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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

THE USE OF INFORMANTS IN FBI DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction and Summary_____ 227
A. Summary of facts ______________________________________ 228
1. The extensive use of intelligence informants__ _______ 228
2. The unpublished standards for the use of intelligence
informants____________________________________ 228
B. Policy and constitutional issues raised by the use of intelligence
informants__________________________________________ 230
C. The lack of judicial treatment of intelligence informant issues_ 231
D. The scope of the committee's investigation ________________ 233
II. The Nature of the Intelligence Informant Technique_______________ 233
A. Case histories of particular informants ____________________ 233
1. Mary Jo Cook-FBI informant in the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War__________________________ 235
a. Background______________________________ 235
b. Cook'l3 instructions________________________ 236
c. The scope of Cook's reporting_______________ 236
d. Cook's taking of VVAW documents__ ________ 237
e. Reporting on non-VVAW groups and individuals_
________________________________ 238
2. Gary Rowe-FBI informant in the Ku Klux Klan_ __ 239
a. The use of intelligence informants to report
Klan violence and criminal activity________ 239
b. The scope of Rowe's reporting_ _____________ 241
c. The issue of participation in criminal or violent
activity ________________________________ 243
B. Examples of intelligence informant coverage of groups subject
to intelligence investigations_ _____________ ________ __ ___ 244
Case No. I-Citizens panel on the merits of an antiballistic
missile system (1969)______________________ 245
Case No.2-Dr. Carl McIntyre's American Christian
Action Council (1971)_____________________________ 246
Case No. 3-Detroit Black Panther Party (1970) ______ 246
Case No.4-National Conference on Amnesty (1974)_-- 247
Case No. .'I-Public meeting opposing U.S. involvement
in Vietnam war (1966) ____________________________ 247
Case No.6-Black Nationalist group (1968)___________ 248
Case No.7-Investigation of "free universities" (1966)___ 249
Case No.8-Washington, D.C. Black Panther Party
(1970-1971)_____________________________________ 249
Case No. 9-Women's Liberation Movement (I969) ____ 250
Case No. lQ-Socialist Workers Party (1949 to date)___ 251
Case No. ll-Ku Klux Klan________________________ 251
C. Special FBI informant programs _________________________ 252
1. The ghetto informant program____________________ 252
2. The plant informantprogram (1940-69) ____________ 255
3. The American Legion contact program (1940-54)____ 255
D. The use of informants at colleges and universities_ _________ 255
1. Present FBI policy_______________________________ 255
2. The background to present policy__________________ 2.'16
a. Initial guidelines for use of campus informers_ _ 256
b. The 1967 restrictions ______________________ 257
c. Hoover's resistance to new pressure for relaxed
restrictions on campus informants_ ________ 257
d. The Huston plan's recommendation for expanded
campus informant coverage___ _____ 258
e. The removal of the age restriction__ _________ 259
(225)
226
III. The Intelligence Informant Program-Size, Administration, and Page
Standards__________________________________________________ 260
A. The number of intelligence informants_ ___________________ 260
B. The FBI administrative system for intelligence informants_ __ 261
C. Standards for the use of intelligence informants____________ 262
1. Criteria for the decision to use informants___________ 263
2. Limits on the information an informant may report_ _ 264
3. Limits on an informant's conduct and behavior______ 266
THE USE OF INFORMANTS IN FBI DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
1. INTRODVCTIOX AXD Sl:MiUARY
The dangers to a free society that are implicit in the use of secret
intelligence informers have long been reeognized. In his OonstituMorlal
Histol'Y of E'ngland: written in the mid-19th centmy, Sir
Thomas May observed:
Men may be without restraints upon their liberty; they may
pass to and fro at pleasure: but if their steps are tracked by
spies and informers, their words noted down for crimination,
their associates watched as conspirators--who shall say that
they are free? 1
May pointed to the use of infonners by "continental despotisms,"
noting that "the freedom of a country may be measured by its immunity
from this baleful agency." 2
On the other hand, law enforcement officials see informants 3 as a
highly effective technique-Qne justified by the public's interest in the
detection of crime and the prosecution of criminals. FBI officials testified
tD the Committee that informants "provide one of the best and
most complete fonns of coverage}' in their investigations/ Fonner
Attorney General Katzenbach testified that the use of intelligence
informants in the mid-1960s to infiltrate the Ku Klux Klan-a technique
urged upon the FBI by President Johnson, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy, and Mr. Katzenbach-was a principal factor in
stopping repeated acts of criminal violence.
This Appendix, pursuant to the Committee's mandate under
Senate Resolution 21, focuses on the use of informants in FBI intelligence
investigations who are recruited, paid and directed by Bureau
Special Agents. The Committee did not examine the use of informants
in FBI criminal investigations nor did the Committee examine instances
of the "walk-in" who volunteers information to the FBI on a
one-time basis. As discussed in more detail below, paid and directed
intelligence informants are extensively used in FBI domestic intelligence
investigations of groups and individuals. These intelligence
informants are the subject of this Appendix.
The use of informants to collect intelligence on Americans is not
confined to the FBI. The Committee also examined the use of intelli-
1 T. .May, Oonstitutional History ot England (1863), p. 275.
• Id.
• The term "inforIIumt" is used throughout the remainder of this report. That
is the term employed in the statute which provides that appropriations for the
Department of Justice are available for payment of "informants," 28 U.S.C.
§ 524, and is also the term which tlte FBI employs in its directives.
• Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 11/25/75, Exbibit
88, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 444.
(227)
228
gence informants by other goYernmental agencies, In the late 1960s,
informants and undercover agents wm'e used by the CIA and Army
Intelligence to secretly penetrate domestic groups. In 1968, about 1500
Army intelligence agents were engaged in monitoring and penetrating
civilian acti \·ity in the rnited States; although a 1971 Defense Depa,rtment
directive now generally limits the military's collection of information
about priYate groups and indiYiduals, the directive permits the
military to secretly penetrate civilian groups where approved by the
Defense Department. See the Appendices on Improper Surveillance
of Private Citizen.g by the Military and CIA Intelligence Activities
Regarding American.g. In addition, the Internal Hevenue Service uses
informants for intelligence purposes. See the IRS Report: p. 863,
"Selective Enforcement for Non-Tax Purposes."
A. Swrnmary of Facts
1. The Exten.give Use of Intellige1Ufe Informants
The paid and directed informant is the most extensively used technique
in FBI domestic intelligence investigations. Informants were
used in 85 percent of the domestic intelligence investigations analyzed
in a recent study by the General Accounting Office.5 By comparison,
electronic surveillance was used in only 5 percent of the cases
studied. The FBI places strong emphasis on informant coverage in intelligence
investigations, instructing agents tq "develop reliable informants
at all levels and in all segments" of groups under investigation.
6
The Committee's investigation revealed that the FBI was using
more than 1,500 domestic intelligence informants as of June 30,1975.7
The FBI budget for Fiscal Year 1976 programmed a total of $7,401,000
for the intelligence informant program, more than twice the
amount allocated for the organized crime informant program.s
The number of intelligence informants has been substantially larger
in previous years because of the "Ghetto Informant Program," which
at its height comprised over 7,000 informants. The FBI began the
Ghetto Informant Program in 1967 in the context of the urban riots
and violence of the mid-1960'S, and in response to instructions from the
·White House and the Attorney General. Although "ghetto" informants
were initially used as "listening posts" to provide information on
the planning or organizing of riots and civil dIsturbances, many were
eventually given specific assignments to attend public meetings of
"extremists" and to identify bookstores and others distributing "extremist
literature", The FBI terminated the program in 1973 after
sharp debate within the Bureau over the program's eft'ectivenes.'l and
the propriety of the listening post concept.
Generally, there are two types of intelligence informants: those the
FBI first recruits and then inserts into investigated group under
investigation, and those who are already members of such a group and
are "turned" or recruited as FBI informants.
5 General Accounting Office, DOOW8tio Intelligence Operatioo8 of the FBI
(2/24/76).
• FBI Manual of Instructions Section 87 B (6), hereinafter cited as "FBI, MOl",
7 FBI Memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 11/28/75.
R ~reIllorandum, "FBI o,erall Intelligence Program FY 1977 compared to FY
1976." The intelligence informant program inclndes payments to informants for
services and expenses as well as FBI personnel and support costs and o'·erhead.
229
In addition to paid and directed informants, the FBI uses "confidential
sources," defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as persons
who furnish the FBI information available to them through
their position, such as "bankers, telephone company employees, and
landlords." 9 Confidential sources were used in 50 percent of the cases
analyzed by the GAO, ranking behind informants and local hnv enforcement
officials as the third most used techniques in intelligence
cases. As of .rune lll/5, there \wre 1,254 confidential sources apprO\'ed
by FBI headquarters for domestic intelligence purposes.9a
12. 7'lIe Unpublislled ,....'falldaJY!s for tile Use of Intelligence
Inforrnants.
The standards for the use of intelligence informants are contained
in internal FBI directives that are not available to the public.
The FBI Manual of Instructions sets few limits on the scope of
intelligence informant reporting. The Manual proscribes only the reporting
of communications between an attorney and client, legal
"defense plans or strategy," "employer-employee relationships"
(where an informant is connected with a labor union), and "legitimate
institution or campus activities" in schools.10 The Manual contains
no standard limiting an informant's reporting to information relating
to the commission of criminal offenses or even to violent or potentially
violent activity. In fact, intelligence informants repOlt on virtually
C\'ery aspect of a group's acti \'ity sening, in the words of both FBI
officials and an informant, as a "vacuum cleaner" of informationY
FBI officials recognized this broad scope of informant reporting as
a problem area, poiliting out that it produces "too much information"
in FBI files. lla They expressed their belief that an informant should
report to some degree the lawful aspects of a group's activity in
order to permit an accurate picture to be drawn. But they did recognize
the neecl "to narrow down" informant reporting from its present
broad scope.12
The Manual does not set independent standards which must be
supported by facts before an organization can be the subject of informant
coverage. Once the criteria for opening a regular intelligence
investigation are met, and the case is opened, informants can be used
without any restrictions.12a There is no specific determination made as
to whether the substantial intrusion represented by informant coverage
is justified by the government's interest in obtaining information.
There is nothing that requires that a determination be made of
whether less intrusive means will adequately serve the government's
interest. There is also no requirement that the decisions of FBlofficials
to use informants be reviewed by anyone outside the Bureau. In
• FBI, MOL Sec. 107, A(4).
o. FBI deposition, 2/10/76, p. 12.
