Church Committee Reports at American Buddha Online Library

Site Map

CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

IV. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
Intelligence has been the province of the President. It has informed
his decisions and furthered his purposes. Intelligence information has
been seen as largely belonging to the President, as being his to classify
or declassify, his to withhold or share. The instruments of U.S. intelligence
have been the Presirlents' to use and sometimes to abuse.
The President is the only elected official in the chain of command
over the UnitBd States intelligence community. It is to him the Constitution
and the Congress han granted authOl'ity to carry out intelligence
activities. It is the President who is ultimately accountable to
the Congress and the American people.
ThB Committee focused its investigation on the instruments available
to the President to control, direct, and supervise the U.S. intelligence
community. As the result of controversy as to whether the intelligence
community has been "out of control," Senate Resolution 21
directed the Committee to detBrmine the "nature and extent of executive
branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities."
This involves three Presidential instrumentalities: 1
-The National Security Council;
-The Office of Management and Budget;
-The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
The Committee sought to establish whether these mechanisms, as
they have evolved, provide effective control over the entire range of
U.S. intelligence activities. Particular attention was given to the subject
of covert action, in part because it has been a major object of
presidential-level review. In addition, the Committee considered
the adequacy of high-level supervision of espionage, counterintelligence,
and the overall management of the U.S. intelligence community.
For the first time in the history of conlr]'('s"ional oWl"silrht. the Committee
had access to records of the proceedi ngs of the Nat iana} Security
Council and its subcommittees. It revie\ycf1 the NSC diredives
related to intelliQ.'ence and the files of other agencies' j):Jl'ticipation in
the NSC's intelligence-related activities. The Comlllltt~ conducted
extensive interviews with current and former WThite House, NBC, ,tid
cabinet-level officials dealing with intelligence mattrrs. It took swom
testimony on these is",ues from a number of them, including the preserlt.
Secretary of State. Officials of the Office of Management and Budget
and former members and staff of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board were also interviewed.
This report presents the results of that investigation and the Committee's
findings with respect to the central question of Presidential
accountability and control of the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States Government.
1 A fourth in~trumentalit:vhas been established as a result of President Ford's
February 17. 1976, reorl!"anization of the foreil!"n intelligence community. Executive
Order 11905 created the Intelligence Oversight Board.
(41)
207-932 0 - 76 - 4
42
A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1. Overview
The National Security Council was created by the National Security
Act of 1947. According to the Act, the NSC is "to advise the President
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to national security" and "assess and a:ppraise the objectives,
commitments, and risks of the United States III relation to our
actual and potential military power." Over the years, the principal
functions of the NSC have been in the field of policy formulation and
the coordination and monitoring of overseas operations. Among its
responsibilities, the NSC has provided policy guidance and direction
for United States intelligence activities.
The National Security Council is an extremely flexible instrument.
It has only four statutory members: the President, the Vice President,
and the Secretaries of State and Defense. At the discretion of the
President, others may be added to the list of attendees; NSC subcommittees
may be created or abolished, and the NSC staff given great
power or allowed to wither.
Thus, the operation of the NSC has reflected the personal style of
each President. The Council's role and responsibilities have varied according
to personalities, changing policies and special circumstances.
Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson found a loose and informal
NSC structure to their liking. Others have set up more formal and
elaborate structures-President Eisenhower's NSC syst,em is the best
example.2 At times, particularly during crises, Presidents have bypassed
the formal NSC mechanisms. President Kennedy set up a.n
Executive Committee (EXCOM) to deal with the Cuban Missile
Crisis; President Johnson had his Tuesday Lunch group to discuss
Viet Nam and other high level concerns. As a result, over the years the
NSC has undergone major changes, from the elaborate Planning
Board/Operations Coordination Board structure under Eisenhower to
its dismantlement by Kennedy and the creation of a centralized system
of NSC subcommittees under President Nixon and his Assistant
for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger.
Today, in addition to the four statutory members, the National
Security Council is attended by the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as advisers.
From time to time, others, such as the Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, also attend.
Prior to President Ford's reorganization, the NSC was served by
seven principal committees: the Senior Review Group, the Under
Secretary's Committee, the Verification Panel, the Washin~on Special
Actions Group (WSAG), the Defeme Program Review Committee,
the 40 Committee, and the National Security Council Intelligence
3 For a full treatment of the evolution of the Nation'll Security Coundl and its
place within the national security decisionmllking process, see 'Keith Clark and
Laurence Leg-ere, The Pre·.ident and the Management ot National Security
(1969) ; Stanley Falk and Theodore Baul'r, National Security Management: The
Nation'll Security Structure (1972); and Inquiries of the Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinerv for the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
Organizing tor National Scrurity (1961),
43
Committee (NSCIC).3 The latter two committees had direct intelligence
responsibilities. The 40 Committee has now been replaced by the
Operations Advisory Group. No successor for NSCIC has been designated.
The current NSC structure is shown below.
I
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL I'
• President • Vice President _ Secretary of State • Secretary of Defense
• Chairman, Joint Chiefs 01 Staff • Director of Centrallnteltigence
I
I While House I
Situation Room
I
Ass!. to Pres. for Nat'l I
Sec. AfLws
I
NSC Staff
I
UNDER SECRETARIES
COMMITTEE r-----------
• DqJ S· r ,,: $IJt" 'Chmrll
oi\,.,!"'JP,.:"IU":.Jr'1
~~'C Aft,l,',
• Dl'p S"c of Q.;t.,,,>l.'
• Cl'J""",j'l, JCS
• DCI
I
SENIOR REVIEW GROUP
• AS\110 Pres for Ndl'l
S'-'C Alia", IChr'll)
• Del! Sec uf SIdle
• Dc~ $L'C uf Defense
• (I'J"mJ". JCS
· DCI
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE 1----------
• DCI {Gil"",j
· A,H to Pres lor r'J.l(1
Sec AffJ"~
• O.. p Sl'e ()I D"f"f1w
{ Irl!"tl"J~nc,,1
I
VERIFICATION PANEL
f------------j
• As~! III P,,:,s iv! N~I!
SeC AflJ,r, ICh,,,nj
· Del! Sec of St.'Ie'
• ell,)""].,,,. JC:;
• O''''ct':", ACUA
• DCI
DEFENSE PROGRAM
REVIEW COMMITTEE
· Asst to Pies fur Nat')
Sec AII,HJS IChrnnl
• Drl; Sec of Siclte
• Dell S~C 01 D<.'!ense
• Ch~irnldn> JCS
• Chilir'll~n. Council 01
Ecun Ad~,sors
• Qilector,OMB
-DCI
WASHINGTON SPECIAL
ACTIONS GROUP
• AlIt to Pre> lur Na!'1
Sl'C Aff,j"s (Chm,tI
• 0,'1' S,'c uf Stat<.'
• Del! S,:c uf Defcnsl.:
'ChJ"m,trl, JCS
·DCI
OPERATIONS ADVISORY
GROUP _._--_._--
'As,t II' P",> I,,, N,II'1
Sec AIL,HI,>
• Sec of St~te
• S~C of Defen>e
, DCI
• ChJ'rmJr,. JCS
• Al\o,nC'1 Gen ... ral
(obser~cr)
• Director, OM[3
lobserver!
Each of the current NSC subcommittees are "consumers" of the
intelligence community product. The DCI sits on all of them. In most
cases, the DCI briefs the subcommittees and the full NSC before
agenda items are considered. CIA representatives sit on working and
ad hoc groups of the various subcommittees. The CIA's Area Division
Chiefs are the Agency's representatives on the NSC Interdepartmental
Groups (IGs).' In all of these meetings there is a constant give and
take. Policymakers are briefed on current intelligence and they, in
turn, levy intelligence priorities on the CIA's representatives.
• The Senior Review Group. under the direction of the President's Assistant
for National Security Affairs defines NSC issues; determines whether
alternatives, costs, and consequences have been fUlly considered; and forwards
recommendations to the full Council and/or the President. The Under Secretaries
Committee seeks to ensure effective implementation of NSC decisions. The Verification
Panel monitors arms control agreements and advises on SALT and
MBFR negotiations. WASG coordinates activities during times of crises, such as
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The Defense Program Review Committee,
nQw nearly defunct, assesses the political, military and economic implications of
defense policies and programs.
• NSC Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) are made up of representatives from
State, Defense, CIA, the Joint Ohiefs of Staff and the National Security Council.
IGs are chaired by the State representative, an Assistant Secretary, and they
prepare working papers for the Senior Review Group.
44
£. The NSO and Intelligence
The 1947 National Security Act established the CIA as well as the
NSC. The Act provided that the CIA was "established under the
National Security Council" and was to carry out its prescribed functions
"under the direction of the National Security Council." Five
broad functions were assigned to the CIA:
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments
and agencies as relate to national security.
(2) to make recomt7nendations to the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of
the departments and agencies of the Government as relate
to the national ~ecurity ;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination
of such intelligence within the Government using where
appropriate existing agencies and facilities.
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence
. agencies, such additional services of common concern as the
National Security Council determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally.
(5) to perform such other function.~ and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct.
The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for seeing that
these functions are performed, and is to serve as the President's
principal foreign intelligence officer.
The NSC sets overall policy for the intelligence community. It does
not, however, involve itself in day-to-day management activities. The
task of coordinating intelligence community activities has been delegated
to the DCI, who, until President Ford's reorganization, sought
to accomplish it through the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB). USIB was served by 15 inter-agency committees and a variety
of ad hoc groups. It provided guidance to the intelligence community
on requirements and priorities, coordinated community activities
and issued, through the DCI, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).
