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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

132
Senator TOWER. The next witnesses to appear before the committee
are Mr. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-Deputy Associate Director
(Investigation), responsible for all investigative operations;
Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division,
responsible for internal security and foreign counterintelligence
investigations; Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel
Division; Joseph G. Deegan, section chief, extremist investigations;
Mr. Robert L. Shackelford, section chief, subversive investigations;
Mr. Homer A. Newman, Jr., assistant to section chief, supervises
extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigalus, unit chief, supervises
subversive informants; Joseph G. Kelley, assistant section chief, civil
rights section, General Investigative Division.
Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before
this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God? .
Mr. ADAMS. I do.
Mr. WANNALL. I do.
Mr. MINTZ. I do.
Mr. DEEGAN. I do.
Mr. SCHACKELFORD. I do.
Mr. NEWMAN. I do.
Mr. GRIGALUS. I do.
Mr. KELLEY. I do.
Senator TOWER. It is intended that Mr. Wannall will be the principal
witness, and we will call on others as questioning might require, and
I would direct each of you when you do respond, to identify yourselves,
please, for the record.
I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow the members
of the committee to return from the floor.
[A brief recess was taken.]
Senator TOWER. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Wannall, acc,ording to data, informants provide 83 percent of
your intelligence information. Now, will you provide the committee
with some information on the criteria for the selection of informants ~
TESTIMONY OF JAMES B. ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTORDEPUTY
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION; ACCOMPANIED BY
10HN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL DM.
SION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L. SHACKLEFORD,
SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR., ASSISTANT TO
SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT CHIEF; AND
JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF, CIVIL RIGHTS
SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
Mr. WANNALL. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you have
quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting Office.
Senator TOWER. That is GAO.
Mr. WANNALL. Based on a sampling of about 900 cases.
133
Senator TOWER. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate figure?
Mr. WANNALL. I have not seen any survey which the FBI itself has
conducted that would confirm that, but I think that we do get the
principal portion of our information from live sources.
Senator TOWER. It would be a relatively high percentage then?
Mr. WANNALL. I would say yes. And your question is, what criteria?
Senator TOWER. What criteria do you use in the selection of
informants?
Mr. WANNALL. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In our cases
relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get an informant who
can meld into a grOl~p which is engaged in a criminal-type activity,
you're going to have a different set of criteria. If you're talking about
our internal security matters, I think we set rather high standards. We
do require that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist
principally of che~ks of our headquarters indexes, our field office
indexes, checks with other informants who are operating in the same
area, and in various established sources such as local police departments.
Following this, if it appears that the person is the type who has
credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we would interview
the individual in order to make a determination as to whether
or not he will be willing to assist the FBI in discharging its responsibilities
in that field.
Following that, assuming- that the answer is positive, we would
conduct a rather indepth mvestigation for the purpose of further
attempting to establish credibility and reliability.
Senator TOWER. How does the Bureau distinguish between the use
of informants for law enforcement as opposed to intelligence collection
? Is the guidance different, or is it the same?
Mr. WANNALL. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address the use
of informants on criminal matters since he heads the operational
division on that.
Mr. ADAMS. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact that
with a criminal informant in a law-enforcement function, you are
trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in court for
prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant alone, your
purpose could either be prosecution or it could be just for the purposes
of pure intelligence.
The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality of the individual
and protecting the individual, and trying, through use of
the informant, to obtain evidence which could be used independently
of the testimony of the informant so that he can continue operating
as a criminal informant.
Senator TOWER. Are these informants ever authorized to function
as provocateurs?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regulations against
using informants a,:; provocateurs. This gets into that delicate area of
entrapment which has been addressed by the courts on many occasions
and has been concluded by the courts that providing an individual
has a willingness to engage in an activity, the Government
has the ri~ht to provide him the opportunity. This does not meall,
of course, that mistakes don't occur in this area, but we take whatever
steps we can to avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants
can engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that, espe134
cially the Supreme Court in the Ncwark 0 ounty case, that the very
difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that an informant himself
can engage in criminal activity, but because there is lacking this
criminal intent to violate a law, we stay away from that. Our regulations
fall short of that.
If we have a situation where we felt that an informant has to become
involved in some activity in order to protect or conceal his use
as an informant, we go right to the U.S. attorney or to the Attorney
General to try to make sure we are not stepping out of bounds insofar
as the use of our informants.
Senator TOWER. But you do use these informants and do instruct
them to spread dissension among certain groups that they are in·
forming on, do you not?
Mr. ADAMS. We did when we had the COINTELPRO, which were
discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best
examples of a situation where the law was in effect at the time. We
heard the term "states rights" used much more then than we hear it
today. We saw in the Little Rock situation the President oithe United
States, in sending in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local
law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the
troops only as a last resort.
And then you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve
the respective roles in law enforcement. You have historical problems
with the Klan coming along. We had situations where the FBI and the
Federal Government were almost powerless to act. We had local law
enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence.
The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those, he saw
them from the lowest level of'the informant. He didn't see what action
was taken with that information, as he pointed out in his testimony.
Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments
in every instance. We also knew that in certain instances the
information, upon being received, was not being acted upon. We also
disseminated SImultaneously through letterhead memorandums to the
Department of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI,
in a position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction
from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.
Sections 241 and 242 do not cover it because you don't have evidenc,8
of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in a situation where the
Department called in U.S. marshals who do have authority similar to
local law enforcement officials. So, historically, in those days, we were
just as frustrated as anyone else was, and when we got information
from someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information,
and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something
about it, it was not always acted upon, as he indicated.
Senator TOWER. In none of these cases, then, was there adequate evidence
of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to aet?
Mr. ADAMS. The departmental rules at that time required, and still
require, departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under
241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob
scene, and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but
unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert
in a conspiracy, you have no violation.
135
Congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968 that they came
along and added section 245 to the civil rights statute, which added
punitive measures against an individual that didn't have to be a conspiracy.
But this was a problem that the whole country was grappling
with; the President of the United States, Attorney General. We were
in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know
from a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General.
The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence
and in neutralizing the Klan-and that was one of the reasons.
Senator TOWER. What was the Bureau's purpose in continuing or
urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam Veterans Against
the Wad Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the
intent to halter political expression?
Mr. ADAMS. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans Against
the War that indicated that there were subversive groups involved.
They were going to North Vietnam and meeting with the Communist
forces. They were going to Paris, attending meetings paid for and
sponsored by the Communist Party, the International Communist
Party. We feel that we had a very valid basis to direct our attention to
the VVAW.
