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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
XIV. THE DEPARTMEXT OF STATE
In addition to strengthening our defense, the purpose of U.S. intelligence
activities is more effective foreign policy. Intelligence informs
foreign policy decisions and in the role of covert action seeks to attain
foreign policy objectives. In sum, intelligence is a service, a support
function, indeed it is so designated and structured by the military
services. However, in the field of foreign policy, intelligence activities
have sometimes become an end in themselves, dominating or divorced
from policy considerations and insulated in important respects from
effective policy oversight.
The Department of State is responsible for the formulation and
execution of foreign policy. Yet unlike the Department of Defense, the
State Department has no command over intelligence activities essential
to its mission except the Foreign Service.
The Department of State and the American Foreign Service are the
chief producers and consumers of political and economic intelligence
in the United States Government. The Department participates
actively in the interagency mechanisms concerned with collection and
production of intelligence. However, it has been unable or unwilling to
assume responsibility over clandestine intelligence activities.
The Foreign Service competes with the Clandestine Service in the
production of human source intelligence, but operates openly and does
not pay its sources. The State Department, as well as American ambassadors
abroad, is called upon, at least in theory, to exert a measure of
control over certain aspects of CIA's secret overseas activities. Indeed,
the State Department through U.S. embassies and consulates offers the
only external check upon CIA's overseas activities; they are the only
means abroad that can help assure that Ameri~a's clandestine activities
are being carried out in accord with the decisions made at the
highest level in Washington.
The primary purpose of the Select Committee's inquiry was to examine
the effectiveness of the Department of State and the Foreign Service
in this role. The Committee also examined the Foreign Service
intelligence collection efforts.
To this end, the Select Committee visited several overseas missions,
embassies and consulates and conducted extensive interviews with
ambassadors, Foreign Service officers and State Department personnel
as well as taking sworn testimony. From this investigation it is
evident that the role of the Department of State is central to fundamental
reform and improvement in America's intelligence operations
overseas.
A. ORIGIXS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION
It has been the traditional function of the Department of State and
the Foreign Service to gather, report and analyze information on foreign
political, military, economic and cultural developments. That
(305)
306
intelligence function, like most of the responsibilities of the Department,
IS not established by statute. The basic statement of the duties
and responsibilities of the Secretary of State is contained in an Act of
Congress of July 27, 1789, as follows:
The Secretary of State shall perform such duties as shall froJ!!
time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the PreSIdent
relative to correspondences, commissions, or instructions
with public ministers ~ron: foreign states.or princ~s, o~ t? memorials
or other applIcatIOns from foreIgn publIc mIlllsters
or other foreigners, or to such other matter respecting ~oreign
affairs as the President of the United States shall aSSIgn
to the department and he shall conduct the business of the
department in such manner as the President shall direct.1
The statutes are no more precise about the functions of the Foreign
Service, and the members which
shall under the direction of the Secretary [of State], represent
abroad the interests of the United States and shall perform
the duties and comply with the obligations resulting
from the nature of their appointments or assignments or imposed
on them by the terms of any law or by any order or
regulation issued pursuant to law or by any international
agreement in which the Unjted States is a party.2
Most Presidents have chosen to use the Secretary of State as their
principal advisor and agent in foreign affairs; foreign intelligence
activities of the Department and Foreign Service have developed in
a logICal pattern from that practice.
Today the President's Executive Order assigns to State responsibility
for collecting overtly "foreign political, political-military, sociological,
economic, scientific, technical and associated biographic information."
28 The reporting of the Foreign Service, together with that
of the military attache system, !based on firsthand dbservation and
especially on official dealings with governments, makes up the most
useful element of our foreign intelligence information. Clandestine
and technical sources provide supplementary information, the relative
importance of which varies with the nature and accessibility of
the information sought.
While clandestine and technical sources of information are today
the responsibility of the CIA and other agencies, State is not without
past experience in such matters. The Department operated one or more
clandestine intelligence networks during and after World War II
and closed them down, at CIA insistence, only in the 1950s. The Department
engaged in such activities in earlier times. On the technical
side, the State Department operated a cryptanalytic unit called the
Black Chamber during the inter-war years. It was abolished by Secretary
Stimson in 1929 on the ground that "gentlemen do not read
each other's mail."
