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13
was begun. It made use 0:£ virtually all the media within Chile and
placed and replayed items in the international press as well. Propaganda
placements were achieved through subsidizing rightwmg
women's and civic action groups. Previously developed assets in the
Chilean press were used as well. As in 1964, propaganda was used
in a scare campaign. An Allende victory was equated with violence
and Stalinist repression. Sign-painting teams were instructed to
paint slogans on walls evoking images of Communist firing squads.
Posters warned that an Allende victory in Chile would mean thE' end
of religion and family life.
Unlike 1964, however, the 1970 operation did not involve extensive
public opinion polling, grass roots organizing, or, as previously mentioned,
direct funding of any candidate. The CIA fundpd only one
political group during the 1970 campaign. This was an effort to
reduce the number of Radical Party votes for Allende.
The CIA's spoiling operation did not succeed. On September 4,
Allende won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election. He received
36 percent of the vote; the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, received 35
J?ercent of the vote. Since no candidate had received a majority, a
Joint session of the Chilean Congress was required to decide between
the first- and second-place finishers. The date set for the joint session
was October 24.
Now we will turn to the period between Allende's plurality victory
and the congressional election. Mr. Treverton will go into thIS period.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY F. TREVERTON, PROFESSIONAL STAFF
MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
Mr. Tm:VERTON. Thank you.
The reaction in Washinghm to Allende's victory was immediate. The
40 Committee met on September 8 and 14, to discuss what action should
be taken. On September 15, President Nixon met with Richard Helms,
Henry Kissinger, and John Mitchell at the White House. U.S. Government
actions proceeding along two separate but related tracks.
Track I, as it came to be called, aimed to induce President Frei to act
to prevent Allende from being seated. Track I included an anti-Allende
propaganda campaign, economic pressures and a $2.50,000 contingency
fund to be used at the Ambassador's discretic,n in support of projects
which Frei and his associates deemed important in attempting to influence
the outcome of the October 24 congressional vote. However, the
idea of bribing Chilean Congressmen to vote for Alessandri-the only
idea for use of this contingency fund which arose-was immediately
seen to be unworkable. The $250,000 fund was never spent.
Track II, as it was called by those inside the U.S. Government who
knew of its existence, was touched off by the President's September 15
instruction to the CIA. It is the subject of the Schneider portion of
the committ{,R's recent Report on Alleg-ed Assassinations. I will merely
summarize Track II here.
Track II was to be run without the knowledge of the Ambassador,
or the Departments of State and Defense. Richard Helms' handwritten
67-116 () - 7fi • 2
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notes of the meeting with the President [exhibit 2 1] convey the flavor
of that meeting. I will quote from his note :
"One-in-ten chance perhaps, but save Chile.
"Not concerned risks involved.
"No involvement of Embassy.
"Ten million dollars available, more if necessary.
"Full-time job-best men we have.
"Make the economy scream."
Between October 5 and October 20, the CIA made 21 contacts with
key military and police officials in Chile. Coup plotters were given
assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government
both before and a~r a coup. The CIA knew that the coup plans
of all the various conspirators included the removal from the scene of
Chilean Gen. Rene Schneider, the Chief of Staff of the Army and
a man who opposed any coup. CIA officials passed three submachine
guns to two Chilean officers on October 22. Later that day, General
Schneider was mortally wounded in an abortive kidnap attempt. However,
the group which received CIA weapons was not the same group
as the one which carried off the abortive kidnaping of Schneider.
Along the other line of covert action, Track I, the U.S. Government
considered a variety of means considered as constitutional or quasiconstitutional
to prevent Allende from taking office. One of these was
to induce the Christian Democrats to vote on October 24 for Alessandri
instead of Allende, who finished in first place, with Alessandri to
promise to resign immediately, thereby paving the way for new Presidential
elections in which Frei would be a legitimate candidate.
Another scheme considered by the government was to persuade
Frei to step down, permitting the military to take power.
