CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

MAJOR FINDING
The Committee finds that those responsible for overseeing, superYising,
and controlling domestic actiyities of the intelligence community,
although often unaware of details of the excesses described
in this report, made those excesses possible by delegating broad authority
without establishing adequate guidelines and procedural
checks; by failing to monitor and coordinate sufficiently the activities
of the agencies under their charge; by failing to inquire further after
receiving indications that improper activities may have been occurring;
by exhibiting It reluctance to know about secret details of programs;
and sometimes by requesting intelligence agencies to engage in
questionable practices. On numerous occasions, intelligence agencies
have, by concealment, misrepresentation, or partial disclosure, hidden
improper activities from those to whom they owed a duty of disclosure.
But such <leceit and the improper practices which it concealed
would not 1m,-e been pO&'3ible to such a degree if senior officials
of the Executive Branch and Congress had clearly allocated responsibility
and imposed requirements for reporting and obtaining prior
approval for activities, and had insisted on adherence to those
requirements.
8ubfindings
(a) Presidents have given intelligence agencies firm orders to collect
information concerning "subversiYe activities" of American citizens,
but have failed until recently to define the limits of domestic
intelligence, to provide safeguards for the rights of American citizens,
01' to coordinate and control the ever-l'xpanding intelligence
efforts by an increasing number of agencies.
(b) Attorneys General have permitted and even encouraged the
FBI to engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide
range of intrusin innstigative techniques-such as \viretaps, microphones.
and informants-but have failed until recently to supervise
or establish limits on these activities or techniques by issuing adequate
safeguards, guideline:,;, or procedures for review.
(c) Presidents, 1Yhite House officials, and Attorneys General have
requested and receind domestic political intelligence, thereby contrilmting
to amI profiting from the abuses of domestic intelligence
and setting a bad example for their subordinates.
(d) Presidents, Attorneys General, and other Cabinet officers have
neglected until recently to make inquiries in the face of clear indications
that intelligence agencies were engaging in improper domestic
activities.
(e) Congress, which has the authority to place restraints on domestic
intelligence activities through legislation, appropriations, and
(265 )
266
oyersig'ht committees. has not eifectiyely asserted its responsibilities
until lw'pntly, It has failerl to ddine tIl(' scope of donwstic intelligence
aetiyities or intelligence collection techniques. to 11l1COyer excesses,
or to propose legislatiYe solutions, Some of its membel's haye
failed to object to improper activities of which they were aware and
haw prodded agencies into questionable aetiyities.
(f) Intelligence agpncies haye often 11llrjertaken pr0l!rams "'ithout
authorization with insufficient authorization. or in disregard of express
orders.
(g) The ,wakness of the system of accountability alHI control can
be seen in the fact that many illegal or abusin (lonH'stic intelligence
operations were terminated only aftprthey had been exposed or threatened
with exposure by Congress or the ne,vs media.
E7abomtion of Findings
TIl<' Committee has found l'xcessl's committed by intl'lligencl' agl'ncies-
lawless and improper behaYior, intelTl'ntion in the drmocratic
process. oyerbroad intelligrnce targeting and colll'ction. and the usl'
of covert teelmiC[ul's to discredit and "neutralize" persons and groups
defined as enemies by the agencies. Rut responsibility for those acts
does not fall solely on the intelligence agl'ncies which committed
them, Systematic excessl's would not have occurred if lines of authority
had beell clearly defined; if procedlll'es for reporting and reyiew hacl
been established; and if thosl' rl'sponsibll' for snpl'rvising the intelligence
community harl properly rlischarged their duties.
The pressure of eYents amI the widespread confirlence in the FBI
help to explain the deficiencil's in command and authorization discoyered
by the Committee. 'Most of the aetiyities examined in this
report occnrrerl during pl'riorls of foreign or (lomestir crisis. There
was substantial support from the public and all branches of government
for some of the central objeetiYes of domestic intelligl'nce policy.
including the searrh for "Fifth Columnists" before ",Vorl(1 ",Yar II;
the desire to irlentifY communist "influence" in the Cold ",Yar atmosphere
of the 1D50s:'the demand for action against Klan yiolence in
the early l%Os: and thl' reaction to yiolent racial distnrbancl's anrl
anti-Yi~tnam war aetiyities in the late 11160s and early 111708, It was
in this heated enyironment that President and Attornevs General 01'dl'red
the FBI to investigate "subversive activities": Further. the
Bureau's reputation for effectiYelH'SS and professionalism. and Director
Roowr's ahility to cultivate political support and to inspire apprehension.
playerl a significant role in shaping the relationship between
t llf' FRI and t hl' rest of the Goyernment.
",Vith onlv a few l'xceptions. the domestic intelligencl' aetiyities reyie,
wd by the Committee were properly authorized1l·ithin the intelligl'nce
agPllcies. Thl' FBI epitomizes a smoothly functioning military
structure: actiyities of agents arl' closedly supenised; programs are
authorized onlv after thev han tranll'd a well-defined bureaucratic
circuit; and virtually all' adiyitil's-ranging from high-level policy
considerations to the minutia of daily reports from fiel(1 agenriesare
reduced to writing. These characteristics are comn1€'ndable. An
efficient law l'nfor('ement and intelligence-gathl'ring marhinr. acting
consistently ,vith law. ran great1.'" benefit the nation. Rowenl', ,vhen
usp(l for 'Hongful purposes, this efficiency ran posp a gran danger.
267
It appears that many specific abusrs ,,'ere not knO'Yll by the Attor!
ley Gr!leral. the Prrsident, or other Cabinpt-Ieycl officials directly
]'('sponsible for superyising dOIlH'stic intelligencc aetiyitics. But
whether or not particular activities were authorize(l by a President
or _\ttorncy General. those indiyiduals must-as the chief executiyc
and the pl'lncipa1 la~y enforcement officer of the rnite(l States Gm'Cl'nment-
bear ultimate responsibi lity for thc acti yitics of executi H'
agrncie,.; lllHlcl' their command. The President and his Cabinet officers
lWHI a (lnty to deh'rmine tIl(' nature of 'aetiYities cng-age(l in by executiyo
agencies :tlld to preyent undesil'ed adiyitie,.; from taking place,
This duty is particularly compelling when responsible officials have
reason to bpI ieH' that undesimble acti ,-ity is occurring, as has often
bren tlw caso in tIl(' conh'xt of domestic intelligencp.
The COlllmittee's inquiry has reycaled a pattern of reckless disregard
of acti,'ities that threatened om Constitlltional systplll. InteIliw'nco
agpncies were o]'(lpI'ed to inyestigate "subyel'sin' aeti,'ities," and
were tllPn usually lpft to determine for themselyes which aetiyities
'\'Pro "sub,'ersin';' and how those aetiyities should be inyestigated,
InteIligpnco agencies were told they could use ill\'estigativp techniques-'
YirP1aps, microphones, informants-that permitted them to
pry into the l1Iost \"I1lurd areas of privacy and wl'r(' then gi,'en in many
cases the unregulated authority to determine when to use those techniquesan(
l how long to continue them. Intelligencc agencips were encouraged
to gather "pure intelligence," which was put to political use
by public officials outside of those agencies. This was possibly because
Congress had failed to pass laws limiting the areas into which intel·
ligence agencies could legally inquire and the infonnation they could
disseminate.
Improper acts were often intpntionally concealpd from the Gowrnment
officials I'esponsible for supen·ising the intelligenct' agencies, or
llndertakrn without cxprcss 'Huthor'ity. Such beha,'iol' is inexcusable.
But equally inexcusable is the absencc of executi"c an(l congressional
owrsight that engendered an atmosphere in whiC'h the heads of those
agencies lwlieycd they could conceal acti,rities hom their superiors.
Attol'lley General Leyi's recent guidelines and the recommelHlations
of this Committee are intended to provide the necessary guidance.
"TIlCther or not tlw responsible Go,'el'llment officials knew about
improper intelligence activities, and even if the agency heads failed in
their duty of full (lisclosure, it still follows that Presidents and the
appropriate Cabinet offiC'ials 8hould have known about those activities,
This is 'a demanding standard, but one that must he imposcd. The
futlll'c of demorracy rests upon such account'ability.
Su7rfindinq (a)
Presidents have given intel1igence agencies firm orders to collect
information concel'lling "subversive activitips" of Amcrican citizens,
hut have failed until recently to define the limits of domestic intelligence,
to provide safeguards for the rights of American citizens, or to
coordinate and control the ever-expanding intel1igence efforts by an
increasing number of agencies.
As emphasizC'd throughout this report, domestic intelligence activities
haw been undC'rtaken pursuant to mandates from the Executive
branch, genC'ral1y issued during times of 'war or domestic crisis. The
268
directives of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and EisenhmH'r to investigato
"subycrsinJ activities," 01' other equally ill-define(l targets, ,,'ere
echoed in various orders from Attomeys General, who themselves encouraged
the FBI to undertake domestic intelligence activities with
vague but vigorous commands,
Neither Presidents nor their chief legal officers, the Attorneys General,
have defined the "subyen,ive activities" which may be investigated
or provided guidelines to the agencies in determining ,,,hich individuals
Or groups were engaging in those activities, No reporting
procedures ,wre established to enable Cabinet-level officials or their
designees to review the types of targets of domestic investigations and
to e,xercise independent judgment concerning whether such inyestigations
,,,ere warranted, No mechanisms ,,,ere established for monitoring
the conduct of domestic investigations or for (letermining if and when
they should be terminated. If Presidents had articulated standards in
these areas, or had designated someone to do the job for them, it is possible
that many of the abuses described in this report ,,,ould not have
oceurred,
Considering the proliferation of agencies engaging in domestic intelligence
and the overlapping jurisdictional lines, it is surprising that
no President has successfully designnted ono individual or body to
coordinate and supervise the domestic intelligence activities of the various
agencies. The half-hearted steps that were taken in that direction
appear either to have been abandoned or to have resulted in the concentration
of even more power in individual agency heads. For example,
in 1949 President Truman attempted to establish a control
mechanism-the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-to centralize
authority for supervising domestic intelligence activities of
the FBI and military intelligence agencies in a committee chaired
by the Director of the FBI. The Committee reported to the National
Security Council, and an NSC staff member was assigned
responsibility for intemal security.! The practical effect of the lIe
was apparently to increase the power of the FBI Director and to
remove control further from the Cabinet level. In 1962, the functions
of the JIC were transferred to the .Justice Department, and
the Attorney General was put in nominal charge of domestic intelligence,
2 ",Vhile in theory supervision resided in the Internal Security
Division of the .Tustice Department, that Division deferred in large
part to the FBI and provided little oversight.3 The top two executives
of the Internal Security Division were former FBI officials. They
1 ~ational Security Council memorandum 17/5, 6/15/49.