The DCI was also assisted by the Intelligence Resources Advisory
Committee (IRAC). IRAC assisted the DCI in the preparation of
a consolidated intelligence budget and sought to assure that intelligence
resources were being used efficiently.
As a result of President Ford's Executive Order, management of the
intelligence community will now be vested in the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence (CFI). USIB and IRAC are abolished. Membership on
the new committee will include the DCI, as Chairman, the Deputy
Secfl'tary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. Staff support will
be proviiled bv the DCI's Intelligence Community (IC) staff. The new
committf'e will report directly to the NSC.
The CFI will have far-ranging responsibilities. It will oversee the
budget and resources, as well as establish management policies, for the
CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency~
45
and United States reconnaissance programs. Further, it will establish
policy priorities Tor the collection and production oT national intelligence.
The DCI will be responsible for producing national intelligence,
including NIEs. To assist him in this task, the DCI will set up
whatever boards and committees (similar to the now defunct USIE)
are necessary.
The President's Executive Order also directed the NSC to review,
on a semi-annual basis, certain Toreign intelligence activities. Prepared
by the President's Assistant Tor National Security Affairs, these reviews
will TOcus on the quality. scope and timeliness oT the intdligence
product; the responsiveness oT the intelligence community to policymakers'
needs; the allocation of intelligence collection resources; and
the continued appropriateness of ongoing covert operations and sensitive
intelligence collection missions.
One of the functions the NSC has assigned to the CIA is the conduct
oT foreign covert operations. These operations began in 1948 and
have continued to the present, uninterrupted. Authority to conduct
covert operations has usually been ascribed to the "snch other functions
and duties" provision of the 1947 Act.'
The NSC uses National Security Council Intelligence Directives
(NSCIDs) to set policy Tor the CIA and the intelligence community.
NSCIDs are broad delegations of responsibility, issued under the authority
of the 1947 Act." They may assign duties not explicitly stated
in the 1947 Act to the CIA or other intelligence departments or agencies.
NSCIDs, sometimes referred to by critics as the intelligence community's
"secret charter," are executive directives and, therefore, not
subject to congressional review. Fntil recently, Congress has not seen
the various NSCIDs issued by the NSC.
3. Overview: .40 Committee ana N8CIC
Prior to President Ford's reorganization. two NSC committees. the
40 Committee and the National Securitv Council Intelligence Committee,
had special intelligence duties. Their functions and responsibilities
wiII be discussed in turn.
Throughout its history, the 40 Committee and its direct predecessors-
the 303 Committee, the 5412 or Special Group, the 10/5 and 10/2
Panels-have been charged by various NSC directives with exercising
political control over foreign covert operations.? Now this task will
be the responsibility of the Operations Advisory Group. The Committees
have considered the objectives of any proposed activity,
5 Three possible legal bases for covert operations are most often cited: the
National Security Act of 1947, the "inherent powers" of the President in foreign
affairs and as Commander-in-Chipf. and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Congressional
acquiescence and ratification through the anpropriations process is a
fourth possibility. See Anpendix I of this report for a full discussion.
• For example, NSCID"l are used to spell out the duties and responsibilities of
the DCI, the coordination of covert intellig-ence collection activities, and the produetion
and dissemination of the intellil{ence community prodUCt.
7 Covert operations encompass a wide range of programs. These include political
and propaganda prOgrams desil{ned to influence or support foreign political
parties, groups. and specific political and military ]paders; economic action proI{
rams: paramilitary operations: and some counterinsurgency prOl{rams. Human
intelligpnce collection, or spyinl{. and counterespionage programs are not included
under the rubric of covert operations.
46
whether the activity would accomplish those aims, how likely it would
be to succeed, and in general whether the activity would be in the
American interest. In addition, the Committees have attempted to
insure that covert operations were framed in such a way that they
later could be "disavowed" or "plausibly denied" by the UnitBd States
Government. President Ford's Executive Order included the concept
of "plausible denial." Using the euphemism "special activities"
to describe covert operations, the Order stated:
Special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives
[are thoseJ activities ... designed to further official
United States programs and policies abroad which
are planned and executed so that the role of the United States
Government is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.7a
The concept of "plausible denial" is intended not only to hide the
hand of the United States Government, but to protect the President
from the embarrassment of a "blown" covert operation. In the words
of former CIA Director Richard Helms:
... [theJ Special Group was the mechanism ... set up ...
to use as a circuit-breaker so that these things did not explode
in the President's face and so that he was not held responsible
for them.7b
In the past, it appears that one means of protecting the President
from embarrassment was not to tell him about certain covert operations,
at least formally. According to Bromley Smith, an official who
served on the National Security Council staff from 1958 to 1969, the
concept of "plausible denial" was taken in an almost literal sense:
"The government was authorized to do certain things that the President
was not advised ot" 7c According to Secretary of State Kissinger,
however, this practice was not followed during the Nixon Administration
and he doubted it ever was. In an exchange with a member of
the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Secretary Kissinger
stated:
Mr. KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, you said that the President
personally, directly approved all of the covert operations during
that period of time r1972 to 1974J and, in your knowledge,
during all periods of time. Is that correct?
Secretary KISSINGER. I can say with certainty during the
period of time that I have been in Washington and to my almost
certain knowledge at every period of time, yes.8
Four senior officials who deal almost exclusively with foreign affairs
have been central to each of the sequence of i'ommittees charged with
considering covert op?rations: Thl' President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary
of State for Politieal Affairs (formerly thr Deputy Under Secretary).
and the Director of Central Intelligence. These four officials,
plus the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made up the 40 Com-
7> Executive Order No. 11905, 2/1R/76.
7b Richard Helms tpstimony. 6/13/75, pp. 2R--29.
7c Rtafl' S11mm,uy of Bromley Smith interview, 5/5/75.
8 Henry Kissinger testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings,
10/31/75, p. 3341.
47
mittee. At ('{'Iiain times the Attorney Gpneral also snt on the Committee.
President Ford's I'eo!'l!anization will significantlv aIter this membership.
The new Operations Advisory Group will consist of the
Pmsiden:t's Assistant for XationaI Sef'nrity Affairs, the Secretaries of
State and Defense, the Chairman of th~ .rCS, and the DCI. The
Attorney Gpneral and the Dirertor of O~IB will a'ttend meetings as
observers. TI1P Chairman of the Group will 1)(' <lesignated by the
President. Staff support will be provided by ,the NSC staff.
The formal composition of the Opel'ations Group breaks with
tradition. The Secretaries of State and Defense will now be part of
the approval process for co\'('rt opemtions, rather than the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Deputy Secretary of
Defense. The OperaJtions Advisory Group apppars to be, therefore, an
up-graded 40 Committee. 'Yhether this proves to be the case remains to
be seen. Prpsidenit Ford's Exrcutive Order contained a pmvision,
Section 3(c) (3), which allmvs Group members to send a "designated
mpmsentmtive" to meetings in "unusual circumstances."
The National Secmity Council Intelligence Committee (XSCIC)
was es:t3!bli!'lhed in Kovember 1971 as part of a far-reaching reorganization
of the intelligence community ordCl"ed by President Nixon.9
The Presidential direct:ive stated:
The Committee will give direction and guidance on national
intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of
in'telligence products from the viewpoint of HlP intelligence
user.
One reason cited for creating NSCIC waS a desire to make the
intelligence community mOl"e responsive to the needs of policy makers.
Acoording to a news report at the time:
"The President and Henry [Kissinger] have felt that the
intelligence we were collectin!J' wasn't always rcsponqive to
their needs," said one source. "They suspected that one reason
was because the inteHigence community had no way of knowing
day to day what the President and Kissinger needed.
This isa new link bt-tween producers and consumers. We'll
have to wait and see if it works." 10
Prior to NSCIC no formal structure existed for addressing the
major questions concerning intelligence pl'iorities rather than specific
operations: Do "producers" in the intelligence community perform
analyses which are useful to "consumers"-the polieymakers at various
levels of government; are intelligence resources allocated wisely
• For over a year, the intelligence community had heen under study by the
Office of Management and Budget, then hpaded by .Tame-,; Schle!'inger. In addition
to NSOIC. the President's rCQrganization included an enhanced leadership
role for the DCI, the estahlishmpnt of fl Npt Assessmpnt Group within the
N~C . staff, the creation of an Intelli!!'ence Re"ourc~ Advisory Committee
.< IRAC), and a reconstitution of the United States Intelligence Board <USIB).
The Net Assessment Group was hertdl'd hy a senior NSC staff mpmber and was
responsible for reviewingnnd evaluating all intelligence products and for
producing net asse"'<;ments. When .Tames S'chlesinger was nnmpd Secretary of
Defense in .Turie. 1973. the NSC Npt Assf'ssment Group was aholishpd. Its staff
mf'mher joined Schlpsinger at the Defense Department and set up a similar office.
,. "Helms 'Told to Cut Global Expenses," New York Time8, 11/7/71, p. 55.
48
among agencies and types of collection? NSCIC ,vas a structural response
to these issues as well as part of the general tendency at that
tIme to centralize a greater measure of control in the White House for
national security affairs.
NSCIC's mission was to give direction and policy guidance w the
intelligence community. It was not, and was not intended to be, a channel
for transmitting substantive intelligence from the intelligence
community to policymakers nor for levying specific requirements in
the opposite direction. Neither was NSCIC mvolved in the process of
allocating intelligence resources. Its membership included the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, who chaired the
Committee, the DCI, the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense,
the Chairman of the JCS, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury
for .Monetary Affairs.
