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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS
VI. HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTRODUCTION 1
The current political climate and the mystique of secrecy surrounding
the intelligence profession have created misperceptions about the
Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA has come to be viewed as an
unfettered monolith, defining and determining its activities independent
of other elements of government and of the direction of American
foreign policy, This is 'a distortion. During its twenty-nine year history,
the Agency has been shaped by the course of international events~
by pressures from other government agencies, and by its own internal
norms. An exhaustive history of the CIA would demand an equally
exhaustive history of American foreign policy, the role of Congress
and the Executive, the other components of the intelligence community,
and an examination of the interaction among all these forces. Given
the constraints of time and the need to pursue other areas of research,
this was an impossible task for the Committee. Nonetheless, recogniz-:
ing the multiple influences that have contributed to the Agency's development,
the Committee has attempted to broadly outline the CIA's
organizational evolution.
An historical study of this nature serves two important purposes.
First, it provides a means of understanding the Agency's present structure,
Second, and more importantly, by analyzing the causal elements
in the CIA's patterns of activity, the study should illuminate the possibilities
for and the obstacles to future reform in the U.S. foreign
intelligence system.
The concept of a peacetime central intelligence organization had
its origins in World War II with the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS). Through the driving initiative and single-minded determination
of General William J. Donovan, sponsor and later first director
of OSS, the organization became the United States' first central intelligence
body. Although OSS was disbanded in 1945 and its runc-
1 This section is the summary version of a longer history to be published as an
Appendix to the Committee's Final Report. This section and the longer history
are based on four principal groups of sources. Since classification restrictions prevent
citing individual sources directly, the categories of sources are identified as
follows: (1) approximately seventy-five volumes from the series of internal CIA
histories, a rich if uneven collection of studies, which deal with individual components
of the CIA, the administrations of the Directors of Central Intelligence,
and specialized areas of intelligence analysis. The histories have been compiled
since the late 1940's and constitute a unique institutional memory. (2) approximately
sixty interviews with present and retired Agency employees. These interviews
were invaluable in providing depth of insight and understanding to the
organization. (3) special studies and reports conducted both within and outside
the Agency. They comprise reviews of functional areas and of the overall administration
of the CIA. (4) documents and statistics supplied to the Select Committee
by the CIA in response to specific requests. They include internal communications,
budgetary allocations, and information on grade levels and personnel
strengths.
(97)
98
tional components reassigned to other government agencies, the existence
of ass was important to the CIA. First, ass provided an organizational
precedent for the CIA; like ass, the CIA included clandes-
tine collootionand operations and inrelligence analysis. Second, many ass personnel later joined 'the CIA; in 1947, the year of the CIA's
establishment, approximately one-third 'Of the CIA's personnel were ass veterans. Third, ass suffered many of the same problems
later experienced by the CIA; both encountered resistance to the
execution of their mission from other government agencies, both experienced
the difficulty of having their intelligence analysis "heard,"
and both were characterized by the dominance of their clandestine operational
components.
Despite the similarities in the two organizations, ass was an instrument
of war, and Donovan and his organization were regarded by
many as a group of adventurers, more concerned with derring-do operations
than with intelligence analysis. The post-war organization
emerged from different circumstances from those that had fostered
the development of OSS.
Following the War, American policymakers conceived the idea
of a peacetime central intelligence organization with a specific purpose
in mind-to provide senior government officials with hIgh-quality,
objective intelligence analysis. At the time of the new agency's creation,
the military services and the State Department had thei.r own
independent intelligence capabilities. However, the value of their anal.
ysis was limited, since their respective policy objectives often skewed
their judgments. By reviewing and synthesizing the data collected by
the State Department and the military services, a centralized body was
intended to produce national intelligence estimates independent of
policy biases. "National" intelligence meant integrated interdepartmental
intelligence that exceeded the perspective and competence of
individual departments and that covered the broad aspects of national
policy. "Estimates" meant predictive judgments on the policies and
motives of foreign governments rather than descriptive summaries
of daily events or "current intelligence."
Although policymakers agreed on the necessity for national intelligence
estimates, they did not anticipate or consider the constraints
that would impede achievement of their objective. As a result, the CIA
assumed functions very different from its principal mission, becoming
a competing producer of current intelligence and a covert operational
instrument in the American cold war offensive.
The establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency coincided
with the emergence of the Soviet Union as the antagonist of the United
States. This was the single most important external factor in shaping
the Agency's development. Of equal importance were the internal organizational
arrangements that determined the patterns of influence
within the Agency. In exploring the Agency's complex development,
this summary will address the following questions: What institutional
and jurisdictional obstacles prevented the Agency from fulfilling its
original mission? To what extent have these obstacles persisted? In
what ways have U.S. foreign policy objectives influenced priorities in
the Agency's activities? What internal arrangements have determined
the Agency's emphases in intelligence production and in clandestine
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activities? vVnat accounts for the continued dominance of the clandestine
component ,vithin the Agency? How have individual Directors
of Central Intelligence defined their roles and what impact have their
definitions had on the direction of the Agency? Wpat impact did
technological developments have on the Agency and on the Agency's
relationship with the departmental intelligence services?
This study is not intended to catalogue the CIA's covert operations
but to present an analytical framework within which the CIA's policies
and practices may be understood. The following sedion summarizes
the Agency's evolution by dividing its history into four se.grnents:
1946-1952; 1953-1961; 1962-1970; and 1971-1975. Each perIod constitutes
a distinct phase in the Agency's development.
A. THE CEXTlL4.L I::-'"'"TELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY: 1946-1952
The years 1946 to 1952 were perhaps the most crucial in determining
the functions of the central intelligence organization. The
period marked a dramatic transformation in the mission, size and
structure of the new entity. In 1946 the Central Intelligence Group
(CIG), the CIA's predecessor, was conceived and established as an
intelligence coordinating body to minimize the duplicative efforts of
the Departments and to provide objective intelligence analysis to senior
policymakers. By 1952 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged
in independent intelligence production and covert operations. The CIG
was an extension of Executive departments; its personnel and budget
were allocated from State, Army and Navy. By 1952 the CIA had
developed into an independent government agency commanding manpower
and budget far exceeding anything originally imagined.
1. The Origins of the Central Intelligence (}1'OUp
As World War II ended, new patterns of decisionmaking emerged
within the United States Government. In the transition from war
to peace policymakers were redefining their organizational and informational
needs. As President, Franklin Roosevelt maintained a
highly personalized style of decisionmaking, relying primarily on informal
conversations with senior officials. Truman preferred to confer
with his cabinet officers as a collective body. This meant that officials
in t.he State, War and Navy departments were more consistent participants
in Presidential decisions than they had been under Roosevelt.
From October through December 1945, U.S. Government agencies
engaged in a series of policy debates about the necessity for and the
nature of the future United States intelligence capability.
Three major factors dominated the discussions. The first was the
issue of postwar reorganization of the Executive branch. The debate
focussed around the question of an independent Air Force and the
unification of the services under a Department of Defense. Discussion
of a separate central intelligence agency and its structure, authority,
and accountability was closely linked to the larger problem of defense
reorganization.
Second, it was clear from the outset ti;at no department was willing
to consider resigning its existing intelligence function and accompany100
ing personnel and budgetary allotments to a central agency. As
departmental representatives aired their preferences, maintenance of
independent capabilities was an accepted element in defining future
organization. Coordination, not centralization, was the maximum that
each Department was willing to concede.
Third, the functions under discussion were intelligence analysis and
the dissemination of intelligence. The shadow of the Pearl Harbor
disaster dominated policymakers' thinking about the purpose of a
central intelligence agency. They saw themselves rectifying the conditions
that allowed Pearl Harbor to happen-a fragmented militarybased
intelligence apparatus which in current terminology could not
distinguish "signals" from "noise," let alone make its assessments
available to senior officials.
Formal discussion on the subject of the central intelligence function
began in the fall of 1945. The Departments presented their separate
views, while two independent studies also examined the issue.
Inherent in all of the recommendations was the assumption that the
Departments would control the intelligence product. None advocated
giving a central independent group sole responsibility for collection
and analysis. All favored making the central intelligence body responsible
to the Departments themselves rather than to the President.
Each Department lobbied for an arrangement that would give itself
an advantage in intelligence coordination.
The Presidential directive establishing the Central Intelligence
Group reflected these preferences. The Departments retained autonomy
over their intelligence services, and the CIG's budget and staff were
to be drawn from the separate agencies. Issued on January 22, 1946,
the directive provided the CIG with a Direotor chosen by the President.
The CIG was responsible for coordination, planning, evaluation,
and dissemination of intelligence. The National Intelligence Authority
(NIA), a group comprised of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a personal representative
of the President served as the Group's supervisory body.
