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X. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS: THE CIA AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS, THE MEDIA, AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS Although its o~rational arena is outsi~e th~ ynited ~trut~l CIA clandestine operatIons make use of AmerIcan cItIzens as mdIvIduals or through American institutions. Clandestine aotivities thwt touch American institutions 'and individuals have taken many forms and are effected through a wide varici-y of means: university officials and professors provide leads and make introductions for intelligence purposes,. 1 scholars 'and journalists collect intelligence; journalists devise and place propaganda; United StaJtes publications provide cover for CIA 'agents overseas. These forms of clandestine cooperation had their origins in the early Cold War period when most Americans perceived a real threat of a communist imperium and were prepared to assist their government to counter that threat. As the communists pressed to influence and to control international organizations and movements, mass communications, and culturnl institutions, the United States responded by involving American private institutions and individuals in the secret struggle over minds, institutions and ideas. Over time national perceptions would change as to the nature and seriousness of ,the communist idoolog:ical'and institutional threat. Time and experience would also give increasing currency to doubts as to whci-her it made sense for 's; democracy to resort to practices such as the clandestine use of free American institutions 'and individuals-practices that tended tAl 'blur the very difference between "our" system and "theirs" that these covert programs were designed ,to preserve. These covert relationships have attracted public concern and the attention of this Committee because of the importance Amer,icans attach to the independence of primte institutions. Americans recognize that insofar as universities, newspapers, and relig;ious groups help mold ,ohe heliefs of the public and the policymakers, their diversity and legitimacy must be rigorously protected. It is through them that a society ~nforms and criticizes itself, eduoates its young, interprets its history, and sets new goals. At the same time, Americans also recognize the legitimacy and necessity of certain clandestine operations, particularly the collootion of foreign intelligence. To conclude that certain sectors of American lif~ must 'be placed "off limi,ts" ,to clandestine operations inevitably raIses questions not only on possible intelligence losses which would result from such a prohibition, but on whether the United States can 1 The material italicized lin this report has been substantially abridge at the request of the executive agencies. The classified version of this material is available to members of the Senate under the provisions of Senate Resolution 21 and the Standing Rules of th~ Senate. .see also p. IX. (179) 180 afford to forego the clandestine use of our universities, our media, and our religious groups in competing with our adversaries. In exploring this problem the Committee has given special attention to the CIA's past clandestine relationships with American institutions. The Committee has examined the past to illuminate the attitudes and perceptions that shaped these clandestine programs using American institutions and to determine whether the internal CIA regulations established in 1967 are sufficient ito prevent the large scale programs of the past from being reinstruted in the future. Some of these concerns were addressed almost a decade ago during an investigation that proved to be a watershed in the Central Intelligence Agency's relationship to American institutions. President Lyndon Johnson, moved by public and congressional uproar over the 1967 disclosure of the CIA's covert funding of the National Student Association (NSA) and other domestic private institutions, es!JaJblished the Katzel1lbach Committee. The Committee, chaired by the then Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, directed its investigation primarily at the CIA's covert funding of American educational and private voluntary organizations. The recommendations of the Kwtzenbach CommitJtee, although they had great impact on the CIA's operations, spoke only to the issue of the covert funding of institutions. In its investigation the CommiUee has looked not only at ,the impac.t of foreign clandestine operations on American institutions but has focused particular attention on the covert use of individual8. J.t should be emphasized from the outset thwt the in~oTIty of these institutions or individuals is not jeopardized by open con'tact or cooperaJtion with Government intelligence institutions. United St'llites Government support and cooperaJtion, openly acknowledged, plays an essential role in American education. Equally important, Government policymakers draw on the ·technical expertise and advice availl3ible from academic consultants and university-related research organizations. Open and regular contact with Government agencies is a necessary part of the journalist's responsibility, as well. A secret or a covert relationship with any of these insti,tutions, however, is another mwtter,and requires careful evaluaJtion, given the critical role these institutions play in maintaining the freedom of our society. In approaching the sU'bjeot the Committee has inquired: Are the independence and integrity of American institutions in any way endangered by clandestine relationships with the Central Intelligence Agency? Should clandestine use of institutions or individuals within those institutions he permitted? If not, should there be explicit guidelines hid down to regulate Government clandestine support or operational use of such institutions or individuals? Should such guidelines be in the form of executive directives or by statute? In addressing- these issues, the C{)mmittee'saccess -to CIA documents and files V'aried with the subject matter. In reviewing the clandest·ine aotivities that proceeded the Katzenbach Committee inquiry of 1967, the Seloot Committee had full and unfettered access to most files and documentation, with the single exception of records on media relationships. In addition, the Committee took extensive sworn testimony from virtually all of those involved in the management and review of the pre-1967 projects. Access to post-1967 material was far more 1'e181 stricted: certain of the Ititlesand names of authors of propaganda books published 'aTter 1967 were denied the CommitJtee; access to files on the contemporary clandestine use of the American aoademic community was restrict,e,d 1:0 ,information which would provide the numbers of institutions and individuals involved and a description of the role of the individuals. As for the media and relationships with religious groups, the Committee inspected precis or summaries of all opemtional relationships since 1951 and then selected over 20 cases for closer inspection. The documents from these some 20 files were selected and screened 'by the Agency 'and, by mutual agreement, names of individuals and institutions were removed. Therefore, the Commi'ttBe has far from the full picture of the nature and extent of these rellationships and the domestic impact of foreign clandestine operations. Nevertheless, it has enough to outline the dimensions of the problem and to underscore its serious nature. The conclusions and recommendations must necessarily be considered tentative and subjoot to careful review by the successor intelligence oversight committee (s) of the Conp:ress. In presenting the facts and issues associated with CIA covert relations with United States private institutions, this report is organized as follows: I. Covert Use of Academic and Voluntary Organizations. II. Covert Relationships with the United States Media. III. Covert Use of United States Religious Groups. A. COVERT USE OF ACADEMIC A.xD VOLUNTARY ORGA.xIZATIONS The Central Intelligence Agency has long-developed clandestine relationShips with the American academic community, which range from academics making introducti(YJ1S for intelligenee purposes 2 to intelligence collection while abroad. to academic research and writing where CIA spolL9Orship is hidden. The Agency has funded the activities of American private organiz8Jtions around the world when those activities supported-or could be convinced to supportr-American foreign policy dbjectives. Until 1967 the Agency also maintained covert ties to American foundations in order to pass funds secretly to priV'llte groups whose work the CIA supported. The relationships have varied according 1:0 whether made with an institution or an individual, whether the relationship is paid or unpaid, or wheJther the individuals are "witting"-i.e. aware-of CIA involvement. In some cases, covert involvement provided the CIA with little or no operational control of the inst~tutions involved; funding was primarily a way to enable people 1:0 do things they wanted to do. In other cases, influence was exerted.. Nor was the nature of these relationships necessarily staJtic; in the case of some individuals support turned into influence, and finally even to operational use. During- the 1950s and 19608, the CIA turned increasing'ly to covert action in the area of student and labor m3JtJters, cultul'lal affairs, and community developments. The struggle with communism was seen to be, rut center, a struggle between our institutions and theirs. The CIA subsidized,advised, and even helped develop "private" organizrutions that would compete with the communists around the world. Some of 2 For explanation of italics, see footnote. p. 179. 