Both the anti-Allende propaganda campaign and the program of
economic pressure were intended to support these efforts to prevent
Allende's acee,Ssion to power. The propaganda campaign focused on
the ills that would befall Chile should Allende be elected, while the economic
offensives were intended to preview those ills and demonstrate
the foreign economic reaction to an Allende presidency.
A few examples: .Journalist-agents traveled to Chile for on-thescene
reporting; by September 28, the CIA had journalists from 10
different countries in, or en route to, Chile. The CIA placed individual
propaganda news items, financed a small newspaper, and engaged in
other propaganda activities.
Finally, the CIA gave special intelligence briefings to U.S. journalists.
For example. Time magazine requested and received a CIA briefing
on the situation in Chile, and, according to the CIA, the basic
thrust and timing of the Time story on Allende's victory were changed
as a result of the briefing.
In the end, of course. neither Track I nor Track II achieved its aim.
On October 24, the Chilean Congress voted 153 to 35 to elect Allende.
On November 4. he was inaugurated. U.S. efforts, both overt and covert,
to prevent his assumption of office had failed.
Now let me turn to covert action between 1970 and 1973. As Mr. Miller
mentioned a moment ago. is his 1971 state of the world message,
President Nixon announced: "\Ve're prepared to have the kind of re-
1 see p. 9fl.
15
la~ionship w~th the Chilean Gover~ment that it is prepared to have
WIt~ us." ThIS cool but correct pubhc posture was articulated by other
semor officials. Yet, public pronouncements notwithstanding, after
Allende's inauguration, the 40 Committee approved a total of $7 million
in covert support to opposition groups in Chile. That money also
funded an extensive anti-Allende propaganda campaign.
The general goal of United States covert action toward Allende's
Chile was to maximize pressures on his government to prevent its
internal consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary
to U.S. interests in the hemisphere. That objective was stated
clearly in a Presidential decision issued in early November 1970. U.S.
policy was designed to frustrate Allende's experiment in the Western
Hemisphere and thus limit its attractiveness as a model; there was a
determination to sustain the principle of compensation for U.S. firms
nationalized by the Allende government.
Throughout the Allende years, but especially after the first year of
his government, the American Government's best intelligence-National
Intelligence Estimates, prepared by the entire intelligence community-
made clear that the more extreme fears about the effects of
Allende's election were not well-founded. There was, for example,
never a significant threat of a Soviet military presence in Chile, and
Allende was little more hospitable to activist exiles from other Latin
American countries than had been his predecessor, Eduardo Frei.
Nevertheless, those fears, sometimes exaggerated, appeared to have
activated officials in Washington.
Covert action formed one of a triad of official American actions
toward Chile. Covert action supported a vigorous opposition to
Allende, while the "correct but cool" overt posture denied the Allende
government a handy foreign enemy to use as a rallying point. The
third line of U.S. action was economic. The United States did what it
could to put economic pressure on Chile and encourage other nations to
adopt similar policies.
The subject of this report is covert action, but those operations did
not take place in a vacuum. It is worth spending a moment to describe
the economic pressures, overt and covert, which were applied
simultaneously. The United States cut off further new economic aid
to Chile, denied credits, and made partially successful efforts to enlist
the cooperation of international financial institutions and private
firms in tightening the economic squeeze on Chile.
Now to turn to the effort of covert action itself. More than half of
the 40 Committee-approved funds supported the opposition political
parties in Chile: the Christian Democratic Party, the National Party,
and several splinter groups. CIA funds enabled the major opposition
parties to purchase their own radio stations and newspapers. All
opposition parties were passed money prior to the April 1971 municipal
elections, the March 1973 congressional elections, and periodic
by-elections. Covert support also enabled the parties to maintain a
vigorous anti-Allende propaganda campaign throughout the Allende
years.
Besides funding political parties, the 40 Committee approved large
amounts to sustain opposition media and thus to maintain a largescale
propaganda campaign.