I. FBI,MOI, Sees. 107 D(2d), U(lb).
11 James Adams testimony 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135; Mary Jo Cook
testimony 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 111.
Ua Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135.
u Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135.
,.. Under a Manual provision adopted in 1973, established informants may suppLy
information in a preliminary investigation, but new informants may not be
l'eel'llited. (FLU, )101, Sec. 87. B (-Ie).) The Attorney General's draft guidelines
for domestic intelligence investigation similarly provide that only established informants
may be used in preliminary investigations. (Draft Guidelines for Domestic
Secntrity Investigations, 12/9/75, Sec. II (E) (G).)
230
short, intelligence informant coverage has not been subject to the
standards which govern the use of other intrusi ve techniques such as
wiretapping or other forms of electronic surveillance. (Compare the
requirements for use of electronic surveillance and wiretaps discussed
in "Intelligence Acti vities and the Rights of Americans"; Part IV.)
B. Policy and Oonstitutional Issues Raised by the Use of Intelligence
I nfol'ma:nts
The use of informants and confidential sources in intelligence investigations
of domestic groups and citizens can raise important policy
and Constitutional issues. Unlike investigations of specific criminal
activity, intelligence investigations frequently have involved continuous
surveillance across a broad spectrum of activity. vVhere "intelligence"
rather than evidence of particular criminal activity is collected,
informants and confidential sources give the FBI a large amount of
information dealing with the lawful political and personal activity of
citizens. Former FBI informants infiltrated into organizations testified
that they reported "any and everything" they saw or heard pertaining
to the group's members,13 and that they took membership lists, financial
data, and other records and gave them to the FBI. This testimony
was confirmed by the FBI agents to whom they reported. As one agent
testified, his informant "told me everything she knew" about the political
organization she infiltrated.14
Under the Bill of Rights, particularly the First and Fourth Amendments,
our Constitution protects freedom of speech and political associ~
tion and the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
SClzures.
In the light of the protections guaranteed by our Constitution, the
use of informants for intelligence purposes raises three principal
issues:
(1) The first issue concerns whether informants should be used at all
in mtelligence investigations,I5 and, if so, under what circumstances.
The use of informants in the investigation of groups and individuals
involved in political activity may chill the exercise of First Amendment
rights. For example, citizens interested in attending a meeting of
a political group either to join or to express support for a lawful
interest they share with the group, may be deterred by the fear that
their athmdance would mark them as a member in an informant's eyes.
They may fear an informant's report will prevent their gaining a job
requiring a security clearance, even though in fact they supported no
unlawful activity. Although citizens may not know that a secret
informant is reporting on a particular group, the mere existence of
the FBI intelligence informant system can be sufficient to cause them
to curtail their exercise of First Amendment rights for fear they will
be reported to the FBI.
(2) The second issue concerns the scope of an informant's reporting.
Should an informant report only indications of criminal or violent
activity, or should he report all aspects of a group's activity and the
13 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116, Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, vol. 6, p. 111.
14 Special Agent, 11/20/75, p. 55.
U This Report focuses solely on the informant technique as used in intelligence
investigations. It does not address the question of whether intelligence investigations
are themselves consistent with Constitutional guarantees and sound law
enforcement policy or can be made so by appropriate standards and controls. See
the Committee's Report on Domestic Intelligence and the Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendations in that Report.
231
personal lives of individuals in the interest of intelhgence? In this
connection, there is the further question of whether an informant
should be permitted to take the confidential records and documents of
a group or individual (such as membership lists or financial data)
and give them to the FBI, when the Government cannot properly
obtain them through statutory disclosure requirement, subpoena, or
search warrant.
(3) Finally, there is the issue of an informant's conduct and behavior.
The Committee heard testimony on the difficulties inherent
in an informant reporting on violent and criminal activity. To be
in a position to report, the informant may have to participate in the
unlawful activity to some degree. As one FBI handling agent testified
of an informant in a violence-prone elemt'nt of the Ku Klux Klan, "he
couldn't be an angel and be a good informant.16 ""Where such an in:
formant is paid ancl direded hy the FBI, the Government may be
placed in the at least unseemly posture of involvement through its
agents in the activity it is seeking to prevent. At the extreme, the Government's
informant may be held to have acted as an agent provocateur,
that is, an agent of the Government who has provoked illegal or
\,io]ent activity.
C. Tile Lack of Judicial Treatment of Intelligence Informant Issues
These issues have rarely been before the courts. This is in part due
to the nature of secret intelligence informant activity. Members of a
group will seldom learn that an FBI intelligence informant has been
in their midst or has copied their records for the FBI because intelligence
investigations almost invariably do not result in proseeutionsY
'Vithout knowledge of an informant's aeti\'ity and in the absence of a
prosecution, a group or its members will not come before a court to
raise Constitutional objections. Consequently, there are few court decisions
and those that do exist usually concern criminal, rather than intelligence
informants. In Hoffa v. United States,18 a criminal case
involving charges of bribing a jury, the Supreme Court held that an
informant's testimony concerning a defendant's conversations could
not be considered the product of a search where the defendant had consented
to the presence of the individual who served as an informant.
The facts did not, however, present the issue of whether an inform-
16 Special Agent, 11/21/75, p. 12.
17 Only 16 of the domestic intelligence cases reviewed by the General Accounting
Office--or less than 3 percent-were referred to a U.S. attorney or to local
authorities for possible prosecution. Of the 16 referrals for criminal violations,
only 7 were prosecuted. (GAO Study, p. 33)
Even where there are grounds for prosecution in a domestic intelligence case,
such as acts of violence, the decision may be made to forego prosecution rather
than surface an informant. The informant's continued reporting from within an
organization may be deemed more valuable than a particular prosecution. This
in turn may lead to the use of illegitimate action to prevent violence, such as that
employed in the FBI's "COINTELPRO" operation. (See COINTELPRO Report.)
16 385 U.S. 293 (1966). The Hoffa court stated: "The risk of ... being betrayed
by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is
probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we
necessary assume whenever we speak." In another criminal ease, Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), the Court, in declining to rule that the use of
undercoyer agents is unconstitutional per se, stated: "In the detection of many
types of crime, the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the
identity of its agents."
232
ant's surreptitious taking of documents for the Government constituted
an unlawful search.
The Select COlllmittee's investigation has re\'ealed for the first time
the extremely broad scope of FBI intelligence informant surveillance
and reporting. The Supreme Court has yet to be presented with the
types of f'letual situations-such as intensive informant coverage of
lawful political activity and personal matters-which may produce the
chilling of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. :Moreover,
apart from particular cases which may come before a court, the overall
effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights in the society at
large Illay be very great where it is known that a large-scale intelligence
informant system is operating. No court has seen the o\'erall pattern
of FBI intelligence informant coverage of citizens and groups.
Consequently, courts have been unable to assess the full impact of the
informant system on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
A U.S. Army surveillance system was challenged on First Amendment
grounds in Laird v. l'atwn, but the Court described the information
gathered in that case as "nothing more than a good newspaper
reporter ,,'otl1d be able to gather by attendance at public meetinb"S and
the clipping of articles from publications availalble on any newsstand."
19
In a more recent case, the Ca.lifornia Supreme Court held that secret
surveillance of classes and group meetings at a university through the
use of undercover agents was "likely to pose a substantial restraint
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights." 20 Citing a number of
U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the California Supreme Court stated in
its unanimous decision:
In view of this significant potential chilling effect, the
challenged surveillance activities can only be sustained if [the
Government] can demonstrate a "compelling" state interest
which justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendment
rights and which cannot be served by alternative means less
intrusive on fundamental rights.21
19 In a 5--4 decision, the Court held only that a complaint that First Amendment
rights were chilled by "the mere existence, without more" of an Army intelligence
activity alleged to be broader than necessary did not present a justiciable
controversy in Federal court. Because the complaint failed to allege more specific
harm than mere subjection to governmental scrutiny, it failed to state a Federal
claim. 408 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)
However, Justice l\:larshall, sitting as a Circuit Justice, held that a Federal
claim under the First Amendment was stated in Socialist WO'rkers Party v.
Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1315 (1974). There, Justice Marshall found that allegations
of a "chilling effect" on First Amendment rights were sufficiently specific
to satisfy jurisdictional requirements where it was complained that FBI informants
were to monitor a public meeting of the Socialist Workers Party. The
complaint stated that FBI informant coverage would have the concrete effect of
dissuading delegates from participating in the convention and lead to possible
loss of employment for those identified by the informants as attending. Although
Justice Marshall refused to grant an injunction against the use of informants at
the convention, he did prohibit the Government from transmitting any information
obtained at the convention to nongovernmental entities and left to a trial on
the merits the question of whether the claimed "chill" was substantial enough to
justify permanent injunctive and monetary relief.
2() White v. Davis, 533 Pac. Rep. 2d, 222, 232 (California Supreme Court, 1975).
"533 Pac Rep. 2d, at 232.
233
D. The Scope of the Oommittee's Investigation
Before tUl'lling to the discussion below, two points as to the Committee's
investigation must be noted.
First, in recognition of the sensitive nature of the informant technique,
including the risk of exposure or physical harm to present and
former informants, the Committee worked out procedures with the
cooperation of the Attorney General and the FBI to protect the integrity
of the FBPs operations while assuring the Committee's ability
to conduct a thorough investigation. For example, while materials on
full FBI intelligence investigations were examined, including informant
reports on taJ'get groups and particular incidents, the names and
identities of informants were not revealed unless they had previously
been made public through court proceedings or the informant's own
choice.
Second, as noted above, the Committee's investigation focused on
the use of FBI-paid and directed intelligence informants and FBIapproved
confidential sources, not criminal informants, one-time
"walk-ins" or citizens who provide information to FBI Special
Agents on their own initiative. In short, the Committee's investigation
dealt not with the citizen's right to communicate with a law enforcement
agency, but with a specific and substantial government intelligence
program employing individuals who are paid and directed by
the FBI Intelligence Division. It is in this sense that the discussion
that follows uses the term "intelligence informant."
The discussion below is in two parts. To illustrate the nature of the
intelligence informant technique, Part One examines the case histories
of two former FBI intelligence informants. Part One also sets out
eleven additional examples of informant coverage in domestic intelligence
investigations and describes the "Ghetto Informant Program,"
conducted from 1967 to 1973, as well as other past FBI informant programs
directed towards specific concerns.
