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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
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the questioning of Mr. Katzenbach and has disqualified himself from
any preparation in the questioning of Mr. Katzenbach, in that he has
represented ~1r. Katzenbach on occasion in a legal connection.
Gentlemen, would you rise and be sworn. please? Do you solemnly
swear that the testimony you're about to giyc before this committee is
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. CLARK. I do.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I do.
Senator TOWER. Do you gentlemen have counsel with you?
Mr. KATzENBACH. No. I have friends who are lawyers here, but Pm
not being reprel~ntedby counsel.
Senator TOWER. And you, Mr. Clark?
Mr. CLARK. No, Pm here by myself.
Senator TOWER. 'Ve will first hear opening statements by the witnesses.
Mr. Katzenbach, you may proceed if you wish.
TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH
Mr. KATZENBACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, I have
submitted a long stawment to the committee and I would like now
just to read a brief summary of it.
Senator TOWER. Your full statement will be printed in the record
and you may summarize if you like.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach follows:]
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS DEB. KATZE~BACH, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Chairman and members of the select committee, this committee has uncovered
and publicly exposed activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
which were unlawful, grossly improper and a clear abuse of governmental authority.
According to the testimony before this committee, some of those activities
took place while I was Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General.
Some of those revelations have surprised me greatly. Some, such as the extent
of the FBI's attempt to intimidate, to harass and to discredit Dr. Martin Luther
King have shocked and appalled me. Those activities were unlawful and reprehensible.
They served no public purposes. They should be condemned by this
Committee.
My surprise and shock stem more from the fact that these activities occurred
with the apparent knowledge and approval of J. Edgar Hoover than from t.he
fact that I, as Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, was unaware of
them. Mr. Hoover dedicated his life to building a Federal Bureau of Investigation
which enjoyed a great and deserved reputation for integrity, efficiency and
dedication to public service. Even in a world which he believed was questioning
and rejecting some of the values which :\lr. Hoover so esteemed-patriotism, respect
for law, sexual mores grounded in marriage and family, the work ethic,
I would not have expected him to risk the Bureau's reputation-his life's workby
resorting to unlawful or improper tactics.
I was aware of the fact that the Director held political views far more conservative
than my own or those of the administrations which I served. I knew
that on occasion he promoted those views on the Hill, without consultation with
me and sometimes in opposition to administration policy. I knew the intensity of
his views on the dangers of communism. on the decline of moral standards, on
the evils of permissiveness, on the lack of respect for law and order. I knew that
as Mr. Hoover grew older and the country changed-for the worse, in his viewthe
intensity of those feelings and his frustration at what was taking place
grew. I knew that :\Ir. Hoover was extremely sensitive to any criticism whatsoever
and that he deeply llnd persoually resented public criticism by civil rights
leaders, and especially that made by Dr. King.
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I knew all these things, and so, I believe, did the Congress, the press and
much of the public at large.
As background, I think that it is important that I recall that some of the
Bureau's activities being investigated by this committee have long been a matter
of public record. :\Iany of them are well known to any schoolboy. Others were
discussed in executive session every year in the Director's annual appearance
before the House Appropriations Committee. :\Iuch of what apparently constituted
the concern and focus of the so-called COINTEL Program was discussed
by Mr. Hoover in testimony before the Violence Commission in 1968. Still other
activities have been written about in bOoks and periodical literature and have
long been the subject of public comment and interest.
'For example:
1. Domestic InteUigence Aotivities
The Bureau's responsibility includes domestic intelligence activities. Mr.
Hoover annually described those activities to the House Appropriations Committee.
The bulk of that testimony was 01I the record. Nevertheless, it is clear
that each year at budget time, the Congress had ample opportunity to explore
those activities in some depth with :\Ir. Hoover.
2. Use of Confidential InfrYrr/l,4nts
It has never been a secret that the FBI has used a substantial number of confidential
informants to assist in its criminal and subversive activities investigations.
Mr. Hoover annually disclosed that fact to Congress. In 1959, for example,
Hoover testified that "it is obvious that maximum results cannot be obtained
without informants in the criminal and subversive fields. The record shows the
value of these informants in bringing to justice the criminal and the subversive."
(Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before House Appropriations Committee, February
5, 1959, p. 271.) In 1960, Hoover testified that the Bureau's confidential
informants supplied information that led to the arrest of over 1,800 suspects and
the recovery of more than $2 million in contraband and stolen property in just
one fiscal year alone. In addition, information obtained by the Bureau from its
confidential informants led directly to the arrest of more than 2,000 suspects
by state, local and other law enforcement organizations. (Testimony of J. Edgar
Hoover before House Appropriations Committee, February 8, 1960, pp. 339-40.)
Ever since the publication of I £eel Three Lives, it has been common knowledge
that much of the Bureau's knowledge of Communist Party activities came
from inside information. Indeed, Art Buchwald wrote a brilliant parody of the
extent of this activity in one of his more famous columns.
3. Files
The fact that the FBI maintained extensive files on individuals has also been
well known. For example, ::\Ir. Hoover informed Congress in 1960 that the FBI
maintained, in its central record file, over five million files and over 47 million
index cards. Those files, according to Hoover's testimony, were kept pursuant
to the Bureau's "responsibility of coordinating and disseminating security and
intelligence data...." (Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before House Appropriations
Committee, February 8, 1960, p. 369.)
4. Wiretaps a1UL Electronic SurveiUances
'( a) Wiretaps
Ever since FDR's claim of a governmental right to tap telephone conversations,
the fact of governmental use of this technique, at least in internal security matters,
has been known to the Congress and to the public. Congressional Committees
have often inquired as to the Ilumber of taps, and :\Ir. Hoover regularly gave
this information to the House Appropriations Committee. It was also public information
that the Department's procedures required that all "iretaps be personally
approved by the Attorney General, and this was in fact the practice.
There was not, however, any procedure for following up on authorizations until
::\Iarch 30, 1965, when I established a Ilew procedure requiring re-authorization
en'ry six months and notice to the Attorney General of any termination. ~or,
until President Johnson's directh'e of June 30, 1965, was there any similar control
over wiretaps by agencies other than the l<'BI. That directive required all
federal departments and agencies to obtain the written authorization of the At,
torney General for any wiretap.
66-077 0 - 76 - 14
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,( 11) Electronic Surveillances
Curiously, "bugs," which in my judgment are far more serious invasions of
privacy than are taps, were not subjeet to the same authorization procedure in
the Department of Justice until I so directed on .March 30, 1965. Theretofore, the
Bureau had claimed an authority to install bugs at its sole discretion under a
memorandum from then Attorney General Brownell dated May 20, 1954. I thought
the claim that Attorney General Brownell's memorandum authorized the widespread
use of bugs was extremely tenuous. The Attorney General's personal approval
was not sought nor was he even directly advised of any microphone surveillance
despite their increased use through the late 1950's and early 1960's.
Neither :\1r. Kennedy nor I was aware of their use by the Bureau until just before
Mr. Kennedy resigned his office in September 1964, though in retrospect it may
be fair to say that we probably should have inferred its existence from memoranda
we received, and )lr. Hoover may have believe we did in fact know. Unlike
wiretaps, the Congress and the public were not, so far as I know, generally aware
of this practice.
5. Use ot Mail COVfN'S
A mail cover is a procedure by which information on the outside of mail, such
as the address of the sender, is recorded. It is a well-known procedure, and has
been approved by the courts when carried out in compliance with postal regulations
on a limited and selective basis. The use of such an investigative technique
was fully disclosed by the Long Committee hearings in 1965 and indeed that
Committee pUblished the numbers of requests made to the Post Office Department
by the FBI as well as by other Federal agencies.
6. Investigation ot the Ku Klux Klan
The Bureau's intensive investigation of the Klan's criminal activities in the
South in the mid-1960's has also been well-known and ~idely reported. Indeed,
the fact that 153 FBI agents were thrown into the successful Goodman, Chaney,
Schwerner murder investigation in 1964, the fact that that investigation had
the Klan as its principal focus and the fact that most of those ultimately convicted
were associated with the Ku Klux Klan are all facts that have been fully
disclosed not only in the press, but even in books and movies. Don Whitehead's
book, Attack on Tcrrar, published in 1970, contains a thorough description of the
FBI's extensive use of confidential informants inside the Klan as an integral
part of that investigation.
Being in the Department of ,Justice I was, perhaps, more aware of and conscious
of the above practices and some of the problems they raised than others
may have been. There was, especially in the area of civil rights, a good deal of
tension between the Director on one hand and the Attorney General and his principal
assistants on the other. I was very conscious of the fact that there was often
a lack of candor in relationships between the Bureau and the Department; that
Mr. Hoover was opposed to many of the views of Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Clark and
myself, and that he expressed his views privately, and occasionally publicly; that
the Bureau leaked stories to the press which were embarrassing to me and to my
predecessor. I did occasionally pursue those leaks but the Bureau invariably
denied that it was the source.
Having said that, let me say that I did respect the Bureau's reputation for
integrity and propriety in law enforcement matters and that it never occurred
to me that the Bureau would engage in the sort of sustained improper activity
which it apparently did.
Moreover, given these excesses, I am not surprised that I and others were
unaware of them. Would it have made sense for the FBI to seek approval for
activities of this natur€-----('specially from Attorneys General who did not share
Mr. Hoover's political views, who would not have been in sympathy with the
purpose of these attacks, 1md who would not have condQIled the methods?
The Director of the FBI is a subordinate of the Attorney General. In the 1960's
J. Edgar Hoover was formally my subordinate; indeed, I had the formal power
to fire him. Mr. Hoover was also a national hero, and had been for 30 years or
more. I doubt that any Attorney General after Harlan Fiske Stone could or did
fully ex('rcise the control over the Bureau implied in that formal relationship.
It is also important to note that Mr. Hoover had great "clout" in the Congress and
with the Presidents he served. That position resulted naturally from his great
public reputation and the respect which members of C<:mgress and Presidents
had for him and for the Bureau. I do not think the practices this Committee has
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brought to light eould han' been exposed other than hy Congressional investigation,
It is also true, I suggest to the committee, that a Congressional investigation
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not a political possibility
during ~[r, Hoover's tl'"nure as Dir""tor, not simply lwcausp of his enormous and
unique public prestige and power, but also hecause of the Bureau's reputation
for total integrit~·, Certainl~', no such inn'stigation was conducted during ~Ir.
Hoover's tenure.
Anyone contemplating an im'estigation of 111'. Hoo,'er's Bureau would have
hall to face the strong likelihood that 111', Hooyer would haye vigorously resisted.
At least he would hayl'" asserted that the investigation was unnecessar~', unwise
and politically motinlted. At worst he would ha,'p denounced the im'estigation as
undermining law and order and inspired by Communist ideology, No one risked
that confrontation during his lifetime.
