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II. THE GROWTH OF DO~lESTIC IXTELLIGEKCE: 1936 TO 1976 A. SUl\BLARY 1. The Lesson: History Repeatsltselj During and after the First 'Yorld 'Yar, intelligence agencies, including the predecessor of the FBI, engaged in repressiw activity.l A new Attol'lley General, Harlan Fiske Stone, sought to stop the Illvestigation of "political or other opinions." 2 This restraint ,vas embodied only in an executive pronouncement, however. Xo statutes were passed to prennt the kind of improper activity ,vhich had been exposed. Thereafter, as this narratin ,vill show. the almses retul'lwd in a new form. It is now the responsibility of all three branches of government to ensure that the pattern of abuse of domestic intelligence activity does not recur. 2. The Pattel'1l: Broadening Through Time Since the re-establishment of federal domestic intelligence programs in 1936, there has been a steady increase in the gOYCl'llmenfs capability and ,villingllpss to pry into, and pnn disrupt, the political activitips and personal lins of the people. The last forty years have witnessed a relentless expansion of domestic intelligence activity beyond innstigation of criminal conduct toward the collection of political intelligence and the launcl.ing of secret offensive actions against Americans. The initial incursions into the realm of ideas and associations were related to concpl'llS about the influence of foreign totalitarian powers. 1 RepressiYe practicE'S during World 'Val' I includE'd the formation of a volnntE'er anxinnr;> fore('. 1"10\'"11 as thE' American ProtE'ctiYe LE'ague, which assisted the .Justice Department and militar;> intelligencE' in the iIl\'esti~ation of "nn-American activitiE's" and in thE' mass round-up of 50,000 persons to discovE'r draft evaders. These so-called "slacker raids" of 1918 inYolYE'd warrantlE'SR arrE'sts without sufficient probable cause to be1iE'Ye that crime had been or was about to be committed (FBI Intelli~ence DiYision memorandum, "An Analysis of FBI DOlllE'stic Recurit;> IntelligE'ncE' IllYestigations," 10/28/7:;.) The American Protective LE'ague also contrilmtE'd to tilE' pressnrps which rE'suited in nearl;> 2.000 prosecutions for dislo;>al uttE'rances and activities dnrin~ "'orld 'Val' I, a policy dE'scribed !.J;> .Tohn Lord O'BriE'n, Attornpy General GrE'~Olfs Rpeelnl A~~i~tant. as one of "whoIE'~ale rE'prE's~ion and rE'straint of public opinion." (2Rchnriah ChafE'e. Pree Spcceh in the [-nitI'd Stat('.~ (Camhrid~e: H:H\'nrrl l'n"'E'r~ity Pr('~~. llHli p. 69.) Rhortly after the war thp Justice Department and tile Burpau of InYE'sti~ation jointl;> plannecl the notorious "Pa1mE'r Raids", namE'd for Attorney GE'n" eraI A. :\Iitchell Palmpr who ordered the oYerni~ht round-Up nnd dptention of SOlllp 10,000 Iwrsons who WE're thought to hE' "anarchi~t" or "rE'\'olutionary" aljplls suhje('t to dE'portation. ('Villiam Prpston, Aliens anll nissentcrs (Camhri( Tge: llanaI'd T'lli\'er~ity Prp~~. 1!l63). ellS. 7-.<;;: ~tanlE';> COhPll, -to JJit('/lcll Palllll'r: Pnlitirirlll IXew York: Columhia T'l1iypr~ity PrE'ss. 1963), clls. 11-12.) 2 SE'P Attornp~' Gpl1pral ~tol1e'~ full ~tntenlPllt. p. 23. (21 ) 22 Ultimately, howeTer, intelligence activity was directed against donwstic groups ach'ocating change in America, particularly those ,,,ho most vigorously opposed the Vietnam war or sought to improve the con(litions of racial minorities. Similarly, the targets of intelligence investigations ,yere hroadened from gronps perceived to be violence prone to include groups of ordinary protesters. .J. T11I'cc Paiods of G1'owth fol' DO/llcstir Intelligence The expansion of domestic intelligence acti"ity can usefully be diYidrd into three broad periods: (a) the pre-war and 'Vorld 'Val' II period; (b) the Cold 'Val' era; and (c) the period of domestic dissent beginning in the mid-sixties. The main developnwnts in each of these stages in the evolution of domestic intelligence may be summarized as follows: rr. 1.9."]6-1,q.1·5 By presidential directive-rather than statute-the FBI and militaJ'~' intelligeJlce agenries were authorized to rondnct domestic intelligrncf' investigations. These innstigations included a Yagnely drfinrd mission to collect intelligence about "snbyersi,'e actiyities" which were sometimes nnrelatecl to law enforcement. 'Vartime exigencies enconraged the unrcgnlated use of intrusi \'e intelligence technic(lles; and the FBr brgan to resist supervision by the Attorney General. b. 1946-1968 Cold 'Val' frars and dangers nnrtured the domestic intelligE'ncE' programs of the FBI and military, and they became permanent features of governmrnt. Congress dcferred to the rxecutiye branch in the oversight of these programs. The FBI became increasingly isolated from effeetin~ ontside controL even from the Attorneys General. The scope of innstigations of "subversion" widenrd greatly. Fnder the cloak of "ecrecy. the FBI institnted its COINTELPRO operations to "disrupt" and "neutralize" "subnrsins". ThE' National Security Agency, the FBI. and the CIA re-institnted instJ'llsi\'e '''artime surveillance techniques in contravention of law. c. 1,q(J4-1976 Intrlligence techniques which preYiously had bern concentrated upon forrign threats and domestic gronps said to be under Communist influrnce wrre applied ,,,ith incrrasing intensity to a ,vide range of domrstic activity by American citizens. These techni(111es '\"err utilizrd against peacefnl civil rights and antiwar protest activity, and thereafter in reaction to civil unrest, often without rrgard for the consequences to Amrrican liberties. The intelligrnce agencies of the United Statrs-somrtimes alwttecl by public opinion and often in response to pressnre from afllninistration officials or the Congress-frequE'ntly disregarded the Jaw in their con(lnct of massin' snrYeillance and a!'"gressiYe connterintelligence operations against American citizens. In the past few ~'rars, sonw of thrsr activities wcre cnrtailea, partly in response to thr modrration of the dome"tic crisis; but a11 too often improper programs \yrrr tf'l'minatrd only in rrsponse to rxposnrr, the threat of exposure, or a change in thr climate of pnblic opinion, such as that triggrlwl by the 'Vatergate affair.
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