182 these organizations were foreign; others were international; yet others were U.S.-based student, labor, cultural, or philanthropic organizations whose international activities the CIA subsidized. The CIA's interest in the areas of student and labor matters, culturalaffairs, and community development reached a peak in the mid1960' s. By 1967, when public disclosure of NSA's funding and the subsequent report of the Katzenbach Committee caused a major curta-ilment of these activities, interest in the major covert action efforts in these "areas was already waning. There appear to be two reasons for this. First, there was considerable skepticism within the CIA 'as to the effectiveness of this approach. It differed 'from classical CIA "tradecraft" in that the org-anizations funded were basically independent from CIA control. Richard Helms expressed this skepticism when he remarked in testimony before this committee, The clandestine operator . . . is trained to believe that you really can't count on the honesty of your agent to do exactly what you want or to report accurately unless you own him body and sou1.2a :Ylr. Helms contended that "the clandestine operator sneered at the other kind of operation"-the aiding and abetting of people or organiz1ations who are your "friends" or "have the same point of view that you do." Skepticism of the clandestine operators was directed particularly at the Covert Action Staff/International Organizations Division, the CIA units which conducted the programs in the area of student and cultural exchange. Second, it became increasingly difficult to conceal the CIA funds that supported these activities as the scale of the operations grew. By fiscal year 1967, for example, over $3 million was budgeted for youth and student programs and $6 million for labor. Most of the funds were transmitted through legitimate or "devised" foundations-that is, fictitious entities established by the CIA. 1. OIA Use of Private Foundations, Pre-1967 The use of philanthropic organiz'ations was a convenient way to pass funds, in that large amounts could be transferred rapidly, and in a form that need not alert um,-ittting officers of the recipient organizations to their source. In addition, foundation gmnts bestowed upon the recipient the apparent "blessing" of the foundation. The fundin<Y patltern involved a mixture of bona fide charitable foundations, devised foundations and funds, "front men" drawn from a list of America's most prominent citizens, and lawyers representing undisclosed clients. The CIA's intrusion into the foundation field in the 1960s can only be described om:; massive. Excluding grants from the "Big Three"Ford, Rockefeller, 'and Carnegie-of the 700 grants over $10,000 given by 164 other foundations during the period 1963-1966, at least 108 involved pa,rtial or complete CIA funding. More importantly, CIA funding was involved in nearly half the grants the non-"Big Three" foundations made during this period in the field of international activities. In the same period more than one-third of the grants awarded by non-"Big Three" in the physical, life and social sciences also involved CIA funds. " Richard Helms testimony, 9/12/75, p. 2J-26, 183 Bona fide foundations, rather than those controlled by the CIA, were considered the best and most plausible kind of funding cover for certain kinds of operations. A 1966 CIA study explained the use of legitimate found'ations was the most effective way of concealing the CIA's hand as well as reassuring members of funded organizations that the organization was in fact supported by private funds. The Agency study contended that this technique was "particularly effective for democratically-run membership organizations, which need to assure their own unwitting members and conabarators, as well as their hostile critics, that they have genuine, respectable, private sources of income." 2. The 0/A's Foundation-funded Oovert Activity, Pre-1967 The philanthropic fronts used prior to 1967 funded a seemingly limitless range of covert action programs affecting youth groups, l~bor unions, universities, publishing houses, and other private institutions in the United States and a:broad. The following list illustrates the diversity of these operations: (1) The CIA assisted in the establishment in 1951 and the funding for over a decade of a research institute at a major American university. This assistance came as the result of a request from Under-secretary of State James Webb to General Bedell Smith, then Director of the CIA. Mr. Webb proposed that the center, which was to research worldwide political, economic, and social changes, be supported by the CIA in the interest of the entire intelligence community. (2) A project was undertaken in collaboration with a nationaIly prominent American business association. The object of the project 'was to promote a favorable image of America in a foreign country unfavorably disposed to America and to promote citizen-to-citizen contacts between Americans and influential segments of that country's society.3 (3) The cooperation of an American labor organization in selected overseas labor activities. (4) Support of an international organization of veterans and an international foundation for developing countries. (5) Support of an organization of journalists and an international women's association. (6) Partial support for an international educational exchange program run by 11 group of United States universities. (7) Funding of a legitimate U.S. association of farm organizations. Agency funds were used to host foreign visitors, provide scholarships to an intemational cooperative training center at 'a United States university, and to reimburse the organization for various of its activities abroad. A CIA document prepared in 1967 notes that although the organization received some overt government funds from AID, the CIA should continue its covert funding because "programs funded by AID cannot ,address themselves to the same political goals toward which Ag-ency operations are targeted ,because AID programs are part of official government-to-government programs and are designed for economic-not political-results." 'For pxplanation of italics, !'!PI' footnotp, p. 179. 184 The Best llnown Oase: Oovert Funding of the National Student Association CIA funding of the National Student Association (NSA) from 1952 to 1967 is a particularly good example of how the United States Government entered the field of co\'ertly supporting "friends," of the vulnerabilities felt by the CIA in undertaking to support organizations and individuals that cannot be controlled, and of the operational temptation to mo\'e from SUppOl't to "controL" The reason the CIA de<?ided to help NSA is clear. In the years immediately after World War II the Soviet rnion took the lead in trying to organize and propagandize the world student movement. The first Soviet Vice President of the International Union of Students, for example. was Alexander N. Shelepin, who later became Chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB). The American students who sought to compete with these communistmanaged and directed student group were hampered by a lack of funds, while the communist groups had enough money to put on world youth festivals, conferences and forums, and regional conferences. In seeking funds at home, the American students found they were considered too far to the left in the general climate of McCarthyism and anti-intellectualism of the 1950s. Against this background, NSA officials, after being refused by the State Department and rebnfl'ed by the Congress, were finally directed by the State Department in 1952 to the CIA} The CIA maintains that its funding efforts were based on shared interests, not on manipulation. CIA funding of the National Student Associwtion appears to have been intended primarily to permit United States students to represent their own ideas, in their own way, in the international forums of the day. Nevertheless, the Committee has found instances in which the CIA moved from blank-check support to operational use of individual students.5 For example, over 250 U.S. students were sponsored by the CIA to attend youth festivals in Moscow, Vienna, and Helsinki and were used for missions such as reporting on Soviet and Third World personalities or observing Soviet security pradices. A United States student, for example, was recrui1ted in 1957 to serve as a CIA "asset" at the Sixth 'Vorld Youth Festival in Moscow. According to CIA documents, he was instructed to report on Soviet counterintelligence measures and to purchase a piece of Soviet-manufactured equipment. • Under the agreed arraJlgement. CIA funds would support onl)' the international diYisi()Jl of the National Student Association; only the NSA President and the International Affairs Vi~e President would be witting of the CIA connection. Each year, after the election of new student leaders, the CIA held a secret briefing for the new officers, and elicited from them a secrecy agreement. During the 1960s howeYer, witting National Student Assorciation leaders became increasingly reRtiYe about the CIA sponsorship, until finally in 1967 one of them reyealed the relationship to Ramparts magazine. S "Operational use" of indiyiduals as used in ,this report means recruitment, use, 0r training, on eHher a witting or unwitting basis, for intelligence purposes. That is. the indiyiduul iR directed or "taRked" to do somethiilg for the CIA-as oppoRed to Yolunteering information. Such purposes include eoyert action, clandestine intelligence collection (espionage) and yarious kinds of support functions. 