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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SURVEILLANCE
AFFECTING AMERICANS
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction and Summary_____________________________________ 735
A. NSA's origins and official responsibilities_ _________________ 736
B. Summary of interception programs_ ______________________ 738
C. Issues and questions____________________________________ 742
II. NSA's Monitoring of International Communications_ __ _____ _______ 743
A. Summary of watch list activity __________________________ 743
B. History _______________________________________________ 744
C. Types of names on watch lists_ _______ ______ ___ ___ __ ___ __ 749
D. Overlapping nature of intelligence community requests_ ____ 750
E. Drug watch lists: United States-South American intercepts_ 752
F. Termination of the civil disturbance watch list activity____ 756
G. Authorizaljon__________________________________________ 761
H. Conclusions_ __________________________________________ 764
III. A Special NSA Collection Program: SHAMROCK_ _______________ 765
A. Legal restrictions____ __ ___ _____ __ __ __ ___ ___ __ _ _ 765
B. The committee's investigation_ ______ ______ ___ ___ ___ __ __ _ 766
C. The origins of SHAMROCK____________________________ 767
D. The participation of the companies_______________________ 770
E. NSA's participation_ ____________ __ __ ___ __ ___ __ _____ _ 774
F. Termination of SHAMROCK___________________________ 776
IV. NSA Personnel Security and Related Matters_ ___________________ 777
A. Background___________________________________________ 777
B. Questionable activities__ ______ _____ __ _ _____ _____ 777
(733)

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SURVEILLANCE
AFFECTING AMERICANS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This report describes the Committee's investigation into certain
questionable activities of the National Security Agency (NSA).l The
Committee's primary focus in this phase of its investigation was on
NSA's electronic surveillance practices and capabilities, especially
those involving American citizens, groups, and organizations.
NSA has intercepted and disseminated international communications
of American citizens whose privacy ought to be protected under
our Constitution. For example, from August 1945 to May 1975, NSA
obtained copies of many international telegrams sent to, from, or
through the United States from three telegraph companies. In addition,
from the early 1960s until 1973, NSA targeted the international
communications of certain American citizens by placing their names
on a "watch list." Intercepted messages were disseminated to the FBI,
CIA, Secret Service, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD), and the Department of Defense. In neither program were
warrants obtained.2
With one exception,3 NSA contends that its interceptions of Americans'
private messages were part of monitoring programs already being
conducted against various international communications channels
for "foreign intelligence" purposes. This contention is borne out by
the record. Yet to those Americans who have had their communications-
sent with the expectation that they were private-intentionally
intercepted and disseminated by their Government, the knowledge that
NSA did not monitor specific communications channels solely to acquire
their messages is of little comfort.
In general, NSA's surveillance of Americans was in response to
requests from other Government agencies. Internal NSA directives
now forbid the targeting of American citizens' communications. Nonetheless,
NSA may still acquire communications of American citizens
as part of its foreign intelligence mission, and information derived
from these intercepted messages may be used to satisfy foreign intelligence
requirements.
NSA's current surveillance capabilities and past surveillance practices
were both examined in our investigation. The Committee recog-
1 See the Committee's Foreign Intelligence Report for an overview of NSA's
legal authority, organization and functions, and size and capabilities.
2 Since the NSA programs involving American citizens have never been challenged
in court, the necessity of obtaining a warrant has not yet been determined.
Although there 'have been court cases that involved NSA intercepts, NSA's activities
have never been disclosed in open court. Spe pp. 765-766 of this Report
and the Committee's Report on 'Warrantless FBI Electronic Surveillance for a
dis('ussion of wftrrant rE"f)uiremE"nts for electronic surveillancE".
8 Between 1970 and 1973, NSA intercepted telephone calls between the United
States and various locations in South America to aId the BNDD (now the Drug
Enforcement Administration) in executing its responsibilitiees. See pp. 752-756.
(735)
736
nizes that NSA's vast technological capability is a sensitive national
asset which ought to be zealously protected for its value to our common
defense. If not properly controlled, however, this same technological
capability could be turned against the American people, at great cost
to liberty. This concern is compounded by the knowledge that the proportion
of telephone calls and telegrams being sent through the air is
still increasing.
In addition to reviewing facts and issues relating to electronic surveillance,
the Committee also examined certain questionable activities
of the NSA's Office of Security. See pp. 777-783.
A. NSA's Origim and Official Respomibilities
NSA does not have a statutory charter; its operational responsibilities
are set forth exclusively in executive directives first issued in
the 19508. One of the questions which the Senate asked the Committee
to consider was the "need for specific legislative authority to govern
the operations of ... the National Security A~ency." •
According to NSA's General Counsel, no eXlstin~ statutes control,
limit, or define the signals intelligence activities of NSA. Further, the
General Counsel asserts that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to NSA's interception of Americans' international communications for
foreign intelligence purposes.5
1.07igim
NSA was established in 1952 bv a Top Spcret directive issued by
President Truman.' Under this directive, NSA assumed the responsibilities
of the Armed Forces Security Agency, which had been
created after World War II to integrate American cryptolo~c efforts:
These efforts had expanded rapidly after World War II as a
result of the demonstrated wartime value of breaking enemy codes,
particularly those of the Japanese.
2. Responsibilities
(a) SUbject Matter Resp0'fl,.<jibilitws.-The executive branch expects
NSA to collect political, economic, and military information as
part of its "foreign intelligence" mission." "Foreign intelligence" is
an ambiguous term. Its meaning changes, depending upon the pre-
• Senate Resolution 21, Section 2 (8).
• Roy Banner deposition, 2/4176, pp. 13, 16,39.
Banner stated that signals intelligence activities are authorized by the President
under Article II of the Constitution and "the Fourth Aml'ndment does
not restrict these signals intelligence activities" if the "purpose is solely to
obtain foreign intelligence." (Ibid., p. 39.)
, Memorandum from President Harry S. Truman to Secretary of State
and Secretary of Defense, "Communications Intelligence Activities," 10/24/52.
7 NSA exercises technical control over the three Service Cryptologic Agencies:
the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group Command, and Air Force
Security Service. NSA's Director is always a military officl'r of at least three-star
rank. He reports to the Secretary of Defense, but responds to requests from
other intelligence agencies for intelligence information.
" "The purpose [of forming NSA] was to maintain and improve this source
of intelligence which was considered of vital importance to the national security,
to our ability to wage war, and to the conduct of foreign affairs. This
mission of NSA is directed to foreign inteUigC1lCe, obtained from foreign l'lectrical
communications and also from other foreign shmal~ such as radars."
[Emphasis added.] Lew Allen, Jr. testimony, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 6.
737
vailing needs and views of policymakers, and the current world situation.
The internal politics of a nation also playa role in setting requirements
for foreign intelligence; the domestic economic situation,
an upcoming political campaIgn, and internal unrest can all affect
the kind of foreign intelligence that a political leader desires. Thus,
the definition constantly expands and contracts to satisfy the changing
needs of American policymakers for information. This flexibility
was illustrated in the late 1960s, when NSA and other intelligence
agencies were asked to produce "foreign intelligence" on domestic
activists in the wake of major civil disturbances and increasing- antiwar
activities.
NSA's authority to collect foreign intelligence is derived from a
Top Secret National Security Council directive which is implemented
by directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence." These
directives give NSA the responsibility for "Signals Intelligence"
(SIGINT) and "Communications Security" (COMSEC). SIGlNT
is subdivided into "Communications Intelligence" (COMINT) and
"Electronics Intelligence" (ELINT). COMINT entails the interception
of foreign communications and ELINT involves the interception
of electronic signals from radars, missiles, and the like. The
COMSEC mission includes the protection of United States Government
communications by providing the means for enciphering messages
and by establishing procedures for maintaining the security of
equipment used to transmit them.
NSA's interception of communications-the area on which the
Committee focused-arises under the COMINT program. The controlling
NSCID defines COMINT in broad terms as "technical and intelligence
information derived from foreign communications by other
than the intended recipients." 10 The same NSC directive also states
that COMINT "shall not include (a) any intercept and processing
of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts,
or censorship." 11 .
The specific exclusion of unencrypted written communications from
NSA's mandate would appear to prohibit NSA's interception of
telegrams. NSA contends that this exclusion is and always has been
limited to mail and communications other than those sent electronically.
12
9 These are referred to as NSCIDs (Nati{)nal Security Council Intelligence
Directives) and DelDs (Director of Central Intelligence Directives).
10 The effect of the "other than intended recipients" language is to make clear
that the communication is intercepted by someone other than a party to the
communication-in this case, the Government.
11 The relevant DCID contains thesatn:e definition. The exclusion is the same,
except that after "communications" the words "except written plaintext versions
of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent
encryption" have been added.
I' Banner disposition, 2/4/76, p. 71.
The "written communications exclusion was added in 1958; the CIA's New
York mail opening project had been underway since the early 19508. See the
Committee's Report on CIA and FBI Mail Opening Programs. The exclusion
of "press and propaganda broadcasts" may reflect the fact that OIA had
been granted responsibility for intercepting, analyzing, and disseminating
such foreign press broadcasts under its Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) program. In support of NSA's contention that "unencrypted written
communications" refers to mail, it might be argued that the exclusion was
designed to ensure that NSA would not engage in mail opening, which was under
the CIA's jurisdiction.
738
The same NSCID which discusses foreign communications also
states that NSA is to produce intelligence "in accordance with objectives,
requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central
Intelligence with the advice of the United States Intelligence
Board." USIB was composed of representatives from the FBI, CIA,
Treasury Department, Energy Research and Development Administration,
State Department, and Defense Department.!3 Since 1966,
NSA annually received general requirements from USIB for the collection
of foreign intelligence. These requirements ordinarily identified
broad areas of interest, such as combating international terrorism, and
,vere supplemented by more specific "amplifying requirements"
periodically submitted to NSA by other USIB members.
(b) Geographw Re8pomibilitie8.-Although none of the applicable
executive directives explicitly prohibit NSA from intercepting communications
which occur wholly within the United States, internal
NSA policy has always prohibited such interceptions. In practice,
NSA limits itself to communications where at least one of the terminals
is in a foreign country. This means that when Americans use
a telephone or other communications link between this country and
overseas, their words may be intercepted by NSA.
(c) Jurisdiction with Re8pect to Nationality.-Although the controlling
NSCID contains no limitation relating to the citizenship of
persons whose "foreign communications" may be intercepted, the relevant
DCID does exclude messages "exchanged among private organizations
and nationals, acting in a private capacity, of the U.S.~'
This restriction is designed to prevent NSA from processing communcations
between two Americans, regardless of their location.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, NSA did intercept and
disseminate some messages exchanged between two Americans where
one of the terminals was foreign. NSA does not now knowingly process
or disseminate messages where both the sender and recipient are
American citizens, groups, or organizations.
B. Summary of InterceptionProgramJ]
The Committee's hearings disclosed three NSA interception programs:
the "watch lists" containing names of American citizens;
"Operation SHAMROCK," whereby NSA received copies of millions
of telegrams leaving or transiting the United States: and the monitoring
of certain telephone links between the United States and South
America at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs. In addition, the Committee's investigation revealed that although
NSA no longer includes the names of specific citizens in its
selection criteria, it still intercepts international communications of
Americans as I?art of its foreign intelligence collection activity. Information
derived from such communications is disseminated by
NSA to other intelligence agencies to satisfy foreign intellig-ence
requirements.
" USIB was formally abolished by Presidential directive of February 18,
1976. No comparable group was established to replace it, but the directive
authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to create such a body.
739
1. Watoh Lists Oontaining Names of Amerioans
From the early 1960s until 1973, NSA intercepted and disseminated
international communications of selected American citizens and groups
on the basis of lists of names supplied by other Government agencies.
In 1967, as part of a general concern within the intelligence community
over civil disturbances and peace demonstrations, NSA responded
to Defense Department requests by expanding its watch list program.
Watch lists came to include the names of individuals, groups, and
organizations involved in domestic antiwar and civil rights activities
in an attempt to discover if there was "foreign influence" on them.a
In 1969, NSA formalized the watch list program under the codename
MINARET. The program applied not only to alleged foreign influence
on domestic dissent, but also to American groups and individuals
whose activities "may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert
the national security of the U.S." 15 At the same time, NSA instructed
its personnel to "restrict the knowledge" that NSA was collecting such
information and to keep its name off the disseminated "product." 16
Prior to 1973, NSA generally relied on the agencies requesting information
to determine the propriety and legality of their actions in submitting
names to NSAY NSA's new ~irector, General Lew Allen, Jr.,
indicated. some concern about Project MINARET in August 1973,
and suspended the dissemination of messages under the program. In
September 1973, Allen wrote the agencies involved in the watch
lists, requesting a recertification of their requirements, particularly
as to the appropriateness of their requests.
In October 1973, Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen and
Attorney General Elliot Richardson concluded that the watch lists
were of "questionable legality" and so advised NSA.18 In response,
NSA took the position that although specific names had been targeted,
the communications of particular Americans included on the watch
lists had been collected "as an incidental and unintended act in the
conduct of the interception of foreign communications." Allen
concluded:
[NSA's] current practice conforms with your guidance that
"relevant information acquired [by NSA] in the routine pur-
U Although the agencies submitting names to NSA were members of the United
States Intelligence Board, USIB never approved a watch list requirement
on civil disturbances, or discussed the monitoring of American citizens'
communications.
15MINARET Charter, 7/1/69, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No.3, pp. 149-150.
16 Ibid.
11 Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 31-32.
18 Letter from Elliot Richardson to Lew Allen, Jr., 10/1/73, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibit No.7, pp. 160--161.
Petersen reported to Richardson that he had discovered the watch list program
("of which we had no previous knowledge") as a result of inquiries made
to the FBI and other intelligence agencies with respect to possible electronic
surveillance undertaken by such agencies in connection'with a criminal prosecution.
In one case in which NSA reported that it had conducted such surveillance,
the Government elected to drop the prosecution. See pp. 757-758, 761. Memorandum
from Henry Petersen to Elliot Richardson, 9/4/73.
740
suit of the collection of foreign intelligence information may
continue to be furnished to appropriate government
agencies.19
f. 0 btaining Oopies of Messages from I nternati01U1l Telegraph
Oompanies: Operation SHAMROOK
From August 1945 until May 1975, NSA received copies of millions
of international telegrams sent to, from, or transitmg the United
States. Codenamed Operation SHAMROCK, this was the largest
governmental interception program affecting Americans, dwarfing
CIA's mail opening program by comparison. Of the messages provided
to NSA by the three major international telegraph companies,
it is estimated that in later years approximately 150,000 per month
were reviewed by NSA analysts.
NSA states that the origInal purpose of the program was to obtain
the enciphered telegrams of eertain forei~ targets. Nevertheless,
NSA had aecess to virtually all the internatIOnal telegrams of Americans
carned by RCA Global and ITT World Communications.20 Once
obtained, these telegrams were available for analysis and dissemination
according to NSA's selection criteria, which included the watch
lists.
The SHAMROCK program began in August 1945, when representatives
of the Army Signals SecurIty Agency approached the commercial
telegraph compames to seek post-war aecess to foreign governmental
traffic passing over the facilities of the companies. Despite advice
from their attorneys that the contemplated mtercept operation
would be illegal in peaeetime, the companies agreed to participate,
provided they received the personal assurance of the Attorney General
of the United States that he would protect them from suit, and
that efforts be immediately undertaken to legalize the intercept operation.
Apparently these assurances were forthcoming, because the intercept
program began shortly thereafter.2oa
In 1947, representatives of the companies met with Secretary of Defense
Forrestal to discuss their continued participation in SHAMROCK.
Forrestal told them that the program was "in the highest
interests of national security" and urged them to continue.'11 The companies
were told that President Truman and Attorney General Tom C.
Clark approved and that they would not suffer criminal liability, at
least while the current Administration was in office. Those assurances
were renewed in 1949, when it was again emphasized that future administrations
could not be bound. There is no evidence that the companies
ever sought such assurances again.