1 R.S. § 202, 22 U.S. 2556.
• 22 U.S. 841.
•• Executive Order No. 11905, 2/18/76.
307
Although foreign intelligence has always been a major function
of the State Department, the Department had no separate-and acknowledged-
intelligence unit prior to Wodd War II. At the end of
the war, the research and analysis branch of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), numbering over 1,500, was transferred to the Department,
and the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research
and Intelligence was established to head the new organization
into which was incorporated as well certain existing State units.
President Truman initially contemplated a much more significant
intelligence role for State and directed Secretary Byrnes to
take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated.
foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned
with that type of activity. This should be done through
the creation of an inter-departmental group, heading up
under the State Department, which should formulate plans
for my approval.'·
Although Dean Acheson, as Under Secretary, moved promptly in the
fall of 1945 to develop such plans, he soon
encountered heavy flak. It came from three sources: congressional
opposition to professional intelligence work, civil disobedience
in the State Department [i.e. the geographic divisions
opposed "intelligence work not in their organizations
and under their control"] and indecision in high places
brought on by military opposition to both unification of the
services and CIvilian control of intelligence.3
In the end Secretary Byrnes bowed to this opposition and joined in
recommending to the President what Acheson calls "an odd plan for
a National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Group,
. . . thus moving primacy in intelligence from the State Department
to the Executive Office of the President." 4
Byrnes also adopted the recommendations of the Department's
geographic divisions and broke up the OSS research and analysis
unit which State had inherited, dispersing its personnel to those divisions.
However, this decision was reversed by General Marshall shortly
after he became Secretary of State in January 1947 and State has
since then had a central intelligence unit, now generally known as
INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research). INR's stature and
influence in the Department have gradually increased, though its size
has been greatly reduced, numbering today some 325 with a budget of
less than $10 million. The reduction has resulted in part from budgetary
pressures, in part from the transfer of certain functions (e.g., contributions
to the now-defunct National Intelligence Survey, biographic
reporting) to the CIA.
The organization is made up of two directorates reflecting the two
basic responsibilities of the organization. The Directorate for Research
produces finished intelligence (reports and estimates) to meet the
operating and planning requirements of the Department. The Direc-
2' Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,
1969), p. 158.
3 Ibid., p. 159.
• Ibid., pp. 160-161.
308
torate also participates in the production of National Intelligence
Estimates. The Directorate for Coordination is concerned with
the Department's relations with the other intelligence agencies
on matters other than the production of substantive intelligence. This
includes (a) the provision of Departmental guidance on operational
intelligence questions, including staff support for State participation
on the 40 Committee; (b) management of assignment of Defense
Attache personnel; and (c) development of positIOns on intelligence
requirements and the allocation of intelligence resources.
However, INR has no personnel abroad and is not responsible for
the collection of intelligence overseas. The substantive direction of
the U.S. embassies and consulates, which are the intelligence collectors,
is the responsibility of the geographic bureaus.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL
In viewing the role of the Department of State in command and
control of intelligence operations, it is necessary to distinguish between
Washington and the embassies abroad. The authority and responsibility
or the Secretary of State in this area differs markedly from
that of the Ambassador. Secondly, a distinction must be made between
covert operations, where the influence of the Department and the
Ambassador is normally substantial, and clandestine intelligence and
counterintelligence operations (espionage and counterespionage) ,
where the role of the Department, and sometimes but not always
that of the Ambassador, is minimal.
1. Role of the State Department in Washington
The duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of State, in general,
and for the direction and supervision of U.S. foreign intelligence operations
in particular, have not been defined by statute. Proposals after
WorId War II to put the Secretary of State 'in overall control of U.S.
foreign intelligence activities were rejected. The role of the Secretary
appears to be further downgraded in the President's Executive Order
of February 1976. The State Department is not represented on the
new Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Secretary is only
authorized to "coordinate with" the DCI to ensure that United States
intelligence activities and programs a,re useful for and consistent with
United States foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the Secretary is the senior Cabinet member, his primacy
within the executive branch in foreign relations has usually been
accepted, and his Department is the only one with knowledge, personnel
and facilities abroad to exercise effective control over foreign
operations. A Secretary who is disposed to assert his potential influence
and who has the support of the President can exercise considerable control
over CIA activities. This is clearly the situation today. It is
equally clear that it was not the situation under the previous Secretary
of State, William Rogers, who not only did not play an active role in
the intelligence area but on at least one occasion, the Committee found,
was systematically and deliberately kept in the dark regarding important
CIA operations.5
• Senate Select Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders," p. 231.