2 ~ational Security Action memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
:l For pxamplt>, the FBI continned an inrestigation of one gronp in 196-1 after
the Internal Security Dirision told the Bureau there was "insuffh-ient evidence"
of any legal viola ti~ns. (:\lemorandum from Yeaglcy to Hoover, 3/3/6-1.) Two
years later, an FBI intelligence official suggested that it would lie "in the Burpau's
hpst interest to put tlJe Dt'partment on record again."' The f)f>partment apprm"ed
the FBI's refIUest for IJermission to continue tht' invf>sti/.:"ation even though
tlll're had lif>en "no signifieant changf>s as to the character and tactics of th£>
organization." The FBI did not request further instructions in this inrestigation
untillD73, pIemorandum from Baumgardner to SUllivan, 7/15/66: memorandum
frolll Yeagley to Hoover, 7/21'/66.)
269
appeared sympathetic to the Bureau. and like the Bureau. emphasized
threats of Communist "influence" without mentioning actual results.4
Another opportunity to coordinate intelligence collection was missed
in UlfJ7. \yhrll .\ttonwy General Ramsry Clark rstablishrd thr Intrrdivisional
Intelligrnce {-nit (IDIF) to dra\y on virtually the entire
Frderal GOyenllllent\ intelligence collecting capability for information
concerning groups awl individuals "who may playa rolr. whetlll'r
purposrfully or not, either in instigating or sprrading ciyil disonlers.
or in preYenting 01' checking them." 5 In the rush to obtain intelligence~
no efforts \H're made to formulate' standards or guidelines for controlling
how the intelligence woul<1 be collecte<!. In the absence of such
guidelrnes awl under pressure for results, the agencies undertook
some of the most oYerly broad programs encountered by the Committee.
For example, the FBI's "ghetto" informant program was a direct
response to thr Attorney General's brOtHl rrqursts for intelligence.
The need for centralized control of domestic intelligence was again
giyen serious consideration during the Yigorous demonstrations against
the war in Vietnam in 1970. The intelligence community's program
for dealing with internal dissent-the Huston Plan- enYisiOlwd not
only relaxing controls on surveillance techniques. but also coordinating
intelligence collection efforts. According to Tom Charles Huston's testimony,
the President yiewed the suggestion of a coordinating body as
the most important contribution of the plan.8 Although the President
f{uickly reYokrd his approYal for the Huston Plan~ the idea of a central
<Iomestic intrlligence body had taken root. Two months later, with
the rncouragemrnt of Attornry Grneral .Tohn )fitchell. the Intelligence
Entluation Committee was established in the' .Tustice Department.
That Committee. like its preCllJ'sor, the IDIU. compiled and
rnlluated ra", intelligence; it did not exercise sUJwITision.9
The growing sophistication of intelligence collection techniques
underscores the present need for central control and coordination of
domestic intelligrnce activities. Although tIl(' Executi"e Branch has
• For example, tllP annual report of Assistant Attorney (il'neral J. "'alter
Yea~ley for Fiscal Yl'ar 1959 emphasized Communist attempts to wield intluencl',
without pointing out the lack of tangible results:
"Despite thl' 'thaw,' real or apparent, in the Cold "'ar, and despite [its] losses.
the [Communist] Party has continued as an or~anized force. constantly .~cekin.q
to repair its losses and to regatin its former position of intluellce. In a numher of
fields its activities are directed ostensibly toward laudahle ohjectiYes, such as the
elimination of discrimination hy reason of race, low c:Jst housin~ for the !'Conomicall~'
underprivileged, and RO on. TheRe activities are purRued in large part
a8 a 1cay Of e;rtC1uling the forces and currents in AlllPrican life, and with th('
hope ot being able to 'move in' on such movements when the time seems propitious."
[Emphasis added.] (Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal
Year 1959, pp. 247-24R. l
The same executives headed the Intemal Security DiYision from 1959 until
1970. throug;h the administrations of five Attorneys General and four PreRidents.
In 1971 a new Assistant Attorney General for the Internal Security DiYision,
Rohert :\Iardian. actively encouraged FBI surveillance and collaborated with
FBI executive "'illiam C. Sullivan in transferring the records of the "17" wiretaps
from the Bureau to the Xixon White House.
D :\Iemorandum from Attorney General Clark to KeYin Maroney, et aI., 11/9/67.
8 Tom CharIeR Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.
• Staff summary of interview of Colonel Werner E. :\Iichel, 5/12/75.
270
recognized that need in the past, it has not, until rerently, faced up to
its responsibilities. President Gerald Ford's joint dIod with members
of Congress to place further restrictions on \Yiretaps is a \H'1col1le step
in the right direction. Congress must act expeditiously in this area.
Snbfinding (b)
Attorneys General haYe permitted and e\-en encouraged the FBI to
engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide range of
intrusive investigative techniques-such as wiretaps, microphones,
and informants-but have failed until recently to supervise or establish
limits on these activities or techniques by issuing adequate safeguards,
guidelines, or procedures for review.
The Attorney General is the chief law ('nforcpment officer of the
rnited States and the Cabinet-Ie\'el officer formally in charge of the
FBI."° The .Justice Department, until recently, has failed to issue
directi ves to the FBI articulating the grolllHls for opening dompstic
intelligence inYestigations or the standards to be followed in carrying
out those investigations. The Justice Department has neglected to
establish machinery for monitoring and sUJwlTising the conduct of
FBI investigations, for requiring appro\'t\l of major inYestigative
decisions, and for determining \yhen an investigation should be terminated.
Indepd, in 1972 the Attorney General said he did not even
know \vhether the FBI itself had formulated guidelines and standards
for domestic intelligence activities, was not aware of the FBI's manual
of instructions, and had neYer re\-iewed the FBI's internal guidelinesY
The Justice Department has frequently levied specific clemands on
the FBI for domestic intelligence, but has not accompanipd thE'se
demands with restrictions or guidelines. Examples includE' the .J llstice
Department's Civil Rights Division's requests for rE'pOl'ts on demonstrations
in the early 1960's (including con>rage of a speech by GovE'rnor-
elect George "Wallace lla and COVE'rage of a civil rights demonstration
on the 100th anni\-ersary of thE' Emancipation Proclamation
12) : Attorney General Kennedy's efforts to expand FBI infiltration
of the Ku Klux Klan in 1964; 13 Attol'lley GeneraI Clark's sweeping
instructions to collect intelligence about ci\-il disorders in 1967; 14
and the Internal Security Division's request for more extem,in investigations
of campus demonstrations in 1969.'0 'While a limited inYestigation
into some of thE'se areas may have I)('en \varl'antecl, the improper
acts committed in the course of those inH'stigations were possible
because no restraints had been imposed.
The Justice Department also cooperated \vith the FBI in defying
the Emergency Detention Act of 19.10 by apJ))'oving the Bureau's Security
Index criteria for the im-estigation of "potentially dangerous"
10 Despite the formal line of responsibility to the Attorney General. Director
.J. Edgar Hoover in fact developed an informal channel to the White House. During
several administrations beginning with President Franklin Roosewlt the
Director and the President circumvented the Justice Department and dealt
directly with each other.
11. ;\Iemorandum from St. .Tohn Barrett to Marshall, 6/18/63.
118 l\Iemorandum from Director, FBI to Assistant Attorney General Burke
:\Iarshall. 12/4/62.
12 )Iemorandum from Director, FBI to Assistant. Attorney General Burke
13 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal "lear 19(');). JlJl. 18;)-18G.
14 )Iemorandum from Attorney General Clark to Hom-er. 9/14/G7.
15 :\Iemorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeaglpy to Hooyer. 3/3/GD.
271
persons,I6 Enll aftl'r Congress repealed the J)l'tl'ntion Ad. the .Tnstice
Department allmwd tIl(' Bureau to continue listing "potentially dangerous"
persons on [L ne\\' Administ rati \'(' I ndex. TIll' Ikpartment
stopped re\'ie\\'ing tIll' lwmes on tIll' FBI's index. and appal'l'ntly
l'1H10l'sed thr FBI's yip\\, that the list ('ould, ('ontrarY to la\\". hr USP(] for
dl'trntion purpos('s in an "en1l'rgen('y," '
Thr FBI's autonomy has ]wrll a prominpnt and long-accppted feahIre
of the Fpderal ])lll'('all('nttic tl'lTain, As ('ar1\' as tllr l!1-Ws the FBI
('oul(] opposP .Tustj('p J)rpartmrnt inquiries into' its in(('l'l1al aHail's hy
raising' Illl' specter of "leaks," 17 The DrpaJ'tlllent aCfjuir:-i('rd ill tllP Bure~\
l1's claim that it \"as rlltitled to withhol(] its raw fill'S. ('ollcral the
ir]entitirs of infor11lants.a]](l, in n numher of cases. rduse to gi \'(' the
.Tusticl' lkpartllH'nt eyidrncp supp01ting broa(] allrgations and characterizations,
FOl'l1wr Attorney Gelll'ra I Katzellbach has pointe(] out that
there \Yr]'l' both positin and llegatin' sides to the Bureau's r:.ntollomy:
Keeping the Bureau fn'e from political interfprrnce \\'as a
powerful argullwnt against ef1'01ts by politically appointed
officials. \Yhate\'er their motiYations. to gain a greater measurr
of control on'r operations of the Bureau.... [J)irector HoO\'er
also] found great yalue in his formal position as subordinate
to tIll' Attorney General and the fact that the FBI \yas a part
of the Department of .Justice.... In effect, he \Yas uniquely
successful in haying it both ways; he \Yas protected from public
criticism by ha ring [L theoretical suprrior \\'ho took responsibility
for his work, and was proteetrd from his suprior
by his public reputation. IS
As a eonseqnence of its autonomy, the Bureau could plan and imp]rment
many of the abusiYe operations described in this report. Former
Attornrys General have told thr Committee that they would neyer
have permitted the more unsavory aspects of the Xew Left or Racial
COIXTELPROs if they had been [L\\'are of the Bureau's plans. To
the extent that Attomeys General were ignorant of the Bureau's actiyities,
it \yas the consequence not only of the FBI Director's independent
political position, but also of the failure of the Attomeys Gel1l'1'a1 to
establish procedures fo1' finding out \vhat the Bllr<?all \Yas doing and
for permitting an atmosphere to evoln~ in which Bure.au officials
belieyed that they had no duty to report their activities to the .Tustice
Department, and that they could concral those aeti\,ities with little risk
of exposure.20 •
16 i\Iemorandum from Belmont to Ladd, 10/15/52,
17 Memorandum from Hooyer to L, M. C, Smith, Chief, Neutrality La\Ys rnit,
11/28/40.
