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b. Hllgginy, Jlail Opening, alld SW'i'CptitiollS Entry.
Intrnsiw techniques such as bugging, mail opening and surreptitious
pntrv ,vero used bv the FBI ,vithout PTen the kind of formal Presi(
lent'ial authorizatIon and requirement of ~\.ttorney General approval
that applied to warrantless ,viretapping.
During the ,val', the FBI began "chamfering" or surreptitious mail
opening, to supplement the owrt censorship of international mail
authorized by statute in ,vartime. 77 The practice of surreptitious entry-
or breaking-and-entering-1vas also used by the FBI in ,val"
time intelligence operations.'s The Bureau continued or resumed the
use of these techniques after the 1Yllr ,vithout explicit outside
authorization.
Furthermore, the installation of microphone surwillance ("bugs"),
either \vith or ,vithont trespass, was exempt from the procedure for
Attorney General appronll of ,viretaps.•Tustice Department records
indicate that no Attorney General formally considered the question
of microphone suneillance ill\'olYing trespass, except on a hypothetical
basis, until 1952.'9
C. DmIEsTIc IXTELLIGEXCE IX THE COLD 'YAR ERA: 1946-1963
1. Main Del'elopments of the 19.'f6-1963 Pel'iod
The domestic intelligence programs of the FBI and the military
intelligence agencies. which ,yore established under presidential authority
before World 'Yar II, did not cease with the end of hostilities.
Instead, they set the pattern for decades to come.
Despite Director Hoowr's statement that the intelligpnce structure
could be "discontinued or very materially curtailed" with the termination
of the national emergellcy, after tIle war intelligence operations
were neither discontinued nor curtailed.so Congressional deference to
the executive branch, the broacl scope of investigations, the growth of
the FBI's po\\-er, and the substantial immunity of the Bureau from
effective outside supenision became increasingly significant features
of domestic intelligence in the United States. Kew domestic intelligence
functions were added to previous responsibilities. X0 attempt ,vas
"FBI nlPmorandum from C. E. Hennrich to A. H. Bplmont, 9/7/51.
":\lemoraI1(Ium from thp FBI to thl' Spnatp Sl'll'ct Committpe, 9/23/75.
79 A H)·JA .Justice Dppartmpnt nWll10randum discusspd the "admissibility of
pyidp]H'e ohtainpd hy trash eoyprs and microphone surYPillance," in rpsponse to
a sprips of hypothetical qupstions suhmittPlI h~' tIw FRL The memorandum
eoncluclpd that ('y!dencp so obtaine<J. was admissible Pypn if the microphone surypil!
ancp inyo]ypd a trpspass. (:\Iemorandum from Alexandpr Holtzot'f, Sppcial
Assistant to thp Attornpy Gpnpral. to .T. Edgar lIooypr, 7/4/44; c.f., nwmorandum
from AttorIwy Gp]wral .J. Howard :\lcGrath to .J. Edgar Hooyer, 2/26/52.) Sep
footnote 22fl for the Ifl50s considpration of bugs by the Attol'lwy Gpneral.
80 In parly 1941, Dirpctor I-Iooypr had had tIw follO\ying exehange with mpmlJPrs
of t}w HOllSP A]I]lr-opriations Com'nittpp:
'·:\lr. LUDLOW. At the dosp of thp prpspnt pmprgpney, whpn peace comps, it
would mean that much of this {'mprgpncy 'York np(,Pf:sarily will be discontinued."
":\Ir. Hoon:R. That is COITPet.... If thp national pmergpnc~- should terminate,
the structurp dpaling with national defpnsp can immpdiatply hp discontinupd or
\"pry matprially eurtailpd accof(ling to the wislws of Oongrpss." (First DC'{icicllC'1!
Appropriatioil Rill. 1.~i1, Hearings hf'forp the House Committee OIl Ap]lropriation",
3/19/41. ]1]1. ISS-ISH.)
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made to enact a legislatiw charter replacing: the wartime emergency
orders, as was done in the foreign intelligence field in 10H.
The main dewlopments during the Cold '''ar ('ra may be summarized
as follmYs:
a. Domestic Intelligence AldhOl·ity
During this period there was a national consensns regarding the
danger to the rnited States from Communism: little distinction ,,'as
made betwl'en the threats posed by thl' Soyjet Cnion and by Communists
\yithin this country. J)oJllestie intelligence acti\'ity \yas suppOl1:e(l
by that consensus, although not specifically authorized by the Congress,
Formal authority for FBI inycstigations of "subyersi\'e actiyity"
and for the agrecn1Pnts behwen the FBI an(lmilitary intelligcnce waS
explicitly granted in executi\'e directin's from Prrsi(lrnts Trllman
and Eisenhmn~r. the Xational Securitv Council, and "\ttornev General
KellllPdy. These directiws proYi([ed no gnidallel'. howe\:l'r, for
conducting or contI'oll ing SIlCh in \'pst igations.
b. Scope of Domestic Inte71igence
The breadth of the FBI's inYestigation of "subyersiye infiltration"
continul'(l to produce intelligence reports and massi\'e files on lawful
groups and law-abiding citizens \yho happened to associate, eyen
llll\yittingly. \yith Communists or wit.h socialists U1wonnected with the
Soyiet rnion who used rpyolutionary rhetoric. At the same time, the
scope of FBI intrlligence expanded to co\'er ciyil rights protest activity
as \yell as \,iolent "Klan-type" and "hate" groups, \'ocal anticommllnists.
and prominent opponents of racial integration. The vagueness
of the FBI's investigatiye mandate and the overbreadth of its
collection programs also placed it in position to supply the 'Vhite
House with numerous items of domestic political intelligence apparently
desired by Presidents and their ai(les.
In response to '''hite House amI congTessional intHest in right\"
ing organizations, the Internal Rewnue Sen-ice began romprehensin>,
inYestigations of right-\\'ing groups in 1961 and later expanded
to left-wing organizations. This etTort ,,'as (lirected at identifying
contributions and ascertaining whethrr the organizations ,,'rre entitled
to maintain their exrl1lpt status.
c. Acco/lntability and Control
Penasiye secrecy pnabled the FBI and the .Justice Department to
(lisregard as "ulnmrkable" the Emergency Detpntion Act intended to
set standards for aspects of donwstic intelJ igence. The FBI's indelwndent
position also allowed it to withhold significant information from a
prrsidential commission and from e\'ery Attorney General; and no
JJtorney General inquirrd fully into the Bureau's operations.
During the same period, apprehensions about haYing a "security
poli('e~' influenced Congress to prohibit the Central Intelligence
~\gen('y frolf' rxercising la \\' en forcement pO\yers or performing "interna1
security functions." XeYrrtheless, in secret and without effective
internal controls, the CL\ un(lprtook programs for testing chemical
and biological agents on 11ll\yitting Americans, sometimes with tragic
consequences. The CIA also used American priyate institutions as
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"cover" and used intrusive techniques affecting the rights of
Americans.
d. Intrusive Techniques
The CIA and the Xational Security Agency illegally instituted programs
for the interception of international communications to and
from American citizens, primarily first class mail and cable traffic.
During this period, the FBI also used intrusive intelligence gathering
techniques against domestic "sub,-ersives" and counterintelligence
targets. Sometimes these techniques were covered by a blanket delegation
of authority from the Attorney General, as with microphone
surveillance; but frequently they ,vere used without outside authorization,
as with mail openings and surreptitious entry. Only conventional
wiretaps required the Attorney General's approval in each case, but
this method was still misused due to the lack of adequate standards
and procedural safeguards.
e. Domestic COI'ert Action
In the mid-fifties, the FBI denloped the initial COIXTELPRO
operations, which used aggressive covert actions to disrupt and discredit
Communist Party activities. The FBI subsequently expanded
its COIXTELPROactivities to discredit peaceful protest groups
whom Communists had infiltrated but did not control. as ,vell as
groups of socialists who used revolutionary rhetoric but had no connections
with a hostile foreif,'ll power.
Throughout this period, there ,vas a mixture of secrecy and disclosure.
Executive action was often substituted for legislation, sometimes
with the full knmY1eclge and consent of Congress and on other
occasions ,vithout informing Congress or by advising only a select
group of legislators. There is no question that Congress, the courts,
aJl(l the public expected the FBI to gather domestic intelligence about
Communists. But the broad scope of FBI investigations, its specific
programs for achie,-ing "pure intelligence" amI "lH'rventi,-e intelligence"
objectives, and its use of intrusi,'e techniques and disl'Uptin~
counterintelligence measurrs against domestic "subvrrsin>s" were not
fully known by anyonr outside the Bureau.
2. J)oJlwstie Intelligence Authority
a. Anti-ConwlIlnist Consensus
During the Cold "'ar era, the strong consensus in fa,-or of governmental
action against Communists was reflected in (lecisions of the
Supreme Court aJl(1 acts of Congress. In the Korean ,Yar period, for
instance, the Supreme Comt upheld the cOll\'iction of domestic Communist
Party lea(lers under the Smith ~\.ct for conspiracy to a(h-ocate
violent overthrow of the gonrnment. The Court pinned its decision
upon the conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party of the Cnited
States and its ideological links \vith the Soviet Union at a time of
strcss in Sm'iet-Amcrican relations.81
01 The Court held that the grave and probable danl-:er posed hy the Communist
Party justifiE'{1 this restriction on free speech lUl(ler the First Amendment:
"The formation hy petitioners of such a hig-hl~' org-anizpd ('(Hlspiraey, with
ril-:idly diseiplined memhers subject to call WIH'll the Ipaders, these petitiollers,
felt that the time had ('ollie for action, ('oupled with the inflnnullahlp natnr!' of
41
Several statutes buttressed the FBI's claim of legitimacy for at least
some aspects of domestic intrlligencr. Although Congress never directly
authorized Bureau intel1igence operations. Congress enacted the
Int€l"llal Security Act of 10:")0 over President Truman's veto. Its hvo
main pro\·isions were: the SubYersiYes Activities Control Act. requiring
the rrgistration of members of communist and communist "front"
gl'Oups; and the Emergency Drtention Act, providing for the intel'llmrnt
in an rnlPrgency of persons \\'ho might rngage in espionage or
sabotagl'. In this ~\ct. Congrrss made findings that the Communist
Party ,vas" a disciplined organization" operati-ng in this nation "under
Sovid rnion contl'01" 'vith the aim of installing "a Soviet style dictatorship:'
,2 (ioing cnn f1ll'ther in H):)-+. Congress passed the Comnmnist
Control .\c1. \\'hich provided that thr Comnmnist Party ,vas
"not entitled to any of thr rights, pri yi leges, and immunitirs attpndant
upon legal bodil's creatcd under the jurisdiction of the !a\yS of tllP
T-nitrcl States." 83
In H);")(L the Suprrmr C01ll't rrcognized the existence of FBI intel1igencr
aimed at "Communist seditious acti\'ities." 8' The hasis for Smith
Act. prosecutions of "suhnrsive activity" ,vas narl'Owed in 1!)i)7, hmve\-
rl" when the Court ovprturned the convictions of second-string
Comnlllnist leadrrs. holding that the gonrnment must show ach-ocaey
"of action amI not merelv abstract c1octrinr." 8" In I!)RI. the Court
sustainrd the constitutional it v under the First Amendment of the requirrmrnt.
that the Commmiist Party register with the Subn'rsivp
Acivities Control Board.86
Th(\ consrnsus should not lw portrayed as monolithic. President
Truman was concerned ahout risks to constitntional go\-ernment posed
worIel cOl]{1ition~, and the touch,anel-go nature of our relations with countries
with whom petitioners wcre in the ypry lpast ideologically attuned. ('onYince us
that their convictions were justified on this score." [DCl1l1i,~ v. Fl1itcd Statc8, ~41
Lf'. 4!l4 .•1()--:;n (1H:;ll.]
"64 Sta t. 987 (1930) The Subversive Activities Control Act's registration provision
was hl'ld not to violate the First Amendment in 1961. [Comlll11niRt Party v.
i'i,,/n'c'r8ire ~1('tiritiC8 Control Board, ~67 r.S, 1 (l!l61).] However, registration
of Comnlllnists under the Act was later held to violate the Fifth Amendment
l'riYilpge again~t self-incrimination, [Albcrt80n Y, Subversive Activitie.~ Control
ROl/rd, :~82 F.R. 70 (lOC)..).] The Emergency Detention Act was repealed in 1971.
"68 Rtat. 7T; (l!l34) , :-.0 CS.C. 841-844. The constitutionality of the Communist
Control Act of 1954 has never been te~ted.
" In light of the facts now known, the Supreme Court seems to have overstated
the dpgree to which Congres~ had explicitly "charged" the FBI with intelligence
respon~ihilities:
"Congress has deyised an all-embracing program for resistance to the Yariou~
forms of totalitarian aggre""ion.... It ha" charged the Federal Bureau of
Tnn'stigation and the Central Intplligence Agency with re"pon"ibility for intelligem'!'
concerning Communist ~editiou~ acti"itips against our GoYernment, and
has denominated such actiyitie~ as part of a world conspiracy." [Penn811lt'ania v.
.Ydg()//, ~:;O C.S. 497, 504-505 (l\};J6),]
Tl1is decision held that the federal gm-emment had preempted state sedition
law~. citing Presidrnt Roo~e\"E'lt's September l\}39 statement on FBI authority
and an address hy FBI Director Hooyer to state law enforcement officials in
Angn~t 1940.
R5 Yate.~ Y. United States, ~54 V.S. 298, ~25 (1957) .
•• .Tu~tice Douglas, who dissented on Fifth Amendment grounds, agreed with
tl1e majority on the First Amendment issue:
"Thr Rill of Rights was de~igned to give fullest play to the exchange and dissemination
of ideas that touch the politics, culture. and other aspects of our life,
"-hen an organization i~ used hy a foreign power to make advances here, questions
of "ecurity are rai"ed beyond the ken of disputation and debate between
the people resident here." rCommunist Party v, Subversive Activitics Control
Board, 367 C.S. 1,174 (19tH).]
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by the zealous anti-Commuuism in Congress. According to one ",Vhite
House staff member's notes dming the debate over the Internal
Secmity ~lct :
The President said that the situation ... ,,-as the ,,-orst
it had been since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 179S, that
a lot of people on the Hill should know better but had been
stampeded into running \yith their tails between their legs.
Truman announced that he would n~to the Internal Security Act
"regardless of how poEtically unpopular it was-election year or
no election year." S7 But President Truman's YCto \yas o\-erridden by
an oYCr\Yhelming margin.
b. The Fedeml Employee Loyalty-Security Program
(1) Origil/s of the Pl'ogm7ll.-President Truman established a
federal employee loyalty program in 19.n.SS Its basic features were
retained in the federal employPe secmity program authorized by
President Eisenhower in public Executi \-e Order 104-50, \yhich, \yith
some modifications, still applies today.80
Although it had a much broader reach, the program originated out
of well-founded concern that SO\-irt intelligence was then using the
Communist Party as a vehicle for the recruitment of espionage
agents.oo President Truman appointed a Temporary Commision on
Employee Loyalty in 194-6 to rxamine the problem. FBI Director
Hooyer submitted a memorandum on the types of actiyities of "subversiYC
or disloyal persons" in goycrnment srlTice which would constitute
a "threat" to security. As Hoover sa\v it. however, the danger
was not limited to espionage or recruitmrnt for espionage. It extended
to "influencing" gOYCl'Ilment policirs in favor of "the foreign country
of their idrological choice." Consequently. he mged that attention
be given to the associations of gO\'ernment employees with "front"
organizations. including "temporary organizations. 'spontaneous'
campaigns, and pressure movements so frequently usrd by subversive
groups." 01
The President's Commission accepte<l Director HoO\-er's broad view
of the threat. along with the \-iew endorsed by 'a Presidential Commission
on Civil Rights that there also was a danger from "those who
would subYC!'t our drmocracy by ... destroying the civil rights of some
groups.'~ !J2 Consequently, the ExecutiYC Order includrd, as 'an indica-
"File memorandum of S. .J. Spingarn, assistant counsel to the President.
7/22/50. (Spingarn Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.)