309
Apart from his relationship with the President, however, the Secretary
of State has had only limited influence upon the CIA. The Secretary
of State does not have access to CIA communications, except as
prescribed by the DCI. This privileged position, it is contended, is sanctioned
by the provision of the National Security Act of 1947 making
the DCI responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure. The Secretary of State knows only as
much about CIA opera,tions as CIA elects to tell him. Secondly, except
for covert action operations considered by the 40 Committee, he has
had no voice in the expenditure of CIA funds abroad. This is in contrast
to the role the Secretary of State has with regard to expenditure
of Military Assistance Program funds.
The Secretary of State's influence or control over CIA operations
varies greatly, depending upon the nature of the activity. It has been
greatest in the area of covert action, least in the area of espionage. In
the setting of intelligence requirements and the allocation of intelligence
resources, the Secretary of State has a voice but it is only one
voice out of many.
Authority for State influence over covert operations derives from
XSC directives and is exercised through membership on the 40 Committee
(now the Operations Advisory Group--OAG), which reviews
and recommends approval of such operations and certain sensitive
reconnaissance programs. Until the Kennedy administration, State
chaired the Committee. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
even without the chairmanship, State often had a virtually
controlling voice, through its veto power. Covert action and sensitive
reconnaissance operations are normally not presented to the Committee
unless cleared in advance with (or originated by) State and, where
this is not the case, a negative 'State position has rarely been overridden.
There have, however, been important exceptions, notably during
the first Nixon term when State influence declined markedly. On
one occasion the 40 Committee itself was bypassed.6
The leading role which State has normally played in the 40 Committee
stems from the fact that covert actions are designed to further
foreign policy objectives. But operations clearly have driven policy
in many instances. It is the CIA, not State, which is called on, in the
first instance, to explain and justify these programs to Congress. In
part this has been due to a desire to preserve State's "deniability."
However, that has apparently ended with President Ford's ExecutIve
Order which formally requires Secretary of State attendance at OAG
meetings.
In contrast to the 40 Committee mechanism for covert action operations,
there is no systematic procedure for vVashington review and
approval of clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence (espionage
and counterespionage) operations outside CIA. The distinction
was made by former DCI Richard Helms in this way:
Mr. HELMS. Exactly. Now this was one kind of approval for
the so-called political action projects. They had to be
approved not only once a year, but as they came forward
each time. And thus they had to be sent to the Approval Como
Ibid., p. 225.
310
mittee, you know, it has been variously knmvn as 303 and
Forty and Special Group and so forth. So there was a special
mechanism to have those projects cleared in the Special
Group.
The intelligence projects had a different kind of clearance
mechanism, because they could be done under the Director's
own authority. As you recall, NSCID Number 5 gives the
Director the authority to do foreign intelligence [checks?]
and counterespionage on his own recognizance, he doesn't
have to check it out with anybody as to whether he did this
or that or something else.
Q. Is that a good system ~ 'When you were Director you had
a sensitive collection program or counterintelligence program.
Did you often or sometimes check with the President or somebody
jn the White House or the Secretary of State about the
advisability or risks ~ Did you regard that as really basic to
yourjob~
Mr. HELMS. It was left to my judgment when I was Director
as to whether I cleared it with anybody or not.
Q. Did you very often ~
Mr. HELMS. From time to time I did. I was involved with
that Berlin Tunnel, for example, and I remember, we did
check that out before we went ahead with it.
Q. You did or did not?
Mr. HELMS. We did. And there were certain others that
we checked out before we went ahead with them. I don't
remember what they all were now. But there was a rule of
reason that was permitted to prevail here. And I think most
directors were sensitive enough fellows that if you were really
going to run a serious risk to our diplomatic life or our
foreign policy life, you might want to go to sec the Secretary
of State or somebody to hold lumds on those things,7
Thus State is effectively excluded from the decision to carry out
espionage operations unless CIA elects to consult. Because in practice
State is rarely consulted,s it does not have institutional arrangements
to develop advice and guidance in this area-as it does for covert
action operations.