Palt Two discusses the size and scope of the FBI intelligence informant
program and the standards that exist for the use of intelligence
informants.
II. THE NATURE OF TilE INTELLlGENCB INFORMANT TECHNIQUE
A. Oase Histories of Particular Informants
To provide an understanding of the intelligence informant technique,
two case studies are presented. The first case study involves a
former FBI "subversive" informant in the Vietnam Veterans Against
the \Var, Mary .To Cook. The second case study involves a former FBI
"extremist" informant in the Ku Klux Klan, Gary Rowe. Before turning
to those cases, the FBI's definitions of subversive and extremist
informants are set fmth below.
Subversive Informants.-The FBI classifies its paid and directed
intelligence informants into two categories, "sub\"ersi,"e" and "extremist,"
corresponding to the 1\'00 types of domestic intelligence investiga234
tions. "Subversive" 22 informants are those used in the investigation of
"subversive activities;' defined in Section 87 of the FBI Manual as
"activities aimed at overthrowing, destroying, or undermining the
Government of the united States or any of its political subdivisions"
by illegal means.23 Section 87 has been applied to the activities of the
Communist Palty and a wide variety of other organizations which
the FBI believes have revolutionary characteristics. During the Vietnam
War, investigations of individuals labeled "Key Activists" were
conducted under Section 87, in which informant coverage was stressed.
For example, in January 1968, instructions went out to ten major field
offices to designate certain persons as "Key Activists." They were
defined as "individuals in the Students for a Democratic Society and
the anti-Vietnam war groups [who] are extremely active and most
vocal in their statements denouncing the United States and calling for
civil disobedience and other forms of unlawful and disruptive acts." 24
There was to be "an intensive investigation" of each "key activist":
Because of their leadership and prominence in the "new
left" movement, as well as the growing militancy of this
movement, each office must maintain high-level informant
coverage on these individuals so that the Bureau is kept
abreast of their day-to-da,Y activities as well as the organizations
they are affiliated wIth, to develop information regarding
their sources of funds, foreign contacts, and future
plans.25
Extremist Informants.-"Extremist" informants 25a are those used
in the investigation of "extremist" activities, defined in Section 122 of
the FBI Manual in the same way as subversive activities but also
including "denying the rights of individuals under the Constitution."
26 In practice, "extremist" investigations have concerned violence-
prone groups composed of members of one or another race. Section
122 is mtended to cover what the Bureau calls "White Hate"
22 A subversive informant (sometimes referred to as an "internal security"
informant) , is defined in the FBI Manual as :
"Individual actively engaged in obtaining furnishing current information on
security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be
protected. S\lJCh person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization,
or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able
to provide current information of value. (FBI, MOl, Sec. 107, I, A(l).)"
23 FBI, MOl, Sec. 87.A(4) .
.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 1/30/68.
25 Ibid.
250 An extremist informant is defined in the FBI Manual as :
"An individual whose identity must be protected and who is actively engaged in
obtaining and furnishing current information on extremist matters exclusively
to the Bureau. Extremist informants include any individual:
"a. W'ho is a member of or attends meetings of an extremist group (white,
black, or Indian) which has a propensity for violence or which strives to deny
individuals certain constitutional rights through the use of force, violence, or
intimidation;
"b. Who is in a position to obtain and provide current information of value
concerning s\lJCh organizations;
"c. Or who furnishes information on extremists who mayor may not be members
of extremist groups but are engaged in planning or carrying out any type
of guerrilla warfare against established institutions, which may be in violation
of local, state, or Federal laws." (FBI, :\101, Sec. 130, A(1).)
26 FBI, MOl, Sec. 122 A (1--e).
235
groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, and "Black Nationalist Hate"
groups, such as the Black Panther Party and the Nation of Islam. It
also applies to some American Indian groups such as the American
Indian Movement, as well as a variety of terrorist organizations
engaged in "urban guerrilla warfare." 2.
In the case of organizations of blacks, informant coverage in Section
122 investigations extended beyond the Black Panthers. In the
fall of 1970, the FBI decided to include "every Black Student Union
and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in
disorders." 28 The initial proposal for informant coverage called for
"preliminary inquiry through established sources and informants to
determine background, aims and purposes, leaders and Key Activists."
29 It was estimated this would cause FBI field offices to open
4,000 cases on both groups and individuals. The subsequent instructions
to the field offices stressed the n€;ed to investigate Black Student
Unions and similar groups and to "target informants and sources to
develop information regarding these groups on a continuing basis ...
and to develop such coverage where none exists." so
The case histories illustrating the activity of FBI's subversive and
extremist intelligence informants are presented below.
1. Mary Jo Oook-FBI Informant in the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War
In June 1973, Mary Jo Cook was recruited by the FBI field office
in Buffalo, New York to serve as a paid and di'rected informant in
the Buffalo chapter of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War
(VVAW).31
a. Background.-The FBI made limited investigations in 1967
and 1968 to determine if the Communist Party or other "subversive"
elements were directing or controlling the VVAW but concluded that
there was no such outside influence.32
In August 1971, a full investigation of the VVAW was opened on
the basis of repOlts that Communist youth groups were infiltrating
the VVAWand the alleged involvement of some VVAW members
in illegal demonstrations; militant antiwar activity by the VVAW,
includmg reported links with foreign elements, was also a basis for
the full investigation.s3 FBI concern centered on the national office
27 FBI, MOl, Sec. 22(A) .
.. Memorandum of the Executives Conference 10/29/70.
"ld.
.. 'Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/4170.
31 Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6 p.112.
.. FBI Memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 12/2/75; Hearings, Vol. 6,
Exhibit 72.
33 In a Memorandum to the Committee, the FBI described the basis for the
opening of the full investigation as follows:
"[In August 1971] information from a variety of sources dictated the need to
determine the extent of control over VVAW by subversive groups and/or violence-
prone elements in the antiwar movement. Sources had provided information
that VVAW was stockpiling weapons, VVAW had been in contact with
North Vietnam officials in Paris, France, VVAW was receiving funds from former
CPUSA. ~ember~ and VVAW was aiding and financing U.S. military deserti"
rs. AddItionally, lllformation had been reech'ed that some individual chapters
throughout the country had been infiltrated by the youth groups of the
CPUSA and the SWP. A trend of increased militancy developed within the
VVAWand the possibilities of violence escalated within the organization. During
December 1971, VVAW members forcibly and illegally occupied or Bur-
(Oontinued)
69-984 0 - 76 - 16
236
of the VVAW, which the FBI saw as adopting ~Iarxist-Leninistdoctrine
and anti-imperialist positions.
The FBI's investigation of local VVAW chapters was, in part, designed
to determine the extent to which they were following the position
of the VVA",V national office or were being infiltrated by Communist
elements.34
b. Oook's Irl.'structiOrt8.-From her initial meeting with the FBI
agent who recruited her, Cook understood that she was to serve
as both a reporter of information and a moderating force in the
VVA",V. Cook testified that she understood she was to act as "a voice
of reason . . . a !,ruiding force in the organization and keep things
calm, cool and collected." 35 Cook testified:
The major understanding that I got from the meeting was
that VVAW-WSO was an organization primarily of veterans
who v,ere possible victims of manipulation. They had 'been
through the Vietnam War. They had legitimate readjustment
needs, and the Bureau was afraid that they could become
violent or could become manipulated in a cause or social concern,
and they wanted me to go in there and participate in
the organization and make sure that the veterans didn't get
"ripped off".36
Cook's handling agent similarly testified that one of the main purposes
of placing Cook in the VVAW chapter was to neutralize any
violence or illegal activities, as well as to report them.37
c. The Scope of Cook's Reporting.-As to her reporting function,
Cook testified that she was to report virtually everything about the
VVAWand its members. She stated that:
... I was to go to meetings, write up reports ... on what
happened, "'ho was there ... to try to totally identify the
background of every person there, what their relationships
were, who they were living with, who they were sleeping with,
to try to get some sense of the local structure and the local
relationships among the people in the organization.3s
The FBI Special Agent to whom Cook reported similarly testified
as to the broad scope of Cook's reporting: "She told me everything
she knew about the Buffalo chapter of the VVAW." 39
To obtain the type of information desired by the FBI, Cook testified
that she took a leadership role in the VVAW. The FBI asked her
to go to as many regional and national meetings of the VVAW as
possible to "get a good sense of how the local chapter fit in [the]
national organization".4o Cook stated "it was a very democratic proc-
(Continued)
rounded public buildings and national mOlluments in New York City, Philadelphia,
Austin, Texas, and Washington, D.C." IfBI Memorandulll to Senate Select
Committee, 12/2/75, pp. 2-3; Hl'arings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 72.
.. Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 135. Cook had expressed an interest in being
an FBI informant to a close friend who was an informant ,vith the VVAW for
the FBI. Cook's friend put her in touch with an FBI agent. (Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings,
p. 110.)
os Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 110, 111.
34 Ibid.
S1 Special Agent, 11/20/75, p. 47.
3ft Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 111.
.. Special 'Agent, 11/20/75, p. 55.
.., Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 121.
237
ess [in the vv"nV] so that there ,vas no way that I could ... fulfill
the request of the FBI ... without actually becoming elected leadership
in the chapter"Y
The scope of Cook's intelligence reporting, including identities of
individuals, personal matters, and lawful political activity, is illustrated
by the following FBI summaries 42 of two reports given the
FBI by Cook:
Report No.1
Report concerns a meeting of the VVAW/WSO Women's
Group held November 5, 1973, in Buffalo, New York. Nine
women attended, all named in the report. One woman had
been the girlfriend of an individual named in the report who
was associated with the Martin Sostre Defense Committee
and lived with him for a while. Report concluded with plans
for a men's group meeting tQ be held later.
Report No. 92
Report concerns a meeting of the VVAW/WSO Steering
Committee held 11/10/73. Five identified individuals were
present. There was a discussion of finances and some displeasure
at the financial record system. Plans for a benefit at a bar
were discussed. Information ,vas presented concerning a newsletter
to be mailed out which will discuss the VVAW/WSO's
position on amnesty, the upgrading of discharges, information
about a strike at a Buffalo firm.
Some objections were raised concerning the wording of
some VVAW/WSO objectives.
Plans for a future coalition meeting organized. by two individuals
were discussed, the same coalition that worked on the
Impeach Nixon rally.
Matters concerning possible new members and/or attendees
at future meetings were discussed. Plans for a VVAW/WSO
team on a television sports quiz show were discussed.
