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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH
COXCERXIXG COVET-{T ACTIOK
I believe this committee has produced a remarkably thorough report
on the difficult subject of covert action. However. it is my own personal
view that the covert action capability of the 11$. intelligence community
ought to be circumscribed more sharply than a majority of the full
committee was willing to recommend. I include these adclitional remarks
to explain my point of \'iew.
\Ve live in a dangerouf' worH. Soviet submarines silently traverse
thb vcrail floors carrying transi'ontinental lllissilps with thp cap3;city
to strike. at 0111' heartland, The nuclear arms race threatens to C'ontmue
its deadly spiral to,ntrd .\xmagprlrlon,
In this perilous setting1 it i;.: imperative for the United States to
maintain a strong and effective intelligence service. On this propositioll
we can ill afford to be of 1\\'0 mi'v'ls. \V(' haw> no ,hoi('(' otlll'I' than to
gather, analyze, and as~'ess-- to th,' ht'st of our abilities-vital information
on the intent and prowess of foreign adversaries. present 01'
potentiaL
\VitDout an adequatE' intf'lJig'l"Tl"e-f'litllering apparatus we would be
unable to gauge wIth ronfidpll('f' 0111' defense requirements; unable to
conduct an informed foreign polie)'; unable to control. through satellite
surveillance. a runaway nuelear arms race. "The winds and waveS
are always on the side of t1w ablest navigators," wrote Gibbon. Thosp
nations without a skill fn J i nh'lI i~pn('p service must navi;,rate beneath
a clouded sky.
'Vhile one may debate the <VlaJity of the Agencyls performance,
there has never been any (1I1PstlOn about the propriety and necessity
of its evolvement in the procpss of ~athering and evaluating foreign
intelligence. Nor have serious questIOns been raised about the means
used to acquire such informatIOn. whether from the overt sources,
technical deviees, Or by clanrlestine methods.
'Vhat has becomp rontronrsiaJ is quite nnn>lated to intplligenel',
but has to do, instead, with the so-called covert operations of the CIA,
those secret efforts to manipulate events within foreign countries in
ways presumed to serve the interest" of the United States. Nowhere
rrre such activities vouchsaferl in the statutory language which created
the Agency in 1947. "No indication was given in the statute that the
CIA WOllIn be{'ome a "ehi('le for foreign political action or clandestine
political warfare," notes Harrv Howe Ransome. a scholar who has
,written widely and thought deeply about the problems of intelligence
111 mo.der~ society. Mr. Ransome concludes that "probably no other
orgamzatlOn of the Federal Government has taken such liberties in
interpreting its legally assigned functions as has the CIA."
The legal basis for this political action arm of the CIA is very
much open to question. Certainly the legislative history of the 1!l47
Act fails to indicatp that Congr'pss antieipntl'c1 the CI\ would ever
engage in ('o\'(>rt politieul warfare abroad.
(56:3)
564
The CIA points to a catch-all phrase contained in the 1947 Act as a
rationalization for its operational prerogatives. A clause in the statute
permits the Agency "to perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may, from time to time, direct." These vague and seemingly
innocuous words have been seized upon as the green light for the
CIA intervention around the world.
Moreover, these interventions into the political affairs of foreign
countries soon came to overshadow the Agency's original purpose of
gathering and evaluating information. The United States came to
adopt the methods and accept the value system of the "enemy." In the
secret world of covert action, we threw off all restraints. Not content
merely to discreetly subsidize foreign political parties, labor unions,
and newspapers, the Central Intelligence Agency soon began to directly
manipulate the internal politics of other countries. Spending many
millions of dollars annually, the CIA filled its bag with dirty tricksranging
from bribery and false propaganda to schemes to "alter the
health" of unfriendly foreign leaders and undermine their regimes.
The United States must acquire a longer view of history. We need
not be so frightened by each Russian intervention. We need not feel so
compelled to react in kind to each Russian move. We haVE} gained
little, and lost a great deal by our past policy of compulsive interventionism.
Above all, we have lost- or grievously impaired-the good
name and reputation of the United States from which we once drew
a unique capacity to exercise matchless moral leadership. Where once.
we were admired, now we are resented. Where once we were welcom!>,
now we are tolerated, at best. In the eyes of millions of once friendly
foreign people, the United States is today regarded with grave suspicion
and distrust.
I must lay the blame, in large measure, to the fantasy that it lay
within our pOWer to control other countries through the covert manipulation
of their affairs. It formed part of a greater illusion that entrapped
and enthralled our Presidents-the illusion of American
omnipotence.
Neverthe'less, I do not draw the conclusion of those who now argue
that all American covert operations must 'be banned in the future. I
can conceive of a dire emergency when timely clandestine action on
our part might a.vert a nuclear holocaust and save an entire civilization.
But for such extraordinary events, certainly we do not need a regiment
of cloak-and-dagger men, earning their campaign ribbons-and,
indeed, their promotions-by planning new exploits throughout the
world. Theirs is a self-generating enterprise. Once the capability for
covert activity is established, the pressures brought to bear on the
President to use it are immense.
I, myself, believe that all covert activity unrelated to the gathering
of essential intelligence should be severed entirely from the CIA.
If some circumstance in the future should require a secret operation in
a foreign land, let it be done under the direct aegis of the States
Department.
And if the covert activity is not impelled by the imperative of survival,
itself, then let it be directly connected with legitimate security
interests of the United States in a way that conforms with our tradi565
tional belief in freedom. Then, if our hand were exposed, we could
scorn the cynical doctrine of "plausible denial," and say openly, "Yes,
we were there-and proud of it!"
We were there in \Vestern Europe, helping to restore democratic
governments in the aftermath of the Second World War. It was only
after our faith gave way to fear that we'began to act as a self-appointed
sentinel of the status quo.
Then it was that all the dark arts of secret intervention-bribery,
blackmail, abduction, assassination-were put to the service of reactionary
and repressive regimes that can never, for long, escape or
withstand the volcanic forces of change.
And the United States, as a result, became even more identified with
the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new.
The remedy is clear. American foreign policy, must be made to
conform once more to our historic ideals, the same fundamental belief
in freedom and popular government that once made us a beacon of
hope for the downtrodden and oppressed throughout the world.
FRANK CHURCH

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SEXATORS WALTER F. l\10NDALE,
GARY HART, AXD PHILIP HART
\Ve fully support the analysis, findings, and recommendations of
this Report. If implemented, tIl(' re{'ommendations will go far toward
providing our nation with an intelligence community that is more effective
in protecting this country, more accountable to the American
public, and more responsive to our Constitution and our laws. The
key to effective implementation of these recommendations is a new
intelligence oversight committee with legislative authority.
Committees of Congress have only two sources of power: control
over the purse and public disclosure. The Select Committee had no
authority of any kind over the purse strings of th.. intelligence community,
only the power of disclosure. The preparation of this volume
of the Final Report was a case study in the shortcomillgs of disclosure
as the sale instrument of oversight. Our experience as a Committee
graphically demonstrates why legislative authority-in particular
the power to authorize appropriations-is essential if a new oversight
committee is to handle classified intelligence matters securely and
effectively.
In preparing the Report, the Select Committee bent over backwards
to ensure that there were no intelligence sources, methods, or
other e1assified material in the text. Asa re-snlt. important portions of
t he Report have been excised or significalltly abridged. In some cases
the changes were clearly justified on se,(~urity grounds. But in other
cases, the CIA, in our view, used the classification stamp not for security,
but to censor material that would be embarrassing, inconvenient,
or likely to provoke an adverse public reaction to CIA activities.
Some of the so-called security oojections of the CIA were so outlandish
they ,,,ere dismissed out of 'hand. The CIA wanted to delete
reference to the Bay of Pigs as a paramilitary operation, they wanted
to eliminate any reference to CIA activities in Laos, and they wantE'd
the Committee to excise testimony given in public before the television
cameras. But on other more complex is.<;ues, the Committee's necessary
and proper concern for caution enabled the CIA to llse the clearance
process to alter the Report to thE' point where some of its most important
implications are either lost. 01' obscured in vague language.
\\'e shall abide by the Committee's agreement on the facts which are
to remain classifi€'d. ,yp did what we had to do und€'r the circumstancE'S
and the full tE'xts arE' available to the SE'nate in classified form.
\Yithin those limits. howeyer. we belien it is important to point out
those areas in tIll' Final Report w,hich no longer fully reflect the work
of the Committee.
For example:
-Because of editing for classification rellsons, the italicized
pllssages in the Findings and Recommendations obscllre tlw
(567)
568
significant policy issues involved. The discussion of the role
of U.S. academics in the CIA's clandestine activities has been
so diluted that its scope and impact on the American academic
institutions is no longer clear. The description of the CIA's
clandestine activities within the United States, as well as the
extent to which CIA uses its ostensibly overt Domestic Contact
Division for such activities, has been modified to the
point where the Committee's concern about the CIA's blurring
of the line between overt and covert, foreign and domestic
activities, has been lost.
-Important sections which deal 'with the problems of
"cover" 'were eliminated. They made clear that for many years
the CIA has known and been concerned about its poor cover
abroad, and that the Agency's cover problems are not the
result of recent congressional investigations of intelligence
activities. The deletion of one important passage makes it impossible
to explain why unwitting Senate collaboration may
be necessary to make effective certain aspects of clandestine
activities.
-The CIA insisted upon eliminating the actual name of
the Vietnamese institute mentioned on page 454, thereby
suppressing the extent to which the CIA was able to use that
organization to manipulate public and congressional opinion
in the United States to support the Viet Nam War.
-Although the Committee recommends a much higher
standard for undertaking covert actions and a tighter control
system, we are unable to report the facts from our indepth
covert action case studies in depth which paint a picture
of the high political costs and generally meager benefits
of covert programs. The final cost of these secret operations
is the inability of the American people to debate and decide
on the future scope of covert action in a fully informed way.
The fact that the Committee cannot present its complete case to
the public on these specific policy issues illustrates the dilemma secrecy
poses for our democratic system of checks and balances. If the
Select Committee, after due consideration, decided to disclose more
information on these issues by itself, the ensuing public debate might
well focus on that disclosure rather than on the Committee's recommendations.
If the Select Committee asked the full Senate to endorse
such disclosure, we would be unfairly asking our colleagues to make
judgments on matters unfamiliar to them and which are the Committee's
responsibility.
In the field of intelligence, secrecy has eroded the system of checks
and balances on which our Constitutional government rests. In our
view, the only way this system can be restored is by creating a legislative
intelligence oversight committee with the power to authorize
appropri'ations. The experience of this Committee has been that such
authority is crucial if the new committee is to be able to find out what
the inteiligence agencies are doing, and to take 'action to stop things
when necessary without public disclosure. It is the only way to protect
legitimate intelligence secrets, yet effectively represent the public and
569
the Cong-ress in intelligence decisions affecting America's international
reputatIOn and basic values. A legislative oversight committee with
the power to authorize appropriations for intelligence is essential if
America is to govern its intelligence agencies with the system of checks
and balances mandated by the Constitution.
PHILIP HART
1VALTER F. MONDALE
GARY HART
207-932 0 - 76 - 37

INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATORS
JOHN G. TOWER, HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., AND BARRY
M. GOLDWATER
Our mutual concern that certain remedial measures proposed by
this Committee threaten to impose undue restrictions upon vital and
legitimate intelligence functions prevents us, in varying degrees, from
rendering an unqualified endorsement to this Committee's Findings
and Recommendations in their entirety. We also perceive a need to
emphasize areas of common agreement such as our unanimous endorsement
of intelligence reforms heretofore outlined by the President.
Therefore, we have elected to articulate our common concerns and
observations, as viewed from our individual perspectives, in separate
views which follow.
JOHN TOWER, Vice Chairman.
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr.
BARRY M. GOLDWATER.
(571)

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER,
VICE CHAIRMAN
When the Senate mandated this Committee to conduct an investigation
and study of activities of our Nation's intelligence community,
it recognized the need for congressional participation in decisions
which impact virtually every aspect of American life. The gravamen
of our charge was to examine the Nation's intelligence needs and the
performance of agencies charged with intelligence responsibilities,
and to make such assessments and recommendations as in our judgment
are necessary to maintain the delicate balance between individual
liberties and national security. I do not believe the Committee's reports
and accompanying staff studies comply fully with the charge to maintain
that balance. The Committee's recommendations make significant
departures from an overriding- lesson of the American experiencethe
right of American citizens to be free is inextricably bound to their
right to be secure.
I do not question the existence of intelligence excesses-the abuses
of power, both foreign and domestic, are well documented in the
Committee's report.
Nor do I question the need for expanded legislative, executive, and
judicial involvement in intelligence policy and practices-the ''uncertainties
as to the authority of United States inteUig-ence and related
agencies" were explicitly recognized by Senate Resolution 2l.
Nevertheless, I question, and take exception to, the Committee's report
to the extent that its recommendations are either unsupported by
the factual record or unduly restrict attainment of valid intelligence
objectives.
I believe that the 183 separate recommendations proposing- new detailed
statutes and reporting procedures not only exceed the number
and scope of documented abuses, but represent over-reaction. If
adopted in their totality, they would unnecessarily limit the effectiveness
of the Nation's intelligence community.
In the area of foreign intelligence, the Committee was specifically
mandated to prevent "... disclosure, outside the Select Committee, of
any info-rmation which would adversely affect the intelligence activities
... of the Federal Government." In his separate view Senator
Barry Goldwater clearly points up the damage to our efforts in Latin
America occasioned by release of the "staff report" on covert action in
Chile. I objected to releasing the Chile report and fully support Senator
Goldwater's assessment of the adverse impact of this "ironic"
and ill-advised disclosure.
Another unfortunate aspect of the Committee's foreign report is its
response to incidents of lack of accountability and control by recommending
the imposition of a layering of Executive Branch reviews
at operational levels and needless bifurcation of the decisionmaking
process. The President's reorganization which centralizes foreign in-
(573)
574
telligence operations and provides for constant review and oversight,
is termed "ambiguous." Yet the Committee's recommended statutory
changes would [in addition to duplication and multiplication of decisions],
add little except to insure that the existing functions set up by
the President's program were "explicitly empowered," "reaffirmed" or
provided with "adequate staff." By concentration upon such details
as which cabinet officer should chair the various review groups or
speak for the President, the Committee's approach unnecessarily restricts
Presidential discretion, without enhancing efficiency, control,
or accountability. The President's reorganization is a thorough, comprehensive
response to a long-standing problem. It should be supported,
not pilloried with statutory amendments amounting to little
more than alternative management techniques. It is far more appropriate
for the Congress to place primary legislative emphasis on establishing
a structure for Congressional Oversight which is compatible
with the Executive reorganization while elimmating the present proliferation
of committees and subcommittee's asserting jurisdiction over
intelligence activities.
Another area in which I am unable to agree with the Committee's
approach is covert action. It would be a mistake to attempt to require
that the Congress receive prior notification of all covert activities.
Senator Howard Baker repeatedly urged the Committee to adopt the
more realistic approach of obligating the Executive to keep the Congress
"fully and currently informed." I believe any attempt by the
legislative branch to impose a strict prior notification requirement
upon the Executive's foreign policy initiatives is neither feasible nor
consistent with our constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
On the domestic front the Committee has documented flagrant
abuses. Of particular concern were the political misuses of such agencies
as the Federal Bureau of InveRtigation and the Internal Revenue
Service. However, while thoroughly probing these reprehensible activities
and recommending needed changes in accountability mechanisms,
the Committee's "corrective" focus is almost exclusively on prohibitions
or limitations of agency practices. I hope this approach to
remedial action will not be read as broad criticism of the overall performanc.
e of the intelligence community or a minimization of the
Committee's own finding that "... a fair assessment must place a
major part of the blame upon the failures of senior executive officials
and Congress." In fact, I am persnaded that the failure of high officials
to investigate these abuses or to terminate them when they learned of
them was almost as reprehensible as the abuses themselves.
A further objectionable aspect of the Committee's approach is the
scope of the proposed limitations on the use of electronic surveillance
and informants as investigative techniques. With respect to electronic
surveillance of Americans suspected of intelligence activities inimical
to the national interest, the Committee would limit authority for such
probes to violations of specific criminal statutes. This proposal fails to
address the real problem of utilizing electronic surveillance against
myriad forms of espionage. A majority of the Committee recommended
this narrow standard while acknowledging that existing statutes
offer inadequate coverage of "modern forms of espionage." The
Committee took no testimony on revision of the espionage laws and
575
simply proposed that another committee "explore the necessity for
amendments." To prohibit electronic surveillance in these cases pending
such revision is to sanction an unnecessary risk to the national
security. In adopting this position the Committee not only ignores the
fact that appellate courts in two federal circuits have upheld the Executives
inherent authority to conduct such surveillance, but also fails
to endorse the Attorney General's comprehensive proposal to remedy
objection to current practices. The proposed safeguards, which include
requirements for the Attorney General's certification of hostile foreign
intelligence involvement and issuance of a judicial warrant as a condition
precedent to electronic surveillance, represent a significant expansion
of civil liberties protections. The proposal enjoys bi-partisan
support in Congress and I join those members urging prompt enactment.
I am also opposed to the methods and means proposed by the Committee
to regulate the use of informants. Informants have been in the
past and will remain in the future a vital tool of law enforcement. To
adopt the Committee's position and impose stringent, mechanical time
limits on the use of informants-particularly regarding their use
against terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities in the United
States--would be to place our faith in standards which are not only
illusory, but unworkable.
In its overly broad approach to eliminating intelligence abuses, the
Committee report urges departure from the Congress' role as a partner
in national security policy and comes dangerously close to being a
blueprint for authorizing Congressional management of the day-today
affairs of the intelligence community. Whether this management
is attempted through prior notification or a shopping list of prohibitive
statutes and regulations, it is a task for which the legislative
branch of government is ill-suited. I believe the adverse impact which
would be occasioned by enactment of all the Committee recommendations
would be substantial.
Substantial segments of the Committee's work product will assist
this Congress in proceeding with the task of insuring the conduct of
necessary intelligence activities in a manner consistent with our obligation
to safeguard the rights of American citizens. However, we must
now step back from the klieg lights and abuse-dominated atmosphere,
and balance our findings and recommendations with a recognition that
our intelligence agencies and the men and women who serve therein
have been and will always be essential to the existence of our nation.
TIlis Committee was asked to provide a constitutionally acceptable
framework for Congress to assist in that mission. We were not mandated
to render our intelligence systems so constrained as to be fit for
employment only in an ideal world.
In addition to the above remarks I generally endorse the positions
set forth in Senator Baker's individual vie"\Ys.
I specifically endorse:
His views stating the need for legislation making it a criminal
offense to pnblish the name of a Fnited States intelligence
officer stationed abroad under cover.
576
His position that there must be a system of greater accountability
by our intelligence operations to the United States
Congress and the American people.
His concern that the Congress exercise caution to insure
that a proper predicate exists before any recommendations for
permanent reforms are enacted into law.
His view that there be careful study before endorsing the
Committee's far reaching recommendations calling for an
alteration of the intelligence community structure. I also support
the individual views of Senator Goldwater.
Further, I specifically endorse:
His assessment that only a small segment of the American
public has eyer doubted the integrity of our Nation's intelligence
agenCIes.
His opinion that an intelligence system, however secret,
does not place undue strain on our nation's constitutional
government.
His excellent statement concerning covert action as an essential
tool of the President's foreign policy arsenal.
His opposition to the publication of an annual aggregate
figure for United States intelligence and his reasons therefor.
His views and comments on the Committee's recommendations
regarding the National Security Council and the Office
of the President. Specifically, comments number 12, 13 and 14.
His views challenging the proposed limitation concerning
the recruitment of foreigners by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
His views and general comments concerning the right of
every American, including academics, clergymen, businessmen
and others, to cooperate with his government in its lawful
pursuits.
For the reasons stated above, I regret that I am unable to sign the
final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities.
JOHN G. TOWER,
Vice Ohairman.
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER
This final report of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities must be read with care. Historically, the work of the Committee
and its report are an outgrowth of a period in which disillusionment,
dismay, and disaffection were all too prevalent in America.
Failure in Vietnam and the Watergate scandals were prime contributors
to the foregoing and helped produce a feeling that the ship of
state was rudderless.
Under these circumstances of confusion, the basic premises of our
foreign policy came into question, with some taking refuge in isolationism
as the only way out. Others reacted as though some demon needed
to be exorcized and launched a kind of guerilla attack upon our foreign
policy.
Pressure from the new isolationists and the demonologists forced a
skittish Congress into asserting a greater influence over the conduct of
our foreign policy.
The results were mostly bad:
-Two good allies, Greece and Turkey, were alienated.