16
As mentioned before, $1% million went to one opposition publication
alone, the major Santiago newspaper, EI Mercurio, Chile's oldest
newspaper. The U.S. Government calculated that EI Mercurio,
under pressure from the Allende government, would not survive without
covert U.S. support. At the same time, however, CIA documents
acknowledged that only EI Mercurio, and to a lesser extent, the papers
belonging to the opposition parties were under severe pressure from
the Chilean Government. Freedom of the press continued in Chile
until the military coup in 1973.
Let me say just a word about two specific topics which have been the
subject of great public interest: The first of these is U.S. relations with
private sector opposition groups during the Allende years; the other
is United States actions vis-a-vis the Chilean military. Covert support
for private sector groups was a sensitive issue for the U.S. Government
during this period because some of these groups were involved with
anti-Government strikes and were known to agitate for a military intervention.
In September 1972. the 40 Committee authorized $24,000
for "emergency support" of a powerful businessmen's organization.
At the same time, the 40 Committee decided against financial support
to other private sector organizations because of their possible involvement
in anti-Government strikes. In October 1972, the 40 Committee
approved $100,000 for three private sector groups, but, according to
the CIA, this money was earmarked only for activities in support of
opposition candidates in the March 1973 congressional elections. On
August 20, 1973, the 40 Committee approved further money for private
sector groups, but that money was dependent on the approval of the
U.S. Ambassador and Department of State, and none of these funds
were passed before the military conp.
American decisions during this period suggest a careful distinction
between supporting oppositIOn groups on one hand and aiding elements
trying to bring about a military coup on the other. But, given
the turbulent conditions in Chile, such a distinction was difficult to
sustain. There were many close links among the opposition political
parties, private sector groups, militant trade associations. and the
paramilitary groups of the extreme right. In one instance, a CIAsupported
private sector group passed several thousand dollars to
striking trnck owners. That support was contrary to Agency groundrules,
and the CIA rebuked the group, but nevertheless passed it money
the next month.
With respect to the covert links with the Chilean military during the
Allende years, the basic United States purpose was monitoring coupplotting
within the Chilean military. To that end, the CIA developed
a number of information "assets" at various levels within the Chilean
military. Once this network was in place by September 1971, the CIA
station in Santiago and headquarters in Washington discussed how
it should be used.
At one point, the station in Santiago suggested that the ultimate goal
of its military program was a military solution to the Chilean {>roblem.
But CIA headquarters cautioned that there was no 40 CommIttee approval
for the United States to become involved in coup plotting.
There is no evidence that the United States did become so involved.
Yet several CIA efforts suggest a more active stance than merely
17
collecting- information. One of these operations was a deception operation
involving the passage of information, some of it fabricated by
the CIA, which would alert Chilean officers to real or purported Cuban
involvement in the Chilean Army.
At another point, the CIA station in Santiago provided short-lived
financial support to one small magazine aimed at military officers.
On September 11, 1973. of course, Salvador Allende was toppled by
a military coup. Let me just say several words about Chile since the
coup, and about United States covert action in Chile since that time.
After the coup the military junta moved quickly to consolidate its
political power. Political parties were banned, Congress was put in
indefinite recess, and censorship was instituted. Supporters of Allende
and others deemed opponents of the new regime were jailed, and the
military leader, Augusto Pinochet, indicated that the military might
have to rule Chile for two generations.
The prospects for revival of democracy in Chile have not improved
over the past 2 years. Oharges concerning the violations of civil rights
in Chile persist. Most recently, the Umted Nations report on Chile
charged that torture centers are being operated in Santiago and other
parts of the country. The Pinochet government continues to prevent
international investIgative groups from free movement in Chile, and
in several instances, has not permitted these groups to enter Chile at
all.
After the coup, the United States covert action program in Chile
sank dramatically. 'No major new initiatives were undertaken, and
what projects were continued operated at a low level. These consisted
mainly of maintaining media assets and several other small activities.