10 Letter from Lew Allen, Jr. to Elliot Richardson, 10/4/73, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibit No. 8, pp. 162-163.
20 Western Union International provided NSA only with copies of the messages
of the foreign targets, except for messages to one country, where it provided
everything.
- A letter, dated August 24, 1945, from the Army officer responsible for making
the arrangements with the companies states that ITT would begin participation
in SHAMROCK the last week in August. Another letter, dated October 9,
1945, from RCA to the Army states that it would 'begin participation immediately.
See pp. 768-769.
n Testimony of Robert Andrews, Special Assistant to the General Counsel,
Department of Defense, 9/23/75, p. 34.
741
Throughout the operation NSA never informed the companies that
it was analyzing and disseminating telegrams of Americans. Yet the
companies, who had feared in 1945 that their conduct might be illegal,
apparently never sought assurances that NSA was limitmg its use to
the messages of the foreign targets once the intercept program had
begun.
3. Monitoring of South American Links for Dmg Traffic Oontrol
Purposes
From 1970 to 1973, at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, NSA monitored selected telephone circuits between
the United States and certain countries in South America to obtain
information relating to drug trafficking.
The BNDD was initially concerned about drug deals that were being
arranged in calls to a South American city from public telephone
booths in New York City. The Bureau determined that it could not
legally tap the public telephones and enlisted NSA's help to monitor
international communications links that carried these telephone calls.
Thus, instead of intercepting calls from a few telephone booths, as
the BNDD would have done with a wiretap, NSA had access to international
calls placed from, or received in, cities aU over the United
States that were switched through New York.zz
In addition, BNDD submitted the names of 450 Americans to NSA
for a "drug" watch list. This list resulted in the dissemination of about
1,900 reports on drug traffickers to BNDDand CIA.
The CIA began to assist NSA's monitoring effort in late 1972, but
later determined that the program served a law enforcement function
and terminated its participation in February 1973.23 NSA was affected
by the CIA decision, as it had come to view this program as possibly
serving a law enforcement function and thus beyond the scope of its
proper mission. NSA terminated this activity in June 1973, but continued
to monitor some of the same United States-South American
links for foreign intelligence purposes until July 1975.
4. "Incidental" Intercepts of Americans' Oommunications
Although NSA does not now target communications of American
citizens, groups, or organizations for interception by placing their
names on watch lists, other selection criteria are used which result
in NSA's reviewing many communications to, from, or about an American.
The initial interception of a stream of communications is analogous
to a vacuum cleaner: NSA picks up all communications carried
over a specific link that it is monitoring. The combination of this
technology and the use of words to select communications of interest
results in NSA analysts reviewing the international messages of American
citizens, groups, and organizations for foreign intelligence.
The interception and subsequent processing of communications are
conducted in a manner that minimizes the number of unwanted mes-
.. According to the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, calls
from American cities to South America are routinely switched through New
York.
.. CIA's participation in this activity violated provisions of its charter, the
National Security Act of 1947, which prohibit the Agency from exercising law
enforcement powers. NSA does not have a charter prohibiting such activity, but
recognizes that it has no law enforcement function.
742
sages. Only after an analyst determines that the content of a message
meets a legitimate requirement will it be disseminated to the interested
intelligence agencies. In practically all cases, the name of an
American citizen, group, or organization is deleted by NSA before
a message is disseminated.
Internal NSA guidelines ensure that the decision to disseminate an
intercepted communication is now made on the basis of the importance
of the foreign intelligence it contains, not because a United
States citizen, group, or organization is involved. This procedure is,
of course, subject to change by internal NSA directives.
In short, NSA's pUrsUIt of international communications does result
in the incidental interception and dissemination of communications
which the American sender or receiver expected to be kept private.
This issue of the latitude NSA should be given in disseminating
incidental intercepts must be dealt with if we are to resolve the dilemma
between the need for effective foreign intelligence and the need
to protect the rights of American citizens.24
O. /strUes and Questions
Pursuant to its mandate, the Committee has studied whether NSA's
jurisdiction and operations should be governed and controlled by a
legislative charter. The facts discovered by the Committee with respect
to NSA's programs and ca{>abilities suggest that the following questions
should be posed for legxslative resohltion:
1. Should NSA, which like the CIA has vast powers intended
for "foreign" purposes, be barred from using those
powers domestically'?
2. Should NSA, hke the CIA, be prohibited from exercising
"law enforcement powers" or "internal security functions'''~
3. Should NSA be permitted specifically to target the international
communications of Americans? If so, for what purposes
and should a warrant be required?
4. Should NSA be permitted to disseminate information derived
from the "incidental" interception of Americans' mes-
.. The establishment of guidelines relating directly to this issue poses an ongoing
problem. Some may argue that NSA's current policy to disguise the identity
of an American corporation in a communication is misguided. It could be
held that, in the case of companies, their right to privacy does not extend as far
as with individual citizens. For example, if an intercepted communication indicates
that an American company executive is negotiating with a foreign government
for the sale of large quantities of a crucial material, should the Federal
Government be entitled to know the identity of the company? If NSA discovered
that an American firm is exporting material to a foreign country that is prohibited
by law, should the Government be allowed to know the name of that
company? Or, does NSA violate the Fourth Amendment rights which protect
Americans from unreasonable searches and seizures by disseminating such messages
without deleting the names? Should special procedures be instituted-such
as approval of the Attorney General or acquisition of a warrant-before messages
containing U..S. names can be disseminated?
A discussion of these issues of interception and dissemination occurred in an
open session of the Committee between Attorney General Edward H. Levi and
Professor Philip B. Heymann. Levi supported the dissemination by NSA of incidentally
intercepted foreign intelligence information involving Americans without
a warrant; Heymann maintained that dissemination should require a warrant.
See Edward H. Levi and Philip B. Heymann testimonies, 11/6/75, Hearings,
Vol. 5. pp. 6&-143.
743
sages obtained by monitoring an international communications
link for foreign intelligence purposes? If so, to whom,
for what use, and under what controls?
II. NSA'S MONITORING OF IN'J.1ERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
A. Summary of the Watcn List Activity
Lists of words and phrases, including the names of individuals and
groups, have long been used by the National Security Agency to select
information of intelligence value from intercepted communications.
These lists are referred to as "watch lists" by NSA and the agencies
requesting intelligence information from them, such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs, Secret Service, and Department of Defense.
The great majority of names on watch lists have always been
foreign citizens and organizations.
The Committee examined two types of watch lists which included
Americans. One focused on domestic civil disturbances, the other on
drug trafficking. Messages selected on the basis of these watch lists
were analyzed and forwarded to other Federal agencies, including the
FBI, CIA, BNDD, and DOD. The Secret Service also received information
from NSA regarding potential threats to persons under its
protection.
Between 1967 and 1973, NSA received watch lists from these agencies
which included the names of Americans as well as foreign citizens
and organizations. These lists were used to select messages from
intercepted traffic and to discover whether there was foreign mfluence
on, or support of, domestic antiwar and civil rights activities. From
1970 until 1973, similar lists were used to gather intelligence on international
drug traffic.
NSA itself added names to the watch lists to enhance the selection
criteria used to support the requirements levied by other agencies.25
NSA's Office of Security also added names to the lists for counterintelligence
and counterespionage purposes.26
Between 1969 and 1973, NSA disseminated approximately 2,000 reports
(e.g., the text or summaries of intercepted messages) to the various
requesting agencies as a result of the inclusion of American names
on the watch lists.27 No evidence was found, however, of any significant
foreign support or control of domstic dissidents.
.. General Lew Allen, Jr. said this process "was a martter of adding aliases . . .
of adding addresses in some cases where an organization had been specified, and
it would assist picking up messages of that organization, the names of officials
of the organizations [were thus] added to enhance the selection process." Allen,
10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 27.
Another NSA official later advised the Committee that names were added by
NSA in its amplification of watch lists and that this "was usually done either by
adding the name of an executive officer of an organization, or by adding the organization
name associated wirth a person who was placed on the watch list by
another agency." (Letter from NSA to Senate Select Committee, 11/6/75.)
.. NSA response to Senate Select Committee interrogatories, 8/22/75, pp. 3-6.
(Cited hereinafter as XSA Response, 8/22/75.) See pp. 781-782.
27 The material collected between 1007 and the fall of 1969 was destroyed by
NSA which only retains documents less than five years old. The approximately
2,000 reports are only for the post-1969 period.
744
Information generated by the watch list activity was the product of
collection conducted against channels of international communications
("links") with at least one terminal in a foreign country. Neverthe~
less, the messages NSA intercepted and disseminated were sometimes
between two American citizens, one in the United States and one
abroad. With one exception, NSA intercepted messages only from
"l~~" it was already monitoring as part of its foreign intelligence
mISSIon.
This exception occurred in 1970, when the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs asked NSA to provide intelligence on international
drug trafficking. NSA began to monitor certain international communications
links between the United States and South America to
acquire intelligence on drugs entering the United States. The BNDD
also supplied NSA with the names of Americans suspected of drug
trafficking for inclusion on a wat{lh list. Reports on drug-related activities
of American citizens were disseminated to both the BNDD and
CIA.
Both the drug and "nondrug" watch lists of United States citizens
were discontinued in 1973 as a result of questions concerning their legality
and propriety, raised by the Justice Department and by NSA
itself.
B. History
1. Early Period: 1960-1967
The exact details of the origin of the watch list activity are unclear.
Testimony from NSA employees indicates that the early 19608 marked
the beginnin~of watch lists and the inclusion of names of American
citizens. Accordin~ to a senior NSA official, ''the term watch list had
to do with a list of names of people, places or events that a customer
would ask us to have our analysts keep in mind as they scan large
volumes of material." 28
Originally these lists were used for two purposes: (1) monitorin~
travel to Cuba and other communist countries; and (2) protectin~ the
President and other high Government officials. According to NSA,
neither of these tasks involved a regular .program for including
American names on the lists: requests from other agencip.s were
infrequent and generally ad hoc.29 Prior to 1962, NSA did not have an
office specifically in charge of interagency dealings, which also limited
the number of requests for information from other agencies.
In the parly 1960s requesting agencies, usuallv the FBI, submitted
names of United States citizens and business firms having dealings
with Cuba to NSA. In turn, NSA provided the FBI with intelli~nce
on American commercial and personal communications with Cuba.
A May 18, 1962, internal FBI memorandum from Raymond Wannall,
Chief of the Nationalities Intellig-ence Section of the Domestic Intelli~
ence Division. to Assistant Director William Sullivan reported'
on a meeting with NSA officials concernin~ Cuba. The purpose of the
meeting was to devise a way for the FBI to make better use of NSA
intercepts relating to "commercial and personal communications be-
.. Senior NSA official No.1 testimony, 9/16/75, p. 47.
"Ibid., pp.47-49; senior NSA official NO.2 testimony, 9/18/75, p. 13.
745
tween persons in Cuba and in the United States." 30 The memorandum
stated:
of the raw traffic now available, the material which would be
most helpful to us would consist of periodic listing of firms in
the U.S. which are doing business with individuals in Cuba
and the Cuban government.... \Vith regard to personal messages,
we feel that those relating to individuals travelling between
Cuba and the U.S. would be the most significant....
We will furni8h NSA a li8t of persons in WMm we have an
irvvestigative or an intelligence interest. [~mphasis added.pI
The second area of concern in the early 1960s was protection of the
President. According to NSA, the Secret Service submitted the names
of the Presidents and others under its protection, possibly as early as
1962.32 This activity, however, was not instituted for the purpose of
acquiring the communications of the protectees, but to determine possible
threats to their well-being. After President Kennedy was assassinated
in November 1963, interest in presidential protection naturally
intensified, and NSA's joint efforts with the Secret Service were expanded.
This early activity was not directed against American citizens; no
intelligence program called for the systematic inclusion of American
citizens on a watch list. The evidence indicates, however, that NSA
did intentionally monitor certain international activities of some
American citizens as early as 1962. These objectives, which began as
legitimate concerns for the life of the President, expanded when the
watch list activity intensified in 1967.
f3. Systematic Inclusion of American Names: 1967
The major watch list effort against American citizens began in the
fall of 1967. In response to pressures from the White House, FBI,
and Attorney General, the Department of the Army established a civil
disturbance unit. An area of special interest was possible foreign involvement
in American civil rights and antiwar gToups. General William
Yarborough, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(ACSI), directed the operations of this unit.33
III Memorandum from Raymond Wannall to William Sullivan, 5/18/62.
at Ibid.
Wannall testifif'd that names were. in fllct, sent to NSA by the FBI in the early
19608. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/3/75, p. 18.
32~SA Response 8/22/75, p. 12.
.. William Yarborough testimony, 9/10/75, p. 8.
"Que8tion: Did you ever have the feeling that these instructions were coming
from the President or somebody else in the White House?
"General YARBOROUGH: There was a lot of evidence to indicate that the
President was deeply interested, as were the Attorney General and the Director
of the FBI. There was a great deal of public interest. In other words, the interest
was not just within the military at all.
"Que8tion: But you don't have any evidence or knowledge of a direct order
from the President to the Secretary of Defense with regard to setting up a civil
disturbance unit within the Department of the Army?
"General YARBOROUGH: I would not have a way to know about that direct
relationship unless I found it out by chance. I did not know.
A complete examination of the U.S. military's participation in collecting intelligence
on domestic dissidents is contained in the Committee's Report: "Improper
Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military."
746
On October 20, 1967, Yarborough sent a message to the Director
of NSA, General Marshall Carter, requesting that NSA provide any
available information concerning possible foreign influence on civil
disturbances in the United States. Yarborough specifically asked
for "any information on a continuing basis" concerning:
A. Indications that foreign governments or individuals or
organizations acting as agents of foreign governments are
controlling or attempting to control or influence the activities
of U.S. "peace" groups and "Black Power" organizations.
B. Identities of foreign agencies exerting control or influence
on U.S. organizations.
C. Identities of individuals and organizations in U.S. in
contact with agents of foreign governments.
D. Instructions or advice being given to U.S. groups by
agents of foreign governments.34
A senior NSA official knowledgeable in this area testified that such
a request for information on civil disturbances or political activities
was "unprecedented. . . . It is kind of a landmark in my memory;
it stands out as a first." 35 The initial request was also vague; it did
not discuss the targeting of American citizens, or what specific organizations
or groups were of interest. The Army was "interested in determining
whether or not there is evidence of any foreign action to develop
or control these anti-Vietnam and other domestic demonstrations."
36
The following day, Carter sent a cable to Yarborough, Director of
Central Intelligence Richard Helms, and each member of the United
States Intelligence Board, informing them that NSA was "concentrating
additional and continuing effort to obtain SIGINT" in support
of the Army request.31 Although USIB members were notified of
this new requirement, there is no rerord of disclission at USIB meetings
of the watch list, nor did USIB ever validate a requirement for
monitoring in support of the civil disturbance unit.38
'Vatch list names were submitted directlv to NSA bv the
FBI, Secret Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, the mIlitary
services, and the CIA. These same agencies received reports of intercepted
communications pertaining to their areas of interest. The State
Department also received some reports on international terrorism and
drug activities, but it is unclear whether they submitted any American
names.39
Between 1967 ancl1973, a cumulative total of about 1.200 American
names anpeared on the civil disturbance watch list. The FBI submitted
the largest proportion, approximately 950. The Secret Serv-
•• Cahle from Yarborough to Carter, 10/20/67. Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No.1,
pp. 145-146.
.. Senior official No. I, 9/16/75, pp. 57. 54.
36 ('ahle from Yarborough to Carter, 10/20/67; Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No.1,
pp. 145-146.
lIT ('ahie from Carter to Yarborough, 10/21/67, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No.2,
pp. 147-148.
.. Allen, 10/29/75. Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 28.
.. Senior NSA official No.1, 9/16/75, p. 76.