88 Executiye Order 9835.12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
8. Executiye Order 10450. 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953) .
•• A rt'port uy a Canadian Royal Commission in June 1946 greatly influenced
Cnited State~ goyernmPllt Ilolic~-. The Royal Comlllis~ion ~tated that "a nUllluer
of young- Canadians. public ~ervants and other~. who begin with a dt'~ire to
adyance caust's which tht'y con~ider worthy, haye been induced into joining
study groups of the Communist Party. They are IJt'rsuaded to ket'p this adherence
secret. They have been led ~tep hy step along til(' ingt'neous psychological de\-elopment
conrse ... nntil llIHlt'r the inflnence of ~oIJhi~ticatt'd and unscrupulous
leadprs they have ht't'n persuaded to engagp in illegal activities directed against
the safety and interests of their own society." The Royal Commission reCOInmendt'd
additional spcurity measurt's "to prt'vent the infiltration into positions
of trn~t under the Government of per~ons likely to commit" snch acts of t'spionagt'.
(Tht' Rpport of til(' Royal Commission, 6/27/46. pp. 1'2-1"3. 6SG--6i'9.)
01 :\Iemorandum from the FBI Dirpctor to tht' President's Temporary Commis,
sion on Employee Loyalty. 1/3/47.
02 President'~ Committee on Ciyil Right~, To Secure These Rights (1947),
p.52.
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tion of (lisloyalty, membership in or association ,yith groups desiglUlted
Oll all ".\Jtorlll'y (~('n('rars list" as:
totalitarian, fascist. conllllUnist, 01' sllbycrsive, or as ha\-ing
adopted a policy of tuho('atillg 01' apprO\-ing the commis:-;ion
of acts of forc(' or violence to deny otl1('rs their rights undpr
the Constitution of till' 1-nitpc! ~tates, or as seeking to alter
the form of gonrllnlPllt of tlH' {-nitee! States by llllconstitlltionalnl('
ans.\l:l
The Ex('('utin' Ord('r was u5('(1 to pro\'ide a legal basis for the FBPs
ill\-l'stigation of allq!\'(Uy "subn'rsi\e" organizations ,yhich might faJ]
withill tlwse categorie".'" ~llch ill\'estigations supplied a body of int(']]
ig('nce data against \\-hich to check the names of Proslwctin f('(lend
employees.";;
(:2) IJI'eI/{!tlt of t1/1 llil'e8tirJ(rtioIi8.~By the mi(l-l!);)()s, the Bmeall
heliey('d that the COllllllunist Party was no longer used for Soviet
('spionage: it n'p]'('sented oilly a "potential" ]'('cruiting grOlllHI. fOi'
spies."'; Thereafter, FBI investigations of Communist orgtlllizatlOns
and other gronp" lllH'onnedec! to espionage hut fa]]ing ,yithin the
stanclanls of tIl(' Attorney (~eneral's Jist fl'eqlH'ntly hecame a means
for monitoring tIl(' political background of ProslwdiH' fpderal employee,;
by 1l1ealb of tIl(' "naill(' c!wck" of Bureau files. TIll'SP investigations
also senec! the "pure inteJ]igence" function of informing the
Attorney General of the influence and organizational affiliations of socaUed
"subvprsives.'· \l7
Xo organizatiolls 'H'I'l' formally added to tlw Attol'l1ey Gpnera1's
list aftpr U);j;j."R IIo\\'('n'r, the FBI's "llamp dl('ck" rq)()rts on prospectin'
employees 'wre lll'yer limite(l to information abollt listed organizations.
The broac! standar<ls for placing a group on the Attorney
General's list ,wre used to pyaluate an employee's background, regardless
of \yltethpl' or not he was a IllPIll!JeI' of a group on tIl(' Jist. nn If a
"name dH'ck" llllCOYP1'NI informatioll about a ]ll'osIwctin' l'lllployee's
association \yith a group which might COIll<' within thosp stalHlal'ds, the
"ExecutiH~ Order 983.). part I, section 2; d. Expcutiyp Ordpr 10·mO, section
Sea) (5).
01 In 1960, for instance. tllP .Justiep IlppartnlPnt :Hhispd tllP FBI to continue
inl'pstigating an organization not on the Artorne~' Gpneral's list in nrdpr to :-{'Cure
"additional information ... re]atin' to thp critpria" of thp pmplo~-pp securit~·
onler. (~Iemorandum from Assistant Attorne~' Genpral .T. "-:lltpr Yeagley to
,J. Edgar Hool'er, 5/17/60.)
,.> FBI "name cheCks" arp ,lllthorized as Imp of the "national agencies checks"
required b~' Exeeuti\'p Order 10450. sf'etion 3 (a)_
c< }<'BI ~Ionogl'Uph. "The ~Ienace of CommUni''ll1 in thp Cnitell 1'tatps Today",
7/2D/3:l. pp. iY-Y. See footnotp 271.
'" TllP FBI official in charge of thp Internal f'('curitl' f'eetion of the Intelligpncy
Di\-ision in tIl(' IIfties and early sixties tf'stiflPd tila! the priman- purpose
of FBI inH'stigations of eOllllllnnist "infiltration" ,yas to adl'ise the Attorney
(;pnel'al so that hp could dP!erllline ,yhether a group shoulll go on thp Attorney
Gpnpnll's Ii,-t. He also tpstified that inH'stigations for this purpose continued
aftpr tll(' AttorIlPY Gpnpral eeasel! al!<ling nam('s of gronps to tllP list. (F..J.
Baulllgarduer testimon~-. 10/8/7;), pp. 48-!9.) Sep pp. 48-!!l for discussion of tlIP
FBI's CO~ITXFILprogram.
"' ~Iemorall(]a from thp Attornp:> Gpneral to heads of DPlmrtmpnts and Ageneies,
.J/2!l/ti.1; 7/1.V.-i:1: !l/2S/.':1: 1/22/.•4. Groups l!I'signatpll prior to that timp
inc]ul]pl! numerous defunct German all(l .Tapanesp so('jP!ies. COlllnmnist all(] Communist
"front" org-anizations. the Socialist "-orkprs Part,,- tIl(' Xationalist Part:>
of Puerto Rico. and seH'ral Ku Klux Klan organizations. . ,
'u Executil'e Order 10-,1;')0, section l' (a) (.').
44
FBI \yould report the data and attarh a "charaC'terization" of the orgallizationrelating
to tIl(' standal'(l~Y'°
(i)) FBI COlltl'07 of LOyIl7ty-''''('(,//I'I'ty IlIl'e8t;.qatioll.~.-President
Eisenhower's Inr),) order specifically designatpel tIl(' FBI as l'Psponsible
for "a full field inH'stigation" \yhell('Y('r a "nanll' clll'ck" 01' a background
inyestigation by the Ci\'il Senicp COlllmission or any other
agency IlIlco\'{)red infol'mation ill(licating a potential sl'curity risk. 101
President Tl'lIlllan hadrefusp(l to gin· the Bure;lu this ex('lusil'e powpr
initially. but hl' fought a losing battle. Hle
Director Hom'er had objeete(l that Presidl'nt Truman's order dielnot
gi\'e the FBI excusin~ powpr and thrpatpned "to with(lmw from this
fielel of inn'stigation rather than to engagl' in a tug of war with the
Ciyil Sen'ire Commission." 103 Prpsidl'nt Truman \yas apprphensiye
about the FBI's growing power. The notps of onp prp·;;idpntial aidp on a
meeting with the Prpsident refteet that Tnunan felt "\'{'ry strongly
anti-FBI" on the issue and \yanteel "to bl' snre and hold FBI down.
afraid of '(~estapo.~ ~~ 104
Prpsidential assistant Clark Clifford rC\'iewed the situation and
came down on t he side of the FBI as "better qualified" than the Civil
SCI'vice Commission.10" But the Presidrnt insisted on a compromise
\yhich gan' Ci\'il Sen-ire "(liseretion~~ to call on the FBI "if it
\yislll's.~· lOr, Di redor Hom'er protested this "ronfusion " about the FBI's
jurisdiction.Io , "'hrn .Justice Departm.ent officials \yarned that Congress
,,'ould "find fta\Ys~~ with the compromise. President Truman
noted on a memoran(lum from Clifford:
.J. Edgar will in all probability get this baclmard looking
Congress to gin him \vhat he \Yants. Ifs dangerous.Ios
President's Tnunan's prediction \yas COlTect. His bnrlget request of
$1(1 million for Ci\'il Sen'ice and SR.7 million for the FBI to eonduct
loyalty inn'stigations \yas rC\·ised by Congress to allocate $7.4 million
to the FBI and only $3 million to Civil Sen-ice.100 The issue \yas finally
resohe(l to the FHI~s satisfaction when the President issued a statement
declaring that there 'were "to be no exccptions~~ to the rule that
the FBI \\'ould make all loyalty ill \'('stigatiolls. 110
100 The FBI's field offices were supplied with sll('h ··tllI1mh,nail sketches" or
charactprizations to supplemeut the Attonwy GCIH'ral's list amI thc reports of the
Housp Committpe on {'II-American Aetil'itips. (R.rl., ~AC Lf·tter .\'0. (;O--3-l.
7/12/(;0.)
101 Executh'e Ordcr 10450. section 8 (d).
102 The reference to a "full field inYestigation" where thprp was "derogatory
information \\'ith respect to loyalty" did not, ill the Truman on1pr. say who would
conduct the illYestigation. (ExecutiYe On]pr !li'3:J. part I. seelioll 4.)
103 ~Ipmoralll]a from .J. Edgar Hom'er to Attorney General Tom Clark, 3/1!J/47
and 3/31/47.
101 File memorandum of George ~I. Elsey. ;}/2/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
IC, ~rE'lnor:tndumfrom C'ark Clifford to the President. ;;/7/17.
100 ~Iemorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/!J/47; letter from
President Truman to H. B. ~Iitchell, r.s. Ch'i! Senice Commission, ti/!J/47.
(Harry S. Truman Lihran'.)
107 ~rPlllorandulll froll! .J. Edgar Hom'er to Attorney Gpneral Clark, 5/12/47.
lOS ~Iellloralldulll from Clark Clifford to tlH' President, 5/9/47. (IIaJT~' S.
Truman Library.)
10'> Eleanor Bontpcou. The Federal Doyalfy-Secllrify Progral/l (Ithaca: Cornell
Uniyersity Press, 1!)53) , pp. 33-34.
110 ~Iemorandum from .J. R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, to the Attorney
General, 11/3/47.
45
c. Eccecutil'e Di!'peti"C8: Lad' of Guir!IIIICi.' and Contl'Ol8
1'\\'0 puhlic prpsidential statelnents on FBI donwstic intplligencc anthority-
by Presi(lent Truman in H).iO and by Presidpnt Eisenhmyer
ill 10;;;1-siwcifically (lpchll'l'Cl that tl](' FBI ,,-;\s authorized to investigate
"suln'ersin activity," electing the broader interpretation of the
conflicting Hoosenlt directins, ~Ioreonr. a confidential directive of
thc Xational Security Council in 10-Hl granteel authority to the FBI
and military intelligpncc for im'estigation of "subnrsin, flctivities."
In 1962 Presidpnt Kennedy issue(l a confielential order shifting supcrvision
of these inYestigations from tIll' XSC to thp Attorney Genpral,
and the XSC's 194:9 authorizations \H'1'e reiSSllPc1 by Attorney General
Kennpdy in 1964. . .
As WIth the earlipr Hoosenlt directin's, thpse statenwnts. orders
anc1 authorizations fai]rd to providc' guic1ancp on conducting or controlling
"subwl'sive" im'estigations.
Fmler Prrsidpnt T\'llman. the Intl']'(lP)>artllll'ntal Intplligenc'l' Confl'rl'nce
(IIC') 111 \nlS formfllly authorizec1 in Hl4:9 to supervisl'
coorc1ination bet\veen the FBI and the military of "all im'l'stigation of
domestic rspionage, countl'l'l'spionage. sabotage. 8l1bl'pr8ion, and other
rc7ated intelligence matter8 affecting internal security." 112 [Emphflsis
ad(led.]
Thl' confidential Delimitations Agrl'l'nwnt behwen tlw FBI and
the military intelligeJ)ce agt.·J)cies m\s also rp,-isNl in 1DJD to rpquirc
greater exchangl' of "information of nmtual interest" and to require
the FBI to aeh-ise military intellige!H'p of dP\'rlopments com'l'rning
"subn'l'si,-c" groups who \\'('1'(' "potpntial" dangers to thp spcurity of
t hl' Fnited StatesY'
In In,iO. aftpr tIl(' outhl'pak of tIl(' I(orl'an \val' aIHl in the midst
of Congressional cCJ!lsideratioll of m'\\' intp1'11al s('curity legislatioll,
IJirrctor Hoon'r n'comlllp!H1c'd that AttorJll'V Gl'!wral .J. IIowanl
~fcGrath 11' awl the XSC dra ft a sta tement ",flich President TI'lI111an
iss!wd in .July 1!l;-)() pnl\-iding that t 11(' FBI:
should takP eharge of in H'stigati H' ,york in matters relating
to espionage, f'abotage, "lib l'cl'"i /'(' I/eti l'itie8 1/nd I'ell/ted
71WttCI'8. 11
' [Emphasis added.]
111 In a ~Iarch 1949 directive on coordination of internal security President
Trulllan approved the creation of the Interdepartlllental Intelligence Conference
("lIC"). ~lemorandum by .J. P. Coyne. ~Iajor Chronological Developments on the
1'1uhjrct of Intc'rnal Security, -!jK/-Hl (Harry S. Truman Lihrary). and :'I1'1C
~[emorandum 17/4, 3/23/49.
ll2 :\1'1(' ~Iemoramlum 17n. 6/1:)/49. Thr Kational Security Council was rstah·
lishpd by the Xational Security Aet of 1947, which authorized the :'ISC to ad\-ise
the Prrsidrnt "ith rrsprct to "the intl'grntion of doml'stic, forflign. and military
policies" relating to the "national security." (Section 101 of the :'Iational Se('
nrit~, Act of 194i.) l'nder this authority, the :'ISC then approved a seeret charter
for Ow ICC. compospd of the FBI Director (as chairman) and the heads of tlw
threp military intelligpnce agencies.
113 Delimitatian of Inrestigati\'e Duties and Agreement for Coordination,
2/23/49. A sUPlllementary agreement required FBI and military intelligence
officials in the field to "maintain close personal liaison," particularl~- to aroid
",luplication in ... the use of infornwrs." "'here there was "doubt" as to whether
anot!H'r agpncy ,ras interested in information, it "should he transmitted."
(HlIlIlIlemental Agreement No.1 to the Delimitation Agreement, 6/2/49.)
'" Lettpr fmlll ,\ttorney Genrral ~IcGrath to Charles S. ~Iurphy' Counsel to
(Ill' PresillPnt, 7/11/50.
II', Rtatrlllent of President Truman, 7/24/50.
46
Despite concern among his assistants.ma President Truman's
statellH'nt clearly placl'd him Oil thl' record as rndorsing FBI inn'stigat
ions of "subn'rsin~ actiyitirs." ThE' statenwnt said that such inH'stigations
had l)('en anthorizl'd initially hy Prrsidrnt RoosHelt's
"dirrctin's" of Sl'pt('nt!lPr H);j0 and .Tanuary 10-i:j. HO\yeWl" thosl'
particular (lirrctin's had not nspd this prl'cisr languageY6
Shortly aftrr Prrsi(lrnt Eisrllhowrr took office in 19;)~. the FBI
adyised the IYhitr Housr that its "intrl'llal srcurity responsibility"
\wnt lwyoml "statutory" authorit\-. The Bureau attached a COPy of the
Truman statellwnt. hut not thr Rooseyelt (lirectiw. The FBI again
broadly intrrprptp(l tlw Roosp'-Plt dil>ectin~ by saying that it hall authorizpd
"inwstigati ye \york" rplatpd to "subwrsiw acti \-itirs." 117
In Dpcemhpr 10i\:) Presidpnt Eisenhmyer issned a statl'llwnt reiterating
Prrsident Tnllllan's "dirpcti,'p" and rxten(ling the FBI's mandate
toinnstigations un(ler the .\tomic Enerp-y Act.ll8
President Kl'nnedy issuprl no puhlic statement comparablp to the
RoosewIt. Truman. and Eisenhmypr "directi ,'es." Howeyer. in 100:2
he (lirl transfer the Tnterclepartl1lental Intelligence ('onferencp to "the
supen-ision of the .\ttorney General :" 119 and in 196-i Attorney General
Robert Kennedy re-issupd tlw TI(' charter. citing as authority tIlP
President's HH):2 order and retaining the term "subyersion." The charter
added that it did not "morlify" or "afl'ect" the pre,-ious "Presidential
Directiws" rrlating to thr dnties of the FBI. and that the
Delimitations Agrerment brt\yeen the FBI and military intelligence
"shall remain in fnll force and efl'rct." 120
None of the directin's. ordrrs. 01' charters proyided any definition
of the broad and loosr trrms "subyersion" or "suhversiye activities;"
and none of tlIP arlministrations prm-idrd efl'ecti ,'e controls oyer the
FBI's inyestigations in this area.