One member raised four criticisms of the VVAW/WSO,
all listed. One member wrote a regional newsletter.
d. Oook's Taking of VVAW Documents.-Besides reporting in detail
on VVAvV members and meetings, Cook also took VVAW documents
and gave them to the FBV3 For example, Cook testified that
she gave the FBI VVAW mailing lists, thus providing the FBI with
the names of many individuals outside of the smaller number of people
who attended VVAW meetings.44
In addition to the mailing lists which Cook gave to the FBI, she
also took a number of other VVAW documents, including papers re-
<l Ibid.
•, The Committee had full access at FBI Headquarters to the reports of the
intelligence informants whose cases were examined. In view of the FBI's position
that delivery to the Committee of these reports would endanger the security
of the FBI's relations with present informants, it was agreed that FBI Special
Agents would prepare summaries of those informant reports to be referred to at
the public hearings or in the Committee's Report. The Committee staff verified
these summaries for accuracy and completeness against the full informant
reports.
.. Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 112.
•• Ibid.
238
lating to legal defense matters. As Cook's FBI handling agent testified:
She brought back several things ... various position papers
taken by various legal defense groups, general statements of
... the VVAW, legal thoughts on various trials, the Gainesville
(Florida) 8 ... the Camden (New Jersey) 9 ... various
documents from all of these groups.44B
Cook also gave the FBI a confidential legal manual prepared by
VVA\V attorneys as a guide for legal defense strategy and methods
should VVA\V members be arrested in demonstrations or other political
activity.45 As discussed in more detail below, the FBI Manual
provides that legal defense matters are not to be reported by informants.
However, the FBI interprets this provision as prohibIting only
the reporting of privileged attorney-client communications or legal
defense matters in connection with a specific trial. Since the VVAW
legal manual was intended for general use, rather than in connection
with a particular case, the FBI considered that the VVAW manual
did not fall within the prohibition.
e. Reporting on Non-VVAW Groups and hldividuals.-In addition
to reporting on the VVAW itself, Cook also reported on those
individuals and groups who worked on political issues in conjunction
with the VVAW :
Senator HART: ... did you report also on groups and individuals
outside the [VVAW], such as other peace groups
or individuals who were opposed to the war whom you came
in contact with because they were cooperating with the
[VVA1V] in connection with protest demonstrations and
petitions?
Ms. COOK: ... I ended up reporting on groups like the
United Church of Christ, American Civil Liberties Union,
the National La'''yers Guild, liberal church organizations
[which] quite often went into coalition with the [VVAW].45a
As a result of this broad reporting scope, Cook estimated that
she identified as many as 1,000 people to the FBI in the 18 months
she worked as an informant.46 Cook estimated that sixty to seventy
percent of these 1,000 people were nonveterans who had participated
with the VVAW in various political efforts.47
In November 1974, Cook quit her work as an informant because
of her belief that the VVAW was engaged in lawful political
activity and her conclusion that she could not in conscience inform
on its members and others working with them.48 Cook concluded that
the Buffalo VVA\V Chapter was working towards ending the involvement
of U.S. in Vietnam, amnesty for draft resisters, upgrading
military discharges, and better health and drug treatment for Vietnam
veterans.49
... Special Agent 11/20/75, pp.15-16.
.. Cook deposition, 11/14/75, p. 36.
... Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 119.
'" Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 112.
" Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 120
.. Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, pp. 112-114.
• 0 Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 119.
239
Cook testified:
. . . I started talking with t,he FBI about all of the contradictions
that I was starting to see. I didn't understand what my
invol vement was anymore ... I didn't see the reason for my
continuance . . . [I said to the FBI] these people don't need
me functioning in their midst, and if you can't give me assurances
that the information that I am giving you, which you
seem to strip the context away from isn't going to be used
against these people, then I cannot continue ... and they
could not give me any assurance that this information would
not be used against people....50
2. GaI'y Rowe-FBI Informant in the Ku Klux Klan
Gary Rowe worked as an FBI informant in the Birmingham, Alabama
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan from 1959 until March 1965, when
he surfaced to testify as an eyewitness to the killing of a civil rights
worker, Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, by Klan members.51
Rowe's activity as an FBI informant illustrates the distinction between
an informant's reporting of information relating to violence or
criminal activity and the reporting of general intelligence. On the one
hand, Rowe provided the FBI with a great deal of infonnation on
Klan violence and criminal activity. At the same time, however, Rowe
reported virtually every aspect of Klan activity, regardless of its relation
to actual or potential violence or criminal offenses. In addition,
on a number of occasions Rowe participated in Klan violence in order
to be in a position to report its occurrence to the FBI. Consequently,
even though Rowe was able to report significant violence and criminal
activity, his case highlights two principal issues: 1) the question of
overbreadth in intelligence informant reporting, and 2) the government's
participation or unseemly involvement through its paid and
~lirected informants in the violent or criminal activity it is investigatmg.
a. The Use of Intelligence Informants to Report Klan Violence and
Criminal Activity.-In testimony before the Committee, former Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach emphasized the violent acts committed
by some Ku Klux Klan members in the South during the years
Rowe was an FBI informant:
The central point of . . . my testimony is that some Klan
members in those states, using the Klan as a vehicle, were engaged
in repeated acts of criminal violence. It had nothing
to do with preaching a social point of view: it had to do with
proven acts of violence.52
uo Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, pp, 112-113. In 1974, investigations of a number of
VVAW chapters were closed, The FBI Memorandum to the Oommittee stated:
"In 1974, FBI field offices were instructed to analyze the chapters and regions
in their respective territories. If the local organization did not subscribe to the
policies of the National Office and were not :\Iarxist-Leninist groups advocating
the overthrow of the Government, the investigation of the local organization was
to be terminated.... Many of the investigations of the various chapters were
closed, not because they were no longer active, but because of their apparent
failure to follow the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary posture of the National
Office." (I<'BI :\Iemorandum to Select Committee, 2/2/76, p. 5; Cook, Hearings,
Exhibit 72.)
51 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p.115.
52 Katzenbach Testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 207.
240
Katzenbach stated that to deal with the problem of Klan violence, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy had suggested to President .Johnson
an int{'nsified use of FBI informants in tIll' Klan, along the lines employed
by the FBI against Communist groups. Katzenbach quoted
from a lettm' Robert Kennedy had sent to the President in mid-1964
just prior to the murders of three civil rights workers in Mississippi:
The unique difficulty as it seems to me to be presented by the
situation in Mississippi (which is duplicated in parts of Alabama
and Louisiana at least) is in gathering information on
fundamentally lawless activities which have the sanction of
local law enforcement agencies, political officials and a substantial
segment of the white population. The tedmigues followed
in the use of specially trained, special aSSIgnment
agents in the infiltration of Communist groups should be of
value. If you approve, it might be desirable to take up with
the Bureau the possibility of developing a similar effort to
meet this new problem.53
And Katzenbaeh pointed out that informants were critical to the solution
of the murders of the three civil rights workers: "That case could
not have been solved without acquiring informants who were highly
placed members of the Klan." 54
Katzenbach emphasized his view that the use of FBI informants in
the Klan should be viewed as a criminal investigation technique, pointing
out that, in the case of the Klan, "these techniques were designed
to deter violence-to prevent murder, bombings, and beatings. In my
judgment, they were successful." 55 At the same time,he indicated the
disruptive results that "an effective informant program" 56 may produce.
He stated:
It is true that the FBI program with respect to the Klan
made extensive use of informers. That is true of virtually
every criminal investigation with which I am familiar. In an
effort to detect, prevent, and prosecute acts of violence, President
.Johnson, Attorney Geneml Kennedy, Mr. Allen Dulles,
myself and others urged the Bureau to develop an effective
informant program, similar to that which they had d~Neloped
with respect to the Communist Party. It is true that these
techniques did in fact disrupt Klan activities, sowed deep
mistrust among the Klan members, and made Klan members
aware of the extensive informant system of the FBI and the
fact that they were under constant observation.57
Rowe played a critical role in the solution of the murder of Mrs.
Viola Liuzzo. Owing to his close relationship to Klan leaders, Rowe
was asked to accompany several Klansmen in an unspecified mission
against those participating in a civil rights march in Alabama in
March, 1965. Rowe reported this invitation to his FBI handling agent,
who told him to go and report what occurred.57a As a result, Rowe
63 Ibid, p. 214.
50 Ibid, p. 215.
00 Ibid, p. 207.
'" Ibid.
" Ibid.
67< Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, pp. 32-33.
241
was an eyewitness to the murder of Mrs. Liuzzo, and reported the
crime to the FBI within hours of its occurrence. Subsequently, Rowe's
testimony ,,'as a critical element in the ultimate conviction of the
Klansmen responsible for the killing.os
b. The Scopc of Rowc's Rcportilifl.--HO\ve·s assignlllent, according
to the FBI Special Agent ,d1O recruited him '9 and served as his first
hanelling agent, was
to gather information as to members, leaders, because I did
not know who they were, if he could get the number of Klavems
... in the Birmingham area, and just keep in toueh with
me as to the activities that occurred. That was his initial
instruction.
I wanted information that would be of assistance to make
a determination as to the violent nature of the organization.
This would be, violations of civil rights, things of this nature
... you certainly can't get it on the outside.60
"" The murder of Mrs. Liuzw took place in 1965; from the outset of his informant
activity in 1961, Rowe provided the FBI with a great deal of information
on planned and actual violence uy the Klan throughout his years as an
informant. (Rowe, 12/2/75, Yol. 6,llP. 117-11S: Adams, 12/2/75, Yol. 6, 142-143).
Only rarely, however, did Rowe'8 information lead to the prevention of violence
or arrests of Klan members.
There were several reasons for lliis, including the difficulty of relying on local
police to enforce the law against the Klan in the early 1960's, the failure of
the Federal Government to initially mobilize its own resources, and the role of
the FBI as an investigative rather than police organization.
Iformer Attorney General Katzenbach pointed out that, at the outset of the
1960s, when Rowe began his work as an informant, "neither the [Justice]
Department nor the Bureau fully appreciMed the significance or indeed the
genesis of the repeated acts of violence and bloodshed" committed by the Klan
and that Federal effoIlts against Klan violence "did not crystallize" until the
murder in JUine 1964 of three civil rights workers in Mississippi. (Katzenbach,
12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 213-214) and FBI Deputy Director Adams
testified:
"'Ve do not have police powers like the United States Marshalls do ... We are
the investigative agency of the Department of .Ju8tice and during these times the
Depal'tment of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency.