Those points are key to understanding the role of the Attorney General in
"supen-ising" ~Ir. Hoon'r and the Bureau, I can think of no caret>r public servant
who e,'en approached 111', HoovE'r's stature in thE' pUblic eye or with the Congress.
Under 111'. HooYer, the FBI l)peame the finest investigative agency in the world.
Ahspnt strong aud unpqui,'ocal proof of the grpatest impropriety on the part of
thn Director, no Attorney General eould haYl~ conceh'ed that he could possibly
win a fight with ~Ir, Hoo,'er in the "yes of the public, the Congress, or the President.
110reover, to the extent proof of any such impropriety existed, it would
almost by definition ha"e been in the Bureau's possession and control-unreachahlo
except with Burpau ('ooperation, This Committee has heard testimony that
the Director ordered that certain files were not to be released outside the Bureau,
and that certain othel"S were kept personally by 111'. Hoover and were destroyed
at his death.
Let me emphasize briefly some further considerations, ~Ir, Hoover exercised
total control over the Bureau and its personnel and brooked no interference
with that process. He demanded total loyalty and enforced total dedication to
the Bureau and to himself as Director. Agents had no job protection from Civil
Senice or otherwise: they were reprimanded, demoted, reassigned, and dismissed
at his direction. Complaints by the agents-and certainly public complaints
or complaints to the Attorney General-were not tolerated, and given Mr.
Hoover's political position would have had little prospect for success,
:\11'. Hoover's total control over personnel and management was reenforced by
eneouraging predominantly formal relationships with those outside the Bureau,
including the Attorney General and his prineipal subordinates. Mr, Hoover normally
dealt with the Attorney General in writing, personally, or through a
designated liaison officer, He maintained discipline and control by actively discouraging
efforts by the Attorney General to deal directly with agents in the
field or anyone in the Bureau other than himself and his principal assistants.
Mr, Hoover was proUd of the absence of partisan political interference in the
work of the FBI. His absolute control was in fact a protection against politi,
cally motivated investigations by a politically minded Attorney General or a
politically appointed United States Attorney. At the same time, ket>ping the
Bureau free from political interference was a powerful argument against efforts
by politically appointed officials, whatever their motivation, to gain a greater
measure of control over operations of the Bureau,
The Committee should remember also that the Bureau is an extremely important
resource of the Department and key to its success. No Attorney General
can earry on the work of the Dppartment without the full cooperation and
support of the FBI. Animosity between an Attorney General and the Director
was a losing proposition for the work of the Department and for the success of
the Administration-as well as for the Attorney General involved, Certainly I
sought in many wa~'s to avoid, wherever possible, too direct a confrontation,
'Vhenever the Bureau came in for public criticism, as it occasionally did,
l\lr. Hoover could count on a defensp and expression of confidence by the Attorney
General. He found great value in his formal position as subordinate to the
Attorney General and the fact that the FBI was a part of the Department ot
Justice. He was very conscious of the fact that an independent Federal Bureau
of Investigation would be far more vulnerable to public suspicion and pUblic
criticism than one formally under the control of the Attorney General. In
pffeet, hp was uniquely sueeessful in having- it both ways: he was protected
from public critieism by ha ving' a thE'Oretical superior who took responsibility for
his work, and was protected from his superior by his public reputation,
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'Mr. Hoover was a permanent fixture in government; Attorneys General came
and went. Surely he mllst have, with some justification, regarded Attorneys General
as rank amateurs in the investigative techniques in which the Bureau
was so expert. While he accepted their view of the law with respect to prosecutions,
he controlled both the resources and the methods of investigation. While
he was enormously sensitive to any accusation that a particular activity was
not authorized by the Department, this did not mean that the incumbent
Attorney General or any of his principal subordinates knew of the activity. As
far as Mr. Hoover was concerned, it was sufficient for the Bureau if at any time
any Attorney General had authorized that activity in any circumstance. In fact,
it was often sufficient if any Attorney General had written something which
could be construed to authorize it or had been informed in some one of hundreds
of memoranda of some facts from which he could conceivably have inferred the
possibility of such an activity. Perhaps to a permanent head of a large bureaucracy
this seems a reasonable way of proceeding. However, there is simply no
wayan incoming Cabinet officer can or should be charged with endorsing every
decision of every predecessor, and particularly those decisions which even the
predecessor did not know he was making.
Let me briefly cite an example. The Bureau used terms of art, or euphemisms,
without informing the Attorney General that they were terms of art. I do not
think it is excessively naive to assume that a "highly reliable informant" was
precisely that, and not a "bug". Why were such euphemisms used? I don't know,
but one of the results of their use was to make precise communication difficult.
The extremes to which the FBI would go in charging an Attorney General with
knowledge of its activities based on the use of such euphemisms came most
dramatically to my attention in connection with papers filed in the Supreme
Court in the Black case in 1966. That case involved the use of a "bug" and I
strongly urge the Committee to review my correspondence with the Director
on that occasion-a correspondence which, incidentally, led to precisely the kind
of confrontation which persuaded me I could no longer effectively serve as
Attorney General because of Mr. Hoover's resentment towards me.
I do not think informing the head of a Department is or ought to be a guessing
game. Responsible subordinates know or ought to know when a particular policy
or practice is, in the circumstances, questionable, and should seek guidance from
their superiors. The process of government should not depend on guess or
inference when it is easily open to the process of inquiry, recommendation and
decision. It was not my practice, and I believe not the practice of others in the
Department of Justice, to avoid difficult decisions by looking the other way or by
using ambiguous language which left subordinates free to act as they chose.
I did not seek to be left with a "plausible denial".
But perhapS more important than all the foregoing was the simple fact that
while I did not in all respects share the public adulation of Mr. Hoover, I did
respect the Bureau's reputation for integrity and propriety.
I would like to turn to three areas in which, I understand, the Committee
has particular interest: the opening of mail; the so-called COINTEL program,
partiCUlarly regarding the Klan and the Communist Party; and the FBI's activities
with respect to Dr. King, including wiretaps and bugs. In this connection
I am sure that the Committee appreciates that I have had to depend largely
upon my recollection of events taking place some ten years ago. To assist this
recollection I have had access to my own calendars, to the recollection of a few
colleagues, and to the few documents provided to me by the Committee staff.
I have spent some substantial time trying to reconstruct events and to refresh
my recollection, but obviously I make no claim that my recollection is complete
or in all cases precisely accurate. It is simply my best recollection.
1. OPENING OF MAIL
The press, and perhaps the Committee staff. have drawn an inference from
certain internal FBI memoranda (not previously available to me) that I was
aware of the FBI's program with respect to mail opening in violation of law.
That is not the fact. I do not recall any such program and had I been made
aware of such a program, I am sure that I would recall it since I would not
have tolerated it.
Let me discuss the documents involved and the surrounding circumstances:
The first document is an internal Bureau memorandum from ~Ir. D. E. ~foore
to ~Ir. W. C. Sullivan, Ilpparently viewed by ~Ir. Hoover. and dated October 2.
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1964 [see Exhibit 71 1
]. That memorandum discusses the case of USA v.
Baltch, an espionage case then going to trial on October 2, 1964-the date of the
memorandum-in the Eastern District of ~ew York. It reveals that a "mail intercept"-
an FBI euphemism that the Committee staff tells me meant an unlawful
mail opening '-had been 'utilized in the case; that Department lawyers had not
theretofore been infonned of the fact of this tainted evidence; and that the
Bureau would rather drop the case than to admit to the existence of the "intercept".
The case was in fact dropped that day, at my direction, on the ground that
it could not be further prosecuted without revealing national security information.
From those facts the inference is drawn that I was personall~' aware of the
opening of mail, and directed that the case be dropped for that reason. That inference
is not correct.
I was not aware of any mail opening in connection with this case. I do recall
that prosecuting the case raised two problems: (1) the repatriation of certain
alleged co-conspirators virtually destroyed the case against the Baltches; and
(2) there was a bug and, I believe, an unlawful entry into the Baltch apartment.
The United States Attorney had not been informed of the bug, despite his inquiries
of the FBI, and in fact he had denied its existence in open court on September
28. The next day, the United States Attorney again advised the court that he
had checked with the Department of Justice and stated that no leads had been
secured from eavesdropping or any other illegal activity. It was not until October
2 that the United States Attorney was advised that there had in fact been a
microphone in the apartment. Although he had been assured that no tainted
evidence resulted from the bug, when I was informed of the bug and his statements
to the court, I directed that the United States Attorney advise the court
immediately that his earlier representations had been incorrect. I did this without
knowing anything about mail being opened in the investigation.
To understand this sequence of events it is necessary to read Mr. Moore's memorandum
carefully, to note that it reports three separate conversations, and fo
focus carefully on their order. Having done this, it is obvious to me that the
first of these conversations, between Mr. Hall and me (reported third hand in
the memorandum), took place in the morning of October 2, before the United
States Attorney or anyone outside the Bureau was aware of the so-called "mail
intercept", and before any decision had been made to drop the case. Thereafter,
Mr. Hall apparently told Mr. :\1001'1' that he would pass whatever information he
in fact received about the "mail intercept" on to Mr. Yeagley and :\11'. Hoey in
Xew York, not to me in Washington. Both of these facts are confirmed by my own
calendar, because the only time that I talked with Mr. Hall on October 2 was at
9 a.m. for no more than ten minutes---clearly before he could have received an
answer to the inquiry about the "mail intercept". In other words, I was quite
aware of difficulties in pursuing the prosecution-though the Bureau was pushing
it and I hoped it could be done--quite apart from, and indeed before I could possibly
have known of, the additional problems raised by the so-called "mail
intercept".
:\Iy calendar reflects that I talked with :\11'. Hoey twice on October 2, and that
accords with my recollection. The first time was, on his recommendation, to
authorize him to dismiss the crucial counts in the indictment; the second time
was to find out how this had been received by the Judge, and what publicity we
were likely to get.
If I learned about any mail opening in this case on October 2 I had to learn
about it from the United States Attorney because my calendar reflects that he
is the only person I talked with who was knowledgeable about the case after my
early morning discussion with :\11'. Hall. Neither he nor the Assistant Attorney
General, both of whom were familiar with the case in a detail that I was not,
have any recollection of being told about mail opening in connection with this
matter on that date or previously. Their recollection accords with my own. :\11'.
Moore, as I read his testimony, believes that he did tell :\11'. Yeagley about a
"mail intercept" but does not know if Mr. Yeagley knew that that term meant
mail opening. Given all the circumstances of that case, I frankly doubt that
Department law~'ers were in fact advised about mail opening. It would have been
sufficient for the Bureau to have told them that there were problems in the case
1See pp. ,~21< throng-h 83;;.