The Intelligence Advisory Board (lAB), which included the heads
of the militarv and civilian intelligence agencies, was an advisory
group to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
Through budget, personnel, and oversight, the Denartmpnts had
assured control over the Central Intelligence Group. The eIG was
a creature of departments that were determined to maintain independent
capabilities as well as their direct advisory relationship to
the President. In Januarv 1946 they succeeded in doing both; by retaining
autonomy over their intelligence operations, they established
the strong institutional claims that would persist for the lifetime
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. The Directors of Oentral Intelligence, 1946-1952
At a time when the new agency was developing its mission, the role
of its senior official was crucial. The Director of Central Intelligence
was responsible for representing the agency's interests to the Departments
and for pressing its jurisdictional claims. In large part the
strength of the agency relative to the Departments was dependent on
the stature that the DCI commanded as an individual. The four DCIs
101
from 1946 to 1952 ranged from providing only weak leadership to
finnly solidifying the new organization in the Washington bureaucracy.
Three of the four men were career military officers. Their appointments
were indicative of the degree of control the military services
managed to retain over the agency and the acceptance of the services'
primary role in the intelligence process.
Sidney Souers, the first DCI, served from January to June 1946.
Though a rear admiral, he was not a military careerist but a business
executive, who had spent his wartime service in naval intelligence.
He accepted the job with the understanding that he would remain
only long enough to establish an organization. Having participated
in the drafting of the directive which created CIG, Souers had a fixed
concept of the central intelligence function----one that did not challenge
the position of the departmental intelligence components.
Under Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, CIG moved beyond
production of coordinated intelligence to acquire a clandestine collection
capability as well as authority to conduct independent researcha'hd
analysis. Vandenberg was an aggressive, ambitious personality,
and as the nephew of Arthur Vandenberg, Chainnan of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, exerted considerable influence
on behalf of the CIG. In May 1947, Vandenberg was succeeded by
Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter. Two months after Hillenkoetter's
appointment, the CIG was reconstituted as the Central Intelligence
Agency. Hillenkoetter did not command the personal stature to successfully
assert the Agency's position relative to the Departments.
Nor did he possess the administrative ability to manage the Agency's
rapidly expanding functions.
It was precisely because of Hillenkoetter's weakness that General
Walter Bedell Smith was selected to succeed him in October 1950.
Nicknamed "the American Bulldog" by Winston Churchill, Smith was
a tough-minded, hard-driving, often intimidating career military officer
who effected major organizational changes during his tenure.
Smith's temperament and his senior military status made him one of
the strongest DCls in the Agency's history. He left the Agency in
February 1953.
3. The Evolution of the Oentrallntelligence Function, 1946-195'2
The CIG had been established to rectify the duplication among
the military intelligence services and to compensate for their biases.
The rather vaguely conceived notion was that a small staff in the CIG
would assemble and review the raw data collected by the departmental
intelligence services and produce objective national estimates for the
use of senior American policymakers. Although in theory the concept
was reasonable and derived from infonnational needs, institutional
resistance make implementation virtually impossible. The departmental
services jealously guarded both their information and what
they believed were their prerogatives in providing policy guidance to
the President. making the CIG's primary mission an exercise in futility.
Limited in the execution of its responsibility for coordinated estimates,
the CIG emerged within a year as a current intelligence
producer. generating its own summaries of daily events and thereby
competing with the Departments in the dissemination of information.
102
An important factor in the change was the CIG's authorization to
carry out independent research and analysis "not being presently performed"
by the other Departments. Under this authorization, granted
in the spring of 1946, the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) was
established. ORE's functions were manifold-the production of national
current intelligence, scientific, technical, and economic intelligence
as well as interagency coordination for national estimates.
With its own research and analysis capability, the CIG could carry
out an independent intelligence function without having to rely on the
departments for data. The change made the CIG an intelligence producer,
while still assuming the continuation of its role as a coordinator
for estimfltes.
Yet acquisition of a research and analysis role meant that independent
production would outstrip coordinated intelligence as a
primary mission. Fundamentally, it would be far easier to assimilate
and analyze data than it had been or would be to engage the Departments
in producing "coordinated" analysis.
The same 1946 directive which provided the CIG with an independent
research and analysis capability also granted the CIG a clandestine
collection capability. Since the end of the war, the remnant of OSS's
clandestine collection capability rested with the Strategic Services
Unit (SSU), then in the War Department. In the postwar dismantling
of OS8, 8SU was never intended to be more than a temporary body,
and in the spring of 1946 SSU's duties, responsibilities and personnel
were transferred to CIG along with SSU's seven overseas field stations
and communications and logistical apparatus.
The transfer resulted in the establishment of the Office of Special
Operations (OSO). OSO was responsible for espionage and counterespionage.
From the beginning the data collected by 080 was highly
compartmented. ORE did not draw on 080 for its raw infonnation.
Instead, overt collection was ORE's major source of data.
Since its creation CIG had had two overt collection components.
The Domestic Contact Service (DCS) solicited domestic sources, including
travellers and businessmen for foreign intelligence infonnation
on a voluntary basis. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) an element of OSS, monitored overseas broadcasts. These
components together with foreign publications provided ORE with
most of its basic infonnation.
The acquisition of a clandestine collection capability and authorization
to carry out independent research and analysis enlarged CIG's
personnel strength considerably. As of June 1946 the total CIG staff
numbered approximately 1,816. Proportionately, approximately onethird
were overseas with OSO. Of those stationed in Washington,
approximately half were devoted to administrative and support functions,
one-third were assigned to OSO, and the remainder to intelligence
production.
The passage of the National Security Act in July 1947 legislated
the changes in the Executive branch that had been under discussion
since 1945. The Act established an independent Air Force, provided
for coordination by a committee of service chiefs, the .Toint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), and a Secretary of Defense, and created the National
103
Security Council (NSC). The CIG became an independent department
and \yas renamed the Central Intelligence Agency.
Under the Act, the CIA's mission was only loosely defined, since
efforts to thrash out the CIA's duties in specific terms would have contributed
to the tension surrounding the unification of the services. The
four general tasks assigned to the Agency were (1) to advise the NBC
on matters related to national security; (2) to make recommendations
to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the
Departments; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide
for its appropriate dissemination and (4) "to perform such other
functions ... as the NSC will from time to time direct...."
The Act did not alter the functions of the CIG. Clandestine collection,
overt collection, production of national current intelligence and
interagency coordination for national estimates continued, and the personnel
and internal structure remained the same.
The Act affirmed the CIA's role in coordinating the intelligence
activities of the State Department and the military-determining
which activities would most appropriately and most efficiently be
conducted by which Departments to avoid duplication. In 1W7 the
Intelligence Advisory Committee (lAC) was created to serve as a
coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements 2 among
the Departments. Chaired by the DCI, the Committee included representatives
from the Departments of State, Army, Air Force, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Although the
DCI was to establish priorities for intelligence collection and analysis,
he did not have the budgetary or administrative authority to control
the departmental components. Moreover, no Department was willing
to compromise what it perceived as its own intelligence needs to
meet the collective needs of policymakers as defined by the DCI.
As the CIA evolved between 1947 and 1950, it never fulfilled its
estimates function bnt continued to expand its independent intelligence
production. In July 1949 an internal study conducted by a senior
ORE staff member stated that ORE's emphasis in production had
shifted "from the broad long-term type of problem to a narrowly
defined short-term type and from the predictive to the non-predictive
type." In 1949 ORE had eleven regular publications. Only one of
these addressed national intelligence questions and was published
with the concurrence or dissent of the other departments. Less than
one-tenth of ORE's products were serving the purpose for which the
CIG and the CIA had been created.
4. The Reorganization of the Intelligence Function, 1950
By the time Walter Bedell Smith became DCI in 1950, it was clear
that the CIA's record on the production of national intelligence estimates
had fallen far short of expectation. ORE had become a directionless
service organization, attempting to answer requirements levied
by all agencies related to all manner of subjects-politics, economics,
science, and technology. The wholesale growth had only confused
ORE's mission and led the organization into attempting analysis in
areas already adequately covered by other departments. Likewise, the
2 Requirements constitute the Informational objectives of inteIli~ence collection,
e.g., in 1947 determining Soviet troop strengths in Ea!ltern Europe.
104
obstacles posed by the Departments prevented the DCI and the
Agency from carrying out coordination of the activities of the departmental
intelligence components.
These problems appeared more stark following the outbreak of
the Korean War in June 1950. Officials in the Executive branch and
members of Congress criticized the Agency for its failure to predict
more specifically the timing of the North Korean invasion of South
Korea. Immediately after his appointment as DCI in October 1950,
Smith discovered that the Agency had no current coordinated estimate
of the situation in Korea. Under the pressure of war, demands
for information were proliferating, and it was apparent that ORE
could not meet those demands.
Smith embarked on a program of reorganization. His most significant
change was the creation of the Office of National Estimates
(ONE), whose sole purpose was to produce National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs). There were two components in ONE, a staff which
drafted the estimates and a senior body, known as the Board of National
Estimates, which reviewed the estimates, coordinated the judgments
with other agencies, and negotiated over their final form.
