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B. THE OVERBREADTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGEXCE ACTIVITY MAJOR FIXDIKG The Committee finds that domestic intelligence activity has been o\'erbroad in that (1) many Americans and domestic gr~H1J?s have .b~en subjected to investigation who ,vere not suspected of cl'lm~nal aetn',lty and (:2) the intelligence agencies have regularly collected IIIformation about personal and political activities irrelenlllt to any legitimate governmental interest. 8ubfindings (a) Large numbers of law-abiding Ar.neric~ns an~ lawf~l d?mestic groups have been subjected to extenslve llltelhgence lllvestlgatlOn and sUr\'eillance. (b) The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations of Americans contributed to overbreadth. Congress did not enact statutes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence actidty. The executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney General Stone-that the government's concern was not with political opinions but ,vith "such conduct as is forbidden bv the la"s of the United States:~ Intelligence agencies' superiors issued over-inclusive directi YeS to investigate "subversion~~ (a term that was never defined in presidential directives) and "potentiaF rather than actual or likely criminal conduct~ as well as to collect general intelligence on lawful political and social dissent. (c) The intelligence agencies themsel\'Ps used imprecise and overinclusi\' e criteria in their conduct of intellig-ence investigations. Intelligence in\'Pstigations extended beyond "sul)\'ersive~' or violent targets to ac1ditional groups amI indi\'iduals suhied to minimal "suln'ersin· influence'~or having little or no "potential" for violence. (d) Intelligence agencies pursued a "nlcuum cleaner~~ approach to intelligence collection-drawing ill all available information about groups and individuals~ including their lawful political aeti\,ih' and details of their personal1ives. ' (e) Intel1igenre im'estigations in many cases continued for excessively long periods of time, resulting in slistained gO\'Prnmental monitoring of political acti\-ity in the ahsence of anv intlication of criminal ronduct or "subversion."- . Elaboration of Findings , The rentral problem posed by domestic intellig-ence activity has been Its departure from the standards of the law. This departure from law has !l1~ant not only the violation ?f constitutional prohibitions and exphclt statutes, but also theadoptlOn of criteria unrelated to the law as the basis for extensive investigations of Americans. ( 165) 166 In Hllj-lD2-1, the federal goYel'llnwnt, often assisted by the priyate Yigilante American Protecti\'e League, conduded s\weping inH>stigations of dissenters, \yar protesters, labor organizers, un(l alleg'ed "anarchists" and "re\'olutionaries:' These inH>stigations le(l to mass'arrests of thousands of persons in the IH20 "Palmer raids:' Heacting to thesp and other abuses of inYestigatiyc Po\Wl'. ~\ttol'lley (rem'ral Harlan Fiske Stone in 192-1 confined the Bureau of Inyestigation in the .Tnstice Department to the inycstigation of fe(leral crimes. ~\ttol'lley General Stone articulate<.l a clear and \vorkable standard: The Bureau of Inwstigation is not concel'lled \vith political or other opinions of indi ,'iduals. It is concel'lled only \vith their conduct and then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the rnited States." Nevertheless, his restriction lasted for little more than a decade. In the mid-1930s the FBI resume(l domestic intelligence functions, carrying out President Roospvelfs vague order to investigate "subversive actiYities:' Tll<' President and the Attornev General authorized FBI and military intelligence imestigations ofconduct explicitly re~ognized as "not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes." As a result, ideas and associations, rather than snspicion of criminal offenses, once againlwcame the focus of federal investigations. The scope of domestic intelligence ill\'estigations consistently widened in the decades after the HmOs. reaching its greatest extent in the late l!)()Os and early 19jOs. Domestic intelligence inn>stigations were permitted under criteria which more nearly resembled political or social labels than standards for governmental action. Rather than Attorney General Stone's standard of investigating "only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the rnited States," domestic intelligence used such labels as the following to target intelligence investigations: -"rightist" or "extremist" groups in the "anticommunist field . -persons with "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" or who were "espousing the line of revolutionary mO\'ements" -"general racial matters" -"hate organizations" -"rabble rousers" -"key activists" -"black nationalists" -"white supremacists" -"agitators" -"key black extremists" These broad and imprecise labels reflect the ill-defined mission of domestic intelligence, which resulted from recnrring demands for progressively wider investigations of Americans. 'Without the firm I New York Times, 5/10/24. Attorney General Stone implemented this policy by issuing a directive to Acting Director J. Edgar Hoover of the Bureau of Investig- ation: "The activities of the Bureau are to be limited strictly to investigations of violations of la,,', under my direction or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General regularly conducting the work of the Departme-nt of Justice." Dlemorandum from Attornp'l' General Stone to J. Edg-3r Hom'er, r;/1~/24. cited in Alpheus 'l'homas :\lason. Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law [Xew York: Viking Press, 1956), p. 151.] 167 guidance proyided by la,,-, intelligence actiyities intruded into areas of American life which are protected from goyernnwntal inquiry by the constitutional guarantees of personal priyacy and free speech and assembly. Subfinding (a) Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups have been subjected to extensiye intelligence investigation and surveillance. Some domestic intelligence acti \'ity has focused on specific illegal conduct or on instances \vhere there \vas tangible cyidence that illegal conduct was likely to occur. But domestic intelligence has gone far beyond such matters in collecting massiw amounts of data on Americans. For example: FBI Domestic Intelligence.-The FBI has compiled at its headquarters oYer -!80,OOO files on its "subversion" inYestigations and O\"er 33,000 files on its "extremism" inYestigatiolls. ~ During the twenty years from 1D5i) to 1975, the FBI conducted 7-:1:0,000 inYestigations of "subversi\-e matters" and }DO,OOO ill\'estigations of "extremist mattel's." 3 The targets for FBI intelligence collection have included: -the ,romen's Liberation ~Iovement; -the conselTative Christian Front and Christian ~Iobilizers of Father Coughlin: -the conservati\-e American Christian Action Council of Rev. Carl ~IcIntyre; -a ,,-ide variety of uni\'ersity, church and political groups opposed to the Vietnam war; -those in the non-yiolent ci\'il rights mo\'ement. such as Martin Luther King's Southel'll Christian Leadership CounciL the Xational Association for the Advancement of Colored People (XAACP), and the Council on Racial Equality (CORE). Army Sw'veillance of Civilion8.