18 Xicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Yo1. 6, p. 201.
20 The Justice Department's investigation of the FBI's COIXTELPRO illustrates
the reluctance of the .Justice Department to interfere in or even inlJuire about
Internal Bureau matter;;. Although the existence of COI:O\TELPRO \YaR made
public in 19,1, the .JuRtice Department did uot initiate all irn'eRtigatioll until 1974.
The Department';; Committee, headed by ARRistant Attorne~' General Henry Peter;;
en. \Yhlch ('onducted the investigation, agreed to u;;e only ;;ummarie;; of document;;
prepared by the Bureau inRtead of examining the Bureau documents
themselves.
Tho;;e summaries \Yere often extremely misleading. l<'or example, one summary
stated:
··It \Yas recomnwnded that an anonymous letter be mailed to the leader of the
BlackRtone Rangers. a black extremist organization in Chicago. The letter would
(Continued)
272
Attorneys GeJll'ral ha \'e not only neglected to establish procedures
for reyie\ving FBI programs and activities, hut they han' at the same
time granted the FBI authority to employ highly intrusive investiga,
tive techniques \vith inadequate guidelim>s and review procedures,
and in some instances ,,'ith no extemal rpstraints \vhatsoever. Before
1%;'), \viretaps required the appronl of the Attorney General in
a(1\'ance, but once the Attorney General had authorized wiretap
coverage of a subject. the Bureau could continue the sun'eillancc for
as long as it j1Hlged necessary.
This permissiyp policy was Clll'l'ent in October H)(iR ,vhen Attorney
General Hobert Kennedy authorized the FBI to ,vil'etap the phones
of Dr. ~Iartin Luther King, .rr. "at his currrnt acldrrss 01' at any
future address to which he mav move"~ and to wiretap the Ke\v York
and Atlanta SCLC offices."l Heading the Attorney General's wiretap
a,uthorization broadly, the FBI constl'11Pd Dr. King's "residence" so
as to permit ,virebq;s on threr of his hotrl rooms and the homes of
fripnds ,vith \vhom he stayed temporarily.22 The FBI was still relying
on Attorney General Kennedy's initial authorization when
it sought reauthorization for the King wiretaps in April 1965
in response to new procedures fornllllated by Attorney General Katzenbach.
Although Attorney General Krnnedy's authorizing memorandum
in October 196:) said that the FBI should IwO\-ide him with
an m-alnation of the ,viretaps aftrr 60 days. he failed tf) complain
,vhen the FBI neglected to send him the eYalllation. .Apparently the
Attorney General llPver mpntioned the wiretaps to the FBI again,
even though he receiyp(] FBI rrports from the ,vin'taps until he resigned
in September, 196-!,2'
The .Justice Department's policy toward the usc of microphonps
has been even more pprmissi\-e than for ,viretaps. rntil HHj:J, the
FBI was free to carry out microphone sllrnillal1ce in national security
casps without first sppking tIl(' approYal of the Attonwy Genpral
or notifying him nftenvHn1. The total ahsence of supen-ision enabled
the FBr to hide microphones in Dr. ~Iartill Luther King's hotel rooms
for nearly two years for the express purpose of not only determining
whether he ,yas being influel1('pd hy allegpdly communist ad,'isprs,
but to "attempf' to obtain information about the pri,-ate "activities
(Continued)
hopefully dd\'e a wedge between the Blackstone Rangers and the Black Panthers
Party. The anonymous letter would indicate that the Black Panther Party in
Chicago blamed the leader of the Blacl,stone Rangers for ,blocking their programs:'
The document from which this summary was deri\'ed, howe\,er, stated that the
BJa('kstone Rangprs wprp pronp to "\'iolent type acti\'ity, shooting'. and the like."
The anon~'mous letter was to statp that "the Pantllprs blame you for blocking
thpir thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you." The memorandum
concluded that the letter "may intensify the degrpe of animosity bptween the two
groups" and "lead to reprisals against its leadership." (~Iemorandum from Chicago
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/18/69.)
21 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoo\'er to Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
10/7/6.'3; memorandum from J. gdgar Hoo\'er to Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, 10/18/63.
22 Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 7/24/75, pp. 4-5.
z.l See ~I. L. King Rpport: "EIE'Crtronic Sur\'eillance of Dr. ~Iartin Luther King
and the Christian Leadership Confprpnce." It should be noted, howe\'er, that
President Kennedy was assassinated a month after the wiretap was installed
which may account for Attorney General Kennedy's failure to inquire about the
King wiretaps, at least for the first few months.
273
of Dr. King and his associatps" so that Dr. King could be "complptply
discredited." ~4 Attol'JlPy Gpneral Kpnnedy was apparently never told
about the nllcrophone surveillances of Dr. King, although he did
receive reports containing unaHl'ibuterl information from that surveillance
from \vhich Ill' might ha\'c cOllcludpd that microphoncs \vere
the source.20
The Justicp Dppartment imposed external control onl' microphones
for the first time in ~larch lUG;), \rhen .\Jtomey Gencral Katzenbacll
applied the same procedurcs to \viretaps and microphones, requiring
not only prior authorization but also formal periodic review."G
But irregularities \Yere tolerated eYen \vitll this standard. For example,
the FBI has pro\'icled the Committee three memoranda from
Director HoO\'pr, initialed by Attomey General Katzenbach, as evidence
that it informed the .Justice Department of its microphone
stllTeillance of Dr. King after the March 196;) policy change. These
documents, howe\'er, show that Katzenbach was informed aoout t.he
microphones onl.y after they had already been installrd."' Such aftrrthe-
fact approval \ras permitted under Katzenbach's procedurrs."'a
There is no indication that Katzenbach inquired further after rpceiving
tho notice. 28
The Justice Department condoned, and often encouraged, the FBrs
use of informant&-the innstigative technique with the highest potential
for abuse. HO\veYer, the .J ustice Department imposed no restrictions
on informant activity or reporting, and established no procedures
for reviewing tlll' Bureau's decision to use informants in a particular
case.
In 1954 the Justice Department entered into an agreement \vith
the CIA in which the CIA was permitted to withhold the names of
2-1 :\lemorandum from }'rederick Baumgardner to "'illiam Sullivan, 1/2:-;/64.
~; The FBI informed the Committee UUit it has no documents indicating that
Attorney General Kennedy was told about the microphones. His associates
in the Justice Department testified that they were never told, and they did not
believe that the Attorne~' General had been told about the microphones. (Sep
memorandum from Charles Brennan to 'Yilliam Sullivan, 12/19/66; Courtnpy
}jvans testimony, 12/1/75, p. 20; Burke ~Iarshall testimon~', 3/3/76, p. 43.)
'1'he question of whether Attorney General Kennedy suspected that the FBI
was using microphones to gather information about Dr. King must be viewed
in light of the Attorney General's express authorization of wiretaps in the King
case on national security grounds, and the FBI's practice--known to the Attorney
General---{)f installing microphones in such national security cases without notifying
the Department.
26 ~Iemorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 3/30/6;), p. 2. The
Attorney General's policy change occurred during a period of pulJlicit~' und
Congressional inquiry into the FBI's use of electronic surveillance.
27 Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 5/17/65; ~Iemorandum
from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 10/19/65; ~Ipmorandum from
Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 12/1/&').
"'" Katzenbach advised Director Hoover in September 1965 that "in emergency
situations [wiretaps and microphones] may be used subject to my latE"r ratification."
C\Iemorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/27/65.) ;'\evertheless, therE"
is no indication that these microphone surveillances of Dr. King presented
"emergency situa tions."
"Katzenhach testified that he could not recall having seen the notices, although
he ackriowledged the initials on the memoranda as in his handwriting and in
the locution where he customarily placed his initials. (Kat7.enbach. 12/3/75,
Hearings, Yo1. 6, p. 227.)
68-7860-19
274
employees whom it had determined were "almost certainly guilty of
violations of criminal statutes" when the CIA could "devise no
charge" under which they could oe prosecuted that would not "require
rC\'elation of highly classitied information." C" This practice \yas terminated
oy the Justice Department in January, lUi3. 2""
Despite the failul'l' of _\ttol'lleys Gelleml to exercise the supenision
that is necessary in the area of domestic intelligellce, senral
Attorneys General 1m\·e takell steps ill tIll' right direction. Of note
were Attorney Geneml ~ icllOlas Katzenoach's reyipw procedures for
electronic surveillance in l!.)(j;); I{alllsey Clark's refusal to approve
e~ectronic sUlTeillance of domestic intelligence targets and his rejectIOn
of repeated requests by the FBI for such sUlTeillance; Acting
Deputy Attorney (jcncra1 "'illiam Hucke1shaus' inquiries into the
Bureau's domestic intelligence program; Deputy Attorney General
Laurence Silberman's inquiry into political abuses of the FBI il.1
early lDi5; and _\ttorney General Saxbe's decision to make the ,Justice
Department's COIXTELPHO report public.