The Committee is strongly of the view that these informal arrangements,
which leave consultation to the discretion of the DCI and which
do not fix any responsibility on the Secretary of State, have proved
to be harmful. Two areas of concern can be cited: First, some espionage
operations, e.g., the attempted recruitment as an agent or an official of
a friendly government, can have major adverse foreign policy
repercussions. Second, certain types of espionage operations have
had the effect of covert political action. For example, a subsidy to the
leader of a dissident group to facilitate the collection of information
about the group, has been taken by the leader (and the government in
power) as support for his dissidence. Thus a DCI cannot be subject to
7 Staff summary of Richard Helms interview. 9/11/75. p. 62.
• Out Of hundreds of agent recruitment efforts last year the Secretary of State
was co~Ited on less than five. . .
311
40 Committee or other controls by defining an operation with significant
political impact as espionage. State Department review of espionage
operations is needed to provide support and advice to ambassadors
in field supervision of CIA activities.
2. Command and Control in the Field
In contrast to the uncertain authority of the Secretary of State, the
authority of the Ambassador with respect to U.S. intelligence activities
in his country of assignment is clear, and, since 1974, has had a
statutory basis.
In 1961, President Kennedy addressed a letter to each Ambassador
stating that he expected him "to oversee and coordinate all activities of
the United States Government" in his country of assignment.9
That letter appears to have remained in force until it was superseded,
in December 1969, by a similar letter from President Nixon
which included the following:
As Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission, you
have full responsibility to direct and coordinate the activities
and operations of all of its elements. You will exercise
this mandate not only by providing policy leadership and
guidance, but also by assuring positIve program direction to
the end that all United States activities in (the host country)
are relevant to current realities, are efficiently and economically
administered, and are effectively interrelated so that
they will make a maximum contribution to United States
interests in that country as well as to our regional and internationalobjectives.
lO
This letter was supplemented by a classified State Department
instruction,l1 concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence,
which advised the Ambassador how the President's letter should be
interpreted with regard to CIA. The effect of this instruction is to
make the Ambassador's access to information on intelligence sources
and methods and his authority to approve or disapprove CIA operations
subject to the agreement of the Chief of Station and, in the
event of disagreement, to Washington for decision. It may well also
have had the effect of inhibiting ambassadors in seeking to inform
themselves fully in this area.
In 1974, the authority of the Ambassador was given a statutory
basis. The following new section was added to "An Act to provide
certain basic authority for the Department of State," approved August
1, 1956, as amended: 12
Authority and Re8ponsibility of Amba88ado1'8. Under the
Direction of the President-
(1) the United States Ambassador to a foreign country
shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination,
• "The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination, A Study Submitted by
the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations (Pursuant to S.
Res. 13, 88th Cong.) to the Committee on Government Operations, United States
Senate."
,. State Department Foreign Affairs Manual, 1"FAM 011.2, 1/27170.
11 CA-6693, 12/17/69.
12 22 U.S. 2680a.
312
and supervision of all rnited States Govel'llment officers and
employees in that country, except for personnel lInder the
command of a rnited States area military commander;
(:2) the Ambassador shall keep himself fully and cUlTently
informed with respect to all acti\'ities and operations of the
rnitecl States Government within that country, amI shall inSlll'e
that all govel'llment officers and elllployPes in that country,
except for persolllwi under the command of a rnited
States area military commander, comply fully \vith his directin'S;
and
U\) any department 01' agency having officers 01' employees
in a country shall keep the United States Ambassador to that
country fully and currently informed \"ith respect to all activities
and operations of its officers and employees in that
country, and shall insure that all of its officers and employees,
except for personnel under the command of a rnited States
area military commander, comply fully with all applicable
directives of the Ambassador.
The legislative history indicates that this statute was intended to
gi\'e statutory force to existing directives. However, under any reasonable
construction, it goes weB beyond the N"ixon letter, particularly
as interpreted by the State Department instruction cited above.