It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was head of the
Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made, and what it
finally boiled down to was a situation where it split off into the Revolutionary
Union, which was a Maoist group, and the hardline Communist
group, and at that point factionalism developed in many of the
chapters, and they closed those cases where there was no longer any
intent to follow the national organization.
But we had a valid basis for investi~ting it, and we investigated
chapters to determine if there was affilIation and subservience to the
national office.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Hart.
Senator HART of Michigan. But in the process of chasing after the
Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information that clearly
has no relationship to any Federal criminal statute.
Mr. ADAMS. I agree, Senator.
Senator HART of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that stuff
off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?
Mr. ADAMS. Here is the problem that you have with that. When
you're looking at an organization, do you report only the violent
statements made by the group or do you also show that you may have
one or two violent individuals, but you have some of these church
groups that were mentioned, and others, that the whole intent of the
group is not in violation of the statutes. You have to report the good,
the favorable along with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We
wind up with information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum
cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the real
purpose of an organization, do you only report the violent statements
made and the fact that it is by a small minority, or do you also show
the broad base of the organization and what it really is ? .
And within that is where we have to have the guidelines we have
talked about before. We have to narrow down, because we recognize
that we do wind up with too much information in our files.
66-077 0 - 76 - 10
136
Senator HART of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process, you are
feeding into departmental files the names of people who are--who have
been engaged in basic first amendment exercises, and this is what
hangs some of us up.
Mr. ADAMS. It hangs me up. But in the same files I imagine everyone
of you has been interviewed by the FBI, either asking you about
the qualifications of some other Senator being considered for a Presidential
appointment, being interviewed concerning some friend who
is applying for a job.
Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the FBI?
Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that this is an
indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our files has an onerous
impression, a chilling effect. I agree. It can have, if someone wants
to distort what we have in our files, but if they recognize that we interviewed
you because of considering a man for the Supreme Court of the
United States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't see
where any harm is served by having that in our files.
Senator HART of Michigan. But if I am Reverend Smith and the
vacuum cleaner picked up the fact that I was helping the veterans,
Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and 2 years later a name check is
asked on Reverend Smith and all your file shows is that he was associated
2 years ago with a group, that was enough, if you believed them
to be of doubtful patriotism, to justify turning loose a lot of your
energy in pursuit of them.
Mr. AnAMS. This is a problem.
Senator HART of Michigan. This is what should require us to
rethink this whole business.
Mr. ADAMS. Absolutely. And this is what I hope the guidelines committees
as well as the congressional input are going to address themselves
to.
Senator HART of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range of
groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetration and
report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition of when an
extremist or security investigation may be undertaken, refers to
groups whose activity either involves violation of certain specified
laws, or which may result in the violation of such law, and when
such an investigation is opened, then informants may be used.
Another guideline says that domestic intelliwmce investigations
now must be predicated on criminal violations. The agent need only
cite a statute suggesting an investigation relevant to a potential violation.
Even now, with an improved, upgraded effort to avoid some
of these problems,' we are back asrain in a world of possible violations
or activities which may result in illegal acts.
Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the right to
demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition, conceivably may
result in violence or disruption of a local town meeting, when a controversial
social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers
rather than those holding the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau
should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such a
meeting because they may result in violence, disruption?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir.
Senator HART of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify spying on
almost every aspect of the ppacp movement?
137
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir. ·When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor
demonstrations \vhere we have an indication that the demonstration
itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in,
a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these
groups are participating where there is a potential that they might
change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.
But this is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to
avoid getting into an area of infringing on the first amendment
rights of people, yet at the same time being aware of groups such
as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the
present time. But we have had periods where the demonstrations
have been rather severe, and the courts have said that the FBI
has a right, and indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect
to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders
until it may be too late for prevention.
And that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut case. Our
problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a
judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of
enabling us to monitor the activities, and that's where I think most
of our disagreements fall.
Senator HART of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule for opening
an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The Bureau manual
states that informants investigating a subversive organization should
not only report on what that group is doing but should look at and
report on activities in which the group is participating.
There is a section 873B dealing with reporting on connections with
other groups. That section says that the field office shall "determine
and report on any significant connection or cooperation with nonsubversive
groups." Any significant connection or cooperation with nonsubversive
groups.
Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of 1969 there was a
rather heated national debate over the installation of the antiballistic
missile system. Some of us remember that. An FBI informant and two
FBI con'fidential sources reported on the plan's participants and activities
of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM,
particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium, which
ineIuded speakers from the Defense Department for the ABM and a
scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.
The informants reported on the planning for the meeting, the distribution
of materials to churches and schools, participation by local
clerg-y, plans to seek resolution on the ABM from nearby town councils.
There was also information on plans for a subsequent town meeting
in Washington with the names of local political leaders who would
attend.
Now the information, the informant information, came as part of an
investigation of an allegedly subversive group participating- in that
coalition. Yet the information dealt with all aspects and all participants.
The reports on the plans for the meeting and on the meeting
itself were disseminated to the State Department, to military intelligence,
and to the White House.
How do we get into all of that?
Mr. AoAMS. WeIl-.-
138
Senator HART of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it, would you
do it again?
Mr. ADAMS. Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969 was. The problem
we had at the time was where we had an informant who had
reported that this group, this meeting was going to take place and it
was going to be the Daily 'Worker, which was the east coast Communist
newspaper that made comments about it. They formed an organizational
meeting. We took a quick look at it. The case apparently was
opened on May 28, 1969, and closed June 5, saying there was no problem
with this organization.
Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick look and get out,
fine. We've had cases, though, where we have stayed in too long. When
you're dealing with security it is like Soviet espionage where they can
put one person in this country, and they supported him with total
resources of the Soviet Union, false identification, all the money he
needs, communications networks, satellite assistance, and everything,
and you're working with a paucity of information.
The same problem exists to a rertain extent in domestic security.
You don't have a lot of black and white situations. So someone reports
something to you which you feel, you take a quick look at, and there's
nothing to it, and I think that's what they did.
Senator HART of Michigan. You said that was 1969. Let me bring
you up to date, closer to current-a current place on the calendar. This
one is the fall of last year, 1974. President Ford announced his new
program with respect to amnesty, as he described it, for draft resistors.
Following that there were several national conferences involving all
the groups and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.
Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is not yet the law,
we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.
Mr. ADAMS. That's right.
Senator HART of MIchigan. Some of the sponsors were umbrella
organizations involving about 50 diverse groups around the country.
FBI informants provided advance information on plans for the
meeting and apparently attended and reported on the conference.
The Bureau's own reports described the participants as having represented
diverse perspectives on the issue of amnesty, including civil
liberties and human rights groups, GI rights spokesman, parents of
men killed in Vietnam, wives of expatriates in Canada, experts on
draft counseling, religious groups interested in peace issues, delegates
from student organizations, and aids of House and Senate Members j
drafting legislation on amnesty.
