. Yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I have some concern about the fact that in intelligence
gathering, one is 'bound to gather a great deal of information
about some individual that is useless as far ,as Ithe intent of the
intelligence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarrassing
or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any effort
to separate this kind of information out of a person's file tha.'t is really
ini'tiated for a purpose, for a specific purpose unrelated to this information.
Is there 'any effort, or could any direction be given to doing that?
Mr. KELLEY. We would be very happy to work under the guidelines
or rules or anything else to purge material which is extraneous, irrelevant,
or for any other reason objectionable.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. And how about the length of time that these
files are lrept in the agency? '
Mr. KELLEY. We ,are willing to work within that framework, too.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. I think that might be done.
I think in developing the chain of command, so to speak, it certainly
would be very difficult to prevent the President of the United
States from calling up the head of the FBI or anyone else and discussing
any law enforcement problem he might so desire, and perhaps
even give direct'ion to the agency.
But how frhaut that? What about White House personnel who might
also be inclined to call the Director and ask him to do specific things?
Could there be some clear-cut understanding as to whether or not the
Dire('tor would be obligated to undertake anv such project, that just
anybody at the 'White House might suggest? .
Mr. KELLEY. It's very clear to me that any request must come from
:Mr. Buchen's office. and that it be, in any case. wherein it is a request
for action, followed with a letter so requesting.
This has come up before during-the "\Vatergate hearings, and I think
it has been placed very vividly in am minds; that is, take care that
you just don't follow the request of e·mne underling who does not truly
reflect the desire of the President.
Senator HrDDLEsTOX..Just OIl(' 1110re question about techniques,
aside from the guidelines of authority all broad projects undertaken.
295
\Yould ,it be feasible from time to time in a congressional oversight
committee to discuss with the Department and with the Bureau various
techniques so that they could have some input as to whether or not
these actions are consistent with the overall guidelines, to start with,
and consistent with 'the very protections ~
)11'. KELLEY. Senator, I have already said to the Oversight Committee
of the Senate that so far as I can now see, the only thing that
would be \vithheld ,is the identity of informants. We'll discuss techniques,
we'll discuss our present activities. I think this is the only way
that we can exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you
want to accomplish and what I want to accomplish.
Senator HUDDLESTO~. I feel tha:t is an important aspect of it because
even though you have a charier which gives broad direction for all the
guidelines and to the type.<; of projects that you enter into it, if we
don't get down to specifics, such things as how intelligence is to be collected,
how evidence is ,to be collected, what is done after it is collected,
that type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap again for
the Bureau to assume thaJt it has total instruction and total permission
to move in a certa'in direction and go beyond what is intended or what
was authorized.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Dirootor.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Goldwater ~
Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI electronic surveillance
of Dr. King, several tapes of specific conversa'tions, and later
a composite King tape were produced. Are these tapes still in the
possession of the FBI ~
Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.
SenatDr GOLDWATER. Have they been reviewed by you ~
Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. Have they been reviewed by any of your staff,
to your knowledge ~
Mr. KELLEY. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.l-know
that at least some have reviewed it wi,thin the area of this particular
section. There has been no review of them since I came tD tlhe FBI, I
can tell you that.
Senator GOLDWATER. \Vould these tapes be available to the committee
if the committee felt they would like to hear them ~
Mr. KELLEY. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is of, .as I
said before, some del'icacy, and there would have to be a discussion
of fhis in an executive session.
The CHAIIL"\IAX. I might say in that connection 'that the committee
staff gave some consideration to this matter and decided that it would
compound the original error for the staff to review the tapes, because
that would be a still further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained
from insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing thrut it was
unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at what we
neNIE'd to know about thE' King case.
So the staff did refrain, and for that reason 'the issue never came to
a hrad. I ju:;;t wanted to lay that information before the Senator.
Senator GOLDWATER. I realize that's a prerogative of the staff, but
it's also the prE'Y'ogatin of the committee if,and I'm not advocating it,
if we wanted to hear them ourselves to determine whether Mr. Hoover
66-077 0 - 76 - 20
296
was off on a wild goose chase 01' whether there \yas, in effect, some reason.
Again. I am not advocating it I am merely asking a question.
They would be available if the committee took a vote to hear them and
decided on it.
~fr. KELLEY. I don't t !link it \yould be within my jurisdiction to respond
to this, Senat{)!'. It would have to be the Attorney General.
Senator GOLDWATER. I see. Now. are these tapes and other products
of surwillance routinely retained even after an individual ceased to
be a target of inquiry? .
1fr. KELLEY. They are retained usually for 10 years.
Senator GOLDWATER. Ten years.
Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. 'Vhat is the future value, if any, to the Bureau
of retaining such information?
Mr. KELLEY. If there be guidelines that set out a destruction or
erasure, we will abide by it. 'Ve will. on those occasions where we think
that matters might come up wiNlin that period of time which may need
the retention of them, we will express our opinion at that time, but
other than that ,ve would be guided by guidelines.
Senator GOLDWATER. Is it your view that legitimate law enforcement
needs should outweigh privacy considerations with respect to retention
of such information, or do we need the clear guidelines on the
destruction of these ma'terials when the investigative purposes for
which they were collected have been served?