During the past year, Attorney General Edward H. Levi has exercised
welcome leadership by formulating guidelines for FBI inyestigations;
developing 1egislatiye proposals requiring a judicial warrant
for national security \viretaps and microphones; establishi~1g
the Office of Professional Responsibility to inquire into departmental
misconduct; initiating innstigations of allrged \\Tongdoing by the
FBI; and cooperating \vith this Committee's requests for documents
on FBI intelligence operations.3D The Justice Department's concern
in recent years is a hopeful sign, but long oyerdue.
Sub finding (c)
Presidents, ·White House officials, and Attorneys General have
requested and receiyed domestic political intelligence. thereby contributing
to and profiting from the abuses of domestic intelligence
and setting a bad example for their subordinates.
The separate finding on "political abuse" sets forth instances in
which the FBI was used by ·White House officials to gather politically
useful information, including data on administration opponents
and critics. This misuse of the Bureau's powers by its political
superiors necessarily contributed to the atmosphere in which abuses
flourished.
If the Bureau's superiors \vere willing to accept the fruits of excessive
intelligence gathrring, to authorize clrctronic surveillance for
political purposes, and to receive reports on critics which included
intimate details of their personal lin"s. thry could not credibly hold
the Bureau to a high ethical standard. If political expediency characterizrd
the drcisions of those eXj)rctrd to set limits on thr Burrau's
conduct, it is not surprising that the FBI considerrd the principle of
rxpediency endorsed.
.. :\Iemorandum from Lawrence Houston to Deputy Attorney General, 3/1/54.
2IJa :\Iemorandum for the Record hy General Counsel, CIA, 1/31/75.
:lO The Committee's requests also proyided the Department of .Justice with the
opportunity to see most of these FBI documents for the first time.
275
,'-I'ubft'nding (d)
Presidents. "\ttonH'YS GpneraL and otJJl'1' cabinet officprs hayp
nq!lectp(l, until I'pcpntiy. to makp inquil'il's in thl' fan' of c!Pal' iwlications
that intl'lliuencl' aul'ncies '''PI'P enuauin o' in improppr donH'stic
aetiyitil's, ,,",. ""' '""' '""' '""'
Executiye branch officials contri]mtl'(l to an atmospheI'l' in \,hich
excesses \\'l'rp possible by ignoring c!l'ar in(lications of PX('l',;sl's an(l
failing to take cOl'l'ectin' J1WaSIlrps \\'llPn (lirectly confronted \\'ith
illlpl'opl'r ])('ha \'ior. Thl' Committl'e\ findings on "Yiolating and Ignoring
the Law~~ illustratl' that se\'eral (lllp,;tionable 01' il1egal programs
continul'd aftl'r hip:hel' officials hall !Pal'lle(l partial ddails awl failp([
to ask for additional information, l'ithl'l' Ollt of thl' Jlain' assumption
tha't intelligence agencil''; \\'olt1(l not l'ngagl' in la\\'less cOll<luct, 01'
because they prefelTed not to])(' informe(l.:J!
Some of thl' most <listurbing l'xamplps of insufficient action in thl'
face of clear <langeI' signals \\'Pl'(, Ilncon'rl'd in thl' Committee's inyestigation
of the FBI',; program to "1H'utralize" Dr. .JIartin Luthl'!' King,
.Tr. as the leader of tIl(' ci \'il rig<hts monm1Cnt. The Bureau informe(l
the Committee that its fill'S contain no e\'idence that any officials outside
of the FBI "\,ere specifieally a\"are of any effol'ts, steps, or plan,;
01' proposals to 'discredit' 01' 'neutralize' King." ;;2 The rele\'ant executin
branch officials haye told the Committee that they \H're unaware
of 11 general Blll'eau program to (liscre(lit King. Formei' Attol'lley GenPral
Katzenbach, hO\\,en'1", ,tol(l the Committee:
Kobocly in the Department of .Tustice connected \"ith Civil
Rights could possibly haye been unaware of .JIr. Hom'er's
feelings [against Dr. King]. KoOO(ly cOlll<l lta\'e been llllaware
of the potential for (lisaster which those feelings elllbo<
lied. But, ginn the realities of the situation, I (10 not
belie"e one coul<l han anticipated the l'xtremes to which it
\\'as apparent Iy carripd.34
The e\'idencc before the Committee eonfirms that the "potential for
disastpr" \\'as indped clpar at thp tilllP. Therp is no question that
officials in the "'hitp HOll,;e allll .Justice Depal'tment, incllldil1g President
.Tohnson and Attol'lley Gpl1pral KatzPIlbach, knew that the Bureau
\Vas taking stpps to (liscredit Dr. King, aIthough they (li<l not
know ,the fu]] extent of the Bllrpall's dforts,
-In ,Tanuary HlGc! thc FBI ga\'c Presidpntial Assistant 'WaIter
.Jenkins an FBI report unfanlraule to Dr. King. According to a
contempOral1POlIS FBI nlPtIlOrandllm . .Jenkins said that he "\\'as of the
opinion that the FBI could perf01"111 a good sprvice to the cOllntr,)' if
this mattpr could sOlllehm\' 1)(' confidentially gi\'en to Illpmbers of the
press." .Jenkins, in a staff intenip\y, denied ]ul\'ing ma(lp sllch a
suggestion.a"
31 One cahinet official, '''hen told that the CIA wanted to tell him ';OInethingo
Recret, replied, "I would rather not kno,,~ an~,thing about it," The ",;pcret" matter
wa~ CIA'~ illegal mail opening program. (.r. Edward Day testimon~'. 10/22/7;'),
Hearings, Vol. 4. p. 45. l
33 Letter from FBI to the Senatp Seled Committee, 11/6/75.
31 KatzenlJach, 12/3/75. Hearing,;, Vol. 6, p. 209.
3.; :\I('morandlllll frolll Cartha DeLoach to .r. Edgar Hom·er. 1/14/64; Staff ~um,
mary of "'ultpr .Tenkin,; Inten'ipw, 12/1/75, pp. 1-2. ~Ir..Tenkin,; ';Ulmp(]llently
,;aid that he wa,; unahlp to t('~tify forlllall~' lJ('cau~e of illne~s and ha~ failpd to
answer written interrogatorip~ submittpd to him by the Committee for response
under oath.
276
-In FrlJrllary HHi4: a reporter informrd the .Justiee Department
that the FBI ha<l ott'errd to "leak" information unfanmllJle to Dr.
King to the press. The .J ustice Department':-; Press Chief, Edwin
Guthman, asked Cartha DeLoach, the FBI's liaison ,,-ith the press,
about this allegation and DeLoach denied any inyolyement. The .J ustice
Department took no further aetion.3G
-Bill ~Ioyers, an ~~ssistant to President .Johnson, testified that he
learned sometime in early 11.)64 that an FBI agent twice offered to play
a tapc reconling for ,Yalter Jenkins that \YOuld han been personally
embarrassing to Dr. King and that .Jenkins refused to listen to the
tape on both occasions.3nu Moyers testified that he neyer asked the FBI
why it had the tape or was offering to play it in the ,Yhite House.31
,Yhen asked if he had enr questioned the propriety of the FBI's disseminating
information of a personal nature about Dr. King within
the Goyernmenf. he replied, "I neYer questioned it, no." ,Yhen he \yas
asked if he could recall anyone in the ,Yhite House eyer questioning
the propriety of the FBI disseminating this type of material, ~foyers
testified. "I think ... there were comments that tended to ridicule
the FBI's doing this, but no." 38
-Burke ~Iarshall, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Civil Rights Diyision, testified that sometime in 1964 a reporter told
him that the Bureau had offered information unfayorable to Dr. King.
Marshall testified that he repeated this allegation to a Bureau official
and asked for a report. The Blll'eau official subsequently informed him
"The Director \yants you to know that you're a ... damned liar." 39
- In November 1964 the ,Yashington Bur'eau Chief of a national
nC\ys publication told Attorney General Katzenbach and Assistant
Attorney General l\Iarshall that one of his repOliers had been approached
by the FBI and offered the opportunity to hear some "interesting"
tape recordings involving Dr. King. Katzenbach testified that
he had been "shocked," and that he and l\Iarshall had informed President
.Johnson, \yho "took the matter very seriously" and promised to
contact Director Hoover.40 Xeither ~farshall nOl~ Katzrnbach knew
if the President contacted HooyerY Katzenbach testified that, during
this samr period, he learned of at least one other reporter who had
been offered tape recordings by the Bureau, and that he personally
confronted DeLoach, who was reported to have made the offers.42
DeLoach told Katzenbach that he had never made such offersY The
only record of this episode in FBI files is a memorandum by DeLoach
stating that ~Ioyers had informed him that the newsman was "telling
"",Memorandum from John Mohr to Cartha DeLoach, 2/5/65; J<Jdwin Guthman
testimony, 3/16/76, pp. 20--23.
3•• Bill :\Ioyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19.
37 Bill :\Io~-ers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19; staff summaQ- of Bill :\Ioyer;..; inten-iew,
11/24/75.
In an unsworn staff intprYie,,,, .Jenkins denipd that he e,-er recpiyed an offer
to listen to such tapes. (Staff summary of Walter .Jenkins inten-iew, 12/1/75.)
38l\Ioyers, 3/2/76, pp. 17-18.
"Marshall, 3/8/76, pp. 46-47.
• 0 Katzenhach, 12/3/75, Hrarings, Yo1. 6, p, 210.
":\Iarshall, 3/3/76, p. 43; Katzenhach. 12/3/75. Hearings. Yo1. 6, p. 210.
42 Katzrnbach. 12/3/75. Hearing;;;. Yol. 6, p. 210.
'" Katzenhach. 12/3/7:>, Hearings, Yo1. 6. p. 210. DeLoach testified hefore the
Committee that he did not recall conyersations with reporters about tape
recordings of Dr. King. (Cartha DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75. p. 156.)
277
all OWl' to\yn" that the FBI was making- alleg-ations cOJl('erning- Dr.
King, am] that :\Ioycrs hall "statc!] that the President fplt that Ithp
newsman] lackPd integ-rity....,. H ~Ioyl'l's could not 1'(>call this episode,
lillt to]l] the ('onllilittee that it ,,'mild ]'l' fair to l'onc]lldp that the
Pn'si(]ellt lUll] ]ll'Cll upsl't by the fact that tIll' m'\\'sman 1'(>n'a]ed the
Bureau's cOlll]ud ratllPl' than bv thr Burrau's conduct itself,'"
The response of top 'White IIouse and .Justice DepartlllPnt officials
to strong- indications of "Tong-doing- by the FBI was clearly inadequate.