Smith also attempted to redefine the DCI's position in relation to
the departmental intelligence components. From 1947 to 1950 the DCls
had functioned at the mercy of the Departments rather than exercising
direction over them. By form'ally stating his position as the senior
member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Smith tried to assume
a degree of administrative control over departmental activities.
Nonetheless, the obstacles remained, and personal influence, rather
than recognized authority, determined the effectiveness of Smith and
his successors in interdepartmental relationships.
In January 1952, CIA's intelligence functions were grouped under
the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI), ORE was dissolved and
its personnel were reassigned. In addition to ONE, the DDI's
intelligence production components included: the Office of Research
and Reports (ORR), which handled economic and geographic intelligence;
the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which engaged in
basic scientific research; and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI),
which provided current political research. Collection of overt information
was the responsibility of the Office of Operations (00). The
Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) engaged in the dissemination
of intelligence as well as storage and retrieval of unevaluated
intelligence.
The immediate pressures for information generated by the Korean
War resulted in continued escalation in size and intelligence production.
Government-wide demands for the Agency to provide information
on Communist intentions in the Far East and around the world
justified the increases. By the end of 1953 DDI personnel numbered
3,338. Despite the sweeping changes, the fundamental problem of
duplication among the Agency and the Departments remained. DDI's
major effort was independent intelligence produotion rather than c0ordinated
national estimates.
5. Olandestine Operations
The concept of a central intelligence agency developed out of a
concern for the quality of intelligence analysis available to policy105
makers. The 1945 discussion which surrounded the creation of the CIG
focussed exclusively on the problem of production of coordinated intelligence
judgments. Two years later, debates on the CIA in both the
Congress and the Executive assumed only a collection and analysis
role for the newly constituted Agency. Yet, within one year of the
passage of the National Security Act, the CIA was charged with the
conduct of covert psychological, political, paramilitary, and economic
activities.3 The acquisition of this mission had a profound impact on
the direction of the Agency and on its relative stature within the
government.
The suggestion for the initiation of covert operations did not originate
in the CIA, but with senior U.S. officials, among them Secretary
of vVar James Patterson, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary
of State George Marshall, and George Kennan, Director of the
State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Between 1946 and 1948
policymakers proceeded from a discussion of the possibility of initiating
covert psychological operations to the establishment of an organization
to conduct a full range of covert activities. The decisions were
gradual but consistent, spurred on by the growing concern over Soviet
intentions.
By late 1946 cabinet officials were preoccupied with the Soviet
threat, and over the next year their fears intensIfied. For U.S. policymakers,
international events seemed to be a sequence of Soviet incursions.
In March 1946 the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its troops
from the Iranian province of Azerbaijan; two months later civil war
involving Communist rebel forces erupted in Greece. In 1947 Communists
assumed power in Poland, Hungary and Rumania, and in the
Philippines the government was under attack by the Hukbalahaps, a
communist-led guerrilla group. In February 1948 Communists staged
a successful coup in Czechoslovakia. At the same time France and
Italy were beleaguered by a wave of Communist-inspired strikes. Policymakers
could, and did, look at these developments as evidence of
the need for the United States to respond.
In March 1948 near hysteria gripped the U.S. Government with
the so-called "war scare." The crisis was precipitated by a cable from
General Lucius Clay, Commander in Chief, European Command, to
Lt. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, Army
General Staff, in which Clay said, "1 have felt a subtle change in
Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling
that it [war] may come with dramatic suddenness." The war scare
launched a series of interdepartmental intelligence estimates on the
likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe and the United
States. Although the estimates concluded that there was no evidence
the U.S.S.R. would start a war, Clay's cable had articulated the degree
of suspicion and outright fear of the Soviet Union that was shared
by policymakers in 1948.
For U.S. officials, the perception of the Soviet Union as a global
threat demanded new modes of conduct in foreign policy to supple-
• Psychological operations were primarily media-related R<,tivities. including
unattributed publications, forgeries, and subsidi~tion of pUblications; political
action involved exploitation of dispossessed persons and defectors, and support to
political parties; paramilitary activities included support to guerrillas and sabotage;
economic activities consisted of monetary and fiscal operations.
207-932 0 - 76 - 8
106
ment the traditional alternatives of diplomacy and war. Massive
economic aid represented one new method of achieving U.S. foreign
policy objectives. In 1947 the United States had embarked on an unprecedented
economic assistance program to Europe with the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. By insuring economic stability, U.S.
officials hoped to limit Soviet encroachments. Covert operations represented
another, more activist departure in the conduct of U.S. peacetime
foreign policy. Covert action was an option that was something
more than diplomacy but still short of war. As such, it held the
promise of frustrating Soviet ambitions without provoking open
conflict.
The organizational arrangements for the conduct of covert operations
reflected both the concept of covert action as defined by U.S. officials
and the perception of the CIA as an institution. Both the
activities and the institution were regarded as extensions of the State
Department and the military services. Covert action was to serve a
support function to foreign and military policy preferences, and the
CIA was to provide the vehicle for the execution of those preferences.
In June 1948, a CIA component, the Office of Special Projects, soon
renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), was established
for the execution of covert operations. The specific activities included
psychological warfare, political warfare, economic warfare, and I?aramilitary
activities. OPC's budget and personnel were approprIated
within CIA allocations, but the DCI had no authority in determining
OPC's activities. Responsibility for the direction of OPC rested with
the Office's director, appointed by the Secretary of State. Policy guidanee-
decisions on the need for specific activities-came to the OPC
director from State and Defense, bypassing the DCI. .
In recommending the development of a covert action capability in
1948, policymakers intended to make available a small contingency
force with appropriate funding' that could mount operations on a limited
basis. Senior officials did not plan to develop large-scale continuing
activities. Instead, they hoped to establish a small capability
that could be activated when and where the need occurred-at their
discretion.
6. The Office of Policy Ooordination, 19.48-19512
OPC developed into a far different organization from that envisioned
by Forrestal, Marshall, and Kennan. By 1952, when it merged
with the Agency's clandestine collection component, the Office of Special
Operations. OPC had innumerable activities worldwide, and it
had achieved the institutional independence that was unimaginable
at the time of its inception.
The outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 had a significant
effect on OPC. Following the North Korean invasion of South
Korea, the State Department as well a.', t4e .Joint Chiefs of Staff requested
the initiation of paramilitary activities in Korea and China.
OPC's participation in the war effort contributed to its transformation
from an organization that was to provide the capability for a
limited number of ad hoc operations to an organization that conducted
continuing, ongoing activities on a massive scale. In concept, manpower,
budget, and scope of activities, OPC simply skyrocketed. The
comparatiye figures for 1949 and 1952 are staggering. In 1949 ope's
107
total personnel strength was 302; in 1952 it was 2,812 plus 3,142 overseas
contract personnel. In 1949 OPC's budget figure was $4,700,000;
in 1952 it was $82,000,000. In 1949 OPC had personnel assigned to
seven overseas stations; in 1952 OPC had personnel at forty-seven
stations.4
Apart from the impetus provided by the Korean ",Var several other
factors converged to alter the nature and scale of OPC's activities.
First, policy direction took the form of condoning and fostering activity
without providing scrutiny and control. Officials throughout the
government regarded the Soviet Union as an aggressive force, and
OPC's activities were initiated and justified on the basis of this shared
perception. The series of NSC directives which authorized covert operations
laid out broad objectives and stated in bold terms the necessity
for meeting the Soviet challenge head on. After the first 1948
directive authorizing covert action, subsequent directives in 1950 and
1951 called for an intensification of these activities without establishin,
g- firm guidelines for approval. State and Defense guidance to oPC
quickly became very general, couched in terms of overall goals rather
than specific activities. This allowed OPC maximum latitude for the
initiation of activities or "projects," the OPC term.
Second, OPC operations had to meet the very different policy needs
of the State and Defense Departments. The State Department encouraged
political action and propaganda activities to support its diplomatic
objectives, while the Defense Department requested paramilitary
activities to support the Korean ",Var effort and to counter Communist-
associated guerrillas. These distinct missions required oPC to
develop and maintain different capabilities, including manpower and
support material.
The third factor contributing to OPC's expansion was the organizational
arrangements that created an internal demand for projects.
To correlate the requirements of State and Defense with its operations,
OPC adopted a project system rather than a programmed financial
system. This meant that OPC activities were organized around projects
rather than general programs or policy objectives and that OPC
budgeted in terms of anticipated numbers of projects. The project
system had important internal effects. An individual within OPC
judged his own performance, and was judged by others, on the importance
and number of projects he initiated and managed. The result
was competition among individuals and among the ope divisions to
generate the maximum number of projects. Projects remained the
fundamental units around which covert activities were organized, and
two generations of Agency personnel have been conditioned by this
system.
7. opclnteqrationand the OPC-OSO Merqer
The creation of OPC and its ambiguous relationship to the Agency
precipitated two major administrative problems: the Del's relationship
to OPC, and antagonism between OPC and the Agency's clandestine
collection component, the Office of Special Operations. DCI Walter
Bedell Smith acted to 'rectify both problems.