747
ice's list included about 180 American individuals and groups active
in civil rights and antiwar activities. The DIA submitted the names
of 20 American citizens ,vho tra,-c]cd to Xorth Vietnam, and the CIA
submitted approximately 30 names of alleged American radicals. The
Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the Naval Investigative
Service, and the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence all
submitted a small number of names to NSA. In addition, NSA contributed
about 50-75 names to support the watch list activity.
At its height in early 1973, there were 600 American names and
6,000 foreign names on the watch lists.40 According to NSA, these
lists produced about 2,000 reports that were disseminated to
other agencies between 1967 and 1973. NSA estimates 10 percent of
these reports were derived from communications between two American
citizens.41
3. Increa8ing Se1cwity and Concealment of Program.'j Involving
A l1u!7ican Citizens
The watch list activity was always a highly sensitive, compartmented
operationY The secrecy was not due to the nature of the communications
intercepted (most were personal and innocuous) but to
the fact that American citizens were involved. NSA requested that
some of the agencies receiving watch list product either destroy the
material or return it within two weeks.43 This procedure was not followed
with even the most sensitive of NSA's legitimate foreign intelligence
product.
When NSA intercepts, analyzes, and disseminates a foreign com·
munication, the regular procedure is for the communication to be
classified, given a serial number, and filed. From 1967-1969, much of
the watch list material was treated in this manner, and given the same
classification as the most sensitive NSA intercepts. As a senior NSA
official testified:
During the 1967-1969 period, communications that had a
U.S. CItizen on one end and a foreigner on the other were
given [a high level security classification] ... and went out
as serialized product, through a limited by name only distribution.
44
Other material was even more highly classified. Whenever communications
between two Americans ,vere intercepted, they were classified
Top Secret, prepared with no mention of NSA as the source, and
disseminated "For Background Use Only." 45 No serial number was
assigned to them, and they were not filed with regular communications
.. Allen,10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p.12.
1.1 Ibid.
'" In an effort to prevent disclosure of the program, NSA "compartmented" the
actiVity by restricting the number of officials within the agencies Who had access
to the material. General Allen stated: "in my judgment the controls which were
placed on the handling of the intelligence were so restrictive that the
value was significantly diminished." Allen, 10/29/75, Heurings, Vol. 5, p. 13.
4' Staff summaries of Michael Mastrovito (Secret Service) interview,10/17/75;
and 'Of Philip Smith and Gerald Strickler (Drug Enforcement Administration)
interviews, 10/7/75.
.. Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, pp. 39-40.
65 Ibid., p. .w.
69-984 0 - 76 - 48
748
intelligence intercepts. This effectively limited access to the material
and prevented its use in any official study or report. As Benson Buffham,
Deputy Director of NSA, testified:
first it is true that we maintain permanent type records of
all of our product. However, it is my understanding that this
material was dealt with separately. It was not serialized and
put out in regular distribution lists. These items were produced
as display items, show-to items and thus the normal
procedures that would be followed for our serialized product
were not followed. So as best as I know, there would not be
any record of this material held in other places within the
Agency in the permanent files. 46
The project's sensitivity was due to a number of factors. The requirements-
protection of the President, terrorism, civil disturbances,
drug activities-involved sensitive subjects. NSA also wanted to ensure
protection of the SIGINT source and of other intercept operations,
which could be ieopardized by unauthorized release of the
watch list materialY Finally, American citizens, firms, and groups
were involved, and this was "different from the normal mission of
the National Security Agency." 48
The faet that NSA did not serialize and file the intercepted communications
between Americans indicates they did not view this activity
as part of their "nonnal" mission. Buffham stated that he believed
the interception and dissemination of communications betwoon
American citizens to be outside NSA's mission, as defined in applicable
executive directives.49
4. Project MINARET: Further Ewpamion and Increa8ed
Secrecy
The civil disturbance watch list program became even more compartmented
in July 1969, when NSA issued a charter to establish
Project MINARET.
MINARET established more stringent controls over the information
collected on American citizens and groups involved in civil
disturbances. To enhance security, MINARET effectively classified
all of this information as Top Secret, "For Background Use Only," and
stipulated that the material was not to be serialized or identified with
the National Security Agency. Prior to 1969, only communications between
two Amencam were classified in this manner; with the adoption
of MINARET, communications to, from, or mentioning United
States citizens were so classified.
The MINARET charter established tighter security procedures
for intercepted messages which contained:
a. information on foreign governments, organizations, or
individuals who are attempting to influence, coordinate or
control U.S. organizations or individuals who may foment
civil disturbance or otherwiRe undermine the national security
of the U.S. ;
.. Benson Buffham testimony, 9/12/75, p. 34.
.. Senior NSA official No.1, 9/16/75, p. 69.
U Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, p. 38.
.. Bu1fham, 9/12/75, p. 73.
749
b. information on U.S. organizations or individuals who
are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances
or otherwise subvert the national security of the U.S. An
e([lViay important (J)Jpect of MINABET will be to restmt the
knowledge that such infor11U1tion is being collected and processed
by the National Security Agerwy. [Emphasis added.] 50
This charter was prepared within NSA and issued by an
NSA Assistant Director. According to testimony given the Committee,
the charter was discussed with NSA Deputy Director Louis Tordella
and probably with the Director, but other agencies involved
in the watch list activity were not informed of the new procedures
until the charter had been adopted.51
In addition to regulating the distribution and format of watch
list product, MINARET also initiated a more formal procedure for
submission of names. No longer were names accepted over the telephone
or by word of mouth.52 According to NSA, the watch list "was
handled less systematically prior to 1969 ... some watch lists entered
NSA during that time via direct channels, including secure ,telephone."
53 NSA maintains, however, that the regular procedure was
for agencies submitting names by secure telephone or in person to
eonfirm them with written requests. A senior NSA official testified:
"From 1969 on [the watch list] was handled in a very careful, reviewed
and systematic way." 54
The MINARET charter was an effort both to restrict knowledge
of the watch list program and to disguise NSA's participation in ~t.
NSA maintains that its concern for the security of SIGINT sources,
i.e., NSA's intercept operations, was the primary reason for initiating
these measures.55 NSA further maintains that it was concerned
with the privacy of U.S. communications and, by imposing the MINARET
restrictions, sought to ensure that dissemination was made
exclusively to those outside NSA who had a legitimate need for
the infonnation. It is apparent that the MINARET restrictions
also prot~ted NSA's role from exposure. Dissemination of
foreign communications to domestic agencies was obviously a sensitive
matter. It involved considerable risk of exposure which would increase
if the number of people within the intelligence community who were
aware of the activity grew. Therefore, NSA placed more restrictive
security controls on MINARET material than it placed on other highly
classified foreign intercepts in order to conceal its involvement in
activities which were beyond its regular mission.
O. Types of Na:mes on Walch Lists
The names of Americans submitted to NSA for the watch lists
ranged from members of radical political groups, to celebrities, to
"'MINARET Charter, 7/1/69. Healing-s. VoL ii, Exhihit No.!J, pp. 149-150.
51 Bu1!ham, 9/12/75, pp. 50, 49; senior NSA official No.1, 9/16/75, p. 68.
53 Senior NSA official No. 9/16/75, p. 78.
53 NRA Response, 8/22/7;'). p. 12.
In this written response, NSA confirmed reports the Committee had received
from other agencies that prior to 1969 watch list requests were occasionallY
communicated to NSA by telephone or in person. See Mastrovito (staff summary),
10/17/75; Wannall, 10/3/75, p. 32; Smith and Strickler (staff summary),
10/7/75.
50 Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, p. 19.
IS Senior NSA official No.1, 9/16/75, p. 69.
750
ordinary citizens involved in protests against their Government.
Names of organizations were also included; some were communistfront
groups, others were nonviolent and peaceful in nature.
The use of names, particularly those of groups and organizations, to
select international communications results in NSA unnecessarily re\'
ie\Ying many messages. There is a multiplier effect: if an
organization is targeted. all its member's communications may be
intercepted; if an individual is on the watch list, all communications
to, from, or mentioning that individual may be intercepted. These communications
may also contain the names of other "innocent" parties.
For example, a communication mentioning the wife of a U.S. Senator
was intercepted 'by NSA, as were communications discussing a peace
concert, a correspondent's report from Southeast Asia to his magazine
in New York, and a pro-Vietnam war activist's invitations to speakers
for a rally. According to testimony before the Committee, the material
that resulted from the watch lists was not very valuable; most communications
were of a private and personal nature, or involved rallies
and demonstrations that were public knowledge.56
D. 01'erlapping Nature of I1ltelligen<Je Community Requests
As noted above, the primary purpose of the watch Ih,ts on Americans
from 1967-1973 was to collect intelligence on civil disturbances. NSA
also responded to a requirement from BNDD to monitor for illegal
drug trafficking from 1970-1973. In addition, NSA supplipd information
to Federal agencies (FBI, CIA, Secret Service, and Department
of Defense) on possible terrorist activity, and disseminated reports to
the Secret Service which related to the protection of the President. The
demarcations between these categories, however. was not always clear.
Secret Service officials, for example, have told the Committee that
presidential and executive protection includes "providing a secure
environment" for the White House for foreign embassies within the
United States and in areas where high Government officials travel.
According to the Secret Service, this requires "information regarding
civil disturbances and anti-American or anti-U.S. Government demonstrations
in the U.S. or overseas, as these demonstrations may affect
the Secret Service's mis:o":ion of protecting U.S. and foreig-n officials." 51
After the October 20, 1987, Yarborough cable, the Secret Service began
submitting names of individuals and organizations active in the antiwar
and civil rights movements to NSA. Although these individuals
and groups were not considered a direct threat to protectees, it was
believed they might participate in demonstrations against United
States policy which would endanger the physical well-being of Government
officials.58 Intercepted communications to, from, or mentioning
these individuals and groups were always disseminated by NSA to
the Spcret SPrvice and the CIA, and often to the FBI.
/iIJ WannalI, 10/3/75, p. 13. He stated: "the feeling is that there was very little
in the way of good product as a result of our having supplied names to NSA."
General Allen, however, told the Committee in public session: "we are aware
that a major terrorist Rl't in the U.S. was prevented. In addition, some lar/i:e drug
shipments wl're prevented from enteriu2' thl' n.s. he<>ause of oU1~ efforts on international
narcotics trafficking." Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 12-13.
'1 NSA response, 8/22/75.
" Secret Service response to Senate Select Committee. 10/12/75.
751
There was considerable overlap among various agencies in submissions
for watch list coverage and requests for material. For example,
the CIA was interested in :
The activities of u.s. individuals involved in either civil
disorders, radical student or youth activities, racial militant
activities, radical antiwar activities, draft evasion/deserter
support activities, or in radical related media activities, where
such individuals have some foreign connection by virtue of:
foreign residence, foreign travel, attendance at international
conferences or meetings andjor involvement or contact with
foreign governments, organizations, political parties or individuals;
or with Communist front organizations. [Emphasis
added.] 59
The FBI was interested in similar kinds of information, as illustrated
by excerpts of two memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Director,
NSA:
This is to advise you that this Bureau has a continuing
interest in receiving mtelligence information obtained under
MINARET regarding the targets previously furnished
you. . . . Information derived from this coverage has been
helpful in determining the extent of international cooperation
among New Leftists and has been used. for lead
purposes.60
The purpose of this communication is to advise of general
areas of interest to this Bureau in connection with racial
extremist matters and to request your assistance in such
matters.
There are both white and black racial eietremists in the
United States advocating and participating in illegal and
violent activities for the purpose of destroying our present
form of government. Because of this goal, such racial eietremists
are natural allies of foreign enemies of the United States.
Both material and propaganda support is being given to
United States racial extremists by foreign elements. The
Bureau is most interested in all information showing ties between
United States radal extremists and such foreign
elements. [Emphasis added.] 61
These requests reflect an underlying similarity of interests among
agencies, despite the differing needs which are expressed in their requirements.
To some extent the DIA, FBI, CIA, and the Secret
Service received information on Black activists and groups, and on
the antiwar movement. All were concerned with how civil disturbances
and antiwar demonstration were affecting the internal
security of the United States. Although their general area of concern
was the same, each agency used the information for its own particular
purposes. The DIA was interested in travel to North Vietnam;
the CIA kept files on alleged antiwar radicals for its Project CHAOS;
51 NSA Response, 8/22/75, p. 17.
60 Memorandum from J. Erlgar Hoover to Director, ~SA 6/3/70.
01 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Director, NSA, 11/6/70.
752
the FBI used the information to develop "leads" on new left activists,
at the same time it was conducting COINTELPRO efforts against
alleged radicals; 62 and the Secret Service was concerned with protecting
the President. Despite slight variations in focus, the different
agencies' requests reflected the overriding fear that the nation was
being undermined internally and externally. It was this perception
which produced the watch list program directed against Americans.
E. Drug lVatch Lists: United States-South Amel'ican Intercepts
1. Initial Monitoring: 1970
An unofficial requirement to collect and disseminate international
communications concerning drug trafficking was levied on NSA by
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs on April 10, 1970.
BNDD Director John Ingersoll sent a memorandum to NSA Director
Noel Gayler requesting "any and all COMINT information which reflects
illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs.~' NSA initiated
its monitoring in .June 1970, but a general requirement to obtain
foreign intelligence on drug trafficking was not validated by the
United Stat€s Intelligence Board until August H171.
The Ingersoll memorandum specified that BNDD was interested in
individuals and organizations involved in illegal drug activities, information
on production centers, and all violations of United States
laws pertaining to narcotics and dangerous drugs. In order to assist
NSA in fulfilling the requirement, BNDD stated that they would provide
NSA lists of individuals and organizations which had a history of
involvement with illegal drug activities. According to the Ingersoll
memorandum, "this watch list will be updated on a monthly basis and
andaddi-tions/deletions will be forwarded to NSA." 63
NSA implemented this request by monitoring international communications
traffic. The first intercepts began in June 1970:64 Telephone
traffic carried on circuits between the United States and certain
South American cities was first monitored in September 1970. Unlike
other watch list monitoring, the United States-South American effort
required NSA to devote additional resources to intercepting communications
over this specifically targeted link.65
This link included the telephone circuits between New York City
and a South American city. BNDD was initially concerned about drug
deals that were being arranged in calls from public telephone booths
.. For a detailed discussion of the Bureau's program against the New Left,
see the Committee's report on COINTELPRO.
.. Memorandum from John Ingersoll to Noel Gaylor, 4/10/70, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibit No.4, pp. 158, 154.
•• XSA was coyprin~ links for international traffic prior to and during
the drug watch list activity. However, the monitoring of certain United StatesSouth
American circuits for telephone traffic was initiated in September solely
to coyer drug traffickers. Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, pp. 107, 108.
Although NSA collected intelligence from communications intercepted in other
areas of the world to support the drug watch list, the Committee's investigation
centered on the United States-South American monitoring due to the specific
tar~eting of American citizens.
.. Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, p. 99.
753
in New York City to South America. According to a senior NSA
official:
BNDD had some information that led them to believe that
arrangements were being made by telephone from New York
City, a Grand Central Station telephone booth, to some individuals
in [a South American city] .66
BNDD felt that it could not legally tap the public telephones and
thus enlisted NSA's help to cover the international link that carried
these telephone calls. At BNDD's request, NSA began to intercept
telephone conversations carried over this link in September 1970.
Additional United States-South American links were soon added.
BNDD also supplied NSA with code names for drugs and names of
individuals, including American citizens.
The telephone monitoring was conducted from one NSA site until
December 1970, when that intercept station was closed. An NSA East
Coast facility, operated by the military, began monitoring United
States-South American links in March 1971. According to NSA, 19
united States-South American links were monitored for voice traffic
at the two sites between 1970 and 1973.67 Six South American cities
were of primary interest, in addition to New York and Miami.68
During this period, BNDD submitted 450 American names to NSA
for inclusion on the drug watch list. At the high point, in early 1973,
250 Americans were on the active list.
Of the calls intercepted at the East Coast site, le$ than 10 percent
were sent to NSA headquarters, and less than 10 percent of these were
disseminated.69 Yet it is clear that many personal and business calls
of Americans were reviewed during this operation. This results from
the lack of an effective method for avoiding the incidental interception
of calls involving American citizens when a link with one terminal in
the United States in monitored.