During this period, the CIA also renewed its liaison assets with
Chilean Government's security and intelligence forces. However, in
doing so the CIA was sensitive to worries that liaison with such organizations
would open the CIA to charges of political repression, and
the CIA sought to insure that its support for activities designed to
control external subversives was not used on internal subversives as
well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. That concludes the panel
presentation.
There is another vote on the Senate floor. I think this might be a
good time for a brief recess to give the members a chance to return.
[A brief recess was taken.]
The CHAIRMAN. The staff members on the panel have finished their
presentation, and before we go to our next witnesses, Senator Goldwater
has indicated that he has some questions for the panel, and so I
recognize Senator Goldwater for that purpose.
Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Miller, in your presentation, you say the
record examined thus far shows that covert action programs over the
past 30 years have been successful generally against weak nations and
far less so against our major potential enemies. How many cases have
you examined over the past 30 years?
Mr. MILLER. How many cases has the committee staff reviewed?
Well, in depth, Senator, we have done six. We have reviewed in general
terms the entire scale of covert action, both in budgetary terms,
18
geographical coverage, and with some attempt to measure success and
quality.
The reasons for this disparity of success against the major potential
enemies such as the Soviet Union and China I think are fairly
clear. Those nations have very strong aubhoritarian governments. It
is very difficult to collect information there. It is very difficult to
mount operations. It is not the case in the nations which are 'not
authoritarian in structure or do not have such disciplined secret services,
and have a police state that is not as effective as those of the
Soviet Union and China, but I do not think I should go into any
detail in open session.
Senator GOLDWATER. Well, has the committee examined any cases
that involved Soviet Russia or Red China or any other potential strong
adversary~
Mr. MILLER. We have in certain areas. We have had an inquiry into
particularly the areas of counterintelligence, and also the area of
collection.
Senator GOLDWATER. Are you saying we've conducted covert actions
against major potential enemies ?
Mr. MILLER. There have been attempts, particularly in the period
immediately following the end of the Second World War, the beginning
of the cold war.
Senator GOLDWATER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a rather
important statement. I know we cannot discuss it in public, but I would
suggest that proper officials of the CIA be recalled to testify as to what
we have done in this general field. If we are going to pick on Chile
alone as an example of covert action while we have heard testimony
that there have been covert actions against major enemies, I think we
have to look into that also, and I would request that Mr. Bader or any
representative of the CIA be called back to testify as to what we're
talking about when we hear this kind of testimony.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I have no objection to your request of this
committee. As far as I am concerned, I would like to examine all of
these covert actions in the past, because I think so many of them have
been wrong, and our problem is that we cannot get the administration
to agree to any kind of public presentation to any of these operations.
It has only been as a result of very extended efforts that we have been
able to present the Chilean case, to obtain the cooperation of the administration
in a very limited way, with respect to sanitizing the presentation
to protect legitimate security interests of the United States. We've
had no such offer from the administration with respect to any covert
operation.
Senator GOLDWATER. We've heard nothing about any other covert
action such as has been discussed by Mr. Miller. Had we heard of it, I
think the Members on my side would certainly have requested that a
study to be done, and I would suggest that if this team can do as
thorough a job on Chile as they have done, they certainly ought to be
able to do an equally good job on a much larger country such as the
Soviet Union or Red China or any other large potential enemy. I
don't think we can let a statement like this stand.
Now, if Mr. Miller wants to change it, fine. But I don't want to see
this made a matter of public record that we, without saying so, that we
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have conducted covert actions against potential enemies of a large scale.
I think this is wrong.
However, before you start I might say that had we seen Mr. Miller's
statement before he read it, we might have been able to clear this up.
We did not see any statements on this side of the table. We listened
to them, and I think this is the first time in the whole history of this
committee that the minority side has been sort of kept outside the tent.
And I just want to register my J?rotest against that kind of treatment.