• Congress in 1949 enacted legislation exempting the DC! from the necessity
of accounting for specific disbursements.
108
As OPC continued to grow, Smith's predecessor, Admiral Hillenkoetter,
resented the fact that he had no management authority over
OPC, although its budget and personnel were being allocated through
the CIA. Hillenkoetter's clashes with the State and Defense Departments
as well as with Frank G. Wisner, the Director of OPC, were
frequent. Less than a week after taking office, Smith announced that as
DCI he would assume administrative control of OPC and that State
and Defense would channel their policy guidance through him rather
than through Wisner. On October 12, 1950, the representatives of
State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally accepted the
change. The ease with which the shift occurred was primarily a result
of Smith's own position of influence with the Departments.
OPC's anomalous position in the Agency revealed the difficulty of
maintaining two separate organizations for the execution of varying
but overlapping clandestine activities. The close "tradecraft" relationship
between clandestine collection and covert action, and the
frequent necessity for one to support the other was totally distorted
with the separation of functions in OSO and OPC. Organizational
rivalry rather than interchange dominated the relationship between
the two components.
On the operating level the conflicts were vicious. Each component
had representatives conducting separate operations at each overseas
station. Given the related missions of the two, OPC and OSO personnel
were often competing for the same agents and, not infrequently, attempting
to wrest agents from each other. In 1952 the outright hostility
between the two organizations in Bangkok required the direct intervention
of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, Lyman Kirkpatrick.
There an important local official was closely tied to OPC, and
OSO was trying to lure him into its employ.
Between 1950 and 1952 Smith took several interim steps to encourage
coordination between the two components. In August 1952 OSO
lind ope were merged into the Directorate for Plans (DDP).
The lines between the OSO "collectors" and the OPC "operators"
blurred rapidly, particularly in the field, where individuals were called
upon to perform both functions.
The merger did not result in the dominance of one group over
another; it resulted in the maximum development of clandestine
operations over clandestine collection. For peorle in the field, rewards
came more quickly through visible operationa accomplishments than
through the silent, long-term development of agents required for clandestine
collection. In the words of one former high-ranking DDP
official, "Collection is the hardest thing of all; it's much easier to
plant an article in a local newspaper."
To consolidate the management functions required for the burgeoning
organization, Smith created the Directorate for Arlministration
(DDA). From the outset, much of the DDA's effort supported
field activities. The Directorate was responsible for personnel, budget,
security, and medical services Agency-wide. However, one quarter of
DDA's total personnel strength was assigned to logistical support for
overseas operations.
109
By 1953 the Agency had achieved the basic structure and scale it
retained for the next twenty years. The Korean War, United States
foreign policy objectives, and the Agency's internal organizational
arrangements had combined to produce an enormous impetus for
growth. The CIA was six times the size it had been in 1947.
Three Directorates had been established. The patterns of activity
within each Directorate and the Directorates' relationships to one
another had developed. The DDP commanded the major share of the
Agency's budget, personnel, and resources; in 1952 clandestine collection
and covert action accounted for 74 percent of the Agency's
total budget;5 its personnel constituted 60 percent of the CIA's personnel
strength. While production rather than coordination dominated
the DDI, operational activities rather than collection dominated the
DDP. The DDI and the DDP emerged at different times out of disparate
policy needs. They were, in effect, separate organizations.
These fundamental distinctions and emphases were reinforced in the
next decade.
B. THE DULLES ERA: 1953-1961
Allen W. Dulles' impact on the Central Intelligence Agency was
perhaps greater than that of any other single individual. The source
of his influence extended well beyond his personal qualities and inclinations.
The composition of the United States Government, international
events, and senior policymakers' perception of the role the
Agency could play in United States foreign policy converged to make
Dulles'position and that of the Agency unique in the years 1953 to
1961.
The election of 1952 brought Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency.
Eisenhower had been elected on a strident anti-Communist platform,
advocating 'an aggressive worldwide stance against the Soviet
Union to replace what he described as the Truman Administration's
passive policy of containment. Eisenhower cited the Communist victory
in China, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, and the
Korean War as evidence of the passivity which had prevailed in the
United States Government following World War II. He was equally
passionate in his call for an elimination of government corruption and
for removal of Communist sympathizers from public office.
This was not simply election rhetoric. The extent to which the
urgency of the Communist threat had become a shared perception
is difficult to appreciate. By the close of the Korean War, a broad
consensus had developed about the nature of Soviet ambitions and
the need for the United States to respond. The earlier fear of United
States policymakers that the Soviet Union would provoke World
War III had subsided. Gradually, the Soviet Union was perceived
as posing a worldwide political threat. In the minds of government
officials, members of the press, and the informed public, the Soviets
would try to achieve their purposes by the penetration and subversion
of governments all over the world. The accepted role of the United
States was to prevent that expansion.
• This did not include DDA bUdgetary allocations in support of DDP operations.
110
Washington policymakers regarded the Central Intdligence Agency
as a primary means of defense against Communism. By 1953, the
Agency was an established element of government. Its contributions
in the areas of political action and paramilitary warfare were recognized
and respected. It alone could perform many of the kinds of
activities seemingly required to meet the Soviet threat. For senior
officials, covert operations had become a vital element in the pursuit
of United States foreign policy objeetives.
At this time, the CIA attracted some of the most able lawyers,
academicians, and young, committed activists in the country. They
brought with them professional associations and friendships which
extended to the senior levels of government. The fact that Agency
employees often shared similar wartime experiences, comparable social
backgrounds, ancI then c-omph>mentary positions with other government
officials, contributed significantly to the legitimacy of and confidence
in the Agency as an instnlment of government. Moreover,
these informal ties created a tac-it understanding among policymakers
about the role and direction of the Agency. At the working level,
these contacts were facilitated by the Agency's location in downtown
·Washington. Housed in a sprawling set of buildings in the center of
the city, Agency personnel could easily meet ancI talk with State
and Defense officials throughout the day. The CIA's physical presence
in the city gave it the advantage of seeming an integral part of, rather
than a separate element of, the i!overnment.
A crucial factor in securing the Agency's place within the government
during this period was the fact that the Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, and the DCI were brothers. Whatever the formal relationships
among the State Department, the NSC, and the Agency,
they were superseded by the personal and working association between
the brothers. Most importantly, both had the absolute confidence of
President Eisenhower. In the day-to-day formulation of policy, these
relationships were crucial to the Executive's support for the Agency,
and more specificallv, for Allen Dulles personally in the definition of
his own role and that of the Agency.
Noone was more convinced that the Allency could make a special
contribution to the advancement of United States foreign policy goals
than Allen Dulles. Dulles came to the post of DCI in February 1953
with an extensive backa-rolmd in foreign affairs and foreign espionage,
dating back to World War 1. By the time of his appontment,
his view of the CIA had been firmly established. Dulles' role
as DCI was rooted in his wartime experience with OSS. His interests
and expertise lay wi'th the operational aspects of intelligence, and his
fascination with the details of operations persisted.
Perhaps the most important effect of Dulles' absorption with operations
was the impact it had on the Agency's relationship to the intelligrnce
"commnnity"-the intelligence components in State and Defense.
As DCI Dulles did not assrrt his positional' that of the Agency
in attempting to coordinate departmental intelligence activities.
This, aftE'r alL had been a maior purpose for the Agency's creation.
Dulles' failure in this area constituted a lost opportunity. By the mid111
dIe of the decade the Agency was in the forefront of technological
innovation and had developed a strong record on military estimates.
Conceivably, Dulles could have used these advances as bureaucratic
leverage in exerting some control over the community. He did not.
Much of the reason was a matter of personal temperament. Jolly,
gregarious. and extroverted in the extreme, Dulles disliked and avoided
confrontations at every level. In doing so, he failed to provide even
minimal direction over the departmental intelligence components at
a time when intelligence capabilities were undergoing dramatic
changes.
1. The Clandestine Service 5a
It is both easy to exaggerate and difficult to appreciate the place
which the Clandestine Service secured in the CIA during the Dulles
administration and, to a large extent, retained thereafter. The number
and extent of the activities undertaken are far less important than the
impact which those activities had on the Agency's institutional identity-
the way people within the DDP, the DDI, and the DDA perceived
the Agency's primary mission, and the way policymakers regarded
its contribution to the process of government.
Covert action was at the core of this perception. The importance of
covert action to the internal and external evaluation of the Agency
was in large part derived from the fact that only the CIA could and
did perform this function. Moreover, in the international environment
of the 1950's Agency operations were regarded as an essential
contribution to the attainment of United States foreign policy objectives.
Although by 1954 the Soviet threat was redefined from military
to political terms, the intensity of the conflict did not diminish. Political
action, sabotage, support to democratic governments, counterintellig-
ence-all this the Clandestine Service could provide.
The Agency also benefited from what were regarded as its operational
"successes" in this period. In 1953 and 1954 two of the Agency's
boldest, most spectacular covert operations took place-the overthrow
of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and the coup against
President .Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala. Both were quick
and bloodless operations that removed two allegedly Communist-associated
leaders from power and replaced them with pro-Western offi~
ials. Out of these early achievements both the Agency and Washington
policymakers acquired a sense of confidence in the CIA's capacity for
operational snccess.