-Jewish emigration from Russia was reduced.
-The hands of our President were tied in the day-to-day
conduct of foreign policy.
-U.S. intelligence was demoralized and its efl'ctiveness
@:reatly diminished.
-Our allies came to seriously question America's reliability,
if not our collective sanity.
-Our adversaries took comfort in watching us tear ourselves
apart.
In the field of intelligence activities, the worst of it all occurred
in the Senate on October 2,1974 when the Hughes Amendment (ultimately
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment) was included in the foreign aid
bill. Under its provisions, six committees of the Congress are required
to be informed of any covert action conducted abroad. This means that
approximately 50 Senators and over 120 Congressmen may receive
highly sensitive information on a covert action program. It also means
that public disclosure is almost inevitable, as proved to be the case in
Angola.
As the Soviet Union moved decisively in Africa, pushing its Cuban
mercenaries in the vanguard, and as the word "detente" came more and
more to 'be understood as a game played under rules favorable to Moscow,
a new appraisal seemed to be arising among our fellow citizens:
The pendulum had swung too far and much damage was being
done to the Nation's foreign policy and the organizations
necessary to its conduct.
The foregoing was largely in the past tense, because it is my hope and
belief that the period of self-criticism, if not self-flagellation, is coming
(577)
578
to an end. If not, our once proud and strong Nation is headed for very
hard times.
COVERT ACTION IN CHILE-1963-1973
Throughout the "Foreign and Military Intelligence" section of tihe
Committee~s final report, there are references to covert action in Chile
which are based on a staff report of the Committee entitled, "Covert
Action in Chile-1963-1973." Because the report was a "staff report,"
Senators on the Commitee were n()lt entitled to submit opposing views.
In my opinion, the staff report is 'a distort-ion of history and will not
stand the test of time. The following is what I believe to be a :fair
representation of events in Chile from 1963 to 1973 and any U.S.
involvement.
On December 4, 1973, the Senate Seled Committee on Intelligence
Activities held public hearings on covert action in Chile covering
the years 1963 to 1973. In his opening stJatement, Chail"II1an Church
stated that, "The nature and extent of the American role in the overthrow
ofa democra:tically-elected Chilean government are matters for
deep and continuing public concern."
The Chairman then introduced the staff director, who with other
members of the staff, summarized a staff report entitled, "Oovert
Action in Ohile 1963-1973." The staff conclusion was even more
specific: "In the period 1970 through 1973, in order to prevent a
Marxist leader from coming to power by democratic means, the
U.S. worked through covert·aotion to subvert democraJtic processes....
this interference in the internal affairs of 'another country served to
weaken the party we sought to assist and created internal dissensions
which, over time, led to the weakening and, for the present time
at lea:st, an end to constitutional government in Chile."
These assertions, and the Committee report on which they are based,
are misleading because they make it appear that the United States was
responsible for the downfall of a respectable and truly democratic
government. The real character of Allende and his coalition was ignored
by excluding both public statements of philosophy and intent
as well as the public record of highly illegal actions while in office.
Omitting publicly available information (not to mention the exclusion
of voluminous classified intelligence dealing with Chilean support
of Soviet and Cuban international subversion) makes it difficult
for the American public to understand why anti-Allende operations
were undertaken by three successive U.S. administrat,ions. Moreover,
the report concludes that "fears, often badly exaggerated or distort.W,
appear to have activaJt:ed officials in Washington."
Thus, Oovert Action in Ohile 1963-1973 leaves the impression of
U.S. bungling in Chilean affairs induced by a corrosive fear of commllnism
and Marxism.
'While there may have 'been some mistakes made in the conduct of
our affairs in Chile, the threat of a communist dictatorship under
Allende was very real. To set the record strllJight, here are :fac.ts that
should be taken into account:
1. Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular
An avowed Marxist-Leninist. All('nrle narticipated in the creation
of the Chilean Socialist Party in 1933, the year he graduated from
medical school. He was elected a Federal Deputy in 1937, and was
579
named Secretary-General of the Socialist Party in 1943. Since its inception,
the Chilean Socialist Party has been an extreme interpreter of
Marxist-Leninist dogma, espousing violent revolution for Chile and
the rest of Latin America.
Castro's Cuba became the Socialist model, and many young Socialists
were trained in Cuba in guerilla warfare as well as in politiool
action. Allende personally headed the Chilean delegation to the 1966
Tricontinental Conference in Havana and was a key figure in the creation
of the Cuban-sponsored Latin America Solidarity Organization
called LASO---created specifically to foment guerilla warfare in Latin
America. It was the guiding force for the "Che" Guevara Guerrilla
adventure in Bolivia in 1967.
In January 1970, Allende was listed as a director of the Chilean
Committee of Support for the Bolivian People and the National Liberation
Army, known as ELN.
Meanwhile the stronger, but less violent, Chilean Communist Party
had joined the Socialist Party in a coalition which backed Allende as
its presidential candidate in four presidential elections (1952, 1958,
1964 and 1970.) Allende was an active member of many Communist
front organizations, particularly the World Peace Council, of which
he was Vice-President during his first visit to the USSR in 1954.
Intellig-ence gathered over a period of many years has provided
what Ambassador Korry calls "certain knowledge that the Soviet Union
and other Communist governments and organizations provided
substantial sums for covert political action to the Communist Party,
to the Socialist Party, and to Allende himself."
The significance of Allende's election as President of Chile was thus
reltdily apparent or should have been. Allende affirmed publicly in his
1970 campaign, as he had in previous campaigns for the presidency,
that his intention was to bring about an irreversible Marxist revolution
in Chile. He viewed himself as the man who WQuld do what Castro
failed to do: destroy America's leadership in Latin America. Allende
minced no pre-election words. Prior to his election. he stated flat out
tha;t the United States was to be treated as "public enemy number
one" in the western hemisphere.
Allende's tactics centered on using constitutional tools to fashion
a socialist revolution, but he never pretended to expouse traditional
parliamentary democracy. A minority president who received only
36.5% of the popular vote, he declared three months after taking
office:
I am the President of the Unidad Popular. I am not the
President of all the Chileans.
He and Castro chose to follow different roads, but Allende's intentions
were never really masked. To quote again from his 1970 presidential
campaign:
Cuba in the Caribbean and a Socialist Chile in the Southern
Cone will make the revolution in Latin America.
Was this empty campaign rhetoric?
Soon after the 1970 election, Allende met secretly with Latin American
revolutionaries and pledged covert support to them. Ambassador
Korry has written: "In 1970, as in 1963, we know beyond a shadow
580
ofa reasonable doubt that an Allende government intended to use
the processes and laws of what it called formal democracy to eliminate
and replace it with what it called popular democracy. (From
1961 to 1970, the Embassy, like the majority of Congress, agreed that
such a development would do serious harm to U.S. interests and influence-
for-good in the world.)"
2. Efforts of the Allende Government to Destroy Democratic Institutwns
Communist Party leaders were largely in charge of the economic
program of the Allende government. The communists intended gradually
to replace private enterprise by State enterprise, thus enabling
the government to assume complete social and economic power.
The government, therefore, drew up a list of all Chilean corporations
whose capital reserves exceeded $500,000. These companies, representing
82% of the capital holding-s of all companies incorporated in
Chile, were earmarked for nationalization. Congress atempted to block
this government program by passing legislation defining the economic
areas subject to government ownership, but the government continued
to take over Chilean firms, using methods which became progressively
more illegal.
These methods ranged from expropriations (declared unconstitutional
by the Chilean Supreme Court), to requisitions (many of which
were declared illegal by the Chilean Office of the Comptroller General),
to "decrees of insistence" (a rarely used judicial tool created to resolve
differences of legal interpretations between the judiciary and the
executive) .
In agriculture, all farms exceeding 80 hectares of irrigated land
were made subject to legal expropriation. These "legal" expropriations
were supplemented by those of roving armed bands who took
possession of agricultural properties by force without any intervention
by the Chilean police.
Similarly, a series of economic pressures was exerted to silence the
independent media, including coercion, bribery, the manipulation of
government control over credit, imports and prices, and the incitement
of strikes.
As an adjunct to economic pressures, the Allende government began
to develop the concept of "popular power", creating parallel revolutionary
organizations which duplicated the functions of existing legal
organizations. For example, special communal commands, known as
JAPS, were established to control the distribution of essential articles,
mainly food. Government supplies were channeled throu~h these new
organizations rather than through established retailed outlets. Of
Soviet oripin, the communal commands had the dual function of
displacing "bourgeois" organizations and of training their members
for armed revolution.
Prior to the Allende regime, Chile had a strong democratic tradition
and a firm commitment to constitutional processes. Under the Allende
regime, its institutions fought long and tenaciously to save themselves
from destruction by legal, constitutional means. When the government
violated Chilean law, protests were filed with the courts and
"contraloria." 1
1 (Comptroller-General of the Republic, who supervised the legality of the
government's actions.)
581
When the courts and the Contraloria objected to these violations,
however, the government either paid no heed to these decisions or overruled
them through "decrees of insistence", which were themselves
illegal.
The National Congress also tried to check these violations of the law
by impeaching the ministers responsible for them, but Allende merely
moved the ousted ministers from one post to another, thus thwarting
the purpose of Congressional sanctions.
Finally, when all the protests of the Congress, the courts and the
Contraloria had been repeatedly ignored, these bodies solemnly declared
that the Allende government had placed itself outside both the
law and the Constitution. These declarations were made by the Supreme
Court on May 26, 1973, by the Contraloria on July 2, 1973, and
by the Chamber of Deputies on August 22, 1973. The full text of the
Chamber of Deputies resolution, and that of a subsequent August 29,
1973 Report of the Bar Association are appended in full, because they
record many of the abuses and illegalities of the Allende government
and also illustrate the inability of true democratic institutions to coexist
with a Marxist government. The Chamber's declaration was, in
fact, a notice to the armed forces that the legal and constitutional order
of the country had broken down.
The military coup of September 11, 1973 was the tragic climax
of a long process of political polarization, exacerbated by the worst
economic crisis in Chile's history :
-Inflation exceeded 300% in 1973;
-the trade balance deficit in the same year exceeded $450
million;
-the foreign debt increased 60% in three years.
As the economic situation deteriorated, strikes proliferated', crippling
the country. It was not U.S. "interference," but rather a minority's
attempt to impose doctrinaire Marxism on a democratic framework,
which led to the establishment of the present military government.
3. Ohile: a B~e for Soviet ana Ouban Subversion
Within the Allende government, the Communist Party was largely
responsible for running the economic pro~am, counting heavily on
Soviet support. There were 1,300-odd Soviets in Chile as of March
1972. Soviet Bloc credits of some $200 million had been extended. Moreover,
the Soviets were dangling an offer of $300 million to the Chilean
military for the purchase of miJitary equipment. The Soviets, however,
left to the Cubans most of the revolutionary guidance and support
provided to the Allende coalition.
Under Allende. Chile became the center for Cuban operations in the
southern cone of Latin America. Juan Carretero Ibanez, alias "Ariel",
former chief of the Cuban Liberation Directorate (LD) for Latin
America (the Cuban intelligence and executive action agency) arrived
in Chile in October 1970 just prior to Allende's inauguration. He was
soon followed by Luis Fernandez Ona, a senior intelligence officer of
the DGI who became Allende's son-in-law. Chile re-established diplomatic
relations with Cuba and the Cuban Embassy rapidly reached a
582
strength of 54 (later nearly 100) officers. Cuban visitors to Chile averaged
100 per month.
Cuban support to the Chilean government was primarily in the security
field. The Cubans trained and armed the Presidential security
guard, and also helped to develop an intelligence organization which
functioned independently of established government services. Chilean
police were trained in repressive security tactics, such as setting up
neighborhood informant systems. The Cubans also provided arms,
funds, and guerrilla training to hundreds of members of the Socialist
Party and other far leftist Chilean militia groups.
Dozens of crates of arms, mostly of Soviet and Czech origin, we'l'e
found stored in Allende's Santiago home and mountain retreat after he
was overthrown. These crates had been flown in as "gifts" by Cuban
airlines.
The Cuban intelligence effort in Chile, concentrated on exporting
revolution to other Latin American countries, primarily Bolivia but
also Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Some ten to fifteen thousand foreign
revolutionaries flocked into Chile, where the Cuban LD center
conducted a thriving business. The Center had a unit for providing
false documents and training, and its operatives met revolutionaries in
exile and visitors from other countries to receive their reports, pass
money, arrange travel to Cuba and direct their activities.
In November 1971 Bolivian exiles in Chile announced formation of
the Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Front, known as FHA, which included
the ELN. Its mission was to replace the Banzer Government
with a government of the "proletariat". A number of FHA leaders in
Chile travelled to and from Cuba. A massing of FRA exiles on the
Chilean border drew official protests from the Bolivian government
in April 1972.
Chile also served as a support base for the Argentine terrorist organization
PRT/ERP. (Subsequently the PRT/ERP was responsible
for such actions as the abduction and shooting of a State Department
official and for extracting ransom in excess of $20,000,000 from U.S.
firms in Argentina.)
4. Actions of Allende's Coalition Subsequent to the March 1973
Elections
Like the other Unidad Popular parties, the Communist Party,
known as the PCCR, began almost immediately after Allende's election
to arm and train its membership in paramilitary tactics. Prior to
March 1973, however, the Communist Party publicly and privately
advocated policies designed to lull the political opposition and military
into believing that the government would not resort to flagrant
violations of the Chilean constitution. The PCCR believed that time
was on the side of the government, and that the political opposition
would be effectively stifled by progressively increasing government
control of the economy.
This posture changed with the March 1973 congressional elections,
which showed that the Christian Democrats and other parties in the
political opposition were gaining rather than losing ground. The Communists,
realizing that force was the only way to guarantee the continuance
of the Marxist government, then joined the Socialist Party
in pressing Allende to take harsher measures against the opposition.
583
After the September 1, 1973 coup, the junta government charged
that the Unidad Popular had been planning a terrorist action, which
was known as "Plan Z" and called for the assassination of military and
opposition leaders as part of a move to secure total control of the
country. A reliable leftist military source, who was in Chile prior to
and during the military rebellion, confirmed that the leftist forces had
indeed planned a pre-emptive move against the military, to have taken
place during the independence celebrati?ns of Septem~e.r 17-18, 197?
The documents and large arms caches dIscovered by mIlItary authorIties
after the coup suggest that Plan Z may indeed have existed.
A complete and fair assessment of the U.S. role in Chile can only be
made if the following are taken into account:
1. The character of the Allende regime as revealed by public statements
and by the nature of the political parties from which he drew
support;
2. Efforts of the Allende regime to manipulate and ultimately
destroy constitutional democracy;
3. Soviet and Cuban use of Chile as a base for international
subversion;
4. The possibility that the Marxists were planning a pre-emptive
and bloody coup to seize power totally.
The Senate Select Committee Staff Report on Chile concludes that
"fears, often badly exag~eratedand distored, appear to have activated
officials in Washington." But even the National Intelligence Estimate
cited as endorsing this conclusion was published on June 14, 1973 and
was written before Allende's violations of civil liberties were intensified.
In the months after the Estimate the country's democratic
processes were reduced to chaos and provoked the solemn declarations
by the Supreme Court, Comptroller-General and Chamber of Deputies
mentioned earlier.
U.S. policy toward Chile from 1962 to 1970 was consistent in
attempting to prevent the take-over of the Government of Chile by
Allende and his totalitarian Communist and Socialist supporters. The
actions of the Allende regime after 1970 proves the wisdom of that
policy.
In Chile, the U.S. was acting within the broad mainstream of traditional
U.S. policy in Latin America, which has been to resist encroachment
by powers outside the Western Hempishere. The USSR
dealt with the Allende government (and with the Chilean Communist
Party, before and after Allende's election) at the very highest level.
For example. the Soviet Ambassador to Allende's Chile, Alexander
Vasilyevich Rasov, was oneoT only three members ofthe Central Committee
of the Communist Partv to he stationed in non-Communist capitals.
The other two being in Washintgon and Paris.
The Allende experiment in Chile was seen bv the Soviets as a model
for other strategic countries. It is worth noting' that both the Soviets
and the Cubans considered the overthrow of the Allende government
in Chile as a disaster to their interests. In their comments on
Chile. the Soviets emphasize that Chile proves the thesis that '~socialist
revolntion" !'hould never be attempted without political control of
the military forces.
There can he honest differences of oninion about the wisdom of
American policy toward Chile over the last decade. What is missing
584
in the Staff report is the acknowledgement of a viewpoint contrary
to its own conception: that "\Vashington opinionmakers were activated
by badly exaggerated and distorted fears. History has proved that
minority Communist and radical Marxist parties ultimately destroy
the elements of democracy and diversity which enable them to gain
power. Allende clearly stated his intent to bring about an irreversible
Marxist revolution in Chile.
Had the facts presented here been made available to the reader of
the Staff Report, that reader might have concluded that U.S. Government
fears were not "exaggerated or distorted", and might have concluded
that the U.S. was essentially correct in its Chilean policy. This
policy, prior to 1970, was to prevent a convinced Marxist from taking
power and after 1970 strove to support and sustain until the 1976
elections a democratic opposition to a government which, by 1973,
was clearly operating outside the laws and Constitution of Chile.
The results of the disclosures of sensitive classified data which were
made during open hearings and in the published report on Chile will
not be evident for some time to come, but two recent developments may
be of interest.
First, the conclusion to the Staff Report sta:tes that "it would be the
final irony of a decade of covert action in Chile if that action destroyed
the credibility of the Chilean Christian Democrats."
According to an official report received by this Government, "ExPresident
Frei feels completely shattered as a result of the release of
the Senate report ... and has confided to friends that it has brought
his political career to a close ... The source commented tha:t it is ironic
that U.S. congressional distaste for the role of the U.S. Government
against the Allende Government may have succeeded in destroying the
only viable alternative to the present Chilean government."
Second, data taken from the Report are being used to give credibility
to false allegations about the Agency. An example is the WashinQton
Post article of ,ranuary 16, 197'6 by Walter Pincus entitled
"CIA Funding Journalistic Network Abroad." After quoting data
taken from the Chile Report, the author quotes "a former intelligence
agent" as claiming that the CIA subsidized the Latin American news
service LATIN in much the same manner as it gave money to "EI
Mercurio." The true fact is that the CIA never gave any help, financial
or otherwise, to LATIN, but this false allegation has been tied in
with facts published in the Staff Report in such a way as to make it
appear to have the Senate stamp of approval.
As of this writing AnQ'ola has fa,llen into the hands of a revolutionary
gTouP backed by the Soviet Union. The winning element was
thousands of Cuban soldiers supplied with Russian weaponry. In
other words. the Soviet Union used Cuban soldiers in Angola much
the same way as Hessians were employed by the British during our
own Revolutionarv War.
To the world. the Soviet Union is boasting of its victory and the
defeat of the U.S.
There is an ironical, if not tragic. postlude to the report Oovert
Action in Ohile 196/'1-1973. On December 17, 1975 Fidel Castro made
585
a speech which quoted several paragraphs of the Report. Here is Fidel
Castro's accolade:
... We consider the revelation of the report a positive move
by the Senate committee despite the opposition of the President
of the United States, even when much information was
omitted because of pressure from the CIA itself and from the
President's office....
FOREIGN AKD MILITARY FIXDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Turning to the report entitled "Findings and Recommend9:tions of
the Committee: Foreign and Military," two general observatIOns can
be made:
1. Much of the supporting evidence or information for this section
of the report is drawn from a series of staff studies which have n?t
been considered by the full committee in their final form as of th~
writing. Moreover, the staff reports are wider in scope than the testImony
taken by the full committee.
2. Recommendations for reorganization of the intelligence community
are not backed up by sufficient testimony or analysis.
Below are some detailed comments on the report. They follow the
heading given on the "Contents" page.
1.11istoricallVote
The Select Committee on Intelligence Activities spent nearly $3
million and over 15 months investigating the intelligence community,
and it had a peak staff of over 120 professionals, consultants,
and clerical personnel. I believe these facts should be a matter of
record, because no excuses can be made for the final report based on
a lack of time, money, or personnel. In fact, the Senate was more
than generous in providing repeated extensions of time and money
to the Select Committee. The results speak for themselves.
The truth of the matter is that approximately 6 months was spent
in a fruitless investigation into alleged assassination attempts. During
the course of the investigation of assassination attempts, not one bona
fide assassination ordered by the U.s. Government wac;; discovered.
What did emerge were attempts on the life of Fidel Castro during
the early 60's when our relations with Cuba were very close to being
a state of war. In any event, much time and effort was frittered away
in this unproductive exercise.
A. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL FINDINGS
Oommittee Report:
... Allerrations of ahuRe, revelations in the press, and the
results of the Committee's 15 month inquiry have underlined
the necessitv to restore confidence ill the iptplYl'ity of our
Nation's intelligence agencies.... (See p. 423.) .
586
Oomment:
Only a small segment of American public opinion has ever had
any doubts in the integrity of our Nation's intelligence agencies. In
general, the American people fully support our intelligence services
and recognize them as the Nation's front line of defense. Accordingly,
the use of the word "restore" is misleading.
Oommittee Report:
· . . At the same time, the Committee finds that the operation
of an extensive and necessarily secret intelligence system
places severe strains on the nation's constitutional government.
. . . (See p. 425.)
Oomment:
It is not the operation of an intelligence system that strains our
nation's constitutional government. Any strains that exist are the
direct result. of Presidential- misuse, misunderstanding, or abnsl1 of the
nation's intelligence capabilities. It should be noted that the report
correctly salutes the men and women of the intelligence community,
and also correctly points out that the 'Soviet KGB and other hostile
intelligence services conduct spying and covert operations-(not to
mention assassinations) .
Oommittee Report:
· .. The Committee finds that covert action operations have
not been an exceptional instrument used only in rare instances
when the vital interests of the United States have been
at stake. On the contrary, presidents and administrations
have made excessive, and at times self-defeating, use of covert
action. In addition, covert action has become a routine program
with a bureaucratic momentum of its own. The longterm
impact, at home and abroad, of repeated disclosure of
U.S. covert action never appears to have been assesed. The
cumulative effect of covert actions has been increasingly
costly to American interests and reputation. The Committee
believes that covert action must be employed only in the
most extraordinary circumstances.
Oomment:
Covert action is intended to provide the President of the U.S.
and the nation with a range of actions short of war to preserve the
free world and to thwart the global ambitions of Corrununist imperialism.
Covert operations can and should be used in circumstances
which might not be described as "vital" but are nevertheless neres·
sary to prevent a crisis from occurring. One of the pnrposes of covert
action is to prevent the occurrence of "most extraordinary circumstances."
Those who support the above-mentioned quotation are in
effect saying: "Don't put out the fire while it is small; wait until it
becomes a conflagration."
Oommittee Report:
· .. Although there is a question as to the extent to which
the Constitution requires publication of intelligence expen587
ditures information, the Committee finds that the Constitution
at least requires public disclosure and authorization of an
annual aggregate figure for United States national intelligence
activities. . . . (See p. 425.)
Comment:
Publication of an annual aggregate figure for U.S. intelligence
may appear to be innocent especIally because estimates, with varying
degrees of accuracy, have appeared in the press. "Whether or not the
Constitution requires such a disclosure is open to question. Traditionally,
nations have kept their intelligence budgets secret for at least
two reasons: First, they did not want to officially acknowledge the
fact of these activities. Second, the publication of a figure might
give potential adversaries some indication of the magnitude of their
intelligence efforts. Both of these arguments may be somewhat obsolete
in a world where little, if anything, is considered private.
There is still another objection which I submit cannot be discounted:
Disclosing an annual aggregate figure will inevitably lead
to demands for a breakdown of that figure. If these demands cannot
be resisted, ultimately we would hand our adversaries very important
indicators concerning the magnitude and thrust of our intelligence
activities. In addition, our allies would be inclined to view such a
step as one more signal that America is unable to protect its secrets
leading to a possible further erosion of cooperative intelligence efforts.
In any event, this matter should be decided by a vote of the
entire Senate.
D. THE NATIOXAL SECURITY COUXCIL AXD THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
Oommittee Report:
. . . The Central Intelligence Agency, in broad terms, is. not
"out of control." ... (See p. 27.)
Oomment:
After having heard the CIA described as a "rogue elephant run
rampant", it is gratifying that the Committee now finds the CIA is
not "out of control."
Oommittee Report:
... 12. By statute, the Secretary of State should be designated
as the principal administration spokesman to the Congress
on the policy and purpose underlying covert action
projects. . . . (See p. 430.)
Comment:
Making the Secretarv of State the spokesman for covert action
could place him in a diplomatically untenable position. 'Vhat is meant
by "the Congress" in this context? This recommendation is vague
and if enacted into the statutes could overburden the Secretary of
State, who has more than enough work to do.
588
Oommittee Report:
... 13. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should
be required to fully inform the intelligence oversight committee
(s) of the Congress of each covert action prior to its
initiation. No funds should be expended on any covert action
unless and until the President certifies and provides to the
congressional intelligence oversight committee (s) the reasons
that a covert action is required by extraordinary circumstances
to deal with grave threats to the national security
of the United States. The congressional intelligence oversight
committee (s) should be kept fully and currently informed
of all covert action projects, and the DCI should
submit a semi-annual report on all such projects to the committee
(s). (See p. 430.)
Oomment:
As mentioned in the introduction, the operation of the HughesRyan
Amendment requires 6 committees to be informed of any covert
action. This recommendation would merely add another layer to the
cake in the absence of a repeal of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. If
the Oongresi> could agree that only a joint committee on intelligence
or -preferably the House and Senate Armed Services Committees were
to be informed, I might be able to su-ppoti the concept of prior notification.
Prior notification raises an important point that should be
carefully considered by the Congress: Does the OmgTess intend to
share responsibility with the President for covert a<ltions~ In other
words, will the Congress be content to accept our successes as well as
our failures as secrets ~
oommittee Report:
... 14. The Committee recommends that when the Senate
establishes an intelligence oversight committee with authority
to authorize the national- intelligence budget, the HughesRyan
Amendment (22 U.S.C., Section 2422) should be
amended so that the foregoing notifications and Presidential
certifications to the Senate are provided only to that committee....
(Seep. 431.)
Oomment:
This recommeni1ation presupposes that the House of Representatives
wonld be willing to accept the creation of a Senate committee
as a sufficient reaSQIl to repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. In the
absence. of an agreement with the House on repeal, this recommendation
is meaningless.
F. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Oommittee Report:
... The Committee also questions the recruiting. for foreign
esnionage purposes. of immigrants desiring American citi:r.enship
because it might be construed as coercive. . . . (See
p. 439.)
589
Oomment:
Why should any category of foreigner be excl.uded from rec~u~~ment
by the CIA? Does the Committee have any valId reason why It questions"
that any such recruitments "might be construed as coercive?"
I submit it doesn't. Finally, if the Committee believes that coercion
should not be used in the handling of immigrants, then it should say so.
Oommittee Report:
... 27. The congressional intelligence oversight committee
should consider whether:
-the Domestic Collection Service (overt collection operations)
should be removed from the Directorate of Operations
(the Clandestine Service), and returned to the Directorate of
Intelligence; .
-The CIA regulations should require that DOD's overt
contacts be informed when they are to be used for operational
support of clandestine activities;
-The CIA regulations should prohibit recruiting as agents
immigrants who have applied for American citizenship....
(See p. 442.)
Oomment:
Until 1973 the Domestic Contact Service was part of the Directorate
of Intelligence. It was placed under the Directorate of Operations to
enable the CIA to provide better support for the Foreign Resources
Division. Because the Domestic Contact Service has contacts with
leaders in all walks of life, it possesses a unique capability to open the
door for the clandestine services. Requiring that the Domestic Contact
Service inform overt contacts that they are to be used for operational
support of clandestine activities violates the important rule of
compartmentalization. As previously noted, there is no valid reason
for excluding immigrants unless coercion is part of the process.
Oommittee Report:
... Some covert operations have passed retrospect public
judgments, such as the support given Western European
democratic parties facing strong communist opposition in
the late 1940s and 1950s. Others have not. In the view of the
Committee, the covert harassment of the democratically
elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile did not
command U.S. public approval. (See page 445.)
Oomment:
Here as in other parts of the report the story of w'hat happened in
Chile under Salvador Allende is distorted. While 'the Allende regime
may have been "democratically elected'" it gradually evolved into an
abusive left-Iwing dict'atorship. (See the preceding part of these individual
views entitled 001lert Action in Ohile 1963-1973 as well as
the comments of Senator .Tames L. Buckley in the Oongressional
Record of February 26, 1976.)
590
Oommittee Report:
· . . 36. The Committee has already re<lommended, following
its investigation of alleged assassination attempts directed.
at foreign leaders, a statute to forbid such activities. The
Committee reaffirms its support for such a statute and further
recommends prohibition by statute of the following covert
activities :
-All political assassinations.
-Efforts to subvert democratic governments.
-'Support for police or other internal security forces which
engage in the systematic violation of human rights. . . .
(See p. 448.)
Oomment:
Prohibiting "efforts to subvert democratic governments" is a vague
phrase, because there is no standard set as to what constitutes "democratic"
governments. It also raises the problem of what the U.S. may
do when a democratic government is 'headed inexorably towards dictatorship
of the right or the left, and that this process may lead to a
government which is hostile to America. Here again, we are confronted
with the problem of putting out a fire while it is small as opposed
to waiting- until it becomes a conflagration. In some instances it
is necessary for U.S. intellig-ence services to cooperate with the internal
security forces of nations where thecre is systematic violation of human
rights. The purpose of such cooperation is to gain foreign intelligence
on vital targets. In order to gain the cooperation of the internal security
forces in these countries, support is sometimes a condition for
cooperation. In a world \Where the number of authoritarian regimes
far outnumbers the number of democratic governments, such a prohibition
limits the flexibility of our intelligence services in defending
America.
Oommittee Report:
· .. 39. By statute, any covert use by the U.S. Government
of American citizens as combatants should be preceded by
notification required for all covert 'actions. The statute should
provide 'that within 60 days of such notification such use shall
be terminated unless the Congress has specifically authorized
such use. The Congress should be empowered to terminate
such use at any time.... (See p. 449.)
Oomment:
If such a statute is enacted, 'the intellig-ence services will have to
place gre:ater reliance on foreign mercenaries for covert action. 'While
I have no objection to the use of foreigners for this purpose, Americans
are much more likely to serve loyally and courageously.
Oommittee Report:
· .. 42. The Committee is concerned about the integrity of
American academic institutions for clandestine purposes.
Accordingly. the Committee rPC'ommends that the CIA amend
its internal directives to require that-individual academies
591
used for operational purposes by the CIA, together with the
President or equivalent official of the relevant academic institutions,
be informed of the clandestine CIA relationship. (See
page 456.)
Oomment:
While I believe that any institution or org-anization has the right
to take positions on domestic or foreign polley issues, I also believe
each individual American has the right to cooperate with his government
in its lawful pursuits. I submit this right should apply to
academics, clergymen, businessmen, union mem'bers, newsmen, etc. The
more groups we exclude from assisting the intelligence community,
the poorer our intelligence will be. Surely, our values have been turned
upside down, when cooperating with the CIA is viewed as unseemly
or degrading.
Oommittee Report:
· .. 54. By statute, the CIA should be prohibited from causing,
funding, or encouraging actions by liaison services which
are forbidden to the CIA.
Furthermore, the fact that a particular project, action or
activity of the CIA is carried out through or by a foreign liaison
service should not relieve the Agency of its responsibilities
for clearance within the Agency, within the executive
branch, or with the Congress.... (See p. 459.)
Oomment:
In order to gain foreign intelligence the CIA sometimes enters
into liaison operations with foreign services who may engage in activities
that would be unacceptable within the United States. Some of
these services are creatures of governments whose policies both domestic
and foreign are unpalatable to American public opinion. The
problem with Recommendation 54 is the use of the word "funding."
It may not always be possible for the CIA to fully determine how
funds to foreign services have in fact been used.
oommittee Report:
· .. 55. The intellie:ence oversight committee (s) of Congress
should be kept fully informed of agreements negotiated with
other governments through intelligence channels. . . . (See
p.459.)
Oomment:
If this requirement comes into effect, foreign intelligence services
are going to be reluctant to enter into liaison arrangements with the
CIA. Public disclosure of CIA activities over the past few years has
already had a chilling effect on liaison operations. Let's not compound
the felony.
Oommittee Report:
· .. 64. By statute, the General Counsel should be nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.... (See p. 461.)
592
Oomment:
It is contrary to precedent to have the General Counsels of agencies
and bureaus nominated by the President and subject to Senate confirmation.
The General Counsel of any agency should be the choice of
its chief executive officer.
Oommittee Report:
· .. 68. B. The Director of the CIA should be appointed by
the President and subject to confirmation by the United
States Senate. Either the Director or Deputy Director should
be a civilian. . . . (See p. 465.)
Oomment:
Why should the Director or Deputy Director of the CIA be a
civilian? First, this implies a lack of integrity or ability among our
uniformed services. Second, the CIA was created to provide a civilian
organization that, among other things, would offset any bias in the
military intelligence services.
Oommittee Report:
· .. 69. By statute, a charter for the NSA should be established
which, in addition to setting limitations on the operation
of the Agency (see Domestic Subcommittee Recommendations),
would provide that the Director of NSA would be
nominated by the President and subject to confirmation by
the Senate. The Director should serve at the pleasure of the
President but for not more than ten years. Either the Director
or Deputy Director should be a civilian.... (See p. 465.)
Oomment:
I agree that a charter for the NSA is desirable. Because the NSA
is a service organi7,ation under the Department of Defense, I fail
to see why the Director should be nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. NSA has a large proportion of civilians, and
I can see no valid reason for prohibiting one of them rising to Director
or Deputy Director. Nevertheless, Recommendation 69 repeats the
implied insult mentioned above in connection with the DIA.
L. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AXD AMBASSADORS
Oommittee Report:
· . . 71. The National Security Council, the Department of
State, and the Central Intelligence Agency should promptly
issue. instructions implementing Public Law 93-475 (22
U.S.G. 2680a). These instructions should make clear that Ambassadors
are authorized recipients of sources and methods of
information concerning all intelligence activities, including
espionage and counterintelligence operations. Parallel instructions
from other components of the intelligence community
should be issued to their respective field organizations
593
and operatives. Copies of all these instructions should be
made available to the intelligence oversight committee(s) of
Congress. (See p. 468. )
72. In the exercise of their statutory responsibilities, Ambassadors
should have the personal right, which may not be delegated,
of access to the operational communications of the
CIA's Clandestine Service in the country to which they are
assigned. Any exceptions should have the approval of the
President and be brought to the attention of the oversight
committee. . . . (See p. 468.)
Oomment:
As a general statement, I cannot take exception to the concept that
Ambassadors should be privy to all of the activities within their missions.
There may be instances where the Chief of Station believes that
the identity of a particular intelligence source should not be made
known to the Ambassador. Rather than giving the Ambassador the
final say under these circumstances, I believe both the Ambassador
and the Chief of Station should have the right to appeal to the Secretary
of State and the DCI.
Recommendation 72 is closely related to Recommendation 71 in that
it extends the Ambassador's authority over the CIA Chief of Station.
Here again, I believe the general statement is correct but that provision
should be made for exceptional cases as previously stated. I believe
exceptions in some cases should be worked out between the Secretary
of State and the DCI rather than having to be submitted directly
to the President.
I have refused to sign the final report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities in the belief that it will cause severe embarrassment,
if not grave harm, to the Nation's foreign policy. A
lengthy report of this nature, produced under heavy deadline pressure,
further increases the possibility of embarrassment and unintentional
security violations. Finally, the majority report tends to blacken the
reputation of agencies and persons who have served America well.
Senate Resolution 21 that created the Select Committee held the promise
of a calm and deliberate investigation. That promise was not fulfilled,
and this is a report that probably should never have been written.
BARRY GOLDWATER.
207-932 0- 76 - 38
SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
At the close of the Senate Watergate Committee, I felt that there
was a compelling need to conduct a thorough examination of our intelligence
agencies, particularly the CIA and the FBI. Congress
never had taken a close look at the structure or programs of either
the CIA or the FBI, since their inception in 1947 and 1924, respectively.
l
Moreover, there never had been a congressional review of the
intelligence community as a whole. Therefore, I felt strongly that
this Committee's investigation was necessary. Its time had come. Like
the Watergate investigation, however, for me it was not a pleasant
assignment. I say that because our investigation uncovered many
actions by agents of the FBI and of the CIA that I would previously
have not thought possible (e.g., crude FBI letters to break up marriages
or ca,use strife between Black groups and the CIA assassination
plots) in our excellent intelligence and law enforcement institutions.
Despite these unsavory actions, however, I do not view either the FBI
or CIA as evil or even basically bad. Both agencies have a long and
distinguished record of excellent service to our government. With the
exception of the worst of the abuses, the agents involved truly believed
they were acting in the best interest of the country. Nevertheless, the
abuses uncovered can not be condoned and should have been investi.
gated long a~.
- I am hopeful, now that all these abuses have been fully aired to the
American people through the Committee's Hearings and Report, that
this investigation will have had It cathartic effect; that the FBI and
CIA will now be able to grow rather than decline. Such growth with a
healthy respect for the rule of law should be our goal; It goal which
I am confident can be attained. It is important for the future of this
country that the FBI and CIA not be cast as destroyers of our constitutional
rights but rather as protectors of those rights. With the
abuses behind us this can be accomplished.
LONG-TERM IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
On balance, I think the Committee carried out its task responsibly
and thoroughly. The Committee's report on both the Foreign and
Domestic areas are the result of extensive study and deliberation, as
well as bipartisan cooperation in its drafting. The Report identifies
many of the problems ill the intelligence field and contains positive suggestions
for reform. I support many of the proposed reforms, while
differing, at times, with the means we should adopt to attain those
reforms. In all candor. however, one must recognize that an ~nvestigation
such as this one, of necessity, will oause some short-term damage
to our intelligence apparatns.A responsible inquiry. as this has been,
will in the long run result in a stronger and more efficient intkllligence
community. As my colleague Senator Morgan recently noted at a Committee
meeting. f>uch short-term injury will be outweighed by longterm
benefits gained from the re-structuring of the intelligence (',om-
1 Upon the eXpiration of the watergate Committee in September 1974, I had
the privilpge to conRponRor with Senator Weicker, S. 4019, which would have
creatf'd a joint committee on Congress to oversee all intelligence activities.
(594)
595
munity with more efficient utilization of our intelligence resources.
Former Direotor William Colby captured this sentiment recently
in a New York Times article:
Intelligence has traditionally existed in a shadowy field
outside the law. This year's excitement has made clear that
the rule of law applies to all parts of the American Government,
including intelligence. In fact, this will strengthen
American intelligence. Its secrets will be understood to be
necessary ones for the protection of our democracy in tomorrow's
world, not covers for mistake or misdeed. The guidelines
within which it should and should not operate will be
clarified for those in intelligence and those concerned about
it. ImproVed supervision will ensure that the intelligence
agencies will remain within the new guidelines.
The American people will understand and support their
intelligence services and press their representatives to give
intelligence and its officers better protection from irresponsible
exposure and harassment. The costs of the past year
were high, but they will be exceeded by the value of this
strengthening of what was already the best intelligence service
in the world.2
The Committee's investigation, as former Director Colby points
out, has probed areas in which reforms are needed not to prevent
abuses, but to better protect and strengthen the intelligence services.
For example, it is now clear that legislation is needed to make it a
criminal offense to publish the name of a United States intelligence
officer stationed abroad.3 Moreover, the Committee's investigation
convinced me that the State Department should revise its publication
of lists from which intelligence officers overseas predictably and often
easily can be identified.
Yet we have not been able, in a year's time, to examine carefully all
facets of the United States' increClibly important and complex intelligence
community.4 We have established that in some areas problems
exist which need intensive long-term study. Often these most important
and complex problems are not ones which lend themselves to
quick or easy solutions. As Ambassador Helms noted in his testimony
during the Committee's public hearings :
. . . I would certainly agree that in view of the statements
made by all of you distinguished gentlemen, that some result
from this has got to bring about a system of accountability
that is go,ing to be satisfactory to the U.S. Congress and to
the AmerIcan people.
• New York Times, Jan. 26, 1976.
• I intend to propose an amendment to S. 400 to make it a criminal offense to
pUblish the name of a United States intelligence officer who is operating in a
cover capacity overseas.
• For many months, the Committee thoroughly and exhaustively investigated
the so-called "assassination plots" which culminated with the tiling of our report
on Xovember 11'. 1975. This inv!'stigation was vitally important in order to clear
the air and set the record straight. And, it WIIS instructive as to how "sensitive"
operatioos are conducted within our intelligence structure. But, it necessarily
shortened the time availahle to th!' Committee to investi~nte the intelli~
enc!' community as a whole.
596
Now, exactly how you work out that lWcountability in a
secret intelligence organization, I think, is obviously going to
take a good deal of thought and a good deal of work and I
do not have anv easy ready answer to it because I 'assure you
it is not an easy answer. In other words, there is no quick fix.