• I do not recall ever haYing- prevlouRly heard the term "mall Intercept" and certalnlr
not ItR nse In connection with anr mall opening. In this statement I accept the stalf's
definition although I query whether "mall Intercept" was used only to describe mall
openings.
204
arising from an unlawful entry and an unlawful search and seizure and that,
under the circumstances, the Bureau recommended dropping the case. That
would be far more consistent, in my judgment, with the Bureau's prior refusal to
acknowledge the bug or that there was tainted evidence of any kind in the case.
And it would clearly have both satisfied and relieved the United States Attorney
who was anything but enamored of the case and its prospects for success.'
The other incident concerns the investigation by Senator Edward Long of
activities conducted by the Post Office Department, the Internal Revenue Service,
and others-not including the FBI. Here, again, there are two internal J;'BI
memoranda that have led to some speculation that I might have been aware of
the Bureau's opening of mail. I believe that a little background may be helpful
to the Committee in evaluating that correspondence.
Rightly or wrongly, I and my colleagues perceived the investigation by
Senator Long as an effort to discredit the Organized Crime Program and the
prosecution of James Hoffa, while not taking 011 the FBI directly. This view is
consistent with a handwritten note which appears 011 Mr. Belmont's memorandum
to :\Ir. Tolson of February 27, in Mr. Hoover's handwriting [see Exhibit 71'].
Since 1962 Senator Long had been making inquiries of the Post Office Department
about the use of "mail covers". Late in 1964 Senator Long requested that
the Post Office Department supply him with a list of names and addresses of all
persons on whom mail covers were placed after January 1,1963, The Postmaster
General contacted the Department in this regard, and Assistant Attorney General
Herbert J. :\Iiller, wrote him on December 22 that it was inadvisable to disclose
such information to the Senator. I discussed this personally with both Mr. Miller
and with the Postmaster General.
In January 1965, Senator Long and his staff continued to press for this iriformation,
particularly as it involved IRS investigations. During this period'
I had a number of conversations with the Postmaster General, members of my
staff and members of his as to whether the Postmaster General would provide
a list of the persons on whom mail covers had been requested. On February 19,
in response to a request by the Senator for such a list, the Postmaster General
formally declined, stating that "many of the mail covers include names of persons
who are being investigated for national security reasons or because of their
affiliation with syndicated crime. Release of these names would seriously impair
the effectiveness of such investigations and could in some cases be inimical to
our national security." (Emphasis added).
Mr. Montague, the Chief Postal Inspector, testified before Senator Long's
Committee on February 23 and 24 regarding mail covers. During the course of
that testimony Senator Long directed :\Ir. Montague to prepare a list of all mail
covers in the past two years, and further stated that he would not commit to
keep that list confidential. This raised obvious questions of executive privilege
(as well as national security), and it is my recollection that it was for that
reason President Johnson asked me to coordinate all matters before the Long
Committee, as reflected in Mr. Belmont's memorandum to Mr. Tolson of
February 27.
During that testimony Mr. Montague stated that mail being covered was never
opened or examined, and that such mail was never permitted to be taken out of
the post office facility.
On February 27, a Saturday, I met with Mr, Belmont and Mr. Evans. I have
no precise recollection of that meeting nor do I recall that Mr. :\Ioore was present.
I am, however, content to accept his recollection that he was, as well as his
recollection of the meeting. His specific recollection of the meeting is not different
from my general recollection of the subject matter. It is Mr. Moore's testimony
before this Committee that he has no recollection that "mail openings" were
discussed, and that is confirmed by Mr. Evans, Indeed, I am confident that they
1 E'I"en If one were to conclude that the Bureau did In fact reveal that mall had been
opened and that this fact was relayed by the lawyers Involved In the case to me, I am
certain that that fact would have been revealed by the FBI-and I would have accepted Itas
an unfortunate aberration, just then discovered In the context of a Soviet espionage
Investigation, not as a massive mail-opening program. In that event, nothing would have led
me to deduce that the Bureau was, as a matter of polley and practice, opening letters.
, See pp. 828 through 835,
3 I would not wish the Committee to conclude that the Long Investigation was the principal
focus of my attention at that time. This was the period of voting rights demonstrations
In the South. In Washington, and In the Department of Justice building Itself. The heatlngs
In Montgomery, the conduct of Governor Wallace. SheriII' Clark and others led to Congressional
demands and publk demonstrations for troops. It was an extraordinarily tense
perlod--especlally for an Attorney General sworn In on February 13.
205
were never discussed at any meeting I ever attended. I do recall that Mr. Belmont
raised a question aoout the technical accuracy of :\lr. :\lontague's testimony,
and I believe that Mr. Moore is correct in his recollection that it did not concern
mail openings, but the question of custody. It is my recollection that in some
cases the outside of mail might have been examined or even photographed by
persons other than Post Office employees. (Indeed, I believe that the BaUch
case illvolved a microdot under a postage stamp.) I also recall that in his
first testimony before the Committee, :\lr. l\lontague did not mention the fact
that certain Internal Revenue Service mail levies resulted in the transfer' of
mail from the Post Office to the IRS. I have a clear recollection that my evaluation
of l\lontague's testimony was that it was essentially truthful. I could not
have arrived at this conclusion if I were aware that mail was being opened b;l'
the Bureau.
It seems to me that 1\lr. Hoover's handwritten note on lUr. Belmont's memorandum
strongly confirms the fact that I was not told about the Bureau's extensive
program of opening mail which has since been revealed by the Committee.
If I had been so informed, it is impossible to imagine Mr. Hoover writing:
"I don't see what all the excitement is about."
On l\larch 1, the Postmaster General wrote to Senator Long, again declining
to turn over a list of mail covers. Senator Long responded by asking whether
executive privilege was being claimed. :My diary for that day indicates that I
talked with Mr. Hoover, the Postmaster General, personnel on my own staff,
saw Senator Long in the late afternoon, talked again with the Postmaster General,
and saw his General Counsel that evening. l\ly recollection--conflrmed by
my dairy-is that all of this was on the subject of "mail covers" and Senator
Long's demand for the names of those people subject to them. My diary for
March 3 reflects that I again spoke to the Postmaster General, Senator Long,
and personnel in the Criminal Division about this problem, and that on l\larch 5
I saw Senator Long's committee counsel in the company of Justice Department
personnel. l\ly diary again confirms that the subject was "mail covers".
There is nothing in 1\lr. Hoover's memorandum of :\larch 2 which differs in
any way from my recollection. [see Exhibit 71 ' ] That memorandum refers to
"mail coverage, et cetera". Although the addressees of that memorandum, I
would think, were familiar with the Department's mail opening program, there
is no reference in that memo to such a program, or to the fact that I was aware
of it. Had I been aware of it, I am sure that such a reference would have been
made. Indeed, Mr. Hoover refers to his conversation with me about laxity in the
use of mail covers-scarcely the conversation to be expected if it were between
two people aware of the Bureau's illegal program with respect to mail openings.
There are two points in Mr. Hoover's March 2 memorandum from which an
inference that I knew about mail openings could be taken. The first is to treat
the words "et cetera" in the phrase "mail coverage, et cetera" as a code word
or euphemism for "mail openings". No one could reasonably suggest such a
meaning and certainly it has no such meaning to me. The second is the following
passage:
"The Attorney General stated that 1\lr. Fensterwald [Senator Long's counsel]
was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some
possible witnesses who are former Bureau agents and if they were asked if mail
was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated
that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they
were ever involved in any program touching on national security and, if not, it
is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know."
I generally recall the conversation described by 1\lr. Hoover, but, as is the
case with all internal memoranda, it is hard to know whether I concurred in a
suggestion made by him or whether I initiated the suggestion, and whether it is
accurate in other ways. In addition, it is important to remember that he was
writing to people who were privy to information that I was not.
But assuming the accuracy of the memo, it is not consistent with my being
aware of the Bureau's mail opening program. Had I been aware of that program,
I naturally would have assumed that the agents had been involved in that
program, and I would scarcely have been content to leave them to their own
devices before Senator Long's Committee. 1\loreover, it would have been extremely
unusual for ex-FBI agents to be interviewed by the Senate Committee
st!lfl' without revealing that fact to the Bureau. In those circumstances both the
Director and I would have been concerned as to the scope of theIr knowledge
1 See pp. 828 through 835.
206
with respect to the very information about mail covers which the Senator was
demanding and which we were refusing, as well as about any other matters of a
national security nature. If the witnesses in fact existed (which I doubted
strongly), then both the Director and I wanted to know the extent of their
knowledge about Bureau programs, and the extent of their hostility towards the
FBI. That is a normal concern that we would have had anytime any ex-FBI
agent testified before any Congressional committee on any subject.
I do not wish to belabor the point. To infer knowledge on my part is to
assume that I was prepared to deceive many of my closest advisers within the
Department with respect to the Bureau's mail opening program, to enter into
an unlawful conspiracy with the Director and to deny knowledge to the Postmaster
General and his staff, to the head of the Criminal Division and his
First Assistant, to my own Executive Assistant, and to many others. It also
assumes that I was unconcerned about what I would have known to be a flatly
untrue statement under oath by the Chief Postal Inspector before a Congressional
committee. And at the very moment that I was attempting to bring order
into the FBI's program with respect to electronic surveillance, it assumes that
I was prepared to condone the opening of mail in flat violation of the statutes.
SUCh a far reaching set of assumptions is to me obvious nonsense. I did none of
those things and there seems to me to be no reason to suggest that I did.
One final point. It would be my conclusion from some experience with the
FBI's practices that no subordinate of Mr. Hoover's would have told me about
the mail opening program without the express authority of the Director himself.
That would almost certainly appear in written memoranda. In addition,
if I had condoned this practice, I feel confident there would be a memorandum
in the Bureau's files expressing my approval in no uncertain terms, pointing
out that the Attorney General had "authorized" the mail opening program.
Finally, there would be a memorandum in the Bureau files telling me that the
program which I had "authorized" had been discontinued, as I understand it
was, in 1966. I understand that no such memoranda exist.
11. THE KU KLUX KLAN AND THE COMMUNIST PARrY
Let me state at the outset that during my term in the Department, to the
best of my recollection, I never heard the terms "COINTEL" or "COINTEL
PRO". I was, of course, familiar with the fact that the FBI had responsibility
within the United States for counterintelligence and investigation of subversive
activities. That the Bureau gathered intelligence with respect to the Communist
Par,ty and other organizations deemed to be "subversive", or potentially
so, was throughout this period very well known to the Congress and to the general
public. That it engaged in the extensive use of informers in this regard, and
employed wiretaps, was also very well-known and had been known and repeatedly
described to the Congress by the Director for many years. That it gathered such
intelligence, and that in accordance with Executive Orders it disseminated such
information to Interested government agencies, was also very well-known. In
addition to these intelligence activities, and to a degree as part of them, the FBI
also had domestic responsibilities for enforcement of espionage statutes and
related laws. Indeed, the Bureau's activities in this area were generously publicized
by the Bureau itself and were the subject of books, television programs
and movies and were undoubtedly a reason for Mr. Hoover's great public acclaim.