The DDP's major expansion in overseas stations and in the establishment
of an infrastruture for clandestine activities had taken place
between 1950 and 1952. In the decade of the 1950's the existing structure
made possible the development of continuous foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, political action, and propaganda activities.
Policymakers' perception of covert action as the CIA's primary
mission was an accnrate reflection of the Agency's internal dynamics.
Between 195~ and 1962. the Clandestine Service occupied a preeminent
position in the CIA. First, it had the consistent attention of the DCI.
"a The term "ClandeRtine Service" is used synonymously with the Deputy
Directorate for Plans. Although Clandestine Service has never been an official
de»ignation, it is common usage in the intelligence community and appears as
such in the Select Committee's hearings.
112
Second, the DDP commanded the major portion of resources in the
Agency. Between 1953 and 1961 clandestine collection and covert action
absorbed an average of 54 percent of the Agency's total annual
budget." Althoug-h this represented a reduction from the period of the
Korean "War, DDP allocations still constituted the majority of the
Agency's expenditures. Likewise, from 1953 to 1961, the DDP g-ained
nearly 2,000 personnel. On its formal table of org-anization, the DDP
registered an increase of only 1,000. However, increases of nearly 1,000
in the logistics and communications components of the DDA represented
growth in support to Clandestine Service operations.
Within the Agency the DDP was a Directorate apart. As the number
of covert action projects increased, elaborate requirements for secrecy
developed around operational activities. The DDP's self-imposed security
requirements left it exempt from many of the Agency's procedures
of accountability. Internally, the DDP became a highlv compartmented
structure, where information was limited to small groups of
individuals based primarily on a "need to know" principle.
The norms and position of the Clandestine Service had important
repercussions on the execution of the CIA's intelligence mission in the
1953 to 1962 period. Theoretically, the data collected by the DDP field
officers should have served as a major source for DDI analysis. However,
strict compartmentation prevented open contact between DDP
personnel and DDI analysts. Despite efforts in the 1960's to break down
the barriers between the Directorates, the lack of real interchange and
interdependence persisted.
In sum, the DDP's preeminent position during the period was a
function of several factors, including policymakers' perception of the
Agency primarily in operational terms, the proportion of resources
which the Clandestine Service absorbed, and the time and attention
which the DCI devoted to operations. These patterns solidified under
Dulles and in large part account for the DDP's continued primacy
within the Agency.
2. Intelligence Production
In the deoade of the 1950's the CIA was the major contributor to
technological advances in intelligence collection. At the same time
DDI analysts were responsible for methodological innovations in
strategic assessments. Despite these achievements, CIA's intelligence
was not serving the purpose for which the organization had been
creat~d-informingand influencing policymaking.
By 1960 the Agency had achieved significant "advances in its strategic
intelligence capability. The development of overhead reconnaissance,
beginning with the U-2aircraft and growing in scale and
sophistication with follow-on systems, generated information in
greater quantity and accuracy than had ever 'before been contemplated.
Basic data on the Soviet Union beyond the reach of human
collection, such as railroad routes. construction sites, and industrial
concentrations became readily available.
Analysts in the Office of 'National Estimates began reevaluating
assumptions regarding Soviet strategic capabilities. This reevaluation
resulted in reduced estimates of Soviet missile deployments at a time
when the armed services and members of Congress were publicly
• This did not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDP operations.
113
proclaiming a "missile gap" between the United States and the Soviet
Uninn.
A final element contributed to the Agency's estimative capltbility:
material supplied by Oleg Penkovsky. Well-placed in Soviet military
circles, Penkovsky turned over a number of classified documents relating
to Soviet strategic planning and capabilities. These three factorstechnological
breakthrough, analytic innovation, and the single most
valuable Soviet agent in history--eonverged to make the Agency the
most reliable source of intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities in
the government.
Yet the entrenched position of the military services and the Agency's
own limited charter in the area of military analysis made it difficult
for the Agency to challenge openly the intelligence estimates of the
services. The situation was exacerbated by Dulles' own disposition. As
DCI he did not associate himself in the first instance with intelligence
production and did not 'assume an advocacy role in extending the
Agency's claims to military intelligence.
Strategic intelligence, although a significant portion of the DDT's
production effort, constituted a particular problem. A broader problem
involved the overall impact of intelligence on policy. The CIA
had been conceived to provide high-quality national intelligence estimates
to policymakers. However, the communication and exchange
necessary for analysts to calibrate, anticipate and respond to policymakers'
needs never really developed.
The size of the Directorate for Intelligence constituted a major obstacle
to the attainment of consistent interchange between analysts and
their clients. In 1955 there were 466 analysts in ORR, 217 in OCI, and
207 in OS1. The process of drafting, ·reviewing and editing intelligence
publications involved large numbers of individuals each of
whom felt responsible for and entitled to make a contribution to the
final product. Yet without access to policymakers, analysts did not
have an ongoing accurate notion of how the form and su'bstance of the
intelligence product might best serve the needs of senior officials. The
product itself-as defined and arbitrated among DDI analysts-became
the end rather than the satisfaction of specific policy needs.
The establishment of the Office of National Estimates was an attempt
to insure direct interaction between senior level officials and the
Agency. However, by the mid-1950's even its National Intelligence
Estimates showed signs of being submerged in the secoTld-level paper
traffic that was engulfing the intelligence community. Between 1955
and 1956 a senior staff member in ONE surveyed the NIEs' readership
by contacting executive assistants and special assistants of the
President and cabinet officers, asking if the NIEs were actually placed
on their superiors' desks. The survey revealed that senior policymakers
were not reading the NIEs. Instead, second and third-level officials
used the estimates for background information in briefing senior
officials. The failure of the NIEs to serve their fundamental purpose
for senior officials was indicative of the overall failure of intelligence
to influence policy.
/'1. The Oommunity OoordinationProblem
Dulles' neglect of the community management or coordination aspect
of his role as DCI was apparent to all who knew and worked with
114
him. His reluctance to assume an aggressive role in dealing with the
military on the issue of military estimates was closely tied to his lack
of initiative in communitv-related matt~rs. Unlike Bedell Smith'before
him and John McCone a'fter him, Dulles was reluctant to take on the
military. .
The development of the U-2 and follow-on systems had an enormous
impact on intelligence-collection capabilities and on the Agency's relative
standing in the intelligence community. Specifically, it marked
the Agency's emergence as the intelligence community's leader in the
area of overhead reconnaissance.
At a time when the CIA was reaping the benefits of overhead reconnaissance
and when the DDI's estimates on Soviet missiles were taking
issue with the services' judgments, Dulles could have been far more
aggressive in asserting the Agency's position in the intelligence community
and in advancing his own role as coordinator.
As the community became larger and as technical systems came to
require very large budgetary allocations, the institutional obstacles
to interdepartmental coordination increased. By not acting on the opportunity
he had, Dulles allowed departmental procedures, specifically
those in the military's technical collection programs, to become more
entrenched and routinized, making later attempts at coordination more
difficult.
The coordination problem did not go unnoticed during Dulles'
term, and there were several attempts within Congress and the
Executive to direct Dulles' attention to the DCI's community responsibility.
The efforts were unsuccessful both because of Dulles' personal
disposition and because of the inherent weakness of the mechanisms
established to strengthen the DCI's position in the community.
In January 1956, President Eisenhower created the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA).
In May, 1961 it was renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB). Composed of retired senior government
officials and members of the professions, the Board was to provide
the President with advice on intelligence matters. As a deliberative
body it had no authority over either the DCI or the community. Thus,
the Board had little impact on the administration of the CIA or on
the other intelligence services. The Board did identify the imbalance
in Dulles' role as DCI, and in December 1956 and again in December
1958 it recommended the appointment of a chief of staff for the DCI to
handle the Agency's internal administration. In 1960, the PBCFIA
suggested the possibility of separating the DCI from the Agency
to serve as the President's intelligence advisor and to coordinate
community activities. Nothing resulted from these recommendations.
In 1957, the Board recommended the merger of the United States
Communications Intelligence Board with the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.7 This proposal was intended to strengthen the DCI's
7 The USCIB was establiiShed in 1946 to advise and make recommendations
on communications intelligence to the Secretary of Defense. USOIB's membership
included the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Director of the FBI, and
representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. USCIB votes were
weighted. Representatives of State, Deff'nse, thf' FRI, and CTA each had two
votes: other members had one. Although the DOl sat on the Committee, he had
no vote.
115
authority, and it resulted in the creation in the following year of the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB) with the DCI as chairman.
Like the lAC, howm'er, USIB was little more than a super-structure.
It had no budgetary authority; nor did it provide the DCI with any
direct control over the components of the intelligence community.
The separate elements of the community continued to function under
the impetus of their own internal drives and mission definitions.
Essentially, the problem that existed at the time of the creation of
the CIG remained.