(Hearings, Vol. I, 9/17/75, p. 124).
THOROUGH STUDY NECESSARY IN SEVERAL AREAS
The areas which concern me the most are those on which we as a Committee
have been able to spend only a limited amount of time,5 i.e.,
espionage, counterintelligence, covert action, use of informants, and
electronic surveillance. It is in these areas that I am concerned that
the Committee be extremely careful to ensure that the proper thorough
investigatory predicate exist before any permanent reform recommendations
be enacted into law.
Our investigation, however, has provided a solid base of evidence
from which a permanent oversight committee can and should l'aunch
a lengthy and thorough inquiry into the best way to achieve permanent
restructuring in these particularly sensitive areas. It is my view that
such a study is necessary before I am able to endorse some of the Committee's
recommendations which suggest a far reaching alteration of
the structure of some of thl' most important facets of our intelligence
system.
Therefore, while I support many of the Committee's major recommendations,
I find myself unable to agree with all the Committee's
ijndings and recommendations in both the foreign and domestic areas.
Nor am I able to endorse every inference, suggestion, or nuance con·
tained in the findings and supporting indiVIdual reports which together
total in the thousands of pages. I do, however, fully support
all of the factual revelations which our report contains concerning
the many abuses in the intelligence field. It is important to disclose
to the American people all of the instances of wrongdoing we discovered.
With such full disclosure, it is my hope &at we can turn the
corner and devote our attention in the future to improving our intelligence
gathering capability. We must have reform, bat we must accomplish
it by improving, not limiting, our intelligence productivity. I
am confident this ca.n be done.
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATIONS
With regard to the totality of the Committee's recommendations, I
am afraid that the cumulative effect of the numerous restrictions
which the report proposes to place on our intelligence community may
be damaging to "our intelligence effort. I am "troubled by the fact
that some of the Committee's recommendations dip too deeply into
many of the operational areas of our intelligence agencies. To do so,
Tam afraid, will cause practical problems. The totality of the proposals
may decrease instead of increase our intelligence product. And, there
• The Committee's mandate from Congress dictated that the abuses at home
and abroad be given detailed attention. And, there are only a finite number of
important problems which can be examined and answered conclusively in a
year's time.
597
may be serious ramifications of some proposals which. will, I fear,
spawn problems which are as yet unknown. I am u~convmcedthat.t~e
uncertain world of intelligence can be regulated WIth the use of rIgId
or inflexible standards.
Specifically, I am not convinced that the answers to all our proble~ls
are found by establishing myriad Executive Branch boards, commIttees,
and subcommittees to manage the day-to-day operat~ons of the
intelligence community. We must take care to avoid creatmg a Rube
Goldberg maze of reVIew procedures which might result in a bureaucratic
morass which would further increase the burden on our
already heavily overburdened tax dollar.
We should not over-reform in response to the abuses uncovered.
This is not to say that we do not need new controls, because we do.
But, it is to say that the controls we impose should be well reasoned
and add to, not detract from the efficiency of our intelligence gatherering
system.
Increased Executive Branch controls are only one-half of the solution.
Congress for too long has neglected its role in monitoring the
intelligence community. That role should be significant but not allencompassing.
Congress has a great many powers which in the past
it has not exercised. We must now do our share but, at the same time,
we must be careful, in reacting to the abuses uncovered, that we not
swing the pendulum back too far in the direction of Congress. Both
wisdom and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers dictate
that Congress not place itself in the position of trying to manage
and control the day-to-day business of the intelligence operations of
the Executive Branch. Vigorous oversight is needed, but should be
carefully structured in a new powerful oversight committee. I believe
this can be achieved if we work together to attain it.
In moving toward improving our intelligence capability, we must
also streamline it. It is m this approach that my thoughts are somewhat
conceptually different from the approach the Committee is recommending.
I am concerned that we not overreact to the past by
creating a plethora of rigid "thou shalt not" statutes, which, while
prohibiting the specific hypothetical abuse postured in the Report,
cast a wide net which will catch and eliminate many valuable intelligence
programs as well.
The Committee Report recommends the passage of a large number
of new statutes to define the functions of and further regulate the
intelligence community. I am troubled by how much detail should be
used in spelling out the functions and limitations of our intelligence
agencies for all the world to see. Do we want to outline for our adversaries
just how far our intelligence agencies can go ~ Do we want to
define publicly down to the last detail what they can and cannot do ~
I am not sure we do. I rather think the answer is found in establishing
carefully structured charters for the intelligence agencies with accountability
and responsibility in the Executive Branch and vigilant
oversight within the Legislative Branch.
598
PREsIDENT'S PROGRAM
It is my view that we need to take both a moderate and efficient course
in reforming our intelligence gathering system. In that regard, I think
President Ford's recent restructuring of the intelligence community
was an extraordinarily good response to the problems of the past. The
President's program effected a massive reorganization of our entire
intelligence community. It was a massive reaction to a massive problem
which did not lend itself to easy solution. I am pleased that many
of the Committee's recommendations for intelligence reform mirror
the President's program in format. Centralizing the command and
control of the intelligence community, as the President's program does,
is the best way to ensure total accountability and yet not compromise
our intelligence gathering capability.
Therefore, I endorse the basic framework of intelligence reform,
outlined by President Ford, as embodying: (1) a single permanent
oversight committee in Congress, with strong and aggressive staff, to
oversee the intelligence community;6 (2) the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence to manage the day-to-day operation of the intelligence
community; (3) the re-constituted Operations Advisory Group to review
and pass upon all significant covert actions projects;? and (4)
the Intelligence Oversight Board to monitor any possible abuses in the
future, coordinating the activities and reports of what I am confident
will be the considerably strengthened offices of General Counsel and
Inspector General. This framework will accomplish the accountability
and responsibility we seek in the intelligence community with both
thoroughness ,and efficiency. Within this framework, Attorney General
Levi's new guidelines in the Domestic Security area will drasti({all)'
alter this previously sparsely supervised field. These guidelines will
centralize responsibility for domestic intelligence withm the Department
of Justice and will preclude abuses such as COINTELPRO from
ever reoccurring.8
SPECIFIC REFORMS
Within this basic framework, we must look to how we are going to
devise a system that can both effectively oversee the intelligence community
and yet not impose strictures which will eliminate Its productivity.
It is to this end that I suggest we move in the following
direction:
• My original support for a single joint committee of Congress has evolved,
somewhat as affected by the events of this past year's House Intelligence Committee
investigation, to support for a single Senate committee. However, I al80
favor the mandate of the new committee including, as does the present S. 400, a
charge to consider the future option of merging into a permanent joint committee
upon consultation with and action by the House of Representatives. The moment
for meaningful reform is now and we must not lose it by waiting for a joint committee
to be approved by both Houses of Congress.
7 I think a rule of reason should apply here. All signill.cant projects certainly
should receive careful attention from the Group. On the other hand, I would not
require a formal meeting with a written record to authorize the payment of 2
sources in X country at $50 per month to be changed to the payment of 3 sources
in X country at $40 per month.
• I applaud the detailed guidelines issued by the Attorney General to reform the
Department's entire domestic intelligence program. I think he is moving in the
right direction by requiring the FBI to meet a specific and stringent standard for
opening an intelligence investigation, i.e., the Terry v. Ohio standard.
599
(1) Demand responsibility and accountability from the .Ex~cutiv:e
Branch by requiring all major :rolicy decisions and all ~a]or mtelhgence
actlOn decisions be in writing, and therefore retrIevable.9
(2) I recommend, as I have previously, that Congress enact a ~ariation
of S. 400, which I had the privilege to cosponsor. S. 400 IS the
Government Operations Committee bill which would create a per~anent
oversight committee to review the intelligen~e c~mmumty.
The ~xisting Con~essionaloversight system has prOVIded I~frequent
and meffectual reVIew. And, many of the abuses revealed mIght have
been prevented had Congress been doing its job. The jurisdiction of the
new committee should include both the CIA and the FBI, and the committee
should be required to review and report periodically to the
Senate on all aspects of the intelligence community's operations. In
particular, I recommend that the Committee give specific careful
attention to how we might improve as well as control our intelligence
capabilit.Y in the counterintelligence and espionage areas.
(3) SImultaneously with the creation of a permanent oversight
committee, Congress should amend the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, § 662, which now requires the
intelligence community to brief 6 committees of the Congress on
each and every major intelligence action. Former Director Colby
strikes a responsive chord when he complains that the present system
will lead to leaking of vital intelligence information. We must put a
stop to this. This can be done by allowing the intelli~nce community
to report only to a single secure committee.
(4) Concomitantly with improved oversight. we in Congress must
adopt stringent procedures to prevent leaks of intellig-ence information.
In this regard, I recommend we create R regular remedy to prevent
the extraordinary remedy ofa sin~le member of Congress disclosing
the existence of a covert intelligence operation with which he
does not agree. Such a remedv could take the form of an appeal procedure
within the Congress so that a single member, not satisfied with a
Committee's determination that a particular program is in the national
interest. will be provided with an avenue of relief. This procedure.
however. must be coupled with string-ent penalties for any member
of Con.£Tress who disrell'Rrds it and discloS(>S classified information
anyway. I intend to offer an amendment to institute such a remedy
whl'n S. 400 reaches the Senate floor.10
(5) The positions of General Counsel and Inspector General in the
intellip"ence agencies should be elevated in imporlflnce and given increased
powers. I feel that it is extraordinarily important that these
• Never again should we be faced with the dilemma we faced in the assassination
invpstigation. We climbed the ladder of authority only to reach a point
where there were no more written rungs. Responsibility ceased; accountability
ceased; and. in the end, we could not say whether some of the most drastic
actioM our intelligence community or certain components of it had ever taken
al!'ainst a forei!W country or foreign leader were approved of or even known
of by the Preflident who was in office at the time.
10 I would favor a procedure, within the Congorl'ss. which would in effect create
aD avenue of appeal for a member dissatisfied with a Committee determination
on a classification issue. Perhaps an appeal committee made up of the Majority
and Minority ll'aders and other appointl'd mpmbE'rs would be appropriate. Leaving
thp mf'oCIHlniC's aside, however. I believe the concept is import:ant and can be
implemented.
600
positions, particularly that of General Counsel, be upgraded. For that
reason, I think that it is a good idea to have the General Counsel, to
both the FBI and the CIA, subject to Senate confirmation. This adds
another check and balance which will result in an overall improvement
of the system.12 Additionally, I feel that it is equally important to provide
both the General Counsel and Inspector General with unrestricted
access to all raw files within their respective agenciespa This was not
always done in the past and will be a healthy addition to the intraagency
system of checks and balances.
(6) I am in favor of making public the aggregate figure for the
budget of the entire intelligence community. I believe the people of
the United States have the right to know that figure. 13 The citizens of
this country have a right to know how much of their money we are
spending on intelligence production. But, they also want to get their
money's worth out of that tax dollar. They do not want to spend that
money for intelligence production which is going to be handicapped;
which is going to produce poor or inaccurate intelligence. Therefore, I
am opposed to any further specific delineation of the intelligence community
budget. Specifically, I am opposed to the publication of the
CIA's budget or the NSA's budget. It seems to me we are dealing with
the world of the unknown in predicting what a foreign intelligence
service can or cannot extrapolate from these budget figures. We received
no testimony which Il'uaranteed that, if Conll'ress were to publish
the budget figure for the CIA itself, a hostile intelligence organization
could not extrapolate from that figure and determine much more accurately
what the CIA capabilities are in any number of vital areas.
Without such testimony, I am not prepared to go that far. The public's
right to know must be balanced with the efficiency and integrity of
our intelligence operations. I think we can accomplish both by taking
the middle road; publishing the agwegate figure for the entire intelli.
gence community. It is this proposal that I have voted in favor of.
There are a number of other specific findinll'S and recommendations,
supported by a majority of the Committee, which require additional
brief comment.
U I differ with the Committee in that I would not have the General Counsel and
Inspector General file reports and/or complaints concerning possible abuses with
the Attorney General. Rather. I think the more appropriate interface in a new
oversight system would be for both to take complaints to the Intelligence Oversight
Board and the new congressional oversight committee. The Attorney General
would remain the recipient of any and all complaints regarding possible
violations of law.
... I support the Committee's recommendation 11lat Illgency employees report
any irregularities directly to the Inspector General without going through the
ch.,in of command, i.e. through the particular division chief involved.
08 I do not feel that, despite my persona:l view that the ag~ate budget
figure should he di~cl()Sed to the puhlic, only six to eleven members of the Senate
have the right to release unilaterally the actual budget figures. A majority of
both Houses of Congress should be necessary to release such information. And,
while I would cast my vote in favor of the release of the all'grel1.'ate budll'et figure,
I am tronhlPd that there mav he no such vote. I am not sure the "ril1.'ht" result.
justifies the "wrong" procedures, ibecause the next time the wrong procedull'e
can just as easily be utilized to reach the wrong result.
601
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
( 1) COVERT ACTION
I believe the covert action capability of our intelligence community
is vital to the United States. 'Ye must maintain our strength
in this capacity, but, we must also control it. The key and difficult
question, of course, is how we can control it without destroying or
damaging its effectiveness. In my view, the best way to both maintain
strength and yet insure accountability is to have strict control of the
covert action programs through the Operations Advisory Group, with
parallel control and supervision by the proposed permanent congressional
oversight committee.
Covert action is a complex United States intelligence capability.
Covert action provides the United States with the ability to react to
changing situations. It is built up over a long period of time. Potential
assets are painstakingly recruited all over the world. Having reviewed
the history of covert action since its inception, I do not look upon the
intelligence a,gents involved in covert action as a modern day group of
bandits who travel the world murdering and kidnapping people.
Rather, a vast majority of covert action programs are not only valuable
but well thought approaches through media placement and agents
of influence which produce positive results.
Covert action programs cannot be mounted instantly upon a crisis. It
is naive to think that our intelligence community will be able to address
a crisis without working years in advance to establish sources
in the various countries in which a crisis might occur. These sources
provide what is referred to as the "infrastructure," which must necessarily
be in place throughout the world so that the United States can
predict and pret'ent actions abroad which are inimical to our national
interest.14 I believe that, were we to completely abolish covert action or
attempt to remove it from the CIA and place it in a new separate
agency, these sources would dry up: and, when a crisis did come, our
intelligence community would not be able to meet it effectively. Not
only do I Question the effectiveness a new separate agency for covert
action would have, but such a re-structuring would unnecessarily il_crease
our already burgeoning bureaucracy.
I think that it is important to realize that covert action cannot be
conducted in public. We cannot take a Gallup Poll to determine
whether we should secretly aid the democratic forces in a particular
wuntry. I do not defend some of the covert action which has tak~n place
in Chile. But, the ,fact remains that we cannot discuss publicly the
many successes, both major and minor, which the United States has
achieved through the careful use of covert action programs. Many individuals
occupy positions of power in the world today as a direct result
of aid given through a covert action program. Unfortunately, we
cannot boast of or even mention these significant achievements. In
short, we cannot a.pproach covert action from a public relations point
of view. We should not forget that we must deal with the world as
it is today~with our adversaries employing their equivalent of covert
"For example, testimony before the Committee established that the CIA's
failure to act more positively in Portugal was a direct result of an absence of sufficient
clandestine infrastructure. William E. Colby testimony. 10/23/75; William
Nelson testimony, 1l/7/7~.
602
action. 1Ve must either say that the intelligence community should
have the power to address world problems in this manner, under the
strict control of the President and Congr,ess, or we should take away
that pmver completley. I cannot subscribe to the latter.
Finally, the issue remains as to how we can best control covert action
through statutory reform. First, I believe the Executive Branch
can and should carefully review each significant covert action proposal.
This will be accomplished through the Operations Advisory
Group under the program outlined by President Ford.
Second, Congress can control covert action by passing legislation
requiring that the new oversight committee be kept "fully and currently
informed." This, I believe, is the appropriate statutory language
to apply to covert action. I do not agree with the Committee's recommendation
that "prior notice" be given to Congress for each and every
covert action project. As a matter of practice, the important and signifcant
covert action programs will be discussed with the oversight committee
in a form of partnership; and this is the way it should be. "Fully
and currently informed" is language which has served us well in the
atomic energy area. It has an already existing body of precedent that
may be used as a guide for the future. It is flexible, like the Constitution,
and provides a strong. broad base to work from. I am not prepar~d to
say, however, that in the years ahead there may not be some vitally sensitive
situation of which Congress and the oversight committee should
not be told in advance. While the likelihood of this occurring is not
great, we should never foreclose with rigid statutory language possibilities
which cannot be foreseen today. Our statutory language must
be flexible enough to encompass a variety of problems and potential
problems, yet rigid enough to ensure total accountability. "Fully and
currently informed" accomplishes both purposes.
( 2) CIA PUBLISHING RESTRICTIONS
In the area of restrictions on the CIA's publishing of various materials,
I am in complete agreement that anything published in the
United States by the CIA, or even sponsored indirectly by the CIA
through a proprietary, front, or any other means, must be identified
as coming from the CIA. Publications overseas are another matter.
We should allow the Agency the flexibility, as we have in our recommendations,
to publish whatever they want to overseas and to publish
under whatever subterfuge is necessary and thought advisable.15
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
'While the Committee's Domestic Intelligence Report represents an
excellent discussion of the problems attendant to that field of intelligence,
I feel several of the recommendations may present practical
problems. Although our objective of achieving domestic intelligence
reforms is the same, I differ with the majority of the Committee in
how best to approach the achievement of this goal.
15 I do not .view the "domestic fallout" as a real problem. To be sure. some
publications by the CIA abroad will find their way back to the United States.
However, to try to impose severe restrictions to pr~ent STIch fallout would cause
unnecessary damage to the CIA's valid production of propaganda and other
publications abroad.
603
(1) INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS
Scope of Dome8tic Security Inve8tiqations
At the outset, I note that most of my concern with the standards
for investigations in the domestic security area stem from the fact
that "domestic security" is defined by the Committee to include both
the "terrorism" and "espionage" areas of investigation. Severe limitations,
proscribing the investigation of student groups, are more readily
acceptable when they do not also apply to terrorist groups and foreign
and domestic agents involved in espionage against the United States.
To include these disparate elements within the same "domestic security"
rubric, it seems to me, will create unnecessary problems when it
comes to the practical application of the theoretical principles enunciated
in the Committee's recommendations.
(a) Preventive intelliqence investigations-The Committee's recommendations
limit the FBI's permissible investigations in these
critical areas of terrorism and espionage under standards for
what the Committee delineates as preventive intelligence investigations.
Under these standards the FBI can only investigate where:
it has a specific allegation or specific or substantiated information
that (an) American or foreigner will 800n enqaqe in
terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity
[emphasis added.] 16
In am not convinced that this is the best way to approach the real
problem of limiting domestic intelligence investigations. While in
theoretical terms the standards of the recommendations may seem
appropriate, I fear the inherent practical consequences of their
application to the cold, real world of terrorism and espionage. The
establishment of an imminency requirement by not permitting any
investigation by the FBI unless the allegation or information received
establishes that the person or group will "soon engage" in certain
activity might prohibit any number of legitimate and necessary FBI
investigations. For example, an allegation of an assassination attempt
on a public figure at an unspecified date in the future could be precluded
from investigation; or, vague information received by the
FBI that there was a plan to obtain some nuclear components, but no
indication of when or.how, could also be prohibited from investigation.
Surely, matters such as these should be the valid subjects of investigation-
no matter how vague or piecemeal the information isY
(b) Time limit8-The Committee's recommendations would limit
any preliminary FBI investigation of an allegation of wrongdoing
in the Domestic Security area to 30 days from the receipt of the information,
unless the Attorney General "finds" 18 that the investigation
need be extended for an additional 60 davs. The FBI investigation may
continue beyond 90 days only if the investigatory efforts establish
"reasonable suspicion" that the person or group "will soon engage in"
1. Committl'e Doml'stic Report. p. 320.
"My experience dictatf's that many investigations are begun with very limited
or sketchy information. FBI agents and investigators in general are not always
or even ofUm immediately presented with information which constitute6 'Probable
cause of a crime. Probable cause is often established only through painstaking
investigation; putting bits and pieces together. I think we must take this into
consideration w.hen formulating threshold investigatory standards.
,. It is un~lear what standard is to be the predicate for any such finding.
604
terrorist or foreign espionage activitiesY And, even a full preventive
intelligence investigation is not permitted to continue beyond "one
year," except upon a finding by the Attorney General of "compelling
circumstances." 20
,Vhile well-intentioned, I am not persuaded that these are workable
standards. I just don't think we can categorize all investigations into
these rigid time frames. Investigations just are not conducted that way.