NSCIC was abolished by Executive Order 11905. No successor body
was created. The task of providing policy guidance and direction to
the intelligence community now falls to the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence. According to the President's Executive Order, the CFI
will "establish policy priorities for the collection and production of
national intelligence." In addition, the full NSC is now required to
conduct policy reviews twice a year on the quality, scope and timeliness
of intelligence and on the responsiveness of the intelligence community
to the needs of policymakers.
B. AUTHORIZATION AND CONTROL OF COVERT A(JITVITIES
1. The NSO and Oovert Activities: History
President Ford's Operations Advisory Group is the most recent in a
long line of executive committees set up to oversee CIA covert activities.
These committees and CIA covert activities can be traced back to
NSC-4-A, a National Security Council directive issued in December
1947.
In 1947 the United States was engaged in a new struggle, the Cold
vVar. To resist Communist-backed civil war in Greece, the Truman
Doctrine was proclaimed. The Marshall Plan was about to begin.
1Vithin three years China would "fall," the Korean War would beg-in,
and the Soviet Union would acquire an atomic capability. The Cold
"'Val' was being fought on two fronts-one overt, the other covert.
The Soviet clandestine services, then known as the NKVD (now the
KGB), were engaged in espionage and sub,-ersive activities throughout
the world. France and Italy were beleaguered by a wave of Communist-
inspired strikes. In Februarv 1948, the Communists staged a
successful coup in Czechosloyakia. The Philippines government was
under attack by the Hukbalahaps, a Communist-led guerrilla group.
In that climate, and in response to it, a broad range of United States
covert activities were begun. They were intended to supplement not
replace, overt U.S. acti vities, such as the Marshall Plan.
In December 1947, the Department of State advised the National
Security Council that covert operations mounted by the Soviet Union
threatened the defeat of American objectives and recommended that
th,e United States supplement its own overt foreign policy activities
WIth covert operations. At the Council's first meeting. on December 19,
1947, it approved NSC--4. entitled "Coordination of Foreign Intel1i49
gence Information Measures." This directive empowered the Secretary
of State to coordinate overseas information activities designed to
counter communism. A top secret annex to NSC-4-NSC-4-A-instructed
the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake covert psychological
activities in pursuit of the aims set forth in NSC--4. The
initial authority given the CIA for covert operations under NSC--4-A
did not establish formal procedures for either coordinating or approving
these operations. It simply directed the DCI to undertake covert
action and to ensure, through liaison with State and Defense, that
the resulting operations were consistent with American policy. In
1948, an independent CIA office-the Office of Policy Coordination
(OPC)-was established to carry out the covert mission assigned by
the NSC. NSC--4-A was the President's first formal authorization
for covert operations in the postwar period,'l and it was used to undertake
covert attempts to influence the outcome of the 1948 Italian
national elections.
Over the next seven years, from June 1948 to March 1955, a series
of National Security Council directives was issued. Each was addressed,
in part, to the review and control of CIA covert activities.
N'SC 10/2 superseded NSC--4-A on June 18, 1948, and a "10/2 Panel,"
the first predecessor of today's Operations Advisory Group, was established.
The panel was to review, but nat approve, covert action
proposals. The 1948 directive was superseded by NSC 10/5 on October
23, 1951. This directive authorized an expansion of world-wide
covert operations 12 and altered policy coordination procedures.13
Throughout this period, NSC directives provided for consultation
with representatives of State and Defense, but these representatives
had no approval function. There was no formal procedure or committee
to consider and approve projects. Nor was a representative of
the President consulted. From 1949 to 1952, the DCI approved CIA
covert action projects on his own authority;14 from 1953 to March
1955 the DCI coordinated project approvals with the Psychological
11 Covert operations were carried aut by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
dUring the Second World War. OSS was disbanded on October 1, 1945. Three
months later, on January 22, 1946, President Truman issued an Executive Order
creating the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). CIG was the direct predecessor
of the CIA. It operated under an executive council, the National Intelligence
Agency (NIA). Although a psychological warfare capability existed within
CIG, it did not engage in any covert operations during its existence. CIG and
NIA were dissolved with the passa/{e of the 1947 National Security Act.
12 Prior to this time CIA covert operations were largely confined to psychological
warfare, and almost all were media-related. These activities included the
use of false publications, "black" radio, and subsidies to publications. With the
issUll.llce of NSC 10/2, three other categories of covert activity were added to
the psychological warfare mission: political warfare, economic warfare and
preventive direct action (e.g., support for guerrillas, sabotage and front
organizations) .
13 At this same time, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was merged
with the CIA's Office of Special Operations which was responsible for espionage.
The CIA's Clanrlestine Service was now in place.
U The DCI did, however, undertake external coordination of covert action
programs. Under NSC 10/2, the executive coordination group-the 10/2 Panelmet
regularly with the CIA's Assistant Director for Policy Coordination to plan
and review covert action programs. This procedure continued under the 10/5
Panel.
50
Strategy Board or the Operations Coordination Board.I5 Certain
covert activities were brought to the President's attention at the DCI's
initiative.
By the mid-1950s covert action operations were no longer an ad hoc
response to specific threats. They had become an institutional part of
the "protracted conflict" with the Soviet Union and CommunIsm. In
September 1954, a Top Secret report on CIA covert activities, prepared
in connection with the second Hoover Commission, was submitted. to
President Eisenhower. The introduction to that report is enlightening
for what it said about how covert operations were viewed at that time,
as well as the rationale for them.
As long as it remains national policy, another important
requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political
and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique,
and if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the
enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way ofthe
prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission.
It IS now clear that we are facmg an implacable enemy
whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever
means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game.
Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.
If the U.S. is to survive, longstanding American concepts of
"fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective
espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to
subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever,
more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those
used against us. It may become necessary that the American
people be made acquainted with, understand and support this
fundamentally repugnant philosophy.
Two significant NSC directives on covert activities were issued in
1955. The first, NSC 5412/1, made the Planning and Coordination
Group (PCG), an aCB committee, the normal channel for policy
approval of covert operations.Is Approval by an executive committee
was now the rule. The second NSC directive was issued later in
1955 and remained in force until NSDM 40, which created the 40
Committee, was issued in February, 1970. Because of the significance
of this second directive-it covered policy objectives as well as approval
and control procedures-and the fact that it stood as U.S. policy for
fifteen years, it deserves detailed consideration.
The directive reiterated previous NSC statements that thE' overt
15 The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), an NSC subcommittee establised
April 4, 1951, was charged with determining the "desirability and feasibility"
of proposed covert programs and major covert projects. A new and
expanded "10/5 Panel" was established. comprising the members from the earlier
10/2 Panel, but adding staff representation of the PSB. The 10/5 Panel functioned
much as the 10/2 Panel had, but the resulting procedures proved cumbersome
and potentially insecure. Accordingly, when the PSB was replaced by
the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) on September 2, 1953, coordination
of covert operations reverted to a smaller I{I'OUp idpntical to the former 10/2
Panel. without OCB staff participation. In March 1954, NSC 5412 was issued.
It required the DCI to consult with the OCR
,. NSC 5412/1 was issued March 12, 1955. That same month the DC! briefed
the PCG on all CIA covert operations previously approved under NSC4-A, 10/2,
W/5, and 5412.
51
foreign activities of the U.S..Government should be suppleme~ted by
covert operations." It stated, In part, that the CIA was authorIzed to:
-Create and exploit problems for International Communism.
-Discredit International Communism, and reduce the
strength of its parties and organization.
-Reduce International Communist control over any areas
of the world.
-Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of
the nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possible,
the identity of interest between such nations and the United
States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups
genuinely advocating or believing in the advancement of such
mutual interests, and increase the capacity and will of such
peoples and nations to resist International Communism.
-In accordance with established policies, and to the extent
practicable in areas dominated or threatened by International
Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate
covert and guerrilla operations. . . .
The directive dealt with means as well as ends:
-Specifitally, such [oovcrt action] operations shall include
any covert activities related to: propaganda, political action,
economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage,
anti-sabotage, demolition, escape and evasion and evacuation
measures; subversion against hostile states or· groups
including assistance to underground resistance movements,
guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous
and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of
the free world; deception plans and operations and all compatible
activities necessary to accomplish the foregoing.
Control and approval procedures were significantly altered by this
directive. The aCB's functions were transferred to "designated representatives"
of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the President.
This was the first time a "designated representative" of the President
had been brought into the approval, or consultative, process. The
Special Group, as this committee came to be known, was charged with
reviewing and approving covert action programs initiated by the
ClAP
Even under the new directive, criteria governing the submission
of covert action projects to the Special Group were never clearly
defined.
As a 1967 CIA memorandum stated:
The procedures to be followed in determining which CA
[covert action] operations required approval by the Special
11 Coordination procedures were slightly modified on MarC'h 26, 1957. The
Secretary of State was given gole approvlll authority for particul'lrIy sensitive
projects that did not have military implications. Further, the CIA was now
required to keep the Departments of State and Defense advised on the progress
in implementing all approved covert action programs.
52
Group or by the Department of State and other arms of the
U.S. Government were, during the period 1955 to March 1963,
somewhat cloudy, and thus can probably best be described as
having been based on value jUdgments by the DCI.
In the beginning, meetings of the Special Group were infrequent.