From 1953 to 19tH a single Presidential administration and consistent
American policy objectives which had wide public and governmental
support contributed to a period of stability in the Agency's
history. The internal patterns that had begun to emerge at the close
of the Korean War solidified. The problems remained much the same.
The inherent institutional obstacles to management of the community's
intelligence activities combined with Dulles' failure to assert
the Agency's and the DCI's coordination roles allowed the perpetuation
of a fragmented government-wide intelligence effort. The CIA's
own intelligence production, though distinguished by advances in
technical collection and in analysis, had not achieved the consistent
policy support role that the Agency's creation had intended to provide.
Dulles' marked orientation toward clandestine activities, his brother's
position as Secretary of State, and cold war tensions combined to
maximize the Agency's operational capability. In terms of policymakers'
reliance on the CIA, allocation of resources, and the attention of
the Agency's leadership, clandestine activities had overtaken intelligence
analysis as the CIA's primary mission.
C. CHAlIWE AND ROUTINIZATION: 1961-1970
In 1961 cold war attitudes continued to dominate the foreign policy
assumptions of United States policymakers. In the early part of the
decade American confidence and conviction were manifested in an expansive
foreign policy that included the abortive Bay of Pigs landing,
a dramatic confrontation with the Soviet Union over the installation
of Soviet missiles in Cuba, increased economic assistance to underdeveloped
countries in Latin America and Africa, and rapidly escalating
military activities in Southeast Asia.
Although the American presence in Vietnam symbolized U.S. adherence
to the strictures of the Cold War, perceptions of the Soviet
Union began to change by the middle of the decade. The concept of an
international monolith broke down as differences between the U.S.S.R.
and China emerged. Moreover, the strategic arms competition assumed
increased importance in relations between the two countries.
The CIA was drawn into each major development in United States
policy. As in the previous decade, operations dominated policymakers'
perceptions of the Agency's role. The United States' interventionist
policy fostered the CIA's utilization of its existing capabilities as well
as the development of paramilitary capabilities in support of Americlln
counterinsurgency and military programs. At the same time the
Agency's organizational arrangements continued to create an independent
dynamic for operations.
116
The most significant development for the Agency in this period
was the impact of technological capabilities on intelligence production.
These advances resulted in internal changes and forced increased
attention to coordination of the intelligence community. The costs,
quality of intelligence and competition for deployment generated by
technical collection systems necessitated a working relationship among
the departmental intelligence components to replace the undirected
evolution that had marked the previous decade. Despite the Agency's
internal adjustments and attempts to effect better management in
the community, the CIA's fundamental srtucture, personnel, and incentives
remained rooted in the early 1950's.
1. The Directors of Oentral Intelligence, 1961-1970
John A. McCone came to the Central Intelligence Agency as an
outsider in November 1961. His background had been in private industry,
where he had distinguished himself as a corporate manager. He
also held several government posts, including Under Secretary of the
Air Force and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. McCone
brought a quick, sharp intellect to his job as DCI, and his contribution
lay in attempting to assert his role and that of the Agency in coordinating
intelligence activities among the Departments. Much of his
strength in the intelligence community derived from the fact that
he was known to have ready access to President Kennedy. McCone
resigned from the Agency in April 1965, precisely because Lyndon
Johnson had not accorded him similar stature.
Admiral William F. Raborn served as DCI for only a year. He
left in June 1966, and his impact on the Agency was minimal.
Richard M. Helms came to the position of DCI after twenty years
in the Clandestine Service. Just as Allen Dulles had identified himself
with the intelligence profession, Helms identified himself with
the Agency as an institution. Having served in a succession of senior
positions, Helms was a first-generation product of the Agency, and
he commanded the personal and professional respect of his contemporaries.
Helms' orientation remained on the operations side, and
he did not actively pursue the DCI's role as a coordinator of intelligence
activities in the community.
'2. The E,ffort at Management Reform
The Bay of Pigs fiasco had a major impact on President Kennedy's
thinking about the intelligence community. He felt he had been
poorly served by the experts and sought to establish procedures that
would better insure his own acquisition of intelligence. In short, Kennedy
defined a need for a senior intelligence officer and in so doing assured
John McCone an influential position in policymaking. Kennedy's
definition of the DCI's position emphasized two roles: coordinator
for the community, and principal intelligence adviser to the
President. At the same time, Kennedy directed McCone to delegate
the internal management of the Agency to a deputy director. Although
McCone agreed with Kennedy's concept of the DCI's job and vigorously
pursued the objectives, the results were uneven.
To carry out the management function in the Agency, McCone
created a senior staff. The principal officer was the Executive DirectorComptroller,
who was to assume responsibility for day-to-day ad117
ministraiton.8 The arrangement did not free the DCI from continuing
involvement in Agency-'related matters, particularly those concerning
the Clandestine Service. The nature of clandestine operations, the fact
that they involved and continue to involve people in sensitive, complicated
situations, demanded that the Agency's senior officer assume
responsibility for decisions. A former member of McCone's staff estimates
that despite the DCI's community orientation, he spent 90 percent
of his total time on issues related to clandestine operations.
The establishment of the office of National Intelligence Programs
Evaluation (NIPE) in 1963 was the first major effort by a DCI to
insure consistent contact and coordination with the community. Yet,
frem the outset McCone accepted the limitations on his authority;
although Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara agreed to provide
him WIth access to the Defense Department budget (which still constitutes
80 percent of the intelligence community's overall budget), McCone
could not direct or control the intelligence components of the
other departments. The NIPE staff directed most of its attention to
sorting out intelligence requirements through USIB and attempting to
develop a national inventory for the community, including budget, personnel
and materials. Remarkably, this had never before been done.
The most pressing problem for the community was the adjustment to
the impact of technical collection capabilities. The large budgetary
resources involved, and the value of the data generated by overhead
reconnaissance systems precipitated a major bureaucratic battle over
their administration and control. From 1963 to 1965, much of McCone's
and the senior NIPE staff officer's community efforts were directed
toward working out an agreement with the Air Force on development,
production, and deployment of overhead reconnaissance systems.
In 1961 the Agency and the Air Force had established a working
relationship for overhead reconnaissance systems through a central administrative
office, whose director reported to the Secretary of Defense
but accepted intelligence requirements through USIB. By informal
agreement, the Air Force provided launchers, bases, and recovery capability
for reconnaissance systems, while the Agency was responsible
for research, development, contracting, and security. Essentially, the
agreement allowed the Agency to decide which systems would be deployed,
and the Air Force challenged the CIA's jurisdiction.
A primary mission was at stake in these negotiations, and the
struggle was fierce on both sides. Control by one agency or another did
not involve only budgets and manpower. Since the Air Force and CIA
missions were very different, a decision would affect the nature of the
reconnaissance program itself-tactical or national intelligence priorities,
the frequency and location of overflights, and the use of data.
The agreement that emerged in 1965 attempted to 'balance the interests
of both the Air Force and the CIA. A three-person Executive
Committee (EXCOM) for the administration of overhead reconnaissance
was e"tablished. Its members included the DCI, an Assistant Secretary
of Defense, and the President's Scientific Advisor. The EX
COM reported to the Secretary of Defense, who was assigned primary
administrative authority for overhead reconnaissance systems. The
• Other chanll'es included placing the <kneral Counsel's office. the Audit StafJ',
and the Office ot Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower directly under the DCI.
118
arrangement recognized the Del's authority as head of the community
to establish collection requirements in consult'ation with USIB;
it also gave him responsibility for pI'Oressingand utilizing dat1a generated
by overhead reconnaissance. In the event that hE' did not agree
with a decision maoe by the Secretary of Defense, the DCI,,,as given
thfl right to appeal to the Presioent.
The agreement represented a compromise between Air Force and
CIA claims 'and provided substantive recognition of the Del's national
intelligen('e responsibilitv. As a strurture for oE'cisionmaking,
it has worked well. Ho,,-ever, it has not rectified the inherent competition
over technical collection systems that has come to motivate the
intelligence process. The development of these systems has created
intE'nse rivalry. principally between the Air Force ana the Agency,
over program oeployments. ",Vith so much money 'ano manpower at
stake with each new system, ea;ch organization is eager to gain the
benefits of succpssful contracting. As 'a result, the accepted solution
to problems with the intelligence product has come to be more collection
rather than better analysis.
After 1965 efforts to impose some direction on the community did
not receive consistent attention from DCIs Raborn and Helms. The
DCIs' priorities. coupled with the inherent bureaucratic obstacles and
the burden of Vietnam, relegated the problem of coordination to a
low priority.
3. The lntelligerwe Function
Intemally, the Agency was also adjusting to the impact of technical
and scientific advances. In 1963, the Directorate for Science
and Technology (DDS&T) was created. Previously, scientific and technical
intelligence production had been scattereo among the other three
oireetorates. The process of organizing an independent directorate
meant wresting manpower and resources from the existing components.
Predictably, the resistance was considerable, and a year and a half
passed between the first attempts at creating the Directorate and its
actual establishment.
