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94TH CONGRESS } 2d Session SEXATE { REPORT Xo.94-755 FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BOOK I FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STl~DY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGEKCE ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES SENATE TOGETHER WITH ADDITIOKAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE VIKWS APRIL 26 (legislative da~', APRIL 14), 1976 69-983 0 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1976 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.35 Stock No. 052-071-00470-0 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Ohairman JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona WAIlTER D. H1JDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania GARY HART, Colorado WILLIA~I G. MILLER, Staff Director FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, Jr., Chief Counsel CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority AUDREY HATRY, Clerk of the Committee (II) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL (By Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 'With Respect to Intelligence Activities) On January 27,1975, the Senate established a Select Committee to conduct an investigation and study of the intelligence activities of the United States. After 15 months of intensive work, I am pleased to submit to the Senate this volume of the Final Report of the Committee relating to foreign and military intelligence. The inquiry arises out of allegations of abuse and improper activities by the intelligence agencies of the United States, and great public concern that the Congress take action to bring the intelligence agencies under the constitutional framework. The members of the Select Committee have worked diligently and in remarkable harmony. I want to express my gratitude to the Vice Chairman, Senator John Tower of Texas, for his cooperation throughout and the able assistance he has given me in directing this most difficult task. While every member of the Committee has made important contributions, I especially want to thank Senator Walter D. Huddleston of Kentucky for the work he has done as Chairman of the ForeiWl and Military Subcommittee. His direction of the Subcommittee, working with Senator Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado and Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, has been of immeasurable help to me in bringing this enormous undertaking to a useful and responsible conclusion. Finally, I wish to thank the staff for the ~Teat service they have performed for the Committee and for the Senate in assisting the members of the Committee to carry out the mandate levied by Senate Resolution 21. The quality, integrity and devotion of the staff has contributed in a significant way to the important analyses, findings and recommendations of the Committee. The volume which follows, the Report on the Foreign and Military Intelligence Activitie8 of the United States, is intended to provide to the Senate the basic information about the intelligence agencies of the Fnited States required to make the necessary judgments concerning the role such agencies should play in the future. Despite security considerations which have limited what can responsibly bp printed for public release the information which is presented in this report is a reasonably complete picture of the intelligence activities undertaken by the United States, and the problems that such activities pose for constitutional government. The Findings and Recommendations contained at the end of this volume constitute an agenda for action which, if adopted, would go a long way toward preventing the abuses that have occurred in the past from occurring again, and would assure that the intelligence activities of the Fnited States will be conducted in accordance with constitutional processes. FRANK CHURCH. (III) NOTE The Committee's Final Report has been reviewed and declassified by the appropriate executive agencies. These agencies submitted comments to the Committee on security and factual aspects of each chapter. On the basis of these comments, the Committee and staff conferred with representatives of the agencies to determine which parts of the report should remain classified to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. At the request of the agencies, the Committee deleted three chapters from this report: "Cover," "Espionage," and "Budgetary Oversight." In addition, two sections of the chapter "Covert Action of the CIA" and one section of the chapter "Department of State" have been deleted at the request of the agencies. Particular passages which were changed at the request of the agencies are denoted by italics and a footnote. Complete versions of deleted or abridged materials are a,vailable to Members of the Senate in the Committee's classified report under the provisions of S. Res. 21 and the Standing Rules of the Senate. Names of individuals were deleted when, in the Committee's judgment, disclosure of their identities would either endanger their safety or constitute a substantial invasion of privacy. Consequently, footnote citations to testimony and documents occasionally contain only descriptions of an individual's position. Appendix Three, "Soviet Intelligence Collection and Intelligence Against the United States," is derived solely from a classified CIA report on the same subject which was edited for security considerations by the Select Committee staff. (IV) CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION_____________________________________________ 1 A. The Mandate of the Committee's Inquiry _________________ 2 B. The Purpose of the Committee's