Thirty days, for example, is probably not even enou~h time to obtain a
license check return from some states. Moreover, limIting an investigation
to one year may not be realistic when it applies to investigating a
violence prone group like the SLA or a Soviet Union espionage ring.
These investigations are not easily or Quickly accomplished. I do not
believe that the creation of artifiCIal time limits is the best way to approach
the real concern of the Committee, which is that we establish
institutional controls on domestic security investigations. I would
prefer approaching the control and accountability problems by providing
periodic Department of Justice reviews of all categories of
domestic intelligence investigations; not by imposing specific time
limits upon all investigations.
( 2) INFORMANTS
The Committee recommends broad new restrictions on the use o~
infol1llants by the FBI. While our investigation has established that,
in the dom~tic intelligence field, there have been numerous abuses
in the use of informants, I do not think that the proposed recommen··
dations are the best vehicles to achieve the needed reform. I cannot
subscribe to recommendaitons limiting the use of informants to
stringent time standards,2l To limit use of infol1llants to periods of "90
days" 22 unless the Attorney General finds "probable cause" that an
American will "soon" engage in terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence
activity is impractical and unworkable. When groups such as the SLA
attempt to rob, kill, or blow up buildings, it is clearly necessary to
cultivate informants who may provide some advance warning. I am
concerned that the Committee's recommendations will preclude thi$
vital function of the FBI. Moreover, specific time limits, it seems to
me, will prove to be impractical. For example, at the end of the pre·
scribed time, with not enough evidence for arrests, will informant X
be terminated and replaced by informant Y who starts anew, or are
informants thereafter banned from penetrating the particular grou~
even if violence prone or involved in espionage ~
It should be remembered that informants are the single most important
tool of the FBI, and local police for that matter, in the fight
against terrorism and espionage, as well as organized crime, narcotics,
and even the ever pervasive street crimes of murder, rape, and
robbery. Indeed, they a.re the very lifeblood of such investigations.
Moreover, informants are involved in a wide spectrum of activities
,. Committee Domestic Report, pp. 32(}-323.
l!O Compelling circumstances is not further defined. so it is unclear what standards
should be applied in making sueh a determination.
21 My concerns here parallel those I have with respecl to the general investigatory
srnndRrds recommended.
.. The Committee allows an additional 60 days if the Attorney General finds
"compelling circumstances."
605
-from attending public meetings to actual penetration attempts. I am
concerned that theoretical and abstract restrictions designed only for
"domestic intelligence", if enacted, would soon limit our legitimate
law enforcement efforts in many other fields as well. People and actions
do not always fit nicely in neat little boxes labeled "domestic intelligence,"
particularly in the terrorist and espionage areas to which the
proposed restrictions on informants would apply. Congress should
carefully consider the scope and ramifications of any recommendations
with respect to informants.
It is my view that the better way to approach the problems encountered
in the use of informants is to put their use tmder strict
supervision of the Department of Justice. Creation ofa special staff or
committee for this purpose, centralized in the Department of Justice,
would provide effective controls over the potential abuses in the use
of informants, yet not hamstring their legitimate and valuable use.23
( 3) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
I wholeheartedly support S. 3197, the new electronic surveillance
bill sent to the Congress by President Ford.24 It needs consolidated bipartisan
support because it represents a significant advance from
existing practice. For the first time, it will bring all governmental
electronic surveillance under the scrutiny of judicial warrant procedures.
I commend the efforts of President Ford in taking this extraordinary
step forward in the regulation of electronic surveillance.
In supporting S. 3197, I do not regard the existing wiretaps presently
maintained under the direction and control of Attorney General
Levi as being in violation of the Constitution. The present practice
of electronic surveillance authorization and implementation rests upon
a lon~-standing body of precedent which provides a firm constitutional
base for their continued maintenance. The President's approach is to
move from the present practice toward better practices and procedures
for authorization. The abuses of electronic surveillance of the past
clearly dictate a need for a system of judicial warrant approval. Under
the President's proposal the American people will be able to rest easyassured
that electronic surveillance will be employed carefully, yet
when needed to combat serious criminal and espionage activity.
I differ with a majority of the Committee insofar as they recommend
that before a jurlge can issue a warrant for electronic surveillance he
must find more than that an American is a conscious agent of a foreign
power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities. The Committee
would require that probable cause be established for "criminal activity"
before a wiretap can be authorized. I think this departure
from the S. 3197 standard would be a dangerous one because it would
eliminate certain areas of espionage, particularly industrial espionage,
.. Attorney General Levi is in the process of l'Stablishin~ guidelines to regulate
the use of informant.s. I recommend, however, that these guidelines be enforced
through some appropriate form of Department of Justice review of the
FRI'8 U!~e of informants.
.. The bill enjoyed a bipartisan co-sponsorship of Senators.
606
from electronic surveillance. Many areas of espionage do not involve
clearly criminal activity. Indeed, forms of espionage may not constitute
a criminal offense, but should be the valid target of an espionage
investigation. For example, a situation such as American oil company
executives providing unclassified but important oil reserve information
to a Soviet agent might not be a permissible subject of electronic
surveillance if "criminal activity," rather than hostile foreign intelligence,
were the standard.25 I think the Committee proposed standard
would harm the FBI's espionage efforts and would therefore be a
mistake.
(4) CIVIL REMEDIES STATUTE
I oppose any broad new civil remedies statute in the field of domestic
intelligence as both dangerous and unnecessary. It is dangerous because
it could easily open the flood gates for numerous lawsuits filed
seeking injunctive relief in the courts to thwart legitimate investigations.
It is unnecessary because any substantial actions are already permitted
under present Supreme Court decisions, such as Bivens v.
United States, for violation of constitutional rights. There is simply
no valid reason to carve out a broad new category of lawsuits for those
not only injured by domestic intelligence methods but "threatened with
injury." 26 No such statutory provisions are available for "victims" in
any other specific category of activity. The present avenues of relief
provided by law today are clearly sufficient to address any future
abuses in the domestic intelligence field. I note that we have not had the
benefit of any sworn testimony from the many constitutional and crim.
inal law experts in the country, either pro or con such a proposal. Without
the benefit of an adequate record and with my concern about the
practical results of such a statute, I cannot support its enactment.
( 5) CIVIL DISORDERS
A final recommendation which requires brief comment in the Com.
mittee's proposed standards permitting the FBI to assist "federal,
state, and local officials in connection with a civil disorder." The Committee's
recommendation will not allow any investigation by the F.B.I.,
not even preliminary in nature, unless the Attorney General finds in
writing that "there is a clear and immediate threat of domestic
violence" which will require the use of Federal troops.
My reservation about this recommendation is that I think it deprives
the Attorney General of the necessary flexibility in dealing with
.. Those involved in the obtaining of information about our industrial processl.'
S, vital to our national security, for our adversaries should be the legitimate
subject of electronic surveillance, notwithstanding that no criminal statute is
violated. I do not think we can afford to wait for exhaustive reform of our
espionage laws. I note that the section of the proposed S.l dealing with espionage
reform has presented great difficulty to the drafters. Indeed, drafting espionage
into a criminal statute presents some of the same overbreadth problems
that the Committee has been concerned with in the domestic intelligence area.
26 For example, would a cause of action exist simply because X notices a federal
agent following him in an automobile, notwithstanding the nature or status of
the partiCUlar investigation!
607
these delicate matters (i.e., civil disturbances) and might tend to
exacerbate a possibly explosive situation. If the Attorney General is
not allowed to dispatch FBI agents to the scene of disorders it seems
to me that we deprive him of the very means he needs to make the
extraordinarily important decision as to whether Federal troops are
likely to be used.
I believe the better practice would be to permit preliminary investigation
by the FBI of potentially volatile situations so that the Attorney
General might make the most reasoned decision possible with
respect to what I consider the drastic step of deploying Federal troops
to quell a civil disorder in one of our cities.
WATERGATE-RELATED INQt:IRY
Finally, I wish to address briefly an area of the Committee's
investigation which I pursued for the most part independently. At
the close of the Senate 'Vatergate investigation I filed a report as part
of my individual views 27 which outlined remaining areas of investigation
with respect to the relationships between the Central Intelligence
Agency and the former CIA employees who participated in the Watergate
break-in.28 By virtue of my membership on this Select Committee.
I have been able to pursue a further inquiry into these matters, and
wish to thank the Chairman and the Vice Chairman for the staff
assistance and latitude provided me to pursue this area of investigation.
Many of the concerns raised in the 'Vatergate Committee investigation
have been overtaken by time and events. For example~the reported
references to illegal CIA domestic activities have now been confirmed~
as described in detail in the Committee's Report. The reference to the
CIA maintaining a file on .Tack Anderson 29 proved to be part of a
lengthy investigation and physical surveillance of Anderson by the
CIA during a "leak" inquiry. Similarly, the detailing of Howard
Hunt's post-retirement contacts with the CIA has been supplemented
with still more such contacts.3D Since July 1974, we have witnessed a
variety of other disclosures relative to the CIA's domestic activities;
indeed, the creation of our Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities was due in part to the continuing public concern about these
matters.
Unlike the Watergate Committee investigation of CIA activities,
which was terminated because of the refusal of the CIA to turn over
documents.31 this investigation was conducted in an atmosphere of
cooperation. After some initial difficulties. which the Committee en-
27 Senate Waterl!ate Committee Final Report, S. Res. 93-981, pp. 1105-1165.
"The "Action Required" section of the report. at pages 1150-1157. enumerated
unresolved matters and identified materia1s not provided to the Watergate
Committee hy the CIA.
.. Senate Watergate Committee Final Report, p. 1128.
.. For example this disclosure of personal correspondence (detailing certain
of Hunt's activities in 1971 and 1972) betwE'en Hunt and the CIA secretary stationed
in Paris whom Hunt sought to have reassigned to work fur him at the
White Holl.'!e.
.. By lE'tter of March 7, 1974, former Director Colby informed the Senate Watergoate
Committee that certain items of requested information would not ·be made
available to that emnmittee. Such a withholdi~ of timely information. including
that which was totally exculpatory, unnecessarily focused an aura of suspicion
and guilt.
608
countered in a variety of areas, the cooperation afforded by the CIA
\yas exemplary. In particular, I especially want to express my appreciation
to former Director ·William Colby and present Director George
Bush for cooperating to the fullest extent in this investigation. I also
want to thank Ambassador Richard Helms and former Counterintelligence
Chief .James Angleton for their J?atience and extensive
assistance in in numerous conferences, in trymg to reconstruct the
elusi"e details of this significant period.
In pursuing this area of inquiry, the Committee staff examined a
great volume of highly sensitive material, much of 'Which contained
speculative matters and a multitude of information of marginal relevance.
This information, which had not been made available in large
part to the Separate Watergate Committee, was examined in raw form
and without sanitization deletions. Because of the sensitivity of the
material, it was reviewed on the Central Intelligence Agency premises.
Thus, it was in a spirit of cooperation that this examination was accommodated;
and, this experience indicates that the Congress and the
intelligence community can cooperate in an investigation without incurring
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information.32
At the close of this Committee's examination of the available record,
I wish to state my belief that the sum total of the evidence does not
substantiate a conclusion that the CIA per se was involved in the range
of events and circumstances known as Watergate.33 However, there was
considerable evidence that for much of the post-Watergate period the
CIA itself was uncertain of the ramifications of the various involvements,
witting or otherwise. between members of the Watergate
burglary team and members of components of the Agency. Indeed,
the CIA was apparently. at times as perplexed as Congressional investigators.
34 It should 'be noted that the Agency undertook an extensive
internal inouirv in an effort to resolve these uncertainties. The investigation
of Watergate and the possible relationship of the Centrol Intelligence
Agency thereto. produced a panoply of puzzlement. While
the available information leaves nagging qustions and contains bits
and pieces of intriguing evidence, fairness dictates that an assessment
be rendered on the basis of the present record. An impartial evaluation
of that record compels the conclusion that the CIA, as an institution,
was not involved in the 'Watergate break-in.
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr.
.. For example, the staff was given access to the Martinez contact reports (to
which access was refused during the Watergate Committee investigation) in th~r
entirety. This review was accomplished in secure facilities at the CIA, and no
notes were taken of sensitive information contained in the reports not related
to Hunt or in some other way relevant to the Committee's inquiry. I cite this as
an example of how a Congressional investigation can be thorough and yet not
threaten the integrity of CIA secret documentation, containing names of officers
and other highly classified information.
.. I am filing with the Committee the detailed results of libis investigation in
the form of classified memoranda. These memoranda will be turned over to the
successor permanent oversight committee to be kept in its secure files. No useful
purpose would be served in further publicizing the contents. because much of it
is fragmentary and its sum total reinforces the findings stated herein.
'" Colby to Helms letter of 28 January, 1974, references seven to nine communications
from Hunt while he was at the White House to Helms' secretary, with
the query: "Can you give us some idea as to what they were about?"
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CHARLES MeG.
MATHIAS, JR.
I fully support the Final Report and Findings and Recommendations
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.
When the Majority Leader, Senator Mike Mansfield and I first proposed
the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on
October 4,1974, in the aftermath of Watergate and charges of domestic
spying and the misuse of the CIA and the FBI, confidence of the
people in our vital government intelligence system was severely
strained. It was the Majority Leader's and my view that in order to
restore confidence and legitimacy to the intelligence activities of the
United States, there was a need to examine in depth to what extent
secret activities are required by the United States. In December 1974,
in testimony in support of my resolution to create a Senate Select
Committee to Study the intelligence activities of the United States,
I stated:
One of the most important tasks facing the United States and
particularly the Congress is determining the proper role of
intelligence agencies in our constitutional system of government
and drawing new guidelines for the future intelligence
activities of the executive branch. It is quite clear that our
foreign and domestic intelligence agencies, including such
valued agencies as the CIA, the FBI, and other departments
and agencies, have in the course of their activities, violated
the constitutional guarantees of citizens and have operated
outside of normal constitutional processes. The instances of
abuses of power by intelligence agencies and the abridgement
of constitutional rights of individual citizens by these agencies
revealed by 'Vatergate are sufficient cause to warrant a
thorough systematic examination of not only the present intelligence
activities; but more importantly, in my view, there is
an urgent need to determine what our intelligence needs now
are and how they can most effectively function under firm constitutional
guidelines, providing for rigorous oversight and
accountability.
The Select Committee has just completed this task. Its recommendations
represent an agenda of essential legislative and executive
branch action.
The history of United States intelligence activities since the end of
World War II is a record of remarkable intellectual and organizational
achievement. It is also a record of the exercise of subtle violence
and brutal warfare. The latter is not a pretty picture, but given the
attitudes of major powers since the end of World War II, our national
leadership regarded such measures as necessary and unavoidable. The
history of the past three decades raises the important issue of whether
the United States must adopt all the methods of our potential adver-
(609)
207-932 0 - 76 - 39
610
saries. or is able to exercise some restraints. I share the view of the
COmIDittee that if we become "more ruthless than the enemy," as one
important policy document of the 1950's urged, the U.S. will lose t~ose
qualities which distinguish a free society from a totalitarian regune.
It is my belief that restraints are possible and can be exercised in ways
that are both consistent with the needs of national security and with
our constitutional processes.
The information obtained through intelligence activities is important
to government at all policy and operational levels. The U.S. spends
many billions of dollars a year on this effort. After over a year of
study and investigation, there remain, however, many unanswered
questions as to the value of some intelligence collection activities. More
work needs to be done by a fully empowered permanent oversight
committee. For example, in neither the Committee's investigations, nor
in internal executive branch studies, has it been possible to determine
exactly how much and what kind of intelligence is needed. There are
very few solid indicators of the usefulness of the massive amount of
intelligence available to the U.S. Government. There are, however,
many tangible positive benefits; the ABM Treaty, for example, would
not have been possible without reliable intelligence to assure that its
provisions were being adhered to.
The magnitude of the intelligence effort parallels the patterns of our
military and diplomatic policies against potential enemies. In the early
1950's, the intent of United States policy was to counter and roll back
Soviet activities worldwide. In recent years there has been a less~ning
of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the
world of intelligence similar patterns can be observed.
The intelligence activities of the U.S. are largely shaped by the
activities of our potential enemies. We do what they do. ·What is it
that we both do ~
First, we spy on one another. The legal term is espionage; the euphemism
is "clandestine collection;" the direct word is spying.
Second, we make great efforts to know what it is they are doing
in order to counter, stop, or destroy what they are doing against us.
Response to potential enemies has tended to set the pace for our intelligence
efforts.
Third, we both engage in covert action. Covert action, plainly stated,
is the secret exercise of influence. The means used range the gamut of
technique between waging war and peaceful intercourse among nations.
This includes "little" wars-paramilitary activity, subversion of other
governments through propaganda, the use of money, agents of influence,
economic warfare, and other lp.ss directly hostile means. All
this is done to support policy interests.
Fourth, we both collect vast amounts of information through open
means, technological collection and spying. This information is analyzed
and organized into finished intelligence available to the policymakers
of the country in making national decisions.
Upon systematic review, I share the view of the Committee that the
U.S. must continue to undertake some secret intelligence activities.
They are vital to our national sec1lrity. Certain activities, however,
should be prohibit€d. In the past, some intelligenc€ activities have had
the e~ct of eroding our processes of government, have violated our
611
principles, ideals and reputation, and have damaged our ability to
exercise moral and ethical leadership throughout the world. The fundamental
issue facing the Congress and the issue that particularly
confronts the Committee is to decide how secret activities which are
agreed to be necessary are to be governed by our democratic institutions.
This issue has three aspects :
First, how do we decide which activities should be undertaken? The
answer the Committee has come to and that I fully support is that it
must be the executive and legislative branches jointly: The legislature
through appropriate legislative intelligence oversight committee(
s) and the executive through its NSC and other management and
oversight structures.
Second, what system of accountability is necessary in order to assure
that intelligence activities are prudent and appropriate.'! The Committee's
decision is that there must be a rigorous recorded approval process
within the executive branch and a searching oversight process within
the legislative branch. All proposals and approvals for intelligence
activities must be recorded in writing and placed in a central classified
registry; the record of activities should be available to the legislative
oversight committee(s) in accordance with their needs.
Third, who can make use of intelligence information? The Committee's
view is that both the legislature and the executive should
have full access to the intelligence analyses produced by the intelligence
community. The availability of sound intelligence will enable
the legi'llature to become a partner with the executive branch as
intended by the Constitution in this vital area of national policy. A
better informed legislature can only benefit the nation.
These three questions and their answers are at the heart of the
Committee's recommended solutions to the problem of how secret intelligence
activities can be governed within an open democratic society.
These are solutions which I fully support. But for these solutions to
work, a strong oversight committee must be created with power of the
purse and full access to information. Without a strong oversight committee,
the failures of the past will recur.
Inherent contradictions are created when secret activities are permitted
within a democratic society. The U.S. is a government of laws,
yet laws have not been passed which accurately describe the nature
and extent of intelligence activities. This dilemma has raised a number
of important questions for the Committee. Although the Committee
has come to conclusions about these issues, they are problems that
require constant reexamination.
In this regard, a key question before the Committee was whether the
U.S. should be the first nation to say through its laws what it is in
fact doing in the world of intelligence activities. Should it pass laws
specifically authorizing and governing covert action, including the
explicit right to make warfare, to practice subversion and propaganda?
Should these intelligence methods-which have never been publicly
acknowledged by any other nation-be put into law? Should the
United States Government do so directly and explicitly, rather than
through euphemisms and vague imprecise language, and not disguise
from its own people what it is actually doing? Is it naive or innocent
to express what the U.S. and all other nations in fact are doing? Or
612
would there be advantages to expressing directly what we and all other
nations do, expressing also the hope that through negotiation between
nations many activities could be stopped on a mutually acceptable
basis~
In response to the question of whether we should express openly
what we now do secretly in the world of intelligence, many have answered
that to reveal the missions of the intelligence agencies with any
precision and to set limitations on them by law would, at a minimum
have severe diplomatic repercussions. Further, it is argued, disclosure
would, as a practical matter, result in effective countermeasures by the
intelligence services of other nations, particularly those nations hostile
to the United States.
In the past, all nations have disavowed acts of their intelligence
agents abroad when they have been revealed. But as the scale of intelligence
activities has grown, "plausible denial," once an accepted doctrIne
for the U.S. Government, has become implausible. It is my belief
that the failure to assure accountability through constitutional processes
has jeopardized the integrity of our democratic institutions.
Many of the practices and techniques exercised by our nation's intelligence
agencies have also become obsolete in this age of nuclear weapons
and other advanced technology. For example, there is now recognition,
at least for the present, among the great powers that so-called
"national technical means," that is, satellite reconnaissance, should not
be interfered with. There are a number of intelligence missions which,
through tacit international acceptance and widespread press discussion,
have, over time and through common usage, become "overt" in
fact. In such cases, public discussion and approval of these kinds of
intelligence missions, such as technical collection systems, is essential,
even if the details are not revealed.