93. OIA/NSA Drug Activity
In October 1972, NSA requested CIA assistance in monitoring
United States-South American communication links to collect intelligence
on illicit drug traffic. According to Buffham, NSA made this
request
because we fe.Jt that this was a sensitive matter, and that
greater security would be achieved bll 1ttilizing the ca:reer
intercept operator·s of the OIA to perform the activity, and,
"'Ibid.
... Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, p. 106.
mAccording to ITT, many of these cities are transit points-ealls are routed
throu~h thpm to othpr citieR. For example, by monitoring one New York-South
American city link, NSA could pick up calls originating in other South American
cities to other cities in the United States. The call would simply be routed
through New York and the South American city. Senior NSA official No.2,
9/18/75, pp. 108-109.
:.\Iost telephone calls from the United States to South America are, in fact,
rontert throu~h Xew York City.
• Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, p. 113; senior NSA official No.1, 9/16/75,
p. 33.
754
in addition, they could be more selective in providing items
because we would be able to give the CIA operators the
specific names on the watch list, and we did not feel that we
could or should provide those names to the [East Coast military
station]. [Emphasis added.] 70
NSA's concern about the security of American names being provided
to the East Coast station stemmed from the fact that the operators
were young military personnel on short tours of duty. They were not
professional intelligence officers, and NSA felt that monitoring American
citizens was too sensitive a task for them. The use of CIA career
operators satisfied NSA that targeting of American citizens would
not be disclosed.
The Rockefeller Commission also investigated this activity, but
found no evidence that the CIA directly targeted American citizens.
The Rockefeller Commission report stated :
For a period of approximately six months, commencing
in the fall of 1973 [sw], the Directorate monitored telephone
conversations between the United States and Latin America
in an effort to identify foreiJ{Il drug traffickers. . ..
A CIA intercept crew stationed at an East Coast site monitored
calls to and from certain Latin American telephone
numbers contained on a "watch list" provided by NSA.
While the intercept was focused on foreign nationals, it is
clear that American citizens were parties to many of the
monitored calls. . . .
The Commission's in'oestigation disclosed that, from the
outset of the Agency's involvement in the narcotics control
program, the Director and other 01A officials instructed invol'oed
personnel to collect only foreign intelligence and to
make no attempt-either within the United States 01' abroadto
gather information on American citizens allegedly trafficking
in narcotics. [Emphasis added.] 71
The evidence examined by the Select Committee directly contradicts
this finding. An internal CIA memorandum of November 17, 1972,
to the Director of Commlmications from the Chief. Special Programs
Division, reveals that the CIA was receiving the names of U.S.
citizens.
NSA had tasked [the East Coast site] with this requirement
[to monitor for drug traffic] but were unwilling to provide
the site with the specific names and U.S. telephone
numbers of interest on security/sensitivity grounds . . . to
get around the problems mentioned above NSA requested
the Agency undertake intercept of the long lines circuits
of interest. They have provided us with all information
available (including the "sensitive") and the [OIA] facility
is 100rking on the requirement. [Emphasis added.] 72
,. Btrlfham, 9/12/75, p. 20.
11 Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the
United States (Rockefeller Commission Report), June 1975, PII. 222-223.
.. Memorandum from Chief, Special Programs Divisions (CIA) to the Director
of Communications, 11/17/72.
755
This memorandum and subsequent testimony by NSA officials revealed
that the CIA was monitoring these circuits to intercept the
calls of American citizens suspected of illegal drug trafficking. During
this period, NSA continued to monitor the same circuits at its East
Coast site, but that site did not have the specific BNDD "sensitive"
watch lists of American names which were supplied to the CIA. Thus,
the conclusion reached by the Rockefeller Commission-that CIA
intercepts were not undertaken for the purpose of gathering intelligence
on American citizens-is not supported by the evidence.
3. Termination 01 Drug Activity
Three months after the CIA monitoring was initiated, CIA General
Counsel Lawrence Houston issued an opinion which stated
that the intercepts may violate Section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934.13 This law, as amended in 1968, prohibits the unauthorized
disclosure of any private communication of an American citizen
to another party, uniess undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional
authority to collect foreign intelligence which is crucial
to the security of the United States.74 Since intercepted messages
were provided to BNDD, Houston concluded that the activity was
for law enforcement purposes, which is also outside the CIA's charter.
As a result of this memorandum, the CIA suspended its collection.
NSA, which has no charter, continued to monitor these links for drug
information.
NSA officials have testified that they were told in early 1973 that
the CIA was terminating collection because it was concerned about
operating an intercept station within the United States. This concern
is completely different from the one expressed in Houston's memorandum.
NSA officials have told the Committee that questions concerning
the legality of the activity were either not mentioned by
the CIA,75 or else mentioned secondarily.76
NSA Deputy Director Buffham testified that after the CIA decided
to stop the United States-South American drug monitoring, NSA
began to review the legality and appropriateness of its efforts in support
of BNDD. Although NSA is not prohibited by statute or executive
directive from disseminating information that may pertain to
law enforcement, it has always viewed its sole mission as the collection
and dissemination of foreign intelligence. A senior NSA official testiva
Memorandum from Houston to Acting Chief, Division D, 1/29/73.
"18 U.S.C. 2511 (Omnibus Act, 1968) states: "nothing contained in ... Section
605 ... shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the nation against actual or potential
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence
information deemed essential to the security of the United States...."
However, the Keith case (407 U.S. 297 (1972» held that the Omnibus Act
was simply a congressional recognition of the President's constitutional powers
to protect the nation's security and did not grant the Executive additional
powers. The Act did not further define the 1934 statute or provide the Executive
with any additional authority to conduct foreign intelligence.
.. Senior NSA ofticial No.2, 9/18/75, p. 117.
.. Buffham, 9/12/75, PP. 23. 71.
See also former NSA Deputy Director Louis Tordella's testimony of 9/21/75, p.
77: "It was in their General Counsel's opinion beyond CIA's charter to monitor
radio communication~ on e.s. soil and I was told that if they could move a
group of Cubans up to Canada it would be quite all right, but they would not
do it in the United States."
756
fied: "We do not understand our mission to be one of supporting an
agency with a law enforcement responsibility." 11
Although BNDD clearly was a law enforcement agency, NSA initially
held that the intelligence it was supplying BNDD was a part
of a legitimate USIB-approved effort to prevent drugs from entering
the United States.18 This international aspect of the requirement was
interpreted by NSA as sufficient justification for classifying the activity
as part of its "foreign intelligence" mission.
After discussions with the General Counsel's office at NSA and
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of NSA
terminated the activity in June 1973,19 All of NSA's drug materialsproduct,
internal memoranda, and administrative documents--were
destroyed in late August or early September 1973. Ordinarily, NSA
keeps matedal for five years or more. According to a senior NSA
official: "it wasn't thought we would get back into the narcotics
effort anytime soon. There didn't seem to be any point in keeping
them." 80
4. Oontinuation of NSA'8 United State8-South American
Monitoring
In June 1975 the Committee received information that NSA continued
to monitor United States-South American telephone calls
after the June 1973 terminatjon of the drug watch list activity. NSA
officials confirmed that the same links targeted for the purpose of
curbing illegal drug traffic were monitored by NSA for foreign intelligence
after June 1973. Certain of these links were monitored until
July 9,1975.81
According to NSA, this activity was terminated when. "it did not
prove productive." 82 While this effort was underway, NSA states that
i.t did not collect or disseminate any information on narcotics traffic
from the United States-South American links. A Eenior NSA official
stated: "Nothing ever came. No by-product. The problem was dead." 83
5. Ourrent Internal Policy Ooncerning Telephone Monitoring
No statute or executive directive prohibits NSA's monitoring a telephone
circuit with one terminal in the United States.84 An internal
NSA instruction was issued on August 7, 1975, that requires the personal
approval of the chief of a major element within the Agency
before monitoring of voice communications with a terminal in the
United States is initiated. According to Deputy Director Buffham,
"It is obvious that no such collection will be undertaken unless it is
extremely important and is properly reviewed within the Agency." Il5
F. Termination of the Oivil Duturbance Watch Lut Activity
The watch list activity involving civil disturbances was officially
terminated in the fall of 1973. This was due to a combination of fac-
.,., Senior NSA official No.1, 9/16/75, p. 10.
'If Senior NSA official No.1, 9/16/75, p. 10; Banner, 9/15/75, pp. 49-50.
'If Anen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 14-15.
1IO Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, p. 91.
•, Ibid., p. 125.
.. Ibid,. Bul'fham. 9/12/75. p. 2fl.
.. Senior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, p. 126.
.. Ibid., pp. 127-128.
.. Butrham, 9/12/75, p. 30.
757
tors: growing concern within NSA regarding the program's vulnerability
and propriety; the fact that courtE were beginning to require
the Government to reveal electronic surveillance conducted against
particular cri 'uinal defendants; and the questions, raised by the drug
watch list aCllvity, about NSA's authority to engage in monitoring
for law enfort ;t,ment purposes. What follows is a description of events
leading to the termination of the watch lists.
The only Supreme Court case addressing the issue of electronic surveillance
puri'ortedly undertaken for national security purposes is
United States v. United States District Oourt, commonly referred to
as the Keith case.85a The Supreme Court's decision was handed down
on June 19, 1972, over a year before the watch list activity was
terminated.
The case involved warrantless wiretaps on three U.S. citizens who
were subsequently indicted for conspiracy to destroy Government
property. There was no evidence of foreign participation in the alleged
conspiracy.
After examining logs of the wiretaps in camera, t.he District Court
judge had held that the surveillance on the defend>ants was unlawful
and required oth8it the overheard conversations be disclosed.85b The Supreme
Court affirmed the District Court's ruling.
While recognizing the President's oons6tutional duty to "protect
our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by
unlawful means," 85e the Court held that the power inherent in such
a duty does not extend to the authorization of warrantless electronic
surveiUance deemed necessary to protect the nation from subversion by
domestw organizations. The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement for electronic surveillance developed in two
1967 cases 86 applied, and that the electronic surveillances employed
in the instant case were found to be unlawful. The Court did not
reach the issue of whether the Executive has the constitutional power
to authorize electronic surveillance without a warrant in cases involving
the act'ivities of foreign powers or agents.
Although the Keith ruling involved wiretaps and did not apply
specifically to NSA, it did have a bearing on NSA's activities. Operation
MINARET did entail warrantless electronic surve'illance against
certain domestic organizations. If there was no evidence to show that
these domestic organizations were acting in concert with 11 foreign
power, the Keith case would seem to oast doubts upon the legality of
intercepting their messages without a warrant.
The watch list activity was never disclosed in a court proceeding;
thus its legality has never been judicially determined. A 1973 criminal
case did result in the Government's disclosure that some of a defendant's
communications had been subject to a "foreign intelligence intercept."
Some of tile defendants in this 1973 case were members of 'a
group which had been included on an NSA watch list by the Secret
... 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
84·444 F. 2d 651 (1971).
84·407 U.S. at 310.
.. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
347 (1967). These two decisions deal with wiretaps, Mt with activities inVQlving
XSA. For further diSCUSSion, see the Committee's report on Warrantless
Electronic Surveillance.
758
Service land FBI in mid-1971, and NSA had distributed some of their
internationaJ communications to these agencies.87 The propriety of
these actions was never considered by the court" because the Government
moved to dismiss the case rather than reveal the specifics of the
watch list activity.
General Lew Allen, Jr. became the Director of NSA on August 15,
1973. In the course of familiarizing himself with his new responsibilities,
he was fully briefed on the watch list activity.
According to Allen, the BNDD watch list activity had been terminated
just prior to his arrival at NSA because the Agency feared ''that
it might not be possible to make a clear separation between requests for
information submitted by BNDD as it pertained to legitimate foreign
intelligence requirements and the law enforcement responsibility of
BNDD." He also stated that the activity in support of the FBI, CIA,
and Secret Service was suspended when NSA "stopped the distribution
of information in the summer [August] of 1973." 88 Deputy Director
Buft'hamtold the Committee this dissemination was terminated
due to three concerns: (1) NSA could not he certJain as to what
uses were being made of the information it was providing other
agencies; (2) it fearedthwt broad judicial disoovery procedures might
lead to the disclosure of sensitive intelligence sources and methods;
and (3) NSA wanted to be "absolutely certain that we are providing
infonnation only for lawful purposes and in accordance with our foreign
intelligence chavter." 89
During July and August 1973, meetings were held between NSA
and Justice Department representatives. According to NSA, these discussions
'influenced the Agency's decision to suspend the dissemination
of watch list materia1.90 As Buft'ham testified:
I believe although I am not positive, that Dr. Tordella, the
Deputy Direct.or, had discussions with people at Justice re~
arding the legality of our aotivities, and that these could
have influenced then the determination in NSA to cease the
activities in August, even though we had not yet received any
formal statements from Justice.91
Ata meeting on August 28, 1973, NSA officials informed Assistant
Attorney General Henry Petersen that communications involving
the defendants in the 1973 criminal case had been intercepted and that
NSA opposed "any disclosure of this technique and program." 92 PEtersen
apprised Attorney General Richardson of these events in a memorandum
of September 4, 1973. On September 7, 1973, Petersen sent
a memorandum to FBI Director Clarence Kelley, requesting to be
advised by September 10 of:
the extent of the FBI's practice of requesting information
intercepted by the NSA concerning domestic organizations
8: Mt'morandum from Henry Pl'tel'Sen to Elliot Richardson, 9/4/73, p. 6.
.. Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 15.
so Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 67.
DO Lew Allen..Jr., testimony, 9/15/75, p. 55.
01 Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 67'-
II Petersen to lUchardson memorandum, 9/4/73, p. 6.
759
or persons for intelligence, prosecutorial, or any other purposes
... ['and] any comments which you may desire to
make concerning the impact of the Keith case upon such interceptions.
. . .113
Kelley responded three days later that the FBI had requested
intelligence from NSA "concerning organizations and individuals who
are known to be involved in illegal and violent ·aotivities 'aimed at the
destruction and overthrow of the United States Government." 94 He
continued that the FBI did not view the materials Sllpplied it by
NSA, or the watch list activity in general, as inconsistent with the
Keith decision: the information "cannot possibly be used for any
prosecutive purpose" and "we do nO't consider the NSA information
as electronic surveillance information in the sense that was the heart
of the Keith decision." The FBI's position was that the information
supplied by NSA did not result from specific targeting of an individual's
communications in the same sense as a wiretJap; therefore, it
was not "electronic surveillance." Kelley maintained :
We do not believe that the NSA actually participated in any
electronic surveillance, per se of the defendants for any other
agency of the government, since under the procedures used by
that agency they are unaware of the ident~ty of any group or
individual which might be included in the recovery of national
security intelligence information.9s [Emphasis added.]
This position is difficult to defend since intelligence agencies, including
the FBI, submitted specific American names for watch lists which
resulted in the interception of Americans' international communications.
On September 17, Allen wrote FBI Director Kelley ·and the heads
of other agencies receiving information from NSA regarding continuation
of the watch list activity. Noting that ''the need for proper
handling of the list and rel'ated information has intensified, along
with ever-increasing pressures for disclosure of sources by the Congress,
the courts,and the press," Allen requested, "at the earliest possible
date," that Kelley and the other agency heads "review the current
list your agency has filed with us in order to satisfy yourself regarding
the appropriateness of its contents...." 96
After receiving Kelley's September 10 memorandum, Petersen ad·
vised the Attorney General that the current number of individuals
.. Memorandum from Henry Petersen to Clarence Kelley, 9/7/73, p. 1.