Findings and Recommendations________________________________________________ 4 C. The Focus and Scope of the Committee's Inquiry and Obstacles Encountered - - - - - - - - ________________ 5 D. The Historical Context of the Inquiry_____________________ 8 E. The Dilemma of Secrecy and Open Constitutional Government_______________________________________________ 11 II. THE FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW__________ 15 A. The Basic Issues: Secrecy and Democracy__________________ 16 B. The Scope 01 the Select Committee Inquiry into Foreign and Military Intelligence Operations_ _______________________ 17 C. The Intelligence Process: Theory and Reality_______________ 17 D. Evolution cf the United States Intelligence Community______ 19 E. The Origins cf the Postwar Intelligence Community_________ 20 F. The Response to the Soviet Threat- _______________________ 22 G. Korea: The Turning Point- ______________________________ 23 H. The "Protracted Conflict" _______________________________ 24 I. Third World Competition and Nuclear Crisis _______________ 25 J. Technology and Tragedy________________________________ 26 K. The1970s______________________________________________ 27 L. The Task Ahead_ _______________________________________ 28 III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES_ ________________________________ _____ 31 A. The Joint Responsibilities of the Legislative and Executive Branches-Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances__ 31 B. The Historical Practice__ ________________________________ 33 C. The Constitutional Power of Congress to Regulate the Conduct of Foreign Intelligence Activity ________________ 38 IV. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICK________________________________ 41 A. The National Security CounciL___________________________ 42 B. Authorization and Control of Covert Activities______________ 48 C. Providing the Intelligence Required by Policymakers_ _______ 61 D. Advising the President on Intelligence Issues______ _____ _____ 62 E. Allocating Intellil!"ence Fesources_ ________________________ 65 V. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE___________ 71 A. The Producer of National Intelligence_ _______________ ___ __ 73 B. Coordinator of Intelligence Activities_ _____________________ 83 C. Director of the CIA_ ___________________________________ 94 VI. HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCL_ 97 A. The Central Intellil!"ence Group and the Central Intelligence Agency:1946-l952___________________________________ 99 B. The Dulles Era: 1953-196L______________________________ 109 C. Change and Routinization: 1961-1970_____________________ 115 D. The Recent Past: 1971-1975_ ______ _________ _ _____ ____ 121 E. Conclusion_ ___________________________________________ 124 VII. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: STATUTORY AUTHORITY____ ___ ___ ___ ___ __ ___ __________ __ __ __ __ 127 A. Clandestine Collection of Intelligence_ ____________________ 128 B. CovertAction__________________________________________ 131 C. Domestic Activities_____________________________________ 135 (V) VI VIII. COVERT ACTION _ A. Evolution of Covert Action _ B. Congressional Oversight _ C. Findings and Conclusions _ IX. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE _ A. Counterintelligence: An Introduction _ B. Current Issues in Counterintelligence _ C. Conclusions _ X. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS: THE CIA AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS, THE MEDIA, AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS _ A. Covert Use of Academic and Voluntary Organizations _ B. Covert Relationships with the United States Media _ C. Covert Use of U.S. Religious Groups _ XI. PROPRIETARIES _ A. Overview _ B. Structure _ C. Operation of Proprietaries _ D. The Disposal of Proprietaries _ E. Financial Aspects _ F. Some General Considerations _ XII. CIA PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCK _ A. Evolution of the CIA's Intelligence Directorate _ B. The Intelligence Directorate Today - - - - _ C. The Relationship Between Intelligence and Policy _ D. The Limits of Intelligence _ E. The Personnel System _ F. Recruitment and Training of Analysts _ G. The Intelligence Culture and Analytical Bias _ H. The Nature of the Production Process: Consensus Versus Competition _ I. The "Current Events" Syndrome _ J. Innovation _ K. Overload on Analysts and Consumers _ L. Quality ControL - _ M. Consumer Guidance and Evaluation _ N. The Congressional Role _ XIII. THE CIA's INTERNAL CONTROLS: THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AND THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL _ A. The General CounseL _ B. The Office of the Inspector GeneraL _ C. IntGeernnaerlaal nd External Review of the Office of the Inspecto_r XIV. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE _ A. Origins of the State Department Intelligence Function _ B. Command and ControL _ C. Support Communications _ D. Production of Intelligence _ XV. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSK _ A. Obmjeucntiivtyes and Organization of the Defense Intelligence Com_- B. The Defense Intelligence Budget _ C. Mamnuangietmy ent Problems of the Defense Intelligence Com_- D. Agencies and Activities of Special IntereRt _ E. Military Counterintelligence and Investigative Agencies _ F. Chemical and Biological Activities _ G. Meeting Future Needs in Defense Intelligence _ Page 141 143 149 152 163 163 171 177 179 181 191 201 205 206 207 234 236 247 251 257 259 26.5 266 268 269 270 270 271 272 273 274 276 276 277 279 280 289 303 305 305 308 315 315 319 320 328 341 349 355 359 363 VII XVI. DISCLOSURE OF BUDGET INFORMATION ON THE IN- Page TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY__________________________ 367 A. The Present Budgetary Process for Intelligence Community Agencies and Its Consequences_ ________________________ 367 B. The Constitutional Requirement- ________________________ 369 C. Alternatives to Concealing Intelligence Budgets from Congress and the Public_______________________________________ 374 D. The Effect Upon National Security of Varying Levels of Budget Disclosure_ ___________________________________ 376 E. The Argument that Publication of Any Information will Inevitably Result in Demands for Further Information_ __ 381 F. The Argument that the United States Should Not Publish Information on Its Intelligence Budget Because No Other Government in the World Does_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _- ____ 383 G. Summary and Conclusion_ ______________________________ 384 XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY_____ 385 A. The Programs Investigated_ _____________________________ 387 B. CIA Drug Testing Programs_ ____________________________ 392 C. Covert Testing on Human Subjects by Military Intelligence Groups______________________________________________ 411 D. Cooperation and Competition Among the Intelligence Agencies, and Between the Agencies and Other Individuals and Institutions_ _________________________________________ 420 XVIII. SUMMARY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS_____ 423 A. Introduction___________________________________________ 423 B. General Findings_ _____________________________________ 424 C. The 1947 National Security Act and Related Legislation____ 426 D. The National Security Council and the Office of the President- 427 E. The Director of Central Intelligence__ ____________________ 432 F. The Central Intelligence Agency_________________________ 435 G. Reorganization of the Intelligence Community_____________ 449 H. CIA Relations with United States Institutions and Private Citizens_____________________________________________ 451 I. Proprietaries and Cover_________________________________ 456 J. Intelligence Liaison_____________________________________ 459 K. The General Counsel and the Inspector GeneraL __________ 459 L. The Department of Defense _____________________________ 462 M. The Department of State and Ambassadors_______________ 466 N. Oversight and the Intelligence Budget_ ___________________ 469 O. Chemical and Biological Agents and the Intelligence Community_____________________________________________ 471 P. General Recommendations______________________________ 472 APPENDIX I: Congressional Authorization for the Central Intelligence Agency to Conduct Covert Action_________________________________ 475 A. The National Security Act of 1947________________________ 476 B. The CIA Act of 1949 ___________________________________ 492 C. The Provision of Funds to the CIA by Congress____________ 496 D. The Holtzman and Abourezk Amendments of 1974-________ 502 E. The Hughes-Ryan Amendmenk__________________________ 505 F. Conclusion_____________________________________________ 508 APPENDIX II: Additional Covert Action Recommendations___________ 511 A. Statement of Clark M. Clifford___________________________ 512 B. Statement of Cyrus Vance_______________________________ 516 C. Statement of David A. Phillips___ ________________________ 518 D. Prepared Statement of Morton H. Halperin________________ 520 E. Recommendations of the Harvard University Institute of Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities __________ 524 F. Recommendations of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Concerning Covert Action ·________ 533 G. Article from Foreign Affairs by Harry Rositzke: America's Secret Operations: A Perspective_______________________ 534 H. Article from Saturday Review by Tom Braden: What's Wrong with the CIAL ______________________________________ 547 I. Recommendations of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission) Concerning Covert Action_ ________ 554 VIII APPENDIX III: Soviet Intelligence Collection and Operations Against Page the United States_ _____ ___________ ____ ___________ _____ _ __ ____ 557 A. Introduction ___________________________________________ 557 B. Organization and Structure ______________________________ 558 C. The GRU_____________________________________________ 560 D. The Scope and Methods of Anti-United States Operations by the KGB and the GRU_______________________________ 561 E. Eastern European Security and Intelligence Services_ _______ 561 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH_________ 563 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WALTER F. MONDALE, GARY HART, AND PHILIP HARL________________________ 567 INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATORS JOHN G. TOWER, HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. AND BARRY M. GOLDWATER_ ______________________________________________ 571 SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER____________ 573 INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER_____ 577 SEPARATE VIEWS OF HOWARD H. BAKER, JR_______________ 594 SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR_ ______________________________________________ 609 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER_ 615 GLOSSARY OF SELECTED INTELLIGENCE TERMS AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS__ _______ _________________________ 617 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CHARTS__________________________ 634 SENATE RESOLUTION 2L___ __ ____ _ 636 STAFF LIST_____________________________________________________ 649
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