If the press is going to be gIven statements that we're not allowed
to see, I've served on these committees before and I can tell you,
when the bell of end comes, that is when it rings. We didn't see the
report until we sat down today. If we're going to have to put up with
that--
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Goldwater, may I simply say that no member
of the committee on either side had the statement. That was an
oversight on the part of the committee. Each member should have had
these statements before every Senator. That is the normal procedure.
That is the procedure that we have followed in the past and will follow
in the future. This was purely an oversight and when it was called
to my attention I immediately asked that the statements be placed
before all members.
Senator GOLDWATER. Well, I would like to have an answer to ml
request that we get a statement from the CIA-if they say they can t
do it, then we're going to have to go higher, to see what we've done
against the Soviets and Red China, because to my knowledge we have
done nothing.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the covert operations have been reviewed in
executive session, all of them, and it has been the objection of the administration
itself that has largely prevented the committee from
developing any more cases in public session than this one, and so I
have no objection to your request, Senator Goldwater, but I would
solicit your help with the administration in hopes that we could clear
the way for a public presentation of other covert actions. But it has
been the opposition of the administration and their refusal to make
witnesses available that has handicapped the committee in this regard.
Senator GOLDWATER. It might have been done in some other administration.
I'd like to find out whether it happened under Kennedy
or Johnson or Nixon or just who was the one that thought they could
perpetrate a covert action upon the Soviets. That's a rather sneaky
task. I'd like to know how they came out, not that I'm opposed to it.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Miller, do you have any further response
to the Senator's Question ~
Mr. MILLER. No; I will endeavor to fulfill Senator Goldwater's
request. I think that is the best response.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Well, while the panel is here, if anybody wants to question members,
please feel free.
Senator Mondale ~
Senator MONDALE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
What do the records show to be the threat that we thought we had
to meet by frustrating and overthrowing Allende ~
Mr. TREVERTON. Let me say a word about that. The question is what
the perception of officials in Washington was.
20
Senator MONDALE. Why did we want to get rid of Allende ~ What
did our specialists say was at stake?
Mr. TREVERToN. There is some difficulty with that question because,
as we pointed out in the report, there is some difference between what
the GovernmenCs intelligence specialists-the national intelligence
estimates-----,Yere sayin~ about Chile and the threat it posed to the
United States and what senior officials apparently believed.
Senator MoNDALE. In other words, this was the apparatus that we
established to collect information and evaluate it, is that right ~
Mr. TREVERToN. That's right. .
Senator MONDALE. What did they say about the threat that Mr. Allende
posed to this country ~
Mr. INDERFURTH. I think the threats perceived by officials had to do
with the presence of the Soviets in Chile and the question of subversion
of other Latin American Governments using Chile as a base. There was
a concern about a movement by Allende, despite the fact that he had
been elected constitutionally, down the road toward a Marxist totalitarian
state.
There was a press conference g-iven September 16, 1970--it was a
background press briefing-in which Dr. Kissinger referred to the irreversibility
of the Chilean election, meaning that it was. doubtful
there would be another free election in Chile.
So I think there were these concerns, as well as economic concerns.
The United States had quite a bit of private capital invested in Chile.
I think these were the motivating factors.
Now, in our examination of the NIE's, over a period of time, the
threat that Allende posed to Chile semed to be less shrill.
Senator MONDALE. On pa~e 229 of our assas..<;ination report the
CIA's Director of Intelligence circulated an intelligence community
assessment on the impact of the Allende government on U.S. national
interest.
Mr. INDERFURTH. That's right.
Senator MONDALE. September 7, 1970. It says that: One, the United
States has no vital national interest in Chile but there could be
some economic losses; two, the world military balance would not be
significantly altered by the Allende government; three, an Allende
victory would create considerable political and psychological cost and
the hemisphere would be threatened by the challen~e of Allende. Is
that right ~
Mr. INDERFURTH. Yes, sir.