185 Although tIl(' CIA's involvement "ith the National Student Association was limit~d to the organization's international activities, CIA influence was felt to some extent in its domestic programs as well. Thr mo~t direct way in ,vhich such influence may have been felt "as in the sC'lcction procC'ss for NSA officl'rs. The Summer International Seminars condnctC'd for NSA leadC'rs and potential leaders in the United States (luring the 1950's and 1960's were a vehicle for the Agency to identify nl'w ll'ac1ers and to promote their candidacy for electiV(' positions in the Nationa1 Stud('nt Association. The C('ntral Intplligence Agency's cxperience "'ith the NSA underJim's the basic prohlem of an action-oriented clandestine organization entering into a cO\'eli fllnding relationship with private organizations; support of friends turns into thl' control of their actions and ultimately to neation of new "friends." S. 00/,('1' i8 lUmen: The Patman and Rampal'ts "Flaps" Tn a public hearing in HHiJ, Congressman 'Wright Patman, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foundations of the House Committee on Problems of Small Businesses. revealed the names of eight of the CIA's funding instruments~theso-called "Patman Eight." These disclosures sharply jarred the Agency's confidence in the secnrity of these philanthropic funding mechanisms. The Patman disclosures led the CIA to take a hard look at this technique of funding, hut not to reconsider the propriety of 'bringing t he independence of America's foundations into question by using them as conduits for the funding of covmtaction projects. According to the Chief of the Cowrt Action Staff's Program and Evaluation Group: The real lesson of the Patman Flap is not that we need to get ont of the business of using foundation cover for funding, but that we need to get at it more professionally and extensively. Dpspite the best efforts of the Agency throughout 1966 to shore up its "ulnerable funding mechanisms, it became increasingly clear that Hamparts magazine, the l'lTew York Times, and the lVashington Post were moving ewr closer to unraveling not only the CIA's system of clandestine funding but to exposing the source of the support for the National Student Association. In an effort to determine whether there "'as foreign influpnce on funds behind the Ramparts expose, the CIA, in coordination with the FBI, undertook through its own counterintelJigpnce staff to prepare extensive reports on the Rampal'ts officers and staff members.G At a press briefing on February H, 1967, the State Department publicly confirmed a statement by leaders of NSA that their organization had received cm'ert support from the CIA since the early 1950s. The NSA statement and disclosures in Rampal'ts magazine brought on ii storm of public and congressional criticism. In response, President • The Agency appointed a special assistant to the Deputy Director fOT Plans, who was charged with "pulIing together information on Rumparf8. inC'!uding any evidence of subversion [and] devising proposals for counteraction." In pursuing the "Communist ties" of Ramparf8 magazine, the "case" of managing pditor, Robert Scheer, was one of the first to be developed aud a report was sent on Scheer to 'Walt ·W. Rostow, Special Assistant to President .Johnson, 207-932 0 - 76 - 13 186 .Johnson organized a committee composed of l-nder5ecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, Secretary of HE'Y .Jolm Gardner, and CIA Director Richard Helms to re\"iew gon>l'Ilment actiYities that lllay "endanger the integrity and i.ndependcnce of the educational community." The cOlllJllittee's life was short-43 days-but its recommendations, accepted by Presidcnt .Tolmson on .:\Iarch :Z9, 1967, were to han a profound effect on the CIA's clandestine operations, both in the Fnited States and abroad. .~. The Katzenbach Oommittee President .Tohnson's concern for the integrity and independence of American institutions could haw resulted in the Katzenbach Committee being chal'ged with general reyiew of the domestic impact of clande-stine activities and their effect on American institutions; including consideration of iwhether all covert relationships should be prohibited, and, if not, what guidelines should be imposed on the use of institutions and individuals. Instead, the Johnson Administration carefully and consciously limited the mandate of the Katzenbach Committee's investigation to the relationship between the CIA and "U.S. educational and private voluntary organizations which operate abroad." In a February 24 memorandum to Gardner and Helms, Katzen'bach cited the narrowness of the mandate in listing problems faced by the Committee : 1. The narrow scope of this mandate, as compared with the demands, by Senator Mansfield, et aI, that this flap be used as a springboard for a review of all clandestine financing by CIA. 2. More specifically, the exclusion in this mandate of relationships between CIA and American businesses abroad. 3. Focusing the mandate on CIA, rather than on all private organization relationships with gO\-ernment agencies. In testimony before this Committee, .:\Ir. Katzenbach said that his committee was designed by President Johnson not only to deal with the relationship of the CIA to educational and voluntary organizations, but to head off a full-scale congressional investigation.7 All other covert relationships were to be excluded from the investig-ation. In a memo to his colleagues, the Deputy Chief of the Covert Action Staff reported: It is stated that the cOIllltry operations funded by black bag [sterilized or laundered fundsl were not to be included in the CIA's response to the Katzenbach Commission and emphasized that the focus of this paper ",as to be on organizations. In addition the Katzenbach Committee did not undertake investig- ation of CIA domestic cDmmercial operations, specifically those designed to provide covel' for clandestine intelligence operations which 7 :"Iicholas Katzenhach testimony. 10/11/75. p. 5. Katzenhach also said of the President's decision on membership: "... he [the President] wanted .lohn Gardner 011 it hecause he thought that would help politically in getting acc€'ptance of whatHer tlH' recomlll€'ndations turned out to be beocause he thought Helllls would defend e\'(~rything and wanted to continue e\"erJ"thin!\,. Gardner would want to "top en·rything. It was my joil to COlli€' out with something in the middle." (Ibill \. 187 the U.S. directed at such targets as foreign students, foreign businessmen, foreign diplomatic and consular officials trave]]ing or residing in the United States. Despite the narrowness of its mandate, the actual inYestigation of the Katzenbach Committee was vigorous and thorough. After deliberation, the Committee issued the basic recommendation that: It should be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency sha]] provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. In May 1967 the Deputy Director for Plans Desmond FitzGerald interpreted the post-Katzenbach ground rules in a circular to the field. He stated: Several operational guidelines emerge: a. Covert relations with commercial U.S. organizations are not, repeat, not barred. b. Covert funding overseas of foreign-based international organizations is permitted. He indicated that greater care would be needed in the conduct of clandestine operations, in order to prevent disclosures: a. The care required under the Katzenbach Report, with respect to the recruitment and use of U.S. students, and U.S. university professors, applies equa]]y to the recruitment and use of foreign students. . . . In simple terms, we are now in a different ba]]game. Some of the basic ground rules have changed. 'When in doubt, ask HQs. 5. A Different Ballgame: OIA Response to Katzenbaeh The policy guidelines established in the Katzenbach Report and supplemental guidelines with which the CIA interpreted the Report brought major adjustments in covert action programs and methods. SOllie 77 projects were examined at high levels within the CIA, and lists were drawn up of projects to be terminated, projects to be transferred to other sources of funding, projects to continue, and projects whose future required higher level decisions. The 303 Committee met frequently throughout 1967 and 1968 to deal with difficult questionB, such as how to provide for continued funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. At the same time the Agency was withdrawing from support of a large number of domestica]]y-based organizations, it moved rapidly to shelter certain high-priority operations from the Katzenbach prohibitions and to devise more secure funding mechanisms. This process was facilitated by what ,vas termed "surge funding." The Katzenbach guidf>linf>s called for termination of CIA funding of domestically based U.S. organizations by December 31, 1967. 