Shall the U.S. Government through laws exempt certain sectors of
its society-such 'as the press, religious institutions, foundations, and
the academic world-from any use by the intelligence agencies of the
U.S.~
How can the executive and legislative branches of government control
necessary but hazardous activities? How can the third branch,
the judiciary, safeguard liberties without an adequate statutory
foundation? The answers lie,the Committee has concluded in its report,
and I fully share this conclusion, in a combination of precise statutory
charters and an infonned interaction between the oversight committees
of the Congress and the appropriate policy groups within the exeCutive
branch. If the oversight committees of the Congress are to be
effl'·ctive they must reflect the full spectrum of views of the legislature,
they require not only the power of the purse and full access to information,
including presentation of proposals before the initiation of
significant intelligence activities. .
The requirement that the legislature through its oversight committees
be fully informed, very quickly raises the question of how fully ~
Whwt "advice" given to Presidents qualifies as "personal"-therefore
privileged--communication as opposed to "decisions" or "facts and
analysis" which all agree should be made available to the Congress?
The experience of the Select Committee will be a good guide to the
problems that oversight committees will face in the future. The execu613
tive bmnch made the entire record available in some cases. In only a
few cases was adequate information not forthcoming. On the one hand,
executive privilege was never formally asserted; on the other hand,
the Committee insisted upon complete access only when absolutely
necessary.
I continue to be deeply troubled by the dilemma created by the necessity
for Congress to work through an oversight committee to exact
adherence to standards through secret consultations. On the one hand,
the agreed-upon needs for secrecy argues for regulation through oversight,
rather than through explicit legislation; yet, such a process must
be supported by statutes embodying the broad principles of declared
policy.
Both the Committee and the executive branch agree that clearly
defined statutory charters and a new strong and effective oversight
committee for the intelligence agencies are necessary. If the proposed
new legislative and executive branch oversight procedures prove insufficient,
additional statutory controls can be instituted. But the first
and present requirement is full executive and legislative support of
the governance of intelligence activities through the newly-cast joint
oversight mechanisms of the legislative and the executive branches.
This is a time of testing. After 200 years of open democratic government
t~e U.S. now has the burden of a permanent secret intelligence
system. If secret intelligence activities are to continue-and
there is present agreement between the branches that they are
necessary-then the secret procedures required must have built-in
checks and especially stringent provisions for accountability. Intelligence
agencies have expressed the concern that some of the Committee's
proposals will create excessive layers of approval through which
a0tions must be approved, and that such layering will introduce new
elements of caution into the approval process which are inconsistent
with the view, held by many in the intelligence agencies, that to be
effective risks must be taken. But in view of the dangers involved, and
the past record of instances of recklessness harmful to the nation
there is clearly a need for more caution through more accountability
and fixed responsibility in the decisionmaking process governing the
initiation and carrying out of intelligence activities.
If such high-risk activities are -to continue, and if the decisions concerning
secret activities are to remain secret, a thorough and rigorous
paper trail must be constructed so that accountability can be fixed
among all those involved in any secret intelligence activity approved.
The possible drawbacks of a monitoring system of extensive checks and
balances are far outweighed by the dangers of unchecked secret activities.
The record of abuses in the past is sufficient warning.
In time of peace a rigorously enforced system of checks and accountability
is necessary for the preservaJtion of a free society.
In my view, the purposes of our intelligence system are many. The
major purpose, however, is the prevention of war. The recommendations
made by the Committee for legislative charters and an informed
interaction between the le~islative and executive branches are
designed to assure that our llltelligence system operates effectively,
accountably, and under the governance of constitutional processes.
CHARLES MeC. MATHIAS, Jr.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR RICHARD S.
SCHWEIKER
The Senate Seled Committee has engaged in an extensive investigation
of the intelligence activities of the United States. The investigation
did not cover all alleged abuses or study in depth all the major
issues. It was, however-and this is more a matter of concern than a
matter of pride-the first thorough investigation of the United States
intelligence community in almost thirty years.
The Committee discovered the real strengths of American intelligence
activities-dedicated personnel, broad expertise, and impressive
technological achievements. But we also found real weaknesses. Among
these is the absenee of statutory authority for many intelligence activities.
Combined with this lack of explicit authorization were two
noteworthy beliefs. First, that a claim of national security, however,
defined or understood, could supersede the laws or regulations that
govern other activities. Second, that if our enemies were engaging in
certain activities we could, and should, do the same.
The coming to maturity of the American intelligence community
will help eliminate these pernicious beliefs. The recommendations
which the Committee made, which I strongly support, will help to
bring intelligence activities under law. Crucial to the success of the
Committee's recommendations-and here I join with my colleagues,
Senators Philip Hart, Walter Mondale and Gary Hart-is the e.<;tablishment
of a new intelligence oversight commIttee with legislative
authority.
Our Committee did not have such authority. As a select committee
we have had a limited mandate and a limited life. Thus we have had
only one tool with which to accomplish reform--public disclosure,
leading to publi(l concern.
The Committee has been in a constant dilemma. Should it use the
one tool available-public disclosure of certain intelligence activitieseven
though it was claimed that almost any disclosure would damage
the "national security"? For example, the Central Intelligence Agency
argued that references to the invasion of the Bay of PIgS should be
eliminated on such grounds. Or shouldit withhold information such as
the fact that NSA was given access to millions of messages and risk
well-deserved cover-up charges? I think, in general, the Committee
chose the right balance.
But an oversight committee with power to bring legislation to the
floor and power to authorize the budget for national intelligence will
not have to face this dilemma. Such a committee could and should disclose
enough information to enable the public to understand how the
intelligence community works or fails to work. Such a committee can
and will protect vital secrets. And it can, in executive session, continue
the intensive scrutiny of intelligence activities which was absent in the
past and which is necessary because these activities cannot be completely
open to public examination.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER.
(615)

GLOSSARY
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee: An interagency group established
in 1955 by the Special Assistant to the DCI to coordinate collection
requirements for the U-2 reconnaissance program.
Agent: An individual who acts under the direction of an intelligence
agency or security service to obtain, or assist in obtaining, information
for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.
Agent of Influence: An individual who can be used to influence covertly
foreign officials, opinion molders, organizations, or pressure
groups in a way which will generally advance United Sta:tes Government
objectives, or to undertake specific action in support of
United States Government objectives.
Analysis: A stage in the intelligence processing cycle whereby collected
information is reviewed to identify significant facts; the information
is compared with and collated with other data, and conclusions,
which also incorporate the memory and judgment of the
intelligence analyst, are derived from it.
Armed Forces Security Agmu:y (AFSA): The predecessor to NSA;
it was created in 1949 to consolidate the crytologic effort.
Army Security Agency (ASA) : One of the Service Cryptologic Agencies;
its collection activities are under the authority of the Director
of NSA (DIRNSA) in his dual role as Chief of the Central Security
Service (CSS).
Asset: Any resource-a person, group, relationship, instrument, installation,
or supply-at the disposition of an intelligence agency for
use in an operational or support role. The term is normally applied
to a person who is contributing to a CIA clandestine mission, but
is not a fully controlled agent of CIA.
Assessment: Part of the intelligence process whereby an analyst determines
the reliability or validity of a piece of information. An
assessment could also be a statement resulting from this process.
Backstopping: A CIA term for providing appropriate verification and
support of cover arrangements for an agent or asset in anticipation
of ~nquiries or other actions which might test the credibility of hig
or Its cover.
Basic Intelligence: Factual, fundamental, and generally permanent
information about all aspects of a nation-physical, social, economic,
political, biographical, and cultural-which is used as a
base for intelligence products in support of planning, policymaking,
and military operations.
Bigot Lists: Using the term bigot in the sense of "narrow," this is a
restrictive list of persons who have access to a particular, and
highly sensitive class of information.
Biological Agent: A micro-organism which causes disease in humans,
plants, or animals, or causes a deterioration of materiel.
(617)
618
Biological Operations: Employment of biological agents to produce
casualties in humans or animals, and damage to plants or material;
or a defense against such an attack.
Biological Warfare: Use of living organisms, toxic biological products,
or plant growth regulators to cause death or injury to
humans, animals, or plants; or a defense against such action.
Biological Weapon: A weapon which projects, disperses, or disseminates
a biologial agent.
Black: A term used to indicate reliance on illegal concealment of an
activity rather than on cover.
Black Bag Job: Warrantless surreptitious entry, especially an entry
conducted for purposes other than microphone installation, such
as physical search and seizure or photographing of documents.
Black List: An official counterintelligence listing of actual or potential
hostile collaborators, sympathizers, intelligence suspects, or other
persons viewed as threatening to the securIty of friendly military
forces.
Black Propaganda: Propaganda which purports to emanate from a
source other than the true one.
Blow: To expose-often unintentionally-personnel, installations, or
other elements of a clandestine activity or organization.
Board of National Estima,tes (BNE): Established in 1950 by DCI
Walter Bedell Smith. The Board was composed of individuals
who had responsibility for receiving National Intelligence Estimates
for the Director of Central Intelligence. The Board was
dissolved in 1973.
Bug: A concealed listening device or microphone, or other audiosurveillance
device; also, to install the means for audiosurveillance
of a subject or target.
Bugged: A room or object which contains a concealed listening device.
Oase: An intelligence operation in its entirety; the term also refers
to a record of the development of an intelligence operation, how
it will operate, and the objectives of the operation.
Oase Officer: A staff employee of the CIA who is responsible for handling
agents.
Oentral Intelligence Group (010.): The direct predecessor to CIA;
President Truman established it by executive order on ,January 22,
1946. It operated under the National Intelligence Authority
(NIA) , which was created at the same time.
Ohemical Agent: A chemical compound which, when disseminated,
causes incapacitating, lethal, or damaging effects on humans,
animals, plants, or materials.
Oenmical Operations: Using chemical agents--€xcludihg riot control
agents-to kill, or incapacitate for a significant period, humans
or animals, or to deny the use of facilities, materials, Or areas.
Oipher: Any cryptographic system in which arbitrary symbols or
groups of symbols represent units of plain text.
Clandestine Intelligence: Intelligence information collected by clandestine
sources.
Olandestine OperaNon,~: Intelligence, counterintelligence, or other
information collection activities and covert political, economic,
propaganda and paramilitary activities, conducted so as to assure
the s~·cre.cy of the operation.
619
Code: A system of communication in which arbitrary groups of symbols
represent units of plain text. Codes may be used for brevity
or for security.
Code 'word: A word which has been assigned a classification and a
classified meaning to safeguard intentions and information regarding
a planned operation.
Collation: The assembly of facts to determine the relationships among
them in order to derive intelligence and facilitate further processing
of intelligence information.
Collection: The acquisition of information by any means and its
delivery to the proper intelligence processing unit for use in the
production of intelligence.
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX)
: One of three intdligence collection committees formerly
under the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), dealing
with photographic intelligence.
Communicatiorus: A method or means of conveying information from
one person or place to another; this term does not include direct,
unassisted conversion or correspondence through nonmilitary
postal agencies.
Communicatiorus Center: A facility responsible for receiving transmitting
and delivering messages; it normally contains a message
center section, a cryptographic section, and a sending and receiving
section, using electronic communications devices.
Communicatioruslntelligence (COMINT): Technical and intelligence
information derived from foreign communications by someone
other than the intended recipient. It does not include foreign
press, propaganda, or public broadcasts. The term is sometimes
used interchangeably with SIGINT.
Communication.'/ Security (COMSEC): The protection of United
States telecommunications and other communications from exploitation
by foreign intelligence services and from unauthorized
disclosure. COMSEC is one of the mission responsibilities of NSA.
I~ includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission securIty,
and physical security of classified equipment, material, and
documents.
Oompartmentation: The practice of establishing specials channels for
handling sensitive intelligence information. The channels are
limited to individuals with a specific need for such information
and who are therefore given special security clearances in order
to have access to it.
Oompromise.: A known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel,
mstallatlOns, or other assets, or of classified information or material,
to an unauthorized person.
Ooncealment: The provision of protection from observation only.
Oonfusion Agent: An individual dispatched by his sponsor to confound
the intelligence or counterintelligence apparatus of another
country rather than to collect and transmit information.
Oonsumer: A pers~>n or agency that uses information or intelligence
~roduced by eIther its own staff or other agencies.
Oontznentq'z United States (CONUS): A military term which refers
to Umted States territory, including adjacent territorial waters,
620
located within the North American continent between Canada
and Mexico.
Oontrol: Physical or psychological pressure exerted on an agent. or
group to ensure that the agent or group responds to the dIrectIOn
from an intelligence agency or service. oounterespionage: Those aspects of counterintelligence concerne~with
aggresesive operations against another intelligence. servIce. to
reduce its effectiveness, or to detect and neutralIze foreIgn
espionage. This is done by identification, penetration, manipul~tion,
deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or orgamzations
conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities
in order to destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent such espionage
activities.
Oounterguerrilla Warfare: Operations and activities conducted by
armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a
government against guerrillas.
Oounterimurgency: Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological,
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat
subversive insurgency within a country.
Oounterintelligence: Activities conducted to'destroy the effectiveness
of foreign intelligence operations and to protect information
against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations
against sabotage. The term also refers to information developed
by or used in counterintelligence operations. See also
counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion.
Oounterreconnaissance: Measures taken to prevent observation by a
hostile foreign service of an area, place, or military force.
Oountersabotage: That aspect of counterintelligence desil!;ned to detect,
destroy, neutralize, or prevent sabotage activities through
identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression
of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or
suspected of conducting sabotage activities.
OounterstWversion: That part of counterintelligence designed to destroy
the effectiveness of subversive activities through the detection,
identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception,
and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations
conducting or capable of conducting such activities.
Oourier: A messenger responsible for the secure physical transmission
and delivery of documents and material.
Oover: A protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation
to prevent identification with clandestine activities and to
conceal the true affiliation of personel and the true sponsorship of
their activities.
Oovert Action: Any clandestine activity designed to influence foreign
governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of
United States foreign policy. Covert action may include political
and economic action, propaganda and paramilitary activities.
Oovert Operatiom: Operations planned and executed against foreign
governments, installations, and individuals so as to conceal the
identity of the sponsor or else to permit the sponsor's plausible
denial of the operation. The terms covert action, covert operation,
621
clandestive operation and clandestine activity are sometimes used
interchangeably. .
Critical Intelligence: Information or intelligence of such urgent Importance
to the security of the United States that it is transmitted
at the highest priority to the President and other national decisionmaking
officials before passing through regular evaluative
channels.
Cryptanalysis: The breaking of codes and ciphers into plain text without
initial knowledge of the key employed in the encryption.
Oryptography: The enciphering of plain text so that it will be unintelligible
to an unauthorized recipient.
Orytology: The science that includes cryptoanalysis and cryptography,
and embraces communications intelligence and communications
security.
Cryptom.aterialo' All material-including documents, devices, equipment,
and apparatus--essential to the encryption, decryption, or
authentication of telecommunications.
Cryptosecur-ity: That component of communications security which
results from the provision of technically sound cryptosystems and
their proper use.
Cryptosystems: The associated items of cryptomaterial which are used
as a unit and provide a single means of encryption and
decryption.
Current Intelligence: Summaries and analyses of recent events.
Cut-out: A CIA term referring to a person who is used to conceal contact
between members of a clandestine activity or organization.
Deception: Measures designed to mislead a hostile person or entity
by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying evidence to induce a
reaction prejudicial to his or its interests.
Decrypt: To convert encrypted text into plain text by use of
a cryptosystem.
Defector: A person who, for political or other reasons, has repudiated
his country and may be in possession of information of interest
to the United States Government.
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): Department of Defense agency
for producing military intelligence, created by directive of the
Secretary of Defense in 1961.
Defense Intelligence Objectives and Priorities (DIOP): A single
statement of intelligence requirements compiled by DIA for use
by all DOD intelligence components.
Departmental Intelligence: The intelligence which government depa~~~
nts and agencies generate in support of their own
actWItles.
Directive: Basically any executive branch communication which initiates
or governs departmental or agency action, conduct, or
procedure.
Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID): A directive issued
by the DCI which outlines general policies and procedures
to be followed by intelligence ag-encies under his direction; it is
generally more specific than an NSCID.
Dissemination: The distribution of information or intelligence rroducts
(in oral, written, or graphic form) to departmenta and
agency intelligence consumers. .
622
Domestic Emergencies: Emergencies occurring within the United
States, its territories, or possessions, which affect the public welfare.
Such emergencies may arise from an enemy attack, insurrection,
civil disturbances, natural disasters (earthquakes,
floods), fire, or other comparable emergencies which endanger
life and property or disrupt the normal processess of government.
. Domestic Intelligence: Intelligence relating to activities or con~itions
within the United States which threaten internal securIty
(in general or to a governmental department, agency, or official)
and which might require the employment of troops.
Double Agent: A person engaging in clandestine activity for two or
more intelligence or security services who provides information
to one service about the other, or about each service to the other,
and who is wittingly or unwittingly manipulated by one service
against the other.
Economic Intelligence: Intelligence regarding foreign economic
resources, activities, and policies.
Electromagnetic Spectrum: The frequencies (or wave lengths) present
in a given electromagnetic radiation (radiation made up of
oscillating electric and magnetic fields and propagated with the
speed of light-such as radar or radio waves). A particular
spectrum could include a single frequency, or a broad range
of frequencies.
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT): Technical and intelligence information
derived from the collection (or interception) and processing
of foreign electromagnetic radiations (noncommunications)
emanating from sources such as radar. ELINT is part of
the NSA/CSS Signals Intelligence mission.
Electronic Line of Sight: The path traveled by electromagnetic
waves which is not subject to reflection or refraction by the
atmosphere.
Electronics Securit,!!: The detection, identification, evaluation, and
location of foreIgn electromagnetic radiations.
Electronic Surveillance: Surveillance conducted on a person, WOUO,
or other entitly by electronic equipment which is often highly
sopbisticated and extremely sensitive.
Elicitation: The acquisition of intelligence from a person or group
which does ndt disclose the intent of the interview or conversamono
This is a HUMINT collection technique, generally of an
overt nature, unless the collootor is other than what he or she
purports to be.
Emission Security: That component of communications security which
results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons
any information of value which might be derived from the interce~
ionandanalysis of c~mp:omisingemanations from cryptyeqUlpment
or telecommUnICatIOns systems.
Encipher: To convert 'It plain text message into unintelligible form
by the use ofa cipher system.
Encrypt: To convert a plain text message into unintelligible form
by means 'of a cryptosySltem; this term covers the meanings of
encipher and encode.
623
Entity: A company, form, corporation, institution, bank, or foundation.
Espionage: Clandestine intelligence collection activity. This term is
often interchanged with "clandestine collection."
Estimating: An efforlt to appraise and analyze the future possibilities
or courses of a0tiion in a situation under study and the various
results or consequences of foreign or Uni,ted States actions relating
,to thtlit situation. This analysis of such a foreign situation
would consider its development and trends to identify its major
elements, interpret the significance of the situtlition, and evaluate
the future possibilities and prospective results of various aotions
whioh might be taken, including clandestine operations.
Evaluation: The process of determining the value, credibility, reliability,
pertinency, accuracy, and use of an item of information,
'an intelligence produ0t, or the performance of an intelligence
system.
Executive Action: This term is generally an euphemism for assassintlition,
and was used by the CIA to describe a 'program aimed
at overthrowing certain foreign leaders, by assassmating them if
necessary.
Exploitation: The process of getting information from any source
and taking full advantage of it for strategic or tactical purposes.
Foreign Intelligence: Intelligence concerning areas outside the
United States.
Grey Propaganda: Propaganda which does not specifically identify
a source.
Guerrilla: A combat participant in guerrilla warfare.
Guerrilla Warfare: Military and paramilitary operations conducted
in hostile or enemy-held territory by irregular, generally indigenous
forces.
Guidance: The general direction of an intelligence effort, particularly
in the area of collection.
Imagery: Representations of objects reproduced electronically or by
optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media.
Indications I ntelZigence: Intelligence in various degrees of evaluation
which bears on foreign intentions regarding a course of action.
Infiltration: The placing of an agent or other person in a target area
within hostile territory or within targeted groups or organizations.
Informant: A person who wittingly or unwittingly provides information
to an agent, a clandestine service, or police. In reporting
such information, this person will often be cited as the source.
Information: Raw, unevaluated data at all levels of reliability and
from all kinds of sources, such as observation, rumors, reports,
and photographs, which, when processed, may produce intelligence.