Certainly, as Attorney General, I was aware of Mr. Hoover's strong feelings
about Communism and subversive activities. So, also, were the Congress and
the general public. Mr. Hoover testified annually before the House Appropriations
Committee about the success of the FBI's counterintelligence operations against
the Communist Party. He made innumerable public speeches and wrote articles
and a book on those subjects.
I think it fair to assume that the facts I knew, as did the Congress and the
public, were about activities that unquestionably had a disruptive effect upon
the Communist Party and splinter organizations. I think it was a matter of
public knowledge that membership in the Communist Party would likely to
be known to the FBI. and that this constituted an employment risk-eertainly
with the Federal Government and defense contractors and perhaps with other
organizations.
It is not my purpose here to either attack or defend this program of the
Bureau, in so far as I was aware of it. :\Iy point is simply that it was not a
,>ecret. Indeed there were many of us in the Department who thought that
207
in view of the Smith Act cases, and in view of the changing nature of the
Communist Party of the United States, the intelligence program was excessive,
wasteful and, perhaps, unwarranted. But it continued to have strong support
in Congress and from the Director himself.
Indeed, after I left the Department, :\Ir. Hoover went even further-again
with full public knowledge-and related the activities of the Communist Party
with those of many other organizations including the following: the Students for
a Democratic ~ociety, the Nation of Islam or Black :\Iuslims, the StUdent Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee, the Black Panthers, and groups whiCh came
to be called the "New Left". To :\Ir. Hoover and the Bureau, these groups aU
advocated violent overthrow of our government and were hence subject to scrutiny.
These attitudes were publicly known and supported by large segments of
the public and the Congress.
Leaving aside the propriety of :\Ir. Hoover's preoccupation with such organizations,
some of which were not even in existence when I was in the Department,
I did not then, and do not now, regard the Bureau's program with respect to
the Ku Klux Klan as in any sense comparable to these programs as I have heard
them described. I did not think of the Bureau's Klan effort in any meaningful
sense, as involved with "counterintelligence".
The Klan program involved the investigation and prosecution of persons who
had engaged in and who were committed to the violent deprivation of constitutionally
guaranteed rights of others through murder, kidnappings, beatings and
threats of violence-all in contravention of Federal and State laws.
If you will remember for a moment the names of Lemuel Penn, Viola Liuzzo,
Vernon Dahmer, :\Iedgar Evers, James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, Michael
Schwerner, and the bombings and beatings so frequent in the mid-1960's, you
may perceive the differences as clearly as I did then. The FBI did a magnificent
job in Mississippi and parts of Alabama and Louisiana in bringing to justice
the perpetrators of those acts. The Bureau was investigating and attempting to
prevent violence. To equate such efforts with surveillance or harassment of
persons exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights is in my view unmitigated
nonsense.
I have previousl~', in Executive Session, described at some length the program
of the FBI in the South as I understood it. I see no need to repeat that testimoney
here, and I am attaching it to this testimony. (See p. 213)
The central point of that testimony and my testimony here is that some Klan
members in those states, using the Klan as a vehicle, were engaged in repeated
acts of criminal violence. It had nothing to do with preaching a social point
of view: it had to do with proven acts of violence. The investigation by the FBI
was hard, tough, and outstandingly successful.
It is true that the F'BI program with respect to the Klan made extensive use
of informers. That is true of virtually every criminal investigation with which
I am familiar. In an effort to detect, prevent, and prosecute acts of violence,
President Johnson, Attorney General Kennedy, :\Ir. Allen Dulles, myself and
others urged the Bureau to develop an effective informant program, similar to
that which they had developed with respect to the Communist Party.
It is true that these techniques did in fact disrupt Klan activities, sowed deep
mistrust among the Klan members, and made Klan members aware of the extensive
informant system of the FBI and the fact that they were under constant
observation. Klan members were interviewed and reinterviewed openly-a fact
which appeared in the public press at the time. They were openly surveilled.
These techniques were designed to deter violence-to prevent murder, bombings
and beatings. In my jUdgment, they were successful. I was aware of them and
I authorized them. In the same circumstances I would do 80 again today.
I was not, to the best of my recollection. aware of any activities which I
regarded as improper. I did not, for example, know of the use of anonymous
letters to wives of Klan members suggesting their infidelity, or practices of that
kind. Even in the context of the Klan I do not regard this technique as proper.
There may have been other overreaching by Bureau agents; in an investigation
of this size, that is always possible. But I continue to helieve that. taken as
a whole. the Bureau did an exceptional job in that investigation. a job which
was important and essential to the restoration of law in the South and to the
w('lfare of this country. Again, I say I would authorize that type of action where
nec('ssary again today.
I hope this Committee will do nothing which would prevent or inhibit such
proper conduct.
208
III. MARTH, LUTHER KING
The Committee's investigation has revealed some grossly improper acts with
respect to Dr. ~Iartin Luther King, Jr. I am appalled by the impropriety of some
of those acts. But beyond impropriety, they suggest an irrationality which I did
not believe the FBI, or the Director, was capable of endorsing. I certainly was
unaware of them at the time, but I cannot claim ignorance of at least a part of
the motivation and of one instance of highly improper conduct.
In order to focus on this situation, some background is necessary.
Dr. King emerged as the most influential Civil Rights leader in this country
at a crucial time in our histolJ'-. There is no doubt that the Kennedy administration
(both the President and the Attorney General) sJ"mvathized with and supported
Dr. King's dramatic efforts to demonstrate the extent of discrimination in
this country and to right those wrongs. By and large, Dr. King sought only to establish
constitutional rights, and so long as he adhered to that objective it was
right and proper that the Attorney General supported the efforts that he made to
achie\'e equality. ~Ir. Kennedy clearly did so. He did so with courage and
conviction.
The leadership and support of Dr. King for civil rights for all citizens was an
essential ingredient in the Kennedy administration and its dedication to that
objective. That basic identity of constitutional and political interest between
Dr. King and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations is the necessary predicate
of all subsequent events. Anything which discredited Dr. King, or his
non-violent Civil Rights movement, would have been a disaster to the Kennedy
administration, and after President Kennedy's death, to the Johnson administration.
~Iore importantly, it would have been a disaster to the country.
This Committee, with its political experience, can understand what I mean
when I say that in the United States in the early and middle 60s a Governmental
effort to discredit Martin Luther King, Jr., could have led to civil strife of an
incredibly serious nature. As it was, this country came through an extraordinarily
difficult period. In my judgment, it could not have done so without the leadership
of Dr. King and his dedication to non-violence.
These points underline the problem presented by Mr. Hoover's vendetta against
Dr. King. That vendetta had the very real potential of causing civil strife iln this
country infinitely greater than that which we suffered in our attempts to bring
equal rights to black citizens.
Mr. Hoover's capitulation to his personal pique was irresponsible, and clearly
contmry to the interests of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, constitutional government,
and the Nation.
From the outset ~fr. Hoover had little sympathy with Dr. King's movement
and with sit-ins, marches, and other demonstrations which were part of that
movement. This may have represented nothing more than the typical distaste of
law enforcement officials for situations which, however peaceful their intention
and however constitutionally protected, can lead to violence; it may also have
been a reflection of the fact that no law enforcement officials at that time really
knew how to cope with acts of civil disobedience. Surely Mr. Hoover found it distasteful
to investigate local law enforcement officials, as the Civil Rights Division
occasionally asked the FBI to do. Clearly, those investigations strained relationships
between local FBI agents and local law enforcement. It is a fair statement
that those Bureau investigations did not approach the quality of the normal
Bureau excellence.
Throughout Mr. Kennedy's administration of the Department of Justice and
mine there was considerable tension between the FBI and the Department on
civil rights matters. In voting rights matters much of the work which should
have been done by the Bureau ended up being done by young civil rights lawyers.
'The quality of Bureau investigations again was not up to its standards of excellence,
and repeatedly the Civil Rights Division had to give the most detailed
instructions to the FBI as to what the Division wished done-instructions almost
unheard of in any other context in terms of their detail. "Thill' the Department
as a whole was heavily and enthusiastically involved in such matters as the
}fontgomerJ" busing. the integration of the Universities of ~Iissis."ippi and Alabama,
and similar events, the role of the FBI was, by comparison. marginal and
somewhat grudging.
In part, I believe the Bureau's attitude was grounded in the difficult lJrohlem
of what the proper role for the Bureau in such unprecedented situations really
was. The Bureau did not, in principle, wish to involve itself in those law enforc~
209
ment responsibilities which weIT the obligations of local law enforcement,
"'hether or not those obligations were being effectively or constitutionally carried
out, In a sense the Bureau performed its normal functions in a situation which
was anything but l101"lllal. 'l'his eontillued to be largely the case until mid,l964
when the Bureau made its massh'e effort with resped to the violence initiated by
the Klan and its members,
This tension between the Bureau and the Department, and between the Bureau
and the Civil Rights :\l<n'ement, increased as the Dl'partment's aetivities increased
and as the Civil Rights movement grew in its intensity. It was greatly aggravated
when Civil Rights leaders, and particularly Dr. King, increasingly voieed public
eriticism of the FBI. That critiC'ism was bitterly resented by the Director.
It is almost impossible to overestimate :\lr. Hoover's sensitivity to criticism
of himself or the FBI. It went far beyond the bounds of natural resentment to
criticism one feels unfair. The most casual statement, the most strained implication,
was sufficient cause for :\lr. Hoover to write a memorandum to the Attorney
General complaining about the criticism, explaining why it was unjustified, and
im!lugning the integrity of its author.
In a very real sense there was no greater crime in :\Ir. Hoover's eyes than
pUblic criticism of the Bureau and Dr. King's repeated criticisms made him a
Bureau enemy. Not only his criticisms, but also his eharacter and re!lutation
became subject to attack. :\lr. Hoover frequently viewed such criticism as
and probably believed it to be, Communist or Communist-inspired. All public
critics of the Bureau, if they persisted, were treated in this fashion. The only
thing unique about Dr. King was the intensity of the feeling and the apparent
extremes to which the Bureau went in seeking to destroJ' the critic.
Nobody in the Department of Justice connected with Civil Rights could possibly
have been unaware of the intensity of :\lr. Hom'er's feelings. Xobody could have
been unaware of the potential for disaster which those feelings embodied. But,
given the realities of the situation, I do not believe one could have anticipatl'd the
extremes to which it was apparently carried.