The informant apparently was attending in his role as a member
of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive, and it described
the topics of the workshop.
Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted that in view
of the location of the, conference at a theolo!!ical seminary, the FBI
would uo;e restraint and limit its coverage to informant reports.
Now this isn't 5 or 10 years ago. This is last fall. And this is a
conference of people who have the point of view that r share, that the
sooner we have unconditional amnesty, the better for the soul of
the country.
Now wl1at rt'ason is it for a varnum cleaner anproarh on It thing
like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad informant intelI3\)
ligence really is, that would cause these groups in that setting having
contact with other groups, all and everybody is drawn into the vacuum
and many names go into the Bureau files.
Is this what we want?
Mr. ADAMS. I'll let Mr. 'Vannall address himself to this. He is
particularly knowledgeable as to this operation.
Mr. WANNALL. Senator Hart, that was a case that was opened on
November 14 and closed November 20, and the information which
caused us to be interested in it were really two particular items. One
was that a member of the steering committee, there was a three-man:
steering committee, and one of those members of the national conference
was, in fact, a national officer of the VVAW in whom we had
suggested before we did have a legitimate investigative interest.
Senator HAR'T of Michigan. 'VeIl, I would almost say, so what, at
that point.
Mr. WANNALL. The second report we had was that the VVAW
would actively participate in an attempt to pack the conference to
take it over. And the third report we had--
Senator HART of Michigan. And. incidentally, all of the information
that your Buffalo informant had given you with respect to the goals
and aims of the VVAW, gave you a list of goals 'which were completely
within constitutionally protected objectives. There wasn't a
single item out of that VVAW that jeopardizes the security of this
country at all. •
Mr. WANNALL. Well, of course, we did not tely entirely on the Buffalo
informant, but even there we did receive from that informant
information which I considered to be significant.
The Buffalo chapter of the VVA'V was the regional office covering
New York and northern New .Tersey. It was one of the five most active
VVAW chapters in the country and at a national conference, or at the
regional conference, this informant reported information back to us
that an attendee at the conference announced that he had run guns into
Cuba prior to the Castro takeover. He himself said that he. during the
Cuban crisis, had been under 24-hour surveillance. There was also
discussion at the conference of subjugating the VVAW to the Revolutionary
Union. There were some individuals in the chapter or the
regional conference who were not in agreement with us, but Mr. Adams
has addressed himself to the interest of the ReVOlutionary Union.
So all of the information that we had on the VVAW did not come
from that source but even that particular source did give us information
which we considered to be of some significance in our appraisal
of the need for continuing the investigation of that particular chapter
of the VVAW.
Senator HART of Michigan. But does it give you the right or does it
create the need to go to a conference, even if it is a conference that
might be taken over by the VVAW, when the subject matter is how
and by what means shall we seek to achieve unconditional amnesty ~
What threat?
Mr. WANNALL. Our interest, of course, was the VVA'V influence on a
particular meeting, if you ever happened to be holding a meeting, or
whatever subject it was.
Senator HART of Michigan. ",Vhat if it was a meeting to seek to make
more effective the food stamp system in this country?
140
Mr. WANNALL. Well, of course there had been some organizations.
Senator HART of Michigan. Wouldthe same logic follow ~
Mr. WANNALL. I think that if we found that if the Communist
Party, U.S.A., was going to take over the meeting and use it as a front
for its own purposes, there 'would be a logic in doing that. You have
a whole scope here and it's a matter of where you do and where you
don't, and hopefully, as we've said before, we will have some guidance,
not only from this committee, but from the guidelines that are
being developed. But within the rationale of what we're doing today,
I was explaining to you our interest not in going ,to this thing and not
gathering everything there was about it.
In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us, and that
was the person who had-who was not developed for this reason, an
informant who had been reporting on other matters for some period
of time.
And as soon as we got the report of the outcome of the meeting and
the fact that in the period of some 6 days, we discontinued any further
interest.
Senator HART of Michigan. Well, my time has expired but even this
brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we really want to control the
dangers to our society of using informants to gather domestic political
intelligence, we have to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investig8ltions.
And that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when
my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants, obliging
the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged informant can
be directed by the Bureau against a group or individuals.
I know you have objections to that and I would like to review that
with you.
Senator MONDALE. Pursue that question.
Senator HART of Michigan. I am talking now about an obligation to
obtain a warrant before you turn loose a full-fledged informant. I'm
not talking about tipsters that run into you or you run into, or who
walk in as information sources. The Bureau has rais~d some objections
in this memorandum to the committee, exhibit 33.1 The Bureau argues
that such a warrant requirement might be unconstitutional because it
would violate the first amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate
with their Government.
Now that's a concern for first amendment rights that ought to
hearten all the civil libertarians.
But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement raise
a serious constitutional question ~
. Mr. ADAMS. Well, for one thing it's the practicability of it or the
Impracticability of getting a warrant which ordinarily involves probable
cause to show that a crime has been or is about to be committed.
In the intelligence field, we are not dealing necessarily with an
imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities such as with
the Socialist Workers Party, which we have discussed before, where
they say publicly we're not to engage in any violent activity today,
but we guarantee you we still subscribe to the tenets of Communism
and that when the time is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow
the United States.
1 S~e p. 444.
141
Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about to do it
because they're telling you they're not going to do it and you know
they're not going to do it at this particular moment.
It's just the mixture somewhat of trying Ito mix a criminal procedure
with an intelligence-gathering function, and we can't find any
practical way of doing it. We have a particular organization. We may
have an informant that not only belongs to the Communist Party, but
belongs to several other organizations and as part of his function he
may be sent out by the Communist Party to try to infiltrate one of these
clean organizations.
We don't have probable cause for him to target against that organization,
but yet we should be able to receive information from him
that he, as a Communist Party member, even though in an informant
status, is going to that organization and don't worry about it. 'Ye're
making. no headway on it. It's just not feasible from our standpomtan
impossibility to obtain warrants to use informants. The Supreme
Court has held that informants per se do not violate the first, fourth,
or fifth amendments. They have recognized the necessity that the
Government has to have individuals who will assist them in carrying
out their governmental duties.
Senator IIART of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything yet
in response to the constitutional question, the very practical question
that you addressed.
Quickly, you are right that the Court has said that the use of the
informant per se is not a violation of constitutional rights of the
subject under investigation. But Congress can prescribe some safeguards,
some rules and some standards, just as we have with respect
to your use of electronic surveillance, and could do it with respect
to informants.
That's quite different from saying that the warrant procedure itself
would be unconstitutional.
