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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

VIII. COVERT ACTION
No activity of the Central Intelligence Agency has engendered more
controversy and concern than "covert action," the secret use of power
and persuasion. The contemporary decfinition of covert action as used
by the CIA-"any clandestine operation or activity designed to influence
foreign governments, organizations, persons or events in support
of United States foreign policy"-suggests an all-purpose policy. t?ol.
By definition, covert action should be one of the CIA's least nSlble
activities, yet it has attracted more attention in recent years than any
other United States foreign intelligence activity. The CIA has been
accused of interfering in the internal political affairs of nations ranging
from Iran to Chile. from Tibet to Guatemala, from Libya to Laos,
from Greece to Indonesia. Assassinations, coups d'etat. vote buying,
economic warfare-all have !wen laid at the doorstep of the CIA. Few
political crises take place in the world today in which CIA involvement
is not alleged. As former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
told the Committee:
The knowledge regarding such operations has become so
widespread that om country has been accused of being responsible
for practically every internal difficulty that has
occurred in every country in the world.!
Senate Resolution 21 authorized the Committee to investigate
"the extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in
the United States and abroad." 2 In conducting its inquiry into covert
action, the Committee addressed several sets of questions:
-First, what is the past and present scope of covert action ~
Has covert action been an exceptional or commonplace tool of
United States foreign policy? Do present covert operations
meet the standard-set in the Hughes-Ryan amendment to
the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act---of "important to the national
security of the United States?"
-Second, what is the value of covert action as an instrument
of United States foreign policy ~ How successful have
covert operations been over the years in achieving short-range
objectives and long-term goals ~ What have been the effects of
these operations on the "targeted" nations? Have the costs of
these operations, in terms of our reputation throughout the
world and our capacity for ethical and moral leadership,
outweighed the benefits achieved ~
1 Clark Clifford testimony. 12/5/75. Hearin~s. Vol. 7. p. 5l.
• Senate ResOlution 21, Section 2, Clause 14. The CIA conducts several kinds of
COVE'rt intelli~ence activitiE's ahroad: clandestine collection of positive forei~
intE'lIig-E'ncE', counterintelligence (or liaison with local services), and covert
action. Althoug-h therE' are a variety of covert action techniques, most can he
I!;rouped into four hroad catel!;ories: political action, propaganda, paramilitary,
and economic action.
(141)
142
-Third, have the techniques and methods of covert action
been antithetical to our principles amI ideals as a nation?
Fnited States officials han been involYed in plots to assassinate
foreign IradE'rs. In ChilE'. tIlE' rnitrd States attempted
to overthrow a democratically' rlE'cted government. ~Iany
covert operations appE'ar to violate our international treaty
obligations and commitments. such as the charters of the
UnitE'd ~at ions and Organization of AnlE'rican States. Cun
these actions be justifieclwhen our national security interests
are at stake?
-Fourth, does the existence of a covert action capability
distort the decisionmaking process? Covert operations by
their nature cannot be (lebated openly in ",ays required by
a constitutional system. However. has this meant that, on
occasion, the Executin has resorted to covert operations to
avoid bureaucratic. Congressional, and public debate? Has
this contributed to an erosion of trust between the execlltive
and legislative branches of government and bebveen the
government and the people?
-Fifth, what are the implications of maintaining a
covert action capability. as presently housed in the CIA's
Directorate for Operations'l; Does the "ery existence of this
capability make it more likely that covert operations will be
presented as a policy alternative and be implemented? Has
the maintenance of this standing capability generated. in
itself. demands for more and more covert action? Conversely,
what are the implications of not maintaining a covert action
capability? 'Will our national security be imperiled? Will our
policymakers he denied a valuable policy option?
-Sixth, is it possible to accomplish many of our covert
objectives through overt means? Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty may be instructive in this regard. For years
RFE and RL were operatE'd and subsidized, covertly, by the
CIA. Today they operatE' openly. Could other CIA. covert
activities be conducted in a similar manner?
-Finally, should the United States continue to maintain a
covert action capability? If so, should there be restrictions
on certain kinds of activities? 'What processes of authorization
and review, both within the E'xecutive and legislative
branches, should be established?
Over the past year, the Committee investigated several major
covert action programs. These programs were selected to illustrate
(1) covert action techniques, ranging from propaganda to paramilitary
activitie<:. from economic action to Sllhsidizing and snpporting foreign
political parties, media. and labor organizations; (2) different
kinds of "target" countries. from de"eloped lYestern nations to less
developed nations in Africa. Asia and Latin America; (3) a broad
time span, from 1947 to the present; and (4) a combination of cases
that the CIA considers to be representative of success and failure.
One of the Committee's case studies, Chile, was the subject of a
publicly released staff report.3 It served as background for the Com-
, Renate Selt'Ct Committee, "Corprt Action in Chile."
143
mittee's public session on covert action.4 During its covert action inquiry,
the COlmnittee took extensive testimony in executive session
and received 14 briefings from the CIA. The staff interviewed over
120 persons, including 13 former Ambassadors and 12 former CIA
Station Chiefs. The successor Senate intelligence oversight committee(
s) will inherit the Committee's classified covert action case studies
as well as a rich documentary base for future consideration of covert
action.
In addition to the major covert action case studies, the Committee
spent five months investigating alleged plots to assassinate foreign
leaders. This inquiry led, inevitably, into covert action writ large.
Plots to assassinate Castro could not be understood unless seen in
the context of Operation MONGOOSE, a massive covert action
program designed to "get rid of Castro." The death of General Schneider
in Chile could not be understood unless seen in the context of what
was known as Track II-a covert action program, undertaken by the
CIA at the direction of President Nixon, to prevent Salvador Allende
from assuming the office of President of Chile. During the assassination
inquiry, the Committee heard from over 75 witnesses during 60
days of hearings.
The Committee has chosen not to make public the details of all the
covert action case studies, with the exceptions noted above. The force
of the Committee's -recommendations on covert action might be
istrengthened by using detailed illustrations of what the United
lStates did under what circumstances and with what results in country
i"X" or "Y." The purpose of the Committee in examining these cases,
however, was to understand the scope, techniques, utility, and propriety
of covert action in order to make recommendations for the
future. The Committee concluded that it was not essential to expose
past covert relationships of foreign political, labor and cultural leaders
with the United States Government nor to violate the confidentiality
of these relationships. Therefore, names of individuals and institutions
have been omitted.
In addition, the Committee decided, following objections raised by
the CIA, not to publicly release two sections of this Report-"Techniques
of Covert Action" and "Covert Action Projects: Initiation,
Review, and Approva1." These two sections will be submitted to the
Members of the Senate in a classified form. However, for a discussion
of covert action techniques, as they were practiced in Chile, see the
Committee Staff Report, "Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973" (pp.
6-10,14-40) .