Apart from the general concenl I have already expressed about :\lr. Hoover's
attitude towards Dr. King and his Civil Rights moveml'nt, I cannot speak in
great detail of what occurred when I wml Deputy Attorney General to Mr.
Kennedy, either because I did not know or I do not now recollect. :\lr. Kennedy
worked directly with :\Ir. :\larshall and :\lr. Doar 011 Civil Rights matters, and
less often with me. I do recall seeing in 1962 (I lJeliew) one or more memoranda
stating, in substance, that an important secret member of the Communist Party,
known to be such to the FBI, was in close contact "ith Dr. King and might be
influencing the actions of Dr, King's movement in ways amicable to the interests
of the Soviet Union and contrary to those of the United States. It is my impression
that at this time the Bureau asked for authorization to tap the phones of
Dr. King. and that :\Ir. Kl'nnedy turned that rl'quest down. :\Iy recollection is that
:'Ill'. Kennedy at that time had a representath'e of the Civil Rights Division eall
upon Dr. King and suggest strongly to him that it was not in his interest nor in
the interest of his movement to have further contact with this lJerson. :\Ir. Hoover
Imew of this call.
I believe that for a period of time Dr. King did follow this suggestion, but
sub50equelltly the contacts wl're resumed. and the Bureau informed the Attorney
General of this fact in one or more memoranda. I believe there were sub,sequent
cautions in this regard to Dr. King. In any event, the contacts did continue, the
Bureau again recommended a wiretap be placed on the phone of Dr. King, and
ultimately :\lr. Kl'nnedy approved that wiretap.
I associate in my mind the approval of this wiretap with another event, although
I cannot clearly recollect the timing. At one point, I bl'lieve in 1963, Mr.
Hoover prepared a detailed memorandum about Dr. King, referring to the fact
of Communist infiltration into the movement and discussing questions of moral
character. Initially, he gave that memorandnm wide circulation in the Government.
L'pon hearing of this fact, Mr. Kennedy was furious, and directed Mr.
Hoo,-er to withdraw all copies of the memorandum to other Departments of the
Government and not to circulate it further.
l\Ir. Kennedy resigned a,s Attorney General on September 3, 1964, and I served
as Acting Attorney General from that date until my confirmation as Attorne~'
General on February 13, 1965. Throughout this period I did not, of course, know
from day to day whether or not President Johnson would nominate me or some·
one else to be :\[r. Kennedy's sllccessor. Obviollsly, my authority might be tem!
lorary, and for this rl'ason I did not take cl'rtain actions, particularly with re210
spect to clarifying the Bureau's procedures on electronic ,surveillance, until after
my nomination and confirmation. I felt this was a matter of important policy
for a new Attorney General to determine.
During this interim period, on Kovember 10, 1964, Mr. Hoover held an unprecedented
press conference with some women reporters. In response to a
question at that press conference Mr. Hoover called Dr. King the "most notorious
liar in the country". That comment received extensive publicit~·. The refl.'rence,
as the Committee may remember, was to the critici,sms that Dr. King had made
of the FBI.
I spoke to Mr. Hoover in connection with that press conference. He told me
that it was not his practice to have press conferences, had not done so in the past,
and would not do so again in the future. Perhaps the depth of his feeling with
respect to Dr. King was revealed to me by his statement that he did not understand
all the pUblicity which the remark had attracted because he had been asked
a simple question and given a simple truthful answer.
Late on the afternoon of Wednesday, l'Iovember 25, 1964 (the day before
Thanksgiving), I was informed b~- the head of the Washington bureau of an important
news publication that one of his reporters covering the Justice Department
had been approached by the FBI and told that he could, if he wished,
listen to some interesting tapes involving Dr. King. The nature of the tapes was
described. The reporter, after consulting hi,S boss, declined.
I was shocked by this revelation, and felt e,at the President should be advised
immediately. On November 28, I flew, with Mr. Burke Marshall, the retiring head
of the Civil Rights Division, to the LBJ Ranch. On that occasion he and I informed
the President of our conversation with the news editor and expressed in
very strong terms our view that this wa,s shocking conduct and politically extremely
dangerous to the Presidency. I told the President my view that it should
be stopped immediately and that he should personally contact Mr. Hoover. I
received the impression that President Johnson took the matter very seriously and
that he would do as I recommended.
On the following Monday I was informed by at least one other reporter, and
perhap.s two, of similar offers made to them the prior week. I spoke to the Bureau
official who had been identified as having made the offer and asked him about it.
He flatly denied that any such offer had been made or that the FBI would engage
in any such activity. Thereupon I asked at least one of the reporters-perhaps
all of them-whether they would join me in confronting the Bureau on this issue.
They declined to do so.
I do not know whether President Johnson discussed this matter with Mr.
Hoover, or what, if anything, was said. However, I wa,s quite confident that that
particular activity ceased at that time, and I attributed it to Mr. Johnson's intervention.
From that time until I left the Justice Department I never heard from
any person of subsequent similar activity by the Bureau, and I assumed it had
ceased. I should add only this: I believed that the tapes in question were not tapes
resulting from Bureau surveillance but tapes acquired from State law enforcement
authorities, and that such a representation was made to the reporter at the
time.
While I have no specific recollection, I am sure that I received many memoranda
concerning Dr. King and his activities during this period, and I am sure
many of those were highly critical of Dr. King's conduct, his reputation and his
morals. I am sure similar memoranda went to the 'Vhite House.
Let me turn now to how I dealt with electronic surveillance after I was confirmed
as Attorney General. On March 30, 1965, after extensive discussions and
negotiations with the FBI, I intrOduced, with Mr. Hoover's acquiescence, new
procedures "ith respect to electronic surveillance, which required the Bureau
to treat bugs and taps in the same way, that is. to secure the prior written approval
of the Attorney General in I.'ach instance. I also directed the Bureau to
notify me whenever an approved device had bl.'en discontinUed, and to seek my
approval on any device which had been in existence for six months, and to seek
a rl.'newed approval every six months thereafter.
In late April 1965, in accordance with this program, I received a request from
the Bureau to continue a tap on Dr. King's personal phone. I ordered it discontinued.
It is. however, possible that a request for a continuation of a pre-existing
tap on the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference was
made about the same time. and I lllay havl.' approved that tap. I do not recan
the date or the circumstancl.'s which would have led me to do So.
Subsequently, on June 30, the President issued a memorandum confining taps
solely to national security mattl.'rs, and requiring that all taps, and practices re211
lating to electronic surveillances, be reviewed with and approved by the Attorney
General. He did that at my insistence.
I think it is important for the Committee to recall the racial ten"ions and
demonstrations which were going on during this period of time and which ultimatelJ'
led to the PrelSident's introducing the Yoting Rights Act and to its Congressional
appro,'al. 'l'hese events included Dr, King's demonstration in Birmingham,
the beating of Ch'il Rights demonstrators by ~heriff Clark, demonstrations
by Civil Rights sJ'mpathizers in Washington and repeated Congressional demands
upon me to send troops to the ~outh for the protection of Civil Rights workers,
The Committee will also recall that Governor 'Vallace called upon President
Johnson, and that President Johnson and I had numerous meetings with Dr. King
and other Civil Rights leaders during this period of time. I wish to remind the
Committee of those events because there was nothing in this period of time of
more concenl to me, which occupied more of my time and energies, or which I
regarded as more serious for this country.
The Committee staff has shown me four pieces of paper from the Bureau's
files which are of major concern to me because the,}' are inconsistent with my
policies. Three of these are information memoranda from the I<'BI, dated I uelieve,
in MaJ' (three weeks after I had disapproved a tap on Dr. King's telephone),
October, and December 1965 Lsee footnote p. 21]. Each of these purports
to have informed me that without prior authorization a bug had been put in a
hotel room occupied uy Dr. King in New York City and removed within 24 hours.
Each of these bears my initials in what appears to be my handwriting in the place
where I customarily initialed Bureau memoranda. I have no recollection of reading
or receiving these memoranda, and given the circumstances I have described
in this statement, I strongly uelieve that I would have such a recollection.
Further, in view of the circumstances which I have discussed above, I find it
virtually inconceivable that I could have received these memoranda at that time
and not written or discussed the matter with the Bureau.
The fourth document is a note in my handwriting, addressed to Mr. Hoover
and dated December 10, 1965. I am informed uy the Committee staff that that
note was attached in the Bureau files to the memorandum from the Bureau dated
December 1, which also bears the handwritten date 12/10/65 in what I do not
believe is my handwriting. That note comments on the sensitivity of surveillances
and the importance of not involving persons other than the Bureau agents in
their installation. I recall writing that note. I do not recall the circumstances,
and nothing in my possession, including my calendar, has refreshed my recollection
on that point.'
I am puzzled by the fact that the handwritten note, if related to the December 1
memorandum from the Director, is written on a separate piece of paper. It was
then, and is now, my consistent practice to write notes of that kind on the incoming
piece of paper, llrovided there is room to do so.
These memoranda do not indicate on their face the Bureau sought any prior
authorization, or state any reasons why it was not sought. They appear to
present me with information after the fact and request no authority to perform
similar surveillances in the future. I believe the Bureau knew full well that
I would not authorize the surveillances in question, not only because of the
circumstances surrounding Dr. King, but particularly because the bugs were to
he placed in a hotel room. That is among the worst possible invasions of privacy
and would demand the strongest conceivable justification. Indeed, I believe
this position had been made cle-ar in written memoranda to the Bureau dating
back to the 1950's, and I have a clear recollection of being critical of the Bureau
for installing a uug in the uedroom of a leading memuer of the Mafia. I reaffirmed
this position to the Bureau sometime in 1965 or 1966, but that reaffirmation
may have postdated these memoranda.
Finally, I cannot recall any memoranda at any time informing me that the
Bureau had installed a tap or a bug without my prior authorization. While I
authorized :\Ir. Hoover to do ~o in emergency circumstances in a memorandum
written in the SUlllmer of 1965, not only doe~ the MaJ' memorandum predate
that authorization, but there is nothing in the memoranda which suggests that
on any of tlwse occasion~ was there an "emergency".
1 ~l,\" calpndar docs show that on that date I had a meeting alone with the Depnty Director
of tIle CL~. ~lr. Helms. Which he had requested the predons afternoon. The meeting was a
hrlpf;me and would he consistent with a rpquest b,' the CIA for domestic surveillances hy
thp ~ HI. I rarely saw ~Ir. Helms alone. and he did on one Or two occasions make such a
request. Bllt I hare no recollection of thp sul'ject matter of that particular meetlng and
cannot therefore say that this handWritten note Is related to It.