.. Memorandum from Clarf'nce Kelley to Henry Petersen, 9/10/73, p. 2.
Kelley is clearly overstating his case when he says Americans are "known" to
be involved in illegal activities. Many of the individuals were protesters speaking
out agaInst tlle G1>vernment's policIes, not urging the over'throw of the
Government.
J. Edgar Hoover discusses the necessity of obtaining information "determining
the extent of international cooperation among New Leftists" in a memorandum
to NSA of June 5, 1970, which is much broader than targetin~ individuals who
are attempting the violent overthrow of the Government.
.. Kelley memorandum, 9/10/73. pp. 3-5.
.. Letter from Lew Allen, Jr. to Clarence Kelley, 9/17/73, Hearings, Vol. 5,
Exhibi,t No.6, pp. 158-159.
760
and organizations on NSA watch lists submitted by the FBI W'llS "in
excess of 600." 97 Petersen pointed out many legal problems arising
from this progrllJIIl and recommended that
the FBI and Secret Service be immedi'ately advised to cease
and desist requesting NSA to dissemiITllite to them information
concernmg individuals and organizations obtained
through NSA electronic coverage and that NSA should be
informed not to disclose voluntarily such information to
Secret Service or the FBI unless NSA has picked up the
information on its own initiative in pursuit of its foreign
intelligence mission.98
He also recommended that the stJandardsand procedures which applied
to "cases where the FBI seeks to acquire foreign intelligence
or counterespionage information by means of its own listening devices"
be extended to apply to the watch list activity.98a These procedures
included obtaining prior written approval by the Attorney
General.
On October 1, Richardson sent memomnd'a to FBI Director Kelley
and the Director of the Secret Service, instructing them to cease requesting
information obtained by NSA "by means of electronic surveillance."
99 The Attorney General also requested that his approval
be sought prior to· either agency's renewing requests to NSA for
foreign intelligence or counterespionage information.
On the same day, Richardson sent a le'tJter to Allen, stating that he
found the watch list activity to be of questionable legality in view
of the Keith decision, and requesting that NSA "immediately curtail
the further dissemination" of watch list information to the FBI and
Secret Service. Althou~h Richardson specified that NSA W'aS not to
respond to "a request from another -agency to monitor in connootion
with a matter that can only be considered one of domestic intelligence,"
he stated that "relevant information a~uired by you in the routine
pursuit of the collection of foreign intellIgence information may continue
to be furnished to appropriate Government agenices." 100
Kelley responded to Richardson's memorandum on October 3 and
agreed to comply with the Attorney Geneml's "instructions to discontinue
requests to NSA for electronic surveillance inform'aJtionand
to obtain approval prior to any future inquires to NSA for such
information." 101 There was apparently some confusion at this point
whether Richardson's instructions meant that NSA was prohibited
from disseminating any information to FBI. After further consultations~
it was determined that the caveats Richardson placed on dissemination
'applied only to information on American citizens and
organizations, and not to foreign intelligence and counterespionage
matters.
Allen replied to Richardson's letter on October 4, stating that he
had "directed that no further information be disseminated to the
VI Memorandum from Henry Petersen to Elliot Richarson, 9/21/73, p. 1.
III Pocersen to Richardson memorandum, 9/21/73, p. 3.
oo. Ibid.
.. Memorandum from Elliot Richardson to Clarence Kelley. 10/1/73.
100 Letter from Elliot Richardson to Lew Allen, Jr., 10/1/73, Hearings, Vol. 5.
Exhibit No.7, pp. 160, 161.
101 Memorandum from CIarenee Kelley to Elliot Richardson, 10/3/73.
761
FBI and Secret Service, pending advice on legal issues." 102 Although
Allen had agreed to suspend dissemination, NSA's position remained
that these communications had always been collected "as an incidental
and unintended act in the conduct of the interception of forei~
communications." Allen thus asserted that NSA's "current practIce
conforms with your [Richardson's] guidance that, 'relevant information
acquired [by NSA] in the routine pursuit of the collection of
foreign intelligence information may continue to be furnished to
appropriate government agencies.' "103
As a result of these and other exchanges between officials at NSA
and Justice, the Agency officially terminated its watch list activity
involving American citizens and organizations in the fall of 1973.
It would no longer accept such names from other agencies for the
purpose of monitoring their international communications.
To a substantial degree, this decision was prompted by the legal
implications of the Keith case and by NSA's fear that criminal prosecutions
of persons on the watch lists would inevitably lead to disclosure
of its intelligence sources and methods. Indeed, the 1973
criminal case referred to above posed the threat that the watch list
activity might have to be disclosed for the first time in a public forum.
It is important to note that the decision to terminate the watch list
was ultimately the administrative decision of an executive agency.
There is no statute which expressly forbids such activity, and no
court case where it has been squarely at issue. Without legislative controls,
NSA cOuld resume the watch list activity at any time upon
order of the Executive.
G. Autlwrization
Authorization of the watch list activity must be viewed in the context
of how NSA operates. It is a service agency which provides foreign
intelligence information at the request of consumer agencies.
Specific requirements are levied on USA, although the Agency also
engages in collection activities that are not responsive to specific
tasking. For example, many USIB requirements-such as those aimed
at terrorist activities, gathering economic intelligence, or discovering
foreign links to civIl disturbances-were so broad that NSA was
given wide discretion for selecting not only the communications channels
to be monitored, but also what information was disseminated.loi
While this is often appropriate because only NSA has the knowledge
and eXJ.>ertise to make these decisions, it also allows NSA considerable
flexibilIty in carrying out its mission.
NSA also responds to specific requests from other Federal agencies.
lBdeed, it is no exaggeration to state that NSA's operations are undertaken
almost entirely to satisfy the intelligence needs of other agencies.
The watch list activity was no exception.
1" Letter from Lew Allen, Jr. to Elliot Richardson, October 4, 1973, Hearings,
Vol. 5, Exhibit No. 8, p.l63.
103 Allen letter, October 4, 1973, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No.8, pp. 162, 163.
10& Wannall (FBI), October 3,1975, p. 12: "I would say that by far the majority
of the product that I saw would have been information that would have been
disseminated to us by NSA, based upon the knowledge of that Agency of our
responsibilities, as opposed to a specific request for any information that might
come to NSA's attention, that we ourselves initiated."
762
1. Knowledge and Authorization Outside NSA
In the case of the 1967-1973 watch list activity, NSA clearly received
instructions from the Army in 1967 to look for possible foreign
influence on, or control of, American peace and Black power
activists. NSA subsequently received the names of American and
foreign citizens and groups from other intelligence agencies.
This activity was not formally approved by USIB. Although NSA
notified USIB members that it was responding to the Army's request,
the inclusion of American names on an NSA watch list was
never discussed at subsequent USIB meetings. Although there were
official USIB requirements for information concerning international
drug activity, presidential protection, and terrorism, there was no approval
or discussion of targeting American citizens. NSA officials
contend that the submission of American names by USIB members
constituted approva1.105
The desire for tight security over the watch list program resulted
in limiting participation to those "with a need to know." Therefore,
it was not in NSAs best interests to have formal USIB approval
of a requirement since knowledge would have been more widely spread.
According to documents supplied to the Committee and testimony
of NSA officials, Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird and James Schlesinger,
as well as Attorneys General John Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst,
were informed that NSA was monitoring Americans. Former
NSA Director, Admiral Noel Gayler sent a Top Secret "Eyes Only"
memorandum to Laird and Mitchell on January 26, 1971, which outlined
ground rules for "NSA's Contribution to Domestic Intelligence."
In this memorandum, Gayler refers to a discussion he had
earlier that day with both men on how NSA could assist them with
"intelli~ence bearing on domestic problems." The memorandum mentioned
the monitoring for drug trafficking and foreign support of
subversive activities, but did not discuss "watch lists" s:pecifically.loe
NSA Deputy Director BufIham supplied the CommIttee with a
Memorandum for Record which indicated that he had personally
shown the Gayler memorandum to Mitchell and had been told by the
Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Laird that the Secretary
had read and agreed to the memorandum.loT In a handwritten note
1"; Allen,10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 28.
108 Memorandum from NSA Director Noel Gayler to the Secretary of Defense
and the Attorney General, "NSA Contribution to Domestic Intelligence,"
1/26/71, Hearings, Vol. 5, Exhibit No.5, pp.156--157.
This memorandum responded to the interfflts of the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee (IEC), a Justice Department working group set up to carry out
domestic intelligence-gathering activities. The IEC was an outgrowth of the
Huston Plan and is detailed in the Committee's report on the Huston Plan.
Suffice it to say that NSA sent a representative to that group and Gayler
was providing them with a statement of NSA's capabilities and procedures
for supplying intelligence.
107 Mpmorandum for the Record, Bpnson K. Bu1l'ham, 2/3/71.
When questioned by the 'Committee, neither Mitchell. Laird. nor Klpindienst
recalled the watch list activity. Mitchell dnes not recall NSA's involvement in
monitoring the communications of American citizens or the meeting with
Bu1l'ham. He stated, howpver, that "he may have" had such a meeting, but cannot
recall. John Mitchell testimony, 10/2/75, pp. 47-48.
763
made available to the Committee, Gayler recalls that he personally
showed the J anual'y 26, 1971, memorandum to Kleindienst on July 1,
1972.
Finally, former NSA Deputy Director Tordella testified that he
accompanied General Samuel C. Phillips, Gayler's successor as Director
of NSA, to brief Secretary of Defense Sohlesinger on the watch
list in the summer of 1973.108
In summary, a number of Federal agencies were aware of NSA's
watch lists and used them. It is clear that the United States Intelligence
Board, which ordinarily set the intelligence requirements to
which NSA responded, never gave its formal approval for the watch
list activity. It also appears that at least two Attorneys General and
two Secretaries of Defense were generally aware that NSA was
monitoring the international communications of American citizens, but
none took measures to halt the practice.
~. KnowZedge and Approval Within NSA
There is a discrepancy in the testimony of knowledgeable NSA staff
members and a former NSA Director with regard to his knowledge
of the watch list activity. When asked whether NSA had included
the names of American citizens or organizations on its watch lists,
Admiral Noel Gayler (who was Director of NSA during the height of
the activity) responded:
I don't know that I even knew that in that specific way. I
knew that communications of one foreign terminal sometimes
concerned doings of interest of people, including American
citizens, yes. And when I became aware of that, I can't
tell you, I guess it was a year or so after I got there.lo9
Gayler became NSA Director in August 1969. He maintains that
he first became aware of the watch list activity about the time of
the June 1970 Huston plan for domestic surveillance, ten months
after his arrival and eleven months after the MINARET Charter
was issued.
Gayler was one of the original participants in the Huston plan
deliberations and in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (early
1971). Both of ,these efforts were designed to use the resources of
NSA and other intelligence agencies to gather information on internal
security matters. In fact, part of the Huston plan called for the
expansion of the watch list activity. Buffham told the Committee that
if the plan had been implemented he assumed "other intelligence
agencies would then increase the numbers of names on their lists"
and NSA would possibly target specific communications channels to
obtain the international traffic of American citizens.u° NSA was par-
108 Tordella, 9/21/75, p. 74.
100 Noel Gayler testimony, 6/19/75, p. 64.
110 Buffham, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 45.
In addition, the Huston Plan report sent to the participants was classified
"Top Secret, Handle Via COMIXT Channels Only," the classification placed
on NSA intercept information. This caveat was designed to limit the distribution
of the report and prevent disclosure of the illegal activities suggested
by Tom Charles Huston. For a further explanation, see the Committee's report,
"National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of Intelligence: A
Report on the Huston Plan,"
69-984 0 - 76 ~ 49
764
ticularly concerned that the executive branch directives would have
had to be changed to permit such an expansion. The alternatives outlined
in the Huston plan included the recommendation that the controling
NSCID and the relevant DCID be changed to allow NSA
to targe~ inte~~ational communications links carrying the messages
of AmerIcan CItIzens.
NSA was already engaged in watch list activity which although
it did not involve targ-eting- of specific communications links, did involve
targeting Amencans by name. The Huston Plan states:
NSA is currently doing so on a restricted basis, and the
information it has provided has been most helpful. Much
of this information is particularly useful to the White
House....111
As discussed earlier, the July 1, 1969, MINARET charter was
designed to restrict knowledge of the watch list activity. It was released
about a month before Gayler arrived at NSA and, according
to a senior NSA official, Gayler "knew everything that was in it, what
was going on, and endorsed it." 112 Gayler recalls that his first knowledge
of the watch list came during the Huston Plan deliberations,
almost a year later. Another senior NSA official testified that Gayler
"review every piece of MINABET prodU<Jt" and maintained that "the
Director kept a close eye on this activity and reviewed the requirements."
[Emphasis added.] 113 This employee also testified that Gayler
was shown the product of the watch list activity and was kept fully
informed.
H. OonclU8i0n8
NSA's monitoring of internatIonal communications oomprises only
a portion of its total mission, but the examination of this capability
to intrude on the telephone calls and telegrams of Americans represents
a major part of the Committee's work on NSA. The watch list
activities and the sophisticated technological capabilities that they
highlight present some of the most crucial privacy issues facing this
nation. Space age technology has outpaced the law. The secrecy that
has surrounded much of NSA's activities and the lack of Congressional
oversight have prevented, in the past, brin¢ng statutes in line
w\th NSA's capabilities. Neither the courts nor Congress have dealt
with the interception of communications using NSA's highly sensitive
and complex technology.
The analysis presented here of the deliberate targeting of A~erican
citizens and the associated incidental interception of their communications
demonstrates the need for a lewslative charter that will define,
limit, and control the signals intelligence activities of the National
Security Agency. This should be accomplished both to preserve and
protect the Government's legitimate foreign intelligence operations,
and to ensure that the constitutional rights of Americans are
safeguarded.
111 Memonmdum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 7(7 "Operational
Restraints on Intelligence Collection," p. 1, Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit No.
2, p. 193.
11JSenior NSA official No.2, 9/18/75, pp. 43-44.
m Senior NSA official No. I, 9/16/75, pp. 63, 62.
765
The next section describes a recently terminated NSA collection
program which also involved United States citizens--Operation
SHAMROCK. This program did not require any special technology;
international telegrams were simply turned over to NSA at the offices
of three cable companies.
III. A SPECIAL NSA COLLECTION PROGRAM: SHAMROCK
SHAMROCK is the codename for a special program in which NSA
received copies of most international telegrams leaving the United
States between August 1945 and May 1975. Two of the participating:
international telegraph companies-RCA Global and ITT World
Communications-provided virtually all their international message
traffic to NSA. The third, Western Union International, only provided
copies of certain foreign traffic from 1945 until 1972. SHAM
ROCK was probably the larg-est governmental interception program
affecting Americans ever undertaken. Although the total number of
telegrams read during its course is not available, NSA estimates that in
the last two or three years of SHAMROCK's existence, about 150,000
telegrams pel' month were reviewed by NSA analysts.115
Initially, NSA received copies of international telegrams in the
form of microfilm or paper tapes. These were sorted manually to obtain
foreign messages. When RCA Global and ITT World Communications
switched to magnetic tapes in the 1960s, NSA made copies
of these tapes and subjected them to an electronic sorting process.
This means that the international telegrams of American citizens on
the "watch lists" could be selected out and disseminated.
A. Legal Restrietionfj
1. The Fourth Ameruiment to the OO'lUJtitution of the United
States
Obtaining the international telegrams of American citizens by NSA
at the offices of the telegraph companies appears to violate the privacy
of these citizens, as protected by the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment
guarantees to the people the right to be "secure . . . in their
papers ... against unreasona;ble searches and seizures." It also provides
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." In no
case did NSA obtain a search warrant prior to obtaining a telegram.
13. Section 605 of the GommunicatioruJ Act of 1934 (4'7 U.S.G.
605)
As enacted in 1934, eleven years before SHAMROCK began, section
605 of the Communications Act provided:
No person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting,
or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
thereof....