8. Scope of Domestic Intelligence
a. "Stdn'crsi!'e Actil·ities·'
The breadth of thr FBI's in\'Cstigations of "snbwrsi,'e acti,'itv" led
to massiye collection of informatIon on law abiding citizens: FBI
domestic intelligrnce inycstigations extended beyond known or suspected
Communist Party members. They included other indi\'iduals
\yho regarde(l the Soyiet l~nion as the "champion of a superior way of
life" and "persons holding important positions \yho haw shown sympathy
for Communist objecti,-es and policies." )Iembers of "non-Stal-
115a One noted, "This is the most inscrntable Presidential statement rye seen
in a long' time," Another asked, "How in H-- did this get out?" A third
rt'plied, "Don't know-I thought you were handling," Xote~ initialed D, Bell.
S.TS (S, .J. Spingarn), and GWE (George W, Elsey), 7/24-25/50 (Elsey Papers,
Harry S, Truman Library), En'n before the statement was issued, one of these
aidE'S had warned the President's counsel that the .Justice Department was
attpmpting "an end run," [:\Iemorandum from G, 'V, Elsey to Charles S. :\Iurphy,
Coum:el to the President, 7/12/30, (:\lurphy Papers, Harry S. Truman Libran',)]
116 See footnotes l!) and 22,
117 Letter from J. Edgar Hooyer to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President,
1/28/53, and attached memorandum on "FBI Liai~on Acth'itie~," 1/26/53,
118 Statement of President Eisenhower, 12/15/53,
119 Xational Security Action :\lemorandum 161, Snbject: L'.S. Internal Security
Programs, 6/9/62.
"0 :\lemorandum from Attorney General Kenned,- to J, Edgar Hooyer, Chairman,
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, 3i5/64,
4i
inist" revolutionary socialist groups were inwstigated because, even
though they opposed the SO\~iet regime, the FBr\~iewed them as regarding
the SO\~iet rnion "as the center for wol'le] revolution." 121
~Ioreonr, the FBI's concept of "subwrsive infiltration" was so broad
that it permitted the inYestigation for decades of peaceful protest
groups such as the ~AACP.
(1) The .Y/llI/bel' of Jill'e8tig(lti01~~.-Byl!)()O the FBI had 0lwned
approximatp]y +:3:2,000 files at headquarters on inclividua]s and groups
in the "suhn'rsiw" intelligence field. Bpt\\'een 1!I(jO andlD(j:) all addihcmal
H.OOO such filP" \n'rp 0llPned. 122 .An ewn larger 1ll1l11ber of invcstigatin,
files were maintained at FBI field offices.123 Under the
Burpau's filing systelll, a sing]p fl]e on a group could illc]11Cle references
to lnllldrpcl" 01' t h01I"a IIIb of gl'Ou p Illelll!wrs or othpr persons as"ociatecl
\vith tllP group in any \vay: ancl such IwnlPS \n'n' indexed so that the
information \VaS readilY rl'tripvabh'.
(:2) ragae (lnd SII'ceping ,..,'tlrJId((J'(18.-The FBI conducted continuing
investigations of persons \vhose membership in the Communist
Party or in "a revolutionary group" had "not been proven," lmt who
had "anarchistic or I'l'volutionary belief,," and had "colllmittee] past
acts of violence during strikes. riots. or clemonstrations." Persons
not cnlTentl.'~ eng:aged in "acti\~ity of a subversive nature" ,,~ere still
ill\~pstigatpc] if they had engagpc] in such acti\~ity "several years ago"
and thpre \vas no "positiw indication of c]isaffection."'24
TI\(' FBI ~Ian\lal statpd that it was "not possihlr to fOl'llllllatr any
hal'd~and-fast "taJl(hl'ds" 1'01' nJ('asul'ing "thr dangerousness of inclivic]
nal ])H'llIbprs Or afliliatps of reyolutionary organizations." Pel'SOIlS
conlc1 1)(' inH'stigatpd if they \vel'(' "espousing the line~' of "revolutionary
movpments". ,\nonymons allegations could start an inwstigation
if thl'Y \\'('1'(' "snfli('il'ntly spl'cifir and of snffiril'nt \wighL"
Thl' ~Iannal addecl.
"'11ere tllPl'e is c]onbt an illi1iyidllal may 1)(' a current threat
to till' intpl'Ilal sl'c1II'itv of the nation: the qUl'stion should
be l'eso]wcl in tllP intel'est of security and investigation
eonductl'cl. J",
The FBI ~lanual did not (leflne "SlIhwrsiw" gronps in terms of
thrir Jinks to a fOI'C'igll gO\·C'I'IlI1lC'nt. Instl'lHl. tl]('y \\"('I'C' "~Ial'xist
l'C'Tolntional'y-typC''' organizations "seeking tllP owrthl'o\\' of the U.S.
GOH'J'llm€Ilt." le" Onp PlIl'POSp of ill\~cstigatioll was possible proseeu-
121 :.\lemorandum from .J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/5/46,
'02 :Uelllorandulll frolll tl](' FBI to the Senate Select COllllllittee. 1O/21</i5. An
indi('atioll of the hrefHlth of the ill\'e~tigations i~ illustrated h~~ tlIP fac·t that
the lllllllher of filps far ex('pe(]pc! tlll' Burl'au's pstimatl' of thl' "all timp high" in
c'01111111Illist Part~~ ml'mhHshi]J which was 1'0.000 ill HH4 and steadil~~ dl'dinpd
thprpaftpr. (William C, Sullimll testimony, l1/l/i:i. pp. 33-34,)
"" Rp]Jort to t!IP lIonsl' ('OJllmittpp on thp .Jndiciary hy the Comptrollpr General
of thl' {'nifed State~, 2/24/TG. JlP, 118--119.
121 Snch ill\~estigationswprp cOlll{nl'tpd I>pc·aw.:l' the Comlllunist Party had issued
instructions that "~ll'epers" should leave tIl(' Party and g:o "underground," still
maintaining secret links to the l'art~·. (:.\IeJllorandum from J. F. Bland tl) A. II.
Belmont, 7/30/:iS,)
"Rl'fu,al to cooperate" with an FBI ag:ent's interview was "taken into con~
sidl'ration nlong: \vifh other facts" in determining: whpther to contimw the invl'stig:
ation. (:\Il'lllorandnlll from .J. Edgar Hoovl'r to DPllUty Attorney (;pnpral
l't>ytoll ForI!. 6/28/:iI,)
100 HH10 FBI :.\Ianual f;PC'tion 87, p, 5,
1:>1 19GO 1<'BI :.\Iallual Section Ri, p. 5,
48
tion lllHler the Smith "\ct. Bnt no prosecntions ,,'ere initiatecl under
the "\ct after lU;')7. 'c ; The ,Tustin' Department achisecl tlIP FBI in
lU;)(i that snch a prospcntion l'C'C]uirpcl "an aetnal plan for a yiolent
reYolution.~· 1~' The Dq>artnlC'nfs position in }!)(iO ,yas that ",incitement
to act ion in the forpsppa hIe futlll'e" was ]l('Pcled.' e" Despltp the
strict requirC'nH'nts for jll'os('cution, the FBI contil111Pcl to in\'l>stigate
"snbnrsiye" orgilllizations "from all intelligence yie,,'point" to appraise
tllC'ir "strC'ngth" ancl"clangC'ronsness." 130 . •
(3) COJII,,-FIL.-The FBI's hroaclest program for colleetmg mt~lliO'ence
was carried ont uncleI' the heacling CO~IIXFIL,or COmll1ll1llst
inJiltration.111 The FBI collecte(l intelligPl1ce :lbont Commnnist "inflnpnce'~
nnder the follO\ying categories:
Political aetiyities
Legislatin' actiyities
Domestic administration issnes
Xegro C]nestion
You! h matters
,yomell's matters
Farmers' ~Iatters
Cnltnral aetiyitips
Yeterans' matters
Religion
Education
Indnstry He
FBI inyestigations cowrecl "the entire spectrum of the social ancl
labor movement in the country," 133 The purpose-as publicly disclosecl
in the Attol'lley General's Annnal Reports-,yas pure intelligenee:
to "fortif~'~~ the GO\'ernment against "snIJ\'('rsi,'e prrssnres," HI or to
"stren~rtll('n~' the (iO\'en1ll1Pnt against "snIJ\'('rsive campaigns." 135
In other ,yords, the c())nXFIL program suppliecl the Attol'lley
Grneral and the Presi(lent ,yith intc'lligence ahout a wide rang'(' 01
gronps seeking to influpnce national policy under the rationale of cletermining
,yhether Communists ,yere inyolnc1.13G The FBI said it was
not eoncenwd ,yitli tllC' "]('gitimate aeti,'ities" of "nonsuhversi,'e
groups," bnt only with whether Communists were "gaining a dominant
l'7 The Supreme Court'~ last deci~ion upholding a Smith Ad conviction was
f'eales v. Fllited f'tatcs. 367 FS. ::!O:~ (1!16l). which reitPfatPll that tIlPre mu~t
he "acl\'ocacy of action." See ratcs Y. United States, 3ii.! CS. 2fl8 (1fl57).
128 ;\Iemol'amlum from A~~i~tant Attorney GelH'ral Tompkin~ to Director, FBI.
3/1,,/,,6.
'''' ;\Ielllorallllulll from Assi"tnnt Attorney Genernl Yengley to llireetor, FBI,
,,/17/60.
130 Ifl60 FBI ~IanualoSection1'7, p. G.
1311fl60 FBI ;\Ianual Section 1'7, pp. 1'3-1'4.
13'1960 FBI Manual Section 87. pp. 5-11.
]~1 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955. p. 195.
134 Annual Report for 1951', p. 331'.
'33 Annual Report for 1964, p. 375.
n. (Examples of such reports to the "-hite Hou~e are set forth later, pp. 5153.)
The Chief of til(' Intl'rnal Security Scction of the FBI Intelligence Diyi~
ion in Ifl4S-lfl66 testiftpll that tIll' Bm'pau "had to he certain" that a group's
po~ition ditl not coincide n'ith the Comml1l1i~t line '·.iu~t hy necillent," The FBI
\\'oulfl not "o!wn n casp" until it had "sppcifte information" that "thp ('ommuni~ts
\\'ere there" and \\'ere "influencing" the group to "a~~i~t the Communist movement,"
(F. ,T. Ballmgal'(lnpr te~timon~'. 10/1'/7;:; p. 47.)
49
role." ''7 ~ewl'thele:-s. CO:\II~FIL report,.: inl'\"itahly dpsnihe(]
"lpgitimate actiyit ies" tota1Jy 11llrpJate(1 to Ow alleged "sllhwrsiYe actiyity."
This is yi\'idl~' (]elllonstrnte(] by the CO:\IIXFIL rppol'ts on
Amcrican's leading ciyil rights group in this pcriod, the ~AACP.l3R
The inwstigation ('ontilllled for at lpast hwnty-fiw years in cities
t hl'oughout thc nation. aIthough no eyidpncp \\'as e"pl' fOlllHl to rpbllt
tIll' ObSel'Ylltion that the XA.\.CP ha(l a "strong tpndency" to "steer
clpar of COllllllunist acti\'itips." "'"
(4) H,lx1rJ,qemtio/i of f'ollllJl./iliist Iilt'lullr'e.-Thp FBI an(] the .Tusticc
Departmellt justified the continuation of CC»nXFIL ill\'estigations,
(lespitp tIl(' COllllllunist Party's steady dpclinp in the' fiftips aIH]
early sixities. on the theory that tlIP Party \yas "seeking to repair its
losses" with the "hope" of being ablp to "moye in" on moypments with
"Jaudablp objpetiyes." 1111
The FBI J'('pOl'le(1 to tIl(' "'hite Housp in 10Gl that the COlllmunist
Party had "attellljlte(]" to take adyantage of "racial (listnrbancps" in
t11(\ Sonth nne] lind "endpa vOI'e(]" to bring "pl'pssure to benr" on gO\'el'llment
officials "thl'ongh the press. labor nnions, and student gl'onps."
At thnt time the FBI \\'as innstigating "hyo 111I11dre(] Imo\yn 01' suspected
communist front aw] cOlllmnnist-infiltmted organizations." HI
By not stating how t'ft'pdin' the "attplllpts" aw] "enc1payol's" of the
Communists \yen:" and by not iw]icating whpther they \\'el'e 'becoming
more or lpss successful. the FBI ott'el'ed a deficient rationale fol' its
sweeping intelligence c~lIpction policy.
'VilJiam C. SulJ iyan. a f01'l11pr hpa(1 of the FBI Intelligence Division.
has tpstified that such language \\'as deliberately nsP(] to pxaggprate
the thl'pat of Comlllnnist infinPllc('. ".\.ttpmpts·· am] "infiuPlH'p" WPl'('
"\'('ry significant \\'OI'ds" in FBI reports. he said. Thest' terms obscurer]
what lw felt to be the mol'(' significant crit('\'ion-the (]('gree of Comnll111ist
succcss. The Bureau "di(] not discuss this bpcausp \\'e \\'ould
han' to say that tlH'y did not hit the targ-d, han]ly any." W
"\ distorte(] pict1ll'P of Communist "infiltration"]ater ser\'P(] to justify
thp FBI's intpnsin inn'stigations of thp gronps inyohpd in protests
against the Yictnam jYa l' am] t hp ci "i I rights mOYemen!. including" Dr.
:\Iartin Lnthpr King..Jr., and the :-\outhel'll Christian Leac1prship Confcrence.
lTo A/lll1lal Report for 1f):J5, p. W";.
lO' For morc dptailpd diseus.,inn nf tllc FBI inH'stig-ations of till' XAACP aud
olllcr ei\'il rig-Ilts gTOUjlS scp tilt' RpIHlrt on til{' Develojlment of I<'BI nOll1pstic
I ntcllig-pncp In ypstig-a tinn.s.
l."" Report of Okl[!lIoma City FieW Officc. n/19/41. Tllis rt'port contilllwd:
"Xcvertheless, there is a strong movement on tile part of the COll1munists to attell/
pt to dominate this group ... Consequently, tile acti\·ities of tlw XAACP will
11(' ('Io.,ply obsPl'\'ed and scrutinized in the future." [Emphnsis ndded.J This stress
on COlllmunist "attempts" ratller tllan their actual aCllieyenwnts is typical of
C():\IIXFI1, rpports. TIll' annual reports on tll(' FBI's CO:\IIXFIL iIwestigation
of tile XAACI' ilH]icate tllat tile Communists consist,'ntly fniled in tllese "attellll)
ts" at tIl(' national IpyeL altllougll tIl(' DurNlu took eredit fOt· using ('overt
tactics to prevcnt a Communist takeover of a major XAACP ella pteI'. (1,('tter
fmlll .T. Edg-ar Hom'cr to Attornp~' Cpnt'ral·t'lcct Robert F. Kenncdy, 1/10/G1
attadH'<1 m"lllo!"aJl(lum, ,sulljed: Comlllunist Part.\'. eRA-FBI Counterattack.)
"., Annual Rp]1ort of tllP Attornpy Genpral for Fiscal Year In:;n, ]1p. 247-241'.
]4l :\1ell1orandull1 from .T. Edgar HooY('r. Chairman, Intprr]l?partnwntnl Intel,
lig-pnce Conference, to :\1c(;corg-e nUlH]~', Rppcial A"istant to tllP I'rf'si<1pnt for
Xational Securit~·, 7/25/Gl, enclosing lIC Heport, Status of CR. Internal Security
Programs.
'" Willialll C. Sullimn testimony, 11/1/75, P11. 40-41.