A. EVOLUTION OF CoVERT ACTION
Covert action was not included as one of the charter missions of the
CIA. The National Security Act of 1947 (which established the
Agency and the National Security Council) does not specifically mention
or authorize secret operations of any kind, whether for intelligence
collection or covert action.5 The 1947 Act does, however, contain a
provision which directs the CIA to "perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the
• Senate Select Committee, Hearings, 12/4-5/75, Vol. 7.
5 See Appendix I, "Congressional Authority for the CIA to Conduct Covert
Actions."
144
National Security Council may from time to time direct." 6 One of the
dra:fters of the 1947 Act, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford,
has referred to this provision as the "catch-all" clause. According to
)fr. Clifford:
Because those of us' who were assigned to this task and had
the drafting responsibility were dealing with a new subject
with practically no precedents, it was decided that the Act
creating the Central Intelligence Agency should contain a
"catch-all" clause to provide for unforeseen contingencies.
Thus, it was written that the CIA should "perform such other
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council may from
time to time direct." It was under this clause that, early in the
operation of the 1947 Act, cO\-ert activities were authorized.
I recall that such activities took place in 1948 and it is even
possible that some planning took place in late 1947. It was
the original concept that covert activities undertaken under
the Act were to be carefully limited and controlled. You will
note that the language of the Act provides that this catchall
clause is applicable only in the 6\-ent that the national
security is affected. This was considered to be an important
limiting and restricting clause.'
Beginning in December 1947, the National Security Council issued
a series of classified directives specifying and expanding the CIA's
covert mission.s The first of these directives, NSC--4-A, authorized the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to conduct covett psychological
operations consistent with United States policy and in coordination
with the Departments of State and Defense.
A later directive, NSC 10/2, authorized the CIA to conduct covett
political and paramilitary operations. To organize an<;l direct these
activities, a semi-independent Office of Policy Coordination (Ope)
was established within the CIA. OPC took policy direction from the
Departments of State and Defense.9 The directive establishing OPC
referred to the "vicious covett activities of the U.S.S.R." and authorized
the OPC to plan and conduct cO\-ert operations, including covert
political, psychological, and economic warfare. These early activities
were directed against the Soviet threat. They included conntering
Soviet propaganda and covert Soviet support of labor unions and
student groups in ·Western Europe, direct U.S. suppott of foreign
political parties, "economic warfare," sabotage, assistance to refugee
liberation groups, and support of anti-Communist groups in occupied
or threatened areas.
Until a reorganization in .June, 1950, OPC's responsibilities for
paramilitary action were limited, at least in theory, to contingency
planning. Networks of agents were trained to assist the ('scape of re-
850 U.S.C. 403 (d) (5).
; Clifford, 12/5/75, Hearings. pp. 50-51.
8 For a full discussion of the National Security Council and its direction of
intl'lIigence acth·ities, see Chapter IV, "The President's Office."
• The semi-independent status of OPC within the CIA creatl'd a rivalry with
the eXisting CIA componl'nt responsihle for clandl'stine intelligence, the Office of
Rtrategic Operations.
145
sistance forces and carry out sabotage behind enemy lines in the event
of war. However, OPC did conduct some guerrilla-type operations in
this early period against Soviet bloc countries, using neighboring
countries as bases and employing a variety of "black" activities.10
The size and activities of the OPC grew dramatically. Many covert
action programs initiated in the first few years as an adjunct to the
United States policy of communist containment in Europe eventually
developed into large-scale and long-term operations, such as the
clandestine propaganda radios aimed at the Soviet bloc-Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty.
Many early OPC activities involved subsidies to European "counterfront"
labor and political organizations. These were intended to serve
as alternatives to Soviet- or communist-inspired groups. Extensive
ope labor, media, and election operations in vVestem Europe in the
late 1940's, for instance, were designed to undercut debilitating strikes
by communist trade unions and election advances by communist parties.
Support for "counterfront" organizations, especially in the areas
of student, labor and cultural activities, was to become much more
prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, although they later became international
rather than European-oriented.
Communist aggression in the Far East led the United States into
war in Korea in .rune 1950. At the same time, Defense Department
pressure shifted the focus of OPC activities toward more ag~ressive
responses to Soviet and Chinese Communist threats, particularly military
incursions. Large amounts of money were spent for ~uerrilla and
propaganda operations. These operations were designed to support
t he United States military mission in Korea. Most of these diversionary
paramilitary operations never came to fruition. For example, during
this period the CIA's Office of Procurement acquired some $152 million
worth of foreign weapons -and ammunition for use by guerrilla forces
that never crume into existence.
As a result of the upsurge of paramilitary action and contingency
planning, OPC's manpower almost trebled during the first year of
t he Korean War. A large part of this increase consisted of paramilitary
experts, who were later to be instrumental in CIA paramilitary operations
in the Bay of Pigs, the Congo, and Laos, among others. In support
of paramilitary activities the CIA had bases and facilities in the
rnited States, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. OPC's increased
activity was not limited to paramilitary operations, however.
By Hl53, there were major covert operations in 48 eountries, eonsisting
primarily of propaganda and political action.
Another e\'ent in 1950 affected the development and organizational
framework for covert action. General vVaIter Bedell Smith became
CTA Director. He decided to nwrge ope with the CIA's Office of
Special Operations.ll Although the merger was not completed until
10 "Black" activities arp those intended to give the impression that they arf'
f;ponsored by an indigenous opposition forcp or a hostile power. rather than hy
the United States.
11 In order to accomplish the mer~er, Smith first consolidated the OPC chain
of command by ordprin~the Director of OPC to report directly to the DCI instead
of thron~h the Departmf'nts of Statp and Df'fensp. Smith also appointPf1 his own
f;f'llior rf'prp;;entativps to fiplrl Mation.~ to f'oonlinatl' thl' coyert lIctiyitie;; of thp
OPC fil111 the espionage oIX'rations of the OSO. ThP two OffiCPf; werp oftpn com]
letil1~ for the f;fime ]lotential assets in foreign conntries.
146
1954, the most important organizational step took place in August
1952-a single new directorate, entirely within the structure and control
of the CIA, was established. Known as the Directorate for Plans
(DDP),12 this new directorate was headed by a Deputy Director and
\vas assigned responsibility for all CIA covert action and espionage
functions. The CIA's "Clandestine Service" was now in place.
By the time the DDP IWas organized, OPC had a large st'aff
and an annual budget of almost $20U million. It dominated the smaller
and bureaucratically weaker OSO in size, glamour, and attention. Yet,
one of the original purposes of the merger, according to General Smith,
was to protect the OSO function of clandestine intelligence collection
from becoming subordinate to the covert action function of OPC. In
1952, Smith wrote that the merger was:
designed to create a single overseas clandestine service, while
at the same time presecving the integrity of the long-range
espionage and counterespionage mission of the CIA from
amalgamation into those clandestine activities which are subject
to short-term variations in the prosecution of the Cold
War.