Senator MONDALE. So that in terms of this Nation's interest, at least
the 1970 estimate was that it did not directly threaten America.
Mr. INDERFURTH. That's correct.
Senator MONDALE. Now did Mr. Allende ever act in a way which
undermined the democratic procedures established by the constitution
of Chile~
Mr. INDERFURTH. That has been the subject of debate. Charges
have been raised about his opposition to political parties, as well as
his opposition to the media. We have looked into both of those areas
and despite the fear that there would never be another free election
in Chile, there were in fact national elections, municipal elections,
there were congressional elections. trade union elections continued, the
21
political parties survived. Of course today you see there are no political
parties functioning in Chile.
Concerning the press, the record there does indicate that Allende
was exerting some pressure on the opposition press, especially EI
Mercurio. There were instances in which radio stations were closed.
I think the number is three. El :Mercurio itself was closed down for a
day, but the court invalidated that and it was reopened the next day.
There are also charges that the government was attempting to take
over a paper company which was the supplying company for newsprint
in Chile. The government backed off.
The NIE's took note of this growing government domination of
the press, but indicated that EI Mercurio had managed to retain its
indeI*dence and had been able to continue operating. This was in
1971.
In 1972 the NIE stated that the opposition news media in Chile persisted
in denouncing the Allende regime and continued to resist government
intimidation. At no point during Allende's regime was there
press censorship. Of course that is the case today.
So I think the record shows that in some ways he was moving forcefully
to stifle some of the opposition press, but certainly not all.
Senator :MONDALE. In the hearings with :Mr. David Phillips, who
had extensive background and experience in Chile, I asked him
whether it was his judgment that although Allende was :Marxist and
espoused :Marxism, he also wanted to achieve this through the democratic
process, and although there was some rough stuff in the press,
whether that was essentially the course he was pursuing.
Mr. Phillips said-I don't recall what he said but he indeed acted
that way. And I asked :Mr. Phillips if Allende attempted to achieve
his :Marxist philosophy with popular support under the constitutional
system. Mr. Phillips said that, yes; essentially that is true.
:Mr. INDERFURTH. That is the record we have seen. In Chile they
have a term for it, via, pacifica, the peaceful road, which is the road
that Allende had followed. He had run for the presidency fonr times,
each time coming back to try again. And the record is unclear, obviously,
where he would have taken Chile.
Senator :MmwALE. They were afraid that although he had never
made a move by force to take it over, that he might.
Mr. INDERFURTH. That was the concern.
Senator :MONDALE. Even though he'd never done it.
Mr. INDERFURTH. That's right.
Senator :MONDALE. I think :Mr. Kissinger, when we asked him that,
said what we were afraid of was that he would establish a Communist-
dominated dictatorship very similar to Portugal.
:Mr. INDERFURTH. He's used that example as well as Cuba. The fear
of another Cuba in Latin America was very strong.
Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAffiMAN. Senator Hart.
Senator HART of Colorado. I don't know to which member of the
staff to direct the question, but there have been suggestions that a considerable
amount of the money that was funneled into Chile from this
country went into assistance of labor unions, trade unions, in Chile in
support of strike efforts against the Allende government. Could you
provide information to the committee in this regard as to amounts of
22
money and whether substantial amounts did in fact provide covert support
to strikers, particularly between 1971 and 1973 ?
Mr. INDERFURTH. I think the record here is clear, at least at the approval
stag~. We have reviewed the records and there was never a 40
Committee authorization for funding strikers in Chile.
Shortly before the coup there was a CIA recommendation for funding
the strikers. It is unclear whether or not that proposal ever reached
the 40 Committee, but it is clear that the 40 Committee never approved
any funds; 40 Committee approval for funding private sector organizations
is another matter. These organizations were sympathetic to and
in support of the strikers, and on three separate occasions the 40 Committee
did approve funding for these private sector organizations.
The total amount authorized was something over $1 million. The
total amount spent was something around $100,000.