'With 303 Committee approval for the largest grants, the Agency "surge funded" a number of organizations, giving them advances before the December deadline which carried them in some cases for up to two years of operations. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were so funded. In adjusting to the "new ballgame," the appearance of contravening the Katzenbach guidelines, rather than specific regulations, was 188 seen as a reason not to continue relationships with certain institutions. At the same time, at least one case suggests that even a clean termination of funcling with a private organization did not necessarily end the CTA's support of the policies and programs of the organization. A CIA report on termination plans for a large project in the Far East indicated that. with surge funding, the organization could continue into fiscal year 1069, and that thereafter "[the organization's] Roar(l of Trustees will assume full responsibility for the organization amI has pleogeo to continue its policies and range of activities." The follmving are examples of the score of projects which the CIA I'cviewcd in H16i ano occioed to continue to fund: (1) "'- publications and press institute that maintained a worldwidc nehvork of stringcrs and correspondents. ,\ CIA I'eport on t he project asS<'rtcd that it "excrts virtually no domestic infhwnce in any quarter, although its publications are reao by F.8. students." (:2) 8cvel'a I intcrnational tnHlc linion organi,mtions. (:q "'- foreig11-based ncws featme servicc. (4) A fOl'cign-baseo research and publishing: institutc. In rc\-icwing the CL'-'s adjustments to the Katzenbach Committee's recommcndations, the Committec found no violations f)f the policy the I'cport sets forth. Howewr. it is important to recognize how nal'l'mv the foclls of the Katzcnbach Committee's conccrn was. The problem was approached by the committee and by the CIA essentially as one of security: how to limit the damage caused by the revelations of CIA relationships \vith private 1'.8. institlltions. Many of the ]'('strictions dcwlopco by the CIA in response to the e\-ents of 1067 appeal' to be security mcasnres aimed at prewnting fmther pllblic disrIosurcs which could jeopardize sensiti,-e CIA operations. They did not r.cprescnt significant rethinking of ,,-here boundaries ought to be (Ira\vn in a free society. Moreovcr, althollgh PresidenLTohnson adopted the Katzenbach report as policy, it was not isslH'd as an executin' 01'(1('1' or enacted as a statute. Thus, it has no firm legal status. C. Post 1{J67 Rr7atiolls1/)ith the U.S. Academic Oommunity In analyzing the adcquacy of the Katzenbach regulations and of the CIA's compliance with them, the Select Committee concentrated mnch of its attention on contemporary re.1ationships between the CIA and the U.S. academic commnnity. The Commif,tee interprets "academic communitv" to include more than the Katzenbach Committee nndollbtedly llad in mind when it recommended prohibition of "co\'('rt financial assistance OJ'support ... to any of the nation's educational ... organizations." ""'-cademic cOlmmmity" has been interpreted by this Committee to include universities, university-related research centers, and the full range of individual scholars and school administrators, ranging from department heads to career counselors and to Ph.D. candidates engaged in teaching. The Committee has approached this inquiry with three principal questions: (1) 'What is the extent and nature of CIA relationships with U.S. academic institutions and with individual American academics? (2) 1Vhat are the guidelines and ground rules governing CIA postKatzenbach relations with the academic community? (3) 1Vhat issues are at stake; what threats, if any, do cnrrent relations pose fol' the independence of this infllH'ntial sector of society? 189 The CIA relationships ,,,ith the academic community are extensi"e and selTe many purposes, including pro"iding leads and making introductions for intelligence purposes, collaboration in research and analysis, intrlligencr collection abroad, and preparation of books and other propaganda materials. The SC'lect Committee's concentration has been on the area of clandestine relationships untouched by the KatzC'nbach CommitteeindiyiduaIs. 7. COL'el't Relations 1cith Individuals in the Academic Community As alrC'acly noteel. from the first clays of the Katzenbach Committee, the CIA proceeded on the operating assumption that the inquiry was directed squarely at institutional relationships-not indi"iduals in or affiliated with those private institutions. After the Katzenbach )'('port. the AgC'llCY issued a basic instruction entitled "Restrictions on Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals." This instruction remains in force today. The instruction states that the "basic rule" for the use of human agents by the Operations Directorate is that "any consenting adult" may be used. 'Vhile all members of the American academic ~ommunity,including students, certainly qualify as "consenting adults," the CIA since 1967 has been particularly sensitive to the risks associated with their use. In order to control and confine contacts with American academics, the handling of relationships with individuals associated with universities is largely confined to two CIA divisions of the Directorate of Operations- the Domestic Collection Division and the Foreign Resources Division. The Domestic Collection Division is the point of contact with large numbers of American academics who travel abroad or who are othenyise consulted on the subject of their expertise. The Foreign Resonrces Division, on the other hand, is the purely operational arm of the CIA in dealing with American academics. Altogether, DeD and FRD are currently in contact-ranging from the occasional debriefing to a continuing operational relationship-with lllany thousands of Cnited States academics at hundreds of U.S. academic institutions. It is imperative to underline that the majority of these relationships are purely for the purpose of asking an academic about his travels abroad or open informal consulting on subjects of the academic's expertise. The Committee sees Ill? danger to the integrity of American pri"ate institutions in continuing such contacts; indeed, there are benefits to both the government and the universities in such contacts. The CIA's Office of Personnel also maintains relationships with nniversity administrators, sometimes in the placement office. These relationships, which are usually contractual, enable the CIA to approach suitable United States students for CIA employment. The "operational use" of academics is another matter. It raises troubling questions as to presen'atioll of the integrity of American academic institutions. 8. Oovert Use of the U.8. Academic Community The Central Intelli,qenN Aqenr,1l is now usinq sCl'eral hundred ;1meriran arademirs ", who in addition to providing leads and, on 11 "Acad€'mics" incluclPR adminiRtrators, faculty m€'mhers and graduate students pn~a~€'d in t€'aching. 190 occa8ion, making lnt1'Oductions 101' intelligence purpose8, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad. Beyond these, an additional few score are used in an unwitting manner for minor aotivities. These academics are located in over 100 American colleges, wniversities, and related institutes. At the 1najority of institution:;., no one other than the individual concerned is aware of the OIA link. At the others, at lea8t one uni'versity ojfz'cial is aware of the operational use made of awrlemics on his campus. In addition, there are several American aoademics abroad 'who serN opemtional purposes, primarily the collection of intelligence.12 The CIA considers these operational relationships with the United States academic community as perhaps its most sensitive domestic area and has strict controls governing these operations. According to the Agency's internal directives, the following distinctions govern the operational use of individuals: the CIA's directives prohibit the operational use of individuals who are receiving support under the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this particular prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers, and students who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Srholarships. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the sm'eral other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright- Hays Act, such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists, or participants in international trade fairs or expositions, who do not come lInder the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships. As far as the three major foundations-Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie-are ronrerned, the prohibition extends to "persons actively participating in programs which are "'holly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made "f the offirials or employees of thei;e organizations." (These large foundations were cited by a CIA offirial in 1066 before the 303 Committee as "a trouble area in New York City-reluctant to cooperate on joint \'entures.") D. Om'ert Relatz:onships with A rarlam,eic and Voluntary Orqanizations: Conclusions With respect to CIA covert relationships with private institutions and ,'olulltary organizations, the Committee concludes: (1) The CIA has adhered to the 1967 Katzenbach guidelines governing relationi)hips with domestic private and voluntary institutions. The guidelines are so narrowly focused, however, that the covert use of .