Despite Smith's desires, the Cold ""Val', and the "hot war" in Korea,
increased the standing, and influence, of the covert "operators" within
the CIA. This trend continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
The 'post-Korean War period did not see a reduction in CIA covert
activitIes. Indeed, the communist threat was now seen to be worldwide,
rather than concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union
and mainland China. In response, the CIA, at the direction of the
National Security Council, expanded its European and crisis-oriented
approach into a world-\vide effort to anticipate and meet communist
aggression, often with techniques equal to those of the Soviet clandestine
services. This new world-wide approach was reflected in a 1955
Xational Security Council Directive which authorized the CIA to:
-Create and exploit problems for International Communism;
-Discredit International Communism, and reduce the
strength of its parties ancI organization;
-Reduce International Communist control over any areas
of the world.
The 1950s sa\v an expansion of· communist interest in the Third
World. Attempts to anticipate and meet the communist threat there
proved to be an easier task than carrying out clandestine activities
in the closed Soviet and Chinese societies. Political action projects in
the Third World increased dramatically. Financial support was provided
to parties, candidates, and incumbent leaders of almost every
political persuasion, except the extreme left and ri~ht. The immediate
purpose of these projects \vas to encourage political stability, and thus
pre~'ent Communist incursions; but another important objective of
political action was the acquisition of "agents of influence" who could
be used at a future date to provide intelligence or to carry out political
action. Through such projects, the CIA developed a world-wide in-
12 The name \YaH changed to the nireetorate for Operations (nDO) in 1m3.
147
frastrueture of individual agents, or networks of agents, engaged in a
variety of covert activities.
By 1955, the CIA's Clandestine Senice had gone through a number
of reorganizations. It emerged with a structure for the support of
cm-ert action that remained essentially the saIlle until the early 1960s.
The Clandestine Service consisted of seven geographic divisions and a
number of functional staffs-foreign intelligence, counterintelligence,
technical support for covert action, and planning and program coordination.
With the demise of pal'amilitary activities following the
Korean War, the Paramilitary Operations Staff had been abolished
and its functions merged with the staff responsible for psychological
action. An International Organizations Division, created in ,Tune 1954,
handled all programs in support of labor, youth, student, and cultural
counterfront organizations.
Using the covert action budget as one measure of activity, the scope
of political and psychological action during the 1950s ,vas greatest
in the Far East, Western Europe, and the Middle East, with steadily
increasing activity in the Western Hemisphere. The international
labor, student, and media projects of the International Organizations
Division constituted the greatest single concentration of covert poli,tical
and propaganda activities. Paramilitary action began to increase again
in the late 1950s with large-scale operations in two Asian countries
and increased covert military assistance to a third.13
The Bay of Pigs disa,ster in 1961 prompted a reorganization of CIA
covert action and the procedures governing it. A new form of covert
action--eounterinsurgency-was now emphasized. Under the direction
of the National Security Council, the CIA rapidly expanded its counterinsurgency
capability, focusing on Latin America, Africa, and the
Far East. After the Geneva agreements of 1962, the CIA took over the
training and advising of the Mea army, previously a responsibility of
F.S. military advisers. The Laos operation eventually be{'ame the largest
paramilitary effort in post-war history. In 1962 the Agency also
began a small paramilitary program in Vietnam. Even after the
rnited States Military Assistance Command (MACV) took over
paramilitary programs in Vietnam at the end of 1963, the CIA continued
to assist the U.S. military's covert activities against North
Vietnam. .
The nIA's paramilitary effort continued to expand throughout the
clecade. The paramilitary budget reaehed an all-time high in 1970. It
probably would have continued to climb. had not the burden of the
Laos program been transferred to the Department of Defense in
1£)71.14
13 In 1962 a paramilitary offiC'{' waf> rN'Onf>titl1t{'d in th{' CIA. Following th{'
Bay of Pigf>, a panel headed by Lvman Kirkpatrick, then the CIA'f> Executive
Diredor-Comptroller, recommended that an office he created in the Clandef>tine
~pr\"ice to rentralize and profeRsionalize paramilitary aC'tion and contingency
planning, drawing upon Agency-wide resonrpeR for Jarg-e-RPale operations. AR a
reRult. a new paramilitary diviRion was eRtablished. It waR to operate under the
g'nid<lnw of a new NSC approval gToU'p--the ~npC'ial Gronn (ConnterinRurgency).
H Part of the Agency's intprPRt in naramilitary aptivities !'1temmed from the
Agell('v's view that these activities are internenendent with intelligence collection
functions. DCI .John MeConp protested the trall!'1fpr of paramilitary prog-
rams in Vietnam to MACV in 196.~-1004 hecauf>e he thought that a third of the
intelligence reporting of the CIA's Vietnam !'1tation might hp IO!'1t with !'1uch a rerlndion
of CIA participation.
148
Paramilitarv action ,,-as but one of the CIA's collection of tools
during the eai'ly and middlp 1060s. Outside the Far East the CIA
mounted an increasing number of political, propaganda, and economic
projects. This was the era of Operation MONGOOSE, a massive covert
nssault on the Castro regime in Cuba.15 The need to combat the "export
of revolution'< by COllllllllllist powers stillllllated a variety of new
covert techniflues aime(l at an increasingly broad range of "targets."
CO\'mt action reached its p<.>ak in the years 1964 to 1967.
In contrast to the period 1964, to 19()7, when expenditures for political
and propaganda action increased almost 60· percent, the period
1968 to the present has registered declines in every functional and ~;eo·
graphic category of covert action-except for paramilitary operations
in the Far East which did not drop until 1072. The number of individual
co\-ert action projects dropped by flO percent from fiscal year 1964
(when they reached an an-time high) to fiscal year 1968. The number
of projects by itself is not an adequate measure of the Scope of covert
adion. Projects can vary considerably in size, cost, duration, and effect.
Today, for example, one-fourth of the cnrrent covert action projects
are relatively high-cost (o\-er $100,000 annually).
No matter which standards are used, covert activities have decreased
considerably since their peak period in the mid- and late 1960s. Recent
trends reflect this decrease in cO\'ert action. In one country, covert
activities began in the early years of the OPC and became so extensive
in the 1950s and 1960s that they affected almost every element of that
society. A retrenchment began in 1965; by 1974 there were only two
J'elatively small-scale political action projects. The only covertexpenditure
projected for fiscal year 1976 is a sman sum for the development
of potential "ass<.>ts" or local agents who may he used for covert action
in the futllre. In a srcond country, covert adion expenditures in
Hl75 were less than one percent of the total in 1971. A slight increase
,,-as projected for fiscal year 1976, also for the development of
potential assets for future lIse, The CIA has thus curtailed its covert
action projects in these two countries, although its current inw'stment
in potential assets indicates that the Agency does not want to preclude
the possibility of covert involvpment in the future.