Mr. KELLEY. 'We feel that there should be a good close look at the
retention of material. and we would, of course, like to have an input.
But we welcome consideration of this.
Senator GOLDWATER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
,'ery much.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Mondale ?
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Director. it seems to me that the most crucial
C{uestion before the Congress is to accept the invitation of the FBI to
draw congressionally imposed lines. limits of authority so the FBI
will know clearly what you can and cannot do, so you will not be
subject to later judgments. The question is, where should that line be
drwwn?
As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created. and Mr. Stone later
became the Chief .Justice, he drew the line at criminal law enforcement.
He said that never again would we go beyond the authority imposed
upon us to get into political ideas, \Ve would stay in 'the area
of law enforcement.
'Vould you not think it makes a good deal of sense to draw the
guidelines in a way that YOll!' activities are restricted to the enforceIllent
of the law. illvestigations of nime. investigations of conspiracies
to commit crime, rather than to leave this very difficult to define and
control area of political ideas·~ .
l\h. K.:Lu;y. I don~t know whether' I understand youz' last stateIllent
of involving the area of political illeas. I say that I feel that
certainly \H' shoulll be v('sted anll should continue in the. field of
criminai im'estigations as an im'('stigatory objective. These are COllclusions.
of COlll'se. \vhich are based on statutf'S in the so-called security
field. national or foreign.
297
Thesp are criminal \"iolations. I fppl that thev should be in tandem.
I fpel, having ,vorked many years in this atmosphere, that you have
morc ears and eyes and you have more personnel working together,
cm"pring the sanw fields. I do not think there should be a separation
of the intell igpncl~ mattprs, heca use it is a concomitant. It naturally
flows from the illl"estigation of the security matters and the criminal.
Senatol' )loxD.\LE. )11'. Kellev, what )II'. Stone said was that the
BUI'eau of Im"estigation is not c~ncerned with political or other opinions
of individuals. It is concprned only with such conduct as is forbidden
by thc laws of the l'nited State~. 'Vhpn the police system goes
beyolH] thpse limits, it is dangerous to propel' administration of justice
and human liberty.
Do you object to that definition·~
Mr. KELLEY. I think that life has become much more sophisticated
and 'Ye have added to the so-called policeman's area of concern some
matters which were probably not as important at that time. I think
that the fact that the FBI has be('lI in touch with the seem'ity investigations
and the gathering of intelligence is something which has
proved to be at times troublesome and given us great concern, but it is
a viable, productive procedure.
I dOlt'! know what )Ir. Stone was thinking of entirely of this course,
but I can tell you about the procpdure today.
Senator MOXDALE. I think you recognize, if that further step is
taken, as you're recommending here, at that point itbeeomcs so difficult
to guarantee. In fact, in my opinion, it becomes impossible to
guarantee that ,,'e won't see a reCUlTPnee of some of the abuses that
we've seen in the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind
of meaningful o\'ersight on a function as nebulous as the one you've
just defined.
If the FBI possesses the authority to inwstigate ideas that they consider
to be threats to this Nation's security, how on earth can standards
be developed that would lwo,'ide allY basis for oversight? 'Ve
have seen how that definition can be stretched to include practically
everybody, including' modprate civil rights lea(lers, war dissenters
and so on.
How can you, from among other things, be protecte(l from criticism
later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't do something that
some politician tried to pressure you into doing~
MI'. KELLEY. It might ,veIl be, Senator, that 10 years from now a
Dilwtor of the FBI ,viII be seated here and will be criticized for doing
that which today is construed as very acceptable.
Senator MONDALE. Correct. And I have great sympathy for the
predicament in which the FBI finds itself.
)fr. Klo:LLEY. And the Director.
Senator MONDALE. And the Director especially. That is why I think
it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines as sharply defined as
possible, so that when you are pressured to do things, or wll('n, after
the fact, people with good 20/20 hindsig-ht cun criticize you or the
Bureau, you can say, h('re are tIl(' stalHlanls that yon :rave us, and they
specifically say this, and that is your answer. 'Ve have to li,'e by the
law. If we don't dpfine it specifically, it seems to me that these excesses
could reoccur, because I don't think it's possible to define them, and the
298
FBI is inHitahly going to be kicked back and forth. depending on
persollalnotions of \yhat you should 11:1\'e done. Don't you fear that?
:\Ir. KELLEY. Xat too mnch, Senator. I think we learned a great lesson
by virtue of ",Yatergate. the reyelations that ha\'e come up as a
result of this committee's inqniries. the fact that I think that "'e have
a different type of spirit today in the Bureau. tlIP fact that, as I said
befon'. you came in. that I think the Bnrean is a matchless organization,
and they are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the
fact that we are getting a number of very fine yonng people in the
organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we had
years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in the Bureau
today of "'hat is the proper type of conduct.
vVe may not be able to project this on all occasions, because we must
equate this with the need and with onr experience, but if precise
guidelines are the goal. you're going to have tronble. If. on the otlwr
hancl. there is flexibility, I think that we can work very well within
those guidelines.