\merican individuals from tlH'se institutions has continued. (2) American academics are no,,, being used for such operational purposes a8 making infrodurtio1J,~ for iJilelligenre purposes 12a and ,,·orking for the Agency abroad. Although the nnmbers are not as great today as ir: 1066, there are no prohihitions to prevent an increase in the operational use of academ irs. TIl(' size of tl1Pse operations is determined by the CIA. . (0) ·With the' exception of those teachers. scholars and students ",ho recei,'c scholarships 01' grants from the Board of Foreign Scholar- 12 For pxplanlltion of italics. see footnote. p. 17fl. 12, Ibid. 191 ships, the CIA is not prohibited from the operational use of all other categories of grantee support. under Ithe Fulbright-Hays Act (artists, athletes, leaders, specialists, etc.). Nor is there any prohibition on the operational use of individuals participating in any other exchange program funded by the Fnitcd States Government. In addressing the issues of the CIA's relationship 11:0 the American academic community the Committee is keenly aware that if the CIA is to sene the intelligence needs of the nation, it must have unfettered access to the best a(l\"ice amI judgment our universities can produce. But this advice and expertise can and should be openly sought-and openly giwn. Suspicion that such openness of intellectual encounter and exchange is eomplemented by covert operational exploitation of academics and students can only prejudice, if not destroy, the possibihty of a full and fruitful exchange between the nation's best minds and the nation's most critical intelligence needs. To put these intellects in the senice of the nation. trnst and confidence must be maintained bet\veen our intelligence agencies and the academic community. The Commitltee is disturbed both by the present practice of operationally using American academics and by the awareness that the restraints on expanding this practice are primarily those of sensitivity to the risks of disclosure and not an appreciation of dangers to the integrity of individuals a;ld institutions. Nevertheless, the Committee does not recommend a legislative prohibition on the operational exploitation of individuals in private institutions by the intelligence agencies. The Committee views such legislation as both unenforceable and in itself an intrusion on the pri\"acy and integrity of the American academic community. The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of private institutions and particularly the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members. This report on the nature and extent of covert individual relations with the CIA is intended to alert these institutions that there is a problem. At the same time. the Committpe recommends that the CIA amend its internal directi\"es to require that individual academics used for operational purposes by the CIA, together with the President or equivalent official of the relevant academic institutions, be informed of the clandestine CIA relationship. The Committee also feels strongly that tlH're should be no operational use made of professors, lecturers, students, artists, and the like who are funded under 1'nited States Gowrnment-sponsored programs. The prohibition on the operational use of Fulbright grantees must be extended to other gowrnment-sponsored programs; and in this case the prohibition should be confirmed by law, given the direct responsibility of the Congress for these programs. It is unacceptable that Americans would go overseas under a cultural or academic exchange program funded openly by the United States Congres.<; and at the sallie time sen"e an operational purpose directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. B. COVERT RELATIOXSHII'S 'VITH TUB UNITED STATES :M:EDIA In pnrsuing its foreign intelligence mission the Central Intelligence Agency has nsed the 1'.5. media for both the colledion of intelligence 192 and for cover. until February 1976, when it announced a new policy toward u.S. media personnel, the CIA mainltained coveflt relationships with about 50 American journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations. They are part of a network of several hundred foreign individuals al'ound the world wlw p1'Ovide intelligence for the OIA and at times attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda. These individuaLs provide the 01A with direct access to a large number of foreign newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, l'adio a1Ul television stations, com1Jwrcial book publishers, and other foreign media outletsY The CIA has been particularly sensitive to the charge that CIA covert relationships with the American media jeopardize the credibili1ty of t.lle American press and risk the possibility of propagandizing the U.S, public. Former Director William Colby expressed this concern in recent testimony before the House ~elect Committee on Intelligence : \Ve have taken particular caution to ensure that our operations are focused abroad and not at <the United States in order to influence the opinion of the American people about things from a CIA point of view. As early as 1967, the CIA, in the wake of the National Student Association disclosure, moved to flatly prohibit the publication of books, magazines, or newspapers in the United States. More recently, George Bush, the new Director, undertook as one of his first actions to recognize the "special stlatus 'afforded the American medi'a under our Constitution" and therefore pledged that "CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any United States news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." 14 In approaching the subject of the CIA's relationship with the United States medi'a, the Select Committee has been guided by several broad concerns. It has inquired into the covert publication of propaganda in order to assess its domestic impact; it has investigated the nature and purpose of the covert relationships that the CIA maintains with bona fide U.S. journalists; it has examined the use of journalistic "cover" 'by CIA agents; it has pursued the difficult issue of domestic "fallout" from CIA's foreign press placements and other propaganda activities. Throughout, it has compared current practice to the regulations restricting activities in this area, in order both to establish whether the CIA has complied with existing regulations, and, more import'ant,in order to evululate the adequacy of the regulations themselves. 1. Books mul Publishing HOU8es Covert propagand'a is the hidden exercise of the power of persuasion. In the world of covert propaganda, book publishing 'activities have a special place. In 1961 the Chief of the CIA's Covert Action '" For explanation of footnotes, see p. 179. "George Bush statement, 2/11/76. 193 Staff, who had responsibility for the covert propaganda program, wrote: Books differ from all other propaganda meflia, primarily because one single book can signitieantly change the readrr's attitude and action to an rxtont \Inlllatchrd by tIl(' impact of any other single medi\lm ... this is, of course, not trur of all books at all times anfl with all readers-but it is tr\lo significantly often eno\lgh to make books the lIIost important wrapon of strategic (long-range) propaganda. According to Th(' Chid of the COH'rt Action Statt', the CIA's elandrstine haJl(lling of book publishing and distribution cO\llfl: (a) Get books published 01' distrih\lted abroad without l'en~alingany C.S. influencr, by cow'rtly subsi<lizing foreign publications 01' booksellers. (b) Get books published which sho\lld not be "contaminatefl" by any overt tic-in with the U.S. government. especially if the position of the author is "delicate." (e) Get books published for operational reasons, regardless of cOlllmercial viability. (d) Initiate and subsidize indigenous national 01' international o)'ganizations for book publ ishing 01' flistrib\lting purposes. (e) Stim\llate the writing of politically significant books by unknmyn foreign a\lthors-rither by flircctly subsidizing the author, if covert contact is feasiblr, or indirectly. through literary agents or publishers. ",Vell over a thousand books WHe prod\lcrd. s\lbsidizpd or sponsored by the CIA before the end of 1967. Approximatrly 2;") 1)(')"('('lIt of them ,,'ere written in English. ~Iany of them werr publishrd by cultural organizations which the CIA backed, and more often than not the author was 1lila \yare of CIA subsidization. Some books, hmycver, involved direct collaboration between the CIA and the \YI·iter. The Chief of the Agency's propaganda unit wrote in 1961: The advantage of our direct contact with the author is that \ye can acquaint him in grrat detail with our intentions; that we can prm-ide him with whatever material \Ye want him to include and that we can check the man\lscript at e\'ery stage. Our cont1"01 o\'er the \niter \"ill ha\'e to be enforced \Isually by paying him for the time he works on tIl(' manuscript, or at least