68·786 o· 76 . 5
50
b. "RoehIT Jfott(l;8'~ (flit! "!lute G1'OIl]l8'~
In the IH.jO,.:. t lIP FBI also cleYl'lope(l intelligence programs to inn'sti!..':
ate "Bacial ~rattel's" an(l"hah' organizations" llnl'elatecl to "J'('\'(llutionary-
tqw" ,.:uhn'rsiH's. "Hate organizations" ,H']'(' innstig'ated if
they ha(l "allegedly adopte(l a policy of [uhocating, condoning, or inciting
t Ill' use of force or yiolellC'P to deny othpl''': their rights unch'l' the
Constitution:' Like the C()~I1~FIL program. howeYl'r. the Bureau
use(l its "c'stahlislll'd S011l'('es" to monitor Ill(' acti\-itips of "hate groups"
\\'hich clidnot "qllalify" uncler tl](' "adn)('acy of \-iole]H'e" staJl(1n]'(1.l4:l
In }fiG:\. FBI liel(l oflkes \\'('1'(' instructed to report "the formation
and identitips" of "rightist or pxt I'(·mist gl'Oups" in tIl(' "anticommunist.
tiel(1." Hea(lqmll'tpr,.; approntl mlS ne('(led for in\'(~stil!atinl! "groups
in this fipld \Y!IOSp aeti\-itips arp not in yiolation of any statutps." '44
l;ndpr thpse programs, thp FBI polleetpd and clissem'inatpd intplligencc
about the .John Birch Society and its founder, Robert ,\'elch,
in 1!l;i8.'40 The acti\-ities of anotlwr right-wing spokesman, Gerald
L. K. Smith, ,yho headed the Clll'istian Xationalist Crnsade, ,\'ere
the subject of FBI reports eyen after tl\(' .Justice Dcpartment had
concluded that the group had not yiolated federal Ia\\' and that thcre
was no basis for including the group on the "Attorney General's
list." 146
Tho FBI pl'ogram for collecting intelligence' on "Gpneral Racial
Matters" \\-as CYl'n broader. It ,wnt bevoml "race riots" to include
"civil dpl1lonstrations" and "similar dey"elopments." These "deyelopments"
includpd:
proposed or actual activities of individuals~ officials, committees,
legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial neld.'"
The FBI's "intelligence function" ,yas to ach-ise "appropriate" feeleral
and local officials of "pertinent information" about "racial incidents."
HS
A briefing of the Cabinet by Director Hom-er in 1!l5G illustrates
the breadth of collect ion and dissemination under the racial matters
program. 'I'll(' briefing covered not only incidpnts of yiolence awl the
"efforts" and "plans'~ of Communists to "influpnce" the ciyil rights
monment, bnt also the legislatiyp strategy of the XA.\CP and the
activities of Southern GOI'Cl'Ilors and Congressmen on behalf of groups
opposing intrgration peaceful1y.14~
143 1!l60 l<'BI ~Ianllal Section 122, p. 1.
1H SAC Lptter Xo. 63-27, 6/11/63.
1<> The FBI llfl~ denied that it eyer conducted a "~ecurity-t~'l)e inYe~tig'atioll"
of the Birch Society or "-elch, but ~tatp~ the Boston field office "was inNtrnC'ted
in 1939 to ohtain ha('kground data" on "-elch using puhlie SOllree~, Dh'moralldUIll
from the FBI to the Senate Spied Committee. 2/10/76.) A 1!l6:~ intpl'llal
FBI memorandum stated that the Bureau "chpcked into tlIP hackg'l'Oun(j of til('
Birch Soeiet,- hecause of its sellrrilous attaek on Presidpnt Eispnll()\ypr a]](l
other high GOYl:rmueut officials." Dlpmorandum from 10', .J. Bamnganln('r to
W. C. SulliYall, ;;/:W/6:1.) Reports 'Yere sent to the Whitp Housp, SPP footnotp HH.
1403 lRtter from AI<sistant Attorney General Tompkins to Sherman A(lam~.
A~~istant to til(' Pn·sidpnt. 11/22/;;4; lptters from .T. Ellg'ar Hom-er to RollPrt
Cntlpr, S!lPclal Assi>tant to the President, 1O/lG/G7, and 1/17/G8. (EbpnhO\wr
Lihran-.)
147 19(iO FBI ~Illnual Seetion 122, pp. ;)---6.
14< 1!l60 FBI ~Ianual Section 122, pp, ;;-6.
lIP "Racial Tensions and Civil Rights," 3/1/G6, statplIlPnt uSpd hy the FBI
Director at Cahinet hriefing, 3/9/56.
51
c. FBI Political Intelligence for the lVhite House
XUllW!"OllS itellls of political intelligence. 'wre supplied by the FBI
to tho "'hite House in each of tho three administrations during the
Cold 'Yar era, apparently satisfying the desires of Presidents and
their staffs. 'oo
President Truman and his aides receiwd regular letters from Director
HOO\'er labeled ;.PersonaI and Confidentia 1" conta ining tidbits
of political intelligence. The letters reported on such subjects as:
inside information abollt the negotiating position of a non-Collllllllnist
labor union: 1:>1 the aeti,"ities of a former Hooseyelt aide who ,yas
trying to inflnellce thc Trllman administration's appointments; 15" II
rl'port from a "conficlential sonrcc"' that a "scandal" was hrewing which
wonld be "nry embarrassing" to tlw Democ'I'atic administration; '''" a
report from a "yery confidential sourcc" ahont a meeting of newspaper
represc'ntatins in Chicago to plan publieation of storic's exposing
organized crime and cOlTnpt politicians; 1:>·' the eontents of an
in-house comnmnication from J'ell'8)1'e('/,' magazine rcportcrs to their
editors abont a story thcy hall obtained frolll the State Department,m
and criticism of the gonmmenfs internal security programs by a
former Assistant to the Attorney GeneraJ.1GG
Letters discussing Communist "inflnencc" proyidecl a considerable
amount of extraneons information abont the legislatiye process, incllHling
lobbying actiyities in snppOlt, of ridl rights legislation 151 and
tIl(' political aetiyities of Senators and Congressmen.'5S
President Eisenhower and his aides receiyed similar tid-bits of political
intelligence, inelnding an flch'flner text of fI speech to be deliyered
by a prominent labor leader,':>" reports from Bnreau "sonrces" on
the meetings of an XAACP delegation ,,,ith Senators Paul Douglas
and EYerett Dirksen of Illinois; lGll the report. of an "informant" on
the rok of the rnited .\uto 'Yorkers l~nion at an XAACP conference/
G1 snmmaries of data in FBI files on thirteen persons (inclncling
Xorman Thomas, Linus Pauling, aml Bertrand Russell) who had filed
suit to stop nuclear testing,1G2 a report of a "confidential source" on
plans of :Mrs. Eleanor Hoose,'elt to hold a reception for the head of
"" Spp p. :{7 for di~c\l~~ion of "'hite HO\l~l' wiretap reque~t~ in 1945-1!H8.
1[,1 U.tter from .J. Edg-ar Hooyer to George E. Allen, TJirector, Rp('Oll~tr\1etioll
Financp Corporation, 12/13/-16. (Harry S. Tr\lman Lihrary.)
lG'Lptter from .J. Edgar IIooyer to :Uaj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, :\Iilitary Aide
to the I're~ident, 2/1:1/47. (Harry S. Truman Lihrary.)
:: Lptter from Hooyer to Yaug]m, 6/2;;/-17. (Harr~' is. Truman Lihrary.)
Letter from .T. Edgar Hom"er to :\Iatthew .T. Connelly, Spcretar~' to the l're~i~
dpnt, 1/27/:10. (Harr~" S. Truman Lihrary.)
1:.5 :\IemorandulI1 from .J. Edgnr HoO\"er to Attomer Gf'nf'ral Clarl,. -1/1/46.
(Harry S. Truman Lihrary.)
,:.'1 Lpttpr from .T. Edg-ar Hooypr to :\Iaj. Gen. Harr~" H. Yauglm. :\lilit:ll'~' Aidp
to the Prp~i(]pnt, 11/13/47. (Harry S. Truman Lihrary.)
'" Letter~ from .T. Edg-ar Booy!'r to Brig-. Gen. Harry H. Ya\lg-hn. :\Iilitar~' Aid!'
to tile Pr('~ident, l/11/-IG awl 1/17/4G. (Harry S. Truman LihraQ".)
105 Lptter from .J. Edg-ar lIooycr to George E. A!lpn, Director. Rpcon~truction
Finance Corporation. :1/29/-19. (Harry S. Truman Lihrary.)
'"' Letter from J. Edgar lIooypr to Dillon AJl(]pr~on. Special A~si~tant to the
Prp~ident, 4/21/55. (Eisenho\wr LihraQ'.)
'''0 Lptter from Roo,,",'r to Alld('r~oll, 3/G/f,6. (Ei~pnhower Library.)
'''' Lettpr from I-Iooyer to AJ1(]pr~on, 3/5/;;6. (Ei~pnhowerLibrarv.)
If.' Lettr'r from J. Edgar lIooypr to Dillon "\JI(]pr.'on, Special 'A,,~istalJt to the
President, 4/11/58. (Ei~('nho\YerLibrary.)
52
a ciyil rights gJ'OllP,"C,o and reports on the actiyities of Hobert "reIch
ancl t Iw .10hn Birch ~ociety.l"j
Tlte FBI also mhlllte(,l~e(] to the 'Yhite Honse information from its
most "l'eliable SOlll'('pS" on pllrely political 01' social contads ",ith foreign
go\'el'llment ofiicials hy a 1)rpllty ~\ssistant to the Pl'rsiclrnt,"'''
Bernan] Bal'llclt.ln'; Sllpreme Court .Tustice 'Yilliam O. Douglas,""
amI ~Irs. Ell'anor Hoose\'plt. lf
,'
Dirpdo]'lToo\,rr sent to thp '''hite HOllse a J'('port from a "ponfi(lrntial
informant" on thr lobbying acti\'ities of a California gToUp callrel
'Yon1('n fol' L{'gislati n ~\ction heca lise its positions "pa I'a IleIp(r' the
Communist linp.",;1
~\s in the priol' administrations. requests also f1mwd from the Eisenhmyer
'''hite lTOllSp to thr FBI.170 For rxamplr. a 1)J'psidpntial aidr
ash(] thr FBI to clwcl\: its lilrs on HrL Carl ~rcInt\Te of thp Intcl'-
national Council of Christian Cll\ll'ches. l7l
•
TlIP pattprn contill1lPd clllring thp Krnnrcly a(lministration. ~\ Sllmmary
of material in FBI fill'S on a prominent rntrrtainpr ",as yohmtppr~
cl to Attornpy (}pnrl'al Kpllnp(h- becallse lToo\'('I' thOll!!ht it "may
he of intrrest." 170 "\ttornpy (}plH'ral Kellneeh' spnt to thr Pn'siclpnt ail
FBI mpllloralH]llm on tIl(" purrly personal life of Dr. ~rartin Luthrr
King, .Jr.101 Dil'pdor lIoonr snpplircl ~\ttomeY (}cncral KennNh- ",ith
hacl\:gTolllHI information on a \\'oman \yho told an Italian ne\\'spapel'
that sll(' had oncp he'{'n pngaQ"ed to malTY Prpsident Kpnnp(h- 101 ane] on
t 1](' ]llIshanel of a \Hlman \dlO \yas rpportp(l in the prpss to ha \'(' stated
that the Presiclrnt's c1aul"thtrr \\'ollld cnl'ol1 in a coollC'rati\'r Ilursery
'Yith ,yhjch she mls cOllnecteel,"'" The FBI Director also passed on
163 Letter from ,J. Ed~ar HoO\'er to Rohert Cntler, Spednl c\ssistant to thp
President, 2/13/;"iS, (Eisenhowpr Lihrary,) The ~roup \yas (]escril,p(] as thl'
"snccessor" to a group cited by the House l'n-American Acth·itips Committee
as a "communist front,"
11)4 Letters frolll .T. Ed~ar HoO\'er to Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to thl'
PrE'sident, 1)/11/59 and 9/16/59.
"" Letter from Hooyer to Cutler, 6/6/;)8. (Eisenhower Library). This inyo]YE'd
eontact with a forei~n official whose later contacts with U.S. officials werE' rE'ported
by the FBI nnder the Kel1lwdy Administration in connection with the "su~ar
lobby." sep 1'p, (>-1-6.),
166 Letter from .1. Edgar Hooyer to Dillon Anderson. Special Assistant to thE'
Prpsident, 11/7(;')5. (Eisenhower Library.)
I';' Lettprs from J. Er]g-ar Hoo\'pr to Robert Cutler. Administrath'e Assistant
to the President. 4/~1/53 and 4/27/;-;3, (Eisl'nhmYer Library.)
lOS L€'tter from Hoowr to Cutler. 10/1/57. (Eisenhower Library.)
109 Letter from Hoover to Gray. 11/9/;-;9. (Eisenhower Library.) Hoo,er added
that membership in the ~roup "does not, of itself, connote membership in or
sympathy with the Communist Party."
,"0 RpqllPsts under the ROOSE'yp!t and Truman administratious. including wiretap
rPfluests. are discusser] at pp, :n a]](]37,
171 Ll'tter from .J. Ed~ar Hoovpr to Thomas Eo Stephpns. Spcrptary to thp
PrE'sident. 4/13/;-;4. (Eisenhower Library.)
172 :\IE'morandum fron'! J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 2/10/61, "Personal."
(.John 1-'. Kennedy Library.)
"" :\1E'morandum from the Attorney Genpral to the President, S/~O/6.'3. attachin~
mPlllorandul11 from Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, 8/13/63.
(.John F. Kpnnedy Library.)
m :\Ipmorandum from .J, Ed~ar Hooyer to R. F. Kennedy, ~/6/61. "Personal."
(.John F. Kennedy Library.)
173 :\IemoralH]um from .J. Edgar Hooyer to R. F. Kennedy. 2/8/61, "Personal."
(.John F. Kennelly Library.)
53
information from a Bureau ;':"ourcr" n'ga]'(ling plrlllS of a group to
puhlish alkg,:,tions about the Presillrnt's persollal lifr.""
In 1962 the FBI complir<1unquestioninfrJ~-\yith a rrqurst from Attorney
GeneI'll I Kelllwd.\- to intrn-ie\\- a Steel Company rxecuti H' Ilnd
sryeral reporters \\'ho hall \Hitten storirs about t )ll' :-IterI rxrcutiye.
The interyie\\'s \\'('rr conductrd latr at night and parly in the morningbeelluse.
according' to t)I{' rrspol\siblr FBI official. t)\(' .\ttorlley Gennal
indicated the information was IH'r<1e(1 for a ,Yhitp House meeting
tIll' Hext <1ay.'77
Throughout the period. thr Burrau also (lisseminated r('ports to
high executiye officials to discrE'(lit its critics. 'Ill(> FBI's inside information
on plans of thr La\\'ycrs Guild to denouncp BurE'au slllTeillance
in 10-tD ga\'(' the Attornr~' GC'neral tIll' opportunity to prC'parC' a
rebuttal \wll in alh-ance of thl' ex)wcte(l criticism."s ,Yhl'n t)\(' Knoxyille
Area Human Relations Council charged in 10()O that the FBI \\'as
practicing racial discrimination, the FBI did "name rlll'cks" on member
of the Council's baal'll of directors and sent the results to the Attorney
General. The name checks dredge(l up derogatory allegations
from as far back as the late thirties and early fortirs.""
d. IRS hU'cstigatioll8 oj l'07itirrt7 OI'galli.zlltioll8
The IRS program that came to be used against the llomestic dissi(
lents of the U)()Os was first used against Communists in the 105()s.
.\5 part of its COIXTELPRO against the ConlJllullist Party. Ol{'
FBI arrange(l for IRS in\'('stip:ations of Party members. and obtained
their tax returns."'O In its e11'orts against t Ill' Communist Party,
the FBI had ul\limited acce"s to tax rrtul'Jls: it nen'I' told thC' IRS \\'hy
it \yantrd them. and IR:-I ne\'er attemptr(l to find out.'S ' •
In Hl6L responding to ,Yhitp Housr and congressional intrrest in
right-\Ying organizations. the IRS began comprehensi\'e ill\'estig-ations
of right-wing groups to identify contributors and ascertain
whether or not somE' of tlH'JIl WE're entitled to t)H'ir tax exempt status.l'2
Ldt-\\'ing groups \\,pr(' latpr add('(1. in an e11'ort to a\'oid charges that
snch IRS adi\-itil's \\,prr all ailll('d at onp part of thl' political spectrum.
Both right- and lpft-wing gl'Onps \\'{'rr splp('(pd for rp\·ipw and innstigatioll
becallsP of their political acti\-ity and not because of any information
that they had \'iolated thr tax la\ys.""
"'hile the Ih:-l etrorts beg'ulJ in }%) to inn>stigate the political
acti\,itirs of tax (;xrmpt organizations \\'Pre not as pxtpnsin' as later
17. ~IemoraJHIlllll from J. Edgar Hoo\'er to R. I,'. Kennedy, 11/20/68. (John F.
Kpnnedy Librar~·.)
'" ~Ielllorandllm from AttOI11PY G€'neral K"nn"dy to th" l're~ident, 4/12/62 €'ndo~
ing- lll€'lllorandllm from Diredor, FRI. to the Attornp~- GenpraL 4/12/62;
tp~1imony of ('ol1rOI('y E\'an~, former A~~i~tant Direetor. FBI. 12/1/"" p. :m.