Section 605 was amended in 1968 by the addition of the phrase:
"Except as authorized by chapter 119, Title 18, no person ...."
UGStaff summary of interview with senior N'SA official No.3, 9/17/75, p. 3.
766
The import of this 1968 addition, however, is not clear, and the Supreme
Court has yet to rule on the point.116
The relevant provision in chapter 119, section 2511 (3), provides that
"nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934 ... shall limit the <0nstitutional power of the President
... to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States...." 111 Yet the Supreme Court,
in the Keith decision (1.972), held that this section "confers no power"
and "merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or
disturb such power as the President may have under the Constitution."
118 .
It is thus uncertain what the phrase in the 1968 amendment to
section 605-"except as mutlwrized by chapter 119, title 18" [Emphasis
added.]-means. The Supreme Court has held that the relevant section
of chapter 119 does not atdhorize any activity. The applicability of
section 605 to the interception of international telegrams for foreign
intelligence purposes is therefore unclear. It would appear that where
such telegrams are intercepted for other than foreign intelligence purposes
(e.g., the watch list activity) , section 605 would be violated.
3. The Controlling National Security Council Intelligence Directive
Since 1958, this executive directive has authorized NSA to conduct
communications intelligence activities.ll9 These have been defined as
excluding "the intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications."
It would appear that if copies of international telegrams
are "written communications," NSA has exceeded its authority
under the executive's own internal directives.
B. The Oomun.ittee's InvestigatiO'n
The SHAMROCK operation was alluded to in documents furnished
to the Committee by the Rockefeller Commission in May 1975. They
indicated that CIA had provided "cover" for an NSA operation in
New York where international telegrams had been copied.J20
In early June 1975, an oral inquiry regarding the operation was
made to NSA officials, but no confirmation of the project was forthcoming.
In July, the Committee sent written interrogatories to NSA,
and was told that this subject was so sensitive that it would be disclosed
only to Senators Church and Tower. No such briefing was immediately
arranged, however.
In July and August, news stories were published which appeared to
reveal small parts of the SHAMROCK operation.l21
The Committee continued to press the matter with NSA, and in
early September the agency gave the Committee its first detailed
118The u;s. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did rule, in. U.S. v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Oir. 1974), cert. denlied sub nom. Ivanov v. United
States, 419 Uo'S. 881 (1974), that section 605 did not render unlawful electronic
surveillance conducted solely for foreilPl intelligence purposes.
117 18 U.S.C. 2511(3).
111 United States v. United States DU/trict Oourt for the Eastern District of
Michigan, et al., 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See pp. 757, 759-760.
119 See pp.737-738.
12) Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, interview with
senior CIA officials, 3/11/75, pp. 14-16, in Select Committee files.
121 See Frank Van Riper, "Find U.S. Agents Spy on Embassies' Cables," New
York Daily News. 7/22/75; iltem., "FCC Terms Cable-Tapping Illegal, Will
Investigate FBI," New York Daily News, 7/23/75; Nicholas Borrock. "National
Security Agency Reported Eavesdropping on Most Private Cables," New York
Time8, 8/l/75, p. 1.
767
information. This briefing was followed by interviews with present
and former NSA employees who had been responsible for the program
and by examinations of documents at NSA and the Department of
Defense. NSA assured the Committee at the time that it had examined
all NSA documents which pertained to SHAMROCK. On September
23, the full Committee was briefed by an NSA official in executive
session. Following this briefing, the Committee interviewed officials in
the telegraph companies which had participated in the SHAMROCK
program.
On the basis of this investigation, the Committee prepared a report
which it submitted to NSA for review. NSA had no specific comments
regarding the accuracy of the report, but expressed its general objection
to public disclosure of the operation on the grounds that the
report was based on classified information.122
On November 6, 1975, in a public session of the Committee, Chairman
Frank Church read the report on SHAMROCK into the record.
Due to the refusal of the executive branch of provide witnesses in
public session, no other public record was made.122
'
At this point, the Committee's active investigation ceased. The Committee
presumed that it had exhausted all sources of information about
SHAMROCK.
On March 25, 1976 as the Committee was about to send this report
to press, it was informed by the Department of Defense that NSA had
"discovered" a file containing various documents and memoranda
about SHAMROCK. An NSA official explained that the file had been
held by a lower-level employee at NSA until around March 1, 1976,
when he brought it to the attention of his superiors. Since this occurred
several months after the Committee's public report, and, in the
opinion of NSA, did not substantially alter the Committee's findings,
it was not immediately reported to the Committee.
After examining the documents, the Committee decided that the
final NSA report should incorporate this new information. Although
it does not alter the basic findings reported in November 1975, it does
change some of the details.'23
C. The Origim of SHAMROOK
During World War 1I, under the wartime censorship laws,124 all
international message traffic was made available to military censors.125
Copies of pertinent foreign traffic were turned over to military intelligence.
With the cessation of the War in 1945, this practice was to end.
In August 1945, the Army sought to continue that part of the wartime
arrangement which had allowed military intellIgence access to
certain foreign traffic.'26 At that time, most of this traffic was still conveyed
via the facilities of three carriers.127
On August 18, 1945, two representatives of the Army Signal Security
Agency were sent to New York
to make the necessary contacts with the heads of the Commercial
Communications Companies in New York, secure their
122 Letter from NSA to the Select Committee, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 51.
122, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 57--60.
l2lI Ibid.
m 47 U.S.C. 606.
125 See the testimonies of: Senior NSA official No.4, 9/23/75, pp. 45-46;
Tordella, 99/21/75, pp. 6-7; senior officer, ITT World Communications, Inc.,
10/15/75, p. 4.
120 Letter from an Army intelligence officer to the Commanding General, Signals
Security Agency, Army Service Forces, "Report on New York Trip," 8/24/45.
121 Stair summary of an interview with Senior NSA official No.3, 9/17/75, p. 3.
768
approval of the interception of all Governmental traffic entering
the United States, leaving the United States, or transiting
the United States, and make the necessary arrangements for
this photographic intercept work.128
They first approached an official at ITT, who "very definitely and finally
refused" to agree to any of the Army proposals. The Army representatives
then approached a vice president of Western Union Telegraph
Company, who agreed to cooperate unless the Attorney General
of the United States ruled that such intercepts were illegal.~29
Having succeeded with Western Union, the Army representatives
returned to ITT on August 21, 1945, and suggested to an IT!' vice
president that "his company would not desire to be the only non-cooperative
company on this project." The vice president decided to reconsider
and broached the matter the same day with the president of
the company. The ITT president agreed to cooperate with the Army,
provided that the Attorney General decided that the program was not
illegal.130 •
These Army representatives also met with the president of RCA on
August 21, 1945. The RCA president indicated his willingness to cooperate,
but withheld final approval until he, too, had heard from the
Attorney General.l3l
After their trip, the Army representatives reported to their superiors
that the companies were worried about the illegality of their participation
in the program:
Two very evident fears existed in the minds of the heads of
each of these communications companies. One was the fear of
the illegality of the procedure according to present FCC regulations.
In spite of the fact that favorable opinions have been
received from the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
the Judge Advocate General of the Army, it was feared that
these opmions would not hold in civil court and, as a consequence,
the companies would not be protected. If a favorable
opinion is handed down by the Attorney General, this fear
will be completely allayed, and cooperation may be expected
for the complete intercept coverage of this material. The second
fear uppermost in the minds of these executives is the fear
of the ACA which is the communications union. This union
has reported on many occasions minor infractions of FCC
regulations and it is feared that a major infraction, such as
the proposed intercept coverage, if disclosed by the Union,
might cause severe repercussions.133
Later memoranda by another Army representative who was present
indicate, that the companies had consulted their corporate attorneys
during these three days of discussions, and that their attorneys uniformly
advised against participation in the proposed intercept program.
134 The company executives were apparently willing to ignore
this advice if they received assurances from the Attorney General that
he would protect them from any consequences.~35
120 Army intelligence officer letter to Commanding General, 8/24/45.
ll!II Ibid.
'''' Ibid.
lJl1 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
13< Memorandum from Record, Armed Forces Security Agency, "SHAMROCK
Operations," 8/25/50.
,., Ibid.
769
The new documentary evidence made available to the Committee did
not reveal that the Attorney General at that time, Tom C. Clark, actually
made the assurances that the companies desired. It is clear, however,
that the program began shortly after the August meetings: I'IT
and Western Union began their participation by September 1,136 and
RCA by October 9,1945.137
In a letter from the Army Signals Security Agency to the Army
Chief of Staff on March 19, 1946, the writer indicates that SHAMROCK
was well underway, but that concerns about its legality had
not vanished:
It can be stated that both [Western Union and RCA] have
placed themselves in precarious positions since the legality of
such operations has not been established and has necessitated
the utmost secrecy on their part in making these arrangements.
Through their efforts, only two or three individuals in
the respective companies are aware of the operation.138
April 26, 1976, while this report was being printed, DOD informed
the Committee that nine additional documents relating to SHAMROCK
had been found in the National Archives. The documents revealed
that the Office of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal attempted
unsuccessfully in June 1948 to have Congress pass an amendment
to relax the disclosure restrictions of Section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934. Agencies designated by the President
would have been allowed to obtain the radio and wire communications
of foreign governments. If the amendment had passed, the SHAMROCK
program, as it was originally conceived, would have been authorized
by law.
The proposed amendment sought to allay concerns of the companies
on the legality of their participation in SHAMROCK. The companies
were demanding assurances in 1947 not only from the Secretary of
Defense and the Attorney General, but also from the President that
their participation was essential to the national interest and that they
would not be subject to prosecution in the Federal Courts. Secretary
Forrestal, who stated he was speaking for the President, gave ITT and
RCA representatives these assurances at a December 16, 1947, meeting
in Washington, D.C.IsD Forrestal warned, however, that the assurances
he was making could not bind his successors in office.140
Representatives of Western Union were not 'present at this meetin~.
Documents made available to the Committee mdicate that the PresIdent
and Operating Vice President of Western Union were briefed
in January 1948 on the earlier meeting with RCA and IT1'.1.41
In early June 1948, the Chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary
1... Army intelligence officer letter to Commanding General, 8/24/45. The armistice
ending hostilities between the United States and Japan was signed in
.Tapan on September 2,1945 (September 1 in the United States). .
137 Letter from a senior official at RCA Global, Inc., to the Army Signal Security
Agency, 10/9/45.
188 Letter from Assistant Chief of Staff, Army Signals Security Agency, to the
Army Chief of Staff, "Letters of Appreciation," 3/19/46. This letter transmitted
letters of appreciation that were to be forwarded to two of the participating
companies.
1llO Apdrews, 9/23/75, p. 34 (referring to documents in his possession). These
documents were examined by the Commitlee. Select Committee memorandum,
9/17/75, "Review of Documents at DoD Regarding LPMIDDLEY."
HO Andrews, 9/23/75, p. 40.
H1 Select Committee memorandum, 11/5/75, "Persons at 1947 and 1949 SHAMROCK
Meetings" (describing a handwritten note to this effect).
770
Committees were informed of the Government's need for a relaxation
of Section 605 and of its position with the telegraph companies. The
delicacy of the problem and the top secret nature of the information
were made clear to these two Chairmen. The amendment was considered
in an executive session of the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 16,
1948, and approved. Since support for the bill was not unanimous, however,
the Committee voted to leave it to the Chairman's discretion
whether or not to release the bill to the Senate floor. The representative
of the Secretary of Defense then told the Senate Judiciary Chairman
that "we did not desire an airing of the whole matter on the Floor of
the Senate at this late date in the session." The bill apparently was not
reported out.
A Defense Department official expressed the view that the thought
a great deal had already been accomplished and that the administratIOn
had sufficient ammunitIOn to be able to effect a continuation of the present
practices with the companies. Apparently no other statutory attempts
were made to authorize the companies' participation in
SHAMROCK.
The companies sought renewed assurances from Forrestal's successor,
Louis Johnson, in 1949. Johnson told them that the President and Attorney
General had been consulted and had given their approval.'" To
the knowledge of those interviewed by the Committee, this was the last
instance in which the companies such assurances from the Department
of Defense.'"
Dr. Louis Tordella, who was NSA Deputy Director from 1958 until
1974 and the NSA official with chief administrative responsibility for
SHAMROCK, testified that to the best of his knowledge, no President
since Truman knew of the program. He "was not sure" whether
any Attorney General since Tom Clark had been informed of it, or if
succeeding Secretaries of Defense were aware of it. Tordella stated
he briefed former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger about the SHAM
ROCK operation in the summer of 1973.146
The Army Signals Security Agency controlled the collection program
until 1949, when the Armed Forces Security Agency was formed.
Responsibility for the program passed from AFSA to the National
Security Agency when it was created in 1952.141
D. The Participation of the Oompanies
None of the telegraph companies could find any record of an agreement
with NSA or its predecessors wherein the companies would provide
copies of telegrams to the Government,148 or which reflected anything
about arrangements with NSA. No one interviewed by the Committee
had any recollection or knowledge that the Government had
'" Andrews, 9/23/75, p. 34.
'" IWd., p. 40.
1.. Ibid., p. 34.
146 Andrews, 9/23/75, p. 40 ; Tordella, 9/21/75, p. 12.
"0 Tordella, 9/21/75, pp. 32-34. Tordella did state that 'he thought former NSA
Director Noel Gayler had informed Attorney General John Mitchell about
SHAMROCK in 1970 (Ibid., p. 33); Mitchell, however, did not recall being
informed about the Q!I)eration (Mitchell, 10/2/75, pp. 47-48). Tordella stated that
he was "quite sure" former Secretary of Defense Laird had known of the
SHAMROCK program (Tordella, 9/21/75, pp. 33--84) .
101 Tordella, 9/21/75, p. 34; senior NSA official No.4, 9/23/75, p. 47.
1<8 Staff summaries of interviews with Counsel, RCA Global, Inc., 10/9/75,
p. 3; Counsel, ITT World Communications, Inc., 10/9/75, p. 1; Counsel, Western
Union International, Inc., 10/10/75, p. 1.
771
given the companies specific assurances to ensure their cooperation in
1945,1947,1949, or at any time thereafter.149
Apparently only a few people in each company-apart from those
who physically turned over the materials-had any knowledge of the
NSA arrangement.150 These were primarily mid-level executives
charged with the operational aspects of the companies' business. All
assumed that the arrangement was valid when it was made and thus
continued it. No witness from the telegraph companies recalled that
there had ever been a review of the arrangements at the executive
levels of their respective companies.
Furthermore, none of the participating companies was apparently
aware that information other than foreign traffic was extracted from
the messages they were providing.m Yet no official at any of the
three companies could recall his company asking NSA what it was
doing with the information it was furnished and, specifically, whether
NSA was reading the telegrams of the companies' American
customers.152
Finally, both the telegraph companies and NSA deny that the
companies ever received anything for their cooperation in SHAM
ROCK, whether in the form of compensation or favoritism from the
Gov~rnme!1t. All claim they were motivated by pu~y patriotic
conslderatlOns.153 .
If there were similarities as to their involvement in SHAM
ROCK, the participation of each company varied in practice.
1. 90A Global
According to a memorandum prepared by Anny representatives,
RCA (the parent company of RCA Global) agreed in August 1945 to
allow Army personnel, who were to be dressed in civilian clothes, to
photograph foreign traffic passinp; over its facilities in New York,
Washington, and San Francisco. The memorandum further provided
that "only the desired tmffic will be filmed." ai
The company official at RCA Global who was charged with implementing
the SHAMROCK program testified that several alternatives
were discussed with Anny representatives. He stated that the Anny
had first- proposed tapping into the company's overseas lines, but the
official rejected this idea as U1lfeasible. The Army representatives then
proposed that company employees sort out pertinent traffic and turn it
over to them; the official rejected this because he did not want company
employees involved. The RCA official finally agreed to provide
paper tapes of all international message traffic. It was understood that
these messages would be sorted manually by persons from the Anny
Signals Security Agency on the company's premises, and that only
1" Testimonies of former vice president, ROA Global, 10/9/75, PP. 17-18, and
senior officer, ITT World Communications, Inc., 10/15/75, p. 6; and affidavit of
senior officer, Western Union International, 10/19/75, p. 1.
