| Site Map CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS |
|
26 Security Advisor whose sole responsibility would be to monitor intelligence activities of all agencies, especially covert actions. It is apparent to me now and should have been in years past, that the special intricacies of this field and the special responsibility of the President strongly suggests the need for more capability than we had in the early 1960's in the Office of the National Security Adviser. Those who might argue that this arrangement unnecessarily concentrates in the President's Office superoperational power ignore, I believe, the burden which the President bears in this area and his need for capable, informed, and independent judgment. ·While I feel less secure in this suggestion because I do not consider myself an expert in the internal organization and structure of the CIA, I think it worth considering the adverse results which oftentimes flow from the establishment of a permanent organization and cadre of bright, active persons. Like any other bureaucracy, private or public, an established grou!? tends, following the Parkinson principle, to generate work to keep It occupied. Where, as I believe has been the case with CIA, a unit is amply funded and prides itself in being gung ho and capable of response to the most extravagant demands, you have the ingredients of trouble. If you add a degree of ideological bias within the unit and lack of restraint by political authority outside the unit, almost any excess is imaginable. All of this leads me to suggest that a drastic cutback in the number of persons involved both in the field and Washington should be examined. As regards what is now known as DDO, I would venture to say that the elimination of permanent personnel and units dedicated to the perfection of devices or techniques to meet esoteric contingences would go far to eliminate some of the excesses which have crept into the system, and which you have documented very well. I do not maintain that there are some capabilities which should be maintained at the ready, but I suspect that most could be energized as requirements arose and that any delays which might be involved would be beneficial rather than otherwise. I am hopeful that these few remarks may be helpful to the committee, Mr. Chairman, and I stand ready to answer any questions you may have. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Dungan. Mr. Meyer? TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. MEYER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRE· TARY OF STATE FOR INTER·AMERICAN AFFAIRS Mr. MEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators. I am present by your invitation, Mr. Chairman, and as I wrote this on December 3, I hadn't received for study your committee paper on Chile. I had received the published document on alleged assassination. And quite obviously, I hadn't a clue as to the staff statement which I understood would introduce this meeting. My statement, therefore, does not respond to any of the specifics of your Chilean examination except that I am not, have never been, and never expect to be party to assassination. Instead, if I may, I'll simply say that my reason for being here in the context of the long work of your committee is that I believe 27 it is fundamentally of great importance to our country. I know little or nothing of the domestic aspect of your work-I'm focused on the international aspect. I want to start with a bit from the past, an excerpt from a fascinating article in, Smithsonian Magazine of January 1975. The article, by Robert Wallace, is called, in short, "The Barbary Wars." In Washington, Eaton, the U.S. Consul in Tunis, laid before Jefferson a scheme that had been developing among Americans in the Mediterranean for a couple of years. The Bashaw of Tripoli was a usurper, having stolen the throne from an older brother who was now wandering forlornly somewhere in Africa. Eaton proposed to find the brother, give him sympathy and support, and install him as rightful head of state, Jefferson approved the idea and thus was launched the first, although not the last, American effort to overthrow an objectionable foreign ruler and put a cooperative one in his place. Jefferson also chose to have that plot proceed quietly, in twilight. He would send the would-be bashaw, through Eaton, a few artillery pieces and 1,000 small arms. Eaton himself was to be given a vague title-"Navy agent of the United states for Barbary regencies"-and placed under the jurisdiction of the commodore of the Mediterranean squadron. If he could accomplish something, fine. If not, small loss. This issue, resolved by the U.S. Navy in 1815 was piracy against American merchantmen and tribute paid by the U.S.A. It was in modern translation, expropriation with negative compensation. Interestingly, the Barbary Wars story, while unique in its time an,d place, has in it many of the seeds which over 160 years have grown into the forest of U.S. interest versus foreign policy versus practice, which this committee is trying, or so it seems to me, to cut its way through, not just intelligence. Speaking to intelligence, I have to reminisce about visiting President Ken,nedy at his request shortly after the Bay of Pigs. He met me outside the Oval Office door and after hellos from both families, he held his arm next to mine and said, "Hey, look, we're wearing the same suit." I answered, "Not exactly, Mr. President, because I bought mine at X and you bou¥tht yours at Y." He looked at me, paused, smiled wryly and said, 'Charlie, your intelligence is a hell of a lot better than mine." In support of his implication, I understand-and I hope accuratecharacter of an intelligence capability of the highest order as indispensable to the national and vital interests of our country and indeed the free world. If that is correct, the next question is, what do you do with it. And that question cannot be fully answered without concurren~ consideration of the evolution of: The perceived national interests, and the perceived vital interests of our country. The actIons taken in the defense of these interests. The decisionmaking process, both in relation to definition of national and vital interest and in relation to actions taken. All of us know that the Congress has played a large part in the overt decisionmaking process in relation to national interest, and the laws of our land are heavy with overtly interventionist intent. All of us know that an overview linkage has long existed between the Executive and the legislative in the pure intelligence area, designating those on the Hill, by congressional action, who had a "need to know." 28 Therefore, when asked, as I constantly have been, what is the Church committee trying to do, I've replied that I believed that this committee under your chairmanship, Senator Church, was working apolitically toward a responsible mechanism for definition of and defense of the national interest-further, that I thought I knew many of you well enough to be able to discern a high level of concern for the future quality of and maintenance of U.S. moral leadership in concert with the responsibility of political and economic and military preeminence, and in a very tough world. Given the accuracy of that evaluation, and the excellence of the staff work done to date, I have in honesty asked myself the question continuously whether the committee really needs further testimony in depth on any geographical or national area. That is not a question motivated by SYA-but rather by the hope that the formation by new parameters for policy and practice at the dawn of our third century does not require that we throw the baby out with the bath water. You all recognize that any action by the U.S.A.-or even perhaps specifically the action of revelation-ean be destabilizing where least expected. My point is not whitewash but that the staff has information from which to proceed constructively. We three here, as Ralph has already said, and countless others, can be useful in consultation toward a desired end and can be helpful in arriving at answers to the many parts of the great questions your committee has raised, generic questions from the past, but most importanly, questions for the future and not answered easily: Who in our sovereign Nation should define and periodically update our national and vital interests? Who shall be the judge as to whether intelligence collected indicated movements inimical to our interests? What may our sovereign Nation do, if anything, when intelligence is judged to indicate movements inimical to our interests, and who makes that decision? And a question of my own-given the ideal solutions to these questions, what should our Nation do about the kiss-and-tell syndrome which confuses public confession and traitorous action. I wonder if somebody wrote that with an expatriate entrepreneur agent in mind. The future credibility of the U.S.A. will be tough to maintain no matter how high the level of international judiciousness to which we aim if nobody trusts the U.S.A. to keep a shared confidence in confidence or a shared secret in secret. I know that all of you know from career experiences that one of the agonizing processes in any aspect of public life is that of learning what not to disclose. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it has taken me since Thanksgiving Day to compress a kaleidoscopic view of the complex world out there and my 4 years in it into these observations. They are not subjectively motivated, but they do reflect my objective conviction of the great responsibilities you have shouldered. Thank you for your invitation. The CHAIRl\IAX. Thank you, Mr. Meyer, for your statement. We have a vote again. I think we had better stretch so we will hold a brief recess for the vote. [A brief recess was taken.] The CHAIRMAX. The members of the panel will please return.
|