'7< Letter from Attol'lle~' General ~[eGrath to l're~i<l"nt Trulllan, 12/,/Hl; letter
frolll ,J. l~dgar IIoon'r to ~Iaj. G"n. IIarry H. Yauglm, :\Iilitary Aidp to the Presi-
(lpnl. 1/14/50.. .
17. :\Ipmorallllulll frolll .J. Edgar Hooyer to Attorney General "'illialll 1'. Rog-erR.
:l/2:l/GO.
»" ~Ipmorandlllll frolll A. II. Rplmont to L. Y. Bdllrdlll'lll, 8/21'/56, p. 4.
''l Leon Grppn tE'~tilllony. H/12/i..., 1111. G.-I'.
'" :\IplllormHlulll, "'illialll Loel>, A~~btant ('Olllllli~sionpr. ('olllplialH'" to Dem.
J. Barroli. Virt'e!or of Audit, 11/80/61.
1'3 ~Ielllorandulll, Attorney As~iRtant to ('Olllllli"iOl! to Dirf'dor, IR~ Audit
DiYbion, 4/2/62.
54
programs in HlfH)-1 !)i:1, they \yere a si~'11 incant depart1ll'e by the IRS
from normal enforcement criteria for investigating persons or groups
on the basis of information indicating noncompliance. By directing
tax audits at individuals and groups solely because of their political
heliefs, the Ideological Organizations Audit Project (as the In6I program
\\"lIS knO\yn) 1'4 cstab1islwl] a precedent for a far morc elahorate
program of targeting "llissidl'nts." IS"
_~. Accmmtaui7ity alld Colltl'o7
During the ('oIl] "Tal' period, there \yere seriolls ,,-cal·messcs in thc
system of accollntability and control of lloml'stic intelligence actiyity.
On occasion thl' exccutiye chose not to comply \vith the \Yill of Congrpss
\yith respect to intcl'Ilal secmity policy; am] thl' ('onl!rpssional attl'mpt
to pxcl\Hlr 1'.8. foreil!n intellil!encp al!cncies from llonwstic activities
was c\'tHled. Intelligence agencies also conductel] cowrt programs in
yiolation of la\Ys protecting the rights of Americans. Problems of accountability
\H'rC compounded by -the lack of pffecti\'C congn'ssional
o\-crsil!ht and the yaguellf>SS of pxpcutin' orders, \\"hich allo\Ycl] intclligencp
agencies to escapp outside scrutiny.
a. The Emc)'geru'y Detention .1ct
In 1!)-l6, foll!' years beforc the Emergrncy Dctention .\et of In50
\yas passed, the FBI advised ~\ttorney General Clark that it had
srnetly compilell a security index of "potentially l]anl!erous" persons,
I'1i The .Justice Dl'parhllent then made tentatiYe plans for emergency
,letention based on suspension of the pri\-ilegc of the writ of
habeas corpus.1'7 Della rtmellt officials dpl iberatcly anlidcd going to
Congress, ach-ising the FBI in a "blilll]mPIllOraIH]um :"
The present is 110 time to seek legislation. To ask for it \Youll]
ollly bring on a loud and acrimonious discussion.'ss
In 1050, hmyeYer, Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act
,,-hich established standards and procedlll'es for the l]l'tl'ntion, in the
m-ent of \yar, im'asion or insurrection "in aid of 11 foreign enemy," of
any persoll :
as to \yholll there is rpasonable ground to belie\-e that such
persoll probably \yin engage in, 01' probably \Yill conspire \yith
others to l'ngage in, acts of espionage or sabotage.
The Act did not authorize the suspension of the pririlegc of the writ
of habpas corpus, and it proyidpd that l]etained pprsons could appeal to
a re\-iew !Joard alHl to the courts."9
Shortly after passage of the Detention Act, according to a Bureau
document, Attorney (.reneral J. Howard ~IcGrath told the FBI to
'" IRS referred to it as Tax Political Action Groups Project. It was apparently
lallPled as ahoye hy the .Taint COllllllittel' on Int"rnal Ren'nue Taxation.
h' Sp(' lIP. fl-!-HlJ for discussioJl of latN' IRS pro~raIlls.
's. ;\IellloraIllluIll froIll .J. Ed~ar Boon'r to Attornpy Gpneral Clark, 3/R/-!6. Ser
footnotp f,7 for tIll' origins of the Security Index in contran'ntion of Attorney
Gl'nl'ral Biddle's polie~T.
,>,7 "Jemorandulll from Assistant .\.ttorney General 1'. L. Caudle to Attorney General
Clark. 7/11j-!6.
'" Quoted in internal FBI IllPlllorallllulll froIll n. ;\r. Lalll1 to ;r. Ellga I' Hoo"pr,
1/2'2/-!R.
"" Jntprnal Security Aet of l!l.'O, Titlp JI-EnlPr~eJl('Y Dptpntion. 64 Stat. flS7
(19;-;0) .
00
disl'pganl it and to "procped ,,-ith the program as pl'('Yiously out]inpd.~·
I>epartnlPnt officials statpd that tIl(' .\ct was "in conflict \yith" their
plans. and \yas "l111\yol'kab1P."· FBI official:-; agrped that the statutory
Ill'O('pdul'es-such as "I'pcom'sp to tllP com'!s" instpad of sllsjlpnsion of
habeas ('OI'jHls-\nml(I "dest my" t hpil' pmgTam."'" ~IOI'pO\-pL the Security
Indpx used broader standards to (jptermine "potl'ntial dangprOllS]
l('SS" than thos(' pl'('sni!lpd in thp statutp: and. unlikl' tIl(' .\cl,
IkpartnlPnt plans 1)J'O\-il!l·(1 for issuing a ~lastel' Search ,YalTant amI
a ~laster Al'I'pst 'Yal'l'anl."'1 Two subsequent Attorneys Genl'ral
p![(lol's('(1 thp (Iecision to ignorc the Emel'l.tl'ney Dl'tention .\el."12
Ii. 11"it11 11 o7r1ill fI / II fO/'i!lIIf iOIl
~ot onl~- did thl' FBI amI the .Justice Department jointly keep their
nOllC'omplianee \\"ith the Detention Act secret from Congress~ 1m! the
!<'Bl \yithheld important aspects of its program from the Attol'l1ey
General. FBI personnel had been instl'1letpd in ID+D that:
no nll'ntion must be made in any inypstigatiYe report relating
to thl' classif1eations of top functionarips and key figurps, nor
to the Detcom and Comsab Pmgrams, nor to the Security
Inelex or the Communist Index. These inYestigatiYe procedures
and administratiye aides arp confidential amI should
not be blOwn to any outsidl' agl'ncy."'"
FBI documents indicate that only the Security Index \yas made kno\yn
to the .JustiC!' Department.' .
In H)i)i"l, the FBI tightened formal standards for the Security Index,
reducing its size from 2{jJ 7-! to 1:2,870 by 1938.194 Howeyer, there is no
indication that the FBI told tlll' Department that it kept the names of
persons taken off the Secll rity I ndex on a Communist Index, because
the Bureau helien~d such persons remained "potential threats." ID4a
The secret Communist Index was renamed the Heserye Index in 1960
and expanded to include "influential" persons deemed likely to "aid
suln-ersiyc elrments" in an emergpncy hecause of their "subyersi\'e associations
and i(leology."' Such indiYiduals fell under tIl(' following
categories:
Professors, teachers. and eclucators: labor union organizers
and leaders: writers, lecturers. newsmen and others in the
mass media fiehl: lawyers, doctors, and scientists: other potentially
influential persons on a local or nationalleyel; individuals
who could potentiallY furnish financial or material
aid. .
1!'j :Uemoramlum from A. H. Belmont to D. ~I. Ladd, 10/15/52.
191 :lIemorandnm from D. ~I. Ladd to .J. Edgar Hoover, 11/13/;;2.
'" :U('morandum from Attornpy Genpral Jamp~ ~IcGranery to .J. Ed~ar Hoover.
11/2:;/52; memorandum from AHoTlll'Y General Herhert Bro\\'nell to .T. Edgar
HooH'r.4/27/53.
'''' Sl,C Lptter Xo. 97, Series 19..U), 10/W/49. Field offices gave special attention
to "j,;Py figurp~" and "top functionarie~" of the Communi~t Part•. The "Comsah"
program concentratpd on potential Communist sahotpurs, and tl~e "Detcom" program
\\'a~ thp FBI'~ oIYn "priority arTP~t" li~t. The Communi~t Index \\'a~ "a comprf'hen~
in' pompilation of individuHls of intprest to the internal securitv,"
101 :lIellloJ"[lIldum from .T. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Bro\\'neli. 3/9/55;
nH'mOraJl(lUlll from .T. F. Bland to A. H. Belmont. 7/30/;;8.
"'" :lIemonlndUlll from A. n. Belmont to L. V. Boanlman, 1/14/.")5.
56
Persons on the UeserY(' Index \youlel recein' "priority consideration"
for "adion" after dptl'ntion of Sl'curity Index subjects. The breadth
of this list is illustrated bv the inclusion of the names of author
Xorman ~lailer and a professor \yho merelY praiseel the Soyiet union
to his cla:-;s."°·' .
In addition to keeping tllPse programs secret. the FBI \yithheld
information about pspionag-c fmlll thp .Justice Department on at least
1\vo occasions. In ID-l-(; tIl(' FBI had "identified m-er IOO persons" whom
it "susppcted of being in thl' (io\"('rnml'nt COllllllllnist l~ll(lerg-round.'·
Xeither this number nor any names from this list \yere ginn to the
Department because Director IIoowr feared "leaks," alld because the
Bureau conceeled in its intemal documents that it did "not have
evidence, \yhether admissible or othenYise, reflecting actual membership
in the Communist Party." 18G Thus the Bureau's "suspicions" were
not tested by outside revie\y by the .Tustice Department and the investig-
atious coulel continue. In 1!);'jl the FBI again withheld from the
Department names of certain espionag-e subjects "for security reasons,"
since disclosure "would destroy chances of penetration and control." 197
En·n the Prpsident's Temporary Commissioll on Employee Loyalty
coulel not get highly relenlllt information f!'Om the B1Il'eau. FBI Assistant
Director n. ~I. Lathl told the Commission in H)4G that there
\"as a ;;sllbstantial" amount of COIllml111ist "infiltration of the gOYernlll('
nt.'· But Lad(l (ledined to answer \"hen Commission lliembers
asked for more details of FBI illtellig-elJre operations and the information
\"hith ser\"(,(l as the basis for his characterization of the extpnt
of infiltration."" The COlllmission prl'jJal'ed a list of questions for
tll(' FBI an(l aske(l that Din'ctor ] loonr apppar in person. Instcacl.
Attompy Gpneral Clark nm(lp an "informal" appearance aml supplied
a memorandum stating- that tl1(' num]wr of "sub\"ersin's" in goyernIIlpnt
hael "not yet reachpd serious pmportions.'· but that the possibility
of "e,'en one clisloya1 prrson" in gonmment sen'ice constituted a
"serious threat." ][10 Thus. the President's Commission chose not to
insisf upon making a serious e,-ahmtion of FBI intelligence operations
or the extent of t hp clanger.
'I'll(' !'l'('onl suggpsts that p,\p('111 i\"(' of1icia Is ,n'J'(' fOI'('p(l to makr de·
cisions ]'('g-al'tling" sp(,lll'ity j)oliey withont fnll kno \\"1 0<1 g-('. They hall
to dppend on the FBI's pstimatp of thp j)roblpm. rather than lwin/.l"
able to makp thpir OInt aS~eSSll1pnt on the basis of complete informa·
tion. It j" also appan'nt that by this timp ontsidp oflicials \Yel'(' somptimps
unwilling- to oppose Director] loon'r or to inqllire fully into FBf
opc' rat ion s. ""0
r', ('1.1 lhJlllnti(' Ar-til'ity
(1) l'urI/II' COllf,'uh Oil CIA.-The \"agnrness of Congress's pmhibitions
of "intpl'llal secllJ'ity functions" by tlte CIA Idt room for tlte
'''' :\Ipmoram]um from A. H. Belmont to :\11'. Parsons, G/;~/()O.
lC~ :\IpmonllH]um from D. :\1. LarJ(] to .J. Ed~ar Roovpr. ()/:;/46; mE'morandum
from Hoowr to Attornp;\" GpnE'ral Clark, fl/:i/-W.
'0' :\1('l1lOrandum from .\. H. Bp]!llont to D. :\1. Ladd. 4/17/51.
198 :\Iinutps of tIl(' Prpsidpl1t's TpllljlOrary COl1unission on Emjllo;\"E'p Loyalty.
1/17/47. (Harr~' S. Truman Library.)
"'.. :\V'IlW!'a!](]llln from .\ttornp~- (!pnpra] Clark to :\11'. \"al1pch. Chairman, PrE'si(]
l'l1t's Tpmporary Commission. :2/1-1/47. (Truma n Libra n-.)
",n Sl'P finding (G) for a full discussion of till' jl['()bll'm of FBI ac(·ountability.
,37
Agrncy's subsrquent domrstic actInty. A restriction against "police,
Jaw ynfoJ'crmrnt OJ' intpl'llal s('cnrity functions" first appearecl in
Prpsldpnt Tl'llman's o]'(ler rst abl ishing the Cpntml I nte11igrnce GJ'oup
in Ill·Hi.~ol
Gpnpral Yalll!Pnllllrg. tll('n DiJ'ector of ('pntral Intelligence. trstifieel
in Hl-l/ that this rp"trietion \ya,; inteJHlpd to "elm,,' the linrs very
sharply bet\\"rpn tlw CI(J and til(' FBI'" and to "assure that the Crntntl
Intplligpll('(' (JJ'oup can Iw\'('r becollw a Grstapo or security policr.'· eoe
:-;('cl'dary of thr Xan' .TanH's FOl'I'rstal trstifiec1 that the CIA woul(l be
"limitP«( ddinitrly t(; purpo,;rs outsidr of this country, except the co1Ipction
of information gathered by othpr goyernment agencies." The
FB I \Y<mld be rpl ipd upon "for domestic acti \'it ips." eo,
In till' Housp floor drbatp Congressman Holifield stJ'esse(1 that the
,,'ork of (II(' (' L\ :
is strictly in the fielll of se(']'et forpign inte11igence-what is
knO\\"n as c1andrstinp intelligencp. Thpy han' no right in thr
(lomestic fipld to col!Pct information of a clandestinr military
nature. Thry can evaluate it; yeS.eOI .
Conspquently, thp Xational Security Ad of Inn prO\-ielp(l specifically
that the C1.\
sha11 haye no police. subp()('na. law-enforcenl('nt powers. or
internal secuJ'ity funetions.~o"
IIo",en-'l'. the Ill-l/ .\d also contained a \'ll(!Ur aIHl undefined (hltT to
protrct intelligpJH'p "sourcps and nH't1H)(ls'" which later \yas uspil to
justify domestic activities ranging fl'Om eleelronic surveillance and
break-ins to penetration of protef't groupS.20G
(:2) Drug Testillg ((lid CocCJ' Fl'ogl·(llIIs.-In the pady lnijOs, the
CIA bpgan a program of surreptitiously testing chc'mica1 alld biological
materials. which inclll(h-'d drug tpsting' On 11l1\yitting Americans.
The pxistence of such a program was kept secret because, as the CIA's
Inspector (~enera1 wrote in 10;)7, it was nrcessary to "protect operations
from exposurp" to "the American public" as wp11 as "enemy
forces." Public knO\yledge of tIl(' C1.\'s "unethical and illicit activities"
was thought likely to hayc sprious "political repel'cusf'ions." e07
CIA drug experimentors c1if'rpgarc1ed instructions of their superiors
\yithin the Agency aIHl failed to take "reasonable precautions" when
'''' l're,idpntial j)ireC'tin'. Coordination of Fp<lpral Forpign Intplligencp Actidtie',
1/22/46, 11 Fpd. Rpg. 1337. Fear, that a forpign intelligelj('p agencr would
intru<lp into donw~tic ma ttpr, \ypnt hack to 1!H4. wlwn General "'illiam Dono,'
an, hpad of the Officp of Stratpgic Spryicp~ (the CIA'~ wartime IJredece~~or)
propo~ed that OSS bp tran,formE'd from a wartimp ba,is to a ppnnanent "central
intplligence ~E'n'icE':' j)onoYan'~ plan wa~ Ipaked to the ClI ieago Tribune, allpgpdlr
b~' FBI Dirpdor Hom-er, and it wa~ (]pnollnced a~ a "~Ilper ~pr sr~tel1l"
which wOllld "pry into tlw lin" of eitizen~ at home." [Corp~- Ford, DOl/oran of
111(' OSS IBo~ton: Little, BrO\YI1. 1970), pp. 303-3IH·l
,," Hparing~ hpfore the Scnate Armed Sen-ices Committee on S. 758, ROth Congo
(1 n47), p. 497.