Tlw ~\ttorney nenpra] \yent no fllrt Ill'r than complaining to
the Pn'sident and asking- a Burpau otlicial if tl\(, charg-es \Y('rp true.
Presidpnt Johnson appan'ntly not only failN] to order thp Burean to
stop, but illC]ped warncd it not to deal with cl'I'tain rqJOrtcl'',; l)('cause
thr.\' had complained about tlIP Hurrau's improper conduct.
In Hl68 Attornev General Hamsey Clark asked Dire('tor IIoon'r if
he had "anv infOl:mation as to ho~Y" facts about Attorney Grneral
Kennedy's ~uthorization of the \yiretap on Dr. King- hacl'lpakell to
colmnnists Thew Pearson and J aek Anderson. Clark rcC[uested the FBI
Director to "undertake whaten'!' iJl\'estigation y01l deem feasible to
drtermine how this happened."''" Director Hoover's rl:'ply, drafted in
the oflice of Cartha DeLoach. pxpresspd "(]ismay" at thl' leak and offered
no indication of the likr]y source.4.'b
In fact, Dr1.oach had prepa'rrd a nwmorandum trn days earJicr stating
that a middle-ll'w>I .lustiee 1kpartml'nt official with knowledge of
the King \yirrtap met \yith him and a<lmitted having "discussed this
matter with Drew Pparson.'· > \cconling- to this lllemOnuH]ulIl. DeLoach
attempted to persuade thr official not to allO\y the story to be printed
bpcausc "certain Xegro groups would still blame tlw FBI. \yhetIIP!' ,n'
\yere orderecl to take s1lch action or not." 4"c Thus. DeLoach and
Hoonr deliberately mislrd Attol'llry Orneral Clark by withholding
their knowledge of the soun'p of thr "leak."
Snbfinding (e)
Congress. \yhich has the authority to place restraints on domestic
intelligence actiyities throug-h legislation, appropriations. and oversight
committees, has not efl'rctin'ly assertPf] its responsibilities until
recently. It has failed to dpfi.Jw the sCOIW of domestic intelligence adivitirs
or intelligence collection teehniques. to 1111CO\'er excessps, or to
propose legislatire ,:olutions. Some of its nwmbers lin. \'P failpcl to object
to improper actiyities of \yhich they were a\yare and han prodded
ag-encies into questionable actiyities.
Congress, unlike the Executin' branch, docs not haw the function of
supen-ising tl10 da,\'-to-day acti\'ities of ag-pncirs engaged in dOllwStic
":\Iplllornmlnm from Cartha DpLoach to John :\Iohr, 12/1/64.
.. :\foyprs. 3/2/76, p, 9.
<Sa M('lllorandnlll from ('lark to Hooypr. ()/27/6K 'rhp storr "'as pnhlishpd in thp
midst of Rohert Kpnnpd~"s campai,(rJ) for tIl(' Dpmoerati(' prpsidpntial nomination.
<5b Mpmoramlnm from Hooypr to Clark. il/2i</6i<.
", Mpmorundnm frolll C, D, DpLoach to Mr, Tolson, 5/17/6K FOllr days latpr
DpLoach hal] a phonp ('onYNsation ",ith .Ta('k Anl1<'rson in \Yhi('h. a('('onling to
partm('nt. oftkial "ha(] adyispd him ('on('rrning srlt'cifk information inyo!ying- an
oJ<! ",ir" tap on King," Df"lllorandnm from C, D. DeLoadl to :\h', Tolson,
:'/21/6,11,) RotJl of thl'sp llIPlllOrnnl]a ",('rp initialpd hy HooYf'r.
278
intelligence. Congress does, howen'l'. haye the ability through legislation
to affect almost e,-ery aspect of domestic intelligence activity: to
erect the framework for coordinating domestic intelligence acti yities;
to define and limit the types of acti,-itirs in ,vhich executi,-e agencies
may rngage; to establish the standards for conducting inycstigations;
and to promulgate guidelines for controlling the use of ,viretaps, microphones,
and informants_ Congress could also exercise a great influence
oYer domestic intelligrnce through its powE'r oYer the appropriations
for intelligE'nce agencies' budgets and through the inYestigatin~
pmn'rs of its committE'es.
Congress has failed to establish precise standards governing domrstic
intrlligence. No congressional statutrs deal ,vith the authority
of executin~ agencies to conduct domestic intelligence operations, or
instruct the executive in how to stl"1wture and supervise those operations.
No statutes address ,vhrn or under ,vhat conditions inn'stigations
may be conducted. Congress did not attempt to formulate standards
for ,viretaps or microphones until Hln8, and even then avoided
the issue of domestic intelligence wiretaps by allowing an exception
for an undefined claim of inherrnt executiYe power to conduct domrstic
srcurity surYeillance, which was subsrquently held unconstitutional.
·Iod No legislati,-e standards have been enacted to gm-ern the
lise of informants.
Congress has helped shape the environment in ,vhich improper
intelligeilCe activities were possiblE'. The FBI claims that sweeping
provisions in several vague criminal statutes and regulatory measures
rnaded by Congress provide a basis for much of its domestic intelligence
activity.45e Congress also added its voice to the strong consensus
in favor of gOYernmental action against Communism in the 1950's and
domestic dissidents in the 19nO's and 1\)70's.
Congress' failure to define intelligrnce functions has invited action
by the executi,-e. If the top officials of the executive branch are responsible
for failing to control the intelligence agencies, that failure is
in part dur to a lack of guidance from Congress.
During most of the 40-year prriod conred in this report, congressional
committees did not effectively monitor domestic intelligence
activitirs. For rxample, in 19n6, a Senatr .Tudiciary subcommittee
undrrtook an inyestirration of electronic sUITeillance and other intrusi,'
e technic;nrs by Federal agencies. According to an FBI memorand.
um, its chairman told a delegation from the FBI that he would
makr "a commitment that he ,,-ould in no ,yay embarrass the FBI,"
and acceded in thr FBI's request that the subcommittee refrain from
ealling FBI witnesses. 46
"d F.8. v. U.8. Di.~trict Court, 407 r.s. 297 (1972).
". Thpse include the Smith Act of 1940 and the Voorhis Act of 1941. In addition
to reliance on these statutps to huttrl'ss its claim of authority for dompstic
intpl!igence opprations. ·the FBI has also placed reliance on a Ciril War seditious
couspiracy statute and a rehellion and insurrection statute passed during the
Whiskey Rehpllion of thr 1790's. FBI Din'dor Clarence Kelley. in II letter to
tlJP Attornp~' Genpral. statpd thllt thpsp latpr statutps were dl'signed for past
centuries, "not thp Twentieth Century." ().Iemorandum from Director, FBI.
to Attorney General, Hparing-s. Vol. 6, Exhihit 53.) The Committee agrees.
'" )'Iemorandum from DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 1/21/66.
279
Another example of the deficiencies in congressional oyersight is
seen in the House Appropriations COllllllittee~s regular approval of
tlw FBI's requests for appropriations ,vithout raising objections to
the activities described in the Director's testimony and off-the-rccord
briefings. There is no question that members of ri: House Appropriations
subcommittee ,vere aware not only that the Bureau ,vas engaged
in broad domestic inteJJigence inwstigations, but that it was also
cmploying disruptive tactics against domestic targets.
In 1958, Director Hoon>r informed the subcommittee that the
Burcau had an "intensi\·c program" to "disorganize and disrupt" the
Communist Party, that the prognllll had existcl] "for years" and that
Bureau informants ,vere used "as a disruptive tactic.~' 47 The next year.
the Director infol'llwd the subcommittep that informants in 12 field
offices
have been carefuJJy briefed to engage in controversial diseussions
with the Communist Party so as to promote dissention.
fadionalism anl] defections from the eommunist cause.
This technique has llPen extremely successful from a disruptin
standpoint.
rnder another phase of this program. ,yc have earefully
selected 28 items of anticommunist propaganda and have
anonymously mailed it to selected communists. carefully concealing
the identity of the FBI as its sourcr. More than 2,800
copies of literature haw lwpn plaeed in the hands of aetive
communists!'
lIoon'r drscribed morr aggressi n' "psyehologiral ,val'fare" trchniques
in 1962 :
During the past year ,w havr caused disruption at large
Party meetings. rallies and press conferenees through various
teclmiqurs such as causing thr last-minute cancrJJation of the
rental of tlw haJJ, packing the audirner with anticommunists,
arranging ad \·erse publicity in the prrss and making available
embarrassing fjurstions for friendly reporters to ask the Communist
Party funetionaries.
The Appropriations snbcommittee ,vas also told during this briefing
that thl' FBI's opl'rations ineludl'd exposing and diserrditing "communists
who arl' secrdl}' operating in legitimatl' organizations and
employments. such as thr Young Men's Christian Association, Boy
Scouts, civiC' groups. and thr likP:' 49
In 1I"l66 Diredor Hoowr infol'llwcl thl' Appropriations subcommittee
that the disruptive program had been extrndecl to the Ku Klux Klan.5Q
The present Associatr Direetor of tlw FBI, Kicholas Callahan, who
acrompanied Dirrctor Hoover lluring scycral of his appearances before
the Appropriations subcommittee, said that mrmbers of the snbeom-
47 19:;1' Fiscal Y"ar Bripfing; Paper Jlreparpd ll~· FBI for Hons" Appropriations
CommitteI'.
"19:;9 Fisral Year Briefing; Palwr prepared ll~' FBI for Honse Appropriations
Committpp.
40 19(;2 Fiscal Year Briefing; PappI' prellRrpd lly FBI for Honse Appropriations
Committpp.
50 19(;6 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared lJy FBI for House Appropriations
Committee.
280
mittee made "no critical comment" about "the Bureau's efforts to neutralize
groups and associations." 51
Subcommittee Chairman John Rooney's statements in a televised
interview in 1971 regarding FBI briefings about Dr. Martin Luther
King are indicative of the subcommittee's attitude toward the Bureau:
Representative ROOXEY. Now you tnlk about the F.B.I.
leaking something about ~Iartin Luther King. I happen to
know all about Martin Luther King, but I have never told
anybody.