Senator MONDALE. As you know. I don't think there is a better
trained or professionally higher qualified law enforcement or'ganization
in the ,yorld than the FBI. I think we all'agree it is superb. But
the problem has been. from time to time, that when you go beyond
the area of enforcing the law into the area of political ideas. in fact.
you lea\'e the criminal field. you get into politics. That is where, it
seems to me. the great controversy exists, and where you are almost
inevitably going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future. no
matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get into trouble.
)11'. KELLEY. I agree to that. and I point out that in almost every
branch of the Gowrnment and in every part, as a matter of fact, every
segment of our society. there are some who deviate from the normal
course. I feel that within the Bureau there is less likelihood of this
happening, and I think that working with you, we can at least make
some achievements that will be significant.
Now, whether it will he lasting. I don't know, but I think we've made
a good start.
Senator )lmmALE. In your speech in Montreal on August 9, you
said we must be willing to surrender a small measure of our liberties
to presen'e the great bulk of them. Which liberties did you have in
mind?
Mr. KELLEY. vVell, of course, this speech has been misunderstood
many, manv times.
Senator ~fmmALE. "'Veil, I want you to have a chance to clear it up.
Mr. KELLEY. All that was intended here was a restatement of the
approach which the courts historically have used in resolving most
is.<;ues of constitutional importance, and its recognition that rights are
not susceptible to absolute protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in
the fourth amendment, for example, which protects the right of
privacy. it does not prohibit searches lll1<1 seizures. As I mentioned, it
only refers to those that are unreasonable.
i came from the police field. ",Vltat is more restrictive to more people
than traffic regulation? But what would be more chaotic is if you did
not haw traffic regulation. ",Ye do, in order to live in the complexities
and intricacies of today's life, haw to gi\'e up some of our rights. Some
may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it is so, I wish to say
that I ,vas only pointing out that there has to be a balance.
299
Senator )10XDALE. SO when you say we han> to gin> up some liberties,
or as you just said, some rights, which rights would you have
us gin' up!
)Ir. KELLEY. Fnder the fourth amendment. vou ,Yould have the
right for search and seizure. . •
Senator )IO);DALE. You wouldn't give up the fourth amendment,
right!
MI'. KELLEY. Oh, no, not the right.
Senator MOXD.\LE. 'Yhat right do you have in mind!
Mr. KELLEY. The right to be free from search and seizure.
Senator MOXDALE. There's no such right in the Constitution. You
can have such seizures, but they must 'be reasonable, under court warrant.
Did you mean to go beyond that ~
Mr. KELLEY. That's right.
Senator MOXD.\LE. You should be able to go beyond that ~
)fr. KELLEY. Ko, no. I do not mean that we should ever go beyond
a constitutional right guarantee.
Senator )10XDALE. 'VeIl, would you say, .Mr. Kelley, that that
sentence might have been inartful inyour speech ~
)11'. KELLEY. I said that if it was misunderstood, I made a mistake,
because I should never make a statement which-yes, it was inartful.
Senator MOXD.\LE. I think I know about your record in law enforcement
well enough to tell you that I think you were saying something
different, that it was taken to mean something different than I think
you intended.
'Vhat you are saying is that, in the exercise of your law enforcement
powers, the rights of individuals are determined by the laws and the
courts, but the courts, in the handling of those issues, have to balance
rights and other values.
That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct ~
Mr. KELLEY. Senator, I ought to have you write my speeches so that
I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't intend that to be at the
time anything that was unusual. I have to admit that maybe I made a
mistake.
Senator MOXD.\LE. 'What you are saying in effect is that the rights
of the American people can be determined not by the Director of the
FBI bllt by the courts alHl by the Ilny. You meant that ~
Mr. KELLEY. Indeed, yes, sir.
Senator MOXDALE. All right. Thank you.
The. CIL\IR:\L\X. Senator Hart?
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to a question by
Senator Mondale, one of his first questions about laying down guidelines,
it seems to me what you were saying ,ms we could work together.
That is to say the Bl1I'eau and tIl(' Congress lay do,Yn guidelines that
woul.d not unreasonably hamper you from im'estigations of crime control
1Il the country.
But I think implicit in his question was also an area that you didn't
respond to, and that is, what kind of guidelines do you lay down to
protect ,vall and the Bureau from political pressure, the misuse of the
Bureau by political figures, particularly in the 'Vhite House?
And ,ye've had indications that at least two of your predecessors, if
not more, ob\'iousl,v were corrupted and ~1r. Gray was under great
pressure from the 'Yhite House to use the facilities of the Bureau and
their capabilities to accomplish some political end,
300
It seems to me you "'ere argning in fa YOI' of fewer restrictions so
yon could get on with your job. but that is not "'hat Senator ~IoJl(Iale
aIHI the rest of ns are inten'sted in.
'What kind of restrictions can we lay down to protect you from
political pressures! I'd be interested in that side of the coin, if you
,,·ould.
~Ir. KELLEY. I "'ould \yelcome any ,!.!nidelines which would protect
me or any snrcpssor from this type of thing. I think that would be
splendid. I haye not revie\wd the guidelines as prepared to the present
elate hy the Department. It might 'be that they are well defined in
there. But I welcome anv consideration of such directives.