'Ve were to furnish the information, to the local police, who had an obligation
to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice." (Adams, 12/2/75, Vol. 6,
Jlll. 142-143.)
Katzenbach and Adams pointed out that in the early 19608, local police in
pal'ts of the South refused to act on information the FBI provided about Klan
violence. Katzenbach testified:
"... because local law enforcement organizations-the traditional first line of
dpfense against· (and the Bureau's primary source of information about) such
violence---were infiltrated by the very persons who were responsible for much
of the violence, the net effect was that there was in many sections of the South a
total absence of any law enforeement whatsoeYer." (Katzenbach, 12/3/75,
Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 213-214.)
•• Rowe was not a member of the Klun or sympathetic with Klan objectives when
he was recruited to serve us an informant. In his initial interviews willi the
FBI Special Agent who recruited him, Rowe indicated "he was not in favor of
the things the Klan did". (Special Agent No.1, 11/19/75, p. 7.) Rowe had previously
served in the United States :\Iarine Corps, enlisting at the age of 14. (Rowe,
12/2/75, Hearings, VoL 6, p. 115.) During his initial talks with the FBI, Rowe
stated he wanted to work in law enforcement and to serve his country; the FBI
told Rowe that to serye as an FBI informant in the Klan would enable him to do
uoth of these things. (Special Agent No.1, 11/19/75, p. 6.)
eo Special Agent No.1, 11/19/75, p. 8.
242
In practic.e, Rowe testified that he reported to the FBI "any and
everything that I observed or heard pertaining to any Klansmen." 61
This broad scope of Rowe's reporting was confirmed by the FBI agents
to whom he reported. As one agpnt testified:
... he furnished us information on the meetings and the
thoughts and feelings, intentions and ambitions, as best he
knew them, of other members of the Klan, both the rank and
file and the leadership."" Special Agent Ko. 3, 11/21/75, p. 7.
According to another of Rowe's FBI handling agents, Rowe's mission
was "total reporting," including membership lists, financial matters,
and political positions, as ,yell as Klan violence.63 Rowe also testified
that, in line with his "total reporting" instructions he reported intimate
details of the personal lives of Klan members.64
Rowe was able to give the FBI extensive information about Klan
membership as a result of his position in the "Klan Bureau of Investigation,"
the Klan's security and investigative arm.65 Rowe did most of
the investigation of prospective members in the Birmingham area,
and would regularly make their applications available to his FBI
handling agent, who would copy the applications before returning
them to Rowe.66
In addition, Rowe took Klan membership lists and gave them to the
FBI. Rowe's handling agent testified as to the way such lists were
taken:
I remember one evening during the course of a meeting that
was going on ... he called my home and said I will meet you
in a half an hour ... I have a complete list of everybody that
I have just taken out of the files, but I have to have it back
within such a length of time.
Well, naturally I left home and met him and had the list
duplicated forthwith, and back in his possession and back in
the files with nobody suspecting.67
Rowe also reported on political matters relating to the Klan.68 During
a campaign for mayor in Birmingham, Rowe was instructed to
attend public political meetings to assess the candidates' position on
integration, and to identify Klan members present and the extent to
which they were actively engaged in the campaign.69 Rowe also reported
on "National Conventions" of the Klan, closed meetings at which
officers were elected and Klan positions determined.70
G1 Rowe, 12/2/75, Vol 6, p. 116.
.. Special Agent No.3, 11/21/75, p. 7.
.. Special Agent No.2, 11/21/75, p. 4. Rowe also carried out certain activities
designed to disrupt the Klan. In early 1964, Rowe testified, his FBI handling
agent told him of the "COINTEL" or counterintelligence program of the FBI
against the Klan. (See COINTELPRO Report i. In connection with the COINTEL
program. Rowe sought to dh,rupt the campaign of a Klansman who was a candidate
for city police commissioner by spreading innuendo that the Klansman was
a homosexual. (Rowe Depsoition, 10/17/75, PP. 14-15.) Rowe also testified
that he was instructed to plant stories calculated to cause divorces amd marital
problems among Klansmen. (Ibid., p. 17)
... Rowe, 12/2/7:1, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.
M Rowe, 12/2/7:1, Yo1. 6, p. 116.
66 Rowe Deposition, 10/17/75, p. 2L
67 Special Agent No.1, 11/19/75, p. lo-lL
6B Rowe, 12/2/7:1, Hearings, Yol. 6. p. 116; Special Agent Xo. 2, 11/21/75, p. 4.
.. Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Yol. 6, p. 116; Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 11.
70 Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 23.
243
In addition to Klan activities, Rowe reported on the activities of
other organizations to the FBI. As a member of the "Klan Bureau of
investigation," Rmve was instructed by the Klan to attend and report
on meetings of civil rights groups. Rowe gave the information he developed
on these civil rights organizations to the FBI as well, even
though this fell outside the area of reporting on Klan activities/1
c. The Issue of Participation in Orimi1Wl or Violent Activity.-In
addition to general intelligence, Rowe was particularly instructed to
report any instances of planned or actual violence by the Klan.72 Merely
attending Klan meetings as an ordinary member did not put Rowe in
a position to observe the planning for, or occasion of violence, by the
Klan.73 As Rowe's FBI handling agent testified, "to gather information
[on violence] you have to be there." 74
Consequently, the FBI instructed Rowe to join a smaller group of
Klan members, a so-called "Action Group", which conducted violent
acts against blacks and civil rights workers.75
At the outset, Rowe's handling agent had instructed him that "under
no conditions should I participate in any violence whatsoever." 76 Although
these instructions continued to be formally reiterated to Rowe,
Rowe and his FBI handling agents understood that for Rowe to be able
to report Klan violence, he would have to be present for-and at times
might be involved in-that violence.
Rowe testified as to a number of instances where he and other Klansmen
had "beaten people severely, had boarded buses and kicked people
off; had went in restaurants and beaten them with blackjacks, chains,
pistols." 77
For example, on one occasion, Rowe gave the FBI advance warning
that Klan members were planning to assault and beat blacks attending
a country fair. His FBI handling agent instructed him "to go and see
what happened." 78 To accomplish this, Rowe accompanied the Klansmen
to the fair, where, to preserve his cover, he participated in the
resulting violence. 79 On another occasion, Rowe's throat was cut while
he ~was participating with other Klansmen in large-scale violence
against Freedom Riders at the Birmingham bus depot in May, 1961.80
Rowe described how he and other Klansmen used "baseball bats,
clubs, chains, and pistols" in attacking the Freedom Riders (Rowe,
12/2/75, p. 1867). Rowe recalled that, when he asked why there was no
apparent action on his reports of the impending violence, his FBI
handling agent told him "who the hell are we going to report it to ~ ...
the [Birmmgham] police department helped set [the violence] up.
71 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 116.
72 Special Agent No.1, 11/19/75, p. 8; Rowe, Hearings, 12/2/75, p.116.
73 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 116-117.
7. Special Agent No.1, 11/19/75, p. 4. 7. Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 144; Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 116-117.
7' Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 116; Special Agent No.1, 11/19/75, p. 9. Rowe's
first FBI handling agent testified:
"My specific instructions to [Rowe] were that he was not to be involved in any
violence. He was not to be involved in any criminal activity, that if he was involved
in any such activity, that I nor anyone else would come to his rescue."
(Special Agent No.1, 11/19/75, p. 9) .
77 Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p.12.
78 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 11'7.
7. Ibid.
811 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 118.
244
vVe are an investigating agency not an enforcement agency. All we do
is gather information." 81
The resulting dilemma ,,'as described by one of Rowe's FBI handling
Agents:
... it is kind of difficult to tell him that we would like you
to be there on deck, obsening, be able to gi\'e us information
and still keep yourself detached and uninvolved and clean,
and that was the problem that we constantly had.
. . . I'm sure he was present many, many times, when he
participated in things, and I'm sure he reported them at that
time, but we certa,inly cautioned him against that.82
Although Rowe's participation in Klan violence was practically
an inherE'nt fE'ature of his informanfs role, the FBI took particular
care in at least one instance that Rowe did not suggest or lead violent
activity. In April 1964, several YE'aI'S after Rowe joined the Klan
"Action Group," the Birmingham Field Office reported that Rowe
had become an Action Group squad leader. Bureau Headquarters ordered
that Rowe resib'11 this leadeI'Ship position or be discontinued as
an informant.s3 The Bureau further advised the Field Office:
in those cases where you ha\'e an informant who is a member
of a violent squad ... you should insure that the informant
under'Stands he is not to direct, lead, or instigate any acts of
violence.S~
Nevertheless, even these instructions did not extend to ruling out
Rowe's participation in violence, but rather only leading or directing
violent acts. The essential characteristic of Rowe's status was expressed
by the following testimony of his FBI handling agent:
If he happened to be with some Klansman and they decided
to do something, he couldn't be an angel and be a good informant.
85
B. Exalnples of Intelligence InfoT1nant Ooverage of Groups Subject
to Intelligence Investigations
In addition to the case historiE's of the informants described above,
the nature of the intelligence informant technique can also be illustrated
by other examples of informant coverage in domestic intellig-
ence investigations. The cases of informant coverage set out below
mdicate the types of information intelligence informants produce for
FBI files.
In summary, these cases further demonstrate the extremely broad
scope of informant reporting, including both lawful political activity
and details of the personal lives of citizens. For example, informants
81 Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 118.... The reasons for the lack of response
lJy the FBI and the Federal Government to Klan violence at the outset of the
1960s have been described above. The 1961 violence at the Birmingham bus depot
did lead to a decision by the Kennedy Administration to send U.S. marshals to
Alabama to protect the Freedom Riders as they proceeded to other cities. (Adams,
12/2/75, Hearings, p. 142-143.)
.. Special Agent No.3, 11/21/75, pp.1~17.
.., ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Birmingham Field Office 4/17/64.
.. :\femorandum from FBI Headquarters to Birmingham Field Office 5/4/64.
85 Special Agent No.3, 11/21/75, p. 12.
245
in the ·Women's Liberation Movement (Case No.9, below) reported the
identities of women who belonged to 'Vomen's Liberation groups at
several Midwest universities, and statements made by women concerning
the personal reasons that motivated them to participate in the
'Vomen's Movement. Informant coverage of lawful political activity is
also shown in Case No.1 which involved a public meeting held by a citizens
group to debate the merits of developing a certain U.S. missile.