Xe\'eltheless, more than a year after its enactment, no new regulation
or clirectivps have bppn issued by the executive branch in implementation
of the statute, nor does it appeal' that it necessarily plans to
take any action to modify present guidelines. In response to the
Committee's inquiry, the 'Vhite House has advised the Chairman as
follows:
As you know, the issues addressed by this legislation were
encompassed in President Kennedy's letter of :May 29, 1961,
President Nixon's similar letter of December 9, 1969, and the
Department of State Circular Airgram 6693 of December 17,
1969. In addition, the Department of State in .July 1975 sent
the relevant section of Public Law 93-475 13 to all major embassies
in confirmation and reinforcement of existing guidelines.
The President is considering further steps and we will
keep you informed of any additional action that is takenY
So far as the Committee knows. no Ambassador has sought to invoke
the statute in see~in!! information on CIA operations. One
senior Ambassador testified that the statute is not really in effect without
implementing regulations in the executive branch:
Ambassador PORTER, Yes, but when you get the legislation
but you don't get the regu1lation based on it. you're not much
better off. That '74, yes, sir, that '74 addition to the basic
State Denariment Authorization Act, that really isn't in force
bef"ause the implementin.<r regulations have not been issued.
Senator MOXDALE. ",VeIl, :Mr. Ambassador, when a law is
passed, that is the law, is it not ~
13 Ibid.
"Ll?ttl?r from Philip Buchen, C<mnsel to the President, to Senator Church,
12/22175.
313
Ambassador PORTER. Yes, sir.
Senator MONDALE. Can a law be repealed by failing to issue,
regulations?
Ambassador PORTER. Repealed?
Senator MONDALE. Suspended.
Ambassador PanTER. Suspended? I would say yes.
Senator MONIlALE. I think t.he word is "inoperative." 15
The statute is apparently also "inoperative" so far as the CIA is concerned,
as indicated by the following CIA written responses to Committee
questions:
-If the Ambassodor asked to sec C'L'cry operational report
((18 opposed to intelligence report) 'What 'Lvould the Chief of
Station say?
The Chief of Station would inform the Ambassador that
he is referring the Ambassador's request immediately to his
headquarters for guidance.
-Is there any place where agent recruitments are cleared
by the Ambassador or the Secretary of State, including real
nannes?
Individual agent recruitments are not cleared with either
the Ambassadors 01' the Secretary of State.1G
The Committee staff has learned that there are divergent views
within the executive branch regarding implementation of the new
statute. It is clear from the testimony that CIA opposes giving the
Ambassador the unrestricted access to its communications and other
operational information that the law would appear to authorize. In
the past, the Agency has argued that this would conflict with the provision
of the National Security Act making the Director of Central
Intelligence responsible "for protecting intenigence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure." However, the statute resolves any
doubts as to whether disclosure to the Ambassador is authorized.
There are also other problems, of a practical nature, in implementing
the statute. Can an Ambassador, without additional support from
Washington, effectively direct and supervise the work of CIA personnel?
The basic responsibility of the Ambassador is for United
States relations with the country to which he is accredited. The Ambassador
is expected to be highly knowledgeable about the country to
which he is assigned. For CIA operations conducted within his country
of assignment, the Ambassador should be a good judge of the risks
of such operations, and of their possible usefulness to the U.S. It is
often the case, however, that CIA espionage operations mounted from
hi~ C'mbassy are directed against a third country, more often than not
a denied area country.11 There is no assurance that the Ambassador is
qualified to assess fully the risks or benefits of such operations. Nor, if
he pel'ceiycs that an operation directed from his embassy in Country
X against the denied area country poses a risk to U.S. relations with
Country X, is he able to weigh that risk against the potential benefits
of the intelligence to be gained. Such judgments often can only be
15 William .T. Porter testimony. 11/11/75, pp. 45-46.
16 William Nelson testimony. 12/10/75, Attachment B.
11 Essentially the commllnist countries.
207-932 0 - 76 - 21
314
made in 'Vashington. ,Yashington is where the problem arises. No
one outside the CIA, unless it be the President himself, is responsible
for directing and superdsing CIA clandestine intelligence operations
or is authorizrcl access to the information necessary to do so.
A logical corollary to 22 U.S. 2680a would, thus, be to assign to a
",Vashing-ton authority responsibility for control and supervision of
clandestine intelligence collection paralleling that assigned to the
ambassadors. The responsibility might be assigned to the Secretary
of State or to the 40 Committee. Either way, the Department of State
\yould have to have access to operational and source information to
\yhich it is not privy today, if meaningful supcrYision and control is
to be f'xerci,"ed.