-The .Army's natioll\yide intel· ligence sUITeillance program created files on some 100,000 Americans and an equally large number of domestic organizations, encompassing virtually eYery group seeking peaceful change in the l"Tnited States including: ' -the ,Jolm Birch Society; - Young Americans for'Freedom ; -the Xational Organization of ,romen: -the XAACP; -the Urban League; -the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'irth; and Business Executin's to End the 'Val' ill Vietnam.4 ('lA's ('HAOS Progmm.-The CIA's extensi\'e CHAOS program- which compiled intelligence on domestic groups and individuals protesting the Vietnam war and racial conditions-amassed some 2 :\Iemorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 10/6/7:>. 3 :\Iemorandum from FBI to Select Committee. Re: InYestiKatiYe :\Iatters, receiyed 11/12/75. These statistics include as separate "matters" investigatiYe leads pursued hy different FBI offices in the same case. 'Senate Judiciary Sul~ommittee on Constitutional Rights. "Federal Data Banks, Computers, and Bill of Rights." 1971. p. 264. 168 10,000 intelligence files on ~\meri('an citizens and groups and indexed :300,000 names of Americans in CTA computer records." IE,S !\.,,'e1ectil'e Tax Int'cstiqutioJls of Dissentel's.-Behwen HHW anel 1073, thp Intel'llal Rl'\'enue SelTicl'. through a secret "Special SeHiee Staff" (SSS), targeted morl' than 10,000 ineliyiduals and groulJs for tax examinations because of their political acti\·ity.G The FBI and the Internal Security Di,'ision of the .Tustice Department ga\'e SSS lists of taxpayers deemed to bl' "aetiyists" or "ideological organizations:" the FBI, in prO\'iding SSS with a list of onr :2,(JOO groups and indiyiduals classified as "Hight lYing,"~ "Xew Left," awl "Old Left," expressed its hope that SSS tax examinations would "deal a blow to dissident elements:" A smaller thOlurh more intensiYe selertin enforcement program, the "Ideological 'Organization Project," ,,'as established in Xonmber 10G1 in response to ,Yhite House criticism of "right-'''ing extremist" groups.s On the basis of such political criteria, 18 organizations were selected for special audit although there ,,,as no evidence of tax yiolation." In 1!:J6cl:, the IRS proposed to expand its program to make "10,000 examinations of [tax] eXE'mpt organizations of all types including the extrE'mist groups." 10 Although this program neyer fully materialized, the "Ideological Organizations Projert" can be "iewed as a precursor to SSS. CIA and FBI Mail Opening.-The 12 mail opening programs conduded by the CIA and FBI between 19c1:0 and 1973 resulted in the illegal opening of hundreds of thousands of first-class letters. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the international correspondence of largE' numbers of Americans who challenged the condition of racial minorities or who opposed the war in Vietrlam ,,,as specifically targE'ted for mail opening by both the CIA and FBI. The onrbreadth of the longest CIA mail opening program-the 20 year (1953-1973) program in Xew York City-is shown by the fact that of the more than 28 million letters screened by the CIA, the exteriors of 2.7 million were photographed and 214,820 letters were opl'nl'd. 11 '111is is further shO\\'n by the fact that American groups and indiyiduals placed on the Watch List for the project included: -The Federation of American Scientists; -authors snch as ,Tohn Steinbeck and Edward Albee; -numerons AmeriC'an peace groups snch as the American Friends Service Committee and ,Vomen's Strike for Peace; and -businesses, such as Praeger Publishers. 12 By one CIA estimate, random selection accounted for 75 percent of the 200,000 letters opened, including letters to or from American political figures. such as Rirharcl Xixon, \\'hile a presidential candidate in 1968, and Senators Frank Church and Edward Kennedy,13 5 See CHAOS Report: Sec. II D, "Operation of the CHAOS Program and Related CIA Projects." 6 See IRS Report: Part II, Sec. II, "Special Service Staff." 1 :Uemorondum from D, .J. Brt'nnan to W. C, Sullh'an, 8/15/69. 6 :'IIt'morandum from William Loeb to Dean Barron, 11/30/61. , :'IIemorandum from :'IIitchell Rogovin to Dean Barron, 12/20/61. 10 :'IIemorandull1 from Commissioner, IRS to :\lyer Pt'ldman, 7/11/63. 11 See :'IIai! Report: Part I, "Domestic CIA and FBI :'IIai! Opening Programs" 12 See :'IIai! Report: Part II, St'c. II B (1 J, "Selection Critt'ria." 13 See :'IIai! Report: Part II, Sec. II B (1), "Selection Criteria," 169 NSA's Watch List and SHAMROCK Pl'Ogmms.-The Xational Security Agency's SHA~fROCK program, by which copies of millions of telegrams sent to, from, or through the rnited States were obtained between Ian and 197:3, invoh-ed the use of a 'Vatch List from IH67-1973. The watch list included groups and individuals selected by the FBI for its domestic intelligence investigations and by the CIA for its Operation CHAOS program. In addition, the SHA~fROCK Program resulted in XSA's obtaining not only telegrams to and from certain foreib'1l targets, but countless telegrams between Americans in the l-nited States and American 01' foreign parties abroad.H In short. viliually every element of our society has been subjected to excessive go,-ernment-ordered intelligence inquiries. Opposition to government policy or the expression of controversial views ,vas frequently considered sufficient for collecting data on ~\mericans. The committee finds that this extreme breadth of intelligence activity is inconsistent with the principles of our Constitution which protect the rights of speech, political activity. and privacy against unjustified governmental intrusion. Sllbfillding (b) Tlw absence of precise standards for int{'lligence investigations of !unericans contributed to overbreadth. Congress did not enact statutes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or defining' the purpose and scope of domestic intrlligenceactivity. The Executive branch abandoned the standard spt by Attorney General Stone-that the government's ronrem was not ,,-ith politiral opinions Imt with "s11rh conduct as is forbidden bv the laws of the United States." Intelligence 'agencies' superiors issu'ed overinclusive directives to investigate "subversion" (a term that was neyer defined in presidential directives) and "potential" rather than actual or likely criminal condurLas well as to rollect general intelligence on lawful political 'and social clissent. Congress has nen:r set out a specifir statntory charter for FBI domestie intelligence artivitv delineating the standards for opening intelligence investigations or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity,15 Nor have the charters for foreign intelligence agenries-the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency-articulated adequate standards to insure that those agencies did not become involved in domestir intelligence activity. While the 1947 National Serurity Act provided that the CIA shall have no "police, subpoena, law enforcemeat powers or internal security functions," 16 H Sl'e "National Sl'curity Agt>ncy SurYt>illance Afft'Cting Americans", NSA Rt>port: Sec. II A, "Summary of XSA Watch List Actiyity". os The FBI's statutory authority provides that the Attornt>y Gt>neral may appoint officials: "( 1) to detect and prost'Cute crimes against the l'nitt>d States; (2) to assist in the protection of the Presidl'nt; and (3) ,to conduct such inYf'stigations rt>garding official matters undt>r tht> control of the Dt'partment of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney Gent> ra1." (28 r.S.C. 533.) Attorney General FAlward H. IJCyi told the Sl'lect Committee "that the statutory basis for thE' operations of thE' Bureau cannot be said to be fully satisfactory." (Edward H. Lt>yi tt'stimony, 12/11/75, Hearings, Yo1. 