Several cases presented below involve instances where informants in
violence-prone groups provided information that led to arrests and
prosecutions or the prevention of violence. (See Case Nos. 3, 6, and 8
below.) The Socialist Workers Party (Case No. 10, below) is an example
of informant coverage and intelligence surveillance that continued
uninterrupted for many years, despite the fact that for more than three
decades the group has committed no criminal acts.86
Case No. l-Oitizens Panel on the !Iferits of an Anti-Ballistic
j}Iis8ile SY8tem (1969)
An FBI informant and two FBI confidential sources reported on a
meeting of a 'Vashington, D.C., group that expressed concern about
the development of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM) in the
late 19605."1 The meeting was targeted for informant coverage because
the Daily World, a communist newspaper, had commented on the
formation of the group.88 The informant reported on plans for the
meeting which was to be held in a high school auditorium where the
merits of development of the ABM would be debated, and on publicity
materials distributed at churches and schools. The informant also reported
that the speakers for the debate would include, on the "pro side,"
a Defense Department official and a Defense Department consultant
and on the "con side" a political science professor and a well-known
scientist.89 A confidential FBI source reported on the past and present
residence of the person who had applied to rent the auditorium and
on his current position in the military. Another confidential source
informed the FBI of the anti-Vietnam war and anti-ABM articles
being distributed at the meeting.90 The informant and source reports
on plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated
by teletype to the ·White House, the Vice President, the Attorney General,
the Secret Service, the State Department, the CIA, and various
military intelligence agencies.91 A subsequent report described plans
for a similar meeting in the District of Columbia and included the
names of prominent D.C. politicians who planned to attend.92
"" Shackelford, 2/2/76, p. 89.
ffI Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 137.
.. Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 138.
89 Memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to Washington Field Office 6/3/69.
90 ~Iemorandumfrom Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69.
•, Memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters 6/3/69.
With respect to this intelligence investigation, FBI Deputy Associate Director
Adams testified that, due to the notice in the Daily World communist newspaper,
the FBI "took a quick look" at the group, and "the case apparently was
opened on ~Iay 28, 1969, and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this
organization." (Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, p. 138.)
92 :Uemorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69.
246
Case No.2-Dr. O(tTl JJlclntyre~8 American Ohristian Action
OOlll/cil (1971)
An FBI confidential source and an informant reported information
about the formation of this group by Dr. McIntyre. The group was
established to act as a counter to various liberal groups and to the
"Clergy and Laymen Concernoo about Vietnam". The initial report
from a confidential source mentioned plans to picket NBC-TV studios
in Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, D.C., and named all the
members of the Board of Directors.93 Subsequent reports from an informant
described the group~s plans to oppose the President's trip to
China and to support prayer in the public schools.93a The informant
also reported on the group~s conventIOn held jointly with Dr. McIntyre's
missionary group and on plans for the group's future organization
and activities. 94
Case No.3-Detroit Blaok Panther Party 1970
An FBI extremist informant involved in an intelligence investigation
of the Detroit Black Panther Party, (BPP) furnished advance mformation
regarding a planned ambush of Detroit police officers which
enabled the Detroit Police Department to take action to prevent injury
or death to the officers. The information led to the arrest of eight
persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons. The informant also furnIshed
information resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau
agents of approximately fifty sticks of dynamite available to BPP,
which likely resulted in saving of lives and preventing property
damage.95
On June 20,1970, the informant furnished the names of three BPP
members who were supposed to carry out the ambush on June 27,
1970 and reported that others whose identity he did not know would
also be involved. This information was furnished to the Detroit Police
Department who in turn monitored the ambush site. On June 27,1970,
the informant advised that the plaJllled ambush of police officers would
definitely take place that night, shortly after midnight. On June 28,
1970, two Detroit police officers, while patrolling on the east side of
Detroit a few minutes after midnight, were fired upon by snipers.
Immediately after the shooting, Detroit police officers arrested the
three individuals identified by the informant ,and charged them with
assault with intent to commit murder. In addition, three other individuals
were arrested in connection with this shooting. A cache of
weapons and ammunition was recovered from the residence of one of
those arrested.96
On July 25,1970, the informant advised that a member of the Detroit
National Committee to Combat Fascism, and another individual, whom
he believed to be a member of the White Panther Party, stole some
dynamite on or about July 11, 1970. The informant was directed to
ascertain the location of this dynamite. He later determined that it had
been stored at the farm of the second individual's mother. The inform-
.. Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/71.
ll3a 1Iemorandulll from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/72.
.. Ibid.
96 Joseph Deegan testimony, 2/13/76, p. 54.
.. FBI Response to Select Committee Request for Documents.
247
ant further advised that the mother did not share her son's radical
views and had no knowledge that the dynamite was on her farm. On
September 16, 1970, the mother gave Bureau agents permission to
search her property. Approximately fifty sticks of dynamite were
discovered.97
Case No. 4-Natio'llal Conference on Anvnesty (197.4)
Several FBI informants provided information on a national conference
held to support amnesty for veterans of the Vietnam war. The
FBI targeted the conference for informant coverage because of other
informant reports that the Vietnam Veterans Against the 'War were
instrumental in organizing the conference and might attempt to take
it over.98 The infornnmt's reports identified the various church and
civil liberties groups who sponsored and organized the conference, as
well as the participation of a draft evader and several "subversives." 99
The reports described the topics for workshops at the conference, and
the organization of a steering committee which would include delegates
from familie..,> of lllen killed in Vie'tnam and Congressional staff
aides.10o
Case No.5-Public Meeting Opposing U.S. Involl/.'Mnent in Vietnam
War (1966)
Informants ,,,ere used extensively in FBI investigations of possible
Communist links to the antiwar movement. An example is the FBI's
con-rage of various Rntiwar teach-ins and conferences sponsored by
the rniversities Committee on Problems of "'Val' 'and Peace. A fortyone
page report from the Philadelphia office-based on coverage by
thirteen informants and confidential sources-described in detail
a "public hearing on Vietnam." 101 A Communist Party official
had "urged all CP members" in the area to wttend, and one of the
organizers was alleged to have been a Communist in the early 1950's.
t:"pon receipt from an informant of a list of the speakers, the FBI
culled its files for data on their backgrounds. One was described. hy a
source 'Us a Young Socialist Alliance "sympathizer." Another was a
conscientious objector to military service. A third had contrihuted
$5,000 to the Xational Committee to Abolish the House Committee
on t:"n-American Activities. A speaker representing the W.E.B.
DuBois Club was identified asa Communist.102 The FBI covered the
mooting with an informant who reported practically verbatim the remarks
of all the speakers, inc1uding the following:
the Chairman of the Philadelphia Ethical 'Society
a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union
a representative of the United Electrical 'Vorkers
a spokesman for the Young Americans for Freedom
a member of the staff of the "Catholic Worker"
In Ibid.
• 8 Wannall, 12/2/75, p. 139-140.
'·11emorandum from Louisville Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/21/74.
100 Ibid.
11ll 1Iemorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/22/66.
102 Ibid.
248
a minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church
a minister of the Episcopal Church
a representative of the Philadelphia Area Committee to
End the 'Varin Vietnam
a Professor of Industrial Economics at Columbia
University
a representative of the Inter-University Committee for
Debate on Foreign Policy
a member of vVomen's Strike for Peace who had traveled
to North Vietnam
a member of vVomen's International League for Peace and
Freedom who had visited South Vietnam
a chaplain from Rutgers University
a professor of political science from Villanova University
another member of Young Americans for Freedom
the former Charge d'Affaires in the South Vietnamese
Embassy 103
This informant's report was so extensive as to be the equivalent of
a tape recording, although the FBI report does not indicate that the
informant was "wired." Another informant reported the remarks of
the following additional participants:
an official of the Committee for a Sane NueIear Policy
a minister of the Church of the Brethren
a Unitarian minister
a representative of United World Federalists
a member of Students for a Democratic Society
a member of the Socialist 'Workers Party
a spokesman for the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs 1()4
The report was prepared as a Letterhead )Iemorandum with fourteen
copies for possible dissemination by the FBI to other Executive
Brarich agencies. Copies were disseminated to military intelligence
agencies, the State Department, ancl the Internal Security and Civil
Rights Divisions of the ,Justice DepartmenU05
Case No.6-Black Nationalist Group (1968)
On July 22, 1968, in connecHon ,,,ith an intelligence investigation
of a Cleveland black nationalist group called "New Libya," an extremist
informant reported that a eache of rifles and automatic weapons
was in the hands of group members. The informant was later able
to determine where these weapons were loeated and that the group
was formulating plans for disturbances in Cleveland and other cities.
On ,July 23, 1968. a racial disturbance broke out in Cleveland triggered
by the Black Libya group. The riot lasted three days 'and resulted
in a number of police and civilian deaths. The informant's
information was relayed to appropriate agencies prior to the outburst
of violence.
103 Ibid.
10< Ibid.
100 :\Iemorandwll from Philadelphia Field Office to l<'BI Headquarters, 3/2/66.
249
The informant's advance reports were instl'llmental in SUCCl'SSfUl
prosecutions on first degree murder charges against "Kew Libya"
members."OG
Oase No. 7~Invcstigation of "Free Universities" (1966)
The FBI used informants in investigations of "Free rni\'ersities"
in proximity to college campuses to det.mnine whether they were connected
with "subversive" groups. For example, when an article appeared
in a Detroit newspaper stating that a "Free rniversity" was
being formed in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and that it was "anti-institutional,"
FBI Headquarters instructed the Detroit field office to "ascertain
through established sources [i.e., informants already in place]
the origin of this group and the identity of the individuals who are
responsible for the formation of the group 'and whether any of these
individuals have subversive backgrounds." 107 A note on the instruction
pointed out that even if there was no specific prior indication of
Communist involvement, established informants were to be used in
investigations of such "free universities":
Several "Free Universities" have been formed in large cities
recently by the Communist Party and other subversive
groups. 1Ve are therefore conducting discreet investigations
through established sources regarding all such "Free Universities"
that come to the Bureau's attention to determine
whether they are in any way connected with subversive
groups.lOB
Based on the reports of five informants and confidential sources, the
field office prepared a ten-page letterhead memorandum describing in
detail the formation, curriculum content, and -associates of the groupincluding
several members of Students for a Democratic Society and
the Socialist 1Vorkers Party."09 Although no further investigation was
recommended, the report was disseminated to local military intelligence
and Secret SelTice offices, military intelligence and Secret Service
headquarters in 1Vashington, the State Department, and Internal
Security Division of the Justice Department.IIO
Case No. 8~Washington, D.O. Black Panther Party (1970-1971)
An informant of the Richmond FBI Field Office reported a conspiracy
by leaders of the vVashington, D.C., Chapter of the Black
Panther Party (BPP) and leaders of the Richmond Information Center
(RIC), an affiliate of the BPP, to steal and transport weapons
from Richmond, Virginia, to Washington, D.C. Five persons were
ultimately indicted by a federal grand jury. A subsequent trial resulted
in the conviction of four of the individuals.