ad\'ancing him s\lms which he might have to repa)( . . . [the Agency] must make sure the actua1ll1'anuscript will correspond with Olll' operational 'Und propagandistic int€ntion.... The Committ€e has )'eYiewed II few examples of what the Chief of tho Covert Action Staff termed "books publishe<l for operational reasons regardless of commercial viability." Examples included: (1) A book about the conflict in Indochina was produced in Hl;'14 at the initiation of the CIA's Far East Diyision. A major r.s. publishing house under contract to the CIA published the book in French and English. Copies of both editions \yere distributed to foreign embassies 194 in the United States, and to selected newspapers and magazine editors both in the l7nit€d States and abroad. (2) A book about a student from a developing country who had studied in a communist country ",vas de,'eloped by [two area divisions of the CIA] and produced by the Domestic Operations Division ... and has had a high impact in the U.S. as ,veIl as the [foreign area] market." The book, whIch was published by the European outlet of a U.S. publishing house, was published in condensed form in two major U.S. magazines. Eric Severeid, the CBS political commentator, in reviewing this book, spoke a larger truth than he knew when he suggested that "our propaganda services could do worse than to flood [foreign] university towns with this volume." (3) Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was published in the United States in 1965 "for operational reasons", but actually became commercially viable. The book was prepared and written by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials. Publication rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher through a trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware of any U.S. Government interest. The publishing program in the period before the National Student Association disclosures was large in volume. and varied in taste. In 1967 alone the CIA published or subsidized well over 200 books, ranging from books on wildlife and safaris to translations of Machiavelli's The Prirwe into Swahili and works of T. S. Eliot into Russian, to a parody of the famous little red book of quotations from Mao entitled QU<Jtations from Ohairman Liu. The publicity which in 1967 surrounded several CIA sponsored organizations and threatened to expose others caused the CIA to act quickly to limit its use of U.S. publishers. In direct response 'to the Katzenbach report, Deputy Director for Plans Desmond FitzGerald ordered, "We will, under no circumstances, publish books, magazines or newspapers in the United States." With this order, the CIA suspended direct puhlication and subsidization within the United Staltes not only of books, but also of journals and newsletters, including: a magazine published by a United States-based proprietary for cultural 'and artistic exch'ange; a newsletter mailed to foreign students studying in North American universities under the sponsorship of a CIA proprietary foundation; and a publication on Latin American affairs published in the United States. Thus since 1967 the CIA's publishing activities have almost entirely been confined to books and other materials published abroad. During the past few years. some 250 books have been published abroad, most of them in foreign languages. As previously noted, the CIA has denied to the Committee a number of the titles and names of authors of the propaganda books published since 1967. Brief descriptions provided by the Agency indicate the breadth of subject matter, which includes the following topics, aqlOng many others: (1) Commercial ventures and commercial law in South Vietnam; (2) Indochina representation at the U.N.; (3) A memoir ofthe Korean War; 195 (4) The prospects for European union; (5) Chile under Allende. 12. Oovert U8e of u.s. Journa1ist8 and Media Institutions On February 11, 1976, the CIA announced new guidelines governing its relationship with U.S. media organizations: Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any fnll-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.16 Of the approximately 50· U.S. journalis·s or personnel of U.S. media organizations who m're employed by the CIA or maintained some other covert relationship with the CIA at the time of the announcement, fewer than one-half will be terminatE'd under the new CIA guidelines. About half of the some 50 CIA rE'lationships with the U.S. media were paid relationships, ran!!ing from salaried operatives working under journalistic cover, to U.S. journalists serving as "independent contractors" for the CIA and being paid regularly for their services, to those who receive only occasional gifts and reimbursements from the ClAY 1I10re than a dozen United States news organizafions and commercial publishing houses formerly provided cover for 01A agents abroad. A few of these organizations were unaware that they pro-vided this c01,er. 18 Although the variety of the CIA relationships with the U.S. media makes a svstematic breakdown of them almost impossible, former CIA Director Colby has distinguished among four types of relationships.19 These are: (1) Staff of general circulation, U.S. news organizations; (2) Staff of small, or limited circulation, U.S. publications; (3) Free-lance, stringers, propaganda writers, and employees of U.S. publishing houses; (4 ) Journalists "'ith whom CIA maintains unpaid, occasional, covert contact. While the CIA did not provide the names of its media agents or the names of the media organizations with which they are connected, the Committee reviewed summaries of their relationships and work with the CIA. Through this review the Committee found that as of February 1976: (1) The first category, which would include any staff member of a general circulation U.S. ne\vs organization who functions as a paid undercover contact of the CIA, appears to be virtually phased out. The ,. ACl'ording- to the CIA, "accredited" appliel' to individuall' who lire "formally authorized by contract or issuance of press credentials to represent themselves al' l'orrespondentl'." 17 Drawn from "operational case studies" provided to the Committee 12/16/75 and 10/21/75. 13 For expla nation of footnotes, !;lee p. 179. ,. On November 30, 1973, thp WMhinf1frm Star-N~w. reported that Dirertor Colby had ordered a review of CIA media rel'ationships in September of that year, and reported that Colhy would phase out the first category but maintain journali<'\ts in each of the other three categories. In his tef'\timony to the House Select Committee on Intelligence on November 6, 1975, Colby made a general reference to these categories. 196 Committee has found only two current relationships that fit this category, both of which are being terminated under the CIA's February 11, 1976 stated policy. The Committee has also found a small number of past relationships that fit this category. In some cases the covel' arrangement consisted of reimbursing the U.S. newspaper for any articles by Hle CIA agent which the paper used. In at least one case the journalistic functions assumed by a CIA staff officer for covel' purposes grew to a point where the officer concluded that he could not satisfactorily serve the requirements of both his (unwitting) U.S. media employers and the CIA, and therefore resigned from the CIA. He maintained contact, however. with the CIA and continued, very occasionally, to report to the CIA from the countries in 'N'hich he ·worked. (2) Of the less than ten relationships with writers for small, or limited circulation, U.S. publications, such as trade journals or newsletters, most are for cover purposes. (3) The third, and largest, category of CIA relationships with the U.S. media includes free-lance journalists; "stringers" for newspapers, news magazines and news services; itinerant authors; propaganda writers; and agents working under cover as employees of U.S. publishing houses abroad. With the exception of the last group, the majority of the individuals in this category are bona fide writers or journalists or photographers. Most are paid by the CIA, and virtually all are witting; few, however, of the news organizations to which they contribute are aware of their CIA relationships. (4) The fourth category of covert relationships resembles the kind of contact that journalists have with any other department of the U.S. Government in the routine performance of their journalistic duties. No money changes hands. The relationships are usually limited to occasional lunches, interviews, or telephone conversations during which information would be exchanged or verified. The difference. of course, is that the relationships are covert. The jourJ'alist either volunteers or is requested by the CIA to provide some sort of information about people with whom he is in contact. In several cases, the relationship began when the journalist approached a U.S. embassy officer to report that he was approached by a foreign intelligence officer; in others, the CIA initiated the relationship. The first major step to impose restrictions on the use of U.S. journalists was taken by former Director Colby in the fall of 1973. According to Mr. Colby's letter to the Committee: 21 (a) CIA will undertake no activity in which there is a risk of influencing domestic public opinion, either directly or indirectly. The Agency will continue its prohibition against placement of material in the American media. In certain instances, usually where the initiative is on the part of the media, CIA will occasionally provide factual non-attributable briefings to various elements of the media, but only in cases where we are sure that the senior editorial staff is aware of the source of the information provided. 