But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show probable cause,
find therefore, you couldn't get a warrant, therefore you oppose the
proposal to require you to get a warrant. It seems to beg the question.
Assuming you say that, since we UEe informants and investigate
groups which may only engage in lawful activities but which might
also engage in activities that can result in violence or illegal acts, you
can't use the warrant. But Congress could say that the use of informants
is subject to such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate
adivity, including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss the
antiballistic missile system, that we don't want you to use them unless
you have indication of criminal activity or unless you present your
request to a magistrate in the same fashion as you are required to do
with respect to, in most cases, wiretaps.
This is an option available to Congress.
Senator TOWER. Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential security
informant and a security informant?
Mr. WANNALL. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker, that in developing
an informant we do a preliminary check on him before
talking with him and then we do a further in-depth background check.
142
A potential security informant is someone who is unde~ consideration
before he is approved by headqua~ers f~r use as an mform~nt.
He is someone who is under current consIderatIon. On some occaSIOns
that person will have been developeq. to a poi~t where. he is in fa~t
furnishing information and we are engaged m checkmg upon hIS
reliability. . . . . .
In some instances he may be paId for mformatIOn furmshed, but It
has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied ourselves that
he meets all of our criteria. When he does, the field must submit its
recommendations to headquarters, and headquarters will pass upon
whether that individual is an approved FBI informant.
Senator SCHWEIKER. So it's really the first step of being an informant,
I guess.
Mr. WANNALL. It is a preliminary step, one of the preliminary
steps.
Senator SCHWEIKER. In the testimony by Rowe that we just heard,
what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was
known~
I know we asked you several times but I'm still having trouble understanding
what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening
in the Rowe situation when violence was known ~
Mr. WANNALL. Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself
to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to answer that.
Senator SCHWEIKER. All right.
Mr. .ADAMS. The problem we had at the time, and it's the problem
today, is that we are an investigative agency. We do not have police
powers like the U.S. marshals do. Since about 1795, I guess, or some
period like that, marshals have had the authority that almost borders
on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department
of Justice and during these times the Department of Justice had
us maintain the role of an investigative agency'. We were to report on
activities and we furnished the information to the local police, who
had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of
Justice.
In those areas where the local police did not act, it resulted finally
in the Attorney General sending 500 U.S. marshals down to guarantee
the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil
rights.
This was an extraordinarv measure because it came at a time of civil
rights versus Federal rights, and yet there was a breakdown in law
enforcement in certain areas of the country.
This .does~'t mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in itself
at the tIme elt?er because many of them did act upon the information
that was furnIshed to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest
on the spot because we would not have had evidence that there was
a consp!racy available. ·We. c.an do absolutely nothing in that regard.
In LIttle Rock, the decISIOn was made, for instance, that if any
arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and next to the
Army, the U.S. marshals should make them, not the FBI even though
,:e developed the violations. And over the years, as you'know, at the
tl~e there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop
thIs? Why don't you do something about it ~
143
Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan
as far as committing acts of violence, and of course we exceeded statutory
guidelines in that area.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What would be wrong, just following up your
point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it's obvious
to me that a lot of informers are going to have foreknowledge of violence
of using U.S. marshals on some kind of a long-range basis to
prevent violence?
Mr. ADAMS. We do. We have ,them in Boston in connection with the
busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil
Right Act. But the marshals are in Boston, they are in Louisville, I
believe at the same time, and this is the approach, that the Federal
Government finally recognized was the solution to the problem where
you hM to have added Federal import.
Senator SCHWEIKER. But instead of waiting until the state of affairs
reaches the point it has in Boston, which is obviously a pretty advanced
confrontation, shouldn't we have a coordinated program so that when
you go up the ladder of command in the FBI, that on an immediate
and fairly contemporary basis, thllit kind of help can be sought instantly
instead of waiting until it gets to a Boston state? I realize it's
a departure from the past. Pm not saying it isn't. But it seems to me
we need a better remedy than we have.
Mr. ADAMS. Well, fortunately, we're at a time where conditions have
subsided in the country, even from the sixties and the seventies and
periods--or fi:fties and sixties. We report Ito the Department of Justice
on potential troublespots around the country as we learn of them so
that the Department will be aware of them. The planning for Boston,
for instance took place a year in advance with State officials, city officials,
the Department of .Justice, and the FBI sitting down together
saying, "how are we going to protect the situation in Boston ?"
I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the early sixties.
But the Government ha.d no mechanics which protected people at thwt
time.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I'd like to go, if I may, to the Robert Hardy
case. I know he is not a witness but he was a witness before the House
Select Committee. But since this affects my State, I'd like to ask Mr.
Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was the FBI informer who ultimately
led, planned, and organized a raid on the Camden draft board.. And
according to Mr. Hardy's testimony before our committee, he said
that in advance of the raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged
the fact tha.t they had all the information they needed to
clamp down on the conspiracy and could arrest people llit that point in
time, and yet no arrests were made. Why, Mr. \Vannall, was this true?
Mr. WANNALL. Well, I can answer that based only on the material
that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not a case handled in
my division but I think I can ans'wer your question.
There was, in fact, 'a representative of the Department of Justice
on the spot counseling and advising continuously as that case progressed
as to what poin.t the arrest should be made and we were being
guided by those to our mentors, the ones who are responsible for making'
decisions of that sort.
So I think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that there was
someone in the Department there is pexfectly true.
144
Senator SOHWEIKER. That respons~bility rests with who under your
procedures ?
Mr. VVANNALL. 'Ve investigate decisions on making arrests, when
they should be made, and decisions with regard to prosecutions are
made either by the U.S. attorneys or by Federals in the Department.
Mr. !\DAMS. At this time that particular case did have a departmental
attorney on the scene because there are questions of conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a tough violation to prove and sometimes a question
of whether you have the added value of catching someone in the
commission of the crime as further proof, rather than relying on one
informant and some circumstantial evidence to prove the violation.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, in this case, though, they even had a dry
run. They could have arrested them on the dry run. That's getting
pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to me. They had a dry run and they
could have arrested them on the dry run.
I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry run. Who
was this Department of .Justice official who made that decision?
Mr. ADAMS. Guy Goodwin was the department official.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Next I'd like to ask, back in 1965, during the
height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you put it a few mome?ts
ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had somethmg
like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out
of roughly 10,000 estimated membership. I believe these are either
FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that one out of every
five members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the
Government. And I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent
of the new members of the Klan that year were FBI informants.
Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people to put in an
effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that you shouldn't have informants
in the Klan to know about the potential for violence, but it
seems to me that this is the tail wagging the dog.
For example, today we supposedly have only 1,594 total informants
for both domestic informants and potential informants, and that here
we had 2,000 just in the Klan alone.