On May 14, 1970, the informant reported that in Richmond, Virginia,
a leader of the Black Panther Party asked a leader of the
100 FBI Memorandum in Response to ,select Committee Request.
1m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 2/17/66.
lOB Ibid.
109 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
110 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Hfladquarters, 4/15/66.
250
Richmond Information Center if he was in a position to obtain guns
for the 'Washington BPP chapter.1l1 FBI investigation failed to develop
any further information regarding guns. However, on January
8, 1971, a recently dHeloped informant advised that around April
1970 four individuals from the Richmond area had burglarized a private
residence. Seven ,veapons were stolen during the burglary. The
informant advised that on Xovember H, 1970, the guns were then
transported from the Richmond area to ,Yashington, D.C., by rented
automobile.llz
Case Xo. 9-lVomen's Liberation J1fovement (1969)
Informants were a principal source of information in the FBI's
investigation of the ,Vomen's Liberation Movement. For example, in
the sprmg of 1969, the Xew York field office drew largely on informant
reporting to describe the ~Iovement's basic philosophy and to report
particular meetings in the New York area. In describing one such
meeting, the report stated:
On [ ]69, infonnant, who has furnished reliable information
in the past, advised that a 'VLM meeting was held on
[ ]69, at [ ] Xew York City. Each woman at this
meeting stated why she had come to the meeting and how she
felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise.
According to this informant, these women are mostly concerned
with liberating women from this "oppressive society."
They are mostly against marriage, children, and other states
of oppression caused by men. Few of them, according to the
infonnant, have had political backgrounds. The infoI1llant
stated that a mailing list was passed around at this meeting
for 1VLM and the "Red Stockings," another women's
group.113
Similarly, the Kansas City Field Office used infoI1llant reports to
describe the extent of ,Vomen's Liberation Movement activity and
to identify individual members at three universities in the Field Office
territory: the University of Missouri at Kansas City, the University
of Missouri at Columbia, and the University of Kansas at Lawrence.
The level of detail as to personal identities of persons participating
in the Women's Movement at University of Missouri, Kansas City, is
illustrated by the following passage from the Field Office Report:
[informant] indicates members of ,Vomen's Liberation Movement
campus group who are now enrolled as students at University
of Missouri, Kansas City, are [five names deleted]. Of
these five, [infonnant] said [names deleted] are indicated to
be at least potential "New Left Radicals." [Infonnant] noted
that [names deleted], not currently students on the UMKC
campus, are reportedly roommates at ... Kansas City.l14
1U Memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/22/70.
112 Ibid.
113 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69, p. 2.
11< Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/20/70.
251
Case No. 10-Socialist Workers Party (1940 to date)
FBI informants are operating within the Socialist Workers Party
(SWP) as part of the FBI's long-tenn intelligence investigation of
the SWP.ll5 Informants report the political positions taken by the
SWP with respect to such issues as the "Vietnam \Var," "racial matters,"
"U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," and any SWP
efforts to support a non-S\VP candidate for political office.1l6 To enable
the FBI to develop background information on SWP leaders, informants
report certain personal aspects of their lives, such as marital
status.1l7 The informants also report on SWP cooperation with other
groups who are not the subject of separate intelligence investigations.
lIB
The intelligence investigation of the SWP began in 1940 as a result
of the SWP's description of itself as a Marxist-Leninist "combat"
organization which foresaw the inevitability or desirability of violence
should revolutionary conditions arise in the United States.1l9 The FBI
conceded, however, that since shortly after its fonnation the SWP has
not committed any violent acts, nor have its expressions "constituted
an indictable incitement to violence." 120 Nevertheless, the FBI's intelligence
investigation of the SWP-and the use of informants 'against
the party and its members-has continued from 1940 to the present
day.
Case No. ll-Ku KlJux Klan
As part of its COINTEL Program of using covert action against
domestic groups,121 the FBI assisted an informant in the Ku Klux Klan
in his efforts to set-up a new state-wide Klan organization independent
of the regular Klan. The FBI saw the formation of a rival group as an
opportunity to promote dissension in the regular Klan both at the
state and national levels. In approving the operation, FBI headquarters
stated its belief that "if a death-dealing blow can be dealt to the
[state Klan], the entire Klan organization in the United States will
collapse." 12'2 The FBI indicated that if the new Klan organization was
"successful in obtaining a sizable following," it would be "controlled"
by the FBI "through our informant." 123
1lli Shackelford, 2/2/76, p. 89.
116 Ibid., p. 91.
111 Ibid., p. 90.
118 Ibid., p. 92.
11lI Ibid., PP. 88-89.
,.. Ibid., p. 89. In 1942, the conviction a year earlier of 18 SWP members
for violation of the Smith Act was upheld on appeal. Dunne v. United States,
138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert den. 320 U.S. 790 (1943). In upholding
the conviction, however, the appellate court relied on a precedent which has since
been expressly repudiated by the Supreme Court. In Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) the Supreme Court abandoned the "bad tendency" standard
followed by the appellate court in Dunne in favor of a standard whereby speech
must present a grave and probable danger of bringing about a prohibited act
before a conviction may be sustained.
121 For a full treatment of the FBI's COINTEL (counterintelligence) program,
which involved covert actions against groups and individuals, see COINTELPRO
Report.
'22 Brennan to Sullivan [date deleted for security reasons].
,.. Memorandum from field office to FBI Headquarters [date deleted for security
reasons].
69-9840 - 76 - 11
252
Two years after the formation of the new Klan group, a status report
by the FBI Field Office described the operation as "successful"
in capitalizing on the opportunity to "further disrupt [the regular
Klan] and to entice members of the regular Klan into the new Klan
organization. At that time, the new Klan group had issued several
dozen charters (although in many instances no chapter was in fact organized)
and included nearly 200 members. The report stated further
that the new Klan organization 'would be phased out when it had
"done its ultimate damage to the regular Klan." '"
The Committee's investigation revealed that this tactic risked increasing
violence and racial tension. The Director of the State Bureau
of Investigation testified that there were dangerous confrontations
between the two Klan groups. He testified as to one such occasion "in
which the two groups met in force, and both elements had ... guns,
including shotguns ... they were physically armed and facing each
other." 124a The FBI informant in the rival Klan group also called
for violence against blacks. The State Bureau of Investigation Director
further testified that he witnessed the FBI informant address a
Klan rally attended by several thousand persons and heard the informant
state: "We are going to have peace and order in America if we have
to kill every Negro." 124b
O. Special FBI Informant Programs
In addition to the use of informants in particular domestic intelligence
investigations of groups or individuals, the FBI has conducted
special programs to develop informants for general reporting purposes.
These were (1) the Ghetto Informant Program (1967-1973);
(2) the development of informants in defense industrial facilities
under the Plant Informant Program (1940-1969) and (3) the
American Legion Contact Program (1940-1954). These programs Il,re
outlined below.
1. The Ghetto Informant Program
This program was begun in 1967 to develop informants who would
provide general intelligence on the potential for violence and civil
unrest in black urban areas.l$ In July 1973, after considerable debate
within the FBI over the program's propriety, value, and cost, the program
was terminated by Director Kelley, with instructions to field
offices that ghetto informants were to be either included in the regular
FBI informant categories (subversive, extremist or criminll,l) or
discontinued.l2I
As of September 1972, there were 7,402 ghetto informants. Figures
for previous years were: 1971-6,301; 1970-5,178; 1969-4,067:'"
FBI officials saw the Ghetto Informant Program as their response
to the possibility that the urban riots and violence that occurred m the
summer of 1967 mig:ht be repeated and the express desire of White
House and Justice Department officials for advance warnings.1Jll In
10< Memorandum from field office to FBI Headquarters [date deleted for security
reasons].
12<. Deposition of Director, State Bureau of Investigation, 4/1/76, p. 36.
, ..b Ibid., p. 62.
,.. Memorandum from Moore to SUllivan, 10/11/67; memoranda from FBI
Headquarters to all SACs, 10/17/67.
128 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 7/31/73.
W FBI Memoranda in Response to Select Committee Request, 8/20/74.
1J!lI Memorandum from Moore to Sullivan, 10/11/67.
253
September 1967 Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote to FBI Director
Hoover:
There persists . . . a widespread belief that there IS more
organized activity in the riots than we presently know about.
We must recognize, I believe, that this is a relatively new area
of investigation and intelligence reporting for the FBI and
the Department of Justice. We have not heretofore had to
deal with the possibility of an organized. pattern of violence,
constituting a violation of federal law, by a group of persons
who make the urban ghetto their base of operation and whose
activities may not have been regularly monitored by existing
intelligence sources.
In these circumstances, 'We must make certain that every
attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon
these problems,. to take every step possible to determine
whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to
determine the identit,!/ of the people aM interests involved,.
and to deter this actiVIty by prompt and vigorous legal action.
As a part of the broad investigation which must necessarily
be conducted ... sources (Yf' informants in black nati01Uilist
organizations, SNOO and other less publicized groups should
be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose
of these groups and their relationship to other groups, aM
also to determine the whereabouts of persons who might be
involved in instigating riot activity in 1~'iolation of federal
law.1Z9 [Emphasis added.]
In announcing the program to FBI Field Offices, Director Hoover
stated that "it is imperative and essential that the Bureau learn of any
indications of advance planning or organized conspiracy on the part
of individuals or organizations in connection with riots and civil
disturbances." 130
As orirnally conceived, a "ghetto informant" was to act as a "listening
post' rather than an informant who actively sought information or
who infiltrated particular groups.l3l The FBI defined a ghetto informant
as "an individual who lives or works in a ghetto area and has access
to information regarding the racial situation and racial activities in his
area which he furnishes to the Bureau ona confidential basis." 132 A
1972 Inspection Division memorandum noted that the concept of a
ghetto informant "includes the proprietor of a candy store or barbershop"
in an urban ghetto area.133
At the outset of the prog-ram, ghetto informants, in contrast to regular
subversive or extremIst informants, were not given specific assignments
or directed to infiltrate groups. As the program developed,
however, this changed. A Bureau document described this change:
The "listening post" concept was expanded and ghetto informants
are now utilized to attend public meetings held by
extremists, to identify extremists passing through or locating
lJ9 Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Olark to Director, FBI,
9/14/67.