6, p. 313.) 16 50 U.S.C. 403 (d)(3). 170 the Act '\Us silent concerning "'IH~ther the CIA was authorized to target ~\mericans abroad or to gather intelligence in the united States on Americans or foreign nationals in connection ,vith its foreign intelligence responsibilities. By classified presidential directive, the CIA was authorized to conduct counterintelligence operations abroad and to maintain central counterintelligence files for the intelligence communityY Counterintelligence activity was defined in the directive to include protection of the nation against "snbversion," a term which, as in the. directives authorizing FBI domestic intelligelwP activity, ,vas not defined. In the absence of specific standards for CIA activity and given the susceptibility of the term "subversion" to broad interpretation, the CIA conducted Operation CHAOS-a large scale intelligence program involving the gathering of &ata on thousands of Americans and domestic groups to determine if they had "subversive connections"and illegally opened the mail of hundreds of thousands of Americans. Moreover, the Act does not define the scope of the authority granted to CIA's Director to protect intelligence "sources and methods." 18 This authority has been broadly interpreted to permit surveiHance of present and former CIA employees in the United States as well as domestic groups thought to be a threat to CIA installations in the united States. No statute at 'all deals ,vitb the Kational Security Agency. That Agency-one of the largest of the intelligence agencies-was created by Executive Order in 1952. Although NSA's mission is to obtain foreign intelligence from "foreign" communications, this has been interpreted to permit NSA to_intercept communications where one terminal-the sender or receiver-was in the United States. Consequently ,vhen an American has used telephone or telegraph facilities between this country and overseas, his message has been subject to interception by NSA. NSA obtained copies of millions of private telegrams sent from, to or through the United States -in its SHAMROCK program and complied with requests to target the international communications of specific Americans through the use of a watch list. In 'addition to the failure of Congress to enact precise statutory standards, members of Congress have put pressure on the intelligence agencies for the collection of domestic intelligence without adequate regard to constitutional interests.1D Moreover, Congress has passed statutes, such as the Smith Act, which, although not directly authorizing domestic intelligence collection, had the effect of contributing to the excessive collection of intelligence about Americans. Three functional policies, established by the Executive branch and acquiesced in by Congress, were the basis for the overbreadth of intelligence investigations directed at Americans. Thesp poJiries center~ on (~) so-called "subversion investigations" of attempts by hostIle foreJgn gonrnments and their agents in this country to influence the course of American life; (2) the innstigation of persons and groups thought to have a "potential" for "iolatin<r the law or commi~t!ng violence.; and (3) the .collection of general intrlligence on nolJtJcal and SOCIal movements m the interest of predictinO' and controlling civil disturbances. ~ 17 Xational Secnrit:> Intelligence Dirpctiye Xo. 5. "50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3). 10 See Finding 011 Deficiencies in Control ancI Acconntabilit~-. 1111. 277-279. 171 Each of these policies grew out of a legitimate concern. Kazi Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union mounted intelligence efforts in this country before ,Vorld ,Val' II; and Soviet operations continued after the war. In the 1£)60s and early 1970s, racist groups used force to deprive Americans of their civil rights, some American dissidents engaged in violence as a form of political protest, and there were large-scale protest demonstrations and major ci \'il disorders in cities stemming from minority frustrations. The Committee recognizes that the government had a responsibility to act in the face oT the very real dangers presented by these developments. But appropriate restraints, controls, and prohibitions on intelligence collection were not devised; distinctions between legitimate. targets aT investigations and innocent citizens were Torgotten; and the Government's actions were never examined Tor their eflects on the constitutional rights oT Americans, either when programs originated or as they continued over the years. The policies of investigating Americans thought to ha\-e a "potential" for violence and the collection of general intelligence on political and social movements inevitablv resulted in the surveillance of American citizens and domestic grollps engaged in lawful political activity. "Subversive" was neYer defined in the presidential directives from Presidents Roosevelt to Kennedy authorizing FBI domestic intelligence acti\·ity. Consequently, "subversive" investigations did not focus solely on the aeti,-ities of hostile foreign governments in this country. Rather. they targeted Americans who dissented from administration positions or whose political positions were thought to resemble those of "subversive" groups. An example of the ultimate result OT accepting the concept of "subversive" investigations is the .Tohnson I'11ite House instrnetion to the FBI to monitor public hearings on Vietnam policy and eompare the extent to ,yhich Senators' ,-iews "followed the Communist Partv line." 20 Similarly, im'estigations of those "thought to have the "potential" for \-iolating laws 01' committing violence and the collection of general int£'lligence to preparl' Tor civil disturbances resulted in the surveillance of AnwriC'ans where there was not reasonable suspicion to belieye crim£' 01' violencl' 'W1'e likl'ly to occur. Broad categories of American societv-consl'1-vati\-es, liberals. blacks. women, young people and churches-\YE'rc targeted for intrlligence coIledion. Domestic intelligence rxpanded to COWl' widespread politiC'al protrs1:. mo\-ements in the latl' 1960s and early 1!l70s. For example, in Septrmber 1!l67.