Some of the major reasons for the flecline of covert activiti<.>s since
the mid- ano late Hl60s indllde:
-a reduction of CIA labor, student, and media projects
following the 1967 Rmnpart8 disclosure and the subsequent
recommendations of the Katzenbach Committee;
-the transfer of covert military assistance in Laos from
the CIA budget to the Dpfense Department budget in 1971,
and the termination of many other covert activities in that
area with the end of the war in Indochina in 1975;
-reductions in oYerseas personnel of the Clandestine Service
as a result of studies and cuts made by .Tames Schlesinger,
first when he Was with the Office of "Managenwnt and Budget
and later durin.!! his brief tenlll'e as Director of Central Intelligence
in l\Jn;
'" Spnatp SpIed Committpp, "Allpgpd Assassination Plots Im'olving Foreign
L<>uders," p. 139 ff.
149
-shifting FS. foreib'11 policy priorIties in the 1970s,
which have de-emphasized sustained involvement in the internal
affairs of other nations; and
-----concel'll among Agency officials and U.S. policymakers
that publicity given to CIA covert activities would increase
the chances of disclosure and generally decrease the chances
of success of the kinds of large-scale, high-expenditure projects
that developed in the 1060s.1
:>3
B. COXGRESSIOXAL OVERSIGHT
There is no reference to covert action in the 1047 Kational Security
.\ct, nor is there any evi(lence in the debates, committee reports, or
legislative history of the 1947 Act to show that Congress intended
specifically to authorize covert operations.16 Since the CIA's wartime
predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, had conducted covert
operations, Congress may have anticipated that these operations were
envisioned.
Whether specifically authorized by Congress or not, CIA covert operations
were soon underway. Citing the "such other functions and
duties" clause of the 1947 Act as authority, the National Security
Council authorized the CIA to undertake covert operations at its first
meeting in December 1047. At that point Congress became responsible
for overseeing' these activities.
Shortly after the passage of the 1947 Act, the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate assumed
jurisdiction for CIA activities and appropriations. In the Senate, following
an informal arrangement worked out with Senators Vandenberg
and Russell, small CIA subcommittees were created within
Armed Services and Appropriations. Over time, the relations between
the subcommittees and the CIA came to be dominated by two princ~
ples: "need to know" and "want to know." 17 The "want to know"
principle was best expressed in a statement made in 1956 by a congressional
overseer of the CIA, Senator Leverett Saltonstall :
It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials
to speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if
you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects
which I personally, as a member of Congress and as a citizen,
would rather not have, unless I believed it to be my responsibility
to have it because it might involve the lives of American
citizens.IS
1.5. The nl'xt two sl'ctions of this rl'port "Covert Action Techniques" and "Covert
Action Projects: Initiation, Review, ancl Approval," remain classified after con~
ultation between the CommittE'e and the E'xecutive branch. See p. 143.
18 For a full diFcuRRion of the statutory authority for CIA activities, and conp;
rel'."lional authorizltion of covert action. Ree Chapter VII and Appendix I.
11 The Rockefeller Commission made a similar point in its Report:
"In sum, congressional oversight of the CIA has been curtailed by the secrecy
shrouding its activities and budget. At least until quite recently, Congress has not
sought substantial amounts of information. Correspondingly, the CIA has not
generally volunteered additional information." (Report of the Commission on CIA
Activities Within the United States, 6/6/75, p: 77.)
18 Congressional Record-April 9, 1956, p. 8.5292.
150
From the beginning, the House and the Senate subcommittees were
relatively inactive. According to information available to the Select
Committee, the Senate Armed SelTices subcommittee met 26 times between
.Tanuarv Hl66 and December Hl7fi. The subcommittee met fhe
times in Hl7;"i: twice in Hl7..J-, once in Inn and 1972, and not at all in
1971. .
Relations between the CIA and the subcommittees came to be determined,
in large part, by the personal relationship between the chairmen
and the CIA Director, often to the exclusion of other subcommittee
members. Staff assistance was minimal, usually consisting of no
more than one professional staff member.
The two Senate subcommittees had somewhat different responsibilities.
19 The Appropriations subcommittee was to concentrate on the
budgetary aspects of CIA activities. The Armed Services subcommittee
had the narrower responsibility of determining the legislative
needs of the Agency and recommending additional or corrective legislation.
It did not authorize the CIA's annual budget.
The CIA subcommittees received general information about some
covert operations. Prior to the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974
Foreign Assistance Act, however, the subcommittees were not notified
of these operations on any regular basis. Notifications occurred on the
basis of informal agreements between the CIA and the subcommittee
chairmen.2o CIA covert action briefings did not include detailed descriptions
of the methods and cost of individual covert action projects.
Rather, projects were grouped into broad, general programs, either on
a country-widE' basis or by type of ~lcti\'ity, for presE'ntation to the subcommittees.
Chile can sen'e as an l'xample of how o\'ersight of covert action was
conducted. According to CIA records, there \vas a total of 53 cOllgressional
briefings on Chile by the CIA between April 1964 and December
1974. At :m of these ml'l'tings thl're was some discussion of covert
action; spE'cial rl'leases of funds for covert action frolll the Contingency
Reserve wl're discussed at 2;~ of them. Of the 33 covert action
briefings, 20 took place prior to 1973, and 1;~ took place after. 21
Of the 33 covert action projects undertaken in Chile between 1963
and 1974 with 40 Committee approval, Congress was briefed in some
fashion on eight. Presumably the 25 others were undertaken without
congressional consultation.22 Of the morl' than $13 mi11ion spent
in Chile on covert action projects betwl'en 1963 and 1974, Congress
19 Initially the Armed ServiceR and AppropriationR Rubcommittees met separately.
However, in the 1960R, becauRe of overlappin~ membership the two committees
met jointly. For several years Senator Richard Russell was chairman
of both subcommittees.
20 In 1967, the House and Senate CIA appropriations subcommittees began
receivin~ notifications of withdrawalR from the CIA's Contingency Reserve Fund
within 48 hours of the release. In 1975 the two Armed Sl'r\'ice subcommittees
he~an receiving the same notificatior:s. at the initiative of Director Colby.
:n The 13 briefings which occurred after 1973 (March 1973 to December 1974)
included meetin~s with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations and the House l'oreign Affairs Subcommittee on InterAmerican
Affairs. All theRe meetings were concerned with past CIA cO\'ert action
in Chile.
22 Among the 25 projectR were a $1.2 million authorization in 1971. !lalf of
which waR Rpent to purchaRe radio RtationR and neWRpaperR while the other half
went to Rupport muni~ipal candidateR in anti-Allende political partieR; and an
additional expenditure of $RI5,OOO in late 1971 to provide support to oPPoRition
political parties in Chile.