1SO Counsel, RCA Global, 10/9/75, p. 2; counsel, ITT World Communications,
10/9/75, pp. 1-2; and counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75, p. 3 (staff
summaries).
1lIl Former vice president, RCA Global, 10/17/75, p. 13; senior omcer, ITT
World Communications, 10/15/75, p. 12.
111 Senior omcer, ITT World Communications, 10/15/75, p. 12. See also testimony
of senior officer, RCA Global, Inc., 10/19/75, p. 19. RCA Global and ITT
World 'Communications were, by the mid-I960s, providing NSA all of their outgoing
telegraph tramc on magnetic tapes.
1" Senior omcer, RCA Global, 10/19/75, p. 23; senior omcer, ITT World Oommunications,
10/15/75, p. 14; counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75,
p. 2 (staff summary) .
IN Army intelligence omcer letter to Commanding General, 8/24/45.
772
certain foreign traffic would be selected. There was never a written
agreement to this effect, however, ,according to the former official.155
In New York, Army representatives were given office spac~ in the
area where the paper tapes of RCA Global's international message
tra.ffic were sorted manually for foreign traffic. Messages of interest
were transmitted over teletype machines located in that office sJ?lWe.156
In Washington and San Francisco, Army agents were permitted
to pick up copies of foreign messages, which they took to another office
for microfilming.157 By 1950, a Recordak (microfilm) machine was
placed in the New York office and was used to film messages of intelligence
interest.1sB
This arrangement continued without substantial disruption nnW
1963, when RCA Global began to store its message traffic on magnetic
tapes. NSA made arrangements to obtain copies of these tapes from
the RCA Global facilities in New York-they were taken "on loon,"
copied, and returned, the same day if possible. Gradually, magnetic
tapes began to supercede paper tapes and microfilm as a means of
storing messages. By 1966, the New York office was turning over only
magnetic tapes to NSA.159 The offices in Washington and San Francisco,
however, continued to furnish copies of international message
traffic for microfilming by NSA. RCA Global emplo;rees in Washington,
D.C. were under the impression they were prOVIding information
only to the FBI.160
~. ITT World OommwnicatWna
In August 1945, ITT agreed to allow the Army access to all incoming,
outgoing, and transiting messages passing over the facilities of
its subsidaries involved in international communications. It wasagreed
that "all traffic will be recorded on microfilm, that all Governmental
traffic will be recorded on a second microfilm in addition to the original
one, that these films will be developed by the SSA [Signals Security
Agency], and the complete traffic will be returned to ITT." 161
It is not clear whether these arrangements, agreed to at the outset,
were actually implemented in the manner described. The ITT o1licial
with the earliest recollections of the program could recall only that by
the early 19508, ITT World Communications was providing NSA
representatives with copies of the company's international message
traffic, which NSAthen sorted and microfilmed.162
When lIT World Communications began to use paper tapes to
transmit its messages, these were turned over to NSA as well.l68 It is
not clear whether these tapes were transmitted from the premises of
... Former vice president, RCA Global, 10/17/75, pp. 5-7.
"" IMd., pp. 7-8, 11.
,.., Telegram from an AFSA officer to an AFSA officer, "RCA SHAMROCK,"
6/24/51.
1M Senior officer, RCA Global, 10/19/75, p. 4.
"'"IMd.
110 Van Riper, "Find U.S. Agents Spy on Embassies' Cables," New York Da.il1l
News, 7/22/75.
118.1 Army intelligence officer letter to Commanding General, 8/24/45. Senior officer, ITT World CommunicatioDll,10/15/75, pp. 7-8.
"Ibid., p. 8. A senior officer of ITT World Communications stated that be
bad no personal knowledge tbat paper tapes bad been turned over to NSA; bowever,
NSA confirmed that it bad received paper tapes from ITT (testimony of
Senior NSA official No.4, 9/23/75, pp. 49-51). Counsel for ITT World Communications
also told the Committee tbat bis investigation bad revealed tbat tbe
company was providing paper tapes to NSA. (Counsel, ITT World Communications,
10/9/75, p.l (&taff summary).)
773
ITT World Communications to another location (as with RCA
Global) or whether they were simply transported to NSA for sorting.
When ITT World Communications began to use magnetic tapes to
store its incoming and outgoing messages-the best recollection of
this change places it around 1965 164-the magnetic tapes were turned
over to NSA for duplication. They were returned to the company
on the same day. By 1968, ITT World Communications was turning
over only its magnetic tapes to NSA.I65
The Washington and San Francisco offices of ITT World Communications
participated in a similar fashion. In Washington, however,
company officials believed that they were providing the telegrams
to the FBI, rather than NSA. 166 It is clear from the information
made available to the Committee that the Washington messages were
sent to NSA.167
3. Western Union International
At the August 1945 meeting between Army representatives and the
Western Union Telegraph Company (the parent company of Western
Union International), the company stated that it
desired that Western Union personnel operate the [microfilm]
camera and do all the actual handling of the messages.
It was agreed that [the Army Signal Security Agency] would
furnish the necessary cameras and film for the complete intercept
coverage of Western Union traffic outlets. The film, after
exposure, will be delivered [to the office of a company vicepresident],
at which place an officer from the Signal Security
Agency, in civilian clothes, will pick it Up.16S
The company a~d to implement this arrangement at its New
York, San FranCISCO, Washington, and San Antonio facilities.189
This arrangement was apparently implemented as originally
agreed. In New York, at least, company employees segre~ted such
messages and processed them through a microfilm machme on the
transmission room floor.170 At approximately 4:00 each morning, an
NSA courier would come to the floor to pick up the microfilm cartridge.
In San Antonio, an Army signal officer from Ft. Sam Houston
was tasked with picking up the microfilm each day.l7l
It appears that Western Union turned over to NSA only its telegraph
traffic to one foreign country. Approached in 1959 by persons
who identified themselves as being from Ft. Holabird, Maryland
(Army intelligence), Western Union agreed to allow them to duplicate
the traffic going to a particular country.172 In 1970, the company
also began to provide copies of messages going to a particular city
with~n that country which were not being duplicated as part of the
preVIOUS arrangement.173 These messages were apparently sorted by
"" Senior officer, ITT World Communications, 10/15/75, p. 8.
,'" Letter from an NSA courier to an NSA official, 1/23/68.
1M Counsel, ITT World Communications, 10/9/75, p. 2 (staff summary).
1M Tordella, 9/21/75, pp. 36-37.
,.. Army intelligence officer letter to Commanding General, 8/2f/45.
,.. Ibid.
""Counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75, p. 1 (staff summary).
11, Memorandum for Record, Armed Forces Security Agency, "SHAMROCK
Operations," 8/25/50.
,.. Counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75, p. 2 (!ltaff summary).
tTl Ibid.
774
NSA personnel in space provided by Western Union at its New
York officesY4
Western Union International (which was formed in 1963) continued
to microfilm certain foreign traffic for NSA until about 1965,
when a company executive discovered the existence of the microfilm
machine on the transmission room floor. After ascertaining its purpose,
he demanded that NSA renew its request to have this information
in writing. He recalled that instead of submitting such a request,
NSA simply had the machine removed.175 This recollection, however,
was not borne out by documents furnished by NSA. The documents
showed that on February 2,1968, a company vice president (not the
one referred to above) had discovered the existence of NSA's Recordak
(microfilm) machine in the Western Union transmission room.
The machine was reported to the company president, who directed
his employees to find out to whom the machine belonged and what
the basis for the arrangement was. The NSA courier, when asked
these questions by a Western Union International official on February
9, 1968, replied that he was from the Department of Defense and
did not know what the basis for the arrangement was or what was
being done with the microfilm being furnished.176 Yet the documents
do not reflect whether the Recordak machine was removed, either in
1965 or in 1968.
It is clear that NSA continued to receive duplicates of all messages to
the foreign country referred to above until 1972 ; when again as a result
of "discovery" by company officials, this procedure was halted. Although
the original request for this intercept procedure had been
made by "Holabird people" (Army intelligence), when the company
attempted to contact someone regarding its termination, it was ultimately
referred to NSA.177
Finally, Western Union International, unlike its competitors, never
utilized magnetic tapes to store its message traffic. Accordingly, none
was ever provided NSA.178
In effeCt, Western Union International's participation in SHAM
ROCK ended by 1972.179
H. NSA's Participation
1. Origins and Early Developmem
From 1952 (when NSA first inherited the SHAMROCK sources)
until 1963, microfilm and paper tapes originating with the sources
were brought to NSA's headquarters at Ft. Meade, Maryland several
times a week.180 As noted above, some of these had undergone initial
screening, either by NSA operatives or company employees. Even
with this preliminary screening, however, the volume of messages
which reached NSA daily was apparently quite large.l8l
176 Ibid.
... Affidavit of senior officer, Western Union International, Ine., 10/16/75, p. 1.
178 Letter from an NSA courier to an NSA official, 2/9/68.
1'" Counsel, Western Union International, 10/10/75, p. 2 (sta1f summary).
178 Ibid., p. 3.
1.. Tordella, 9/21/75, p. 53.
w Tordella, 10/21/75, p. 17.
181 A former NSA official testified that NSA had received "literally miles and
miles and miles of punched tape." 10/23/75, p. 49.
775
Several witnesses have told the Committee that during this period
the sheer volume of traffic would have likely prohibited the selection
of messages on the basis of content.182 Messages which were selected
out were passed on to NSA analysts, who screened them further.
fJ. The Switch to Magnetic Tape
The character of the SHAMROCK operation changed markedly
with the use of magnetic tape. RCA Global was the first company
to begin using such tape in the early 1960s.183 NSA was notified of
the changeover in early 1963 and, by 1964, was able to sort electronically
the information provided by RCA Global against its selection
criteria. This is significant because it meant that the telegrams
of citizens whose names were on NSA's "watch list" could be selected
for processing by NSA analysts.
From 1964 until 1966, magnetic tapes from RCA Global were
brought to Ft. Meade daily and returned to New York the same day.184
By 1965, ITT World Communications had also begun its changeover to
magnetic tapes and was beginning to provide traffic in this form to
NSA messengers.l85
3.0IA Oover Support
To alleviate the administrative burden entailed by these daily roundtrips,
NSA in 1966 sought to find a place in New York City where the
tapes could be duplicated.186 NSA Deputy Director Tordella requested
that the CIA provide "safe" space where this operation could be conducted.
The CIA agreed to rent office space in lower Manhattan, under
the guise of a television tape processing company, where the tape duplication
process could be carried out.187 CIA designated this project
"LPMEDLEY."
The cover support began in Novem'ber 1966 and lasted until August
1973, when CIA terminated its part of the program.188 Tordella was
told that the CIA General Counsel was "concerned about anI kind of
operation in which the CIA was engaged in the continental United
States. Regardless of whether CIA was doing anything so small as
renting an office, he said 'get out of it.' " 189 NSA subsequently moved its
duplicating operation to new office space in Manhattan, where it remained
until SHAMROCK was terminated in 1975.190
4. Oontrol of the Program
Numerous NSA employees were aware of SHAMROCK, but responsibility
for its conduct rested only with the Director, Deputy
Director, and one lower-level managerial employee.1s1 Throughout the
program's existence, only two individuals occupied this lower-level
1111 See Tordella, 10/21/75, p. 20; testimony of former NSA o1llclal, 10/23/75,
pp.49-50.
- Staff summary of interview with NSA o1llcial No. 5,10/24/75, p.1.
1116 Ibid.
... Ibid.
181 Tordella, 10/21/75, pp. 23-24; Senate Select Committee memorandum, "Review
of CIA Documents re LPMIDDLEY," 9/17/75.
181 Ibid.
... Letter from an NSA courier to an NSA o1llcial, 11/27/66.
181 Tordella, 10/21/75, p. 38.
1110 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 41.
776
managerial position: the first between 1952-1970; the other from 19701975.192
The manager was instructed to report directly to the Deputy Director
of NSA regarding any problems with the companies. As a routine
matter, this individual was in charge of the NSA couriers who traveled
between New York and Ft. Meade; he usually received information
regarding the SHAMROCK operation from these couriers rather
than from the companies. The individual who held this position between
1952-1970 told the Committee that he met with company officials
on only two occasions during this time, and both meetings were perfunctory.
193
Both of the NSA employees who acted as liaison with the companies
confirmed to the Committee that the companies had never asked
what NSA was extracting from the materials provided, and that NSA
had never volunteered this information. Neither of the· lower-level
employees knew what NSA did with the materials; they stated that
the messengers who worked under them also had no knowledge of
what was sorted from the telegrams.19• It seems clear, therefore, that
the companies never learned that NSA sorted anything except foreign
traffic from the telegrams that the companies provided NSA.
Since none of the companies (treating them as separate from their
parent corporations) engage in domestic communications, they could
not have provided NSA with domestic traffic. The Committee has no
evidence to show that NSA has ever received domestic telegrams from
any source.
5. Oonside:ration of SHAMROOK in OO'Yllltection with the
HU8tonPlan
Former NSA Deputy Director Tordella told the Committee that in
1970, in connection with the Huston plan,m the principals involved
in this projectr-Helms of CIA, Sullivan of the FBI, Bennett of DIA,
and Gayler of NSA-discussed the feasibility of the FBI's taking over
the SHAMROCK program in order to obtain more information on
internal unrest. The FBI did not want the responsi'bility, according to
Tordella, and NSA did not want to jeopardize its own working relationship
with the companies.19G The Idea was therefore dropped.
F. Termination of SHAMROOK
Operation SHAMROCK terminated on May 15, 1975, by order of
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.19T NSA claims that the program
was terminated because (1) it was no longer a valuable source of
foreign intelligence, and (2) the risk of its exposure had increased.198
:1M Staff summaries of interviews with NSA official No.5, 10/24/75, p. 1; and
former NSA employee, 10/24/75, p. 1.
m Former NSA employee, 10/2V75, PP. 1-2 (staff summary).
1.. Ibid. See also NSA official No.5, 10/24/75, p. 2 (staff summary).
1llIi The formulation and content of the Huston Plan are described in the Committee's
report: "National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of Intelligence:
A Report on the Huston Plan."
lOITordella, 10/21/75, pp. 34-35, 47-49.
m Staff summary of interview with senior NSA officilal No.3, 9/17/75, p. 1.
The Committee also reviewed a handwritten memorandum from the Director
of NSA, Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., dated May 12, 1975, which stated that the Secretary
of Defense had decided that SHAMROCK should be terminated, effective
May 15, 1975.
1lI8 Senior NSA official No.3, 9/17/75, p. 3.
777
IV. NSA PERSONNEL SECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS
The Committee investigated the NSA Office of Security to examine
personnel security activities which may have been conducted in an
overzealous and, possibly, unlawful manner. These activities are
not part of NSA's two primary missions-the collection of signals
intelligence and the protection of United States communications. Although
this subject area is more narrow than others investigated by
the Committee, there are similiarities involving the protection of both
the rights of citizens and the national security.
A. B{l(Jkground
The NSA Office of Security is responsible for safeguarding the
security of NSA facilities, operations, and personnel, and for protecting
classified materials from unauthorized disclosure. This Office also
administers NSA's security clearance program and investigates suspected
breaches of security by NSA employees. The CIA's Office of
Security performs the same functions for that Agency.
Personnel in the NSA Office of Security are quick to point out that
substantial intangible differences exist between the role of the CIA
and NSA Offices of Security. In recent years, the NSA Office has not
enjoyed the same high status within NSA that the CIA Office has had
within its own organization. At least two factors appear to contribute
to this difference. First, the work of an Office of Security investigator
bears no similarity to that performed by the professionals conducting
signals intelligence and communications security activities, which
comprise the heart of NSA. Second, during the 1950s and 1960s, personnel
security programs at NSA suffered some widely publicized
failures, resulting in both prosecutions for espionage and actual defections
to the Soviet Union by NSA employees.