Info'l"J1'Wr: One who intentionally discloses information about other
persons or activities to police or a security service (such as the
FBI), usually for a financial reward.
Insurgency: A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection
against a constituted government which falls short of civil war.
624
Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, collation,
evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all collected
information.
Intelligence Oollection Plan: A plan for gathering information from
all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement.
Intelligence Oontingency Funds: Appropriated funds to ~ used for
intelligence activities which are unforseen at the tIme of the
budget and when the use of other funds is not applicable or would
jeopardize or impede the task of an intelligence unit. Such funds
are almost invariably used for covert activities. -
Intelligence Oycle: The steps by which information is assembled, converted
into intelligence, and made available to consumers. The
cycle is com.l?osed of four basic phases: (1) dir.ection: the de~ermination
of mtelligence requirements, preparatIOn of a collectIOn
plan, tasking of collection agencies, and a continuous check. on
the productivity of these agencies; (2) collection: the expIOl~ation
of information sources and the delivery of the collected mformation
to the proper intelligence processing unit for use in
the production of mtelligence; (3) processing: the steps whereby
information becomes intelligence through evaluation, analysis,
integration, and interpretation; and (4) dissemination: the distribution
of information or intelligence products (in oral, written,
or graphic form) to departmental and agency intelligence
consumers.
Intelligence Data Base: All holdings of intelligence data and finished
intelligence products at a given department or agency.
Infonnation Data Handling Systems: Information systems that process
and manipulate raw information and intelligence data. The
systems are characterized by application of general-purpose computers,
peripheral data processing equipment, and automated
storage and retrieval equipment for documents and photographs.
I ntelligence Estimate: An appraisal of intelligence elements relating
to a specific situation or condition to determine the courses of
action open to an enemy or potential enemy and the probable
order of their adoption.
Intelligence Process: Those steps by which information is collected,
converted into intelligence, and disseminated.
Intelligence Requirement: A consumer statement of information
needed which is not already at hand.
Intelligence Resources Advisory Oommittee (/RAO): Established
in 1971 to advise the DCI in preparing a consolidated intelligence
program budget for the President. It was abolished by President
Ford's Executive Order, No. 11905,2/18/76.
InterceptUm: This term generally refers to the collection of electromagnetic
signals (such as radio communications) by sophisticate~
collection equipment without the knowledge of the COIllmUlllcants
for the production of certain forms of signals intelligence.
Interf/epartrrum.tal ~ntellig~nce: The synthesis of departmental intelbg~
nce whlch lS reqUIred by departments and agencies of the
Ulllted States Government for performance of their missions'
such intelligence is viewed as transcending the exclusive proouc:
tion competence of a single department or agency.
625
International Lines of Oommunication (ILO): Commercial telecommunications
links. .
Interrogation: A systematic effort to procure informatio~ by direct
questioning of a person under the control of the questioner.
Interview: The gathering of information from a person who kno.ws
that he or she is giving information, although not often with
awareness of the true connection or purposes of the interv~ewer.
This is generally an overt collection technique, unless the mterviewer
is not what he or she purports to be.
Joint Intelligence: Intelligence produced by elements of more than
one military service. .
Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP): A worldwide
series of strategic estimates prepared annually by DIA for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; it is intended to be used as a base for developing
intelligence annexes for JCS plans.
Key Intelligence Question (KIQ): Topics of particular importance
to national policymakers, as defined by the DCI.
Link Encryption: The application of on-line crypto-operations to a
communications system link so that all information passing over
it is totally encrypted.
Links of Oommunication: "Links" is a general term used to indicate
the existence of a communications facility between two points.
Microwave Relay: A process for propagating telecommunications
over long distances by using radio signals relayed by several stations
within "line of sight" from one another.
Monitoring: The observing, listening to, or recording of foreign or
domestic communications for intelligence collection or intelligencesecurity
(e.g.,COMSEe) purposes.
Multiplexing: A technique which allows one signal to carry several
communications (e.g., conversations, messages) simultaneously.
National Intelligence : Intelligence produced by the CIA which bears
on the broad aspects of United States national policy and national
security. It is of concern to more than one department or
agency.
National Intelligence Authority (NIA): An executive council created
by President Truman's executive order of January 22, 1946, which
had authority over the simultaneously created Central Intelligence
Group (CIG). The NIA was a predecessor to the National
Security Council.
National Intelligence E8timate (NIE): An estimate authorized by
the DCI of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses
of action of foreign nations. It represents the composite views of
the intelligence community.
National Security Agency (NSA) : Established by President Truman,
October 24, 1952, to replace the Armed Forces Security Agency
(AFSA).
National Security Oouncil Intelligence Directive (NSOID): Intelligence
guidelines issued by the NSC to intelligence agencies.
NSCIDs are often augmented by more specific DCIDs and by internal
departmental or agency regulations.
Net Asse8sment Group: The group within the NSC staff that was
responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products
and producing net assessments. It was abolished in June 1978.
207-932 0 - 76 - 40
626
Notionals: Fictious, private commercial entities which exist on paper
only. They serve as the ostensible employer of intelligence personnel,
or as the ostensible sponsor of certain activities in support
of clandestine operations.
Office of Policy Ooordination (OPO) : An office in CIA, established in
1948, to carry out covert action missions assigned to CIA by the
National Security Council.
Office of Special Operations (OSO): Prior to 1952, 080 was a CIA
component responsible for espionage and counterespionage. It
merged with CIA's Office of Policy Coordination to form the
Directorate for Plans.
Office of Strategic Services (OSS): The United States Intelligence
service active during World War II. It was established by President
Roosevelt in June 1942, and disbanded October 1, 1945.
OperatWnallntelligen.ce: Intelligence produced to support the planning
and execution of operations.
Operational Use: This term refers to using a person, group, organization,
information, etc. in a clandestine operation or in support of a
clandestine activity.
Operation8 Oomodinating Board (OOB): This replaced the Psychologioal
Strategy Board of the NSC on September 2, 1953.
Order of Battle: This term refers to information regarding the identity,
strength, command structure, and dispositIOn of personnel,
units, and equipment of any military force.
Overt lntelligen.ce: Information collected openly from public or open
sources.
Paramilitary Forces: Forces or groups which are distinct from th",
regular 'armed forces of a nation, although they may resemble
regular forces in organiz,ation, equipment, training, or mission.
Paramilitary Operation: An operation undertaken by a paramilitary
force.
Penetration: The recruitment of agents within, or the planting of
agents or technical monitoring deviceS within, a target organization
to gain 'access 'to its secrets or to influence its activities.
Photographic Intelligen.ce (PHOTlNT) : Information or intelligence
derived from photography through photographic interpretation.
Plain Temt: Unencrypted communications; specifically, the original
message of a cryptogram, expressed in ordinary language.
Planning and Ooordination Group (POG): A oommittee of the Operations
Coordinating Board of the National Security Council.
PCG became the normal channel for policy approval of covert
operations under NSC directive 5412/1 in 1955.
Plau..~ble Denial:
Plumbing: A term referrin8 to the development of assets or services
supporting the clandestme operations of CIA field stati0ns-such
as. safehouses, unaccountable funds, investigative persons, survelHance
teams.
Political Intelligence: Originally, arranging, coordinating and cond~
cting coyert operat~ons so as to "plausibly" permit official dellll!'
l of Umted States mvolvement, sponsorship or support. Later
thIS concept evolved so that it was employed by high offici'als and
their subordinates to communicate without using precise language
627
which WQuld reveal authorization and involvement in certain
lWtivities and would be embarrassing and politically damaging
if publicly revealed.
Processinq: The manipulation of collected raw information to make
it usable in analysIs or to prepare it for data storage or retrieval.
Product: Finished intelligence reports disseminated by intelligence
agencies to appropriate consumers.
Production: The preparation of reports based on an analysis of information
to meet the needs of intelligence users (consumers)
within and outside the intelligence community.
Propagamla: Any communication supporting national objectives
which is designed to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes, or
behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either
directly or indirectly.
Proprietaries: A term used by CIA to designate ostensibly private
commercial entities capable of doing business which are established
and controlled by intelligence services to conceal governmental
affiliation of intelligence personnel and/or governmental
sponsorship of certain activities in support of clandestine
operations.
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB): An NSC subcommittee established
in 1951 to determine the desirability of proposed covert
action programs and major covert action projects.
Psychological Warfare: The planned use of propaganda and other
psychological actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes,
and behavior of hostile foreign groups so as to support the achievement
of national policy objectives.
Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain, by observation or
other detection methods, information about the activities and
resources of foreign states.
Req·uirement: A general or specific request for intelligence information
made by a member of the intelligence community.
Safe House: An innocent-appearing house or premises established by
an intelligence organization for conducting clandestine or covert
activity in relative security.
Sanitize: The deletion or revision of a report or document so as to prevent
identification of the intelligence sources and methods that
contributed to or are dealt with in the report.
Scan: In electromagnetic or acoustical contexts, a scan is one complete
rotation of an antenna. With regard to ELINT, it refers
to the motion of an electronic beam through space which is searching
for a target.
Scientific and Technical Intelligence: Information or intelligence
c?ncerning foreign progress in basic and applied scientific or techmcal
research and development, including engineering R&D, new
technology, and weapons systems.
Security Measures: taken by the government and intelligence departments
and agencies, among others, for protection from espionage,
observation, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise. With respect
to c~assified materials, it is the condition which prevents unauthonzed
persons from having access to official information which
is safeguarded in the interests of national defense.
628
Sensitive: Something which requires special protection from disclosure,
which could cause embarrassment, eompromise, or threat to
the security of the sponsoring power.
Service Oryptologic Agenda (SOAs): These are the Army Security
Agency, Naval Security Group Command, and Air Force Security
Service. Their signals intelligence-colleetion functions were
brought under the operational control of the Director of NSA
when the SCAs were eonfederated into the Central Security Senice
in 1971, and the Director of NSA was given extra responsibility
as Chief of the CSS.
Sheep Dipping: The utilization of a military instrument (e.g., an
airplane) or officer in clandestine operations, usually in a civilian
capacity or under civilian cover, although the instrument or officer
will covertly retain its or his military ownership or standing.
The term is also applied to the placement of individuals in organizations
or groups in which they can become active in order
to establish credentials so that they can be used to collect information
of intelligence interest on similar groups.
Signal: As applied to electronics, any transmitted electrical impulse.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) : The general term for the foreign intelligence
mission of the NSA/CSS; SIGINT involves the inter
ception, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information
derived from foreign electrical communications and other signals.
It is composed of three elements: Communications Intelligence
(COMINT), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry
Intelligence (TELINT). Most SIGINT is collected by personnel
of the Service Cryptologic Agencies.
Smerce: A person, thing, or activity which provides intelligence information.
In clandestine activities, the term applies to an agent
or asset, normally a foreign national, being used in an intelligence
activity for intelligence purposes. In interrogations, it refers to a
person who furnishes intelligence information with or without
knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence
purposes.
Special Agent: A United States military or civilian who is a specialist
in military security or in the collection of in'telligence or counterintelligence
information.
Special Group (Augmented): A NSC subeommittee established in
1962 to oversee Operation MONGOOSE, a major CIA eovert
action program designed to overthrow Fidel Castro.
Special Grottp (OJ): The Special Group on Counter Insurgency, established
by NSAM 124 on 1/18/63 to ensure the design of effective
interagency programs to prevent and resist insurgency. Paramilitary
operations were a prime focus.
5l,.l~/Special Group: An NSC subcommittee that was the predecessor
to the 40 Committee.
Special Operations Division (SOD): A facility at Fort Detrick,
Maryland that was the site for research and some testing and
storage of biological and chemical agents and toxins.
Sterilize: To remove from material to be used in eovert and clandestine
actions any marks or devices which can identify it as originating
with the sponsoring organizllition or nation.
629
Strategic Intelligerwe: Intelligence required for the fonnation of
policy and military plans and operations at the national and international
levels.
Subver8ion: ACltions designed to undermine the military, ooonomic,
political, psychological, or moral strength of a nation or entity.
It can also apply to an undennining of a person's loyalty to a
government or entity.
Surreptitious Entry:
Surveillarwe: Systematic observation of a target.
Tactical Intelligence: Intelligence supporting military plans and operations
at the military unit level. Tactical intelligence and strategic
intelligence differ only in scope, point of view, and level of employment.
Target: A person, agency, facility, area, or country against which intelligence
operations are directed.
Targeting: In regard to COMINT, the intentional selootion and/or
collection of telecommunications for intelligence purpose.
Target of Opportunity: A tenn describing an entity (e.g., governmental
entity, installation, political organization, or individual)
that becomesavailaJble to an intelligence agency or service by
chance, 'and provides the opportunity for the collection of needed
information.
Task: A tenn connoting the assignment or direction of an intelligence
unit to perform a specified function.
Teleeorrvmunieations: Any transmission, emission, or reception of
signals, signs, writing, images, and sounds or information of any
nature 'by wire, radio, visual, or other electromagnetic systems.
10/5 Panel: A predecessor to the 40 Committee of the NSC.
303 Committee: A predecessor to the 40 Committee of the NSC.
Toxin: Chemicals which are not living organisms, but which are produced
by living organisms and are lethal.
Traffic: Messages carried over a telecommunications network.
United State8 Country Team: The senior, in-country, United States
coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the
United States diplomatic mission (usually an ambassador) and
composed of 'the senior member of each represented United States
department or agency.
United State8 /ntelligerwe Board (US/B) : Until it was abolished by
Executive Order No. 11905 2/18/76, USIB was the NSC's central
coordinating committee for the intelligence community.
Watch List: A list of words-such as names, entities, or phrase&which
can 'be employed by a computer to select out required information
from a mass of data.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviations
ACDA-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
ACS(I)-Army Chief of Staff fo~ Intellig~nce..
AFOSI-Air Force Office of SpecIal InvestlgatIOns.
AFSA-Armed Forces Security Agency.
ARC-Ad Hoc Requirements Committee.
ASA-Army Security Agency. .
ASD/I-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelhgence. .
ASD/PA&E-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program AnalysIs
and Evaluation.
ASW-Antisubmarine Investigation.
BI-Background Investigation.
BNDD-Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
BNE-Board of National Estimates.
CDIB-Consolidated Defense Intelligence Budget.
CDIP-Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program.
CFI-Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
CIA-Central Intelligence Agency.
CI&IA-Counterintelligence and Investigative Activity.
CIG-Central Intelligence Group.
CIRL-Current Intelligence Reporting List.
CJCS-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
COMINT-Communications Intelligence.
COMIREX-Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation.
COMOR-Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance.
COMSEC-Communications Security.
CONUS-Continental United States.
CSS-Central Security Service.
DAS-Defense Attache System.
DCI-Director of Central Intelligence.
DCID-Director of Central Intelligence Directive.
DClI-Defense Central Index of Investigations.
DDA-Deputy Director for Administration, CIA, or Directorate for
Administration.
DDCI-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
DDI-Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, or Directorate for
Intelligence.
DDO-Deputy Director for Operations. CIA, or Directorate for
Operations. .
DDP-Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, or Directorate for Plans.
DDR-Deputy Director for Research, CIA.
DDS&T-Deputy Director of Science and Technology, CIA, or Directorate
for Science and Technology.
DDS-Deputy Director for Support, CIA.
(631)
632
DIA-Defense Intelligence Agency.
DIOP-Defense Intelligence Objectives and Priorities.
DIPO-Defense InvestIgative Program Office.
DIRG-Defense Investigative Review Council.
DIRDIA-Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
DIRNSA-Director of the National Security Agency.
DIS-Defense Investigative Service.
KKIQs-Defense Key Intelligence Questions.
DMA-Defense Mapping Agency.
DOD-Department of Defense.
DOJ-Department of Justice.
ELINT-Electronic Intelligence.
ERDA-Energy Research and Development Administration.
EXCOM- Executive Committee.
FBI-Federal Bureau of Investigation.
FBIS-Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
FSO-Foreign Service Officer.
FYDP-Fiscal Year Defense Plan.
GDIP-General Defense Intelligence Program.
GRU-Soviet Military Intelligence Service.
HUMINT-Human Intelligence.
ICS-Intelligence Commumty Staff.
INR-State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
IRAG-Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee.
IR&DG-Intelligence Research and Development Council.
IRS-Internal Revenue Service.
ISA-International Security Affiairs, DOD.
J-2--Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, DOD.
JCS-Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JRG-Joint Reconnaissance Center.
JSOP-Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.
KGB-Soviet National Intelligence Organization.
KIQ-Key Intelligence Question.
MBFR-Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction.
NFIP-National Foreign Intelligence Program.
NIA-National Intelligence Agency.
NIB-National Intelligence Bulletin.
NID-National Intelligence Daily.
NIE-National Intelligence Estimate.
NIQ-National Intelligence Officer.
NIS-Naval Investigative Service.
NKVD-Predecessor to the the KGB.
NPIG-National Photographic Interpretation Center.
NSA-National Security Agency.
NSA/CSS-National Security Agency/Central Security Service.
NSAM-National Security Action Memorandum.
NSC-National Security Council.
NSCIC-National Security Council Intelligence Committee.
NSCID-National Security Council Intelligence Directive.
NSDM-National Securitv Decision Memorandum.
NSSM-Natioilal Security Study Memorandum.
OCB-Operations Coordinating Board.
633
OMB-Office of Management and Budget.
ONE-Office of National EstimatEs.
ONI-Office of Naval Intelligence.
OPG-Office of Policy Coordination.
OSD-Office of the Secretary of Defense.
OSO-Office of Special Operations, CIA.
OSO-Office of Special Operations, DOD.
OSS-Office of Strategic Services.
PCG-Planning and Coordination Group, NSC.
PFIAB-President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
PNIOs-Priority National Intelligence Objectives.
PSB-Psychological Strategy Board, NSC.
R&D.-Research and Development.
RD.T.&E.-R~rch, Development, Test &Evaluation.
SALT-Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
SCAs-Service Cryptologic Agencies (collection)
SIGINT-Signals Intelligence.
SNIE-Special National Intelligence Estimate.
SOD-Special Operations Division, Fort Detrick, Maryland.
TELINT-Telemetry Intelligence.
TOA-Total Obligational Authority.
TSD-Technical Services Division, CIA.
USAINTA-United States Army Intelligence Agency.
USIB-United States Intelligence Board.
WSAG-Washington Special Action Group.
634
Control and Direction of ,U.S. Foreign Intelligence
within the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCil Svdem
[After Executive Order 11905. February 18. 1976)
THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICE OF
t·1AHAGEMEHT
& BUDGET IllTELl OVERSIGHT BOARD
(OVERSIGHT BOARD)
........ '----........ .••
•••
••
••.1
PRESIDENT'S fOREIGN IKTELl
ADVISORY BD. IPFIABI
OPERATIONS ADVISORY GROUP
IOPERA nONS GROUP)
o AP/HIA 0 SEC 11m
olEe OEF 0 C/Je! 0 Del
DIRECTOR OF
CEHTRAl
ItlTEllIGEIICE
• President • Sec Slale
o V.President • Sec Defense
COMMlllEE ON
fOREIGl1 I!HHl lem
ooel oOilEe OEf oOAP/USA
I
I
~ INTElLIGENCE
L. COlolllUIIITY STAFF t----ll---f
IIC)
rL---usis---l··iJisiB-coMMIrrul ~ J
LriiiOSTRutTuRiI_
p_••- ••_--~._•• _.~----~.
SERVICE IlIlEll
COI1PONElITS
USA UIH USAF
(usn IDW) (Hill
{·NcSmA 01,\.
IDIRECIORl 10lRECIORl
CIA
mcn
L-_
STATE
/lURI
IOIRECIORl
TREAS
(IP ASH
TO lEU
fBI
lAlll OIRl
ERDA
(D/AlI
NATiONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE
[Prior to Ex~cutive Order 11905, February 18, 1976)
• ,- L • • • __ ~.
DIRECTION
RECOMMENDATION!
GUIDANCE/ADVICE
635
Intelligence Community Staff Organization
[After Executive Order 11905, February 18, 19761
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY DEPUTY
Deputy/DCI/IC
Assoc Deputy/DCI/le
Executive Officer
Executive Staff
CFI/USIB Executive Secretariat
Support Sttlff
Registry
Intelligence Community Stcff Orgc!"izatio.n
[Prior to 8xecutive Order 11905, February 18, 19761
USIB '-IRAC Secrelarial
Principal Depuly
for Planning
Depuly 10 Direclor of
Cenlral InlelJigence/
Intelligence Community
J-----i USIB Committee Chairmen
Coordination Staff
I I
-, I
Collection & Management.