•\ttor11(':v General Ramsev Clark called for 'a "new al'ea of inn>stigatioll and intelligence rrpOl·ting" by the FBI regarding tlw possibility of "an organized pattrrn of violence" by gl"Oups in the "urban gllf'tto.'· Hr instructed FBI Director HoO\-er: ... we mllst Illilke certain that C\'eryattempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take ryel'y stl'P possible to determine ,yhether the rioting is preplannerl 01' organized.... As a part of the broad investigation \dlieh must IX' eondurterl ... sources or inTormants in black nationalist organizations. SKCC and other less publicizrd groups shoulcl be dcYeloperl and expanded to detel1nine the 20 FBI summary memorandum. 1/31/75, 172 size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groupS.21 Such instructions did not limit investigation to facts pointing to particular criminal or violent activity but called for intensive intelligence surveillance of a broad category of black groups (and their connections with other groups) to determine their "size and purpose." Similarly, the Army's broad domestic surveillance program reflected administration pressure on the Army for information on groups and individuals involved in domestic dissent.22 As a former Assistant Secretary of Defense testified, the Army's sweeping collection plan "reflected the all-encompassing and uninhibited demand for information directed at the Department of the Army." 23 Presidents Johnson and Nixon subjected the CIA to intensive pressure to find foreign influence on the domestic peace movements, resulting in the establishment of Operation CHAOS.Z4 'When the Nixon Administration called for an intensifi0ation of CIA's effort, the CIA was instructed to broaden its targeting criteria and strengthen its collection efforts. CIA was told that "foreign Communist support" should be "liberally construed." 25 The 1Vhite House stated further that "it appea,rs our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate" and implied that any gaps in CINs collection program resulting from "inadequate resources or a low priority of attention" should be corrected.26 In short, having abandoned Attorney General Stone's standard that restricted Government investigations to "conduct and then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States," the Government's far-reaching domestic intelligence policies inevitably produced investigations and surveillance of large numbers of lawabiding Americans. Subfinding (c) The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and over-inclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence investigations. Intelligence investigations extended beyond "subversive" or violent targets to additional groups and individuals subject to minimal "subversive influence" or having little or no "potential" for violence. Having been given vague directions by their superiors and subjected to substantial pressure to report on a broad range of matters, the intelligence agencies themselves often established overinclusive targeting criteria. The criteria followed in the major domestic intelligence programs conducted in the 1960s and 1970s illustrate the breadth of intelligence targeting: "General Racial Matters".-The FBI gathered intelligence about proposed "civil demonstrations" and related activities of "officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc." in the "racial field." 27 21 Memorandum from Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/14/67. 22 See Military Surveillance Report: Sec. II C. 23 Robert F. Froehkle testimony, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. 1971, cited hereinafter as 1971 Hearings. 24 Ree pp. 99--101. '" Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69. p. 1. '" :Uemorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69, p. 1. zt 1964 FBI :\fanual Section 122, p. 1. 173 FBI Field Offices were directed to report the "general programs" of all "civil rights organizations" and "readily available personal background data" on leaders and individuals "in the civil rights movement," as well as any "subversive association" that might be recorded in Field Office files. 28 In addition, the FBI reported "the objectives sought by the minority l:ommullity." 2" These broad criteria, were also reflected in the FBI's targeting of "white militant groups" in the reporting of racial matters. Those who were "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the busing of Negro students to white schools" 'wre to be investigated.30 "New Left" I ntelligence.-In conducting a "comprehensive study of the whole New Left mm-ement" (rather than inwstigating particular violations of law), the FBI defined its intelligence target as a "looselybound, free-,vheeling, college-orien.ted movement.'· 31 Organizations to he im-estigated were those ,,-ho fit criteria phrased as the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft organizations." 32 The use of such imprecise criteria resulted in investigations of such matters as (1) hvo university instructors who helped support a student newspaper whose editorial policy was described by the FBI as "leftof- center, antiestablishment. and opposed to the University Administration"; 33 (2) a dissident stockholder's group planning to protest a large corporation's ,,-ar production at the annual stockholder's meeting; 34 and (3) "Free l7niversities" attached to college campuses, whether or not there were facts indicating any actual or potential violation of law. 35 "Rabble Rou8e,'" IndeJ'.-Beginning in August 1967, the FBI conducted intensi,-e intelligence investigations of individuals identified as "rabble rousers." The program was begun after a member of the National .A.dvisorv Commission on Civil Disorders asked the FBI at a meeting of the' Commission "to identify the number of militant Xegroes amI ",Yhites." 36 This vague refereilce ,,-as subsequently used by the FBI as the basis for instructions implementing a broad new program; persons were to be investigated and placed on the "rabble rouser" index ,vho were "racial agitators who have demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord." 3' Ultimately, a "rabble rouser" was defined as: A person ,vho tries to arouse people to violent action by appealing to tlwir emotions, prejudices, et cetera; a demagogue.3s Thus, rather than collecting information on those who had or ,,-ere likely to commit criminal or violent acts, a major intelligence program was launched to identify "demagogues." 28 FBI ~Ianual, Section 122, revised 12/13/66, p. 8-9. '" l<'BI :\Ianual, Section 122, revised 12/13/66; p. 8-9. ~'SAC Letter, 68-25,4/30/68. 31 :\Iemorandum from FBI Heacl(lUarters to all SAC's, 10/28/68. ;;2 :\Iemorandum from FBI Headl1l1arters to all SAC's 10/2:"/68. :<: :\Ielllorandum from :\Iohile Field Office to FBI Hpadl1l1arter~. 12/9/70. 