Ambassadors interviewed by the Committee all recognize some
degree of responsibility for supervision of CIA activities and cite
President Nixon's letter of 1969 as the governing document. Most express
misgivings about tl1('ir ability to do so with confidence of support
from ",Vashington. The lack of access to CIA communications
leaves a residue of doubt that the Ambassador really knows what is
going on. Vigor and initiative on the part of Ambassadors seems lacking.
Most Ambassadors the Committee has talked with have not appeared
inclined to request detailed information, particularly regarding
espionage operations.
Supervision of intelligence activities by Ambassadors is in fact uneven
and, when exercised, the methods used differ widely. Much depends
on the knowledge and experienre of the Ambassador, and the
support he has or believes he has in 'Vashington. Further, the Committee's
inquiries have turned up no evidence that the State Department
today attaches more than routine importance to this ambassadorial
function.
In the absence of detailed guidance or indication of support from
",Vashington, ambassadorial performance varies widely. One Ambassador,
who generally is known to "run a tight ship," exercises detailed
supervision and control over the CIA Station. For example, he insists
on knowing source identities and on approving any sensitive espionage
operation in advance and CIA, or at least the Station Chief, has accepted
such control. This Ambassador, a career Foreib'11 Service Officer,
tends to attribute his good working relationship with the CIA
Station in large measure to the fact that he has had a great deal of
prior experience with CIA in Washington and in the field. Such experience
is clearly required by Ambassadors assigned to important
countries, thongh in practice, the assignment of Ambassadors has not
considerably reflected this requirement.
For whatever reason, this degree of detailed supervision appears to
be nnusual, if not unique. Our inquiries suggest that Ambassadors
rarely seek to learn source identities. In this arl~a they seem to be
affected by what one Ambassador has called "self-inflicted intimidation."
In one post-where there is a serious terrorist problem-the
Ambassador explained that he preferred not to know source identities
because of the possibility of being kidnapped. However, the same
Ambassador has taken a very strong stand that control of communieations
is esspntial if the Ambassador is to exereise effeefive supervision
over CIA. Still another senior Ambassador does not consider
that control of communications would really ensure that the Ambassa315
dar knows everything that is going on. This Ambassador controls by
what amounts to a threat; he informs each Chief of Station that he
expects to be consulted in advance about any operation which could
cause embarrassment. If any CIA operation about which he has not
been consulted causes difficulties, the Station Chief can expect no support
from the Ambassador. This would appear to be a more typical
procedure.
It should be noted that these are techniques designed to forestall
surprise and embarrassment. There is no body of doctrine or standards
against which judgments can be made on whether to approve a
given operation, nor are Ambassadors given any basic instruction on
espionage techniques and risks. It is hardly surprising, therefore, if
there is a wide variation in practice and that judgments tend to be
ad hoc and subjective. This is not likely to change so long as the matter
is left to individual Ambassadors.17a
C. SUPPORT: COMMUNICATIONS
In the early 1960s, responsibility for most U.S. diplomatic communications
was assigned to CIA. This came about as the result of a
decision to bring about radical (and costly) improvements in existing
facilities. It was judged that CIA could obtain the necessary funds
more easily and quickly than State. Furthermore, CIA already had
its own communication facilities, and, as it was accepted that the
Agency would have to have such facilities in the future, it also seemed
more efficient to give CIA responsibility for a single network serving
both agencies. To permit some privacy in State communications, the
new system provided for a State superencipherment capability.
The situation today is that State has access to CIA communications
only as determined by CIA, whereas CIA has access to all
State communications, except in those cases where State takes the
initiative (and the trouble) to encipher the message giving it to CIA
for further encipherment and transmission. Control of communication
is a key element of command; the existing arrangements are not compatible
with the role of the Ambassador prescribed in 22 U.S. 2680a.
The Ambassador cannot be sure that he knows the full extent and
nature of CIA operations for which he is held responsible by law.