Mr. ADAMS. Well, this number 2,000 did include all racial matters,
informants at that particular time, and I think the figures we tried
to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relation
to Klan members was around 6 percent, I think, after we had read some
of the testimony.
Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called
the Action Group. This was the group, if you remember from Mr.
Rowe's testimony, that he was left out of at the meeting. He attended
the open meetings and heard all of the hurrahs and this type of thing,
but he never knew what was going on because each one had an action
group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary
field.
Theirs was the violence.
In order to penetrate those, you have to direct as many informants
as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers,
the President, and Congress, and everyone was concerned about
the murder of the civil rights workers, the Lemuel Penn case, the
Viola Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We
were faced with one tremendous problem at that time.
145
Senator SCHWEIKER. I acknowledge that.
Mr. ADAMS. Our only approach was through informants. Through
the use of informants we solved these cases, the ones that were solved.
Some of the bombing cases we have never solved. They are extremely
difficult.
These informants. as we told the Attorney General, and as we told
the President that we had moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the
top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a
position where he could forewarn us of violence, could help us on
cases that had transpired. and yet we knew and conceived that this
could continue forever unless we could create enough disruption that
these members will realize that if they go out and murder three civil
rights workers, even though the sheriff and other law enforcement
officers are in on it. if that were the case and with some of them it was
the case, that they would be caught. And that's what we did and that's
why violence stopped, because the Klan was insecure and just like
you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately
were Klan informants and they didn't dare engage in these
acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy
any longer.
Senator SCHWEIKER. :My time is expired. I just have one quick
question. Is it correct that in 1971 you were using around 6.500 informers
for black ghetto situations?
Mr. ADAMS. I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have one year
where we had a number like that which probably had been around
6,000, and that was the time when the cities were being burned, Detroit,
1Vashington, areas like this. We were given a mandate to know what
the situation was, where was violence going to break out, what next?
They weren't informants like an individual penetrating an organization.
They were listening posts in the community that would help tell
us that we have a group here that's getting ready to start another firefight
or something.
Senator TOWER. At this point, there are three more Senators remaining
for questioning. If we can try to get everything in in the first
round, we will not have a second round and I think we can finish
around 1 o'clock, and we can go on and terminate the proceedings.
However, if anyone feels that they have another question that they
want to return to, we come back here by 2 o'clock.
Senator Mondale ?
Senator MONDALE. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the record is now
fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the field of crime investigation
and prosecution, it may be the best professional organization of
its kind in the world. But when the FBI acts in the field of political
ideas, it has bungled its job, it has interfered with the civil liberties,
and finally, in the last month or two, through its public disclosures,
heaped shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of the
cr~cial public confidence in an essential law enforcement agency of
thIS country.
In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it was precisely
that problem that led to the creation of the FBI in 1924.
In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from its law
~nforcementfunctions and became an arbiter and protector of political
Ideas. And through the interference of civil liberties and Palmer raids
146
and the rest, the public became so offended that later through Mr.
•Justice Stone and Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first
statement by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department
get involved in political ideas.
And yet here we are again, looking at a record where with Martin
Luther King, with antiwar resisters-we even had testimony this
morning of meetings with the Council of Churches. Secretly we are
investigating this vague, ill-defined, impossible to define area of investigating
dangerous ideas.
It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people can't protect
themselves, that you somehow need to use the tools of law enforcement
to protect people from subversive or dangerous ideas, which I find
strange and quite profoundly at odds with the philosophy of American
government.
I started in politics years ago and the first thing we had to do was
to get the Communists out of our party and out of the union. We did
a very fine job. I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I lrnow, we had
no help from the FBI or the CIA. We just ran them out of the meetings
on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't
good union leaders, and we didn't want anything to' do with them.
Yet, we see time and time again that we're going to protect the blacks
from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous, that we're going to
protect veterans from whatever it is, and we're going to protect the
Council of Churches from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so
gummy and confused and ill-defined and dangerous. Don't you agree
with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that precisely
what is expected of the FBI is known by you, by the public, and that
you can justify your actions when we ask you?
Mr. ADAMS. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like to point
out that when the Attorney General made his statement Mr. Hoover
subscribed to it, we followed that policy for about 10 years until the
President of the United States said that we should investigate the
Nazi Party.
I for one feel that we should hav{l investigated the Nazi Party. I
!eel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in the fact that
III World War II, as contrasted with World 'War I, there wasn't one
single incident of foreign directed sabotage which took place in the
United States.
Senator MONDALE. And under the criminal law you could have investigated
these issues of sabotage. Isn't sabotage a crime?
Mr. ADAMS. Sabotage is a crime.
Senator MONDALE. Could you have investigated that?
Mr. ADAMS. After it happened.
Senator MONDALE. You see, every time we get involved in political
ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of crimes that could have been
committed. It's very interesting.
In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to continue
what you're now doing and as I understand it, you still insist that you
did the right thing with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and
investigating the Council of Churches, and this can still go on. This
ean still go on under your interpretation of your present powers, what
you try to justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activities
in terms of criminal matters.
147
Mr. ADAMS. The law does not say we have to wait until we have been
murdered before we can--
Senator MONDALE. Absolutely, but that's the field of law again.
You're trying to defend apples with oranges. That's the law. Yon can
do that.
Mr. ADAMS. That's right, but how do you find out which of the :20,000
Bund members might have been a saboteur. Yon don't have probable
eause to investigate anyone, but you can direct an intelligence operation
against the German-American Bund, the same thing we did after
Congress said-
Senator MONDALE. Couldn't you get a warrant for that? Why did
you object to going to court for authority for that?
Mr. ADAMS. Beeause we don't have probable cause to go against an
individual and the law doesn't provide for probable cause to investigate
an organization.
There were activities whieh did take place, like one time they were
going to outlaw the Communist Party--
Senator MONDALE. What I don't understand is why it wouldn't be
better for the FBI for us to define authority whieh you could use in
the kind of Bund situation where under court authority you ean investigate
where there is probable cause or reasonable eause to suspect
sabotage and the rest.
Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these decisions
on your own?
Mr. ADAMS. We have expressed complete concurrence in that. We
feel that we're going to get beat to death in the next 100 ye.ars, you're
damned if you do, and damned if you don't when we don't have a
delineation of our responsibility in this area. But I won't agree with
you, Senator, that we have bungled the intelligence operations in the
United States. I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr.