34 :\Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to ~Iinneapolis FielcI Office, 4/23/70. ;;;; :\Iemorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66. :10 :\Iemorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde 'l'olson. :"/1/67. :r. :\Iemorandum from Charles Brennan to 'William Sullivan, 8/3/67; SAC Letter 67-56, 9/12/67. 38 SAC Letter Xo. 67-70, 11/28/67. 174 A1'lny Domcstic ,,,"'u/'/'eillancc of "Dissidel1ts:'~Extremel'y broad criteria ,vere used in the Army"s natioInvide sUlTeillance program conducted in the latE' 1960s. Such general terms as "the ci ,'il rights moYement" and the "anti-Vietnam/anti-draft moYements" were used to indicate targets for inYestigation.C<" In collecting information on these "mon~ments" and on the "cause of ci,'il disturbancE's," Army intelligence ,vas to investigate "instigators," "group participants," and "subrersire elements"~allundE'fined. "Lnder latE'!' revisions, the Army collection plan extended eYen beyond "subyersion" and "dissident groups" to "prominent persons" who were "friendly" with the "leaders of the disturbance" or "sympathetic ,vith their plans." 40 These imprecise crtieria led to the creation of intelligence files on nearly 100,000 Americans, including Dr. )fartin Luther King, Major General Edwin "\Valker, Julian Bond, .Joan Baez, Dr. Benjamin Spock, Rey. "'illiam Sloane Coffin, Congressman Abner Mikya, Senator Adlai Steyenson 111,41 as well as clergymen, teachers, joul'llalists, editors, attorneys, industrialists, a laborer, a construction worker, railroad engineers, a postal clerk, a taxi driyer, a chiropractor, a doctor, a chemist, an economist, a historian, a play,n-ight, an accountant, an entertainer, professors. a radio announcer, athletes, business executives and authors-all of ,yhom became subjects of Army files simply because of their participation in political protests or their association ,vith those who were engaged in such political actiYity.42 The IRS Computerized Intelligence Index.-In 1973, IRS established a central computer index-the "Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System"-for general intelligence data, much of it unrelated to tax law enforcement. More than 465.'000 Americans were indexed in the IRS computer system. including J. Edgar Hoover and the IRS Commissioner, as well as thousands of others also not suspected of tax violation. Xames in newspaper articles and other published sources were indexed wholesale into the IRS computer. "Lnder the system, intelligence gathering preceded any specific allegation of a violation, and possible "future value" ,vas the sole criterion for inclusion of information into the Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System. CIA's Operation CHAOS.-In seeking to fulfill "\Vhite House requests for evidence of foreign influence on domestic dissent, the CIA gave broad instructions to its oYerseas stations. These directives called for reporting on the "Radical Left" which included, according to the CIA, "radical students, antiwar activitists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists. anarchists, and assorted 'Xew Leftists'." 43 CIA built its huge CHAOS data base on the assumption that to know whether there was significant foreign involvement in a domestic group "one has to know whether each and everyone of these persons has any connection to foreigners." 44 CIA instructed its stations that even "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest" between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements" were deemed to 39 1971 Hearings, pp. 1120-1121. 40 1971 Hearings, pp. 1123-1138. It Stein testimony, 1971 Hearings, p. 266. 42 "~Iilitary SUfI'eillance of Ciyilian Politic"." Senate .Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights Report, W73, p. 57. cited herpafter as lin.l Re)Jort. 43 Book Cable from Thomas Karamessines to yarious Europpan Stations..June l(l6R .. Richard Ober testimony, Rockefeller Co=issi'on, 3/28/75, PP. 88-89. 175 "casual contacts based merelv on mutual interest" bctwe('n Americans opposed to the Vietnam \Val: and "foreign elements" were deemed to constitute "subYersiye connections.~· 45 Similarly~CIA's request to KSA for materials on persons targeted by the XSA "Yatch List ('aIled for all information regardless of how innocuous it may scem." 4G The COlllmittee~sinYestigation has shmvn that the ausence of prccise statutorY standanls and the usC' of oycrbroa(l criteria for domestic intelligl:nce acti \"ity resulted in the extension of intelligence innstigations bpyond tlH'ir original ';subn'I'siYe'~or \"iolent targets. Intelligence inYestigations pxtended to those thought to be suuject to "subnrsiyc influencp." )Iol'em"el', those thought to ha,"p a "potential" for ,"iolellCe wcre also targeted und. in some cases. ill\"cstigations extended e\"en to those engagr(] in wholly nOll-\"io]ent lawful political expression. FBI "OOJfJNFJL~'Jm·('stigatiot1s.-1'nder the FBrs COJIIKFIL ("communist infiltration") program, large I\umbers of groups and individuals engaged in la,dul political activity haye heen subjected to informant cm"m'age and intelligcnce scnltiny. Although CUMIN FIL im-estigations were supposed to focus on the Communist Party's alleged efforts to penetrate domestic groups, in practice the target often became the domestic groups themselYes. FBI CO)IIXFIL inwstigations rcache(] into (lomestic groups ill yirtually eYery arca of American political life. The FBI conducted CO)IIXFIL inyestigations in such an'us as "religion." "education," "veterans' matters,~' "women's matters." "Xegro question,'~ al1(1 "cultural actiyities.'~"The "entire spectrum of the social and labor movement" ,yas coyerecl!S The oyerbreadth that results from the practice of inYestigating groups for indicfltions of communist influence or infiltration is illustrated by the following FBI C(nII~FIL intelligence investigations: NAAOP.-An intensiw 25 year long surveillance of the NAACP ,yas conducted, ostensibly to determine ,,"hether there ,,'as Communist infiltration of the NAAcp. This sUlTeillance, however, produced detailed intelligence reports on NAACP actiyities \\"holly unrelated to any alleged communist "attempts" to infiltrate the NAACP, and despite the fact that no eyidence was ever found to contradict the FBI's initial finding that the NAACP was opposed to communism.4gB l'/orthPl'n YiJ'ginia Citizens Concerned About the ABM.-In 1969, the FBI conducted an intelligence inyestigation and usrd informants to report on a meeting held in a public high school auditorium at which the merits of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System werr debated by. among others, Department of Defense officials. TIl(' inyestigation was apparrntly opened because a communist newspaper had commented on t lw fact that the meeting was to he held.49 iV(tf~or/(ll Oonference on Amnesty fol' Vietnam Vete1'011s.-In 1974. FRT mformants reported on a national conference sponsored by '" Cahle from CIA Headquarters to field stations, l'\oyemher 1967, pp. 1-2. • 6 Mt:'morandum from Richard Ober to XSA. 9/14/71. "1960 FBI ~Ianual. Section 87, pp. 5-11. .. Annual Report of the Aftornt:'y Gt:'nt:'ral for Fiscal Year 1955. p. 195. "a Set:' History of Domestic Intt:'llig-ence. Report. Part II at note 139. •• .Tamt:'s Adams testimony, 11/19/75. Hearings. Vol. 6. pp. 137-138. FBI documents indkate that anotlwr factor in the opt:'ning- of the inyestigation was the role of the ,Yife of a Communist in assistin,g- in publicit~' work for the meeting-. ()Ienwrandum from Washin,g"toll Fit'ld Office to FBI Headquarters. 