D. PRODUCTIO~ OF INTELI,IGE~CE
Surveys carried out by the Director of Central Intelligence make
clear the importance of Foreign Service reporting in the production
of national intelligence. In these surveys analysts are asked which
('ollection sources had most often made a key contribution to the National
Intelligence Bulletin and national intelligence memoranda and
reports. The ranking reflects intelligence inputs regarded by the analysts
as so essential that basic conclusions and findings could not have
17& At the request of the CIA, the Committee has deleted a section of this report
entitled "Support: Cover" to protect sensitive intellig-ence sources and methods. A
classified version of this section is available to Members of the Senate under the
proyisions of S. Res. 21 and the Rules of the Senate.
316
been reached without them. The State Department's collection inputs
have consistently led the ratings.18
Of course, collection of overt intelligence is only one function of the
Foreign Service Officer, who is charged also with representation of
U.S. interests, negotiations, etc. It is, in fact, the latter functions,
which put him in contact with responsible and knowledgeable officials
and politicians of the local government and with other diplomats,
that give him access to the most important information. Foreign Service
reporting generally includes analysis pointing up the significance
of particular events. These factors probably account in large measure
for the high ranking accorded FSO reports by the intelligence analysts.
In any event, the Committee has found no evidence of any correlation
between the importance attached by the intelligence community
to the Foreign Senice collection operation and the application of
reSO\ll'ces in men and money to that operation. Indeed, political and
economic reporting positions abroad have been steadily reduced for
some years. In one major European country crucial to America's
security there is only one Foreign Service political reporting officer
located outside the capital due to such cutbacks. The Ambassador said
that if he had additional resources, the first move would be to reestablish
political reporting officers in the several consulates in the
country. The Ambassador explained that by law the Foreign Service
must carry out a number of consular functions and that with evertightening
resources the political reporting function has been squeezed
out. The Committee determined, however, that the CIA has sufficient
resources to consider a major new clandestine collection program in
that same country.
For the past thirty years, the Department of State has been short of
resources. Its reporting functions have been taken up by the relatively
more prosperous CIA. ViTithin State or in the intelligence community,
there is no systematic or clear allocation of resources for the
reporting task-except for commercial information. Overseas posts
get a "representation allowance," generally meager, which is used in
part to cultivate reporting sources and contacts but which also must
be shared with other sections of the post, including the administrative
and consular sections. 'Vhen there is a choice between paying for the
costs of a visiting distinguished official, such as a Congressman, or
supporting the work of a junior political officer, the only source for
this olltlay is the so-caned "representation fund."
The State Department's "representation allowance" is a favorite
target for Congressional reduction in part because it has become
synonymous with diplomatic "cocktail parties." As a result, the CIA
with its "operational funds" and even the Military Attaches have a
much greater degree of funding and flexibility. In one post, for example,
the allowance of the Defense Attache nearly equaled that of
the Ambassador and the political and economic sections combined.
There is no separate fund to facilitate overt collection of political and
economic information. The Department of State budget contains no
linB items for such purposes and continues to show only salaries and
expenses with no indication of their objectives. The Department has
18 "Key Sources of Selected CIA Publications," Annual Survey done by Directorate
of Intelligence of CIA (1975).
317
been unwilling to press the Congress for more funding, particularly
ror expansion or the so-called "representation allowance." As a result,
the largest, most important, and least risky source of political and
economic intelligence for the United States Government is neglected
in the Federal budget and severely underfunded.
Secondly, the Department itself seems to have made little effort to
direct the Foreign Service collection effort in a systematic way. The
Department itself levies no overall requirements. Most regional bureau
Assistant Secretaries send periodic letters to field posts indicating subjects
of priority interest and these letters are supplemented by "officialinformal"
communications from the Country Director (desk officBr).
In addition the Department participates in the development ()f interagency
intelligence requirement lists, and those lists are transmitted
to the embassies and consulates abroad. The Department believes that
these procedures suffice, and does not ravor the development or a more
elaborate requirement mechanism for the Foreign Service.
The Department has made no significant effort to train junior Foreign
Service Officers in the techniques of political reporting. The record
is somewhat better for economic reporting. A recent report of the
Department's Inspector General concluded that the Department has
generally been remiss in setting and maintaining professional standards
through systematic training, assignment, and promotion policies.
These judgments go well beyond the mandate of the Select Committee,
but the Committee would strongly endorse measures designed to maximize
the userulness of this key collection source.
 

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