Kelley has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the
FBI in aeknowledging mistakes that had been made, but I think that
as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and Senator Chureh,
that we have to watch these hearings beeause of the neeessity that we
must concentrate on these areas of abuse. "Ve must not lose sight of
the overall good of the law enforcement and intelligenee community,
and I still feel that this is the freest eountry in the world. I've traveled
much, as I'm sure you ha.ve, and I know we have made some mistakes,
but I feel that the people in the United States are less ehilled by the
mistakes we have made than they are by the fact that there are 20,000
murders a year in the United States and they can't walk out of their
houses at night aDd feel safe.
Senator MONDALE. That's corred, and isn't that /tn argument then,
Mr. Adams, for strengthening our powers to go after those who eommit
erimes, rather than strengthening or eontinning a policy which
we now see undermines the public confid~nee you need to do your job.
Mr. ADAMS. Absolutely. The mistakes we have made are what have
brought on this embarrassment to us.
I'm not blaming the committee. I'm saying we made some mistakes
and in doing so have hurt the FBI. But at the same time I don't feel
that a balanced picture comes out, as you have said yourselves, bMause
of the necessity of zeroing in on abuses.
148
I think that we have done one 'tremendous job. I think the a<xx>mplishments
in the Klan was the finest hour of the FBI and yet, I'm
sure in dealing with the Klan that we made some mistakes. But I
just don't agree we bungled.
Sl'nator MOXDALE. J don't want to argue over terms, but I think I
sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble over its
involvement in political ideas, and that that's where we need to have
new legal standards.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, I agree with that.
Senator TOWER. Senator Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Adams, with these two instances we have studied at some length
there seems to have been an inclination on the part of the Bureau to establish
a notion about an individual or a group which seems to be very
hard to ever change or dislodge. In the case of Dr. King, where the supposition
was that he was being influenced by Communist individuals,
extensive investigwtion and surveillance was undertaken, and reports
came back indicating that this in fact was not true, and directions continued
to go out 'to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to
be a willingness on the pavt of the Bureau to accept its own facts.
Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar to that
happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, that every
piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau seemed to indlcate
that the Bureau was not corred in its 'assumption that this organ~zation
planned to commit violence, or that it was 'being manipulated,
and yet you seemed to insist that this investigation go on, and this
information was used against the individuals.
Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted tha.'t its
first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their course~
Mr. ADAMS. We have admitted that. We have also shown from one
of the cases that Senator Hart brought up, that after 5 days we closed
the case. We were told something by I3Jl individual that there was a
concern of an adverse influence in it, and we looked into it. On the
Martin Luther King situation there was no testimony to the effect that
we just dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and
on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were 'all approved
by the Attorney General. Microphones on Mart,in Luther
King were rupproved by another Attorney General. This wasn't only
the FBI, 'andtJhe reason they were approved was that there was a
basis to continue the investigation up to a point.
Wh1lJt I testified to was that we were improper in discrediting Dr.
King, but it's just like-- ,
Senator HUODL:t:STON. The committee has before it memorandums
written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the information
they were receiving from the field, from these surveillance methods,
did not confirm their supposition.
Mr. ADAMS. That memorandum was not on Dr. King. That was on
.another individual who I think somehow got mixed up in the discussion,
one where the issue was do we make people prove they aren't
a Communist before we will agree not to investigate them.
Bu~t the young lady appearing this morning making the comment
that she never knew of anything wrong, told us that she considers
herself a true member of the VVA'V-'WSO inasmuch as she :feels in
149
general agreement with the principles of it, and agreed to cooperate
with the FBI in providing information regarding the organization to
aid in preventing violent individuals from associating themselves with
the VVAW- 'VSO. She is most concerned about efforts by the Revolutionary
Union to take over the VVAW-vVSO, and she is working
actively to prevent this.
I think that we have a basis for investigating the VVAW-WSO in
certain areas 'today. In other areas we have stopped the investigation.
They don't agree with these principles laid down by the--
Senator HUDDLESTON. That report was the basis of your continuing
to pay informants and continuing to utilize that information against
members who certainly had not been involved in violence, and apparently
to get them fired from their job or whatever?
Mr. ADAMS. It all gets back to the fact that even in the criminal law
field, you have to detect crime, and you have to prevent crime, and
you can't wait until something happens. The Attorney General has
clearly spoken in that area, and even our statutory jurisdiction provides
that we don't have to wait.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, of course we've had considerable evidence
this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime, when
you had information that it was going to occur. But I'm sure there
are instances where you have.
Mr. ADAMS. We disseminated every single item which he reported
to us.
Senator HUDDLESTON. To a police department which you knew was
an accomplice to the crime.
Mr. ADAMS. Not necessarily.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Your informant had told you that, hadn't he?
Mr. ADAMS. Well, the informant is on one level. We have other informants,
and we have other information.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Yes, but you were aware that he had worked
with certain members of the Birmingham police in orderto--
Mr. ADAMS. Yes. He furnished many other instances also.
Senator HUDDLESTON. So you weren't really doing a whole lot to
prevent that incident by telling the people who were already part of
it.
Mr. ADAMS. 'Ve were doing everything we could lawfully do at the
time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that the Department,
agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, could send the U.S.
marshal down to perform certain law enforcement functions.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, the committee has received documents
which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted an informant
who had been established in a white hate group, to establish a rival
white hate group, and that the Bureau paid his expenses in setting up
this rival organization.
Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being responsible
for what actions the rival white hate group might have undertaken?
Mr. ADAMS. I'd like to see if one of the other g-entlemen knows that
specific case, because I don't think we set up a specific group.
This is Joe Deegan.
Mr. DEEGAN. Senator. it's my understanding that the informant
we're talking about decided to break off from the group he was with.
He was with the major Klan group of the United Klans of America.
150
and he decided to break off. This was in compliance with our regulations.
"Ve did not pay him to set up the organization, he did it on his
own. We paid him for the information he furnished us concerning
the operation. We did not sponsor the organization.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Concerning the new organization that he set
up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that organization?
Mr. DEEGAN. He continued to advise us of that organization and
other organizations. He would advise us of Klan activities.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The new organization that he formed~ did
it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?
Mr. DEEGAN. No, it did not, and it did not last that long.
Senator HUDDLESTON. There's also evidence of an FBI informant in
the Black Panther Party who had a position of responsibility within
the party who with the knowledge of his FBI contact, was supplying
members with weapons and instructing them in how to use those
weapons. Presumably this was in the knowledge of the Bureau, and he
later became-came in contact with the group that was contracting for
murder, and he participated in this group with the knowledge of the
FBI agent, and this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later
killed with the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all
with the knowledge of the FBI. How does this square with your enforcement
and crime prevention responsibilities?
Mr. DEEGAN. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular case.
It does not square with our policy in all respects, and I would have
to look at that particular case you're talking about to give you an
answer.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I don't have the documentation on that particular
case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of control you
exercised over this kind of informant, in this kind of an orgamza·
tion, and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants
from engaging in the kind of thing that you are supposedly trying to
prevent.