212
rther my calendars, which are in the possession of th~ C~m.mi,tte~, indicate
m~ugellP;al 'availability 1 to the Bureau on two oecaslOn~ Ill\.ol\lllg I ~ese
amn,yemreocnordlalae,ctailo1dn mth.,a.ttottahle<av"aeimlaebriglEit'yn'e.yto, thperoBceudrueraIu' o,vnast.he1"'t1h'1i'rdI'.nvNookreddo by athvee
Bureau during m, term in office. b .
Obviously I do not believe that I rece.ived th~se mem~randa. Equally 0 VIOUS
is the fact that if I initialed them, I am nnstaken HI my ~)el~ef. . .
'Vhatever the explanation for these memoranda, I,t. IS undisputed that the
Bureau never sought m~' authorization to [lUg D.r. Klllg at an~ 'place and at
any time for any purpose, and that in t!wse three mstanc?s they did not comply
with the procedures I had directed. Kot only was I avmlabl~, but there c?uld
have been no conceivable "emergem'y" on any of these three Isolated o;caslOns
which would have justified the BurE'au proceeding on its own authOrIty. The
memoranda state none. .. tl
It seems to me clear that the Bureau did not seek my auth?rIZatlOn on lese
three occasions because ~lr. Hoover knew it would not be given. And he was
absolutely correct in that conclusion.
CONCLUSION
Revelations of improper conduct as dramatic as those uncovered by this
Committee would seem to demand equally dramatic recommendations to prevent
their future recurrence.
The Committee could recommend legislation in a number of areas.
It could recommend that certain methods be forhidden entirely to the Bureau.
For example, use of all electronic devices ('ould he banned and their sale or
transportation in interstate commerce prohihited or their use could he severely
restricted or limited by strict safE'guards.
The Committee could recommE'nd greater accountability of the Bureau
within the executive branch or m'ersight by the Congress. It could also limit
the tenure of any Bureau director or make his reappointment subject to substantial
scrutiny by the Senate through its right to Advise and Consent.
I hope the Committee will not recommend Draconian measures. They are
not necessary; they would not work.
The nub of the problems you have disclosed as I see it, is the historical
accident of .J. Edgar Hoover-a man of great dedication and great talent who
built an insignificant law enforcement agency into the powerful Federal Bureau
of Investigation. He was able to do this not only because of his unquestioned
abilities, but also because he became Director at the threshold of the explosive
growth of federal government; because of prohibition: because of 'Vorld War
II with its internal security demands; and because the Cold War continued
and expanded those demands vis-a-vis the Communist Party. For almost half
a century marked by increasing demands on federal law enforcement. Mr.
Hoover headed the FBI. In doing so he became one of the most respected and
feared men in American history.
Thus. my view is that even if this Committee did nothing beyond what it has
already done through puhlic exposure, the odds against an~- future Director
achieving the political power and political autonomy of Mr. Hoover are overWhe'ming.
In demonstrating the dangers of permitting that power and prestige
over such an extended period even to a principled man-and Mr. Hoover wasthe
Committee has performed a significant public service.
My own philosophy of government is to place responsibility for the faithful
execution of the laws squarel~- when' the Constitution places it-on the President.
This principle is promoted when the President is responsible for the conduct
of Executive Departments and Agencies through his appointments and
through the ahility of Department heads to run and control their D('})artments.
The more Congress intrudes on Executive decision in non-legislative ways. the
more it not only destroys the Executive's ability to faithfully carry out the laws
hut "Iso diffuses governmental responsihility.
In short. I believe--despite the e,ents of recent years-in a strong Executive.
T helieY(' our political system has-and has demonstrated-the capability to
hold him responsible for the performance of his Constitutional duties.
1 For commnnlcatlon, pnrpo,e,. it w,," my con,l,tl'nt practlcl' to hI' ml't hy Rnrl'au aA'l'nt,
,,,henpl'pr T tra""I",]' In addition. I kl'ot the Whltp Rou,1' oOl'rator Informl'd of how to rpurh
IIlp at all time,. On thl' fir,t orra'ion. I Il'ft my offirl' for a fllA'ht to ChiraA'o at 2 ::10 n.m. anrl
"·a,. as a orartlral mattpr. una\'alJah]p to thp Rureau onl" <lurlnll thl' two-hour fiillht. On
thp 'eron<l orpa'ion. I Il'ft my officI' at 12 ::15 n.m. for a onl'-hour filA'ht to ",,"pw York. an<l wa'
,imllarlv unavalJahll' only durinA' thl' fllllht. On thp third ocea,lon. I ",a' in my Wa,hlnA'ton
offiee all dar. and wa' thus alwars u"allahle to the Bureau.
213
In the final analysis, I hope the Committee will recognize that decent law enforcement
is almost always less a matter of legislative proscription than the
judgment-right or wrong in retrospect---of people. It is extraordinarily hard to
legislate judgment; it is not so hard to legislate responsibility.
I have said some harsh things about Mr. Hoover. There are many more good
things that could be said about him personally and about the remarkable service
he gave to this nation. He did build from modest beginnings the best and most
principled law enforcement agency in the world. I will accept every wart the
committee has uncovered and without condoning those activities-and accepting
that there may be more-feel that the positive achievements of Mr. Hoover and
the l<'BI should endure.
There is, I think, a note of sadness on which I should conclude. Mr. Hoover
sl'rwd with distinction, but he served too long. That was the fault of others and
of circumstance. Certainly those who had recent contact with him knew that
age increasingly impactl'd his judgment. We all-the Presidents, the Congress,
the Attorneys Gl'neral, the press and many segments of the pUblic-knew that
and yet he stayed on struggling against change and the future.
I hope the Committee will \wigh the grl'at service he gave this Nation and
the great institution he created and dedicated to the public interest favorably
against what I regard as largl'ly the transgressions of an elderly man who served
with great distinction; but too long.
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
XOVD1BER 12, 1975
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I understand that my testimony
today is to deal primarily with the investigation by the FBI of the Ku Klux Klan.
Since the only investigations with which I am familiar occurred about 10 years
ago, I think that a brief statement putting those investigations into the context
of that time would be useful to the Committee. In my opinion they have nothing
to do with any abuse of governmental power.
Let me say at the outset that the Bureau did, to my certain knowledge, investigatl',
penetrate and disrupt activities of the Ku Klux Klan. It did so
vigorously, actively, overtly and with outstanding success. In fact, I believe fuat
the Bureau's thorough and unceasing investigation, and the Department's
prosecution of Klan activities, was one of the major factors in bringing to an
end the Klan's criminal conspiracy of violence that scourged the South, especially
)1ississippi, in the middle 1960's. Let me also say as emphatically as I can that
our concern aliout the Klan was not related to its political activities or its social
action programs, distasteful as they were to those of us who believe in racial
equality. Our concern was with the Klan as a secret criminal conspiracy with
pnormous power, especially in rural areas of the South, that both advocated and
employed violent methods. Its members have been tried and convicted for such
atrocities as murder, arson, felonious assault and kidnapping.
Its violence was far from anything "theoretical" protected liy the First
Amendment. It was actual, real, brutal and would have been-but for the FBI
and the Departml'nt of Justice--effective in its denial of constitutional rights
through violence and intimidation.
The Committee will recall that in the early 1960's the Civil Rights Division
of the Department of Justice was actively engaged in I'fforts to secure compliance
with the Ch'il Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, paying special attention
to voter registration activities.
Voter registration activities were then relatively new to the Department.
and of course were uncharted waters to the FBI. In retrospect, I lielieve that
for some time the FBI failed to devote sufficient resources to that effort, and
jurisdictional friction hetween the Department and the Bureau rendered our
efforts less effective than they might ha\'e lieen. Such activities were, however,
uot only new to the Bureau, but theJ' were quite differl'nt from typical criminal
invl'stigations in which the Bureau excl'lled.
As a consequence, neither the Dl'partment nor the Bureau fully appreciated
the significance or imleed the genl'sis of the repeated acts of violence and bloodshed
lieing committed ever more frequently throughout the South on blacks and
eivil rights workers. As the aetivities of civil rights groups increased, so too
did opposition to them. One was lawfUl; one was unlawful; one was peaceful:
one was violent.
The Burl'au was badly understaffed in the South, and much of its information
ahout the ever increasing violent episodl's in the South came from indirl'ct
sourcl'S, such as clerg~', I'ducators. students and the likl'. Morl'over. bl'cause
local law enforcement organizations-the traditional first line of dl'fense
against (and the Bureau's primary source of information ahout) such violence-were
infiltrated by the very persons who were rl'sponsible for much of the
214
violence, the net effect was that there was in many sections of the South a
total absence of any law enforcement whatsoever.
By the ~pring of 1964, incidents of violence in ~lississippi, parts of Georgia,
Alabama and Louisiana reached truly alarming proportions. In :\1ississippi
alone there were more than 50 fire lJombings, shootings, lJeatings and killingsall
aimed at lawful Civil Rights activities-in the first few months of 1964.
Local law enforcement officials were powerless-or unwilling-to stop the
bloodletting.
Two things became apparent to us in those months. First, the episodes were
not random. They were part of a conscious campaign-a criminal conspiracy,
and our information pointed directly to the Klan. Second, they were directed
almost entirely at black citizens and civil rights workers whose goal was to
exercise the rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution and the laws of this
country. Tilus, the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute these wanton
violations of civil rig-hts fell sfjuarely to the FBI and to tile Department, under
18 U.S.C., Section 241 and Section 242. (In addition, the "Summer Project"the
influx of young people into the South-was a tremendous concern to all of
us in the Department.)
Federal efforts, already under way, did not crystallize until June 21, 1964,
the day that three young civil rights workers, Goodman, Chaney and Sclnverner,
were brutally murdered in Neshoba County, l\Iississippi. Those murders, later
characterized by a Federal Court of Appeals as a "calculated, cold-blooded,
merciless plot", shocked the nation. They also sent the Department of Justice
into action in an investigation that I think was probably unparalleled for its
thoroughness, vigor and success.
The murders were traced to an organization known as the ·White Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi. The White Knights, organized just five
months earlier, had as their stated goal, to protect and promote white supremacy
and segregation of races, with violence if necessary. In the months between
February and June 1964, Klaverns were established in at least 29 Mississippi
counties, and repeated acts of violence, including other murders, were traced
to the 'Vhite Knights during that period.
The situation seemed uncontrollable, and it deteriorated daily. In early
June, 1964-before the murders-Attorney General Kennedy had written to
President Johnson about the Mississippi situation:
"In addition, it seems to me that consideration should be given by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to a new procedure for identification of the individuals
who may be or have been involved in acts of terrorism. and of the possible participation
in such acts by law enforcement officials or at least their toleration of
terrorist activities. In the past the procedures used by the Bureau for gaining
information on known local Klan groups have been successful in many places,
and the information gathering techniques used br the Bureau on Communists or
Communist related organizations have of course been spectacularly efficient.