Senator HART of ColoI·ado. Do yon think this is a problem?
:Mr. KELLEY. No. sir. not with me.
Senator H.\RT of Colorado. Do you think that it has been a problem
for the people that preceded you?
)fr. KELLEY. I think so.
Senator HART of Colorado. And that's a problem the Congress
ought to address?
Mr. KELLEY. I think so.
Senator HART of Colorado. The committee received a letter from the
Department of Justire a couple of days ago. in which the Assistant Attorney
General asked our cooperation in carrying out the inyestigation.
or their efforts to review the investigation, conducted by the FBI
into the death of Martin Luther King, .Tr.• in order to determine
whether that investigation shoulrl be reopened. They asked our cooperation,
they asked for our transcripts, the testimony before the committee,
all material provided to the rommittee by the FBI which relates
to Dr. King anel the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
I guess my question is this: 'Vhy is the Justiee De}YcLrtment asking
this committee for FBI files?
Mr. KELLEY. I don't think they're asking for files. I think they're
asking for what testimony was given by witnesses whose testimony
has not been given up. I don't know.
Senator HART of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all material provided
to the committee by the FBI which relates to Dr. King and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference."
I repeat the question. 'Yhy is the .Justice Department asking this
committee for material proyided to us by the FBI?
MI'. KELLEY. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I just ask-[
Pause.]
Mr. KELLEY rcontinne(l]. I am informed. aIHI I knew this one.
Eyerything that was sent to yon was sent throug-h them. Did they have
a copy also? Yes. they had a retained ropy. I don't know why.
Senator HART of Colorado. So there's nothing you provided us
that's not ayailahle to the .Jnstice Department?
~fr. KELLEY. That's right.
Senator H.\RT of Colorado. And you can't account for whv an offirial
of the .Justice Department w~nl(l ask this committee for your
records?
~[r. KELLEY. No, sir.
Senator H.\Irr of Colorado. Yon released a statement on November
18. 1974. reg-arding- tIl(' FBI's connterintelligence program and
you said von made a (letaiJr>d stlHl\" of COIXTELPHO arti\'ities an(l
reached the following conclusions, ;Illd I quote:
301
"The purpose of these counterintelligence programs was to prevent
dangerously and potentially deadly acts against individuals, organizations
and, institutions, both public and private, across the United
States."
",Ve had an FBI informant before this committee and he stated he
told the FBI on a number of occasions that he planned violent acts
against black people in groups. And yet, he said there were few, if
any, instances in which the FBI actually prevented violence from taking
place. How does his testimony square with your statement that
I have quoted ~
Mr. KELLEY. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of his statements
contral'v to "'hat we ha\'e saill are the truth. ",Ve don't subscribe to what
he said: 'Ve have checked into it and we know of no instances where,
for example. the If) minutes story and that type of thing has been
substantiated.
Senator HART of Colorado. You're saying the testimony he gave us
under oath was not accurate?
Mr. KELLEY. Right.
Senator HART of Colorado. You also said in that statement, and I
quote:
I want to assure you that Director Hoover did not conceal from superior authorities
the fact that the FBI was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics
against reyolutionary and yiolence-prone groups.
Now the committee has received testimony that higher authorities,
the Attorney General and Congress, were not informed of New Left
COIXTELPRO activities. Do you IUl\'e any information in this rega)'{
l?
I know in that st-atement you cite one or two instances. but in terms
of the bulk of COIXTELPRO acti\'ities, the recOl'd seems to indicate
that there was not systematic information flowing upward through
the chain of command to Director Hom-er's superiors.
Mr. KELLEY. )Iay I ask that I be given the opportunity to substantiate
that with documentation ~
Senator HART of Colorado. Sure.
Mr. KELLEY. Or respond to it. [See Appendix B, p. 992.]
Senator H.\RT of Colorado. Director Kelley, just in passing, do you
a/!ree with the statement made by President Ford that those responsible
for harassing and trying to destroy Dr. King should be brought
to justice ~
Mr. KELLEY. Those who were directly responsible and upon whose
o)'{}ers the acti\"ities wpre taken are responsible. I don't know if he
intended to say that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be
llIore propel'. Insofar as my own opinion is concerned. that it should be
centered on those who said to do it, those who an' responsible.
I took the responsibility for any such program and I don't expect
that those under me would be not actin/! in accordance with ,vhat they
think is propel' and may even ha\"e some reselTation, but they do it on
my orders. I accept that responsibility. I think that it should rest on
those who instructel} that that be done.
Senator HART of Colorado. But you agree that the people who give
the orders should be brou/!ht to justice.
Mr. KELLEY. I do.
The CIIAIR)L\X. Aren't they all dead?
302
~rr, KELLEY. Ko,
The Cn.\IlUux. Kat quite?
Mr. KELLEY. Xot quite.
Senator IL\I:T of Colorado. That's all. ~fr. Chairman.
The Cn.\nDux. Thank you, Senator.
Director Kelly, in the committee's re\'ie\\" of COIXTELPRO and
other political invohemcnts of tIll' FBI, it seems to me that ,,'e han\
encOImten.'l] t,,'o or three basic questions.