'03 Hearings heforp the HOllsP COl1lmitt"e on Expenditllres in the Executiye
j)pl'artment, on ILR. 2319. kOth Congo (1nn). p. 127.
'''I n3 Congo Rec. !H30 (1947).
''', ;-;0 e.S.C. 403 ((]) (3).
,," S"e pp. 102-103.
'''' InslJector Genprar~ Report on til(' Tpchnical SerYicps Dh-ision. Central
Intelligence Agency. ln57.
58
they undertook the test which resulted 11l the death of Dr. Frank oIs('n.c08
The C1.'c lllac!(' ('xtensin use of the Bun'au of Xarcotics aIHl DanpyrO\
b Drugs in concluding its program of (lrug testing on nuwitting
subjects.
~Iilitary intc'l1igcnce also tH1mini"tered drugs to \"01unteer subjpcts
who \W1'(' nna,\y,u'(' of the purpose or natum of the tests in \\-hich they
\n're participating.con
The CIA's drug re5('arch \\'a" cOlllluetc'd in part through arrangements
,,-itll nni\-ersitip". hOc'pita]s. and "pri\-ate research organizations"
in a manner \yhich concpal('(1 "from the institution t]IP interests
of the ('1.\." although "key ill\liyi(1uals" \Yen' made \vittiug of ~\geucy
sponsorship.olO There were similar cO\-ert relationships with AlJ1Prican
pri\-ate institutions in other CL\. intelligence activities.2ll
5. [nfl'usivI' Techniques
Thronghont the cold war period. thc intelligencc agencies nsecl
cO\"('1't teeJlIliqu('s \yhich inn\dp(l personal pri\-acy to execnte their
\-a.gu('. \1I1cont1'Oll('d. and on"'rly broad mandate to collect intelligrncr.
Int,'lligrnce techniques werr not pl'Operly controlled by responsible
aut horities: SOlll0 of the teelmiques w('re misused by spnior administraJion
ofliciak On the other hand, the natur(' of the programsand.
in some casps. t hei r n'rv existpnce---\vas often conc('aled frolll
those authorities. ' .
a. Communications Interception: CIA and NEA
During the 1D;iOs the C('!ltra] Intelligence Agency instituted a
major program for opening mail between the rnited States and the
Soyiet Vnion as it passed through postal facilities in New York
City.212 Two other c'hort-term CIA projects in the fifties also involved
the opening of intel1latioual mail within tIl(' rnited States, through
access to Customs Service facilities. 213 }Ioreoyer. in the late 19408 the
Department of Defense made aITangemcnts with several communications
companies to receiyc intemational cable traffic, reinstating a
relationship that had C'xisted during ,Yorld ,Yar 11.214 These programs
violated not only the ban on internal security functions by
foreign intelligence agenciC's in the 1D47 Act. but also specific statutes
protecting the pri \-aey of tile mails and forbiclding the interception of
communications.21
"
208 ~Iemorandum from the CIA General OounsPl to the Inspector General,
1/5/54.
209 U,S. Army Intelligence Center Staff St\l(l~-: )Iaterial 'resting Program EA
1729, 10/15/59.
210 CIA Inspector Gpneral's Revort. 1963.
211 This issue is examinp<! more fully in tile Committee's Report on Foreign
and )Iilitary Intelligpnce Actiyitif's,
212 )Iemoran<!um from .James Anglpton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, to
Chief of Opprations. 11/21/55 (attachnlPnt).
"" CIA )lemorandum rp: Project SETTER, undated (Xew Orleans) ; )Iemorandum
from "Identity #13" to Devuty Director of Security, 10/9/:;7 (Xew
Orlpans) : Rockpfellpr Commission Staff Summary of CIA Office Officer Inten-iew,
3/1R/7;) (Hawaii).
21< Rohert Andrpws. Sppcial Assistant to the General Counsel, Department of
])pff'nsp. tpstilllOlIY, 9/23/7:;. VP. 34--40,
2113 IS 1".8.C. 1701-1703 (mail); 47 FS.C. 60:; (Federal Communications Act
of 1934).
59
,Yhilc their original purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence, the
programs frequent Iy did not distinguish betwpen the messages of forpig-
mrs and of _\.mericans. c1
<J Furthermore, by the late fifties and early
sixties, the CIA and ;\~A were sharing thc "take" ,yith the FBI for
domestic intelligence pUl'lJoses." 1 ;
In this period, the CIA opened mail to and from tIl(> Soviet t-nion
largely at random, intcrcepting lettcrs of Americans llnrelated to foreign
inte]]igence or counterintel1igence.218 After the FBI learned of
t hc CL\. program, it Ie\' ied rp(jucsts in certain categories. Apart from
forcign COlllltl'l'illtp]] igcnce criteria, the Blll'eau expressed interest
in letters from citizens professing "pro-Communist sympathies" 219
anel "data rc "C.S. peace groups going to Russia." 220
The spcrl't alTangcments \yith eablp companies to obtain copies of international
traffie ,,,pre initia]]y authorizPd by Secretary of Dpfense
.fanll'S FOlTestal and Attol'lll'Y '(~eJl('ral Tom ('lark, although it is not
clear that they knew of thp illtereeption of American as \Ye]] as foreign
nH'ssages.""1 TllPY dp\'ploped no formal legal l'lltionale, and their latpr
successors \yere ne\'er consulted to renew the authorization.222
Tlw CIA sought no olltsidp aut horization before instituting its mail
opening program. SeYeral Post Office officials ,ypre misled into believing
thnt t lw C1.\'s rpqllPst for ~l('('CSS to t 11(> mail only involwd examing
the exterior of the envelopes.m President Kennedy's Postmaster Genpra],.
r. Edward Day, testifipd that he told CIA Director Allen Dulles
he did not want to "know anything about" what the CIA was doing.224
Bcyond ulHlocumented assumptions by CIA offieials, there is no e\'idpnce
that the President or the Attorney Gcneral ,vas ever informed
about any aspect of CIA mail-opening operations in this period.225
"" CIA lllenwrandulll "For the Reeord" frolll ThonUl~ B, Ahernathy, S/21/61;
Ill'. Loui~ Tordel!a. former Deputy Director. ;\ational Securit~' Agency, te~tilllony
10/21/75, pp. 17-20.
"I; High FBI officials (]eeidt'd to u~e tht' CIA lllail opening program for "our
internal ~t'eurity ohjee( i\'t's" in 1U:>S. Thpy did not want the Burp,au to "a~~ump
thi~ coypragp" it~plf bpeaust' i(~ "~en~itiYe naturt''' ert'ated "inht'rpnt dangers"
al\(I (Iue to it~ ··comjlll'xity. sizp. and t'xppn~l'." In~tpad. trIP Burt'au would hold
CIA "rt'~llonsiblt' to ~hare their co\,pragp \yith u~." Dlellloran(]ulll frolll A. H. ReIlllont
to :\11'. Boardman. 1/:22/:>S.) 'I'll(' initial FBI refjut'~t to ;\~A ill\'ol\'t'd "eolllmprcial
al\(I jlersonal comllluni<',ations bt't\wpn ppr~llns in Cuba and tht' Cnitp(]
~tatp~." DIl'lllorandulll from ·W. R. \Yannal! to "'. ('. ~ulli\'an. A~~i~tant Dirpctor.
I lillll('~tic Intt'lligenct' Di\'i~ion. 5/1i'/li:2.)
'18 Abernathy lllpmorandum, S/21/61.
019 :\It'lllorandum from ,Yo A. Branigan to ,Yo C. Sulli\'an (attaehment). 1'/21/61.
"" :\Ielllorandulll frolll ,Yo A. Branigan to ,Yo C. Sulli\'an. 2/1:>/<>2.
eel ~pll'et COllllllittt'l' :\Il'lllorandulll, Subject: Reyiew of Docunl('nts at DOl) Rt',
garding 1,1' :\IEDLEY, 9/17/75. ("1,1' :\IEDLEY" wa~ the CIA'~ codl'lJamt' for
thi~ program; thl' ;\SA co!lt'name \\'a~ SfL\:\I ROCK. )
'Z2 St'erp(ary Forresta]'~ immediate suece~~or. Louis John~on, renewed the ar,
rangement in 194D. To the knowledge of those inter\'iewed by the Committep. thi~
wa~ the la~t in~tallee in which tilt' ('ompallit'~ raist'd any ljuestion as to tht'
a uthoritr for the arrangpmpnt~. (Andrpw~, fl/:28/75. VIl. 84, 40.)
""' Riehard Ht'lm~ 'Tp~timony, 10/22/7,). Hearing~, Yo!. 4, ]l. 1-\4. :\Ielllorandum
from Richard IIt'IIll~ to ~ht'ffit'ld Edwal'(I~. Director of ~ecurity, 5/17/54.
'"'.J. Edward Day Te~timony. 10/22/7,). Hearings, Yo!. 4. p. 4:>. Howeyer, a
eontt'lIlporanpous CIA nwmorandum ~tatt'd that "no rplpVllllt details" were with,
hpl(1 from Day \\'I1('n he wa~ hripff'(1 in lllGl by CIA officials. OIt'lllorandulll from
Ri~o~]ard Helms to Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, 2/16/61.)
--, Hplllls. 10/22/7.), IIt'arillg~. Yo!. 4. P]l. R7-RD.
60
b. FRI Co/'cd Techniques
(1) E7ectronic Sw'/'ei77ance.
(a) Thc Qllestion of ~·illth01>ity: In 194(j Attorney General Tom
Clark askp(] Presi(lrnt Truman to renew the authorization for warrantless
"'irctapping: issnerl h~' President Rooscyclt in 10-!(). Clark's
mPllloralHlulll, howpwr, dill not rder to the portion of thr Rooseyelt
dil'ectiyp which sail] wil'ptaps "hould he limited "insofar as possiblp
to alipns." It strrssrd tIll' dangrr from "suhyersiw aetiyity here at
11Onw:' an(] reqlll'stecl authority to \viretap "in cases yitally affecting
the don1Pstic security." c2n The Presidrnt IDlve his appro\":lL Truman's
aides later (lisconred .\ttorney Grneral Clark's omission aml the
Prrsident considered. hut deci(le(] against. returning to the terms of
RooscwIt's aut11Orization.227
In 10,)+ tllQ SII prellle Court drno11ll('Nl thr FOll rth _\ mrndmrnt
violation by policr \vho placp(l a microphonr in a hrdroom in a local
gambling casr. 22S
Soon tlwl'cafter. dpspite this (lpcision-and despitr his jH'pdrcpsso!"s
rulill~' that tl'rspassory installation of hugs \vas in the "area" of the
Fourth .\mendment-~\ttonl('v(~enrral Herbert Br()\vnell authorizPd
thr "unrpstrictrd US(," in thr '''national intrrpst" of "trespass in thp
installation of mierophOllPs." 22"
From 10:)+ until 10(j:). wlwn Attol'!lpy Gpneral Xicholas Katzenhach
l'p('ollsidr1'('d the policy and imposrd strieter rrgulations. 23o the FBI
had unsuperyised discretion to nse microphonr snrypillancc and to
conduct sUl'l'eptitious rntries to install microphOl1Ps. Thus, the safeguard
of approval hy the "\ttol'l1ey General for rach wiretap had been
ul1drrrut by the FBI's ahility to intrmlr into other. often more intimate
convei'sations hy miprop'honp "hugging."
(b) J:'.rt('))si)'(; RII.fJ.qin.rJ: In ~ray 10()!. Dirpdor Hoonr a(hised
Deputy .\tt 0]']wy Gel1pra I Dyron "'hite t hatthp FBI \vas using: "miprophOllP
slllTeillancps" im'oh'ing' "trespass" for "intelligrnre purposps"
in the "intpl'Ilal seruritv fipl(l." He called ,Yhite's attpntion to the 1%4
BroWllPlllllemOrandllli1, although hp sai(l mic!'ophones were 11spd "on
a restrietpd hasis" and cited as examples only "Soviet intelligence
agents and Communist PaItv leaders." 231 •
In fact. tlw FBI had alrpady used microphone sUlTeillance for
hroader ('ovpragp than Communists 01' spips. Indped. it had "bugged" a
hotel room o('('upied hy a Congressman in Fehruary 1961. There is
no p\,idpncc that Attorney Gplleral Ke111wdy or Dep11ty Attorney
"" Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman, 7/17/46.
227 ~rl'morandum from G. ~r. Elsey. Assistant Counsel to the President, to S. ,T.
Rpingarn: lllPmorandum from Elsey to the Presidl'llt. 2/2/50, (Spingarn Papers,
Harry S. Truman Library).
228 Irrine Y. Calitorn ia, 347 FR. 128 (1954).
""" ~remorandum from Attorney Genl'ral BrmYllPll to J. Edgar HooYl'r. 5/20/M.
In Hli)2 Attornl'Y Gl'lleral ,T. H~ward ~reGrath rl'fused to authorize microphone
sUrYl'iIIanee im'olYing trespass lwcausl' it was "in thl' area of the Fourth Ameudment."
premorandum from Attorney Gl'llpral ~IcGrath to .J. Edgar Hom'er,
2/26/i'i2.)
~o See p. 105. (The Chi!'f Couns!'l to the R!'l!'ct Committ!'!' disfjualifi!'d hims!'lf
from partidpating in Committe!' d!'Iill!'rntions cO!1C'prning !'itllPr ~Ir. Kat:wnhach
or form!'r Assistant Attornpy Gpneral Burke ~Iarshall bl'eausp of a preyious
att()rnp~'-elil'nt l'E'latiollship with thosp two persons.)
'" ~rpnlOralHlum from J. Edgar HooYl'r to [)Pjlu!y Attorney Gpneral Byron
White, ;)/4/61.
61
General 'Yhite 'Yere specifically informecl of this surveillance. But
the Attornev General received information which came from the
"bug" and a~lthorized a "'iretap of the Congressman's secretary.""3
Furthermore, FBI rpcon1s disclose' that tIlE' FBI conducted wal'rant
leO's microphonE' sUlTPillances in 19(50-HH:i:3 directed at a "black
sq>aratist gTOUp:' "black separatist group functionaries" and a
"("'hite) racist organization." ":l4 TherE' may have been others for
purely donwstic intplligence purposes.e"" .
The FBI maintained no "cpntral file or index" to rpcord all IlllCrophone
slllTeillances in this period. and FBI records did not (listinguish
"bugs" invol ving trespasO'. "3G
(:2) "Black Riff! Jo1J8"'~T1H'\,(' is no indication that any Attorney
General was informed of FBI "black bag" jobs, and a "Do Xot File"
procedure "'as dpsigned to precllH1e outside (liSCoH'ry of tll(' FBI's
use of the technique,
X0 permanent records \\"pre kept for approntls of "black bag jobs:'
O!' sUlTeptitious entrics conducted fo!' purposes othe!' than installing a
"bug." The FBI has descrihc(l tIlt' procedu\'(' for authorization of surreptitious
entries as re(jlliring the approntl of Director Hoonr or his
Assistant ('lydc Tolson. The authorizing memorandlllll ,vas filed in the
.\ssistant Din'ctor's oflice under a "Do Xot Filp" procedure, and thcre-
'.1" III tht' cour~p of all illn'~til'atiou. authorizP(1 hy .\tt01"J1PY (;PIIPral Kpllllcdy,
iilto lohbyillg' pffort:-- on hC'half of a fOl'pig-n country 1'(·.~(U'tlillg" :--ng-ar quota Ipgi~latioll.
thp FBI dt'tprlllillf'li that ('olll'rp~~Ill;lu IIarolll 11. ('oolp~', (']Jairlllall of tht'
IIou~p Al'ril'ulturp COllllllittpp, jllatllll'rl to Illppt ",ith n'prt'~Plltati\"f'~of a fort'ig-Il
('O\llltr~' ill a hotpl roolll. (FBI III Pill0ra IHI 11111 , ~/1;;/01; ~It'lllorallllulll frolll
W. R. "'allllall to W. C. Sulli\":\Il.1~/~:!/Ofi.)
At till' ill~tru('(ioll of Ilirp!'lor Hoo\"cr, thp Bun'au ill~tallpd a lllicroplHlllP ill
the hotd roolll to rpcor<l thb IIwptilll'. (FBI III PlllO ratHlu III , ~/I;;/(jJ; ~IPlllOrallllulll
frolll IJ. E. ~Ioorp to A. II. BpllllOllt. 2/1G/0I.) Thp n'~ulh of the llIPptill;.(
wprp ~uh~p(juPlltly <lb~plllillated to till' Attonwy Gt'neral. (~IeIllOrandulll frolll
.J. Edgar Hooypr to Attol'llpy CPllPral Kennpd~', ~/1 l'/li1.)