Now these funds were provided with the contingency that they
would not filter down to the strikers, but at least in one instance they
did. The sum was rather small, $2,800. These funds did go through a
private sector organization to a striking group. This was against the
Agency's ground rules for funding strikers. In fact, Nathaniel Davis,
U.S. Ambassador to Chile, and the State Department, had strenuously
objected to any funding of the strikers.
So I think where we come out is that the 40 Committee never approved
any funds. A small amount did, however, filter down.
Whether or not other CIA money that went into private sector operations
or political parties ever made it to the strikers, we have not
been able to determine from the record.
Senator HART of Colorado. Why was there a policy against this assistance
to strikers?
Mr. IXDERFURTH. There's no question that the strikers were creating
the climate in which a military coup appeared to be inevitable. So any
direct assistance to the strikers would be directly heating up, building
up. tension in Chile, which eventually did lead to the coup.
So we would support EI Mercurio and the political parties. But
when you moved into the private sector area, you got closer and closer
to the real tension within the society and eventually to the coup.
So I think that was a concern.
Senator HART of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Do any other Senators desire to ask questions of
the panel. Senator Schweiked
Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. In what time frame did we
start funding EI Mercurio? Do you have any kind of date as to when
we started putting money into El Mercurio as a CIA expenditure?
Mr. TREVERTON. The first funds went to EI Mercurio in the late fall
of 1970 or the early spring of 1971.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Did we previously put money into assets prior
to that period in EI Mercurio?
Mr. TREVERTON. Yes. Part of that period we financed assets-that is,
people who worked for El Mercurio and who received small amounts
of money from the CIA to write or run stories favorable to American
interests.
We had not prior to that time provided substantial support to the
operation of the paper.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And we are not certain when the support for
the operation began, or are we?
Mr. TREVERTON. We are certain. I just don't have it right here in front
of me.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Is it prior to our involvement with going ahead
with the 1970 program against Allende ~ Or don't we have that ~
Mr. TREVERTON. It would have been after Allende's inaugurationthat
is, after the Track I, Track II period, after the election period. It
came in the period after Allende's inauguration. We decided on the
program to support opposition parties and media.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Would it have been before the September 15
meeting in 1970 ~
Mr. TREVERTON. It was after that. It was either November 1970, or
April 1971. Perhaps I can give you the exact date. Perhaps it was as
late as September 1971, so it was surely after the 1970 election period.
Senator SCHWEIKER. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston ~
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I've not heard all the questioning and I hope I'm not repetitious.
In our relationship with the removal and subsequent death of General
Schneider it was not clear that our J?Olicy was that he should not be
done away with. There was no tensIon there, although we were attempting
to foment a coup d'etat to prevent the ascension of Allende
to the presidency. And, I think its important to understand that the
reason that General Schneider had to be removed was that even though
he was not a particular sympathizer with Allende, he was a constitutionalist,
and he believed in his Government's constitution, which subordinated
the military to civilian rule. And because of that, he was not
interested in leading a coup or participating in one.
Is that not accurate ~
Mr. TREVERTON. Yes; those points are correct and well taken.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions of this panel ~ If not, thank
you very much, gentlemen. We will call the next three witnesses, Mr.
Ralph Dungan, Mr. Charles Meyer, and Mr. Edward Korry.
[Pause.]
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, in accordance with the practice of the
committee would you stand and be sworn ~
Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this
proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, SO help you God ~
Mr. KORRY. I do.
Mr. DUNGAN. I do.
Mr. MEYER. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
I understand each of you h&8 an opening statement and perhaps the
logical way to proceed would be chronologically, starting with Mr.
Dungan, please.
TESTIMONY OF RALPH DUWGAN, FORMER UWITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO CHILE
Mr. DUNGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I aP.l?reciate your
invitation to testify in this public hearing on U.S. intellIgence activities
in Chile. You are ultimately interested, I take it, in the question of

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