Since the inYestigation is over insofar as the committee is concerned,
\H' 're no\\" tIlming our attention to remedies for the future,
what I WOUII] think would be our constructive legislative work. It is
very important that we focus On what we learned in that inYestigation.
One thing that we have learned is that Presidents of the Fnited
States have from time to time ordered the FBI to obtain for them certain
kinds of information by exercising the necessary sUl'\'eillance to
obtain and to han' a purely political character, that they simply
wanted to haw for their own personal purposes. I think that you would
agree that that is not a propel' function of the FBI.
Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI, including the Director,
to turn down a Pr'esident of the rllited States if he receives
a direct order from the President. It is always possible, of course, to
say no, and if you insist. I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden
on any man serving in your position, particularly if the President
puts a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible 01'
even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say, you know,
I am consil]ering Senator 'White for an important position in my administration.
and I need to know more about his activities, particularly
of late. I've had some cause for concern and I want to be certain that
there is nothing in his record that would later embarrass me, and I
just want you to keep careful track of him and report to me on what
he's been doing lately.
It's difficult for you to reply to the President: "Mr. President,
that's a n~ry questionable activity for the FBI, and I frankly don~t
belieye that you\'e given me the real reason why you want this man
followed. I think his opposition to your current policy is politically
pmbarrassing to you and you want to get something on him."
I mean. you know~ the Director can hardly talk back that way, and
rm wondering what we could do in the way of protecting your office
and the FBI from political exploitation in this basic charter
that we write.
I want your sug-gestions. but let's begin with one or two of mine,
r would like your response.
If we were to write into the law that any order giyen you either by
the President or by the Attorney General should be transmitted in
writing and should clearly state the objecti\"e and purpose of the requpst
and that the FBI would maintain those written orders and that
furthel'mOI'e they would be aTailable to any oversight committee of
the Congress. If the .Joint Committee on Intelligence is established,
that committee \yould have access to such a file.
So that tlw committee itself would be satisfied that orders were not
being giYen to tIll' FBI that were impropl'r or unlawful. 'Yhat would
you think of writing a provision of that kind into a charter for the
FBI?
303
~Ir. KELLEY. I would say writing into the law any order issued by
the Presi<lent that is a request for action by the Attorney General
shoul<] be in writing-. is certainly, in my opinion, a very plausible
solution. 1"m sure that in conh'mplation of this there would be some
that will say yes or some that ,,"ill say no, but I think we could define
an area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could do that.
Now as to the availability to any oversig-ht committee of Congress,
I woul<l say generaHy that I certainly would have no objection to this
but again, there may be some request for something of high confidentiality
that the PI'esi<lent might put in writing such as some national
01" foreign security matter.
I would like to ha \"e such a consideration be given a great deal of
thought and that the oH'rsight committee review be conditioned with
that possibility. I don't think it would present a problem.
I have said previously that I feel I can discuss everything except the
identity of the informants to the O\"ersight committee. I welcome that.
The CII.\lIUL\N. "'eH, that has been of course the \yay we proceeded
with this committee. It has worked pretty \yell, I think.
Now, Senator Goldwatel' brought up a question on the Martin Luther
King tapes. I would like to pursue that question. If these tapes do
not contain any evidence that needs to be presel'ved for ongoing
eriminal inwstigations, and since Dr. King has long sine(' been violently
remo\'ed from the scene, why are they preselTed? 'Vhy aren't
they simply destroyed? Is there a problem that \ye can help through
new law to enable the FBI to remo\'e from its files so much of this
infol'luation that it has collected that is no longer needed or may never
have connected the person with any criminal activity? And yet, all of
that information just stays there in the files year after year.
'Vhat can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's not the problem,
then what is? 'Vhy are these tapes still clown there at the FBI?
Mr. KELLEY. 'VeIl. of course, we do ha\"e the rule that they are maintained
10 yem'S. Now, why the rule is your question and why, right
now, am they maintailw<l? Since we do maintain e\'erything since the
inquiry has started and until that's lifted, \ye can't destroy anything.
I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines or legislation
and again, as I have said, there should be some flexibility and I know
that's a broad statement but there might be some areas wherein that
the subject of the investigation himself may want them retained because
it shows his innocence. I think you ha ve to deliberate this very
carefully, but it can be done awl we are wiHing to be guided by those
rules.
The ClI.\IR)IAX. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting thousands
of investigations every year on possible appointees to Federal
position. As It matter of fact. the only time I ewr see an FBI agent
is when he ('omes around and Hashes' his llll<lge and asks me a question
or two about what I know of ~II·. so an<l so. who's being considered
for an exP('utin> office. .And 'Ye ha\'e a very brief conYersation in which
I teH him that as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and
that is abont the extent of it.
TllPn when this fill' is cOlllplpte<l and thp person involved is either appointed
or not appointed. ,\"hat happens to that file? I kno\\" it's full of
all kinds of gossip lJecalls<' it is in tIl(' natllre of the im'estigation to go
ont to his 01(1 neighborhoods and talk to pn>l'ybody who might ha\"e
known him? '''hat happens to the file? Is that just retained forC\'er?