Interviewer. How do you know Herything about Martin
Luther King?
Representative ROONEY. From the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Interviewer. They've told you-gave you information based
on taps or other sources about ~IartinLuther King.
Representative ROONEY. They did.
Intervviewer. Is that proper?
Representative ROONEY. 'Vhy not? 52
Former Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson recalled that in 1967
the Justice Department averaged "fifty letters a week from Congress"
demanding that "people like [Stokely] Carmichael 00 jailed." Vinson
said that on one occasion when he was explaining First Amendment
limits at a congressional hearing, a Congressman "got so provoked he
raised his hand and said, 'to hell with the First Amendment.'" Vinson
testified that these incidents fairly characterized "the atmosphere
of the time." 53
The congressional performance has improved, however, in re~ent
years. Subcommittees of the Senate Judiciarv Committee have initiated
Inquiries into Army surveillance of domestic targets and into electronic
surveillance by the FBI. House .Judiciary Committee subcommittees
commissioned a study of the FBI by the General Accounting
Office and ha H' inquired into FBI misconduct and suneillance activities.
Concurrent with this Committee's inn'stigations, the House
Selert Committee on Intelligence considered FBI domestic intelligence
acti vities.
Our Constitution envisions Congress as a check on the Executive
branch, and gives Congress certain pmvers for discharging that function.
Until recently, Congress has not effectively fulfilled its constitutional
role in the area of domestic intelligence. Although the appropriate
congressional committees did not ahvays know what intelligence
agencies ,,"erp doing, they could have asked. The Appropriations subcommittee
was aware that the FBI was engaging in acti,"ities far beyond
the mere collection of intelligence, yet it did not inquire into the
details of those programs.54 If Congress had addressed thp issues of
domestic intelligence and passed regulatory legislation, and if it had
probed into the acti,"ities of intelligence agencies and required them to
":\Iemorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 1/12/76.
52 Inten'irw witll Congressman Rooney, XBC Kews' "First Tuesday," 6/1171.
,," Frpd Yinson testimon~", 1/27/76, p. 34.
•• Dirpctor Hoo\,pr appears to lIaYp told thp suhcommittep of the House Approvriations
Committpe more ahout COIXTELPRO operations and techniques than
he told the Justice Department or the White Honse.
281
account for their deeds, many of the excesses in this Report might not
have occurred.
Sub finding (f)
Intelligence agencies ha\'e often undertaken programs \vithout authorization,
with insufficient authorization, or 1ll defiance of express
orders.
The excesses detailed in this report were due in part to the failure
of Congress and the Executive branch to erect a sound framework for
domestlc intelligence, and in part to the dereliction of responsibility
by executi \"e branch oiticials \vho \vere in charge of individual
agencies. Yet substantial responsibility lies \yith officials of the intelligence
agencies themsclYes. They had no justification for initiating
major activities without first seeking the express approval of their superiors.
The pattern of concealment and partial and mislea(lin~ disclosures
must never again bc allO\vcd to occur.
The Committee's investigations han~ revealed numerous instances
in which intelligence agencies haye assumed programs or activities
were authorized under CIrcumstances \yhere it could not reasonably be
inferred that higher officials intended to confer authorization. Sometimes
far-reaching domestic programs were initiated without the
knowledge or approYal of the appropriate official outside of the agencies.
Sometimes it was claimed that higher officials had been "notified"
of a program after they had been informed only about some
aspects of the program, or after the program had been described with
vague references and euphemisms, such as "neutralize," that carried
different meanings for agency personnel than for uninitiated outsiders.
Sometimes notice consisted of references to programs buried in
the details of lengthy memoranda; and "authorization" was inferred
from the fact that higher officials failed to order the agency to discontinue
the program that had been obscurely mentioned.
The Bureau has made no claim of outside authorization for its
COIKTELPROs against the Socialist Workers Party, Black Kationalists,
or Kew Left adherents..After 1960, its fragile claim for authorization
of the COIXTELPHOs against the Communist Party USA and
'Vhite Hate Groups was drawn from a series of hints and partial, obscm"
ed disclosures to the Attornevs General and the ,Yhite House.
The first eyidence of notificatio;l to higher government officials of
the FBI's COIXTELPHO against the COllllllunist Party uSA consists
of letters from Director IIooyer to President Eisenhower and Attorncy
General "'illiam Hogers in .:\Iay 19;')8 informing them that "in
August of 1956, this Bureau initiated a program designed to promote
disruption ,vithin the ranks of the COlllmllllist Party (CP) USA." 55
There is no record of any reply to these letters.
Later that same year, Director Hoover told President Eisenhower
and his Cabinet: . .
To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in
the l'nited States, we ha\"e a ... program designed to intensify
any confusion and dissatisfaction among its members.
IN ;\Iemorandllll1 from the Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.
282
During the past fe\v years, this program has been most effective.
Selected informants \yere briefed and trained to raise
controversial issues ,,"ithin the Party.... The Internal Revenue
Sen"ice was furnished JUlmps an(l addrf'sses of Party funetionaries
\yho had been active in the llnclergrolllHl a'pparatllS
... : Anticollllllllnist literature a;ld simulated Party documents
\\'('1'(' lnailed anonymously to carefully chosel1 members....
56 .. v
The FBI's only claim to ha \-ing notified the Kennedy Administration
about COI~TELPRO rests upon a letter \uitten shortly before
the inauguration in January 1961 from Dirf'etor lIoonr to Attorney
General-designate Robert Kennedy. Deputy Attorney General-designate
Byron R. 'White, and Secretary of State-designate Dean Husk.
One paragraph in the fin-page letter stated that the Bureau had a
"carefully planned program of counterattack against the CPGSA
which keeps it off balance," and which was "carried on from both inside
and outside the party organization." The Bureau claimed to haye
been "suecessful in preventing communists from seizing control of legitimate
mass organizations" and to haye "discredited others who were
secretly operating inside such organizations." 51 Specifie teehniques
were not mentioned, and no additional notice was provided to the Kennedy
Administration. Indeed, when the Kennedy "\Vhite House formally
requested of HoO\-er a report on "Internal Security Programs," the
Direetor described only the FBI's "investigatin program," and made
no reference to disruptive activities. 58
The only claimed notice of the COINTELPRO against the Ku
Klux Klan was given after the program had begun and consisted of
a partial deseription buried within a discussion of other subjects. In
September 1965, copies of a two-page letter \vere sent to President
Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach, describing the Bureau's
success in solving a number of cases invohing racial violence in the
South. That report contained a paragraph stating that the Bureau was
"seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities of Klan organizations,"
and briefly described the exposure of a Klan member's "kickback"
scheme involving insurance company premiums.51l More questionable
tactics., such as sending a letter to a Klansman's wife to destroy
their marriage, were not mentioned. The Bureau viewed Katzenbach's
reply to its letter-which praises the investigative successes
which are the focus of the FBI's letter-as constituting authorization
for the White Hate COINTELPRO.60
The claimed notification to Attorney General Hamsey Clark of the
White Hate COINTELPHO consisted of a ten-page memorandum
captioned "Ku Klux Klan Investigations-FBI Accomplishments"
with a buried reference to Bureau informants "removing" Klan officers
and "prOVOking scandal" within the Klan organization 61 Clark
56 E)xcerpt from FBI Director's Briefing of Cabinet, 11/6/58.
67 Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 1/10/61,
copies to White and Rusk.
58 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to McGeorge Bundy, 7/25/61, and attached
I.I.C. Report: "Status of U.S. Internal Security Programs."
,. Letters from Hoover to ~Iarvin \Yatson, Special Assistant to the President,
and Attorney General Katzenbach, 9/17/6.').
00 Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/3/65.
61 ~Iemorandum from Hoover to Clark, 12/18/67.
283
told the Committee that he did not recall rrading those phrases or
interpreting tllPlIl as notice that the Bureau was engaging in disrnpti,-e
tactics 62 Cartha DeLoach, Assistant to the Director during this period,
trstified that he "distinctly" recalled briefing Attorney General Clark
"generally ... concerning COIKTELPRO:' 63 Clark denied having
been briefed.G
'
The letters and briefings described abow, which constitute the Bure~
lU's rntire claim to notice and authorization for the CPUSA and
1\11ite Hate COIXTELPROs, failed to mention techniqnes which
risked physical, emotional, or economic harm to their targets. In no
case \vas an Attornev General clearly told tIl(' nature and extent of the
programs amI askefl for his appl'o'-al. III ]lO case \ras approval expressly
given.
Former Attorney (}eneral Katzenbach cogently described another
misleading form of "authorization" relied on by the Bureau and other
intC'lligence agencies:
As far as ~fr. Hoo,-er \vas concerned, it was sufficient for the
Bureau if at any time any Attorney General had authorized
[a particular] activity in any circumstances. In fact, it \Vas
often sufficient if any Attorney General had written something
which could be construed to authorize it or had been informed
in some one of hundreds of memoranda of some facts
from \vhich he could conceivably han inferred the possibility
of such an activity. Perhaps to a permanent head ~f a
large bureaucracy this seems a reasonable \Vay of proceedmg.
Ho\Vevrr, there is simply no \Vay an incoming Cabinet officer
can or should be charged with C'ndorsing eYery deeision of
his predecessor....65
For example, the CPUSA COIXTELPHO \vas substantially drscribed
to the Eisenho\Vrr Administration, obliquely to the Kennedy
Administration designees, but continued-apparently solely on
the strength of those, assumed authorizations-through the Johnson
Administration and into the Xixon Administration. The idea that
authority might continue hom one administration to the next and
that there is no duty to reaffirm authority inhibits responsible decision
making. Circumstancrs may change and judgments may differ. New
officials should be giYN1-and should insist upon-the opportunity to
revie\y significant programs.