This may be explained, in part, by the special relationship that
existed among CIA Director Allen Dulles, his brother John .Foster
Dulles who was Secretary of State, and President Eisenhower. Early
in 1959, regular weekly meetings of the Special Group were instituted,
with one result that criteria for submiSSIOn of projects to the Group
were, in practice, considerably broadened. It wal:> not until March 1963,
however, that criteria for submission to the Special Group became
more formal and precise. These submission criteria are the same as
exist today. (See page 53.)
One other development during this period deserves mention. After
a shoot-down of an American HB 47 aircraft in the Baltic region in
June 1959, the Special Group adopted a new attitude toward reconnaissance
in sensitive cases. They decided that review required for
these missions had previously been inadequate, and established review
on a routine basis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set up a Joint Reconnaissance
Center (JRC) to present monthly peripheral reconnaissance
programs to the Special Group. The new procedures did not prevent
the U-2 incident in 1960.
With the inauguration of President Kennedy in January 1961,
Special Group meetings were transferred to the White House under
the chairmanship of the President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy. For a brief period, General Max\
vell Taylor, President Kennedy's military adviser, chaired the group,
but this role was again assumed by Bundy when Taylor became Chairman
of the JCS. Prior to 1961, the State Department member of the
Special Group had been the "informal" chairman.
As a result of the failure of the Bay of Pigs, control procedures
for covert operatio~s were tightened. The Special Group continued
its once-a-week meeting format and President Kennedy was informed
more frequently of covert action proposals. At the same time, however,
the control mechanism for approving and monitoring covert operations
was fragmented. In addition to the Special Group, two new executive
bodies were created-the Special Group on Counter Insurgency (CI)
and the Special Group (Augmented).
On January 18, 1963, NSAM 124 was issued. This directive established
the Special Group (CI) to help insure effective interagency
programs designed to prevent and resist insurgency in specified critical
areas, such as Laos. Paramilitary operations were a central focus of
this new group. NSAM 124 did not, however, supersede previous NSC
directives on covert operations. Nevertheless, a certain number of
operations that might have earlier been referred to the Special Group
went to the Special Group (CI). General Maxwell Taylor chaired
this group and McGeorge Bundy and Robert Kennedy served on it,
among others.
In 1962 a third NSC subcommittee was established, the Special
Group (Augmented). Its purpose was to oversee Operation MONGOOSE,
a major new CIA covert action program designed to overthrow
Fidel Castro. Its membership included, in addition to the regular
Special Group members, Attorney General Kennedy and General
53
Taylor. Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara
occasionally attended meetings.18
•
During the Johnson Administration, the Special Group, WhICh was
renamed the 303 Committee/9 continued to be chaired by the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs, first McGeorge Bundy,
and, after 1966, 'Walt Rostow. The most important regular, high-level
meeting in the national security process during the Johnson years
was, however, the Tuesday Lunch group. The Tuesday Lunch began
as an informal meeting of President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk,
Secretary of Defense MdTamara, and Bundy. Gradually, the meetings
became a regular occasion and participation was enlarged to include
the President's press secretary, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the Chairman of the JCS. The agenda of the Tuesday Lunch was
devoted primarily to operational decisions-mostly on Vietnam. Although
the Tuesday Lunch was not meant to substitute for the 303
Committee, it probably did consider important matters involving
covert operations directed at North Vietnam.
13. The 40 Oommittee and current procedures
On February 17, 1970, NSDM 40 was issued. It created the 40 Committee.
The directive superseded and rescinded past NSC covert action
directives. It discussed both policy and procedure. With regard
to policy, NSDM 40 stated that it was essential to the defense and
security of the United States and its efforts for world peace that the
overt foreign activities of the United States Government continue to
be supplemented by covert action operations.
NSDM 40 assigned the DCI responsibility for coordinating and
controlling covert operations. The Director was instructed to plan and
conduct covert operations in a manner consistent with United States
foreign and military policies and to consult with and obtain appropriate
coordination from any other interested agencies or officers on
aneed-to-know basis.
The directive also spelled out the role of the 40 Committee. It stated
that the DCI was resnonsible for obtaining policy approval for all
major and/or politicallv sensitive covert action programs through the
40 Committee. In addition, NSDM 40 continued the Committee's
responsibility for reviewing and apnrov;ng overhead reconnaissance
missions, a resnonsibility first acquired in 1959.
A new provision, not founn in previous NSC directives. required the
Committee to flnnually rev;ew covert onerations nreviol1slv anproved,
and mane the DCI responsible for insuring that the review took place.
Guidelines for the snbmission of covert fll'6on pronos"1!'; to the 40
Committee were slw11erl ont in an internfll CIA diredive.20 The Director
of Central Intelligence decided whether an operational program
t8 For a detailed account of the workings of the Special Group (Augmented),
see the Committee's Intprim Report on "Alleged Assassination Plots InV'olving
Foreign IA!a<1ers." nn. 139-148.
11 In June 1964 NSAM 30~ was issued. NSAM 300 left the C'ompoffition. functions,
and responsibilities of tbe Special Group unchanged. The effect of this
directive was. quite simply, to change the name of the Special Group to the 303
Committee. The purpose of NSAM 303 was just as simpll'---the name of the
SpeciAl Group had become public as a result of thp puhlicAtion of the book The
Invisible Government and, therefore, it was felt that the name of the covert
action apnroval committee should be changed.
.. This di,.pctive will, at least initially, continue in effect for the new Operations
Advisory Group.
54
or activity should be submitted to the 40 Committee for policy approval.
The paramount consideration was political sensitivity, but it
was also significant if a program involved large sums of money. In
the past, a "large" project was one costing over $25,000, but this guideline
seems less clear today. As a general rule, the following types of
programs or activities required 40 Committee action: political and
propaganda action programs involving direct or indirect action to
influence or support political parties, groups or specific political or
military leaders (this included governmental and opposition elements)
; economic action programs; paramilitary programs; and counterinsurgency
programs where CIA involvement is other than the
support and improvement of the intelligence collection capabilities of
the loc.al services.
The internal CIA directive also stated that before proposals were
presented to the DCI for submission to the 40 Committee, they should
be coordinated ,,,ith the Department of State. Further, paramilitary
action programs should be coordinated with the Department of Defense,
and, ol'dinaril?/, ('oncurnmce by the Ambassador to the country
concerned would be required. [Emphasis added.]
"Should" and "ordinarily" were underscored for an important reason:
major covert action proposals are not always coordinated among
the various departments. Nor, for that matter, were they always discussed
or approved by the 40 Committee. For example, the CIA's 1970
effort to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile, undertaken at the
instruction of President Nixon, was never brought before the 40 Committee.
After a proposal was approved by the DCI, it was distributed in
memorandum form to the 40 Committee principals.21 Except in emergencies,
distribution to the principals was to occur at least 72 hours in
advance of a meeting. Normally, the written proposal, as contained in
the 40 Committee memorandum, was formally considered following
an oral presentation by the CIA. This presentation was usually given
by the Agency Division Chief having action responsibility. In addition
to the principals, participants at 40 Committee meetings included,
on occasion, the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, a representative
from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
and the Assistant Secretary of State for the region involved.
The 40 Committee could approve, modify, or reject any covert action
proposal. Proposals involving continuing action-for example, a subsidy
to a political group-were normally approved for a fixed period,
one year or less, at the end of which the project was again reviewed by
the Committee and either continued or eliminated. Reconnaissance
programs were rarely dealt with at these meetings. They were usually
cleared bv tp1enhonp vote rather than at a formal meeting.
Prior to 1969 it does not appear that all 40 Committee approvals
were routinelv referred to the President. The President would beoome
involved, formally, only if there was disagreement within the Committee,
or if the Chairman or another member thought a proposal was
21 The memorandum descri'bed the proposal in summary form: what it was
expected to accomplish, its cost and the aVllPability of funds. whether there were
alternative means for achipvingo the objectives sought, the risks involVed, and
the possible consequences of disclosure.
55
sufficiently important, or sensitiw, to warrant the President's attention.
However, as a result of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974
Foreign Assistance Act, the President is notified once a covert action
proposal has been approved by his executive committee. The President
is then required to certify to Congress that the approved covert
action proposal is "important to the national security interests of the
United States." The DCI then informs the Congress of this "Presidential
Finding" in a "timely manner." In practice, informing Congress
means notifying six different committees-the Senate and House Committees
on Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Appropriations.22
The DCI does not, however, feel obligated to inform the six committees
of approved coyert action operations prior to their implementation,
although in some oases he has done so. Once the "Presidential
Finding" is in hand, the CIA's Directorate of Operations implements
the proposal.
During the early years of the Nixon Administration, 40 Committee
meetings were held regularly although, on o~asion, proposals were
approved by telephone vote. Over time, however, formal meetings became
fewer and fewer. This was due, in part, to a decline in covert action
projects. Most business was done by telephone after proposals had
been circulated in advance by couriers. Business became routine. "Telephone
concurrences," involving quick checks rather than intensive
discussion, was the rule. However, for major new departures, the Committee
met in person. For example, the 40 Committee met nine times
between January 22 and December 11, 1975, to discuss Angola. The
National Security Council met once, on June 27, 1975. In addition, an
Interagency Working Group on Angola met 24 times between August
13,1975, and January 14, 1976. The number and frequency of meetings
on Angola appears to reflect a need on the part of policymakers to sit
down and discuss the desirability and mechanics of undertaking a
major new covert operation. When a new departure is not being considered,
when policy and interests are not shifting, 40 Committee business
remained routine, usually conducted by telephone.