The new component included the Office of Scientific Intelligence
and the office of ELINT (electronic intercepts) from DDT. the Data
Processing Staff from DDA, the Development Projects Division (responsible
for overhead reconnaissance) from the DDP, and a newly
created Office of Research and Development. Lat€!' in 1963, the Forpign
Missile and Space Analysis Center was added. The Directorate's
specific functions included, and continue to ineJude, research, development,
operation, data reduction, analysis, and contributions to National
Intelligence Estimates.
The Directorate was organized on the premise that close cooperation
should exist between research and application on the one hand,
and technical collection and analysis on the other. This close coordination
along with the staffing and career patterns in the Directorate
have contributed to the continuing vitality and quality of the
DDS&T's work.
The DDP began and remained a closed, self-contained component;
the DDI evolved into a closed, self-contained component. However,
the DDS&T was created with the assumption that it would continue
to rely on expertise and advice from outside the Agency. A number of
119
arrangements insured constant interchanges between the Directorate
and the scientific and industrial communities. First, since all research
and development for technical systems was done through contracting,
the DDS&T could draw on and benefit from the most advanced technical
systems nationwide. Second, to attract high-quality professionals
from the industrial and scientific communities, the Directorate established
a competitive salary scale. The result has been personnel mobility
between the DDS&T and private industry. It has not been
unusual for individuals to leave private industry, assume positions
with DDS&T for several years, then return to private industry. This
pattern has provided the Directorate with a constant infusion and
renewal of talent. Finally, the Directorate established the practice of
regularly employing advisory groups as well as fostering DDS&T
staff participation in conferences and seminars sponsored by professional
associations.
The Agency's intelligence capabilities expanded in another direction.
Although in the 1953-1961 period, the Agency had made some
contributions to military intelligence, it had not openly challenged the
Defense Department's prerogative in this area. In the early 1960's that
opportunity came. By 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's
dissatisfaction with the quality of military estimates led him to begin
tapping the Agency's analytic capabilities. Specifically, McNamara
requested special estimates from the Agency and included Agency
personnel in community-wide exercises in long-term Soviet force projections.
McNamara's initiatives provided the CIA with leverage
against the military services' dominance in strategic intelligence. The
Secretary's actions, together with McCone's insistence on the DCI's
need for independent judgments on military matters, resulted in the
Agency's expanded analytic effort in strategic intelligence.
In 1962, the Office of Current Intelligence established a military
intelligence division, and five years later the military intelligence units
of OCI and ORR were combined into a separate office, the Office of
Strategic Research (OSR).
During this period economic intelligence grew in importance. In
the decade of the 1950's economic research had concentrated on analysis
related to the Soviet Union and its "satellites." With the emergence
of independent African nations in the early 1960's, and the
view that the U.S.S.R. would engage in political and economic pene"
tration of the fledgling governments, demands for information on the
economies of these countries developed. Likewise, the growing economic
strength of Japan and the countries of 'Western Europe produced
a relat~d decline in the U.S. competitive posture and reflected
the growing inadequacy of the dollar-dominated international monetary
system. Economic analysts found themselves called upon for
detailed research on these countries as tradin.g- partners and rivals
of the United States. In 1967 an independent Office of Economic Research
(OER) succeeded ORR.
/;. The Paramilitary Surge
The Clandestine Service continued to dominate the Agency's activities
during this period. In budget, manpower, and degree of DCI
attention accorded the DDP, clnndestine operations remained the
CIA's most consuming mission. The policies and operational prefer120
ences of the Executive branch dictated the Agency's emphasis in
clandestine activities.
Evidence of Communist guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia and
Africa convinced Kennedy and his closcst advisers of the need for
the United States to develop an unconventional warfare capability.
"Counterinsurgency," as the U. S. effort was designated, aimed at
preventing communist-supported military victories without precipitating
a major Soviet-American military confrontation.
As part of thi8 effort, the Agency, under the direction of the Kennedy
Administration, initia.ted paramilitary operations in Cuba, Laos,
and Vietnam. Following the Bay of Pigs, attempts to undermine the
government of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro continued with Operation
MONGOOSE. Conducted between October 1961 and October 1962,
MONGOOSE consisted of paramilitary, sabotage, and political
propaganda activities. The Agency's large-scale involvement in Southeast
Asia began in 1962 with programs in Laos and South Vietnam.
In Laos, the Agency implemented air supply and paramilitary training
programs, which gradually developed into full-scale manageme:lt
of a ground war. Between 1962 and 1965, the Agency worked wIth the
South Vietnamese government to organize police forces and paramilitary
units.
In the remainder of the decade, Vietnam dominated the CIA just
as it did other government agencies. In both the DDP and the DDI,
the CIA's resources were directed toward supporting and evaluating
the U.S. effort in Vietnam. For the Agency and the DCI, it was a
contradictory position, one which left the institution and the man
vulnerable to the pressures of conflicting purposes.
On the one hand, the DDP was supporting a major paramilitary
operation, which, at its peak in 1970, involved 700 people, 600 of whom
were stationed in Vietnam, the rest at headquarters.9 Stated in other
terms, 12 percent of the DDP's manpower was devoted to Vietnam.
Clearly, the Agency's stake in the operational side of the war was
significant.
At the same time, the analysts were also drawn into the war. After
the initiation of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam in
1965, the Agency began receiving requests for assessments of the campaign's
impact. By 1966, both the Office of R('search and Reports and
the Office of Current Intelligence had established special staffs to deal
with Vietnam. In addition. the Sppcial Assistant for Vietnam Affairs
(SAVA) stwff was created nnder thp direction of the DCI. The total
numher of DDI analysts involved was 69.
'Wbile the DDP pffort was incrpasinfJ' in nroportion to the American
military buildup, DDI pstimates painted a pessimistic view of the
likelihood of F.S. success with succpssive escalations in the ground
and air wars.lO At no time was the institntional dichotomy between the
OT>Prfltional and analytical comnonents more stark.
The Agencv's involvement in Southeast Asia had long-term effects
on the institution. In particlllar, it determined the second-generation
• Rv 1~5. the demand~ for per~()nnpl were ~o lITeat that each DDP component
was lpvied on a quota hasis to contribute per~onnel.
,. Tbpre were pxceptions to this. The SAVA group produced some positive estimates
of the bombing.
121
leadership group within the Agency. By 1970, the first generation of
Agency crureerists was beginning to reach retirement age and vacancies
were opening in senior-level positions. In poth the DDP and the DDI,
many of those positions \vere filled by individuals who had distinguished
themselves in Southeast Asia-related activities. In the Clandestine
Service, men who spent considerable time in the Far East have
O'one on to become a former DCI, the present Deputy Director for
Operations,ll the present Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division,
the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, and the present Deputy
Chief of the Soviet/East European Division. On the DDI side, the
present Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence and the Chief National
Intelligence Officer 12 were all involved in Vietnam assessments
at the height of the war. Clearly, the rewards were considerable for
participation in a major operation.
The decade of the 1960's brought increased attention to the problem
of coordinating intelligence activities in the community but illustrated
the complex difficulties involved in effective management. Departmental
claims, the orientation of the DCI, the role accorded him by the
President, and the demands of clandestine operations all affected the
execution of the coordinrution role. Although policymakers were inconsistent
in their utilization of the Agency's intelligence analysis capability,
all continued to rely heavily on the CIA's operational capability
in support of their policies. That fact estJablished the Agency's own
priorities and reinforced bhe existing internal incentives. Despite the
Agency's growing sophistication and investment in technological
systems, clandestine activities continued to constitute the major share
of the Agency's budget and personnel. Between 1962 and 1970 the DDP
budget averaged 52 percent of the Agency's total annual budgetY
Likewise, in the same period, 55 percent of full-time Agency personnel
were assigned to DDP activities.14 Essentially, the pattern of activity
tthllit had lbegun to emerge in the early 1950's and tJhat became firmly
estaJblished under Dulles continued.
D. THE RECENT PAST: 1971-1975
The years 1971 to 1975 were a period of transition and abrupt change
for the CIA. The scale of covert operations declined, and in the Executive
branch and at the senior level of the Agency growing concern
developed over the quality of the intelligence product and the management
of the intelligence community's resources. However, external
pressures overshadowed initial attempts at reform.
11 In 1973 DCI James Schlesinger changed the name of the Clandestine Service
from the Directorate for Plans to the Directorate for Operations (DDO).
12 See page 123 of this section for discussion of National Intelligence Officers.
13 This does not include the proportion of the DDA budget that supported DDP
activities.
U This figure includes those individuals in the communications and logistics
components of the DDA, whose activities were in direct support of the DDP
mission.
207-932 0 - 76 - 9
122
By the start of the decade broad changes had eyolved in American
foreign policy. Dissension over Vietnam, the Congress' more assertive
role in foreign policy, and shifts in the international po\ver structure
had eroded the assumptions on which u.S. foreign policy had been
based. The consensus that had existed among the press, the informed
public, the Congress, and the Execntiye branch and that had both supported
and protected the CIA broke clmm. As conflicting policy preferences
emerged and as misconduct in the Executiye branch was
reyealed, the CIA, once exempt from public examination, became subject
to close scrutiny.