151
received briefings (sometimes before and sometimes af~er the fact) on
projects totaling about $9.3 million. Fu~ther, CO!lgresslOnal ove~'sIght
committees were not consulted about proJects WhICh were not revIewed
by the full 40 Committee. One of these was the Track II attempt uy
the CIA, at the instruction of President Kixon, to prevent Salvador
Allende from taking office in 1970.23
Congressional oversight of CIA covert operations was altered as
a result of the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance
Act. That amendment stated:
Sec. 662. Limitation on Intelligence Aetivities.- (a) N()
funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other
Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence
Agency for operations in foreign countries, oth~r than
activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelhgence,
unless and until the President finds that each such operation
is important to the national security of the United States and
reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such
operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, including
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
United States House of Representatives.24
The Hughes-Ryan amendment had two results. First, it established
by statute a reporting requirement to Congress on covert action. Second,
the amendment increased the number of committees that would be
informed of approved covert operations. The inclusion of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations
COJllmittee was in recognition of the significant foreign policy implications
of covert operations.
Despite these changes, the oversight role of Congress with respect to
covert operations is still limited. The law does not require notification
of Congress before covert operations are implemented. The DCI has
not felt obligated to inform the subcommittees of approved covert
action operations prior to their implementation, although in some cases
he has done so. Problems thus arise if members of Congress object to a
decision by the President to undertake a covert operation.
The recent case of Angola is a good example of the weaknesses of
the Hughes-Ryan amendment. In this case, the Executive fully complied
with the requirements of the amendment. In January 1975 the
administration decided to provide substantial covert political support
to the FNLA faction in Angola.25 In early February, senior mem-
23 With respect to congressional oversight of CIA activities in Chile the Committee's
Staff report on "Covert Action in Chile" concludell: '
"Between April 1964 and December 1974, CIA's consultation with its congressional
oversight committees-and thus Congress' exercise of its oversight function-
was inadequate. The CIA did not volunteer detailed information; Congress
most often did not seek it." (Senate Select Committee, "Covert Action in Chile,"
p.49.)
,. 22 USC 2422.
:!S'l'here were three factions involved in the Angolan conflict: the National
Fr(~nt for the Liberation of Angola (1<'NLA), led by Holden Roberto; the National
Ulllon for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITAl, led by Jonas Savimbi;
1I.n(1 the Popular )Iovenlf'ut for the Liberation of Angola, ()IPLA) led by Agos1111110
Neto. The latter group received military and political support from the
Soviet Union and Cuba.
152
bel's of the six congressional committees received notification of this
decision.
In late .Tuly the 40 Committee and President Ford approved
an additional expenditure to provide covert military assistance to
the FNLAand a second Angolan faction, UNITA. Again senior
members of til(> six cOlllmittrcs \yere notified. The Chairman, the
ranking minority member, and Chief of Stiaff of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee were briefed in late .Tuly. Under procedures established
within that committee, a notice of the CIA 'briefing was circulated
to all committee members. 'Vhen Senator Dick Clark, Chairman
of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs,
learned that the covert action program was in Africa, he requestBd
further details. On .Tuly 2R, Clark's subcommittee was briefed on the
paramilitary assistance program to the FNLA and, apparently, some
members of tIl(' subcornmittee objected.
In early September the Administration decided to increase its covert
military assistance to Angola by $10.7 million, bringing the total
amount to $25 million. Again, the required notifications were carried
OUt.26
In early November, Senator Clark raised his objections to the
Angola operation before the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The Committee in turn asked Director Colby and Secretary Kissinger
to testify, in closed session, on U.S. involvement in Angola. At this
meeting, several members of the Committee exprrssed their concern
for the program to Dirrctor Colby and 17ndrrsrcretary .Joseph Sisco,
who represented the State Department in Secretary Kissinger's
absence. Despite this concrI'll, in mid-Xovpmber President Ford and
the 40 Committee authorized the expenditure of another $7 million for
covert military assistance to Angola. In early December, the congressional
committees were notified of this new infusion of military
assistance.
Finding opposition within the briefing mechanism ineffective, Senator
Clark proposed an amendment to a pending military and security
assistance bill. In .Tanuary 1\)76 aftrr a complicated series of legislative
actions, additional covert milita 1')" assistance to Angola was prohibited
by Gongl-ess by an amendment to the Defrnse appropriations bill.
The dispute over Angola illustrates the dilemma Congress faces with
respect to covert operations. The Hughes-Ryan amendment guaranteed
information about covert action in Angola, but not any control
over this controversial instrument of foreign policy. Congress had to
resort to thr power of the Jlursr to express its judgment and will.
C. FDillrXGS .\X)) COXCLUSIONS 2Ga
CO\"elt action has been a tool of United States foreign policy
for the past 2R years. Thousands of covert action projects
26 On SeptemlJPr 25, 1975 the New York Times first reported the fact of U.S.
covert assistance to the FXLA and UNITA. The article stated that Director Colby
had notified Congress of the Angola operation in accordance with the HughesRyan
amendment, but "no serious objections were raised." There was little
reaction to the Times article, either in Congress or by the public.
26. See Appendix II which presE'nts summaries of recommendations regarding
covert action made to the Senate Select Committee during the course of its
investigation.
153
lmve been undertahn. An extensive record has been established on
which to base judgments o,f whether covert action shollld have a
role in the foreign policy of a democratic society and, if so, under
,vhat rpstraints of accountability and control. The Committee's examination
of covert action has' led to the follO\ving findings and
conclusions.
1. The Use of Oo,'ut Action
Although not a specific charter mission of the Central Intelligence
Agency, cOYel't action quickly became a primary activity. Covert
action projects were first designed to counter the Soviet threat in
Europe and were, at least initially, a limited anel ad hoc response
to an exceptional threat to American security. Covert action soon
became a routine program of influencing governments and covertly exercising
power-involving literally hundreds of projects each year.
By 1953 there were major conrt operations underway in 48 countries,
consisting of propaganda, paramilitary and political action
projects. By the 1960s, covert action had come to mean "any clandestine
activity designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations
01' persons in support of Fnited Statps forpign policy." Several
thousand individual conrt action projects have been undertaken
since 1961, although the majority of these have been low-risk, low-cost
projects, such as a routine press placement or the development of an
"agent of influence."
That covert action was not intended to become a pervasive foreign
policy tool is evident in the testimony of those who were involved in
thr drafting of the 1947 National Security Act. One of these drafters,
Clark Clifford, had this to say about the transition of covert action
from an ad hoc response to a frrquently used foreign policy tool:
It was the original concept that covert activities undertaken
under the Act were to be carefully limited and controlled.
You will note that the language of the Act provides
that this catch-all clause is applicable only in the event that
national security is affected. 28 This was considered to be an
important limiting and restricting clause.