'Dwo additional points concerning 40 Committee procedures are important.
First, covert action proposals were resubmitted by the DCI
to the 40 Committee when there was a need to reassess or reaffirm previous
policy decisions. Resubmission would occur if new developments
warranted it, or if specifically required by the 40 Committee at the
time of approval.
Second, status reports on covert action programs and activities were
submitted when requested by the 40 Committee or at the discretion of
the DCL Status reports were presented at least annually to the 40
Committee for each continuing activity approved by the Committee.
Apparently, however, these annual reviews were little more than pro
forma exercises carried out by the DCI. They were not thorough
examinations of on-going projects by the 40 Committee principals.23
.. In addition, b<Yth the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence
Activities were briefed on current covert operations.
"" According to the CIA, prior to the review of these annual reports by the
40 Committee principals they were submitted in draft to the concerned agencies
for comment. Thus, the staff of 40 Committee principals had an opportunity to
examine on-going projects.
56
3. Om'crt Acti{)n Approvals
It is difficult to determine the number of covert operations approved
over the years by the 40 Committee or its predecessors. Records for
the early years are either not available or are incomplete. Also, there
has been a steady refinement of "programs" into individual "projects,"
thus making comparisons difficult. Despite this, a rough determination
can be made of projects approved for the period 1949 to 1967.24
Between 1949 and 1952, 81 projects were approved by the DCI on
his own authority after coordination with either the 10/2 or 10/5
Panels. During the first two years of the Eisenhower administration,
1953-54, 66 projects were approved by the DCI in coordination with
the Operations Coordination Board or the Psychological Strategy
Board. Between March 1955 and February 1967, projects approved
or reconfirmed by the Operations Coordination Board, the Special
Group, or the 303 Committee were as follows:
Eisenhower administration-104
Kennedyadministration-163
Johnson administration-142
These totals reflect two things: first, an increase in the number of
projects approved and, second, a tightening up of approval procedures.
Regarding procedures, a CIA memorandum, dated February
25,1967, stated:
As the sophistication of the policy approval process developed
so did the participation of the external approving authority.
Since establishment of the Special Group (later 303 Committee),
the policy arbiters have questioned CIA presentations,
amended them and, on occasion, denied them outright.
The record shows that the Group/Committee, in some instances,
has overridden objections from the DCI and instructed
the Agency to carry out certain activities....
Objections by State have resulted in amendment or rejection
of election proposals, suggestions for air proprietaries and
support plans for foreign governments.... The Committee
has suggested areas where covert action is needed, has decided
that another element of government should undertake a proposed
action, imposed caveats and turned down specific proposals
for CIA action from Ambassadors in the field.
Whereas the "sophistication of the policy approval process" and
the "participation of the external approving authority" has increased
significantly since the establishment of the Special Group in 1955, this
has not meant that all, or even a majority, of covert action projects
have been approved by the "external approving authority." Low-risk,
low-cost covert action projects, such as a routine press placement or
the development of an "agent of influence," do not receive this attention.
In this regard, an Agency memorandum, dated February 21,
1967, stated:
It is obvious that a compilation of Special Group approvals
in no way reflects the totality of significant CIA activities
carried on over the past 15 years. With respect to overall
.. These numbers may include reapprovals of projects initiated earlier.
57
DDP activity, it does not include any mention of FIICI
[Foreign Intelligenc€/Counterintelligence] actions or, of
course, any decisions in the overt field. Even within the restricted
framework of covert action alone, a 1963 study prepared
by this office showed that of the 550 existing CIA projects
of the DDP which were reviewed against the background
of our own int€rnal instruction on Special Group
submission, only 86 were separately approved (or reapproved)
by the Special Group between 1 January and 1
December 1962.
Using the figures cited above, this would mean that 16 percent of
all covert action projects, large and small, received Special Group
approval between January 1 and December 1, 1962. The Select Committee's
own review indicates that of the several thousand covert action
projects undertaken since 1961, only 14 percent were considered
on a case-oy-case basis by the 40 Committee or its predecessors.25 Those
not reviewed by the committee were the low-risk, low-cost type referred
to above.
Another indication of the number of covert action proposals which
eventually reached the 40 Committee is contained in the CIA's 1972
Om'ert Action Manual. According to this document, "the 40 Committee
actually looks at about one-fourth of our covert action projects."
The Manual continues:
. . . this proportion is a reflection on the nature of the project
system, not on any lack of policy approval for our covert
actions. For example, the Agency would have separate projects
for each of a number of media assets that might be
brought to bear on an overall program of persuasion, but the
40 Committee would focus on the program with its descriptions
of the specific assets to be employed.... Thus, the important
point on policy Us that the 40 Oommittee considers
irulividually all major arul critical projects providing broader
program guidelines for the remairuler of our covert activity.
[Emphasis added.]
4. TheNSO arul 001Jert A ctiviNes : Oonclusions
Several points stand out in the history of the committees charged
with overseeing covert operations. The most obvious has less to do
with procedures than with the substance of the projects approved. The
justification for covert operations has changed sharply, from containing
International (and presumably monolithic) Communism in
the early 1950s to merely serving as an adjunct to American foreign
policy in the 1970s. It should be noted that early NSC directives framed
the purpose of covert operations entirely in terms of opposition to
International Communism. By contrast, NSDM 40 described covert
actions as those secret activities designed to further official United
States programs and policies abroad.
25 According to the CIA. since the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign
Assistance Act, all covert action projects not submitted on a case·by-case
basis have been submitted to the President for approval and to the oversight
committees of Congress for its information in collective, omnibus form.
207-932 0 - 76 - 5
58
As stated, procedural arrangements for considering and approving
covert operations have been formalized and tightened over the
years. NSC-4-A of 1947 established no formal procedures for coordinating
or approving operations; the DCI, in liaison with State
and Defense, was to ensure that operations were consistent with
United States policy. Over time, procedures were developed and guidelines
established to indicate which covert action proposals required
40 Committee approval. The requirement of a "Presidential Finding"
in the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act not only requires the President
to certify Lo Congress that an approved covert operation is important
to the national security of the United States, but, in effect, compels
him to become aware of actions approved by the 40 Committee.26 The
concept of plausible denial, at least as it applies to the President,
is dead. Major new covert operations cannot be undertaken without
the knowledge, and approval, of the Chief Executive. President
Ford's Executive Order takes this one step further. The new Operations
Advisory Group will not be responsible for policy approval
of covert operations, as was the 40 Committee. According to the
Executive Order, the Group will "consider and develop any policy
recommendation, including any dissents, for the President prior to
his decision" on each covert operation. The approval of covert operations
now rests solely with the President. .
However, recognition that procedural arrangements for conSidering
and approving covert operations have become tighter does not
necessarily imply that they are adequate. Significant issues regarding
the control of covert operations remain. First, the criteria for determining
which covert operations are brought before the Executive are
still inadequate. Small covert action projects not deemed politically
risky can be approved within the CIA. Although many of these are
in support of projects already approved by the Executive, they nevertheless
make up a majority of all CIA covert action projects. In
addition, some of the low-risk projects approved within the CIA, such
as the development of a foreign "asset," may prove to be extremely
sensitive and risky. One CIA "asset," given the cryptonym QJ/WIN,
was recruited to spot "individuals with criminal and underworld
connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use." 27 Later the
CIA contemplated using Q.J/WIN for its ZR/RIFLE project, a "general
stand-by capahility" to carry out assassination when required.
Other CIA individual project "assets" used in connection with plots
to assassinate foreign leaders were WI/ROGUE and AM/LASH.
116 President Ford has recommended that the "Presidential Finding" requirement
be dropped. In his message to Congress outlining his intelligence reorganization,
the President recommended that the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act
(Public Law 93-559) be modified as proposed by tbe Commission on the Organization
of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. That Commission,
charg-ed by Robert Murphy, recommendl'd:
"We propose that Public Law 93-559 be amendl'd to require reporting of
covl'rt actions to the proposl'd Joint Committee on National Security, and to
omit any requirement for the personal certification of the President as to their
necessity." (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct
of Foreilm Policy, 6/75, p. 101.)
'IT Senate Select Committee, "Alleged Assa~sination Plots Involving Foreilm
Ll'aders," p. 182. Sf'e this report for a full discussion of QJ/WIN, ZR/RIFLE,
WI/ROGUE and AM/LASH.
59
Though none of these specific projects were apparently approved by
the NbC, several ranking CIA officials testified that they were within
the general policy approved at the NSC level.
Second, there were gaps in 40 Committee supervision, notably in
the sensitive areas of human espionage and counterintelligence.
Whether intended or not, espionage and counterintelligence operations
may have the effect of political action. A former chairman of the
Special Group, McGeorge Bundy, has testified that the distinction
among these operations needs re-examination. According to Bundy:
Intelligence collection is often separated from covert operations
in the thinking of intelligence administrators and
other concerned officials. I think this distinction, like the
parallel distinction in the field of counterintelligence, deserves
re-examination. Both intelligence collection and counterintelligence
have involved covert activity which goes well
beyond conventional espionage and counterespionage, and
such enlargements of activity often present many of the same
dangers as covert actions of other sorts.28
Espionage operations can have the effect of political action. A payment
to a dissident leader may be designed to collect intelligence on
the leader's group, but it may also be regarded as support for the
group's objectives. Counterintelligence operations can have a similar
impact. Counterintelligence measures used to enlist the support of
local intdligence and police, neutralize hostile intelligence services, and
discredit local CIA opponents are sometimes indistinguishable from
covert action. As such, the issue is whether these intelligence activities
can, or should, be made subject to effective executive branch and congressional
oversight. President Ford's Executive Order does not address
this issue. The Operations Advisory Group will be responsible
.for approving certain "sensitive intelligence collection operations," but
the Executive Order does not apparently include human as well as
technical collection. Nor is there any reference to Operations Group
review or approval of any counterintelligence activities.