The CIA's mail opening project illustrates an instance in which an
intelligence agency apparC'ntlv receiYed allthorization for a limite(l
program and then expanded that program into significant new areas
withont seeking fmther allthorization. In ~IaY Hl54, DCI Allen Dulles
and Richard Hrlms, tJwn Chid of Operations in the CIA's DirectoratC'
of Plans. briefed Postmastrr General Arth\ll' Summerfield about the
CIA's Xe\V York mail project, which at that time im'olved only the
examination of envelope exteriors. CIA memoranda indicate that
Summerfield~sapproyal \Vas obtainC'd for photographing envelope exteriors,
but no mention was madC' of the possibility of mail oprlling.66
62 Clark, 12/g/75, HearingH, Yol. 6. p. 235.
6' DeLoadl, ]2/g/7i'i, HearingH. 1'01. 6, p. ]1'.3.
6t Clark, 12/3/75. HearingH, 1'01. 6, p. 232.
65 Katzenbac-h, 12/3/75, HearingH. 1'01. 6. p. 202.
""Memorandum from Ric-hard HellllH, Chief of OperatiollH, DDP, to Director
of Seeurity, 5/17/54.
284
The focus of the CIA~s project shifted to mail opening sometime during
the ensuing yeal'~ but the CIA did not return to infonl1 Summerfield
and made no att~mpt to secure his approval for this illegal
operation.
Intelligence officers have sometimes withheld information from
their superiors and concealed programs to prC\'ent discon~ry by their
superiors. The Bureau apparently ignored the Attorney General's
order to stop classifying persons as "dangerous" in 19+3; unilaterally
decided not to provide the Justice Department "'ith information about
communist espionage on at least t,,'o occasions "for security reasons i"
and withheld similar information from the Presidential Commission
investigating the government's security program in 1947.67 More recently~
CIA and KSA concealed from President Richard Xixon their
respecti.-email opening and communications interception programs.
These incidents are not unique. The FBI also concealed its Reserve
Index of prominent persons "'ho ,,'ere not included on the Security
Index reviewed by the .Tustice Department; its other targeting programs
against "Rabhle Rousers," "Agitators,'~ "Key "\ctivists." and
"Key Extremists;" and its use of intrusive mail opening and surrepititious
entry techniques. Indeed, the FBI institutionalized its
capability to conceal acti"ities from the Justice Department by establishing
a regular "Do Kot File'~ procedure. which assured internal
control while frustrating external accountability.
Subfinding (g)
The weakness of the syst~m of accountability and control can be seen
in the fact that many Illegal or abusi"e doniestic intelligence operations
,vere terminated only after they had been exposed or threatened
with exposure by Congress or the news media.
The lack of vigorous oversight and internal controls on domestic
intelligence activity frequently left the termination of improper programs
to the ad hoc process of public exposure or threat of exposure
by Congress, the press, or private citizens. Less frequently, domestic
intelligence projects were terminated solely because of an agency's
internal re"iew of impropriety.
The Committee is aware that public exposure can jeopardize legitimate,
productive, and costly intelligence programs. 'Ye do not condone
the extralegal activities which led to the exposure of some questionable
operations.
Nevertheless two point emerge from an examination of the termination
of numerous domestic intelligence acti"ities: (1) major illegal
or improper operations thrived in an atmosphere of secrecy and inadequate
executive control; and (2) public airing proved to be the
most effeetive means of terminating or reforming those operations.
Some intelligence officers and Executive branch administrators
sought the termination of questionable programs as soon as they
became aware of the nature of the operation-the Committee praises
their actions. However. too often we han seen that the secrecy that
protected i11C'gal or improper adivities and the insular nature of the
agenriC's im-olved prHf'ntC'd intC'lligC'nce officf'rs from questioning
their actions or realizing that they were wrong.
67 See Part II. pp. 35-36. 55-56.
285
There are sEweral noteworthy examples of illegal or abusiw domestic
intelligence actiyities \yhich \yere terminated only after the threat
of public exposure:
-The FBI's widesweeping COIKTELPRO operations were terminated
on April 2i, IDil, in response to disclosures about the program
in the press. 73
-IRS payments to confidential informants were suspended in
March IDi5 as a result of journalistic inyestigation of Operation
Leprechaun. 71
-The Army's termination of sHeral major domestic intelligence
operations, \dlich \yere clearly oH'rbroad or illegal, came only after
the programs were disclosed in the press or were scheduled as the
subject of congressional inquiry.75
-On one occasion, FBI Director Roonr insisted that deetronic surveillance
be discontinued prior to his appearance before the House
Appropriations Committee so that he could report a relatinly small
number of wiretaps in place.'6 Contrary to frequent allegations, however,
no general pattern of temporary suspensions or terminations
during the Director's appearances before the House Appropriations
Committee is revealed by Bureau records.
-Follo\ving the report of a Presidential committee which had been
established in response to news reports in 196i, the CIA terminated
its covert relationship \vith a large number of domestically based organizations,
such afi academic institutions; student groups, prinlte foundations,
and media projects aimed at an intemational audience.78
Other examples of curtailment of domestic intelligence activity in
response to the prospect of public exposure include: President Nixon's
'" ~Iemorandum from Brennan to ~ulliYan, 4/27/71: letter from Director, FBI,
to all Field Offices, 4/28/71. Eyen after the termination of COINTELPRO, it
was suggested that "counterintelligenee aetion" would be considered "in exceptional
instances" so long as there were "tight procedures to insure absolute
secreey" (SulliYan memorandum, 4/27/71; letter from Director, FBI to all Field
Offiees, 4/28/71.)
74 See IRS Revort: "Operation Levrechaun."
7U The Army made its first effort to curh its domestie collection of "civil disturbance"
intelligence on the political activities of primte citizens in ,June 1970,
only after press diselosures about the program whieh prompted two Congressional
committ.ees to schedule hearings on the matt.er. (Christopher Pyle,
"CONFS Intelligence: The Army 'Watches Ci,-ilian Politics" ll'a8hington
Monthly, January 1970.) Despite legal opinior.s, both from inside and outside the
Army, that domestic radio monitoring by the Army Security Agency was illegal,
the Army did not move to terminate the program until after the media revealed
that the Army Security Agency had monitored radio transmissions during the 1!l68
J)emocratic Xational Com-ention Ofemorandulll from Army Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence to the Army General Counsel re: liPASA Covert Activities
in Civil Disturbance Control Operations.) Department of Defense controls on
domestic surveillance were not imposed until ~Iarch 1971, after KBC News
reported that the Army had placed Senator Adlai Stevenson III and Congressman
Almer :\IikYa under sun-eillance_ (NBC Xews, "First Tuesday", 12/1/70.)
"This involved nine of the so-called "17" wiretaps in February 1971. (Report
of the Committee on the JUdiciary, House of RepresentatiYes, 8/20/75, pp. 148,
149. )
78 This included nine of the so-called "17" wiretaps in February 1971.
In rpsponse to the storm of public and congressional criticism engendered
hya press account of CIA support for a student organization, President .Johnson
appointed a ComIllittpe, chaired by then Under Secretary of State Nicholas
Katzenbach, to rpYiew government activities that "endanger the integrity and
independence" of United States educational and private voluntary organizations
which operate abroad. In March 1967, the Committee recommended "that no federal
agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or
(Continued )
286
revocation of approval for the Huston Plan out of concern for the
risk of disclosure of the possihle illegal actions propospd and the
fact that "their sensitivity \\'ould likely generate media criticism if
they were employed;" 79 .r. E(lgar HoO\'er's cessation of the bugging
of Dr. Martin Luther King, .Tr.'s hotel rooms aftC'l' the initiation of a
Senate inn'stigation chaired hy Edward Y. Long of )lissollri: 80
and the CIA's consideration of suspending mail-opening' until thp Long'
inquiry abated and eventual termination of the program "ill the ,Yatergate
climate." 81 )lo1'e rec()lltly. 8P\"(,1'al questiollahlp domestic intplligence
practices have bepn terminated at least in part as a result of
Congressional investigation.82
(Continued)
indirl.'ct, to any of the nation's l.'ducational or priYate Yoluntary organizations."
The CIA responded with a major reYil.'w of such projects.
The question of the nature and extl.'nt of the CIA's compliance with the
Katzenbach guidelines is discussed in the Committee's Foreign Intl.'lligl.'nce
Rl.'llort.
79 Rl.'sponsl.' by Richard Xixon to Intl.'rrogatory Xumbl.'r 17 posl.'d h~' Sl.'natl.'
Sl.'ll.'ct Committl.'l.'.
BO On January 7, 1966, in response to Associate Director Tolson's recommendation,
Director Hooyer "!"eser,e[d] final decision" about whether to discontinue
all microphone surveillance of Dr. King "until DeLoach sees [Senator Edward
V.] Long." (Memorandum from SulliYan to DeLoach, 1/21/66.) The only occasion
on which the FBI Director rejected a recommendation for bugging a hotel room
of Dr. King's was ,Tanuary 21. 196fi, thp same da~' that Assistant Dirl.'ctor DeLoach
met with an aide to Senator Long to try to hl.'ad off the Long Committee's
hl.'arings on the suhjl.'ct of FBI "bugs" and taps. (:\Iemorandum from Dl.'Loach
to Tolson, 1/21/66.) When DeLoach returned from the ml.'eting. he reported:
"While we haye neutralized the threat of being embarrassl.'d hy the Long
Suhcommittee, we haye not yet eliminated certain dangers which might be
crl.'ated as a result of newspapl.'r pressure on Long. We therefore must kel.'p on
top of this situation at all times." plemorandum. EXl.'cutiYes Confl.'rence to til('
Director, 1/7/66.)
Another possible explanation for HooYer's cessation of the King hotl.'l bugging
is found in the impact of a memorandum from the Solicitor General in the
Black case which Hooyer apparently intprpreted as a restriction upon the }<'RI's
authority to conduct microphone surveillance. (Suppll.'mental memorandum for
the Fnited States, U.S. Y. Blaele, submitted by Solicitor General Thurgood
:\Iarshall, 7/13/66; Katzenhach, 10/11/7:;. p. :;,'<.)
81 In 1965, the Long Subcommittee in,estig-ation caused the CIA to consider
whether its major mail opening "operations should be partially or fully
suspended until the subcommittee's inYestigations are completed." WIlPn the
CIA contacted Chief Postal Inspector Henry :\Iontague and learned that he belieYed
that the Long inYestigation would "soon cool off," it was decided to continue
the operation. (:\Iemorandum to the files by "CIA officer." 4/23/65.)