These factors have impelled the Office in conflicting directions. On
the one hand, its personnel are not expected, and ordinarily do
not tend, to take actions on their own initiative that would
exceed the normal bounds of keeping the Agency reasonably secure.
On the other hand, failures in personnel security have occasionally
generated intense public pressure (especially from the House Committee
on Un-American Activities) to take extraordinary measures to
protect that security.
A fair analysis of the incidents listed below, all of which are of
dubious legality or propriety, requires an awareness of these dynamics.
Like other Government officials, personnel in the Office of Security
must be held responsible for their actions. Yet, like most people in
the United States, they have been greatly sensitized 'by the Watergate
scandal and the recent congressional investigations of the intelligence
community to the need to protect civil liberties against dangerous encroachments
in the name of "national security." In this section we
disclose certain aberrations from that sensitivity, in the confidence
that this disclosure will encourage its growth.
B. Questionable Activities
1. NSA Office of Seaurity: Access to Files on American Oitizens
From NSA's inception in 1952 until October 1974, a unit of the
Agency outside the Office of Security maintained a large number of
files on American citizens. At the time of the destruction of these
778
records, approximat~ly '75,000 United States citizens were included.
Unlike CIA's Operatons CHAOS, these files were not created for the
purpose of monitoring the activities of Americans, but for carrying
out NSA's legitimate foreign intelligence mission.loo
Many circumstances could contribute to the creation of such a file,
perhaps the most frequent being the mere mention of an American
citizen's name in a communication intercepted by NSA. The files also
included reports from other intelligence agendes, such as the CIA
and military intelligence units, which mentioned the name of the citizen
and were routinely forwarded to NSA. Materials from open
sources, such as newspapers, were also in the files.
Until the files were destroyed, the Office of Security was often supplied
with information from them when it was conducting background
investigations on applicants for employment at NSA or when other
persons were heing considered for clearances to receive intelligence
gathered by NSA. In effect, this meant that the Office of Security
was a beneficiary of the vast communications intelligence apparatus
of the entire Agency, a resource which is on an entirely different order
of sophistication than the wiretapping capability of any police or
security force in the nation.
(a) CIA Access to N8A Files.-The NSA files contained entrie.<'
on many prominent Americans in business, the performing arts, and
politics, including members of Con,!!Tess. Althou.Q"h the Committee
has no reason to believe that any person at NSA used them
improperly, it has learned that for at least 13 years, one or more employees
of the CIA worked full-time in these files, retrieving information
for the CIA without 1tny snperdsion from NSA. One of thesl'
CIA employees recalled, with varying degrees of certainty, chl'cking
in these files for the names of V'arious well-known civil rights, antiwar,
and political leaders.
It is likely, although the Committee is not in a position to so state,
that some of the information obtained from NSA found its way into
Operation CHAOS.200
NSA did not develop these files for any sinister reason. They were
useful in many ways to conducting successfully NSA's legitimate
communications intelligence functions. Nevertheless, the fact that CIA
personnel used the files without NSA supervision to gather information
on American citizens-during a period when the CIA was engaged
in unlawful domestic activities aimed against many of those same
citizens-illustrates the danger of maintaining such files. The massive
centralization of this information creates a temptation to use it for
improper purposes, threatens to "chill" the exercise of First Amendment
rights, and is inimical to the privacy of citizens.
(b) Destruction of Files.-The Committee was informed by NSA
that the files on American citizens were de-stroyed in 1974. At that
time, a centralized information storage system for foreign names was
set up in the intelligence community. This reorganization provided the
impC'tlls for a re-evalllation of the fileR on American citizens, and It
consensus was reached that their usefulness did not justify the costs
in time, money, and storage space.
,.. For a detailed discussion spe the Committpe's report on Operation CHAOS.
... Testimony of a CIA employee, 7/25/75. pp. 17, 25.
779
2. Faqvre to Purge "Suitability Files"
LikE> other Federal ag-encies, NSA maintains "suitability files" concerning
its employees. These files, which are held by the Office of
Civilian Personnel, constitute an interface between that Office and the
Office of Security. The latter provides information to these files and
has access to them. These files contain highly personal information
which mig-ht show the kind of unreliability or vulnerability of an
employee which could lead to compromises of classified information.
According to NSA, the purpose of these files is to aid the Agency in
providing- counseling- and other forms of assistance to individuals with
personal problems, not to threaten or damage such employees. The
Committee has no reason to believe that the information in these files
has been misused. During its investigation. the Committee reviewed
50 of these files, selected on a random basis, with the names of all individnals
deleted.
Since the information stored in these files is so personal, it seems
reasonable to expect that its retention would be kept to the minimum
necessary for the purposes of these files. Unfortunately, this policy
does not se('m to have been observed in the past. ~fnch of the information
is either many years old or simply irrelevant to the suitability of
an individual for employment.
If a systematic effort had been made periodically to review these
files and purge them of inappropriate or dated information, such notations
would probably have been eliminated long ago. The establishment
of such a system has now been undertaken by NSA. Although
persons in sensitive positions at ll!!pncies such as NSA may be expected
to sacrifice some degree of privacy to the need to protect national
security, that sacrifice must be kept within reasonable bounds.
A related question is the access of employees to their own files. NSA
regulations provide: "In no instance will employees be given access to
their own Suitability File." 201 Nevertheless, with the recent implementation
of the Privacy Act, employees may ask for, and be granted,
access to their files. Since the Committee fonnd that these files sometimes
contain unsolicited and unsubstantiated statements from neighbors.
p.powes. and others. thp Privacv Act should result in much of
this information being purged. ..
3. Files on NonafRlia-tes of NSA Who Publish Writings Ooncerning
the Agency
The Office of Security maintained files on two individuals who have
published materials describing the work of the National Security
Agency. In one case, the relevant writin!!S were published in the late
1960s; in the other case, much more recently.
By the time of the second case, NSA had gained some experience in
dealing with pnblicity. The file on this person consisted mainly of
checks with other Federal agencies to determine what information
they possessed concerning the author. and the results of various internal
NSA inquiries as to where the f1uthor mip-ht have obtained
information. Nevertheless, the Offil'e of Secnrity did submit the author's
name for inclusion on the NSA watch list. There is no evidence
that this submission resnlted in the dissemination of any international
messages sent or received by the author.
201NSA Personnel Management Manual (NSAPMM). Section 2-7(c) (2).
69-984 0 - 76 - 50
780
In the earlier case, the Agency appears to have overreacted. NSA
had learned of the author's forthcoming publication and spent innumerable
hours attempting to find a strategy to prevent its release,
or at least lessen its impact. These discussions extended to the highest
levels of the Agency, including the Director, and resulted in the matter
being brought to the attention of the United States Intelligence
Board.
In the course of these discussions, possible measures to be taken
against the author were considered with varying degrees of seriousness.
The Director suggested planting disparaging reviews of the
author's work in the press, and such a review was actually drafted.
Also discussed were: purchasing the copyright of the writing; hiring
the author into the Government so that certain criminal statutes would
apply if the work were published; undertaking "clandestine service
applIcations" against the author, which apparently meant anything
from physical surveillance to surreptitious entry; and more explicit
consideration of conducting a surreptitious entry at the home of the
author. To the credit of those involved, none of these measures were
carried out.
Other steps, however, were taken. The author's name was placed
on the NSA watch list and various approaches were made to his
publisher. The publisher submitted a manuscript of the work to the
Department of Defense, apparently without the author's permission.
Despite requests from NSA to halt publication or to make extensive
deletions, publication took place with only minor changes, to which
the author had agreed.
The most remarkable aspect of this entire episode is that the conclusion
reached as a result of NSA's review of this manuscript was
that it had been written almost entirely on the basis of materials
already in the public domain. It is therefore accurate to describe the
measures considered by NSA and USIB as an "overreaction."
4. Other Files Maintained by the Office of Security
Although the Office of Security does not maintain files today on
persons not affiliated with the Agency, it has done so in the past.
The Agency describes these files in the following terms:
The maintenance of these files began in the late 1950s.
In early 1974, approximately 2800 files concerning nonaffiliated
organizations and personnel were destroyed in accordance
with DOD Directive 5200.27. The files consisted of
reports from the FBI and other intelligence, security and
federal agencies as well as state and mumcipal agencies who
maintained such records. Information was also obtained from
the congressional records of the House Committee on lTnAmerican
Activities, and open source, commercial publicatiQns.
These files were retained primarily as a reference source
for security education purposes, as an aid to our personnel
security process and to provide assessment regarding the
vulnerability of this Agency to foreilZll intelligence activities
and extremists activities which posed a threat to the NSA
mission, functions and property.
Of the 2800 files which were accumulated, the great majority
concerned forei,gn controlled and subversive organizations
cited by the Attorney General of the United States.
781
These organizations were those advocating the overthrow of
the U.S. Government, and the violent disruption of the
orderly process of government, etc. The small percentage of
files maintained on individuals concerned suspected espionage
agents, extremists, anarchists, etc. These persons were both
U.S. and foreign citizens.202
DOD Directive 5200.27 was first issued in March 1971, and it greatly
restricted the discretion of Department of Defense units to retain
such files. The Directive stated, however, that it was "not applicable
to the acquisition of foreign intelligence information or to activities
involved in ensuring communications security." 203 NSA's General
Counsel interpreted this language as exempting NSA from the coverage
of the Directive, and was supported in this opinion by a Deputy
General Counsel in the Department of Defense.204 Only in 1973 was
NSA informed by the Defense Investigative Review Council
(DIRC) that some of its activities were subject to the Directive. Once
this was established, NSA took steps to comply, which included destruction
of of the 2800 files.205
In April 1975, the DIRC conducted an unannounced inspection of
the KSA Office of Security to ascertain its compliance with DOD
Directive 5200.27. Although substantial compliance was found, the
DIRC did note that the Office still maintained three files with some
questionable entries. These files concerned "threats" to NSA functions
and property; characterizations of organizations; and unsolicited inquiries
and "cranks." 206 Since the time of the DIRC report, NSA has
drastically reduced the amount of materials in these files.
The Committee did obtain from NSA copies of the files as they
existed at the time of the DIRC inspection. As the DIRC reJ?Ort noted,
the first two of these files contained some questionable entrIes. At the
time of the inspection, the "threat" file still contained extensive infonnation
on a peaceful demonstration of less than 40 persons ne.ar
NSA headquarters in 1974. Similarly, the "characterizations" file reflects
the fact that in the past the Office of Security would prepare a
characterization of almost any organization that an NSA employee
wanted information about before joining it or otherwise becomin~ involved.
The characterizations were prepared largely on the baSIs of
NSA's own files and from infonnation supplied by other agencies.
It appears that DOD Directive 5200.27 and its enforcement through
the DIRC mechanism are functioning effectively at this time to prevent
the excessive accumulation of files on American citizens.
6. Office of Security Participation in Watch List Activity.
Innis testimony before the Committee, NSA Director, General Lew
Allen, Jr., detailed the efforts made by the Agency to intercept communications
to and from certain AmerICan citizens from the late 1960s
until 1973.207 Not all of the names "watch listed" under this program
,.., NSA Response, 8/25/75, p. 4.
.... DOD Dh"ective 5200.27, 3/1/71, section H.B. See the Committee's report:
"Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military," for a detailed discussion
of this directive.
... Ibid.
... NSA Response, 8/25/75, p. 1.
... Ibid., Tab 3, p. 6.
... Hearings, Vol. 5, pp.1-46.
782
were submitted to NSA from the outside. The Office of Security also
submitted approximately 13 names for monitoring.
Of these names, 11 had some present or past affiliation with NSA.
Each of these 11 individuals had either defected to the Soviet Union,
been convicted of espionage, were suspected of some other connection
to an unfriendly power, or had made threats against NSA or its Dire0tor.
Two of the names were of American citizens not affiliated with
NSA. As described earlier, these two persons had published writings
in this country about the Agency's activities, causing the Office of
Security concern about the possible compromise of classified
information.
The Government does have a continuing legitimate interest in the
communications of defectors and suspected enemy agents, and should
be permitted to intercept such communications if the proper procedures
(e.g., a warrant or approval of the Attorney General) are established.
The danger in allowing the Office of Security to place names
on a watch list is that the decision as to whether the activitIes of a particular
individual are sufficiently suspicious to justify intrusion into
the privacy of his communications is left in the hands of an interested
party: the Office of Security itself. The inclusion of the names of two
persons not affiliated with the Agency-neither of whom was seriously
suspected of any intent to aid a foreign power and each of whom was
directly exercising First Amendment freedom&-illustrates the tend..
ency of limited infringements of privacy to be extended to an everwidening
scope. Only the involvement of a neutral third party can
help safeguard against such extensions.
6. Oonventional Electronic Surveillance and Surreptiti0u8
Entries
For many years, the Office of Security has scrupulously avoided
the use of conventional electronic surveillance off NSA premises. It
has neither tapped any telephones nor engaged in any bugging of
rooms outside the Agency since 1958.
In the late 1950s, four instances of electronic surveillance without
a court order did take place. Three of these incidents transpired at the
residences of present or former NSA employees. The fourth occurred
in aNew York City hotel room occupied by one of those same persons.
The subjects of surveillance ranged from persons convicted of espionage
activities to persons friendly with diplomatic personnel of unfriendly
foreign powers and/or homosexuals. The duration of the
coverage varied from a few days to three months.
The technology of the bugging devices used by the Office of Security
in the late 1950s was such that they could only be installed by
trespassory means. Each of the above instances thus involved a surreptitious
entry at the place being bugged. Moreover, the devices were
battery operated; in the case of a surveillance lasting three months,
periodic re-entries were necessary to charge the batteries powering the
device.20B
In addition, the Office of Security conducted four surreptitious entries
in the early 1960s which were unrelated to electronic surveillance
and which did not involve warrants. The entries involved two defectors
to the Soviet Union (Martin and Mitchell), an employee suspected
.... Staff summary of an interview with NSA Office of Security official, 8/8/75.
783
of taking classified documents out of NSA, and an employee who had
contact with an embassy of an unfriendly foreign power.
With the passage of many years since these relatively isolated incidents,
it is difficult to ascertain the levels at which they were approved.
Both past and present Directors of Security at NSA have stated that
they ·would not have taken place without the approval of the person
holding that position, and that at the time of these incidents the Director
of Security enjoyed such a close working relationship with the
Director of NSA that the surveillance would not likely have occurred
without the Director's knowledge.209
7. "External Oollection Program"
In 1963, after a review of the Office of Security's counterintelligence
program by the Office and the Director of NSA, several steps were
taken to strengthen the program. Among these was the establIshment
in October 1963 of an "External Collection Program." 210 It appears
that this "program" was, from its beginning, highly informal. Office
of Security personnel had only vague and conflicting recollections as
to what it had consisted of or how long it had lasted.
Most did recall that the program included. brief periodic visits to
bars, restaurants, and other establishments in the vicinity of NSA
headquarters by Office of Security personnel. These visits were made
to determine where NSA employees gathered after hours, whether
they discussed classified information, and whether agents of hostile intelligence
services also frequented these locations. The program also
involved an effort to encourage persons working in these establishments
to report any suspicious incident to NSA and to make the local
police aware of the sensitivity of NSA's mission.
Since the revelant documents were destroyed in 1973, the Committee
has been unable to establish whether the External Collection Program
was used to gather information on persons other than NSA employees
and foreign agents. The Office of Security, in fact, soon discovered that
it lacked the personnel to carryon such a program, and it died quietly
"in approximately 1966-1967." 211
20' Staft' summary of an interview with NSA Office of Security official, 8/22/75.
210 NSA response of 9/30/75 to Senate Select Committee letter of 9/3/75.
2U Ibid.

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