"The unique difficultr as it seems to me to be presented by the situation in
Mississippi (which is duplicated in parts of Alabama and Louisiana at least) is
in gathering information on fundamentally lawless activities whch have the
sanction of local law enforcement agenc}es, political officials and a substantial
segment of the white population. The techniques followed in the use of specially
trained, ~;pecinl assignment agents in the infiltration of Communist groups should
be of value. If you approve, it might be desirable to take up with the Bureau the
possibility of developing a similar effort to meet this new problem."
Acting on his own, Kenned~' sent a team of experienced criminal lawyers from
the Department of Justice to Mississippi for a first-hand report on the growing
violence. The President, in total agreement with the Attorney General, directed
a full-scale FBI im'estigation of the lIIurders of Goodman, Chaner and Sch,,'erner.
Working closely with )Ir. I\:ennedy, and using all the powers of his office, he
asked Allen Dulles to confer immediately with Mississippi officials as his personal
emissary. On June 23, ~Ir. Hoover sent Inspector .Joseph Sullivan, one of the
toughest and most experienced agents in the Bureau, to Mississippi, and the
next day, sent Assistant Director Al Rosen to join him.
When :\Ir. Dulles returned to 'Yashington two or three days later. he rl'commended
a far greater :Federal law enforcement presence in :\lississippi. It is also
my belief, and that of my colleagues in the Department, that Inspector Sullivan
made a similar recolllmendation to the Director, and that he was highly critical
of the Bureau's performancp to date in :\Iississippi. In any ewnt, at the dir{'('t
requl'st of President .Johnson, :\Ir. Hoover flew to :\Iississippi on .Jul~· 10, opened
an FBI field office in Jackson, :\Iississippi. and announced that the number of
215
FBI agents in :\lississippi had been increased from a very few-less than tento
over 150. :\IOst of those agents ,vorked around the dock Oil the Xesholm Count~·
(·ase. Hoo\'t'r also appointed Ho~' :\loon" another experienced, tough, top-flight
agent, as slleciai agent in charge of the Jackson ollic\'. Because of the Bureau's
typical passion for indh'idual allollYlnity, those two gentlelllen-Sullh'an and
:\loore-have never been accorded the recognition due them.
The Bureau did in fact crack the case. The Committee will undoubtedly recall
the grisly details of the tliscovery of the lJurned-out station wagon, the deCOUlIHJsed
lmdles buried under an earthen dam, and the arrest and conviction of those
responsible, including a deputy sheriff and ultimately the Imperial Wizard of
the White Knights.
I refer to that case in some detail not because it represented a high mark in
the Bureau's long list of outstanding criminal inYestigations---which it did-but
because it commenced amI tnJified. I believe, the Bureau's successfUl "war"
against the criminal elements of the Ku Klux Klan.
During that investigation, because of that investigation and as an integral
part of that investigation, the criminal conspiracy was indeed penetrated and
<lisrupted. Because there was so littlc physical cvidence-for months we could
not even find the bodies-a full scale investigation of the Klan was mandated.
Agents of the FBI interrogated and reinterrogated every lmown member of the
Klan in :\Iississippi. :\Iany were openly followed, using surveillance techniques
that the Bureau had de,'eloped in connection with organized crime cases. We
learned more about the Klan activities in those months than we had known in
years. I have no doubt that as an integral part of that investigation, members
of the Klan on whom we were focusing our efforts became disoriented, distrustful
of other members, and ultimately persuaded that cooperation with the ubiquitous
E'BI agents was the only safe recourse.
That case could not have been solved without acquiring informants who were
highly placed members of the Klan. Whereas before the murder, the Bureau
had few such informants. as the conspiracy began to fall apart, due to FBI
pressure, many Klansmen became frightened and began to pass on valuable
information to the FBI. This took time; in fact Imperial Wizard Sam Bowers,
who was sentenced to ten years in prison for his role in the killing, was not
even indicted until February, 1967-21;2 years after the bodies had been discovered.
Let me be quite direct. I have no doubt that the Bureau's investigation of the
criminal activities of the Klan was tough, intensive, harassing and thorough.
I expected no less, the President asked for no less, and the Nation deserved no
less.
But let me also distinguish as forcefully as I can the Bureau's efforts against
the Klan from any disruption of groups composed of ordinary citizens seeking
only to exercise their Constitutional rights. This situation was the precise opposite
of that situation.
Klansmen in Mississippi-the Klan leadership-were not ordinary citizens.
They were lawbreakers of the most vicious sort-terrorists who intimidated.
hombed, hurned and killed, often under the watchful and protective eyes of
theirlJrethren in the local law enforcement agencies. In the words of Judge
.John ~[jnor Wisdom, for a three judge Federal Court:
"The compulsion within the Klan to engage in this unlawful conduct is inherent
in the nature of the Klan. This is its ineradicahle evil.
"We find that to attain its ends, the Klan exploits the forces of hate, prejudice
and ignorance. \Ye find that the Klan relies on systematic economic coercion.
varieties of intimidation. and physical violence in attempting to frustrate the
national policy expressed in ci"i\ rights legislation. \Ve find that the Klansmen,
whether eloaked and hooded as memhers of the Original Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, or sulking in anonymity as members of a sham organization, 'The AntiCommunist
Christian .\ssociation,' or hrazenly resorting to "iolence on the
open streets of Bogalusa, are a 'fearful conspiracy against society - - -[holding]
men silent hy thp tprror of [thpir ads] aUfl [their] power for evil'." United
State8 v. Original Knight.~ of the KlI KlllJ' Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330 (E. D. La. 1965)
\Ye should he justly proud of the Bureau's efforts in smashing the Klan's
criminal conspiracy of terror and violence and bringing so many of its members
to the har of justice.
This Bureau preseucp and Bnrpan activities-and Department prosecutionsdid
not. hy any means. put an end to Violence. That took time. Rut it did solve
the Schwerner, Chaney, Goodman murder case; it did result in the quick appre.
66-077 0 - 76 - 15
216
hension of the murderers of ~Irs. Liuzzo in the fall of 1964. and those of Vernon
Dehmer and others later; as the pace of violence in Forest County, Pike County.
Greenwood. :.\IcComl.J, Bo~alusa and innumerahle other places picked up, so
too did the Bureau activity. Acts of violence and terror by the Klan wer(' s('en
and exposed to legal process for ,vhat tlwy were. raw criminal conduct. :.\Iassiye
investi~ations by the FBI, resultin~ in arrests and convictions hy the score
throughout tlw South, was an important ey('nt in our history. It was. as I ha'-e
said, a magnificent performance and one the Bureau should be proud of. I
certainly am.
Mr. KATZEXBACJI. This committee has publicly exposed activities of
the FBI ,vhich were unlawful, grossly improper. and a clear abuse of
governmental authority. According to the testimony before this committE'E',
some of those activities took place while I was Attonwy General
or Deputy Attorney GE'neral. I am surprise(l and shocked by some
of these activities, particularly those which reflect an effort to discredit
Dr. Martin Luther King, .J r. Those aetivities ,vere unlawful and
reprehensible and should be condemned by this committee. My surprise
and shock stems from the fact that these activites occurred with
the apparent knowledge and approval of .J. Edgar Hoover rather
than from the fact that 1, as Attorney General or Deputy Attorney
General, was unaware of them. )fr. Hoowr dedicated his lifE' to building
a Federal Bureau of Investigation which enjoyed a great and deserved
reputation for integrity. dficiency, and dedication to public
sen-ice. I would not have expected him to risk the Bureau's reputation-
his life's work-by resorting to unlawful or improper taetics.
I was aware of the fact that the Director held political views far
more conservati,-e than my own or those of the administrations which
I sen-eel. I knew that on occasion he promoted those views on the Hill
without consultation with me, and sometimes in opposition to administration
policy. I knew the intensity of his views on the dangers of
Communism, on the decline of moral standards, on the evils of permissiwness,
on the lack of respect for law and order. I knew also that
as Mr. Hoover grew older and the country changed-for the worse,
in his view-the intensity of those feE' lings and his frustration at what
was taking place grew. I knew too that Mr. Hoover was extremely
sensitive to any criticism whatsoever, and that he deeply and personally
resented public criticism by civil rights leaders, and especially
that made by Dr. King. I knew all these things, and so, I believe, did
the Congress, the press, and much of the public at large.
'When you look at these activities from the perspective of 1975, I
am surprised at how much ,,,as public information. If one rereads
:Mr. Hoover's testimony in 1968 before the Violence Commission, one
sees what appears to be almost all outline of the COINTEL Program.
I do not suggest, of course, that he revealed publicly those activities
which the committee has uncovered. But I respectfully suggest that
not only Attorneys General, but the Congress and the general public
were on notice as to the general thrust of these activities. In my more
detailed statement I point Ollt the extent of congressional and public
knowle,dge with respect to: domestic intelligence activities, the use of
confidential informants, the ext~nt of FBI files, public knowledge
with reslwct to wiretaps and electronic suneillances, the use of mail
covers, the intensity of the inwstigation of the Ku Klux Klan, and
other matteI'S. The general thrust of the Bureau interests, and the reasons
therefore, were not in any sense secret.
217
Being in the Department of ,Justice I was, perhaps, more aware of
and conscious of tho::;e facts and some of the problem::; the.y raised than
others may have becn. There ,nt::;, especially III the area of civil rights,
a good deal of ten::;ion between the lJirector on the one hand and the
Attorney General an(l hi::; principal as::;istants on the other. 1 was nwy
conscious of the fact. that there wa::; often a lack of candor in relationships
between the Bureau and the Department; that the Bureau was
opposed to many of the views of ~Ir. Kennedy, ~lr. Clark, alltlmyself;
that )11'. Hoover cxpressed views privately, and occasionally publicly,
that were at odd::; with those of the administration; that the Bureau
leaked stories to the press which were embarrassing to me and to my
predecessor. I did occasionallJ' Jlursue those leaks but the Bureau
invariably denied that it was the source. Having said that, let me say
that I did respect the Bureau's reputation for integrity and propriety
in law enforcement matters, awl that it never occurred to me that thll
Bureau would engage in the sort of sustained improper activity wl:ich
it apparently did. .:\loreover, giycn these excesses, I am not surprIsed
that I and others wcre unaware of them. 'Vould it have made sense for
the FBI to sC€k approval for activities of this nature; especially from
Attorneys General who did not share Mr. Hoover's political views,
,vho would not have been in sympathy with the purpose of these attacks,
and who would not have condone(l the methods?