21 Letter from William Colby to the Select Committee, 10/21/75. 197 (b) As a general policy, the Agency will not make any clandestine use of staff employees of U.S. publications which have a substantial impact or influence on public opinion. This limitation includes cover use and any other activities which might be directed by CIA. (c) A thorough review should be made of CIA use of nonstaff journalists; i.e., stringers and free-lancers, and also those individuals involved in journalistic activities who are in nonsensitive journalist-related positions, primarily for cover backstopping. Our goal in this exercise is to reduce such usage to a minimum. Mr. Colby's letter specified that operational use of staff~thatis, fulltime correspondents and other employees of major U.S. news magazines, newspapers, \'o'ire services, or television networks--was to be avoided. Use would be less restricted for "stringers" or oc'Casional correspondents for these news organizations, as well as for correspondents working for smaller, technical, or specialized publications. The public statement that the CIA issued on February 11, 1976, expressed a policy of even greater restraint: -Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station. -As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy. -CIA recognizes that members of these groups (U.S. media and religious personnel) may wish to provide information to the CIA on matters of foreign intelligence of interest to the U.S. Government. The CIA will continue to welcome information volunteered by such individuals.22 From CIA testimony later that month, the Committee learned that this prohibition extends to non-Americans accredited to U.S. media organizations. Nevertheless, this prohibition does not cover "unaccredited" Americans serving in U.S. media organizations, or free-lance writers. As previously noted, the CIA has informed the Committee that, of the approximately 50 CIA relationships with U.S. journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations, fewer than one-half will be terminated under the new guidelines.23 3. Two Issues: "Fallout" and the Integrity of a Free Press In examining the CIA's past and present use of the U.S. media, the Committee finds two reasons for concern. The first is the potential, inherent in covert media operations, for manipulating or incidentally .. CIA instructions interpreting the new policy explain that "the term 'contractual' applies to any written or oral agreement obligating the Agency to provide financial remuneration including regular salaries, spot payments. or reimbursement of, out-Of-pocket operational expenses or the provision of otber material benefits that are clearly intended as a reward for services rendered the Agency." 23 CIA response of March 17, 1976 (76-{)315/1). 198 misleading the American public. The second is the damage to the credibility and independence of a free ~ress which may be caused by covert relationships with U.S. journalIsts and media organizations. In his 19'67 order prohibiting CIA publication in this country, then Deputy Director for plans Desmond FitzGerald raised the first issue. He stated: Fallout in the United States from a foreign publication which we support is inevitable and consequently permissible. In extensive testimony, CIA employees both past and present have conceded that there is no way to shield the American public from such "fallout." As a former senior official of the Agency put it in testimony: There is no way in this increasingly small world of ours of insulating information that one puts out overseas and confining it to the area to where one puts it out.... When British intelligence was operating in the last century, they could plant an outrageous story in some local publication and feel fairly confident that no one else would ever hear about it, that wonld be the end of it. . . . That is no longer the case. Whether or not this type of overseas activity should be allowed to continue is subject to differing views and judp:ments. My own would be that we would be fools to relinquish it because it serves a very useful purpose.25 The same former CIA official continued: If you plant an article in some paper overseas, and it is a hard-hittin~ article, or a revelation. there is no way of I!naranteeing that it is not going to be picked up and published by the Associated Press in this country.25& The domestic fallout of covert propap:anda comes from many sources; books intended primarily for an English-speaking foreign audience, press placements that are picked up by international wire services, press services controlled hy the CIA, and direct funding of foreign institutions that attempt to propagandize the United States public and Congress. In the case of books, substantial fallout in the U.S. may be a necessary part of the propaganda process. For example, CIA records for 1967 state that certain books about China subsidized or even produced by the Agency "circulate principally in the U.S. as a prelude to later distribution abroad." Several of these books on China were widely reviewed in the United States, often in juxtaposition to the sympathetic view of the emerging China as presented by Edgar Snow. At least once, a book review for an Agency book which appeared in the New York Times was written by a CIA writer under contract. E. Howard Hunt, who had been in charge of contacts with U.S. publishers in the late 19608, acknowledged in testimony before this Committee that CIA books circulated in the U.S., and suggested that such fallout may not have been unintentional. .. Thomas H. KaramesSines testimony of a former Deputy Director for plans, 10/22/75, p. 46. ... Former Deputy Director for plans testimony. 10/2i/75, p. 36. 199 QnesNon. Rut. with anything that was publisl~ed in English, the Unitf'd States citizf'nry would become a likely audience for publication ~ Mr. HUNT. A likely audience, definitely. Question. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept out of or away from the American reading public? Mr. HUNT. It was impossible because Praeger was a commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. HUNT. If your targets are foreign, then where are they ~ They don't all necessarily read English, and we had a bilateral agreement with the British that we wouldn't propagandize their people. So unless the book goes into a lot of lanP.'uages or it is published in India, for example, where English is a lingua !ran<:a, then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this was rationalized by the project review board ... was that the ultimate target was foreign, which was true, but how much of the Praeger output actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.26 An American who reads one of these books which purportedly is authored by a Chinese defector would not know that his thoughts and opinions about China are possibly being shaped by an agency of the United States Government. Given the paucity of information and the inaccessibility of China in the 1960s, the CIA may have helped shape American attitudes toward the emerging China. The CIA considers such "fallout" inevitable. Another example of the damages of "fallout" involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe. Inevitably these news services had U.S. subscribers. The larger of the two was subscribed to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services. A serious problem arises from the possible use of U.S. publications for press placements. Materials furnished to the Committee describe a relationship which poses this problem. It began in August 1967after the Katzenbach Committee rf'commendations-and continued until May 1974. In this case, a F.S.-based executive of a major U.S. newspaper was contacted by the CIA "on a confidential basis in view of his access to information of intelligence and operational interests." ~he news executive served as a witting, unpaid collaborator for intellIgence collection, and received briefings from the CIA which "were of porfessional benefit" to him. The CIA materials state that: It w-as visualized that . . . propaganda (if agreeable to him) might be initially inserted in his paper and then be available for reprinting by Latin American news outlets . There is no indication in the file that Subject agreed or that he did place propaganda in his newspaper.27 '" E. Howard Hunt testimony. 1/10/76 pp. 73, 74. ;1 CIA Operational case stUdy #14. 200 The danger of CIA propaganda contaminating U.S. media-"fallout"- occurs in virtually any instance of propaganda use. The possibility is quite real even when the CIA does not use any U.S. journalist or publication in carrying out the propaganda project. Where a CIA propaganda campaign causes stories to appear in ~any prestig- ious news outlets around the world, as occurred at the bme of .the Chilean elections in 1970, it is truly impossible to insulate the Umted States from propaganda fallout. Indeed, CIA records for the September-October 1970 propaganda effort in Chile indicate that "replay" of propaganda in the U.S. was not unexpected. A cable summary for September 25, 1970 reports: Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo, Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme materials. Items also carried in NelO York Times, Wa8hington Post. Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of Chile developments along our theme guidance....28 The fallout problem is probably most serious when the U.S. public is dependent on the "polluted" media channel for its information on a particular subject. When news events have occurred in relatively isolated parts of the world, few major news organizations may have been able to cover them initially, and world-wide coverage reflects whatever propaganda predominates in the media of the area. Another situation in which the effects of "fallout" in the United States may be significant is that in which specialized audiences in the United States-area study specialists, for example-may unknowingly rely heavily on materials produced by, or subsidized by, the CIA. The d8!nger of this form of dependence is less now than it had been prior to the freer flow of Western travelers to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. In its inquiry into the activities of a Vietnamese institution the Committee discovered a particularly unfortunate example of domestic fall-out of covert propaganda, activities. The institution was a CIAinspired creation. The intention of the CIA, according to its own records, was not to undertake propaganda against the United States. Whatever the design, the propaganda effort han an implld on the American public and congressional opinion. The CIA provided $170,000 per year in 1974 and 1975 for the sunport of this institution's publications. The embassy in the United States distributed the magazine to American readers, including the offices of all United States Congressmen and Senators. The institution on at least one occasion invited a group of American Congressmen to Vietnam and snonsorf>d their activities on at least part of their trip. Through this institution the CIA-however inadventently-engaged in propagandizing the American public, including its Congress, on the controversial issue of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. One particular kind of possible "fallout" has aroused official concern. That is fallout upon the U.S. Government of the CIA's "black nronagnada"- propaganda that appears to originate from an unfriendly source. Because the source of black propaganda is so fully concealed, the CIA recognizes that it risks seriously misleading U.S. policy- .. Chile Task Force Log (R597). 201 makers. An Agency regulation specifies that the Directorate of Operations should notify app'ropriate elements of the DDI and the Intelligence Community If the results of a black operation might influence the thinking of senior U.S. officials or affect U.S. intelligence estimates. Regular coordination between the CIA and the State Department's INR has been instituted to prevent the self-deception of "senior U.S. officials" through black propaganda. It should be noted that this procedure applies only to black propaganda and only to "senior U.S. officials." No mechanism exists to protect the U.S. public and the Congress from fallout from black propaganda or any other propaganda. The Committee re~ognizes that other countries make extensive use of the international media for their propaganda purposes. The United States public is not insulated from this propaganda either. It is clear, however, that the strongest defense a free country has from propaganda of any kind is a free and vigorous press that expresses diverse points of view. Similarly, the most effective way for this country to respond to the use of propaganda abroad is to permit American Journalists and news organizations to pursue their work without jeopardizing their credibility in the eyes of the world through covert use of them. C. CoVERT USE OF U.S. RELIGIOUS GROUPS The Committee considers religious groups-like academia and the press-to be among the most important of our society's institutions. As such, any covert relationship that might either influence them or jeopardize their reputation is extremely sensitive. Moreover, operational use of U.S. religious organizations differs from the use of other elements of U.S. society. It is a special case, in that virtually all religions are inherently supra-national. Making operational use of U.S. religious groups for national purposes both violates their nature and undermines their bonds with kindred groups around the world. In its examination of CIA relationships with domestic institutions, the Committee has focused exclusively on the use of U.S. religious organizations. 1. RestrWtions on the Use of Religious Personnel The CIA guidelines issued in the wake of the Katzenbach Committee report required prior approval bv the DDO for operational use of any employee, staff member. or official of a U.S. erlucational or private organization. Thi~ restriction applied to operational use of these individuals who were affiliated with American relkious organizations. The CIA has provided the Committee with no other regulations that apply specifically to the use of religious groups. In a letter to this Committee, however, Mr. Colby stated that the CIA used religious groups with great caution, and that their use required special approval within the Agency: Denuty Director fN' Operations regulations require the Denuty Director for Onerations' annroval for the 11<::e of religious groups. He has the resnonsibilitv of en!"uring that such operational use avoids infrinl!ement or damage to the individual religious personnel involved in their group. Such 207-932 0 - 76 - 14 202 use is carefully weighed and approvals in recent years have been relatively few in number.29 On February 11, 1976, the CIA announced : CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy. The CIA has assured the Committee that the prohibition against "all paid or contractual relationships" is in fact a prohibition against any operational use of Americans following a religious vocation. ~. Scope of Relationship8 The number of American clergy or misionaries used by the CIA has been small. The CIA has informed the Committee of a total of 14 covert arrangements which involved direct operational use of 21 individuals. Only four of these relationships were current in August 1975, and according to the CIA, they were used only for intelligence collection, or, in one case, for a minor role in preserving the cover of another asset. The other ten relationships with U.S. religious personnel had been terminated before August 1975; four of them ended within the last five years. In six Or seven cases, the CIA paid salaries, bonuses, or expenses to the religious personnel, or helped to fund projects run by them. Most of the individuals were used for covert action purposes. Several were involved in large covert action projects of the mid-sixties, which were directed at "competing" with communism in the Third World. 3. 188ue8 : "Fallout," Violation of Tru8t As several of the relationships-all terminated-involved the religious personnel in media activity, some of the same concerns must be voiced as when U. S. journalists are used covertly. The danger of U.S. "fallout" of CIA propaganda existed in three or four of the relationships with U.S. religious personnel. The more serious issue, however, is the question of the confidentiality of the relationships among members of the clergy and their congregations. Of the recent relationships, the most damaging would appear to be that of a U.S. priest serving the CIA as an informant on student and relicious dissidence. Of the earlier cases, one exemplifies the extent to which the CIA used confidential pastoral relationships. The CIA used the pastor of a church in a Third World country as a "principal agent" to carry out covert action projects, and as a spotter, assessor, asset developer, and recruiter. He collected information on political developments and on personalities. He passed CIA propaganda to the local press. According to the CIA's description of the case, the pastor's analyses were based on his long-term friendships with the personalities, and the agents under him were "well known to him in his professional life." At first the CIA provided only occasional gifts to the pastor in return .. Letter from William Colby to the Select Committee, 10/21/75. 203 for his services; later, for over ten years, the CIA paid him a salary that reached $11,414 annually. 4. The OIA aid U.S. Religious Organizations and Personnel: Oonclusions and Rec01nmendations The Committee welcomes the policy, announced by the CIA on February 11, 1976, that prohibits any operational use of Americans following a religious vocation. The fact that relatively few American clergy or missionaries have been used by the CIA suggests that neither this country's capacity to collect intelligence nor its covert action capability would be seriously affected by a total ban on their. operational use. Therefore, the Committee recommends that the CIA's recent prohibition on covert paid or contractual relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and any American clergyman or missionary should be established by law.
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