Ho,vever, as the Cold ""Val' continued and Communist aggression
became the major problem of the day, our Government
felt that it was necessary to increase our country's responsibilities
in protecting freedom in various parts of the
,vorld. It seems apparent now that we also greatly increased
our covert activities. I have read somewhere that as time
progressed we had literally hundreds of such operations
going on simultaneously. It seems clear that these operations
have gotten out of hand.29
28 The CIA, under the 1947 Act, is directed "to perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct."
2Il Clil'lord, 12/5/75, Hearings, p. 51.
207-932 0 - 76 - 11
154
g. Covert Action "Success" and "Fai1Jul'e~'
The rewrd of covert aotion reviewed by the Conunittee suggests that
net judgments as to "success" or "failure" are difficult to draw."U The
Conunittee has found that when covert operations have been consistent
with, and in tactical support of, policies which have emerged from a
national debate and the established processes of government, these operrutions
have tBnded to be a SUCCBSS. Covert support to beleaguered
democrats in "'estern Europe in the late lU-!Os was in support of an
established policy based on a strong national consensus. On the other
hand, the public has neither understood nor accepted the covelt harassment
of the democra-tically elected Allende governmellt. Heccllt covert
intervention in Angola preceded, and indeed preempted, public and
congressional debate on America's foreign policy interest in the future
of Angola. The intervention in Angola was conducted in the
absence of efforts on the part of the executive branch to develop a
national consensus on Amerioa's intBrests in Southern Africa.
The COlmnittee has received exrtensive testimony that covert action
can be a success when the objective of the project is to support an individual,
a party, or a government in doing \vhat that individual, party,
or govermnent wants ,to d~nd when it has the will and capacity to
do it. Covert action cannot build political institutions where there is
no local political will to have them. 'Where this has been attempted,
success has been problematical at best, and the risks of exposure
enormously high.
The Committee's findings on paramilitary activities suggest that
these operations are an anomaly, if not an aberration, of covert
action. 31 Paramilitary operations are among the most costly and
controversial forms of covert action. They are difficult, if not impossible,
to concea1. They lie in the critical gray area between limited
inft.uence, short of the use of force, and ovelt military intervention.
As such, paramilitary activities are especially significant. In Vietnam,
paramilitary strategy formed a bridge between the two levels
of involvement. Paramilitary operations have great potential for
escalating into major military commitments.
Covert U.S. paramilitary programs have generally been designed to
accomplish one of the following abject.ives: (1) subversion of a hostile
government (e.g., Cuba); (2) support to friendly governments
3(l FQrmer Attorney GeneI'a1 and Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach
had this to say ,about covert action "success" and "failure" :
"I start from the premise that some of our covert activities abroad have been
successful. valuable in support of a foreign policy Which was understood and
approved by the electorate and Congress ... I also start from a premise that
some of our activities abroad have not been successful. and have been wrong and
wrongheaded. In some cases we ha'-I' grossly over-estimated our capacity to
bring about a desired result and ha,-e created situations unintended and undesirable."
(Nicholas Katzenhach testimony. House Select Committee on Intelligence,
12/10/75. Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 1797.)
31 The Committee studied, in detail, covert military opeI'ations in fh-e countries,
including Laos, Vietnam,and Angola. The Committee analyzed l}aramilitary
programs in terms of (1) executive command and control; (2) secrecy and
deniability; (3) effectiveness; (4) propriety; and (5) legislative oversight. The
latter issue is vital because paramilitary operations are directly related to, and
pose special problems for, Congress' authority and responsihilities in making
war.
155
(Laos); (3) unconventional adjunct support to a larger war etIOlt
(Korea, Vietnam, Laos after the middle HH:iOs).
There are two principal criteria which d~t~rmine the minimum success
of paramilitary operations; (1) achievement of the policy goal;
and (:2) maintenance 01 deniability. 1f the first is not accomplishecl, the
operatlOnls a fmlme in UJ1Y case; If the second is not accomplished, the
paramilitary option offers few if any advantages over the option of
overt military llltervention. On balance, in these terms, the evidence
points toward the failure of paramilitary activity as a technique of
covert action.""
Of the five paramilitary activities studied by the Committee, only
one <appears to have achieved its objectives. The goal of supporting a
central government was achieved~the same government is still in
power many years laU~r. There were a few sporadic repOlts of the
operation in the press, but it was never fully revealed nor confirmed.
In no paramihtary oase studied by the Commitree was complete
secrecy successfully preserved. All of the operations were repol'ted in
the American press to varying extents, while <they were going on. They
remained deniable only to the exUmt that such reports were tentative,
sketchy, and unconfirmed, and hence were not necessarily considered
accurate.
J. The hnpact of Oovert Action
Assessing ,the "success" 01' "failure" of covert ,aotion is necessary.
Just as important, however, is an assessment of the impact of covert
action on "targeted" nations and the reputation of the United States
abroad.
The impaot of a large-scale covellt operation, such as Operation
MONGOOSE in Cuba, is apparent. Less apparent is the impact of
small covelt projects on "targeted" countries. The Committee has
found that these small projects can, in the aggregate, have a powerful
effect upon vulnerable societies.
In some cases, covert support has encouraged a debilitating dependence
on the United States. In one \Vestern nation the covert
investment was so heavy ancl so persistent that, according to a former
CIA Station Chief in that country:
Any aspiring politician almost automatically would come
to CIA to see if we could help him get elected ... They were
the wards of the United States, and that whatever happened
for good or hacl was the fault of the United States.
Cyrus Vance, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, cited another
such ex'ample:
Paramilitary operations are perhaps unique in that it is more
difficult to wirthdraw from them, once stallood, than covert
32 For example, the covert paramilitary program in Laos certainly ceased to
he plausibly deniable as soon as it was revealed officially in the 1969 Symington
hearings of the Senate lforeign Relations Committee (it was revealed unoffidally
even earlier). If U.S. policy ",as the preservation of a non-communist
Laotian government, the vrogram ohviously failed. Some administration witnesses,
nevertheless, inclnding DCI Colby, cited the ",ar in Laos as a great
success. Their reasoning was based on the yie", that the limited effort in Laos
served to put pressure on North Vietnamese supply lines, and therefore "'as a
helpful 'adjunct of the larger U.S. effort in Vietnam.
156
operations. This is well illustrated by the case of the Congo,
where a decision was taken to withdrav, in early 1966, and it
took 'about a year and 'a half before the operation was terminalted.
Once a paramilitary operation is commenced, the recipient
of the paramilitary aid tends to become dependent
upon it and inevitably advances the argument that to cut back
or terminate 'the aid would do the recipient great damage.
This makes it especially difficult ,to disengage.34
In other cases, covert support to foreign political leaders, parties,
labor unions, or the media has made them vulnerable to repudiation in
their own society when their covert tips are exposed. In Chile,
several of the Chilean nationals who had been involved in the CIA's
anti-Allende "spoiling" operation had to leave the country when hp
was confirmed as PresidenJt.