A rpyiw of thi~ ('a~p by FBI offil'ial~ in HH;(i ('ondutlp<l that "our file~ ('ontain
110 ('ll'ar intlkation that'tll(' Attornl'y (jelll'ral wa~ ~ppeifi('ally ad\'i~pd that a
llIierophonp ~urypillan('p \ya~ bl'illl' utilizt'<l..." (~It'llIornndum from \Yannall
to Sllllin\ll, 1~/21/Gli.) It \ya~ nott'd, howl'\"p!'. that Oll thc morninl' of FelJruaQ-
17, 1961-aftt'r the microphone \Ya~ ill pla('t' hut an hour or two hefore the
lIweting aetuall~' o(,(,\\lTf'<l-Ilin'etor Booyt'r ~jlokp with Attornc~' (leneral
Kpnlled~' and, ac('ording to IIooyt'r'~ ('ontpmporant'ou~ llIt'moralHlulll, adyi~c<l
him that thp Coolt'~· mef'tinl' wa~ to takp jllacl' that (la~' and that ""'c arp tQ'ingto
('oypr" it. (:\!emoralldulll from .J. Edg-ar HOO\'er to ~It'~sr~. Tobon, Par~on~.
~Iohr, Belmont, and lleLoa('h, 2/17/G1.)
214 A('cording to records compiled by thp FBI, there wa~ FBI microphone surYPillanct'
of onp "lJlack ~pparatist g-roup" in 1000; ont' "hlack ~t'paratist g-roup"
aIHl llllp "black ~pparati~t I'roup functionary" in 1961; two "hla('k ~cparati~t
I'rou)l~." onp "black ~PIlllrati~t g-roup functionary," and onl' "( \yhitt') raci~t
organization" in 1002; an<l two "hlack separati~t group~" and onp "hlack
~PJlarntist group functionar~'" in 1!JU3. (~Iemorandum from FBI to Seipel Com·
mittt't'. 10/28/7;;.)
,,<;; The Splt'ct Committl'e has dett'rmined that tht' FBI, on at It'ast one occasion,
maintained no records of the approy:\l of a microphone suryt'illance authorized
hy an Assi~tant Dirpclor. (FBI ~lpmoralltl\\lll. 1/80/7ii, Suhjpct: Special Squad
at Dpmocratic ~ational ConYPlltion, Atlantic City, ~t'w .Jf'r~t'y, 8/~2-28/64,)
"'0) Memorandum froll! tht' FBI to the Spnate Select Committt'e, 10/17/75, This
memorandum also ~tatp~ that, on the hasis of the rl'collpctions of agents and a
reyicw of hpad(juartpr~ filc~, thp FBI ha~ "hpt'n ahlp to itlt'ntify" the following
num)('r of "~urrpptitiou~ t'ntrip~ for microphOlw installation~" in "internal
~p('urit~·, intpllig-Pllcp, aIHl ('ountprintpllig-pncp" inye~tigation~: 19\\0: 49; 1001;
(;:~: 1!)G~: 7:>: Imm: 70; an<l the following numhpr of RUch pntrit'~ "in criminal
inYc~tig-ations" (as oppospd to intelligence) : 1960: 11; 1961: 69; 1002: 106;
1003: 1'4.
62
after (lestroy('(1. In tlw field ofliee, the ~pecial ~\gent in Charge maintaine(]
a recol'<] of approntl in his of!ice safp..H till' npxt yearly field
office inspection. an I nspcdor "'0111<1 rp\'icw t hpse rccords to ensure
that the :-lAC ha(l see\ll'ed FBI Ill'a(](l1Jarters appnmtl in conducting
sUlTcptitious ent ires. r pon completion of the reYiew, these records
,,'er6 destroyed. 237
Tlw onl)~ intel'llal FBI lllemoralHlum foulH] discussing the policy
for Slll'l'eptitious pntl'ips con/inlls that this \yas the procedure and
stat<>s that "wp do not obtaill allthorization from outsidp the BlIreall"
becausl' tIll' tedllli(l'll' ,,'as "C'1pal'ly illpgal." The !1le!1lorandum in(licates
that "hlack hag johs" \YCl'r use(lnot only "in the espionage field"
hut also against "slIlm·rsiyc elelllrnts" not directly connected to espiOlwgp
act i\'ity. It addpd that tIl(' trchniqurs l'<'sultr(l "on lllllllrrOlIS
occasions" in obLlining' tll<' "hif.':ltly SPCl'pt all(l closrly guarded" nwmjll'l'ship
:1Il(] lllailing lists of "subn'l'sin" groupS."·18
(;)) .1/lIi! OJiellill[!.-Thr FBI dill not srrk olltsillr allthorization
,1"1l<'1l it n'illst itutpll Illail oppning progra!1lS in the fifties and early
sixt ips. Eight pl'Ogra Ilb "'pl'e ('OIl(lucted for foreign intrlligence and
countrl'rspionagp plll'pOSPS, an(l BUl'eau oflicials who sllprlTised thpsr
programs han' tp"ti/ied that legal cOllsidcrations \yrrr simply not
raise!l at thp timr.":'"
Bc)'onl] thrir original pl1l'posr. thp FBI mail 0lwning programs
producrd SOlllP infol'lllatioll of all psspntially dompstic natllrp. For
pxaillplr, dllring this pl'!'iod Olll' program supplipll "consi(lrrablp data"
abollt .\mrl'ican cit izpns ,1'110 pxpl'p,.;spd pl'o-Commllnist sympathies
or lliade ·'anti-l'.~. stat<>lllPlltS." "'0 ~onlP of tlw mail-op<'ning byproduct
rpganling .\I\l<'l'ican,.; mls (li",,;plllinatp(] to otlll'r agcncips for
la". pn forcPlllcnt PU!'J)(ISPS, I\' it h thc SOIll'CC disguise(l."41
c. Usc of FBI Wiretaps
TlIP authorization for ,,'jretapping issllrd by Prrsident Truman in
10+() allowed the Attol'lley Gellrral to apprm'e wiretaps in thp inycstigation
of "sulwersiye aetiYity" to protect the "domestic security.'·'w
'"':\!emoraudum from the FBI to the Senate Splect Committpe, G/23/75.
".' :\Iemorandum from ,Yo C. Sulli\'an to C. D. llpLoach, 7/Ul/66. Suhjpct:
"Blaek Ba~" .Tohs. Initials on thb menlOrandulll i1l(lkate that it \Yas prepared
hy F . .T. Banm~ardnpr, au FBI Intplli~pncp lliYision Spction l 'hipf, aIHI aplll'O\'pd
h~' .T. ,\. Sizoo, principal (lqHlty to Assistant llil'edor W. C. Snllinlll. This
IllplllOl'aJHlulll \yas locatpd in ])irpdor lIoO\'er's "Otfieial and Conndpntial" tiles,
awl it appears tllat the mpmorandmn \yas shiftpd fwm lIooypr's "l'prsonal Files"
shortly hefon' his dpath. (Helen Gand~' dpposition, 11/12/75. pp. 4-6.)
Till' FBI eompi!pd a Ibt of the "dOllH'st ie suhn'l'sh'p" ta q,:pts, baspd "upon
n'('oll('('tions of Sppeial Agpnts \Yllo ha\'e knO\yll'dge of sueh aetiYitie.-, amI rpyip\y
of those nips i(lpntilip(1 hy rpcollpction as hping targ('(s of surrpptitious pntrips."
Tilp list statps !'at h'ast fonrtppn domestk suhyprsin' tlUgptS \Yl'rp thp ,nhjp!'t of
at Ipast 23S pntrip, fWIll 1!)4:! to ,\pril WCS. In addition. at h'ast thrpp dOlnpstic
suhyprsiye targpts \yprp thp ,ubjpd of nunl('rous pntrips frolll Oetobl'r ID:>:! to
.Tune IDCC.... Onp \yhitp hat I' group ,,'as thp targpt of au pntl'~' in :\Iareh WCC,"
Till' Bnrpau admits that this list is "incomplpte." (:\IpmoralHlum from the FBI
to thl' Spnatp Select Committl'e, H/:!3/73.)
,:;u llppo,ition of 'Yilliam R. Branigan, Spction Chipf, FB I Intplligpnce Diyision,
IO/il/7;;. pp. 1:1, :3!), 40. '!'pstimony of A"i,tant Ilirpe!or W. Haymond Wannal!.
FBI Intelligem'e DiYision, 10/24/7:>, Hearin~s. yo!. 4. pp. HR-4!).
'10 :\IpnlOrandulll from San Francisco lipid office to FBI Headquarters. 3/11/CO.
"I :\I('monlIHlum from S. B. ])onallo(' to "'. ('. SulliYan. ~l/l:>/(n; :\IPIllOI'H1Hlmn
from San Franeispo lipid otfiee to FBI hpadljuartprs, 7/2:'</G1.
'" Lpttpr from Attorney Gl'neral Clark to l'rpsident Truman. 7/li/4G.
63
A \viretap on an official of the Kation of Islam, originally authorized
by Attorney <reneral Herbert Brownell in 1937, continued thereafter
without re-authorization until HHi3."4.1 Attorney General Robert Kennedy
appron>d FBI requests for wiretaps on aI~ Alabama Klan leader
in IDG;~ "41 and on hlack separatist group leader ~Ialcolm X in 19G±. Wi
Kenne(ly also authorized wiretap cm-erage requested by the ",Vanen
('omlllis~ion in 1%-l.W) Kennp(ly's apPl'Onll of FBI requests for \vin~taps
on Dr. ~fartin Luther King and senral of his associates are discussed
in greater detail elsewhere in the Committee's report. 247
fn addition, Attorney General Kennedy approved wiretaps on four
American citizens during inwstigations of "classified information
leaks." The taps failed to discowr the sources of the alleged "leaks"
and invohed procedural irregularities. In 1961 Attorney General
Kennedy told Director Hoowr that the President wanted the FBI
to determine who \vas responsiule for an apparent "leak" to Newsweek
reporter Lloyd Xorman, author of an article about American military
plans in Germany.248 But the Attorney General was not asked to
approve a \viretap 011 Xorman's residence until after it was installed.
According to contemporaneous Bureau memoranda. wiretaps in
Hl62 on the residence of Xe\v York Times reporter Hanson Bald,,-in
awl his secretary to determine the source of an article about Soviet
missile sites \vet'e also instituted \vithout prior \\Titten approval of
the Attorney General; and one of them-the tap on the secretarywas
instituted without the ~\ttol'lley General's prior kno\vledge.249
Kennedy's written approval was obtained, however, three days after
the Baldwin tap was installe(l awl fonI' days after the tap on the
secretary was installecU"O
The £)attern. including ex; post facto approval, was repeated for
wiretaps of a former FBI agent who disclosed "confidential" Bureau
information in a puhlic forum. The first tap lasted for eight days in
1962. amI it was reinstituted in 196;3 for an undetermined period.251
Attorney General Kennedy \vas advised that the FBI desired to place
the initial coverage; hut he \vas not informed that it had been effected
the day before, and he did not grant written approval until the day
'" ~Ipmorandumfrom Hoover to Brownpll, 12/31/56.
'" ~Ipmorandumfrom Hoovpr to Kpnnpd~', 10/9/68.
'" ~Iemorandumfrom IIoO\'er to Kennedy, 4/1/64.
'46 ~Iemorandum from Hoover to Kennedy, 2/24/64.
m Sep Findings C and G and Committpe Report on the FBI and Dr. ~Iartin
Lutlwr King..Tr.
"" ~Iemorandum from R. D. Cotter to 'V. C. Sullh-an. 12/15/66. On the same
(lay. and ,vithout specific authorization from the Attorney Gem'ral, the FBI
placed a wiretap on C'\orman's residence. Attorney General Kennedy was
informed of the wiretap two days latpr, and apprm'ed it the following (lay.
(~Iemorandum from J. Edgar Hom-er to Attorne~- Gpnpral Kpnnpdy, 6/29/61.)
Thp tap contil11lPd for four days nntil Xorman went on vaeation. OIemorandum
from S. B. Donahoe to W. C. SuUh-an. 7/3/61.) At no time did this or any other
aspect of the FBI's inn'stigation produee any evideuce that :\'orman had actually
ohtaine(1 elassified information. An FBI summary stated: "The majority of
those interviewed thought a competent. well-infornwd reporter could have written
the article without having reviewed or receivpd classified information."
(~Iemorandum from Cotter to Sullivan, 12/15/66.)
,.. ~Il'morandum fwm .T. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/27/62.
""0 :\femorlln(lnm from .J. Edgar Hom'er to Attorney Gem'ral Kennedy. 7/31/62.
Thl' tap on the secretary lasted threl' weel,s, ant! the tal) on Baldwin a month.
~Iemoranda from 'V. R. Wannall to "'. C. Snlliyan, 8/13/62 and 8/28/62.
201 l'naddressed memorant!um from A. H. Belmont, 1/9/63.
64
it ,vas tenninated,"'~ It appears that anI:,' oral anthorization was
ohtainl'(l for reinstitnting thl' tap in IDGi3,2C>3
Tn Febnlary 1%1. "\Jtornpy (~pneral Kpnnpcly rl'qnC'stp(1 tIl(' FBT
to initiate an in H'st igation forthe pnrpose of (len'loping:
intl'lligene(J data which mmld prm-i(le Pl'l'si(ll'nt Kpl1J1edy a
pictnre of ,,-hat ,yas behind pressures exprted on hphalf of [n
forpign countr,Ylreganling sugar quota dplilwrations in Congress,
, , in eonncction ,vith ppll(ling sligar lrgislation,2>4
This inycstigatioll lastl'd approximately nine ,veeks. and was reinstitnted
for a three-month pprio(l inmid-1DG2,
Acconling to an FBI memOran(hllll. thr Attorney General anthorizcd
the 'Yin·taps in 1DG1 on the theory that "the a(lministration has
to act if mOll(~:'- 01' gifts are being passe(l by the [representatives of n
foreign COllntry]." 2,,, Specificall.", he apprO\'ed wiretaps all se\'eral
~\.merican citizens: thrpe officials of the ~\gricultnreDepartment (residences
only) ; 2CG the clerk of the Honsp Committee on Agrienltnre
,Yho '\'as also senetary to the chairman (resi(lpl1ce only) : ~", and a registered
agpnt of thr forpign country (both resi(lencp and hnsiness telephones),
2SS After passage of the Administration's o,,-n sugar bill in
April 1D61. these ,virptaps 'H~re discol1tinnNUC<l
'I'll(' il1H'stigation '\'as rpinstituted in .Tmw 1D62, when the Bureau
ll'arnpd that rpprcscntati\es of thr samr forrign cOllntry again might
be infhlPnc ing congressional dpIi l)('ra tions concprning' an amendment
to tIll' sngar quota Ic'gislation,"';() Attol'lwy Gl'neral Kennedy approved
wirrtaps on the office tdl'phonc of an attorney bl'lieYC(1 to be an agent
of tIll' forl'ign country all(!. again. on thl' rpsidence telpphonc of the
Clprk of thp Honsp Agricnltnrl' Committl'l',2Gl The latter tap cOlltinnl'd
for one month, but the fOI'l)1pr apparently lastc(l for three months,2G2
'-d ~Il'1lloraml11!n from .T. E(lgar Hoo\'l'r to Attorney Gpneral Kpnnedy, 10/1D/62,
"'31-nadtlre~~ed 1llpIllorandn1ll froIII "hwg" (Director lIooypr's seen·tan' was
Hplpn 'V, Gandy), 1/D/6:J. This IllPmorandum n'a(ls: "~Ir. BPlmont ealle(l to say
(('ourln('y) E\-an~ s]Joke to tile Attornl'Y Gpnpral rl'placing the tpch on [former
FBI ag-ent] ag-ain. a1l(1 tlw .\thll'llPY Gpnpral ~ai(l by all means do this. ~Ir. Bplmont
has instrudpd Xpw York to (10 so." (Assistant Dirl'ctor Courtnpy' Enllls was
till' 1"BI's normal liabon with ,\1 tornpy' Gpneral Kpnnl'dy,)
~"~Iemorandulll from 'V. R "'anall to 'V. C. Sll11iyan, 12/22/66. The Sugar
Lobhy' in\'Pstigation is also (li"cllssed at footnotp 2:{:J.