304
~fr. KELLEY. 1Ve ha"e some capability of destroying some files and
they are rather I!:'ngthy insofar as l'ptention. 1Ve hay!:' some archi,'al
rules which gOYern the retention of material which is dcyeloped in
cases inyolyillg certain members of the executi,'e branch of the Government.
I see no reason why this ,Yould not be a proper area for consideration
of legislation.
The CIIAIR:\L\X. Can you gin~ me any idea of how much-do you
haye r!:'corcls that woulel t!:'11 us how much tim!:' ancl money is being
spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands of routine investigations
on possiblC' Presi<lential appointments to Fe<ll'I'al offices?
Mr. KELLEY. I feel confident we can get it. I do not have it now,
but if you would like to have the annual cost for the investigation of
Feoeral appointees--
The CHAIRc\IAN. Yes. Plus any other information that would in<!
icate to us what proportion of the time and effort of the FBI was
absorbed in this kind of activity.
Mr. KELLEY. I can tell you it is relatively small, but I can get you,
I think, the exact amount of time and the approximate expense.
The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would 00 that because this is a matter
we need more information about. "\n<1 when you snpply those data to
the committee, would you also snpply the number of such inyestigations
each year? You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 01' 2;')
years, but give us 'a good idea of the last few years, For example,
enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the reach
of these investigations may be.
Mr. KELLEY. Through 1970?
The CHAIRMAN. That would be sufficient, I would think.
The other matter that is connecteo to this same subject that I would
like your best judgment on is whether these investigations could not
be limited to offices of sensitiYity. That is to say, ,yhere legitimate national
security interest might be involved so that there is a reason to
make a close check on past associations, attitudes and expressions of
belief.
I have often wondered whether we couldn't elminate routine Federal
offices that are not particularly sensitive in the national security
sense from the reach of these FBI checks. And so when you respond
to the series of questions, I wish you would include the offices that are
now covered by such checks and gin' us an idea of how far down into
the Feoeral bnreaucracv this extelHls. Could YOU do that?
Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. [See Appendix B, p. 992.]
The CHAIR:\IAN. Fine. Now there is a vote. The Yote always comes
jnst at the wrong- time, but :\11'. Srhwarz ,,-ants to ask you some additional
questions for the record, ancl there may be other questions that
would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask Mr. Schwarz to
acljonrn the hearings. It looks like we're going to be tied up on the
floor with yates.
Bnt. before I leaYe, I want to thank yon for yonI' testimony, MI'.
Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you f~r the ,,'ay yOli haye
cooperated with the committee in the course of its investigation during
the past months.
Mr. KELLEY. Thank you.
305
The CH,\IR)IAN. And I hope, as you do, that as a result of the work
of the committee \H'. can write a generic law for the FBI that will
help to remedy many of the problems we'll encounter in the future.
Thank you.
Mr. SCHWAnz. )11'. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.
In your statement, you said the following, and I would like then
to question about what you said:
'Yp must rpeog-nizp that situations han> oecurrpd in the past and will arise
in thp futurp \yhere thp Go\"ernnwnt may well Ill' expected to dppart from ·its
traditional roll', in thp FBI's easp, tU; an ill\"estigatiyp and intellig-encl'-gathpringag-
pncy, ami takl' affirmatin' stpps \yhich are npedpd to mept an imminent thrpat
to human lifp or propprty.
Kow, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what kind of
situation! And can you gi\"c some concrete examples under your genpral
prilll'ipips statement!
)1r. KELLEY. I think that ~1r. Adams addressed himself to that the
other day, \yhere you have an extremist \yho is an employee at the
waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's going to do something
which is (levastating to the city, and you have no way to attack this
ullder the ordinary pro~·edures. and so therefore you Illust take some
steps to meet that imminent threat to human life or property.
Mr. SCHWARZ. So let us take that case as a test of the principle. You
arc saying the extremist has said he is going to do something to the
waterworks, poison it or something, and he is on the way down there
with the poison in his car. Is that the presumption?
MI'. KELLEY. 'Ve hadn't gone that far, but all right, you can extend
it.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right, now, in that case you ha\'e the traditional
law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.
Mr. KELLEY. Kat under probable cause where he has not gone down
there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had not taken any
overt aets in perpetration of this.
Mr. SCHWARZ. If he hasn't taken any overt acts, are you then in
what you would call an imminent threat of human life or property?
Mr. KELLEY. I think so.
Mr. SCHWARZ. How so? L"nless he has taken an overt act to buy the
poison or to get in the car with the poison, there is not by definition
any threat to life or property.
Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business a long
time. I\'c heard a number of threats which were issued. and they thereafter
materialized into actions. I don't take these threats as being
empty ones, because so Illany times they have been acted upon.
I was criticized one time \yhen there was a threat made to kill me,
and it \yas said later on, it's not rhetoric. it's not rhetoric to me, beca~
lse when they say they're going to kill me, that just means one
tIung.
Mr. SCHWARZ. But I'm not disagreeing with you.
Mr. KELLEY. But you are clisagreeing with me. You're saying on
the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible threat. That's
the whole area of concern that we ha\'e lwre-losing the capability
of doing something. 'Ve don't say we should initiate it ourselves.