5/28/69: memorandum from Alexandria Fit'ld Offie('- to FBI Headquarters. 6/3/69) Set:' Findings 6 (a). p. 10. for tlw hroacl (lissemination of reports that resultecl from this inquiry. 176 church and civil liberties groups to support amnesty for YiC'tnam Yeterans. The investigation ,yas based on a t\Yo-ste]) "infiltration" throry. Othrr informants had reportefl that the YiC'tnam Yl'trrans .\Il·ninst the "'Val' (\yhich was itself the subject of an intclligencr inwstigation because it "Was thought to be subject to communist or foreign influence) mi<yhtv trv to "control" the conference.5o Although the conference was th;s t~ic~ removed from the original target. it ,yas lH'vrrthelrss snbjected to informant surveillance. FBI intelligence investigations to find ,yhether gron]}s arc s~lbjed to communist or "subwrsive" influence result in the collectIOn of information on groups and individuals C'ngaged in ,,-holly legitimate activity. Reports on the KAACP \yere not limited to alleged communist infiltration. Similarly, the investigation of the Xational Amnestv Conference produced reports describing the topics discussed at the conference and the organization of a steering committee ,,:hich would include families of men killed in Vietnam and congresslOnal staff aides. 51 The reports on the meeting concerning the AB~I system covered the past and present residence of the person who applied to rent the high school auditorium, and plans for a future meeting, including the names of prominent political figures who planned to attend.52 The trigger for CO~fINFIL-type investigations-that subversive "attempts" to infiltrate groups were a substantial threat-\yas greatly exaggerated. According to the testimony of FBI officials, the mention in a communist ne\yspaper of the citizens' meeting to debate the ABM was sufficient to produce intelligence cm-erage of that meeting.53 A large public teach-in on Vietnam, including representatives of Catholic, Episcopal, ~Iethodist and rnitarian churches, as well as a number of spokesmen for antiwar groups, was inwstigated because a Communist Party official had "urged" party meml)(',.~ to attend and one speaker representing the ",V. E. B. DuBois Club was identified as a commlwist,54 The FBI surveillance of the teach-in resulted in a 41-page intelligence report based on coverage by 13 informants and sources.55 And the FBI's investi~ation of all Free Universities near colleges and universities was undertaken because "several" allegedly had been formed by the Communist Party "and other subversive groups." 56 Similarly, the FBI's broad CO.);IIXFIL investigations of the civil rights movement in the South were based on the FBI's conclusion that the Communist Party had "attempted" to take advantage of racial unrest ancI had "ende(n'ored" to pressure l7.S. Government officials "through the press, labor unions and student groups." 57 [Emphasis Go Raymond W. Wannall testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 139. 51 Memorandum from Louisville Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/21/74. ~ Memoranda from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69. 03 Adams, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p.138, t>< Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66. ~ Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66. 00 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 2/17/66. "~lemorandUln from J. Edgar Hoovpr, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to McGeorge Bundy. Special Assistant to the President for :t\ational Security. 7/25/61, enclosing IIC Report. Status of U.S. Internal Security Programs. See F'indings on Political Abuse. p. 22;) for discussion on the larger impact of such FBI terminology. 177 snpplic'cl. ] X0 mention was made of the general failnrl' of these "attl'lll pts.·' Thl' Committel' fiJ1(l,.; that CO.:\lIXFJL inn'"ti~atiolls han been based on an pxaggprated notion of the threat pospr'l by "sub\'ersiHs" and foreign inftne!lc(, on Alllprican political expression. T1IPrp has been an unjustified belief that ,Americans need informants and go\'ernment :-;nl'\'eillancl' to protect thelll from "subYersiYe" inftnence in their unions, churches, schools, parties and political eHorts. [m'estigatiolls of 1Fholly Non-Violent Political EXjJl'ession.-DonlC'stic intelligence investigations ha\'e extended from those \vho commit or are likely to cOlllmit violent acts to those tho11ght to have a "potpntiar' for \'iolelH'p. and then to tho,.:p l'ngaged in purely peacefnl political expression. This characteristic \vas graphically described by tllP ,,'hite IIom:p official ,,'ho coordinate(l the intelligence agl'llcies' !'e('oIlllllPndatious fOl' "pxpandecl" (and illegal) ('o\'erage in 1niO. Hp testified that intelligence investigations risked moving from the kid ",jth a !lomb to tlIP kid ",ith a pidwt sign. and frOIll the kill with the picket sign to thp kid with the hnmper stiehl' of tIl<' opposing calH{idate. ~\.nd yon just keep going ({own the line."s 'Yirhont preci"e s~andards to I'estriet thpir scope. intplligellce im'estigations (lid IllOH heyon(l those ,,'ho cOllllllitte(l or ,,'el'(' likely to commit cI'iminal Ol' violent acts. FOl' example: -Dr. .:\fartin Luther King. ,Jr., \vas targeted for the FBI's COIN TELPRO operations against "Black Xationalist-llate Groups" on tIl<' theory. \vithout factual justification, that Dr. King might "abandon" his adherence to nOlwiolence.59 -The intc'lliiin FBI inYes~igation of the ,Vomen's Liberation :JIonment \vas similarly predicated on the theory that the activities of \\"OlIlPll in that .:\fo\·p!lIpnt might lea<l to (]Plllon"trations awl \·iolellce.tiO -The FBI innstigations of Black Student {'nions pt'Oceeded from t lIP Coneel'll of 't he FBI llll(l its slippriol's O\'pr yiolpllce in the cities. Yet t he FBI opened intelJigpncp ill\'estigations on "e\"pry Blae!\: Stndent l~llion and similar group ]'ega1Y17ess of their past 01' !)J'('sciltinuoll'elIIellt in disorders." iii [Emphasis added.] -The natiolmi\le .\.l'IllY TntelligelH'p slllTPilJan('p of ci\'ilians wae; conducted in cOll)]Pction \yith ci "il dison]pl':'. Hmye\'pl', the Army colIpdion plan focused not IlH'l'ely on thosp likely to comlllit Yiolc'Jl(:p Imt was "so c'omlnehensin' ... that any categol'y of infol'mation related cn'll l'('llwlely to peoplp 01' organizations acti\'e in a ('ommnnity ill which the potential fol' Yiole]H'p m\s lll'psent \vould fall \vithin theil' scope." (i" The COlllmittpp finds that :-;lIch illtelligence suneil1allPe of groups and indiyidnals has greatly execeded the legitimate interest of tlw gOyerllml'nt in la\v enforcement and the prewntion of "iolenep. "There unsupported determinations as to "potential" behayior arc the basis for ,," Torn Charles Huston tpstimony, \)/23/75. Hparings. Yo!. 2. p. 45. ,," ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68. ""~Iell1ornndulll from Xew York Fipld Office to FBI Hpadquarters, 5/28/69. (Hearings. Yo!. 6. Exhihit 54.) 