Third, there is a basic conflict between sufficient consultation to ensure
accountability and sound decisions on the one hand, and secure
operations on the other. 40 Committee approval procedures for covert
operations were, on occasion, by-passed by the President or his National
Security Affairs adviser. For highly sensitive proposals the
number of individuals or agencies consulted or informed is sometimes
sharply limited on a "need to know" basis. Even the ambassador
in the country where the operation is to be conducted may not be informed.
Middle and lower level officials within the State Department
or the CTA with expertise may not be consulted. The risk of inadequate
consultation was aggravated by the informality of telephone clearances.
President Ford's Executive Order attempts to remedy this deficiency,
at least in part. The Executive Order states: .
The Operations Group shall discharge the responsibilities
assigned ... only after consultation in a formal meeting at-
28 McGeorge Bundy testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence,
12/10/75.
60
tended by all members and observers; or ... when a designated
representative of the member or observer attends.28a
Finally, the annual review of covert actions by the 4-0 Committee
diri not appear to be searching or thorough. Annual reviews were
often handled in the same informal manner as approvals for new
covert action proposals-by telephone concurrence. Some ongoing
covert operations have been challenged over the years, most often by
the State Department. Some die a natural death. Some linger on for as
long as 20 to 25 years. It appears that some covert operations, such
as those in Italy, may come to an end only when they are exposed. President
Foro's Executive Order contains two provisions to increase the
number of covert action reviews. First, the Operations Advisory Group
will he required to "conduct periodic reviews of programs previously
considered." There is no requirement, however, that these reviews must,
take nlace at a formal meeting. Second, the Executive Order requires
tbp fIlII National Security Councll to review, twice a year, the "continued.
appropriateness" of ongoing covert operations.
5. Role of OMB
In oroer to meet unanticipated needs, the CIA maintflins a Contingency
Reserve Fund. The fund is replenished by annual al>propriations
as well as unobligated funds from previous CIA appropriations.
More often than not, the unanticipated needs of the CIA relate to
covprt onerations.
The Director of Central Intelligence has the authority, under the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, to spend reserve funds without
consulting OMB. However, due to an arrangement among OMB,
the CIA, and the Appropriations Committees of Congress, the CIA
has up-reed not to use reserve funds without OMB approval. There is
no evidence that the DCI has ever violated this agreement. In practice.
OMB holds a double key to this reserve fund: first, it approves
additions to the reserve fund and. second, it approves the amounts to
be released from the fund, upon CIA request and justification. OMB
holds a careful review of each proposed relea"e. Turndowns are rare,
but reductions in amounts requested occur often enough to prompt a
careful CIA presentation of its case.
Despite these levers of control. OMB h~s faced spverfll hanoicaps
which render its control of the Contingencv Reserve Fund less effective
than it might be. First, OMB has not. in the past. been renresented on
the National Security Councilor the 40 Committee.29 Much of the
dollar volume of reserve releases originates in 40 Committee action.
Thus. OMB resistance to reserve release requests were often in the face
of policy determinations already made. ~econd, although tre chairmen
of the appropriations subcommittees of Congress are notified or drawdowns
from the nlTld, these notifications occur after the release action,
even thou,gh the releflsP is conceptually the f'flme as a supplemental appropriation.
Thus, OMB does not have the leverage in regard to
28a Executive Order 1905, Sec. 3 (c) (3).
20 Under PrPRident Ford's Executive Order, the Director of OM'R will sit as
an observer on the Operations Arvisory Group, the successor to the 40 Committee.
61
Contingency Reserve Fund releases that it does in regard to supplemental
appropriatitons requests (where OMB is a party to recommending
supplementals to the President and Congress).
OMB suffers other limitations with respect to the use of CIA funds
for covert operations. First, CIA's budget submission to OMB has,
in the past, neglected some aspects of clandestine spending, notably
proprietary activities. Second, current ground rules allow the reprogramming
of CIA's regular appropriations to meet unanticipated
needs; no OMB approval is required for this reprogramming. To the
extent that the above funds are used for covert operations, OMB has
no control over their use.
C. PROVIDING THE IXTELLIGEXCE REQUIRED BY POLICYMAKERS
1. Work of NSOIO
The National Security Council Intelligence Committee was formed
in November 1971. At its first meeting, a Working Group, composed
primarily of officials from the intelligence community, was established.
That composition was soon seen as inappropriate for a committee
whose main purpose was to make intelligence more responsive to the
needs of policymaking "consumers." As a result. at its second-and
last-meeting, NSCIC changed the composition of the Working Group
to exactly parallel the parent body.3o
The various representatives who sat on the Working Group were
not the "intelligence" specialists from those agencies, but officials with
policymaking responsibilities. For example, the State Department was
represented by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
not the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Representatives
were to seek the views of the operating bureaus of their
agencies on major intelligence questions.
An August 1974 meeting of NSCIC produced two direct results. In
response to a request for some mechanism to highlight critical intelligence
memoranda, the DCI now puts out "alert memoranda"-brief
notices in a form which cannot be overlooked. The meeting also resulted
in the production of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet
perceptions of the United States.
Before it was abolished, NSCIC began reviewing the basic documents
which levy requirements on the intelligence community-the
Del's Perspectives on Intelligence, Substantive Obiectives, and especially,
Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). NSCIC also set up a
Working Group panel to conduct surveys of intelligence community
publications. There was also an NSCIC subcommittee which considered
economic intelligence, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs. The subcommittee was inactive.
"" The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman),
the DCI (Vice Chairman), the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Chairman, JCS, and the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs.
62
g. Limitations on Effectiveness
NSCIC's work refled:.ed the basic dilemma inherent in suiting intelligence
to the needs of policymakers. The intelligence community must
be close enough to policymakers to know what is desired, yet distant
enough to preserve its objectivity. Within this framework, the differing
demands of many kinds of policymakers must be balanced. For
example, making the intelligence community more responsive to the
needs of Cabinet-level officials might diminish the quality of the intelligence
produced for middle-level officials.
The limited effectiveness of NSCIC was due to several factors:
-The apparent lack of interest of senior officials in making NSCIC
work.
-The demands of other business on the sub-cabinet level officials
who made up NSCIC.
-"Consumer" unfamiliarity with the intelligence community. Of
necessity, NSCIC spent most of its time educating policymakers about
the community and what it can do. Most officials in policymaking positions,
especially those in senior positions, bring little intelligence experience
to their jobs. One of NSCIC's first tasks was to produce a
manual about the community for policymakers.
-Diversity among "consumers." Cooperative arrangements and the
tradition of working together are matters of long standing within the
intelligence community. By contrast, NSCIC represented a first attempt
to bring "consumers" together. The newness of the endeavor
combined with the diversity of the "consumers" made it difficult for
NSCIC to function effectively.
3. OondusiowJ
The intelligence community has not. always been responsive to the
needs of policymakers. Some have argued that the intelligence product
is more a reflection of what "produf'ers," rather than "consumers,"
deem important. This is debatable. What is not at issue. however, is
that "consumers" should drive the intelligence process. NSCIC was a
disappointment in this regard. To say this is not to imply that the intelligence
community has been unresponsive to the needs of policymakers.•
Just the opposite may he true. "Producers" and "consumers"
get together almost daily at NSC subcommittee meetings (e.g., the
Senior Review Group and the ·Washington Special Action Group.)
Intelligence requirements are levied, informally, at these meetings. It
can be assumed that the intelligence community has been responsive to
these informal requirements and hew~e the need for a more formal
NSC mechanism-NSCIC-was eliminated. The new Committee on
Foreign Intelligence will now have the responsibility for seei~ that
policymakers are provided the intelligence they need.
D. ADVERTISING THE PRESIDENT ON I"'TELLIGENCE ISSUES
1. Overview
The President needs an independent body to assess the quality and
effectiveness of our foreign intelligence effort. Since 1956 the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) has served
this function. Numerous proposals have recently been made to make
63
PFIAB an executive "watchdog" over United States foreign intelligence
activities. Some have suggested that a joint presidential!
congressional intelligence board be established or, at the least, Senate
confirmation of members of the President's board be required. The
Rockefeller Commission recommended that the Board's functions be
expanded to include oversight of the CIA with responsibility for
assessing CIA compliance with its statutory authority. The Murphy
Commission commented favorably on the Rockefeller Commission
recommendations. ·Whether PFIAB should adopt this oversight or
"watchdog" function, or whether Congress should be involved in the
activities of the Board is open to question. President Ford, in his
Executive Order, decided against transforming the Board into a CIA
watchdog. Instead, he created a new three-member Intelligence Oversight
Board to monitor the activities of the intelligence community.
2. Hwtory of PFIAB
On February 6, 1956, President Eisenhower created, by Executive
Order, the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
The Board was established in response to a recommendation bv the
second Hoover Commission, calling for the President to appoint a
committee of private citizens who would report to him on United
States foreign intelligence activities. Creation of the Board was also
intended to preempt a move in Congress at the time, led by Senator
Mike Mansfield, to establish a Joint Congressional Committee on
Intelligence.