'Ve say that we should go to the Attorney General. 'Ve do not
306
subscribe to the idea that we should act independently because maybe
we <lon't haH' the judicial I'pvip,,,-the capability of detPl'mining, but
we do think that we should report it and thereafter see what can be
done.
:Mr. SCHWARZ. Have you changed in the course of our discussion the
standard you refer to in your opening statement,' where you're talking
about an imminent threat.
.Mr. KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And I hear you now as saying a possible threat.
Mr. KELLEY. An imminent possible threat.
Mr. SCHWARZ. An imminent possible threat.
'Vould that be a fair standard fol' either action, other than arrest?
1 don't know what you have in mind, but something to prevent the
person from carrying out his activities, other than arrest, for instance,
what is an example of what you han> in mind?
Mr. KELLEY. Removing him from his position or whatever is necessary
in order to make it impossible, or a.t least as impossible as possible,
to perpetuate this thing.
Mr. SCHWARZ. You mean have him lose his job 01'-Mr.
KELLEY. I don't know what it would be.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Isolate him in some fashion?
Mr. KELLEY. In some fashion perhaps.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, for such activity and for opening an investigation
into a domestic group, could you live with a standard which said
you would have to have an immediate threat that someone was likely
to commit a serious Federal crime involving violence?
Mr. KELLEY. I think that this thing could be worked out so that
there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.
Mr. SCHWARZ. So those words, without trying to commit you entirely
to them, do not seem to you to depart far from what you think
would be an acceptable standard.
Mr. KELLEY. 'Yell, an imminent, immediate threat might be, by
virtue of the word "immediate", that he's going to do it the next minute.
In that case it may be necessary for you to, not with the presence
or the possibility. not be able to do anything pxcept put him under
arrest.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Of course, of course. And nobody would at all disagree
with that kind of action.
Mr. KELLEY. I don't think they would either.
Mr. SCHWARZ. But on the question, let's take the opening of an
investigation into a domestic group. Is it basically consistent with
practicality to make the test immediate threat of a serious Federal
crime involving violence?
~rr. KELLEY. To open a domestic security case?
Mr. SeHwARZ. Yes.
Mr. KELLEY. It appears to me that this is a terrorist activity, in
effect. 'Ve certainly have terrorist activities under our jurisdiction as
a threat against the Fnited States.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Now, are there other circumstances where it is justifiable
to open an investigation of the domestic group where you do
not ha,-e an immediate threat of serious Federal crime involving
violence?
Mr. KELLEY. Oh, I think thpre arr other criteria, and they have hpen
well defined as to what is the possiblr opening, the basis fo'r a possible
1 See p. 284.
307
opening. 'Ve haven't been discussing that, we have been discussing
particular instances, but there are other criteria that are used, yes.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'Vhat would the other criteria be?
Mr. KELLEY. 'Vell, the possible statutory violations over which we
Illt\'e jUt'is(liction arp, gpnerally speaking, tIle, most used of the bases.
And then you have, of course, some intelligence investigations which
should, of comse, be of short duration if there is no showing of this
lpading to action or a viable intent.
Mr. SCHWARZ. So that's what you're looking for in the intelligence
investigation '?
Mr. KELLEY. By intelligence investigation, yes, you are looking to
prevent.
Mr. SCHWARZ. 'Vhat you are looking to prevent, and what you're
looking to find, is a likelihood of action combined with an intent to
take an issue?
Mr. KELL}~Y. And the capability.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And the capability. I just have two other lines, Mr.
Kelley, and I appreciate very much your time.
Mr. KELLEY. That's all right.
Mr. SCHW.UtZ. Assuming a legitimate investigation has been started
into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legitimate for the FBI, in
addition to obtaining information that relates to what we've just been
talking about, the likelihood of violent action, is it also legitimate for
the FBI to collect, retain, and disseminate information concerning
on the one hand the sex life of a person and the political views of a
person on the other?
Mr. KELLEY. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what many of
our problems are-perhaps the guidelines can define this type of thing.
I think probably you will agree that within the determination of the
deviations possibly of sex lives, there might be something that is
relevant. I would say ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views,
yes, I think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or some
view that a(hocates \'iolence or the overthrow of the government.
Mr. SCHWARZ. "Tauld those be the only limits on political views
that you think are OK to collect, advocates of violence or of overthrow?
Mr. KELLEY. 'VeIl, I don't think because he's a Democrat or a
Republican it would be anything that ,,,ould be damaging, but it might
on the other hand counter the report that he's a member of some other
organization.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Is the standard you used on coIledion of sex life
information relevant? I suppose 'anything might be relevant, but
don't you think that as a function of balance, it has to have a high
degree of relevance before it's j ustifiahle to collect that kind of information
on American citizens who are not suspected of having committed
crimes?
Mr. KELLEY. Insofar as doing it presently, it has bepn included in
some reports as a result of the requirement that that is what is required
by our )'ulps, that when a pPl'son reports something to us, we do a
report of the complaint. Insofar as a determination by guidelines that
mlJ~ht be prepared later, I think that we can certainly deliberate on
tillS to see ,,,hether 0)' not this is sompthing wp should retain, and we
would not objrct to anything l'('asonable in that regard.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I just have one nnal question.