01 ~Ipmorandum from Expcutiyes Conference to Tolson. 10/29/70, ., Froehlke. 1971 H eaTinys, p. 384. 68-786 0 - 76 ' 13 178 surwillance of gl'Oups ;Llld individuals, no one IS safe from the influisitin (',n' of th(' intelligence agency. ,"'ubfindings (d) Intelligence agencies pursued a "Y<lcllUm cleaner" approach to intelligence collection-dra\ying in all available information about groups and indidduals, including their lawful political activity and details of their personal lives. Intelligence agencies collect an excessiyc amount of information by pursuing a "yacuum elE'aner" approach that dm\,"s in all available information, including lawful politir'al activity, personal matters, and trivia. Eren \yhere the theory of the inycstigation is that the subject is likely to be engaged in criminal or violent activity, the oyerbroad approach to intelligence collection intrudes into personal matters unrelated to such criminal or violent activity. FBI officials conceded to the Committee that in conclucting broacl intelligence investigations to determine the "real pl1l'pose" of an organization, they sometinlE's gatherPfI "too much information." "3 The FBI's intelligence im-e"stigation of the ;;Xew LcfL" for example, was directed to\yards a ;;comprelwnsiye study of the \yhole monmcnt" and producecl intensiw monitoring of such subjects as "support of movement by rcligious groups or indi\"iduals," ';demonstrations aimed at social reform," ';indications of support by mass media," "all acti\-it~· in the labor field," and "efforts to influence public opinion, the elE'ctorate and Goyernment bodies." 64 Similar onrbreaflth characterized thc FBI's collection of intelligence on ;'\Yhite militant groups." In 196R FBI field offices \yere instructed not to gather information solely on actual or potential violations of la\y or violence, but to use informants to determine the "aims amI purposes of the organization, its leaders, approximate mcmbership" and other ';background data" relating to the group's "militancy." GO In 1971 the rrit('ria for inycstigating indiyiduals \yere \yidened. Special Agents in Charge of FBI field offices \ycre instructed to inwstigate not only persons \yith ';a potential for Yiolence," but also anyone else "who in judgment of SAC should be subject of inyestigation due to extremist activities,"~ fiG Enn in searching for indications of potential violence in black nrban areas or in co]]ecting information about violence-prone K u Klux Klan chapters. there \yas marked oYerbreadth. In black urban areas, for example, FBI agents \yere instructed to han their informants obtain the names of "Afro-American type bookstores" and their "0\\"11erS, operators and clientele." G7 The acti\-ities of ciyil rights and black gronps as \y('ll as details of the personalliYes of Klan members, \yere reported on by an FBI intelligence informant in the Kn Klnx Klan.G'a Cnder this approach, the ayerage citizen who merely attends a meeting, signs a petition, is placed on a mailing list, or yisits a book store, is subject to being recorded in intelligence files. A striking example of informant reporting on an they tOllch mlS provided by an FBI informant in an antiwar group with only ;")i) 63 Adams, 12/2/7:;, Hearinll:s. Yo!. 6. p. 135. 61 JIenwrandmll from FBI Headquartf'rs to all SACs. 10/28/68. B5 SAC Letter 68--25,4/30/68. 66 Hlj1 :UaJlllf1!. Section 122. 67 :\Iemorandum from Philadplphia Fiel(] Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/12/('>1'. 67' Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Yo!. 6. p. 116. 179 regular members and some 250 persons ,,-ho gave occasional support. The informant estimated she reported nearly 1,000 names to thp FBI in an IS-month period-60-70 percent of whom were members of other groups (such as the rnited Church of Christ and the American Civil Liberties "Gnion) which 'H're engaging in peaceful, lawful Jlolitical activity together ,,-ith the anti,yar group or ,,-ho ,yore on the grO\lp's mailing lisL GS Similarly in the intelligence im-estigation of the 'Yomen's Liheration ~loYement. informants reported the identities of indi,-idual women attending meetings (as well as reporting such matters as the fact that women at meetings had stated "hmv they felt oppressed. sexually or otherwise.") .69 Such collection of "intelligence" unrelated to specific criminal or violent acti ,-ity constitutes a serious misuse of governmental power. In reaching into the private liws of individuals and monitoring their lawful political activity-matters irrelevant to any proper governmental interest-dornestic intelligence collection has been unreasonably broad. 8ubfinding (e) Intelligence inYestigations in many casrs continued for rxcessi,-ely long periods of time, resulting in sustained gorernmental monitoring of political activity in the ahsrnce of any indication of criminal conduct or "subyersion." One of the most disturbing aspects of domestic intelligence investigations found by the Committre was thrir excessive length. Intelligence investigations often continuf'd, despite tIlE' absence of facts in( licating all individual or group is violating or is likely to violate the law, resulting in long-term gowl'Ilment monitoring of law'ful political activity. The follmving are examples: (i) The FBI Inte17igrnce h/l'estigation of the NAACP (1941Jr)( JU).-The investigation of the XAACP began in 19-H and continued for at least 25 years. Initiated according to one FBI rf'port as an inn'stigatioll of protests by 15 hlack mess attendants about racial discrimination ill the Xavy,'O the inwstigation expandrd to encompass XAACP chapters in ('ities aeross the nation. Although the ostensible p111'pose of this inrestigation ,,-as to detenninr if thr1'e was "Communist infiltration" of the KAc\CP, the inn'stigation constituted a long-term monitoring of the ~ "\ACP's ,,-holly la,dul political activity by FBI informants. Thus: . -The FBI Kf'w York Field Office submitted II 137-page report to FBI headqua1'trrs c1eseribing the national office of the NAACP. its national eonwntion. its growth alHl membership, its officers and dirrctors, and its stand against Communism.'l -An FBI informant in Sf'attJe obtained a list of KAACP branch officPrs and 1'pported on a Il1peting whrre signatures "'f'1'e gathered on a "petition dirprtp(l to Presidpnt Eisf'nhmver" and plans for two members to go to 'Yashingion, D.C.. for a "Prayer Pilgrimage." ,2 68 )Iary .Io Cook trstimony. 12/2/75. Hearings. Yo1. 6. pp. 112, 120. 60 )Iemorandum from Kal1sas City Field Office. 10/20/70; memorandum New Y<1rk Field Offipp. :I/2S/6l): I1lPmorandum from Baltimore Fif'ld Officp. :1/11/70 to FBI Hpadqnartprs. CIA agents in the I-nitI'd Rtates also reported on \\'omen's Liheration actiyities in the coursp of t11€'ir prpparation for onrSf'as duty in Oppration C'HAOR. (Agent 1. C'ontad Report. Yol. II. Agent 1 filp.) 70 )Ipmorandum from \\'ashing-ton Field Office to FBI headquarters, 3/11/41. 