The Board ceased functioning when President Eisenhower left
office in 1961, but was reactivated by President Kennedy following
the Bay of Pigs failure. It was renamed the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and has functioned, uninterrupted,
since that time.
3. PFIAB Today
The Board currently operates under Executive Orde. 11460, issued
by President Nixon on March 20. 1969. The Board is responsible for
reviewing and assessing United States foreign intelligence activities.
It reports to the President periodically on its findings and recommendations
for improving the effectiveness of the nation's foreign
intelligence effort.
The Board presently has seventeen members, all drawn from private
life and all appointed by the President. It is chaired by Leo Cherne,
and holds formal meetings two days every other month. It has a staff
of two, headed by an executive secretary.
As its name indicates, the Board is advisory. Board reports and recommendations
have contributed to the increased effectiveness and efficiency
of our foreign intelligence effort. For example, the Board played
a significant role in the development of our overhead reconnaissance
program. It has made recommendations on coordinating American
intelligence activities; reorganizing Defem:e intelligence; applying
science and technology to the National Security Agency. and rewriting
the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs). The
Board has conducted post-mortems on alleged intelligence failures and,
since 1969, made a yearly, independent assessment of the Soviet strategic
threat, thereby supplementing regular community intelligence
64
assessments. Most recently, it has reported to the President on economic
intelligence and human clandestine intelligence collection.
The Board has not served a "watchdog" function. As the Rockefeller
Commission noted, the Board does not exercise control over the CIA,
which is, in fact, the Board's only source of information about Agency
activities. When the Board has occasionally inquired into areas of
possible illegal or improper CIA activity, it has met resistance. For
example, when the Board became aware of the so-called Huston Plan
and asked the FBI and the Attorney General for a copy, the request
was refused. The Board did not pursue the matter with the White
House. In 1970, the Board was asked by Henry Kissinger, then the
President's National Security Advisor, to examine Allende's election
victory in Chile to determine whether the CIA had failed to foresee,
and propose appropriate actions, to prevent Allende's taking office. The
Board requested 40 Committee and NSC minutes to determine the
facts. Its request was refused and its inquiry was dropped.
The President needs an independent body to assess the quality and
effectiveness of our foreign intelligence effort. In the words of its
Executive Secretary, the Board has "looked at intelligence throngh the
eyes of the President." PFIAB has served, in effect, as an intelligence
"Kitchen Cabinet." The Board has been useful, in part, because its
advice and recommendations have been for the President. As such, the
executive nature of this relationship should be maintained.
Over the years, many of PFIAB's recommendations have been
adopted, and others have served as a basis for later reform or reorganization.
The Board has not been an executive "watchdog" of the CIA.
To make it so would be to place the Board in an untenable position:
adviser to the President on the qualitv and effectiveness of intelligence
on the one hand and "policeman" o'f the intelligence community on
the other. These two roles conflict and should be performed separately.
4. Intelligence Over8ight Board
To assist the President, the NSC, and the Attorney General in overseeing
the intelligence community, President Ford has created an
Intelligence Oversight Board. The Board will consist of three private
citizens appointed by the President. They will also serve on PFIAB.
The Board will be, in effect, a community-wide Inspector General of
last resort. It will review reports from the Inspectors General and
General Counsels of the intelligence community and report periodically
to the Attorney General and the President on any activities which
appear to be illegal or improper. The Board will also review the practices,
procedures, and internal guidelines of the various IGs and General
Counsels to ensure that they are designed to bring questionable
activities tB light. Finally, the Board will se~ tq it that .intellige~ce
community IGs and General Counsels have access to any mformatiOn
they require.
The President's Intelligence Oversight Board should serve a useful
purpose. However, the ability of a small, part-time Board to monitor
the activities of the entire intelligence community is questionable.
Further, the Board is a creature of the Executive and, as such, may
be unable or, at times, unwilling to probe certain sensitive areas. A
65
body independent of the Executiw must also be responsible for monitoring
the activities of the intelligence community, including those
which may be either illegal or improper.
E. ALLOCATIXG IXTELLIGEXCE RESOURCES
1. Role of OMB
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the principal staff
arm of the President for supenising the Federal budget. OMB is also
a staff arm for management-a tool the President occasionally uses to
reorganize or redirect the structure and activities of the Federal
Government.
In managing U.S. intelligence activities, the President has used
OMB to pull together his annual intelligence budget and also to monitor
the expenditure of intelligence funds. For example, OMB annually
reviews the intelligence community's appropriations requests and
makes its recommendations to the President for amounts to be included
in his budget. Further, OMB apportions 31 CIA's appropriation and
has authority to approve releases from the CIA Contingency Reserve
Fund.
The fiscal management responsibility of OMB has been especially
critical in the field of intelligence. Intelligence activities comprise a
large part of that small and shrinking portion of the federal budget
which is "controllable." 32 About 75 percent of federal spending for
fiscal 1976 was designated in the President's budbJt submission as
"uncontrollable." The Committee has found that the direct cost of national
intelligence spending is currently [deleted] and total intelligence
spending is approximately twice that. Thus the total U.S. intelligence
budget is about [deleted] pe.rcent of federal spending. but is
[deleted] percent of C'ontrollable federal spending. Because the U.S.
intelligence budget is fragmented and concealed, the relationshi.p between
controllable intelligence program sand controllable federal
spending has never been snown to Congress in the President's budget.
OMB has been a principal point at which the President can identify
and exert management leverage over this aggregate of controllable
funds.
Over the years, OMB (and its predecessor, the Bureau of the
Budget) has had the greatest management impact when:
-It has been used as an instrument of presidential
reorganization;
-It has identified major issues for the President, usually
involving bids by intelligence agencies to maintain or launch
duplicative or marginally useful programs.
For example, in 1960 President Eisenhower commissioned the Budget
Bureau to establish a Joint Study Group of the principal intel-
31 "Apportionment" of funds is described by budgetary statutes as the OMB
action, following congressional appropriations, whereby agencies receive formal
notification of amounts appropriated and the distribution of spending by timl'
period and program.
.. Defined as spending that is not predetermined by statute, such as interest
on the federal debt, veterans benefits, Social payments, et cetera.
66
ligence agencies to take a hard look at U.S. in~lligence collection
requirements and other problems. In its report, the Joint Study Group
recommended to the President a variety of measures to strengthen
intelligence management, including a more assertive role for the DCI,
stronger control by NSA of the cryptologic agencies, and centralized
management of collection requirements.
A decade later. President Nixon commissioned OMB to probe the
management of the intelligence community, and to determine what
changes, short of legislation, might be made. An ensuing report by
Assistant OMB Director James Schlesinger concluded that the division
of Jabor envisaged by the National Security Act of 1947 had been
rendered obsolescent and meaningless bv technology and the ambitions
of U.S. intelligence agencies. The Schlesinger Report recommended
nothing less than the basic reform of U.S. intelligence management,
centering upon a strong DCI who could bring intelligence costs under
control and bring intelliQence production to an adequate level of quality
and responsiveness. In addition, the OMB report pointed to nine
specific mergers or shifts of intelligence programs estimated to save
nearlv one billion dollars annually.
OMB has also been an occasional lightning rod for the identification
of specific budget or management issues. In the mid-sixties the Bureau
of the Budget called the President's attention to the problems of better
coordinating the costs and benefits of overhead reconnaissance. Further,
the Bureau pressed hard for a reorganization of Defense mapping
and charting activities emphasizing the issues of needless duplication
of service mapping agencies. This was resolved following the
Schlesinger Report.
'2. Recent Trends and Programs
OMB reportedly was given a major role in developing the recommendations
presented to President Ford for overhauling intelligence
budgeting and management. If this was the case, it would reverse a
recent trend. Since 1971, OMB's day-to-day influence upon intelligence
management has been at a low point. OMB has been confined to its
cyclical, institutional role in the budget process. The strengths and
weaknesses of this role will be discussed below.
3.0MB Role in Formulating the Budget
OMB can always get the President's at~ntion in recommending
what should be included in his annual budget proposals to Congress.
Associated with OMB budget recommendations is the identification
of major resource allocation issues, with an analysis of options and
!t recommended course of action. However, OMB recommendations on
intelligence have had less presidential acceptance than in other areas of
the federal budget. This has been due to the difficulty of carryina any
"military" budget issue opposed by the Secretary of Defense and the
relative ineffectiveness of DCI support. Further, OMB is excluded
from some of the early, formative stages of DOD program determinations
for intelligence which cover eighty percent of the intelligence
budget.
67
For the past three years, with OMB encouragement, the DCI has
provided the President with his own recommendations for the national
intelligence budget. Unfortunately, these have come too late in the
process to have much impact. These recommendations have followed,
not preceded, DOD submissions to OMB and OMB's own formative
stages of analysis.
The President's annual and five-year planning targets are an integral
part of the federal budget process. Federal agencies are adjured
to fit their fiscal and staffing plans within the presidential targets. with
special emphasis upon the nearest or "budget" year. Presidential targets
are especially important in their potential for strengthening central
management of the intelligence community. The DCI has
recognized this. These targets can assist the DCI in getting more value
for the intelligence dollar. However, OMB has issued the planning
targets too late in the planning process and without any in-depth
coordination of totals and major components with the DCI. By the
time the DCI and CIA have received their target figures in June or
July, most of the major decisions on budget request levels and future
year implications have already been agreed to within Defense and
CIA. This type of problem is widespread in the federal budget process
but, because of the insulation of intelligence from external checks and
balances, the problem is especially serious in intelligence budgeting.