308
Taking the current manual and trying to understand its applicability
laid against the facts in HlP )Iartin Luther King case, lmder section
87, permission is granted to open investigations of the infiltration
of nonsubversive groups, and the first sentence reads: "\Vhen information
is rec~ived indicating that a subversive group is seeking to
systematically infiltrate and control a nonsubversive group or organization,
an investigation can be opened."
Now, I take it that is the sallle standard that was used in opening
the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in
the 1960's, so that investigation could still be open today under the
current FBI manual.
Mr. KELLEY. Weare interested in the infiltration of clearly subversive
groups into nonsubversive groups inasmuch as this is a ploy
that is used many times, and having infiltrated, they then get control,
and they have a self-laundered organization which they can use, and
not, certainly, to the benefit of the country.
1\11'. SCHWARZ. But is the answer to my question yes, that under that
standard, the SCLC investigation could still be opened today?
Mr. KELLEY. I think so.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right, then, just one final Question.
Do you agree that special care ne~ds to be taken not only of the
standards for initially opening an investigation of a group, but perhaps
extra care needs to be taken when the investigation goes beyond
the initial target group to individuals or people who come into contact
with it?
Mr. KELLEY. I don't know if I agre~ with that entirely. If you mean
that we go into the nonsubversive group--that we then investigate
people in that nonsubversive group, not the infiltrators, but the noninfiltrators,
that we conduct a lengthy investigation of them without
any basis for doing' so other than that they are in an infiltrated group,
I would say probably that's not. necessary.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Thank you very much.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Just a couple of very brief lines of inquiry, Mr.
Kelley. I think that one of the questions that the chief counsel was
raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you talk
about the difficulty of setting out the line between intelligence gathering
and law enforcl\ment kinds of functions. Nevertheless, though, I
think that you have made an effort, indeed, the Bureau's organizational
scheme reflects an effort to distinguish some of this.
Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage effort, and looking
strictly at what we have been calling domestic intelligence, is it
your view that the retention of this function in the Bureau is critical
to the Bureau's law enforcement position?
1\11'. KELLEY. ~[y personal opinion is that the Bllreau does a splendid
job in this area. I feel further thM the background of criminal investigatory
activities and experiences which all counterintelligence people
have is very helpful. It is helpful not only in gathering knowledge ann
the experience; it also enters in the tif'l(l so that you haw a person with
a broad understanding of rights and privileges, and you don't have
so much t.hat spy or cloak-and-dagger type. that very, very secret type
of operatIOn.
I subscribe to the present system heartily.
309
Mr. SMOTHERS. 'Vould it be of assistance to your mission if, within
the Bureau, guidelines were established that effectively limited access
or controlled dissemination of the intelligence product? In other
words, if we had a situation where the intelligence product is critical
to assist the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question
that there should be access to it.
Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that intelligence
product and preventing the kind of murky crossing of lines there
with the information legitimately needed for law enforcement?
Mr. KELLEY. There is always a problem when there is wide dissemination,
because that just numerically increases the possibility of misuse,
abuse or slander. libel, or anything of that mat,ter, and I think
that it would be well ·worthwhile to review the dissemination rules
to make them subject to close guidance in the guidelines that we're
speaking of.
Mr. S~IOTHERS. Let me just raise one final area with you. A question
was raised about the investigation now being conducted by the Justice
Department regarding the improper actions of COINTELPRO, and
the King case in particular. As we look at allegations of impropriety
by your personnel. I think it would be helpful for our record here
to have some insight into the procedure the Bure.c'lu would normally
follow. 'Vhat does the Bureau do when it gets an allegation that an
agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved improperly?
Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it routinely referred to
the Justice Department?
Mr. KELLY. There may be a revision in this type of procedure as a
result of the establishment of the Council for Professional Responsibility.
At present it would be in the great majority of the cases turned
over to our Inspection Division for investigation. There might be,
on some unusual occasion, a designation of a special task force made
up, perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is handled
internally at present.
Mr. S~IOTHERS. 'Vould these internal determinations be reviewed by
the .Tustice Department. or do you think ,that is a necessary step? .
I guess what we are searching for here is. first. to what extent
does the Bureau police itself; and second. is the Department of Justice
involved in the policy determinations? For instance. what if the Attorney
General disagreed with the assertion that only the higher-up
officials who ordered the action against King should be the subject of
investigation and maybe prosecution? How does the interplay work
there between you and .Tustice?
Mr. KELLEY. 'Ve do report to the Attornrv Genrral those activities
~vhich we construe as improper or possibly iilegaI. There is a possibilIty
that the DepartnlPnt. ha\'ing been a(h·ised of thr situation. might
take it on their own to do their own im·estigating. and this is something
that we feel is a decision to be made only rather rarely, because
we feel we have within our own organization sufficient capability to
handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled independently of
us.
Mr. S:\IOTHERS. Thank you.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Thank you.
C\Vhereupon. at 12 :12 ·p.m., the cOlllmittee recessrd subject to the
call of the Chair.]
 

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