Processing Planning & Rmurce Producl Review
Assessmenl Division Review Division Division
{CPADl IMPRRDl {PRO,
636
94TH COXGRESS SRES 21 1ST SE88IOl'l • •
IN TIlE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATBS
JANUARY 21,1975
?til.. PASTOIlE snomittpu the following resolution; which was ordered to be placed
on thp ralpndllr (under general orders)
JANUARY 27,1975
Considered, amended, and agreed to
RESOLUTION
To establish ll. select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation
and study with respect to intelligence activities
carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.
1 ReS()lved, To establish a select committee of the Senate
2 to conduct an investigation and study of governmental op3
erations with respect to intelligence activities and of the
4 extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activ5
ities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Govern6
ment or by any persons, acting individually or in combination
7 with others, with respect to any intelligence activity carried
8 out hy or on behlllf of the Federal Government; be it further
9 Re.wlved, 'l'hnt (a) there is hereby established a select
10 commiUre of the Senate which may. be called, for· conV
637
2
1 yelllenCe of exprt'~SlOlI, the Select COlllmittee To Study
2 Goyernmeutal Opel'Utitlus Widl Respect to Intelligence Ac:
3 tivitics to couduct an iun~!;tigation aud study of the extent, if
4 any, to which illegal, improper, or unethiclll lIt'tivities were
:> engaged in by auy agency 01' by auy P('\'~(lIlS, actiug ai.ther
6 individually or in combination with others, in: carrying out
7 any intelligence or surveillance activities hy or on behalf
8 of any agency of the Federal Government.
9 (b) The seleot committ.ee created by this resolution
10 shall consist of eleren Members of the Senate, six to he
11 appointed by the President of the Senate from the majority
12 Members of the Senate upon therecommendlltion of the
13 majority leader of the Senate, and five minority Members of
14 the SeINlte to be appointed by the President of the Senate
15 upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the
16 Senate. For the ,purposes of paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the
17 Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a SenatQr as a
18 . member, chairtnan, or vice chairman of the select commi.ttee
19 shall not be taken into account.
20 (c) The majority members of the committee shall sdect
21 a chairman and the minority members shall select a vice
22 chairman and the committee sh1111 adopt rules and procedures
23 to govern its proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside
24 over meetings of the select committee during the absence
25 of the chairman, and discharge such other responsibilities
638
3
1 as mny be assigned to him by the select committee or the
2 chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select com3
mittee shall not affect the authority of the remaining mem4
bel'S to execute the functions of the select committee and
5 shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments
6 to it are made.
7 (d) A majority of the members of the select committee
8 shall constitute a quorum for the transactiQn of business, but
9 the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quontm
10 for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions.
11 SEC. 2. The select committee is authorized and directtld
12 to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the in13
vestigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the
14 first section. Without abridging in any way the. authority
15 conferred upon the select oommittee by the preceding
16 sentence, the senate further expressly authorizes and directs
17 the select c.o~ttee to make a complete investigation and
18 study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons
19 or groups of persons Qr organizations of any kind which
20 have any tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to
21 the following matters or questions:
22
23
24
( 1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has
conducted an illegal domestic intelligence operation III
the United States.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
639
4
(2) Till' conduct of dOlll£'.~1 if' illt l'lJigP))('(\ 01' counterintl.'
lligl.')H'l' opcra,t~ol1s against United States citizens
by the }'edl.'l'l\l Bureau of Investigation or any other
Federal agency.
(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston
Plan to apply United States intelligence agency
capu!bilities against individuals or organizations within
the Uwed States.
(4) The e.'l:tent to which the Federal Bureau of In·
vest;igation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other
Federal law enforcement or inteHigenee agencies coordiIlftte
their re9peotive activities, any agreements which
govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack
of coordination has contn.buted to activities or actions
which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or contrary
to the intent of Congress.
(5.). The extent to wmoh the ()peration of domestic
intelligence or counterin'teHigence aotivities and the
opemrion of any other activities within the United States
by the Central Intelligence Agency comonns to the legislative
charter of that Agency and the intent of the
Congress.
(6) The past ana present interpretation by the
Director of Central Intelligence of the responsrbility to
protect intelligence sources find methods as it relates to
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1;;
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2;;
640
5
the provisi<ln III section 102 (d) (3) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3)) that
"... that the agency shall han no police, subpena, law
enforcement powers, or internal security funeti6ns.•.."
(7) Nature and extent of executiv-e br1Ulch oversight
of all United States intelligence aotivities.
(8) The need for specific legislative authority to
govern the opernti<lns of llny intelligence agencies .,f
the Federal Government now existing without that
explicit statutory authority, including but not limited to
agencies such as the Defense IntelligencE Agency and
the National Security Agency.
The nature and extent to which Federal agencies
c~opeIate and exchange intelligence information and
the adequacy of any reguilltj()ll!l or statutes which
govern such cooperation and exchal1~t of intelligence
informat.ion.
(9) The extent to which United States intelligence
agencies are governed by Executive orders, mles, or
regulations either published or seeret llnd the extent
to which those Executive 01"(1(,J"s, rl1k~, Or r('glllations
interpret, expand, or are in conflict with specific legislative
authority.
(10) The violation OJ" ~11~p(·l't('a ,"iolntion or allY
State OJ" Fl'd('rnl stlltll t(' by <lilY illtd-lig:l'lIt(' llgl'llty 01'
641
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
i1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
-by any p<,!'SOn by or on u<'half of any intelligence agency
of the }'ederal Government includ-ing but not limited
to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wireta~, or eavesdropping,
illegal opening of the 1.)nit<,d States muil, or
the monitoring of the United States mail.
. (11) The need for improved, strengthened, or oonsolida.
ted oversight of United States intelligence activitres
by the Congress.
(12) Whether any of the existing laws of the
Unit~d States are inadequate, either in their provisions
or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of
American citizens, to improve executive and legislative
control of intelligence and related activities, and to 1'0solve
ullcertainties as to the authority of United Stutes
intelligence and re!aJted agencies.
(13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of
expen~ture and effort in the eoUecti~n and processing
of int~lligence -information by United States agencies.
(14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert
intelligence activities in the United States and abrood.
(15) Such other related matters as the committee
dt'ems necessary in order to curry ont its responsihilities
:!:3 under section (a).
2t SEC. 3. (a) To enable the select committee to make
2;) the imcstip:ation and study authorized and directed hy th\8
207-932 0 - 76 - 41
642
7
1 resolution, the Scnatc hCl'l'hy empowers the select committee
2 n..; an a!u']H'Y of tIl(' Sp)wfc (I) to f'Tllploy nnd fix the !:OIJl-
3 pen:-atipn of :-1I{'\1 ell-rieal, iUH',tigntory, legal, tl'('hlli('al,
4 and otll('r as,istnllts as it deelJl)': necessary or al'llfopriatl·,
5 uut it m3.y Hot exceed the nonnal Senate salary schedules;
6 (2) to sit and act at any time Of plllce during scssions,
7 recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; (3) to hold
8 hearings for takill~ testimony on oath or to receive docu-
9 mentary or phpi(1l.1 evidence relating to the matters and
10 questious it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to
11 require uy subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses
12 of allY persons who the select c(lmmittee believes have
13 knowledge or information concerning any of the matters
H or questions it is l1uthorized to investigate and study; (5)
15 to require hy subpena or order any department, agency,
16 officer, or employee of the executive branch of the Umted
17 States G~vepunent, or any priva.te person, finn, or corpora18
tion, to produce for"its consideration or for use as evidence
19 in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled
20 checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers,
21 pl)y~i('nl evideu('c, records, recordings, tapes, or mftterials re22.
luting to any of the matters or qucstions it is authorized to
23 investigate and study which they or any of them may have
24 in their custody or under their control; (6) to mnke to the
25 Sl'llnte :my r('('OJlIniendations it deems appropriate in re8pect
643
8
1 to the willful failure or refusal of auy person tu answer (1\\(':;2
tions or give testimony in his charncter as a witness dming
3 his appearance before it or in resp('et to the willful failun'
4 or refusal ()f any OffiC(,f Of cmploy('C' of tile ('xcclltin' lmllle!l
5 of the United SIMes Gm'ernment or filly person, firm, or
6 corp0rlltion to produce bl'fi)J'(~ the COlllnlitt('c filly book"
7 checks, ('a,ncdcd checks, correspondeuel', eOlllmllllieation"
8 document, financial records, papers, physical evidence,
9 records, reoordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any
10 subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other testi11
mony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any
12 other country; (H) to prQCure the t('lI1porary or iutenuit1atl'ut
sen'iel's of individual ~:mH.ultallts, or urglillizatiolls there14
of, in the same rnann~r lind under the SlillIe condition,.; as
15 a standing oonullittl'e of the Senate lUll}' 'procure slH.'h ,l'l'\'16
iel's under section 202 (i) of thc Lcgislatirc Reorglllliza-
17 tion Ad of 1~46; (9) to usc on a reimum'saulc hasis, with
18 the prior consent of the C()mmittee Qn Rules an~ Adminis19
trlltion, the services of personnel of any such department
20 or figency; (10) to use on Q rejmbursahle basis or other21
wise with the prior cons('ut of the cliail'lllall of any suu-
~2 oommittee of IIny committee of the Senate the facilities or
,)~
~L :;el'viccs of nny memhers of the staffs of such other Senate
2-l ('o1lll1litl(.(.s or filly ,mhCollUllittccs of 8\1:('h oth('l' SCHate com-
'..);)
Pl~ttecs wh~ncy~r the :sekct ('ommitlcc or its cht~inllt\Il deenl"
644
9
that snch Iwtion ]8 necessary or Ilpproprillte to enl\Julr the
1
select cmnmittrr to make the iuwstigat.iou and stndy Ilnthor2
') ized and dirr!'trl1 lIy this resolntion: (I I) to 1m\"(' (lirect
"
4 1l('('("~S through Ill<' ogclICY of Ilny llwm!lers of the ~('led
committcc or any of its invest4!!'l1.tory or leglll Ilssistlluts i) "
G d('~ignfttC'd hy it or its ehaimllln or the mnking minority
7 uwm)1C'1' to IIIH' dilta, evidence, illfonllaf1ion, rrport, 1Illl1lysis,
8 or docnment or papC'rs, relati~lg to any of the matters or
9 questions whieh it is authorized Ilnd directed w investigate
10 and study in the custody or under the control of any dopart11
ment, Ilgeney, officcr, or employee of the executive hranch
12 of 1,lw FlIill'I1 KIIII('sGm'I'!'IJllwuI, iudllfliug' mlY (h~PIll'tllWllt,
13 a~ency, offil'er, or employee of the UlIited States GOYern14
mt>nt hllving the power nntler the law" of the United States
15 to inv('~t,iga/(l :In." alleged eriI1l(IliI,1 :ldivitil'N or til liJ'osceute
IG IK'r~oIls chargt'tl with l'rill\cs against theUnited Statt's aud
17 any dCl)artplent, agency, o~cer, or elliployee of the Uuitetl
18 Staotes Government having the ll.utoority to conduct inteDi19
~encc or surwillnnce within or outside the United States,
20 without reg-lIrd to the jm'isdiction or authority of any other
21 Scntlle C'ommittc(', whil'11 will aid the sdect committee tQ
22 prepare for or conduct. the invcstigatioon lind study lIuthOl;zed
2:~ Iln~ directod hy t·hi~ resolu.tion; and (12) to expend to the
2-t- extl'llt it dl'tNIl,illI'S llrl'l's8111)' or fl1)proprinte nny 1II0llCYS
645
10
1 made availitble to it by the Senate t{) pm10nn the duties
2 and exercise the powers oonferred upon it by this resolution
3 and to IOOke the investigati{)n and study it is authorized by
4 this resolution to make.
5 (b) Subpenas may be issued by the select c-ommittee
6 noting through the chinnan or any other member designated
7 by him, and may be served by any person designated by
8 such cha,innan or other member anywhere within the borders
9 of the United States. The chairman of the select committee,
1<J or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to admin11
ister oaths to any witnesses appearing before the c()lllmittee.
12 (c) In preparing for or oonducting the investigMio~l
13 and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the
14 select committee shall be empowered to exemise the powers
15 oonferred upon ?ommittees of. the Senate by section 6002 of
16 title 18, United States (JQde, or any other Act of Congress
17 regulMing the" granting of immunity to witnesses.
18 SBC. 4. The seiect committee. shAH have authority to
19 recommend the enaotment of any new legislation or the
20 amendment of any existing statute which it considers neces21
sary or desira:ble to strenghen or clarify the national secu22
rity, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United
23 States and to pr{)teot the rights of ITnited States citizens
24 with rega.rd to those activities.
646
11
1 SEC. 5. T!Je select cmnmittee shall make a final report
2 of the results of the inve~·tigation and study conducted l,y
3 it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and
4 its reoommendations as to new congressional legislation it
5 deems necessary or desirahle, to the Senate at the earliem
6 practicable dat{', but no later than September 1, 1975. The
7 select eommittee may also submit to the Senate sUch interim
8 reports as it considers a.ppropriate. After submission of its
9 final report, the select committee shaH have three calendar
10 months to close Its affairs, and on the expiration of such
11 three calendar months shall cease to exist.
12 SEC. 6. The expens{'s of the select committee through
13 SoptcOIher 1, 1975, under this rmlolution shall not exceed
14 $750,000 of which amount not to exeeed $100,000 shall be
15 Ilvailable for the procurement of the services of individual
16 consultants or org'luizations thereof. Such expenses shall be
1'1 paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers
18 approved by the chiWman of the select committee.
19 SEC. 7. The select CO'Illmittee shaH institute and cany
20 out such rules lind procedures as it may deem necessary to
21 prcvent (1) the disclosun~, outt,i.de the seleot committee, of
22 allY infOl'lDatioll relating to the activities of the Central In23
telligence Agency or any other department or agency of the
24 Federal Government engaged in inteUigence activities, ob647
12
1 ta,ined by the select committee during the course of its study
and investigation, not allthorized by the seled committee
3 to be disclosed; and (2) thi' disrlof'.ure, ontside the select
4 committee, of Ilny infol1Jl.'ltion which would a.dversely affect
5 the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Ageney
6 in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign
7 cOllntn('s of flny other deparhnent or ngenry of the Fed<,rnl
8 Government.
9 SEC. 8. As 11 condition for oo1ployment as described in
10 section 3 of this resolution, each person shell agree I1'Ot to
11 accept any honorarium, roynlty Ol' oth<,l' payment for a
12 sl)ellkill~ clIgllgCIlU'llt, magazine nrtide, !I{)ok, or other ell13
deavor eonnected with the inYestigation and study ullder14:
taken hy this committee.
15 SEC. 9. No <'Dl'plll)'('e of the st'h'l't ('ommiUe(' or lin)'
16 l>crsoll l'ugllg(\d 1Iy contract or otherwise to perforrl1 s('l"\'iet>t;
17 for the s~loot committee shall be given access to any cl/\slji18
tied infonnation by the select committee unleS'S such em19
pJoyee or person has received an appropriate security c1ear20
ance as d<,tel'lnined hy the select committee. The type of
21 se<'urity eleflrll1we to he required in the rfl,se of flny !,;I\ch
22 employ<'e or person shall, within the detcrminfltion of t.he
23 s('!ect eommittee, he eommens11Tnte with the sensitivity of
24 tll(' clas:,ifi<'tl iuFormlltion to ",hieh sneh employee or ))<'I'''OU
:!3 will he ~iwn Il('('e~s hy the select rOllllllittl'(',

STAFF LIST
This Final Report is the result of a sustained effort by the entire
Committee staff. The Committee wishes to express its appreciation to
the members of the support, legal, research, and Task Force staffs, who
made a substantial contribution to this Report and who have served
the Committee and the Senate with integrity and loyalty:
David Aaron Task Force Leader.
William Bader Task Force Leader.
Barbara Banoff Counsel.
Howard Barkey Consultant.
Frederick Baron________________ Counsel.
Laurie BartleL_________________ Secretary.
Lawrence Baskir . Counsel.
John Bay-Iy Counsel.
Charity Beuz Office Manager.
Richard Betts Professional Staff Member.
Beth Bloomfield Research Assistant.
Sam Bouchard . Professional Staff Member.
Harriet Bramble . Secretary.
Belva Brissett Secretary.
Nancy Brooks Secretary.
Maxine Brown . Secretary.
Andrew Burness Clerk.
David Bushong Counsel.
Margaret Carpenter . Research Assistant.
Barry Carter Counsel.
Barbara Chesnik . Research Assistant.
Lot Cooke . Clerk/Security.
Elizabeth Culbreth . Counsel.
Lynn Davis Professional Staff Member.
Spencer Davis Press Secretary.
Rhett Dawson Counsel.
Tom Dawson Research Assistant.
James De Marco Counsel.
Joseph Dennin . Counsel.
Mary De Oreo Research Assistant.
Mary de Temple Secretary.
James Dick Counsel.
Joseph di Genova Counsel.
Dorothy Dillon Research Assistant.
Patricia Doolittle_______________ Secretary.
Daniel Dwyer, Jr Research Assistant.
Robert Edwards, Jr Clerk/Security.
John Elliff Task Force Leader.
Betty Ellison Secretary.
Michael Epstein________________ Counsel.
(649)
650
.Toan Rrno Secretary.
Peter Fenn Professional Staff Member.
Harold Ford . (;onsultant.
Richard Garwin . Consultant.
Mark Gitenstein . Counspl.
Janette Ghdewell Secretary.
Bruce GranL Counsel:
Edward Greissing . Research Assistant.
Arthur Harrigan . Consultant.
William Harris Consultant.
Audrey Hatry Clerk of the Committee.
Deborah HerbsL . Assistant Press Secretary.
Paulette Hodges Secretary.
Karl Inderfurth Professional Staff Member.
Portia Iverson Secretary.
Arthur Jefferson Counsel.
Dorothy Johnson . Secretary.
Loch Johnson Professional Staff Member.
Yolanda J ohnson . Clerk.
James J ohnston Counsel.
Anne Karalekas Professional Staff Member.
Jeffrey Kayden Research Assistant.
Robert Kelley . Counsel.
Lawrence Kieves Control Coordinator.
Charles Kirbow Counsel.
Joseph Kirchheimer Consultant.
Diane KoppaL . Secretary.
Susan Koscis . Secretary.
Diane LaVoy Research Assistant.
George Lawton . Professional Staff Member.
Howard Liebengood Consultant.
Charles Lombard . Professional Staff Member.
Dan McCorkle Clerk/Security.
Dorothy McIntyre . Secretary.
Martha MacDonald . Secretary.
Naldeen MacDonald Research Assistant.
Michael Madigan_______________ Counsel.
Ben MarshalL Security Director.
Cynthia MasciolL . Secretary.
Judith Mason . Research Assistant.
Ernest May . Consultant.
Betty Mayo . Secretary.
Elliott MaxwelL Counsel.
Ellen Metsky Clerk.
Paul MicheL___________________ Counsel.
William Miller . Staff Director.
Patricia Monaco________________ Secretary.
Janet Moore Secretary.
Michael Murphy Clerk/Security Assistant.
Lois Nuss . Secretary.
James O'Flaherty Professional Staff Member.
Jan Orloff Research Director.
Lynsey Oster Clerk.
651
Drena Owens Secretary.
John Peterson__________________ Research Director.
Susan Pitts . Research Assistant.
Andrew PostaL Counsel.
Christopher Pyle ... Consultant.
Alton Quanbeck________________ Task Force Leader.
Ted Ralston Research Assistant.
Harry Ransom Consultant.
Gordon Rhea Counsel.
Eric Richard Counsel.
Walter Ricks IIL Counsel.
Alan Romberg Professional Staff Member.
James Rowe Research Assistant.
Ruth Schneider Secretary.
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr Chief Counsel.
Paula Schwartz________________ Clerk.
Lester SeideL__________________ Counsel.
Patrick Shea Professional Staff Member.
John L. Smith Counsel.
Elizabeth Smith Research Assistant.
Stephanie Smith Clerk.
Curtis Smothers Counsel for Minority.
Britt Snidec Counsel.
Martha Talley Counsel.
Athan Theoharis_______________ Consultant
Florence Thoben Mail Clerk.
Sherry ToweIL_________________ Office Manager.
Gregory Treverton Professional Staff Member.
William TrueharL Consultant.
James Tschirgi Professional Staff Member.
James Turner Research Assistant.
Richard IDlman Consultant.
Paul Wallach Counsel.
William White Professional Staff Member.
Burton Wides Counsel.
Carol Wiik Document Clerk.
Joan Wilson Secretary.
Otis Wilson Consultant.
Peter Zimmerman Consultant.
Phebe Zimmerman Research Assistant.
u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1976 0-207-932

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