In addition, the history of covevt action indioates that the cumulative
effect of hidden intervention in the socie!ty and institutions of a
foreign nation has often nm only transcended the actual threat, but
it has also limited the foreign policy options available to the Uni'ted
States Government by creating ties to groups and causes that the
United States cannot renounce without revealing the earlier covert
adtion.
The Committee also found that the cumulative effects of covert
aotion are rarely nmed by the operational divisions of the CIA in the
presentation of new projects or taken into 'account by the responsible
National Security Council review levels.
The Committee has found that cevtain covert operations have been
inoompatible with American principles and ideals and, when exposed.
have resulted in damaging this nation's ability to exercise moral and
ethioal leadership throughou't the world. The U.S. involvement in
assassina,tion plots against foreign leaders and the attempt to foment
a military coup in Chile in 1970 against a democratically elected government
were two examples of such failures in purposes 'and ideals.
Fmiher, because of widespread exposure of covert operations and
suspicion that others are taking place, the CIA is blamed for virtually
every foreign internal crisis.
4. The Executive's Usc of Cm'eFt Action
In its consideration of covert action. the Committee was struck by
the basic tension-if nm incompartibility-of covert operwtions and
the demands of a constitutional svstem. Secrecy is essential to covert
opemtions; secrecy can, however, become a source of power, a harrier
to serious policy debate wit,hin government, and a means of circumventing
the established checks and procedures of government. The
Oommitt~ round that secrecy and compal'tmenrtation contributed ,to
a temptatIOn on ,the part of the Executive to resort to covert operations
in order to avoid 'bureaucratic, congressionaL and public debate. In
a~dition, the Committee found that the major successes of covert actlO~
tended to encourage the Executive to press for t;he use of covert
actIon a..<; the easy way to do things and 'to ,task the CIA with difficult
requirements, such as running a large-scale "secreJe' 'War in Laos or
.. Cyrus Vance testimony, 12/5/75, Hearing'R, Vol. 7. p. 85, footnote.
157
ruttmnpting to overturn the results of a national eleation in Chilewithin
a five-week period.
The Committee found that the Executive has used the CIA to conduct
covert operations because it is less 'accountable than other governmentagencies.
In this regard, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
told the Committee:
I do not believe in retrospect that it was good national policy
to have the CIA conduct the war in Laos. I think we should
have found some other way of doing it. And to use the CIA
simply because it is less accountable for very visible major
operations is poor national policy. And the covert activities
should be confined to those matters that clearly fall into a
gray area between overt military 'action and diplomatic activities,
and not to be used simply for the convenience of the
executive branch and its acoountability.35
Under questioning, Secretary Kissinger went on to say that in Laos
there were two basic reasons 'Why the CIA was used to fight tha:t war:
"one, to avoid a formal avowal of American participation there for
diplomatic reasons, 'and the second, I suspect, because it was less
account'able." 36
The Committee has found that the temptation of the Executive to
use covert action as a "convenience" and as a substitute for publicly
accountable policies has 'been strengthened by the hesitancy of the
Congress to use its powers to oversee covert action by the CIA. Much
of this hesitancy flowed from the legitimate desire on the part of congressional
oversight committees to maintain the security of covert
action projects. But it also resulted from a reluctance on the part of
the approp6ate committees to challenge the President or to become
directly involved in projects perceived to be necessary for the national
security. Congressional hesitancy also flowed from the fact that congressional
oversight committees are almost totally dependent on the
Executive for information on covert operations. The secrecy needed
for these operations allows the Executive to justify the limited provision
of information to the Congress.
5. Maintaining a Oovert Oapability
Former senior government officials have testified to their concern
that the use and control of covert action is made more difficult by a
strong activism on the part of CIA operational officers. McGeorge
Bundy, a former Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to
Presidents Kennedy 'and Johnson, has st'ated :
While in principle it has always been the understanding of
senior government officials outside the CIA thaJt no covert
operations\\'oulcl be undertaken withotlt the explicit approV'al
of "higher authority," there has also been a general expectation
within the Agency that it was its proper business to generate
attractive proposals and to stretch them, in operation,
to the furthest limit of any authorization actually receivedY
'" Henry Kissinger testimony, 11/21/75, p. 54.
36 Ibid., p. 56.
;;; McGeorge Bundy testimony, House SelE'ct CommittE'E' on Intelligence,
12/10/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 1794-1795.
158
Clark Clifford, in testimony before the Select Committee, reinforced
this view:
On 'a num:oor of occasions a plan for covert action has been
presented to the NSC 'and authority request~d for the CIA to
proceed from point A to point B. The authority will be given
and the action will be launched. When point B is reached,
the persons in charge feel that it is necessary to go to point C
and they assume that the original authorization gives them
such a right. From point C, they go to D, and possibly E, and
even furt.her. This led to some bizarre results, and, when
investigation is started, the excuse blandly presented that
the authority was obtained from the NSC 'oofore the project
was 1'aunched.38
The activism referred to by Bundy and Clifford is reflected in part,
in the maintenanc~of a standing covert action capability and a worldwide
"infrastructure." The Committee found that one of the most
troublesome and controversial issues it confronted in evaluating covert
action was the question of the utility land propriety of the CIA's maintaining
a "'orldwide "infrastructure" (e.g., agents of influence, assets,
and media contacts). Are these "assets" essential to the success of a
major covert action program '? Or does this standby capability generate
a temptation to intervene covertly as an alternative to diplomacy?
There is no question that the CIA attaches great importance to the
maintenance of a worldwide clandestine infrastructure-the so-called
"plumbing"-in place. During the 1960il the Agency developed a
worldwide system oJ standby covert action "assets," ranging from
media personnel to individuals said to influence the behavior of governments.
39 In recent years, however, the Agency has substantially reduced
its overseas covert action infrastructure even to the point of
closing bases and stations. A limited infrastructure is still maintained,
however. For example, although the ljnited States has no substantial
covert 'action progmmin the \Vestern Hemisphere ,today, the CIA does
continue to maintain a modest cO\'ert action infrastructure consisting
of agents of influence and media contacts.
The CIA.'s infrastructure is constrllct~d in response to annual Operating
Directives. These directin>s set station prior'ities for both clandestine
collection and covert action!O The Operating Directives 'are
developed and issued by the CIA 'and informally coordinated with
concerned CIA geographic bureaus and the Department of State.
Therefore, the infrastructure that is in place at any given time is
there at the direction of the CIA.
The Committee finds several troublesome problems with the CIA's
development and maintenance of coveIt action infrastructures
3Il Clark 1\1. Clifford testimony 12/5/75, Hearings, Vol. 7, pp. ;'1-52.