Mr. Hoover was a national hero. I doubt that any Attorney General
after Harlan Fiske Stone could or did fully exercise the control over
the Bureau implied in the formal relationship which made him subordinate
to Attornevs General. Mr. Hoover had great "clout" in Congress
and with Presidents. That position resulted naturally from his
great public reputation and the respect which Members of Congress
and Presidents had for him and the Bureau. I do not think the practices
this committee has brought to light could have been exposed other
than by congressional investigation. And I suggest that a congressional
investigation of the FBI was not a political possibility during Mr.
Hoover's tenure as Director. Mr. Hoover exercised total control over
the Bureau and its personnel and brooked no interference with that
process. ~either the Congress. which always voted the appropriations
he asked, and sometimes more, qUE-stioned that control; no more did
his nominal superior in the Dppartment of ,Justice. Exercising that
control, ~fr. Hoover built the FBI into the finest investigative agency
in the world.
I think the Congress and the general public probably viewed Mr.
Hoover's control m'er the Bureau as a protection against a politically
motivated Attorney General or a politically appointed F.S. Attorney.
"That may haYe been less apprcciated is tIl(' fact that the Bureau was
an extremely important and necessarv resource of the Department and
the key to its success at anv time. Xo Attornev General can carry ori
the work of the Department without the full c'ooperation and sup'port
of the FBI. Animositv between an Attornev General ann the Director
was a losing proposition fol' the work of the Department and for the
sueeess of any administration. as well as fol' the Attorney General involYed.
('pl'tainlv I sou£!ht in man~' ways to avoid, wherpver possible,
too direct a confrontation. )fr. Hom-er was very eonseious of the, fact
that an indepPlHlent FBI would he far more vlilnerable to puhlic suspicion
and puhlie eritieism than one formally under the eontrol of the
218
Attorney General. He would ahvays count on a defense and expression
of confidence by his formal superior. In effect, he was uniquely SuC"
cessful in having it both ways: He was protected from public criticism
by having a theoretical superior who took responsibility for his work,
and was protected from that superior by his public reputation.
Mr. Hoover was a permanent fixture in the Government; Attorneys
General, in fact 18 of them. came and went. Surely he must, with some
justification, have regarded Attorneys General as rank amateurs in
the investigative techniques in \vhich the Bureau was so expert. 1Vhile
he was enormously sensitive to any accusation that a particular investigative
activity was not authorized by the Department, this did
not mean the incumbent Attorney General or any of his principal
subordinates knew of that activity. ~fr. Hoover was satisfied if the
Bureau at any time had been autliorized by any Attorney General to
conduct a particular activity in any circumstance whatsoever. Perhaps
to the head of a large bureaucracy in which Attorneys General
come and go this is a reasonable way of proceeding. But there is simply
no wayan incoming Attorney General can or should be charged
with endorsing every decision of every predecessor, and particularly
those decisions which even the predecessor did not know he was making.
And, as the committee has discovered, Mr. Hoover, especially in
later years, went beyond any semblance of authorization. The Bureau
constantly resorted to terms of art. or euphemisms, without bothering
to inform the Attorney General that they were terms of art. I don't
think it is excessively naive to assume that a "highly reliable informant"
is precisely that, and not a microphone surveillance. I don't think
that the Nation's chief law enforcement officer is or ought to be involved
in a guessing game, particularly without being told the rules.
I don't wish to belabor this point, but I most strongly urge that the
committee review my correspondence with the Director on the occasion
of the Justice Department's filings in the Supreme Court in the Black
case in 1966. It was at that time that I became dramatically aware of
the lengths to which the Bureau would go in trying to justify its authority.
My correspondence with Mr. Hoover at that time unavoidably
became a bitter one, and it persuaded me that I could no longer effectively
serve as Attorney General because of Mr. Hoover's obvious
resentment toward me.
My prepared statement then turns to the three subjects in which the
committee has expre&'ied a particular interest. I have discussed these
in considerable detail, and I ha\"e made every effort to insure my recollection
is as accurate as it can be. But. despite the effort and time involved
in trying to reconstruct events of 10 years ago from very limited
resources, I can make no claim that my recollection is complete or
in all cases precisely accurate. It is simply my best recollection.
I discuss first the opening of mail. a program as to which. I am virtually
certain, I had no knO\vledge. The press, and perhaps the committee
staff, has mistakenly drawn the inference from certain internal
memorandllms of the FBr'that I was aware of this program. My statement
discusses these memorandums in detai1.I do not recall any such
program and had I been aware of it, I am sure that I would recall it
since I would not have tolerated it.
The second subject I discuss in some detail is the Ku Klux Klan and
the outstandingly successful investigation which the Bureau conducted
219
in that regard. I say that I did not then and do not now regard the
Bureau's program with respect to the Klan as in any sense comparable
to so-called "counterintelligenc€" programs. The Klan program involycd
the inycstigation and prosecution of members of organizations
who had engaged In and ,,-ho were committed to the violent deprivation
of constitutionally guaranteed rights of others through murder,
kidnappings. beatings, and threats of violence-all in contraycntion of
Federal and State la,vs. If you 'Yill remember for a moment the names
of Lemuel Penn, Yiola Liuzzo, Yernon Dahmer, Medgar Evers.
James Chancy, Andrew Goodman. ::\lichael Sclnverner, and the bombings
and beatings that became so frequent in the mid-1960's, you may
lwrceiyc the (litl'erpnc€s as clearly as I did then. The FBI did a magnificent
job in ::\lississippi and parts of Alabama and Louisiana in
bringing to justice the perpetrators of those acts. To equate such efforts
,yith sUI'\'eillance or harassment of persons exercising constitutionally
guaranteed rights is. in my ,-iew, unmitigated nonsense.
Third. I discuss what I knew about the wiretaps, bugs, and other
sun-eillance with respect to Dr. ':Uartin Luther King, .Jr. I point out
the tension between the Department and the Bureau with respect to
the civil rights movement, a tension which increased as civil rights
leaders, especially Dr. King, were publicly critical of Mr. Hoover and
the Bureau. I have tried to describe fully all my knowledge about taps
and bugs on Dr. King, including my order to terminate a tap on
his home phone and the BurMU'S alleged after-the-fact advices about
three subsequent overnight bugs of Dr. King's hotel rooms, without
prior authorization. It is important here, as with the Klan investigation,
for the committee to recall the eycnts of that time and the tremendous
stake the Xation had in preycnting civil strife and Dr. King's
important contribution through his commitment to nonviolence. In
this cont€xt, Mr. Hoover's capitulation to personal pique stemming
from public criticism of the FBI was pali.icularly reprehensible, and
clearly contrary to the interest of Presidents Kennedy and .Johnson,
constitutional goycrnment, and the Xation. His ycndetta against Dr.
King. if successful, could have led to civil st·rife of frightening
magnitude.
::\ly conclusion. aftf'!' hearing what information I have and that
revealed by the committee hearings to daJe, is that the problems which
the committee. has disclosed rest more with the historical accident of
.J. Edgar Hoover-a man of great dedication and great talent who
built. an insignificant la,y enforcement agency into tne powerful Fed('
ral Bureau of Investigation-than they do with the need for much
legislation to pren'nt future abusps. It is my view that if the committee
did nothing more than it has already done through public exposure,
the odds against any futnrp Director achieving til(' political power
and political autonomy of )lr. Hooycr arc on>l'\yhelming. In demon:
ot.rating the dangel'S of pPl1nitting that power and prestige over such
an extended pm'iocI of tin1f' eYen for a l))'incipled man. and Mr. Hooycr
was. the committe('. has performed a significant public service.
::\11'. Hom-el' built from modest beginning the ])('st and most. principled
law enforcement agpncy in the ,yodd. That should not be forgotten.
Thprdore. I conclude with a note of sadness. I believe that
)[1'. Hoon>r sen-ed with distinction but hp sPITPd too long. That was
the fault of others and of circumstance. Certainly those who had
220
recent contact with him knew that age increasingly impacrod his
judgment. 1Ve all-the Presidents~ the Congress, the Attorneys General,
the press and many segments of the public-knew that, and yet
he stayed on struggling against change and the future. I hope the
committee will weigh the great service he ga\"c this Kation and the
great institution he created and dedicated to the public interest favorably
against what I regard as largely the transgressions of an elderly
man who served with distinction, hut too long.
Senator TOWER. Thank you~ Mr. Katzenbach. Mr. Clark, we have
your complete statement. You may summarize it or read it in its
entirety as you choose. In any case, it will be printed in full in the
record.
TESTIMONY OF RAMSEY CLARK
)Ir. CLARK. Thank you. )11'. Chairman.
I ask that my 7-page statement be put into the record and I make a
few cOlllments so we can get on with the questioning.
It seems like we ha ,-e been through an intolerable series of revelations
of GO\'ernment misconduct. As we approach our 200th anninrsary.
I hope we will renwmber that freedom made this country
possible. and freedom has been our credo, and that we will act with
strength and determination now to see that we can begin our third
century in freedom. It has been imperiled, I believe, by Government
misconduct.
I served 8 years in the Department of .Justice, beginning with the
Kennedy administration and ending at the end of the Johnson administration.
I was no stranger to the Department. ",Vhen I first officially
entered therl', I padded the halls as a 9-year-old kid beside my father.
I love the place. I believe its importance in our social fabric is enormous.
I belie\"e it is a durable instltution~but I believe it needs help, and
I think the Congress must be a principal source of that help.
I ha\"e sadly come to the conclusion that the revelations regarding
the FBI and other governmental activities concerning Dr..Martin
Luther King.•J1'., require the creation of a national commission, not
legislative, not executive, although it certainly could contain members
of both of those branches. hut ill\'olving the people.
I think we have a crisis~ among other things, in credibility. I would
like to see people on this commission who were close to Dr. King, who
belie\"ed in his moral leadership and participated in his movement.
la\vyers from his past~ people \dlO worked with him, like Congressman
Andy Young, many others. broad based.
I think the commission should han the power to compel testimony
to subpena witnesses and documents. I do not helieve we can afford to
leaw a stone unturned in exposing for the scrntiny of a democratic
society ewry activity of gOH>rnment that related to Dr. King. to his
frielllis. his associates. his church, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference. anv of his acti\'ities. to his work.
That is a sa~l thing for me to ha\"e to recommend. I was Attorney
General \dwn Dr. King was mmdered. I followed that inwstigation
more carefully than any ilwestigation while I was Attorney General.
I had confidpllce at the time that we \\'('I'e doing ewrything that could
be dOll(' to detPl'Inine tIll' facts. Hut Illy confidence and my judgment
don't mattel'. The confidence and tIll' judgment of the people is
imperative.

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