Mr. ADAMS. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became
active in an action group, and we told him to get out or we lW'ould no
longer use him as an informant, in spite of the information he had
furnished in the past. We have had cases, Senator, where we have
had-
Senator HUDDLESTON. But you also told him to participate in violent
activities.
Mr. ADAMS. We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.
Senator HUDDLESTON. That's what he said.
Mr. ADAMS. I know that's what he said. But that's what lawsuits
are all about, is that there are two sides to the issue, and our agents
handling this have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff,
that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence.
Senator HUDDLESTON.•rust to do what was necessary to get the information,
I believe maybe might have been his instructions.
Mr. ADAMS. I don't think they made any such statement to him
along that line, and we have informants, we have informants who have
gotten involved in the violation of the law, and we have immediately
converted their status from an informant to the subject, and have
prosecuted I 'Would say, offhand, I can think of around 20 informants
151
that we have prosecut~d for violating the laws, once it came to our
attention, and even to show you our policy of disseminating information
on violence in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents
told me that they found one case where their agent had been working
24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the information
to the police department. No violence oc,curred, hut it showed up
in a file review, and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying
local authorities.
So we not only have a policy. I feel that we do follow reasonable
safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all
informant files.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, Mr. Rowe's stat~ment is substantiated
to some extent with an acknowledgment by the agent in charge that
if you're going; to be a K'lansman and you happen to 00 \With someone
and they decide to do something, that he couldn't be an angel. These
were the words of the agent----:be a good informant. He wouldn't take
the lead, but the implication is that he would have to go along and
would have to 'be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.
Mr. ADAMS. There's no question but that an informant at times will
have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take
place, but I believe his statement was to the effect that-and I was
sitting in the 'back of the room and I don't recall it exactly, but some
of them were beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he
beat someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did 'because
it's one thing to be present, and it's another thing taking an
active part in criminal actions.
Senator HUDDLESTON. He was close enough to get his throat cut. How
does the gathering of information--
Senator TOWER. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that we pro'bably
should recess a few minutes.
Could lWe have Senator Mathias' questions and then should reconvene
this afternoon?
Senator HUDDLESTON. I'm finished. I just had one more question.
Senator TOWER. Go ahead.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I wanted to ask how the selection of information
about an individual's personal life, social, sex life, and becoming
involved in that sex life or social life, is a requirement for law enforcement
or crime prevention.
Mr. ADAMS. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe, that
they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning
it, and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You aren't aware of any case where these
instructions were given to an ~ent or an informant'?
Mr. ADAMS. To get involved in sexual aot.ivity? No, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator TOWER. Senator Mathias.
Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to come back very briefly to the fourth amendment considerations
in connection with the use of informants and in posing
these questions we're not thinking of the one-time volunteer who
walks in to an FBI office and says I have a story I want to tell you
and that's the only time that you may see him. I'm thinking of the
66-077 0 • 76 - 11
152
kind of situations in which there is a more extended relationship which
could be of varying degrees. It might be in one case that the same
individual will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But
when the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first
test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like to explore with you
is the difference between a one time search which requires a warrant,
and which you get when you make that search, and a continuous search
which uses an informant, or the case of a continuous search which
uses a regular UlHlercover agent, someone who is totally under your
control, and is in a slightly different category than an informant.
Mr. ADAMS. Well, here we get into the fact that the Supreme Court
has held that the use of informants does not invade any of these
constitutionally protected areas, and if a person wants to tell an
informant something, that isn't protected by the Supreme Court.
An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected item, but
information and the use of informants have been consistently held
as not posing any constitutional problems.
Senator MATHIAS. I would ag-ree, if you're talking about the fellow
who walks in off the street, as I said earlier, but is it true that under
existing procedures informants are given background checks?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator MATIII.\S. And they are subject to a testing period.
Mr. AD.HIS. That's right, to verify and make sure they are providing
us with reliable information.
Senator MATHIAS. And during the period tha.t the relationship continues,
they are rather closely controlled by the handling agents.
Mr. ADAMS. That's true.
Senator MATHIAS. So in effect they can come in a very practical
way agents themselves to the FBI.
Mr. ADAMS. They can do nothing--
Senator MATHIAS. Certainly agents in the common law use of the
word.
Mr. ADAMS. That's right, they can do nothing, and we instruct our
agents that an informant can do nothing that the agent himself cannot
do, and if the agent can work him.-elf into an organization in an
undercover capacity, he can sit there and glean all the information
that he wants. and that is not in the Constitution as a protected area.
But W'e do have this problem.
Senator MATHIAS. But if a regular agent who is a member of the
FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require a warrant?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir-it depends on the purpose for which he is
entering. If a regular agent by concealing his identity was admitted
as a J!lember of the Communist Party, he can attend Community Party
meetmgs. and he can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and
there's no constitutionally invaded area there.
Senator MATHIAS. And so you feel that anyone who has a less formal
relationship with the Bureau than a regular agent, who can undertake
~t continuous surveillance operation as an undercover agent or as an
mformant--
Mr. ADAMS. As long as he commits no illegal acts.
Senator MATHIAS. Let me ask you why you feel that it is impractical
to require a warrant since, as I understand it, headquarters must approve
the use of an informant. Is that degree of formal action
required?
153
Mr. ADAMS. The main difficulty is the particularity which has to be
shown in obtaining a search warrant. You have to go after particular
evidence. You have to specify what you're going after, and an informant
operates in an area that you just cannot spwify. He doesn't know
what's going to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to blow
up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the State Department
building.
Senator MATHIAS. If it were a criminal investigation, you would have
little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't you?
Mr. ADAMS. We would have difficulty in obtaining probable cause
for a warrant to use someone as an informant in that area because
the same difficulty of particularity exists. 'We can't specify.
Senator MATHIAS. I understand the problem because it's very similar
to one that we discussed earlier in connection with wiretaps on a
national security problem.
Mr. ADAMS. That's it, and there we face the problem of where the
Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy in a friendly country
and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy there and now he's coming to the
United States, and if we can't show under a probable cause warrant,
if we couldn't show that he was actually engaging in espionage in the
United States, we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause
requirements which have been discussed. If the good fairy didn't
drop the evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting
espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's why we're
still groping with it.
Senator MATHIAS. When you say fall short, you really, you would
be faIling short of the requirements of the fourth amendment.
Mr. ADAMS. That's right, except for the fact that the President,
under his constitutional powers, to protect this Nation and make sure
that it survives first, first of all national survival, and these are the
areas that not only the President but the Attorney General are concerned
in and we're all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative
middle ground in here.