71 )Iemorandnm from Xew York Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 2/12/57. 72 )Iemorandum from Seattle Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/57. 180 -In 1966, the Xew York Field Office reported the names of all XAACP national officers and boardnwmhers, and summarized their political associations as far back as the 19-10s.73 -As late as 1966, the FBI was obtaining XAACp chapter membership figures by "pretext telephone call ... utilizing the pretext of being interested in joining that branch of the XAACP." 74 -Based on the reports of FBI informants, the FBI submitted a detailed report of a 1956 XAACP-sponsored Leadership Conference on Ciyil Rights and deseribed plans for a Conference delegation to visit Senators Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, ,Yayne ~lorse, Hubert Humphrey, and.Tohn Bricker.75 Later reports coyered "'hat transpired at several of these meetings with Senators.'6 ~lost significantly, all these reports \vere sent to the ,Vhite House.77 (ii) The FBI Intelli,qenee Im'estigation of the Sociali8t Workers Party (1940 to date).-The FBI has imestigated the Socialist Workers Party (S,Vp) from 19-10 to the present day on the basis of that Partis reyolutionary rhetoric and alleged international links. Kevertheless, FBI officials testified that the SWP has not been responsible for any violent acts nor has it urged actions constituting an indictable incitement to violence. 77a FBI informants haYe been reporting the political positions taken by th!' S'YP with respect to snch issues as the "Vietnam ,Val'," "racial matters," "r.s. inyolvemcnl in Ang'ola," "food prices," and any S\yp ptforts to snpport a non-S,VP candidate for political office. 78 Moreover, to enable the FBI to develop "background information" on S'VP leaders, informants have been reporting certain personal aspects of their liYes, such as marital status.79 The informants also ha\'e been reporting on S",p cooperation "ith other groups who are not the subject of separate intelligence inyestigations.80 (iii) The Effort to Prore .iVegati~'es.-Intelligenceinvestigations and programs haw also continued for excessively long periods in efforts to prO\'e negatives. CIA's Operation CHAOS began in 1967. From that year until the program's termination in 1974,81 the CIA repeatedly reached formal conclusions that there was negligible foreign influence on domestic protest activity. In 1967, the CIA concluded that Communist front groups did not control student organizations and that there \wre no significant links with foreign radicals; 82 in 1968, the CIA concluded that U.S. student protest was essentially homegrown and not stimulated by an international conspiracy; 83 awl in 1971 the CIA founel "there is no evidence that foreig'n governments, organizations, or intelligence services now control IT.S. New Left 73 :\!emorandum from Xe", York Field Offiee to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65. ,. :\!emorandum from Los Angeles Field Qffiee to FBI Headquarters. 4/15/66. 75 :\Iemorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/5/56. 76 :\Iemorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56. 77 See Findings on "Political Abuse." 77. Robert Shaekelford testimony, 2/2/76; pp. 89-90. 78 Shackelford, 2/2/76, p. 89. 79 Shackelford, 2/2/76; p. 90. 80 Shackleford, 2/2/76. p. 92. 51 See Findings, "Deficiencies in Control and Aecountability", p. 265. 83 CIA memorandum, "Student Dissent and Its Techniques in the r.s.", 1/5/G8. '" CIA Report, "Restless Youth," Conclusions, p. 1, 9/4/68. 181 }Ionnwnts ... the r.s. Xev, Lpft is basically self-sufficient and mows undrr its 0'\"11 impetus:' 84 .. The result of these repeate(l findings \yas not tlw tprmination of CHAOS's snrwillancp of Americans, but its redoubling. Presidents Johnson and Xixon presslll'ed the CIA to intensify its intelligence effort to find p\-idencc of foreign (lircction of the r.s. peacc mowmcnt. .\s Director Hclms testified: ",Yl1<'n a President heps asking' if there is any information. "how are you getting along \yith your examination:' "have you picked up any more information on this subjecL" it isn't a direct order to do something. but it seems to me it behooves tlw Dil'PCtor of Central Intelligence to find some \yay to imprOHl his performance. or impron his Agency's performance. 85 In an effort to proyp its negatin> finding to a skeptical ",Vhite Houseand to test its yalidity each succeeding year-CIA expanded its program, increasing its conrage of Americans oyer"eas and building an ever larger "data base" on domestic political activity. Intelligence was exehanged with the FBI. XSA. and other agencies. and eventually CIA agents who had infiltrated domestic organizations for other purposps supplied gpneral information on the groups' activities. 86 Thus. the intelligence mission became one of continued slll'veillance to prove a negative. with no thought to terminating the program in the face of the negative findings. As in the CHAOS operation, FBI intelligence investigations have often continupd eH'n in the absence of any evidence of "subversive" activities merely because the subjects of the investigation have not (lemonstrated their innocence to the FBI's satisfaction. The longterm investigations of the XAACP and the Socialist "'Yorkers Party described above are typical examples. A striking illustration of FBI practice is provided by the intelligence innstigation of an advisor of Dr. ~Iartin Luther King, Jr. The advisor was inn'stigated on the theory that he might be a communist "sympathizer." The Burpau's Xew York office coneluded he was not.87 l~sing a theory of "guilty until proycn innocent." FBI headquarters directpd that the im-estigation continue: The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the Xew York office that r ]88 is not sympathetic to the Party cause. ",Vhile there may not be any evidence that r ] is a Communist neither is there any substantial e\,idence that he is anti-Communist.89 .. &l CIA Report, "Definition and Assessment of Existing Internal Security Threat-Foreign," 1/5/71, pp. 1-3. ~'Riehanl Helms testimony, Rockfeller Commission. 4/28/75, pp. 2~3.J.-2.J.35. Helms further testified: "President .Johnson was after this all the time ... this ,,'as something that came up almost daily and weekl~-." Helms. Rockefeller Commission. 1/13/75. pp. 163-164. "" Sef' CHAOS Hel)()rt: Section II D, "Operations of the CHAOS Program and Helated CIA Projects," and II E, "loo!! Expansion of CHAOS." S1 :\Iemorandnm from :\'e\y York l'ield Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64. "" Same deletf'd by Committee to protect privacy. '" :.\Iemoralldum from FBI Headquarters to Sew York Field Offiee, 4/24/64. 182 ,Vhere cItIzens must demonstrate not simply that they ha.ve no connection with an intelligence target, but must exhibit "substantial e\,idence" that they are in opposition to the target, intelligence investigations are indeed open-ended.
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