"" During its 'assassination inquiry, the Committee found that certain CIA
assets, with the cryptonyms QJ/WIN, WI/ROGUE and A~I/LASH \wre in\'
ol\'ed, or contemplated for use in, plots to assassinate foreign leaders.
"For example, the Chilean Operating Diredi\'e for FY 1972 directed the
Santiago St'ation to: "Sponsor a program which will enable the Chilean armed
forces to retain their integrity and independent political power. Pro\'ide dire<'t
financial support to key military figures \Vho can he expected to de\'elvp a meaningful
following in their respecth'e sen-ices to restrain and, perhaps, topple the
Allende goyernment." The Select Committee found no e\'idence to indicate that
this "direct financial support" was pro\-ided.
159
throughout the world: (1) The operating decisions are made by the
CIA, although infrastructure guidelines are cleared with the State
Department; the Agency's Operating Dire0tivesare rarely soon outsidr,
the CIA and (2) the actual covert action projects which build
and maintain these infrastrnctures rarrly, if ever, go to the NSC for
approval.
The Committee finds that the independent issuance of Operating
Directives, and the fact that most covert 'action proieets which establish
and maintain t,he CIA's infrastructure around -the world do noc
go to the NSC, comlbine to shield this important clandestine system
from effective policy control and guidance. The Committee believes
that all small so-called "non~sensitive" projects which do not now go
to the NBC level for approval should, at a minimum, 'be aggregated
into appropri'ate country or regional programs, and then brought to
the NSC level for approval.
Covert. action should be the serTant of policy. Secretary Kissinger
made this point before the Committ€e when he testified:
If the diplomatic track cannot succeed without the covert
track, then the covert track w'as unnecessary and should not
have been engaged in. So hopefully, if one wants to draw a
general conclusion, one would have to say that only those covert
actions can be justified that support a diplomaitic track,41
G. Oonclusions
Given the open 'and democratic assumptions on which our government
is based, the Committee gave serious consideration to proposing
a. total ban on aU forms of covert '!tction. The Committee has concluded,
however, that the United States should maintain the option
of reacting in the future to a grave, unforeseen threat to United
States national security through covert means.
The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act
regtricts the CIA from undertaking "operations in foreign countries,
other than activities intended for obtaining necessary intelligence,
unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important
to the national security of the United States." 42 The Committee
has concluded that an even stricter standard for the use of covert action
is required than the injunction that such operations 'be "important to
the national securitv of the United States."
The Committee's review of covert action has underscored the neces~
ity for a thoroughgoing strengthening of the Executive's internal
review process for covert action and for the establishment of a realistic
system of accountability, both within the Executive, and to the Congress
and to the American people. The requirement for a rigorous and
credible system of control and accountability is complicated, however,
by the shield of secrecy which must necessarily be imposed on any
covert activity if it is to remain covert. The chailenge is to find a substitute
for the public scrutiny through congressional debate and press
a.ttention that normally attends government decisions. In its consideratron
of the present processes of authorization and review, the Committee
has found the following:
41 Henry Kissinger teSl:irnmlY, 11/21/75, p. 38.
,. RP{' p. 11)1, for full text of Hughes-Ryan amendment.
160
(1) The most basic conclusion reached by the Committee is that
covert action must be seen as an exceptional act, to be undertaken only
when the national security requires it and when overt means will not
suffice. The Committee concludes that the policy and procedural barriers
are presently inadequate to insure that any covert operation is
absolutely essential to the national security. These barriers must be
tightened and raised or covert action should be aband,oned as an instrument
of foreign policy.
(2) On the basis of the record, the Committee has concluded that
covert action must in no case be a vehicle for clandestinely undertaking
actions incompatible with American principles. The Committee has
already moved to condemn assassinations and to recommend a statute
to forbid such activity. It is the Committee's view that the standards
to acceptable covert activity should also exclude covert operations in
an attempt to subvert democratic governments or provide support for
police or other internal security forces which engage in the systematic
violation of human rights.
(3) Covert operations must be based on a careful and systematic
analysis of a given situation, possible alternative outcome. the threat
to American interests of these possible outcomes, and above all, the
likely consequences of an attempt to intervene. A former senior intelligence
analyst told the Committee :
Clearly actions were taken on the basis of some premises, but
they seem not to have been arrived at by any sober and systematic
analysis, and tended often, it appeared, to be simplistic
and passionate. In fact, there was often little or no
relationship between the view of world politics as a whole, or
of particular situations of threat held by operators on the
one hand, and analysts on the other. The latter were rarely
consulted by the former, and then only in parti'al disingenious
and even misleading ways.
It says something strange about successive DCIs that they
allowed this bifurcation, even contradiction, to obtain.43
The Committee has concluded that bringing the analysts directly
into the formal decision process would be a partial remedy to the problem
of relating analysis to operations. More important would be the
insistence of the Director of Central Intelligence that the political
premises of any proposed covert operation be rigorously analyzed.
(4) The Committee also concludes that the appropriate NSC committee
(e.g., the Operations Advisory Group) should review every
covert action proposal. The Committee also hold,s strongly to the view
"John Huizenga testimony, 1/26/76, pp. 6-7. The Committee found, in its
ease study of Chile, that there was Uttle or no coordination between the intelligence
analysts and the covert operators, especially in politically sensitive projects,
which were often restricted within the Clandestine Service and the 40
Committee. The project files for Chile gave no indication of consultation with the
Intelligence Directorate from 1964 to 1973. The exclusion of expert analytic
advice extended to the DCI's staff responsible for preparing National Intelligence
~Jstimates. Today, however, the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) is informed
by <the DDO of new covert activities. The DDI has an opportunity to
comment on them and offer recommendations to the DCI, but he is not in the
formal approval process.
161
that the small nonsensiti,-e covert action proposals which, in the aggregate,
establish and maintain the Agencv's covert infrastructure around
tIll.' world should be considered and analyzed by the appropriate NSC
committee. The Committee also belieYes that m-any of the small covert
,tetion proposals for projects would fall away when forced to meet the
test of being part of a larger cm-ert action operation in support of the
openly a,'owed policies of the Fnited States.
(5) 'Vith respect to congressional oversight of covl'rt action, the
Committl'(, belie\'('s that th(' appropriate oversight committee should
be informed of all significant cO\-l'rt operations prior to their initiation
and that all cm-ert action projects should be reriC\ved by the committl'c
on a semi-annual basis. Further. thl' oYersight committee should
require that the annual budget submission for co,-ert action programs
bc specific and detailed as to the activity recOlnmended. Unforeseen
covert action projects should be fundt'd only from the Contingency
Respn-e Fund which could lw repl<>nished only after the concurrence
of the oversight and any otht'r appropriate congressional committees.
The legislative intl'lligpnce oversight committee should be notified
prior to any withdrawal from the Contingency Resern Fund.

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