Despite continued apprehensions ahout thl.' "flap potl.'ntial" of expo/;url.'
and repeated recognition of its illegality, the actual tl.'rmination of the CIA's
Kew York mail-opening project caml.', according to CIA Office of Security Director
Howard Osborn because: "I thought it was illl.'gal and in the 'Vatergate
climate we had absolutl.'ly no businl.'ss doing this." (Howard Osborn deposition,
8/28/7fl, p, 89,) He discussed the matter with William Colby who agreed that the
project was illegal and should not be continued, "particularly in a climate of that
type." (Osoorn deposition, 8/28/75, p, 90.)
82 Shortly after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Actiyities held
hearings on the laxity of the system for disclosure of tax return information
to Unitl.'d States attorneys, the practice was changed. In October 1975, U.S.
Attorneys rl.'questing tax return information were required by the IRS
to proyide a sufficient explanation of the nPed for the information and
the intended use to which it would be put to enable IRS to ascl.'rtain thl.' Yalidity
of the request. Opl.'ration SHA:\IROCK, l\"SA's program of obtaining- millions
of intl.'rnational telegrams, was terminated in :l\Iay 197fl, according to a sl.'nior
XSA official, primarily becausl.' it was no longl.'r a yaluabll.' source of forl.'ign
intelligence and because the Sl.'nate Select Committee's inYl.'stigation of thl.'
program had increasl.'d the risk of exposure. (Staff summary of "sl.'nior l\"SA
official" interview, 9/17/75, p. 3.)
287
There are seyeral prominent instances of trrminations ,,'hich resulted
from all illtel'llalre,'iew process:
-In August 197:3, shortly after taking office, Intrrnal Heycnue
Service Commissioner Donald Alexander abolished the Special SelTice
Staff upon learning that it was engaged in political intelligence acti,'ities
wInch he considered "antithetical to proper tax administration." S3
-An internal legal rC\'iew in 1Di;~ prompted the termination of the
joint effort b~' KSA and CIA to monitor l-nitecl States-South American
comlllulllcations by indi yiduals namell on a drug traffie "watch
list." 84
-On )Iay D, IDia, newly appointPll CIA Director .Tames Sehlrsinger
n'questell from CIA Iwrsonnd an in n'ntory of all "qurstionable
aetiyities" ,,'hich tlIP "\geney had undertaken. Thl' {)D-! pages of memoranda
recein'd in response to this n'qllest-,vhich became known at
the CIA as "The Family .Jewels·'-prompted the teJ'lIIination 01' limitation
of a number of programs which were in violation of the
the Agency's mandate, notably the CHAOS projrct innllying intelligence-
gathering against Amrrican citizens,'"
-In the early l%Os, the CIA's )IKCLTHA testing program, \yhich
inyolvrd slllTPptitiollSly administrring drugs to lm\"itting persons,
1<, IJonald AIE'Xander testimony, 10/2/75, Hearings, Yo1. i:l, p, R Alexander testifit'd,
llOwen'r, that in a mel'ting with IRS administrators on the day aftpr he took
officE', the SSS was discussed, and "full disclosurE''' was not madE' to him. Prior
to the Leprl'ehaun re"E'lations, CommissiOilPr AlexandE'r had also initiated a general
review of IRS information-gathering and retrieval systems, and he had already
suspended certain types of information-gathering due to discovery of vast
ljuantitil's of non-tax-related material. (All'xander, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, pp.
K-I0. )
Another termination duE' to intefllal review took placl' at IRS in 1968. 'I'hl'
Chief of the Disclosure Branch terminated what hl' considered the "illegal" provision
of tax return information to the FBI by another IRS Dh·ision. (IRS
l\Iemoramlum, V. O. Yirdin to Harold Snydl'r, ;;/2/6R.) During this same period,
thp CIA was also ootaining returns in a manner similar to the FBI (though
in much smaller numbers), yet no one in the Intelligence Division or
l'lsewhere in the Compliance Division apparl'ntly thought to examine that practice
in light of the change being made in till' pradice with respect to the FBI.
(Donald O. Yirdin testimony, 9/16/75. pp. 69-73.)
'" The CIA snspended its participation in the program as a result of an opinion
by its General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, that the intl'rcepts were illegal.
DIell1orandulI1 from Houston to Acting Chief of Di\-ision. 1/29/73.) Shortly
t hereafter, XASA reviewed the legalit~· and appropriateness of its own
invoh'ement in what was essentially a law enforcement {'ffort by the Bureau of
Xarcotics and Dangerous Drugs rather than a foreign intellig-ence program,
which is the only authorized province for XSA opprations. ("Senior XSA official
deposi'tion." 9/16/75, p. 10.) In .Tnne If)73 the Director of XSA terminated the
drug watch list, several months after the CIA had terminated its own intercept
program. XSA's drug watch list activity had been in operation since 1970. (Allen,
10/29/7;), Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 23.)
In the fall of W73, XSA terminated the remainder of its watch list activit~·,
which had involved monitoring commllllications by individnals targl'ted for XSA
oy other agencies including CIA, FBI, and BXnn. In response to the Keith case
and to anothpr case which threatened to diseiose tllP existence of the XSA watch
list, XSA and the .Tustice IJepartment had begun to reconsider the propriety of
thp program. The review process culminated in termination. See NSA Report:
Termination of Civil Disturhance "'atch List.
85 Schllc'singer descrillf'd his review of "gTl'Y arpa activities" which were "perhaps
Il'g-al, pprhaps not Ipg-al" as a part of "thl' l'nhancl'd l'ffort that camp in
thp \\ake of IYatprgate" for oH'rsight of the Ilropriety of Govl'rnll1pnt activities.
(Schlesinger tl'stimony. Rockefeller Commission, 5/5/75, pp. 114, 116.) Schlesinger
testifil'd that his reqnest for the reporting of "(juestionable activities" came after
(Continued)
288
,yas ;'frozen" after the Inspector General qnestioned the morality anel
lack of administmtiw control of the program.RC
'
-Sewral mail-opening operations were terminated hecause they
lacked sufficient intelligence valne, which was often measnred in relation
to the "flap potential"-or risk of disclosure--of an operation.
HO\yever, both the CIA and the FBI continued other mail-opening
operations after these terminations.80
The Committt'e's t'xamination of thr circumstancrs slllTOluHling
trnninatiolls of a 'vidr range of improprr 01' illegal domt'stic intelliI!
rnce aeti,'itirs clt'arly points to the need for morr effecti,-r ovrrsight
from outside the agpncies. In too many cases, thr imprtus for the termination
of programs of obviously qurstionable propriety came from
the press 01' thr Congress rather than from intelligrnce agency administrators
or their suppriors in the Executiye Branch. Although therr
werr several laudable instances of trrmination as a responsible outgrowth
of an agrncy's intt'rual rt'view process, tlU' Committee's record
indicates that this proct'ss alone is insufficient-intelligence agencies
cannot be left to police thrmsehes.
(Continued)
learning- that "there wa~ this whole ~et of relationships" between the CIA and
White House "plumber" E. Howard Hunt, ,Tr.. about which Schlesing-er had not
IlPen briefed completely upon a~suilling his position. (Schlesinger, Rockefeller
Comllli~~ion testimony, p. 115.) "As a consequence." Schlesinger "insisted that
all people come forward" with "anything- to do with the 'Vatergate affair" and
any other arguably improper or illegal operations. (Schlesinger, Rockefeller
Commission, 5/5/75, p. 116.)
85. After the Inspector General's ~nrYE'Y of the Tt'chnical St'rvices Division, he
recommended termination of the testing program. (Earman memorandum,
5/5/63.) The prog-ram was tlwn suspended pending- resolution at the hig-hest
It',-els within the CIA of the issues presented by the program-Hthe risks of
embarras>:ment to the Ag-ency, couplt'd with the moral prohll'm." (~Il'morandum
from DDP Helms to DCI ~IcCone, 9/4/65.) In response to the IG Report, DDP
Helms recommt'nded to DCI ~IcCone that unwitting testing- continue. Helms
maintained that the program could be conducted in a "secure and effectil-e
manner" and believed it "nece~~ary that the Agency maintain a central role in
this activity. keep current on enem~' capabilities in tht' manipulation of human
behavior. and maintain an offt'n~ive capability." (~Iemorandum from Helms to
DCI ::IIcCone. S/Hl/63.) The Acting- DCI deferred decision on the matter and
directed TSn in the meantime to "continue the freeze on unwitting testing-."
(CIA memorandum to Senate Select Commitee. received 9/4/75.) According to
a CIA report to the Select Committee:
"With the destruction of the ::IIKFLTRA files in earl,v 1973, it is oeHered that
there arp no definitive records in CIA that would record the termination of thp
program for testing bl'h:wioral drug-~ on unwitting- persons.... Thl're is no
record to our knowledge, that [the] freeze was erer lifted." (CIA memorandum to
S(,l1ate S('I('ct Committef'. rccf'i'-I'd 9/4/75.)
Testimon~' from the CIA official~ im'olvpd confirmed that the testing- was not
rf'~umed. (Spe Foreign and :\Iilitary Intelli?:ence Report.)
.. T,,'o FBI mail-opening prog-rams were su~pended for security reasons inrolring-
changes in local postal per~onnf'l and nerf'r reinstituted, on the theory
that the value of tht' prog-rams did not jllstif~' the risk inyolyed. (::IIemorandum
from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/66.) The CIA's San
Francisco mail-opening project "waf; terminated since the risk factor outweighed
continuing- an actirit~' which had already achieved its o!JjectiYes." (:\lemorandum
to Chief. East Asia Division..Tune 1973.) The lack of any Rignificant intelligence
yalue to tl1l' CIA apparently led to the termination of the ~ew Orleans mailopening
program. Dlemorandum from "Identity 13" to Dl'puty Director of SpenI'it.
r. 10/0/57.) Thrl'e other program,s were terminatl'{l Iwcall"e tllPY had prodllCf'd
no vaillahll' countt'rintl'lIigf'nct' information. while divl'rting manpowl'r
needed for other operations.

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