The problem is exacerbated by OMB's issuance to the Department
of Defense of a planning target which has the effect of constituting an
alternative planning base for intelligence. This target has not been
directly related to DOD's intelligence budget. The Secretary of Defense
has been given, in effect, a choice between a level of intelligence
spending consistent with the DCI's planning target and one which
matches his own view of overall DOD priorities and claims. Not surprisinglv,
Secretaries of Defense have tended to opt for the latter. The
result, therefore, of the two planning targets has made the DCI's
management mandate all the harder to fulfill.
4. Presidential Budget Decisionmaking
OMB's budget recommendations to the President, which culminate
OMB's annual budget review, have been the only comprehensive presentations
of United States' intelligence spending. These serve to highlight
major issues and are done by analvsts independent of any intelligence
agency. In contrast with the DCI's national intelligence budget
presentation, which excludes future year figures and does not have
the Secretary of Defense's recommended amounts, the OMB presentation
is complete and based upon each agency's final positions. Moreover,
the OMB presentation offers specific solutions to the President's
problem of restraining intelligence spending without degrading
intelligence operations.
These presentations and those related to the DCI's National Foreign
Intelligence budget are not shared with Congress. Therefore, except
for selective briefings bv the DCI and individual program managers,
Congress has not been informed of the major options at stake in the
President's budget.
68
5. Apportionment and Budget Execu,tion
OMB apportionment of appropriated funds is the source of much
of OMB's muscle in budget execution. By law (31 U.S.C. 665), federal
agencies cannot use appropriated funds in the absence of an OMB
apportionment. The apportionment can convey the funds in lump sum,
distributed by quarter, or by major program. OMB can impose setasides
and can call special hearings. With regard to intelligence programs,
however, OMB apportionment action is weak and fraQmented.
The only direct intelligence apportionment by OMB is to CIA-i.e.,
those earmarked amounts of the DOD appropriation which are transferred
from Defense to CIA under authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949. This apportionment is done in lump sum.
The rest of the intelligence budget is scattered among, and apportioned
by, some 20 DOD appropriations and an appropriation to State without
a distinction made for intelligence funds. Thus, OMB apportionment
is procedurally applied to less than 20 percent of the annual
national intelligence budget and to less than 10 percent of total intelligence
spending-.
Another weakness of OMB's ability to monitor budget execution is
its procedural blindness to advanres. renrogramming, and managment
of intelligence proprietary activities. Other weaknesses include:
-A large proportion of funds spent for CIA covert action projects
have come from Defense Department advances, under authority of
the Economy Act, and therefore are outside OMB apportionment.
-OMB does not rontinelv rereive notire of maior reprogramming of
CIA funds from activities shown and justified in the congressional
budget. The premium upon exploitation of unfore!'reen intelli.qence
opportunities puts a premium upon budgeting flexibilitv. Yet OMB
lacks a set of benchmarks to determine routinelv when CIA or other
intelligence agencies have substantially departed from the approved
budget.
H apnear" that more than half 0,i' ~ 11 larp'e-scale covert action projects
initiruted in the period 1961-76 did not come to OMB for review.
6. Absence of GAO Audits
The absence of GAO audits in the intellig-ence community affects
OMB's ability to monitor intelligence performance. In other federal
areas GAO audits often inclllde an evaluation of nerformance effectiveness
and economy, as well as complianre. OMB has a standing
arrangement to follow up with ag-encif>s on GAO audits. GAO audits
often provide launching points for OMB investigations or reinforce
OMB interests in broader problems. The absenre of such indenendent
and critical GAO reports in the intelligence field weakens both OMB
and congressional oversight.
7. OMB Representation on Excom 33
The process of planning and bndR'eting for overhead reconnaissance
is new enough to have escaped historic overlaps of jurisdiction afflict-
.. This EXCOM was abolished as a result of President Ford's recent Executive
Order. It is likelv that a simil'lr bodv will be re·established under the direction
of the new Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
69
ing the rest of the intelligence community. An Executive Committee
(EXCOM) was established to coordinate reconnaissance development
and planning, chaired by the DCI with the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for intelligence as the other mem!ber. 'While OMB was not a
member of EXCOM, it had a representative at EXCOM meetings.
EXCO~f decisions often ,"ere a compromise between the DCI and the
Department of Defense which mayor may not have represented the
most cost-effective solution. On occasion, the O~IB representative took
a role in defining options and insisting upon analysis of key points.
Here is one area of intelligence budgeting where OMB was actively
represented and therefore in a position to help the President identify
and resolve large issues.
8. Net Assessment of OMB Role in Intelligence Management
OMB's cyclical role in the budget process has the strengths and
weaknesses noted. Recognizing that OMB has statutory authority in
budget preparation and apportionment of funds, it is nevertheless
true that the key to OMB influence for management improvement is
the extent to which the Preident chooses to use 'and back OMB for
specific projects. OMB's role ought to be at its strongest in the intelligence
community, given the absence of public scrutiny and checks and
balances which operate in other federal program areas.
The Committee notes several trends in intelligence budgeting
and management which indicate an increasin~ need for strong and
objective OMB staff assitance to the President: first, intelligence
spending has increased significantly in the last decade. There are pressures
for further growth: second, asalreJady noted, intelligence is one
of the few "controllable" program areas of a federal budget; third,
the results of intelligence spemlin!! do not seem to be commensurate
with the increases in outlays. Inflation partly explains this. Since 1969
the real value of goods and services availahle to intelligence has been
reduced by an estimated twenty nercent. Inflation is not a full explanation,
however. Rigidities in the inte]]jp-ence budn-et protect each
manager's share, at the cost of nerpetnatinn- less nrodnf'tive or dunlicative
programs. The result is that ceilino-s on the intelligence budget
are permitted to drive out long-tl'rm improvemen.ts in economy and
effectiveness. Fonrth. there is a fragmentation of management authoritv
in the intelligence commnnity. Thf' DCI has hao sllccessive
nreside,ntial mannatf's to mnnfl o-f'. but has bee,n handicapped by the
laf'k of control of intelligence ool1ars.
In the fa('e of s11ch a f'hnllenp'e. the nnhlrr of fntnre presinential
mnnilntes to O"\fR ('onld. hp, imnortnnt to hnt11 excf'ntiye, ano cono-rpssjnnn
1 mopr"i O'ht. rn any fntnrp npterminflt;nn to stren,o-then O~'fR's
rolp. it will he ne,cessary to enlarge the staff of the six-pe,rson OMB
intellig-ence, unit.
.9. OllfR's Role as Affectpd 01/ the President's Recent Emeeutime Order
In his Rxecntive Orner of Febrnary 18. Presinent Ford. strengthened
OMR's role in inte11i~ence management in two principal ways:
First. OMB has been mn(lp an observpr to the Onpmtions AdviRory
Group, succesSOr to the, 40 Committee. This step will likely give OMB
70
a regular and timely scrutiny of all proposed covert action and other
sensitive intelligence projects. OMB's review will, therefore, no longer
be confined to a postdecision review of those projects requiring Contingency
Reserve Fund financing, Another likely effect is to strengthen
the substantive mandate of OMB's inquiry into CIA projects of all
kinds.
Second, the President has given the DCI a more direct influence
on the national intelligence budget by requiring that the new Committee
on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), which is headed by the DCI,
"shall control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National
Foreign Intelligence Program." Further, the President requires
that the CFI "shall, prior to submission to the Office of Management
and Budget, review, and amend as it deems appropriate, the budget
for the National Foreign Intelligence Program." [Emphasis added.]
The comb1ned effect of these two changes would appear to
strengthen OMB's review role. The directive appears to tackle the problem
of the weak and ill-timed impact of DCI review; it also puts OMB
in the posi60n of evaluating the analyses and proposals of both the
(JFI and the intelligence agencies on the way to the President.
The managerial flaws in the President's Executive Order are these:
1. The President's directive that "neither the DCI nor the CFI shall
have responsibility for tactical intelligence" exempts what may be one
of the largest and managerially vulnerable areas of intelligence from
national management and bpneficial trildeoffs. It gives Defense a dodge
that could defeat future DCI and OMB management efforts. By failing
to make the distinction between operatwnal control of intelligence
organic to military units and management overview (i.e., maintenance
of DCI/CFI data base, continuing overview, and occasional initiatives),
the President's directive may have undercut much of the DCII
O:MB managerial clout.S4
2. The silence of the Executive Order on ewecution of the intelligence
budget fails to mandate CFI and OMB apportionment of funds
appronriated for intelligence and GAO audit. The Order does give
the CFI authority to control "resource allocation." If this is interpreted
to mean a system of centralized CFI apportionment via OMB,
executive oversight of national intelligence programs could be
strengthened. The meaning of these words in the Executive Order
therefore deserves probing.
3. The actual authority of the DCI in the nE'W Committee on Foreiml
Jntelli!lence may not be'very strong in practice because the Executive
Order does nothing about the pattern of 1ntelligE'nce anpronrifl.tions.
Defenpe still receives eighty percent of the national intelligence
budp'et. The Order recognizes the Secretary of Defense as responsible
for directing, funding, and operating "NSA and national, defense, and
military intelligence and reconnaissauce activities as reouin>d." The
Secretary of Defense remains the "executive agent of the U.S. Government"
for signals intelligence. In view of these formidable DOD powers,
the CFI may be dominated by-or at least subject to the veto ofthe
Department of Defense.
.. See Cnnl!'ressional stUdy, Congressional Oversight of the Intelliegnce Budget,
Parts I and II.

Go to Next Page