1. The Director8 of Centrallntelliqenee, 1973-1975
James R. Schlesinger's tenure as DCI from February to July 1973
was brief but significant. An economist by training and long an observer
of the intelligence community through his extensive experience
in national security affairs, Schlesinger came, to the CIA with definite
ideas on restructuring the management of the community and on improving
the quality of intelligence. During his f'ix month term he embarked
on changes that promised to alter the DCI's and the Agency's
existing priorities.
William E. Colby succeeded Schlesinger. An attorney, ass veteran,
and career DDP officer, Colby's background made him seem of the
traditional operations school in the Agency. His overseas assimJments
included positions in Rome, Stockholm, 'and Saigon, where he was
Chief of Station. Yet Colby brought an Agency-wide and community
orientation to his term as DCI that was uncommon for DDP careerists.
Soon after his appointment the Agency he<lame the focus of public and
Congressional inquiries, and most of Colby's time was absorbed in responding
to these developments.
92. Efforts at Ohange
Foreign affairs were a continuing priority in the Nixon Administration.
Until 1971, Vietnam absorbed most of the time and attention of
the Presiclent and his ASf'istant for National Securitv Affairs. Henry
Kissinger. After 1971, both rturned toa redefinition of U.S. foreign policy.
'Sharing 'a global view of U.S. policv, the two men sought to restructure
relationships with the Soviet Union and with the People's
Republic of China. It was Kissinger rather than Richard Helms who
served as President Nixon's intelligence officer. Kissinger provided
Nixon with daily briefings and relied on the staff of the National Security
Council for intelligence analysis.
Both men's preference for working with (and often independently
of) small, tightly managed staffs is well known. However, both were
genuinely interested in obtaining more and better quality intelligence
from the CIA. In Becember 1970, Nixon requested a study of the intelligence
community. Executed by James Schlesinger, then Assistant
Director of the Bureau of the BudQ'et, the study resulted in the Presidential
directive of November 5, 1971, assigning the DCI responsibility
for review of the intelligence community budget. The intention was
that the DCI would advise the President on community-wide budgetary
allocations by serving in a last review capacity. The effort faltered
for two reasons. First, Nixon chose not to request Conwessional enactment
of revised legislation extending the authority of the DCI. The
123
decision inherently limited the DCI's ability to exert control over the
intelligence components. Thus, the DCI was once again left to arbitrate
as one among equals. Second, the implementation of the directive was
less energetic and decisive than it might have been. Helms did not attempt
to make recommendations on budgetary allocations and instead,
presented the President with the agreed views of the representatives
of the departmental intelligence components. Furthermore, within the
Agency, the mechanism for assisting the DCI in community matters
was weak. Early in 1972 Helms established the Intelligence Community
(IC) Staff as a repla~ement for the NIPE staff to assist in community
matters. Between the time of the decision to create such a staff
and its actual organization, the number of personnel assigned was
halved.
It is likely that had James Schlesinger remained as DCI, he would
have assumed a vigorous role in the community, and would have attempted
to exercise the DCI's implied authority. Schlesinger altered
the composition of the IC staff by reducing the number of CIA personnel
and increasing the number of non-Agency personnel to facilitate
the staff's contacts with the community. Schlesinger's primary
concern was upgrading the quality of the Agency's intelligence analysis,
and he had begun to consider changes in the Office of National
Estimates. In addition, he made considerable reductions in personnelwith
most of the cuts occurring in the DDO.l4a
Under Colby, attempts at innovation continued. Colby abolished
the Office of National Estimates and replaced it with a group of eleven
senior specialists in functional and geographical areas known as National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs). NIOs are responsible for intelligence
collection and production in their designated fields, and the
senior NIO is directly responsible to the DCI. The purpose of the
NIO system was to establish better communication and interchange
between policymakers and analysts than had been the case with the
Office of National Estimates.
These changes were accompanied by shifts in emphasis in the DDO
and the DDI. In the Clandestine Service the scale of covert operations
was reduced, and by 1972 the Agency's paramilitary program in Southeast
Asia was dissolved. Yet, the overall reduction did not affect the
fundamental assumptions, organization, and incentives governing the
DDO. Indeed, in 1975 clandestine activities stilI constituted 37 percent
of the Agency's total budget.15 The rationale remains the same,
and the operational capability is intact-as CIA activities in Chile
jIJustrated. While Soviet strategic capabilities remain the first priority
for clandestine collection requirements, in response to recent international
developments, the DDO has increased its collection activities
in the areas of terrorism and international narcotics traffic-with considerable
success.
In the DDI, economic intelligence has continued to assume increased
importance and taken on new dimensions. In sharp contrast to the
British intelligence service, which has for generations emphasized
international economics, the DDI only recently has begun developing
a capability in such areas as international finance, the gold market,
"a See footnote. p. 121.
15 This does not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDO activities.
124
and international economic movements. The real impetus for this
change came in August 1971 with the U.S. balance of payments crisis.
Since that time, and with subsequent international energy problems,
the demands for international economic intelligence have escalated
dramatically.
The Agency's technological capabilities have made a sustained contribution
to policymaking. By providing the first effective means of
verification, CIA's reconnaissance systems facilitated the United
States' participation in arms control agreements with the Soviet
Union, beginning with the 1972 Interim Agreement limiting strategic
arms.
In December 1974 these developments and the impetus for change
begun under Schlesinger were overtaken by pU!blic revelrutions of
alleged CIA domestic activities. What had been a consensual acceptance
of the CIA's right to secrecy in the interests of national securIty
was rejected. The Agency's vulnerability to these public revelations
was indicative of the degree to which American foreign policy and
the institutional framework that supported that policy were undergoing
redefinition.
E. CONCLUSIO~
A brief history cannot catalogue the many shifts in the numerous
CIA subdivisions over a period of nearly thirty years. Instead, this
summary has attempted to capture the changes in the CIA's main
functional areas. Sharing characteristics common to most large, complex
organizations, the CIA has responded to, rather than anticipated,
the forces of change; it has accumulated functions rather than redefining
them; its internal patterns were established early and have solidified;
success has come to those who have made visible contributions in
high-priority areas. These general characteristics have affected the
specifics of the Agency's development:
-The notion that the CIA could serve as a coordinating body and
that the DCI could orchestrate the process did not take into account
inherent institutional obstacles. Vested departmental interests 'and
the Departments' control over budget and management choices
frustrated the Agency's and the DCI's ability to execute the coordination
function. These limitations exist today, when the resources and
complexities of administration have escal'ated dramatically.
-The DDO and the DDT evolved out of separate, independent organizations,
serving different policy needs. Strict compartmentation
in the DDO reinforced the separation. The two components were not
mutually supportive elements in the collection and analysis functions.
-The activities of the Clandestine Service have reflected not what
the Agency can do well but what the demands of American foreign
policy have required at particular times. The nature of covert operations,
the priority accorded them bv senior policymakers, and the
orientation and background of some DCls have made the clandestine
mission the preeminent activity within the organization.
-The qualities demanded of individuals in the Clandestine Service--
essentially management of people, provide the basis for bureaucratic
skiJIs in the organization. These skills account for the fact that
those DCIs who have been Agency careerists have all come from the
DDO.
125
-Growth in the range of American foreign policy interests and
the DDT's response to additional requirements have resulted in an
increased scale of collection and analysis. Rather than rectifying the
problem of duplication the Agency has contributed to it by becoming
yet another source of intelligence production. The DDT's size and the
administrative process involved in the production of finished intelligence
precluded close association between policymakers and analysts,
between the intelligence product and policy informed by intelligence
analysis.
The relationship between intelligence analysis and policymaking is
a reciprocal one. The creation of the NIO system was in part a recognition
of the need for close interaction between analysts and their
clients. If intelligence is to influence policy and if policy needs are to
direct intelligence priorities, senior policymakers must actively utilize
the intelligence capabilities at their disposal. For policymakers not
to do so only wastes resources and encourages lack of direction in
intelligence production. Likewise, the Director of Central Intelligence
or his successor for management of the community must assign priority
attention to the roles of principal intelligence advisor to the President
and head of the intelligence community. History has demonstrated that
the job of the DCI as community manager and as senior official of the
Agency are competing, not complementary roles. In the future separation
of the functions may prove a plausible alternative.
Clandestine activities will remain an element of U.S. foreign policy,
and policymakers will directly affect the level of operations. The prominence
of the Clandestine Service within the Agency may moderate as
money for and high-level Executive interest in covert actIOns diminish.
However, DDO incentives which emphasize operations over collection
and which create an internal demand for projects will continue
to foster covert action unless an internal conversion process forces a
change.
Over the past thirty years the United States has developed an institution
and a corps of individuals who constitute the U.S. intelligence
profession. The question remains as to how both the institution
and the individuals will best be utilized.

 

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