2'", ~[pmorandu1ll from A. II. Bplmont to ~[r. Pan-ons. 2/1-1/G1.
~-" ~rpmorandulll frolll .T. Edgar Hooyer to Attornpy Gpneral Kenne(Iy, 2/14/61.
'''' ~Iemoradnm from Hooypr to tlw Attorney' Gpll<'ral. 2/1I;/G1.
'c., ~rpmoral](lum from HlIon'r to til(' Atto!'ll('y (;enpral, 2/lG/G1.
'" Aceording to a menwramlulll of a llll'pting hd\YPI'n Attornpy (;pnl'ral Kennelly
anll Courtnl'Y EYlllls, Kennpdy' ,tated that "now thp law wa, pa,se(l he did
not fppl there \"as justification for continuing this pxtpn,in' inyestigatiol1."
pIplllorandmu fro III C, A. EYlIll' to ~Ir, I'ar,ons -1/1-1/G1.) The inYe,tigation did
diseoypr possibly' un!a\yfnl infl11l'n('p \yas hping ('xprtl'd hy rppn'sentatil'es of
tIl(' foreign country' im'oln'd. hut it did not 1'I'\'p,11 t ha t 1ll00H'y- wa, ad ually- hping
passed to an" Exe('lltiye or congrps,ional official. (~Iemoramlum frolll 'Vannall
to Sul!iyan, 12/22/66.)
";0 VBI letterhead Illpmoramla, G/L•. 1S. l!l/tt!.
:>11 ~IpllloraJl(lulll from ,J. Edgar Roo""r to tll(' Attorney- Genpral, H/26/62.
'"' The wirpta]J on the Hon,p Committee Clprk had "pro(luepd no information
of yaltle." 'Vhill' thprp is no indication that thp other \Yirptaps, iuellHling fiye
dirpc!p(1 at forpig-n targpts. pr(J(luel'(1 p\'idpIU'e of adual pay'off" they' di(l re\'eal
that l)o.'sillly' unlawful influp1ll'p wa" again hping pxprtpl1 by' til<' for..ign gOYp1'
111l1PnL and intprnal Bun'au pPl'mis,ion \yas ohtainp(l to ('(JIltinup Ilwm for
~ixty' (Iay-, jH'y-OlHl tlw initial thirty-da,\' perio(l. plpnlOl'a1l(lum from 'V. H. 'Vannall
to W. C. Sulliyun. 8/HijG2.)
65
These wiretaps in ID61 and 1062 ,,'ere arguably related to "foreign
intelligence"~lmt not to "subwrsiYe actiyity" unless that term
is interpreted lJeyond its conn'ntional mcaning.en:l :JIorc important,
tlll'Y gencrated information ,yhich ,yas potentially useful to the Kennedy
administration for pmely political Jllll'poses relating to the
legislatin' process.201
The 'Yirctap authorizell hy ~\ttorncy neneral Kcnnedy on another
high exeeutiw ofIicial in this perio<l dill not rclate to politieal considrrations,
hut to conerrn ahout possihle disclosure of classified information
to a foreign gOYeJ'llll1cnt. 2G5 TIIPrr is no indication that the
,,'irrtap authorizcd by Attorney ncnrral Katzrnhach in 1065 on the
rditor of an anti-coll11ll11l1ist nl'\\'slrtter. was rrlatel] in any way to thr
hook he had writtrn in 1!)()+ alll'gi nil' lwrsonaI impropriety h~; Attorney
ncnPl'al KrnnE'dy.2GG
ri. J)Olllr'8tir ('o/'rt't ~[tfio)l
In its C()I~TELPH() 0lwral ion. tll(> FBI m'nt IJP.Yo/H! excl''isi,'e
information-gathcring and dissrlllillation to tl1l' 11Sl' of sl'('J'rlt tactics
dl·signl·d til "d isr11 pt" anI] "np11t ral izp" dOlllPstic int cll igcnep targrts,
.\t the ontset. the target \\'as thl' Communist Party. r.S.A. B11t.
eonsistent ,yith tlw pattrrn l'eYealed in othPl' dOlllestic intrlligrnce ac,
tivities, the program widpned to other targets, im'r('asingly conepntrating
on domestic dissenter·s. Thp expansion of COI~TELPRObegan in
thE' Cold "'Val' periol] and accelerated in tIll' lattpr part of the 10(lOs,
!I. ('0 !.r'l'!:'IPRO : ('ollllllllilid f'11t'ty
TIIP COL,TELPI{O pl'Ogram. allt!lorizpcl hy Dil,('C'tor Hom'pr
against tllP COlllmllllist Party in W;')f). hall its roots in two linps of
Blll'ea11 policy going lJHck to thp WIOs, Thp fir"t ,Ya" the a('('eptcl] FBI
"'" A "'I!ite IIonse "lJriefing paper," prl'llared in Fl'bruary lH61. stated, "It is
thought by some informed ohsl'l'\'ers that the outcome of the sugar legislation
whil'h ('oml'S UJi for rene\val in tllP {'.N. ('ong-rl'ss in :lIarch lUHl will he allimportaut
to the future of C.S./ (foreign eountr~-) relations." (:lIemorandum
from Hit-hanl:lI. Bissl'll, ,II'. to :lkGeorg-l' BUll(]~', ~/17/(n.) Another Whitp Housl'
"hriefing' memoralll]nm" in ,Tnnp 1Un~ stated. "The action taken h~' the House
of RpprespntatiYes in passing' tllP IIousp Ag-ril'ultnre Committee hill (The Cooley
bill) has prpated a furor in thl' (forpig-n ('ountry) ..." Officials of that country
said that the legislation "mmld be disastrous" to its "economy." (Memorandum
from William H. Rruhp('k to :I[('(;po!'gl' BUll(]y all(] :llyer Feldman, (\/23/62,)
(.TFK Lihrar~·.)
Xl Nee Finding- on Political Ahusl', P]). ~33, ~:H. The wiretapping- of Al1lprican
citizens in thpsp iw4allces could only sprH' "intplligencp," rathpr than law ellforl'pmpnt
jilll'lIOSl>,S, since any cl'iminalprosecution (i.e.. for hrillt'ry) would lJave
hepn "tainted" hy thl' warrant\(\Ss wirE-taps, [('o)Jlon v. rnitcd StatcN. lR;, ]", ~d
H~!) (In:;O),lnl F. ~(I7-!H (lH;'1),J
:>,,, The circumstances indicating this possihility and thp c\'Cntual determination
that the a]]pgation \vas unfo\!lHlpd arc set forth in a memorandum from
Dirpetor IInoYl'r to Attornpy (;eneral Kpnl1edy in If)(H. (Hoover to Kennedy,
5/4/64 and cn('\osnre, (.Iohn J>'. Kplllwdy Lihrary) )
xc, The ]'RI requestpd thp wiretap on the editor and an accompanying tap on
a Washington attoI'llP~- in contae! with the pditor heeause of its eoncE'I'll ahout
possihle "leaks" of info!'mation ahout ],'BI lo~'alty-security inYE'stig-ations of
go,'erlHllE'nt offif'ials, Direetor Hom'er al!\-ispd that Imhlieation of this "('lassi·
fied information" eonstitutpd "a llang-pr to tIle interna I se('urity of the linited
Ntates." (:IIl'mor:lllllum from HooH'r to Katzenhaeh, 4/1H/HZ,.) Hmn'wr. in 1!)64
Dirp('(o!' IIooypr h:1<1 Ynluntp(,!,p(] to Attornpy (;pnpral Kl'll1le(ly information
alHl\lt the Jluhli('ation of 111<' hook :tllpgiug imJl;·o]lriet~'. Thl' Huthl;r himsplf had
sUl'plipd information nhout t}J(> hook to til(' }'RJ. (:lIt'moranda from Hoo"pr to
At tonH'Y General Kplllwdy, 7/8/64 and 7/1:;/64.)
68-786 0 - 76 - 6
66
pra.cticp of attempting- to disl'llpt "suln-el'sin" org-anizat:ions. A fO!11wr
lwacl of tlU' FBI InlplliW'IH'p DiYi"ion has testifierl:
"~e were png-ag-ed in COIXTELPHO tactics. to cliYicle, confuse,
wraken, in rliyel"Se ,Yays. an oqranization. lYe "ere
pngagerl in that ,yhpn I entpl'pd the BUl'pauin ID-l-1."6'
Tlw memorandum 1't'C'ommelHling-the institution of COINTELPRO
statp(1 that tIw Hnrpau was all'l'ady seeking- to "fost.. r fact.ionalism"
:lllri "cause confusion" within the Conllnunisi Paliv.06
'
The second line of pre-existing- Bureau policy ill,-oIYed propaganda
to discredit the Communist Party puhlicly. For example. in 1D46, an
earlier lwad of the FBI Intrllig-ence DiYision proposed that efforts he
madr to relrase "rducational material" throngh "ayailable channels"
to influence "public opinion." The "educational" purpose was to undermine
Communist support among "labor unions," "persons prominent
in relig-ions circles," and "thr Lilwral elements," and to show "the basically
Russian nature of thc Communist Party in this country." 269 By
Ulfi6. a propaganda effort was underway to bring the Party and its
h'aders "into disrepute before the American puhlic." 270
The eyidenc~ indicates that the FBI did not helieve that the Communist
Party. whpn the COIXTELPRO pl'ogmm ,yas formalized ,in
1D;";6. constitute(l as serious a threat in terms of aetnal espionage as it
hacl in the 1940sYl XeYeI1:hrless. thr FBI systematizpcl its COY(,I't
aet-ion program against the COffill1unist Part~- in part because the
surfacing of info!111ants in lpg-al proceedings had somewhat limitrcl
the Bun'au's coverage of Party a0t.i,-ities i[lnd also to take adyantage of
inte!11al conflicts within the Party,"'" Covert "disruption" was also
designed to make sure that the Party would not reorg-anize uncleI' a
new ]a1>e1 and thus ,YmIld remain an easier target for prosecu't,ion. 273
2RT Testimony of William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelligence
Dhision (1961-1!J70) and Assistant to the Director (1970--1971),
11/1/75, pp. 42--43.
268l\Ipmorandum from A. H. BPlmont to L. V. Boardman. 8/28/56.
269l\Iemorandum from D. l\1. Ladd to .T. Edgar Hoover, 2/27/46. According to
this memorandum the underlying reason for such Bureau propaganda was to
anticipate and counteract the "flood of propaganda from Leftist and so-called
Liheral sources" which would "be encountered in tbe event of extensive arrests
of Communists" if war with the Soviet Union broke out.
270 Belmont to Boardman, 8/28/56.
271 A Bureau monograph in mid-1955 "measured" the Communist Party threat
as:
"Influence over thE' masses. ability to CrE'ate controversy leading to confusion
and disunity, penetration of i'<pecific channels in Ameri('an life where public
opinion is molded, and espionage and sahotage potential." [Emphasis supplied.]
(Lettpr from .J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon .\ndprson, Sppcial Assistant to the
Presidput. 7/29/55. and en('losed FBI monograph, "The l\lena('e of Communism
in the United States Today." pp. h--v.)
The FBT official who served as Dirpctor Hoover's liaison with the CIA in the
1950s stated that "the Communist Party provided a pool of talent for the Soviet
[intelligence] services" in the "30s and into the 40s." During that period the
Soviets recruited agpnts "from the Party" to penetrate "the U.S. Govprnment"
and "scientific circles." He addE'd, hmvpver, that "primarily because of the action
and counter-action taken by the FBI during the late 40s. the Soviet services
changed their tactics and considerably reduced any programs or projects desiglINl
to recruit CP members, realizing or assuming that tlH'y were getting heavy
attention from the Bureau." (Testimony of former FBI liaison with CIA,
f)/22/75. p. 32.)
,,' Belmont to Boardman. 8/28/65.
r.3 Belmont to Boardman, 9/5/56; memorandum from FBI headquarters to
SAC, New York, 9/6/56.
67
In the years after ID;,}6. the purpose of the Communist Party COIN
TELPRO change\1 somewhat. Snpreme Conrt \1ecisions snbstantially
curbed criminal prosecution of Communists.274 Subsequently, the FBI
"rationale" for COI~TELPRO \\'as that it had become "impossible
to prosecnte Commnnist Party memlwrs" and some alternutin' \\'as
needed "to contain the threat." 275
b. Early E,1'paIl8ioll of COIX7'ELPRO
FrOl11 ]H;")(; nntil H)(iO. the COTXTELPRO progl'Um \\'as primarily
aimed at the Comlllllnist Party organization. Bnt. in ~Iarch 1960,
participatin? FBI fiel\1 offices \wr£' \1in'eted to make efforts to pre,'
ent Communist "infiltl'Ution" of "legitimate maf'S organizations. sneh
as Pa l'l'nt -Teaclll'r Assol'iatiollS. ci ,'i I organizations, and racial aIHI
l'('li,!!iol!s groups." Th(' initial t(·chnique was to notify a lead!'r of the
organization. often uy "anonymons commnnications." auout the allPl.!
ed Conllllllllist in its midst.27n In some cases. both the Comnmnist
(/lid the "infiltrate\}" organization \\""re targeted.
This marked the beginning of the prog-ression from targpting Comn1llnist
Party membprs, to those allegedly undpr Communist "inflnl'ncl'."
to pl'rsons taking positions suppOl'tl'd by thl' Commnnists. For
pxampll'. in HHiJ targets uIHler the Commnnist Party COIXTELPRO
label included a gronp with some Commnnist participants urging- increaf'N1
employment of minorities 277 and a non-Communist g-roup in
opposition to tIl(' Honse Committee on l~n-American Aetiyities.278
Tn ID6l. a COTXTELPHO operation \\'as initiated against the Socialist
"~orkers Party. The originating memol'UIH1nm said it was not
a "crash" program: and it \\'as nen'r gin·n high priority.279 The
S'YP's snpport for "such eanses as Castro's Cnua and integ-l'Ution
llroulpnls al'isinl.! in the Sonth" \H're note(l as factors in the FBI's
;J.C'cision to targ~'t tIll' organization. The Bnn'an also rplie(1 npon its
asse::-;sment that the S'YP \\'as "not jnst anotlwr socialist g-ronp but
follO\\'s the rerolutionary principll's of ~.rarx. Ll'nin. and Engl'ls as
intPrj)]'ptpd by Leon Trotsk~'" and that it \\'as "in freqnent contact
\yith international Trotskyitp gronps stopping short of 0pl'n and direct
contact with these gl'Onps.~' 2'0 The S"'P hall bel'n designated a::-; "snbyprsin"
on the "Attornpy General's list" sinep the I940s.2R
1
D. IXTELLIGEXCE ,\XD DmIEf;TlC Dlf;f;F,XT: 1})64-1976
1. .11(l7n DCI'f'1oprnent8 of the 1.9fl4-J/J76' Period
Beginning in the mid-sixtips. tho;' Fllite(1 States eXlwriencprl a period
of domestic llllrpst and protl'st nnparallelefl in this ('pntury. Yioll'nce
prnptpd in the pOWl'ty-stJ'i('ken nrban ghettos. and opposition to
"\mel'ican interYl'ntion in Yirtnam prodnced massiye demonstrations.
'" E,g,. Yatc8" Tfnitrd Statrs, 354 1'.1;, 29S (1957),
'" Deposition of Supervisor, Internal Security Section, FBI Intelligence
DiYision, 10/16/75. pp, 10. 14,
''76 :\[ellloran<!um from FBI Hl'a<!l1uartl'rs to Xew York field officp, 3/31/GO,
277 ~[pmorllndum from PBI Hl'adquartl'rs to San Franeisco fipld office, 4/16/M,
"7" ~[l'lllorandum from FBI JIpadquartprs to Cle"p!lllHl fip!d offiee, l1/G/M,
"0 Fort~'-five actions ,,"prl' appro"NI hr FBI Headl1Ullrtl'rs under the S'VP
f'OIXTJ<JLPRO froll! 1061 until it wa~ disconlill1lPd iu 10G9, 'rhl' SWP flrogram
was tlwu suhsump(l um!l'r til(' Xl',Y Ll'ft COIXTJ<JLPRO, SPl' pp, SS-R,<J,
200 ~IplllOrall(!llI11 from Dirpptor. FBI, to Xl'''' York fipld officl'. 10/12/Gl.
'" ~Il'lllorandulll from the Attorney Genpral to Heads of Departments and
Agencies, 4/29/53,

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