Senator MATHIAS. Which we discussed in the other national security
area as to curtailing a warrant to that particular need.
Mr. ADAMS. And if you could get away from probable cause and get
some degree of reasonable cause and get some method of sealing indefinitely
your interest, say, in an ongoing espionage case and can work
out those difficulties, we may get there yet.
Senator MATHIAS. And you don't despair of finding that middle
ground?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't because I think that today there's more of an
open mind between Congress and the executive branch and the FBI
and everyone concerning the need to get these areas resolved.
Senator MATHIAS. And you believe that the DepartJ?ent, if we couln.
come together, would support, would agree to that kmd of a warrant
requirement if we could agree on the language?
Mr. ADAMS. If we can work out the problems-the Attorney General
is personally interested in that also.
Senator MATHIAS. Do you think that this agreement might extend to
some of those other areas that we talked about?
Mr. ADAMS. I think that that would be a much greater difficulty in
an area of domestic intelligence informant ""ho reports on many dif154
ferent operations and different types of activities that might come up
rather than say in a Soviet espionage or a foreign espionage case
where you do have a little more degree of specificity to deal with.
Senator MATHIAS. I suggest that we arrange to get together and try
out some drafts with each other, but in the meantime, of course, there's
another alternative and that would be the use of the wiretap procedure
by which the Attorney General must approve a wiretap before it is
placed, and the same general process could be used for informants,
since you come to headquarters any wa;y.
Mr. ADAMS. That could be an alternative. I think it would be a very
burdensome alternative and I think at some point after we attack the
major abuses--or what are considered major abuses of Congressand
get over this hurdle, I think we're still going to have to recognize
that heads of agencies have to accept the responsibility for managing
that agency and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem
up to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.
Senator MATHIAS. But the reason that parallel suggests itself is, of
course, the fact that the wiretap deals generally with one level of information
in one sense of gathering information. You hear what you
hear from the tap.
Mr. ADAMS. But you're dealing in a much smaller number also.
Senator MATHIAS. Smaller number, but that's all the more reason.
When an informant goes in, he has all of his senses. He's gathering
all of the information a human being can acquire from a situation and
has access to more information than the average wiretap.
And it would seem to me that for that reason a parallel process
might be useful and in order.
Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main distinction to
me which I had overlooked from our prior discussions, which is the
fact that with an informant he is more in the position of being a consential
monitor in that one of the two parties to the conve.rsation
agrees, such as like consential monitoring of telephones and microphones
and anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual
whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and neither of the two
parties talking had agreed that their conversation could be monitored.
Senator MATHIAS. I find that one difficult to accept. If I'm the third
party overhearing a conversation that is taking place in a room where
I am, and my true character isn't perceived by the two people who
are talking, in effect they haven't consented to my overhearing their
conversation. Thev may consent if they believe that I am their friend
or a partisan of theirs. But if they knew in fact that I was an informant
for someone else, they would not consent.
Mr. ADAMS. Well, that's what I believe Senator Hart raised earlier,
that the courts thns far have made this distinction with no difficulty,
but that doesn't mean that there may not be some legislative compromise
which might be addressed.
Senator MATHIAS. 'Well, I particularly appreciate your 'attitude in
being willing to wOl'k on these problems because I think that's the
most important thing that can evolve from these hearings, so that we
can actually look at the fourth amendment as the standard that we
have to achieve. nut the way we get there is obviously going to be a
lot easier if WP Cllll work toward them together.
155
I just have one final question, Mr. Chairman, and that deals with
whether or not we should impose a standard of probable cause that
a crime has been committed as a means of controlling the use of informants
-and the kind of information that they collect.
Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir, I do.
1Vhen I look at informants and I see that each year informants
locate 5,000 fugitives, they locate subjects in 2,000 more cases, they
recover $86 million in stolen property and contraband, and that's
irrespective of what we give the local law enforcement and other
Federal agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost
reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much left.
And in the intelligence field, when we carve all of the problems away,
we still have to make sure that we have the means to gather information
which will permit us to be aware of the identity of individuals
and organizations that are acting to overthrow the Government of
the United States. And I think we still have some areas to look hard
at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to stay. They
are absolutely essential to law enforcement. Everyone uses informants.
The press has informants, Congress has informants, you have individuals
in your community that you rely on, not for ulterior purposes,
but to let you know what's the feel of the people-am I serving them
properly, am I carrying out this?
It's here to stay. It's been here throughout history and there will
always be informants. And the thing we want to avoid is abuses like
provocateurs, criminal activities, and to insure that we have safeguards
that will prevent that. But we do need informants.
Senator TOWER. Senator Hart, do you have any further questions?
Senator HART of Michigan. The groups that we have discussed this
morning into which the Bureau has put informants are, in popular
language, liberal groups. To give balance to the record, I would ask
unanimous consent that there be printed in the record the summary
of the opening of the headquarters file by the Bureau on Dr. Carl
McIntyre when he announced that he was organizing a group to
counter the American Civil Liberties Union and other "liberal and
communist groups." This is not only a preoccupation with the Left.
Senator TOWER. Without objection, so ordered.
[The material referred to follows:]
STAFF SUMMARY OF FBI ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO DR. CARL McINTYRE'S
AMERICAN CHRISTIAN ACTION COUNCIL (1971)
The FBI relied on a confidential source and an informant for information
about the formation of this group by Dr. McIntyre to act as a counter group
to the American Civil Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups"
and to the Clergy and Laymen Concerned A-bout Vietnam. The initial report
from a confidential source mentioned plans to picket NBC-TV studios in Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. and named all the members of the
Board of Directors. But the report makes no mention of potential fur violence.
SUbsequent reports from an informant described the group's plans to oppose the
President's trip to China and to support prayer in the public schools. The informant
also reported on the group's convention held jointly with Dr. McIntyre's
missionary group and on plans for the groups future organization and
activities.
The FBI apparently had this confidl'ntial source and this informant watch and
report on the group under a "civil disturbance" theory. It must have been
156
assumed, although there was no indication of potential violence, that the group
migoht provoke an "incident." On that theory the FBI Manual today would permit
the same use of informants and sources to watch and report on the plans,
leadership, and organization of a similar group.
Senator TOWER. Any more questions?
Then the committee will have an executive session this afternoon in
room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at a p.m., and I hope everyone
will be in attendance.
Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans, and Cartha
DeLoach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General Ram::,ey
Clark and Edward Katzenbach.
The committee, the hearings are recessed until 10 a.m. tomorrow.
[Whereupon, at 1 :10 p.m., the hearing in the above-mentioned
matter was concluded. to reconvene on vVednesday, December 3,1975,
at 10 a.m.l

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