130Memoramdum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/17/67, p. 8.
181 Memorandum from Moore to Miller, 9/8/72.
132 Memorandum from Moore to Brennan, 10/27/70.
1.. Memorandum from Inspection Division, 11/24/72.
254
in the ghetto area, to identify purveyors of extremist literature
as well as given specific assignments where appropriate.
134
In addition to specific assignments to report indications of potential
violence, ghetto informants were focused on "Afro-American type
bookstores." A Philadelphia Field Office directive to Special Agents
listed the following such assignment as suitable for ghetto informants :
"Visit Afro-America-type bookstores for the purpose of determining
if militant extremist literature is available therein and, if so to identify
the owners, operators, and clientele of such stores." 135
The "listening post" concept of the Ghetto Informant Program
became the subject of sharp debate within the FBI in 1972. The FBI
Inspection DiVIsion criticized the program for counting a ghetto informant's
report that there was no indication of civil unrest in his
area as "positive" information. The Inspection Division observed that
"negative information is not counted as positive information in any
other informant program." 136 The Inspection Division further stated:
Some Ghetto Informants have in the past furnished information
in extremist or criminal matters. This has been recognized
as a by-product of the Ghetto Informant Program. A
more meaningful approach to this whole problem might be to
concentrate more heavily in ghetto areas to develop proven
Security, Extremist, Revolutionary Activities, and Criminal
Informants upon whom we can then rely to keep us advised
of civil disturbance plans as a steady by-product to the information
they are regularly furnishing on domestic intelligence
or criminal matters.137
The Inspection Division further noted that there mig-ht be "justifiable
apprehension" outside the FBI regarding the "listenmg post" concept.
. . . we have some concern of justifiable apprehension that
might be expressed. by the Congress or the public if this
program were to be described in terms out of context with our
real intentions. We could fully defend informants providing
us regularly with information directly related to our jurisdictional
responsibilities and using them for "by-product" information
on civil unrest. It would be much more difficult
to defend establishment of ghetto or urban listenin~ posts all
over the country with a possible by-product of intormation
directly within our jurisdiction.137
&
The Inspection Division concluded that ghetto informants who had
proven to be productive informants "should 00 converted to the appropriate
substantive informant program to which their services
relate." 138
On July 31, 1973, Director Kelley terminated the Ghetto Informant
Program, eliminating the category of "ghetto informant" and instructing
that "no indIvidual will be operated as an [extremist inform-
1" Memorandum from Moore to Miller, 9/27/72.
1.. SAO memorandum, 8/12/68, re: Racial Informants.
118 Memorandum from Inspection Division, 11/24/72.
1'" Ibid.
117& Ibid.
138 Ibid.
255
ant] solely because he is in a 'listening post' position." 139 Under the
revised extremist informant program, extremist activity and potential
violence were to be monitored through regular extremist informants.
'2. The Plant Info1"ITumt Program (191,fJ-1969)
This program developed out of discussions in October, 1938 among
the Army, Navy, and FBI as to which entity would have responsibility
for the security of defense industries against espionage and sabotageYo
As a result of these discussions, it was decided'that the FBI
would assume the responsibility.
The program was begun in September 1940, when FBI Field Offices
were instructed to develop confidential sources in defense plants identified
to the FBI on lists submitted by the Army and Navy.l4l By
September, 1942, there were 23,746 such confidentIal sources in 3,879
defense plants.1402
The program was cut back sharply after World War II, but continued
in existence until its termination in March, 1969.H~ Generally,
the confidential sources in the program were used as a point of contact
and potential source of information in investigations of suspected
espionage matters.Hr4
3. The American Legion Contact Program (19.1,-0-195.1,-)
This program arose out of a proposal submitted by the American
Legion to the Attorney General in 1939. When World War II broke
out in Europe, the American Legion submitted to the Attorney General
a proposal to use its local posts to investigate and report mdications
of subversive or espionage activity.14I5 The Attorney General
turned down the proposal but referred it to the FBI for comment. The
FBI came forward with an alternative plan, which in essence called
for the use of local American Legion post members as potential "confidential
sources" in their communities.H6 After background checks, such
sources were to be used to provide information without payment on
domestic security matters.147 The FBI proposal was approved by the
Attorney General and the American Legion in November 1940.1418 The
program was terminated on August 17, 1954. FBI Field Offices however
were instructed to maintain contact with American Legion officials
in their areas.l409
D. The Use of Informants at Colleges and Universities
1. Present FBI Policy
In the course of its domestic intelligence investigations, the FBI
regularly uses students, teachers and school officials at colleges and
universities as informants and confidential sources.
,.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 7/31/73.
". FBI deposition, 2/10/76, p. 22.
m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 9/23/40.
". Ibid., p. 24.
"3 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/25/69.
'« FBI deposition, 2/10/76, p. 23.
,.. Ibid., p. 20.
H. Ibid., p. 20. As discussed in greater detail at p. 260 below, confidential sources
are defined by the FBI manual as individuals who furnish information "available
to tbem tbrougb tbeir employment or position in the community."
'<1 Ibid.
,.. Ibid., p. 21.
,.. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/17/54.
256
Under present FBI policy, there are two measures that apply solely
to the use of campus informants. Students under 18 years of age may
not be used as informants in other than "highly unusual circumstances"
and justification for their use must be submitted to Bureau
Headquarters.15v Second, student informants and confidential sources
are requested to sign a statement that they are "voluntarily" submitting
information because of their "concern over individuals and groups
that may be inimical to interests of U.S. Government".l5l The statement
also provides that the student informant or source "understands
[the] FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities."
151a However, the Manual does not further explain or specify
the distinction between relevant matters in intelligence. investigations
and such "legitimate activity."
The FBI Manual emphasizes that, despite these two measures requiring
"care" in the use of campus informants, FBI Field Offices must
have "well-phiimed [informant] coverage" at colleges and universities.
The Manual provides:
Each office must have continuous and weU-plannedprogram
to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so
that Bureau can fulfill its obligations. Care with which this
must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each field
office to have proper coverage.152
2. The BMkgro'Wnd to Present Policy
FBI policy on the use of informants and sources at colleges and
universities underwent a number of changes between 1965 -and 1970,
the period of campus unrest. In 1967 as a result of the Katzenbach
Report on CIA involvement with stud~nt groups, FBI Director
Hoover cut back sharply on the use of campus, informants, imposing
a number of restrictions on their use. Later, despite strong pressure
from the Justice Department for more intelligence on oampus groups,
Hoover initially refused to relax these restrictions. Gradually, however,
the restrictions were lifted and indeed in September 1970 the
age limit for campus informants (and all informants) was lowered
from 21 W 18.
The development of FBI policy on campus informants in the critical
period 1965-1970 is reviewed below.
a. Initial Guidelines for Use of Campu8 Infornuznt8.-FBI field
offices had been instructed as early as 1965 to intensify their investigation
of "subversive activity" among student groupS.153 In 1967,
however, the FBI became concerned that its intelligence activity on
college campuses might be exposed by the controversy over CIA links
with the National Student Association,154 Therefore, field offices were
1M FBI, MOl Sec. 107 U(1) (a).
151. FBI, MOl Sec. 107 U (1) (h) .
IDa I'bUl.
,., FBI, MOl Sec. 107, U (3).
153 SAC Letter NQ. 65-44, 8/17/65.
'61 Referring to the exposure of CIA involvement with the National Student
Assiociation, the FBI informed its field offices:
"It is possible that this current controversy could focus attention on the
Bureau's investigation of student groups on college campuses." (SAC Letter No.
67-13,2/21/67. )
257
advised to conduct campus investigations III a "most discreet and
circumspect" manner':
You should ... bear in mind that in our continuing investigations
to keep abreast of subversive influence on campus groups,
in discharging our responsibilities in the internal security
field, such investigations should be conducted in a most discreet
and circumspect manner. Good judgment and common
sense must prevail so that the Bureau is not compromised or
placed in an embarrassing position.155
Field offices were reminded that existing FBI policy required approV'ltl
from headquaI'ters before investigating individuals or groups "connected
with an institution of learning," before interviewing students
or faculty members, and before developing 'a student or faculty member
"as an informant source." These interviews or contacts were also
to "be made away from the campus." 156
b. The 1967 RestnctionfJ.-vVhen the KatzeIIbach Committee issued
its report on CIA involvement with student groups, FBI Director
Hoover canceled all outstanding authorizations '''to contact students,
graduate students, and professors of educational institutions in security
matters ... [including] est'ablished sources, informants, and
other sources.." Field Offices were instructed to request new authority
from FBI headquarters "where contacts with such individuoa;ls are
particularly important and necessary." 151
Shortly after the 1967 cutback in campus coverage, however, the
FBI formally characterized the Students fora Democratic Society
for the first time, stressing its "subversive" connections. As intellIgence
investigations of SDS chrupters expanded, FBI offici'als realized
that the restrictions on campus contacts "impose problems for the
field." 158
Field Offices were advised to stress "the development of noncampus
informants and sources" to maintain intelligence coverage of "subversive"
activity at educational institutions.159 Shortly thereafter, the
restriction was lifted for contacts on campuses with "established
sources functioning in 'an administrative capacity such as 'a Registrar,
Director of Admissions, Dean of Men, Dean of Women and Security
Officer, and their subordinates." Headquavtersapproval, however,
was still required to contact students or professors.16o
O. Hoover's Resistance to New Pressure for Relaxed Restrictions on
Oa;mpus Informants.-The urban riots of the summer of 1967 greatly
intensified FBI domestic intelligence operations. Equally important,
the Detroit and Ne,vark riots brought other agencies of the Federal
Government into the picture. A Presidential Commission was estaolished
to study civil disorders and the Attorney General reexamined
statutes on sedition, conspiracy and insurrection. Consequently, the
Internal Security Division asked the FBI:
,.. SAC Letter No. 67-13, 2/21/67.
150 SAO Letter No. 67-13, 2/21/67.
,., SAC Letter No. 67-20,4/7/67.
,.. SAC Letter No. 67-24, 5/2/67.
,.. SAC Letter No. 67-24, 5/2/67.
'''' SAC Letter No. 67-29,5/24/67.
258
to furnish us with the names of any individualswho appear
at more than one campus either before, during, or after any
active disorder or riot and the identities of those persons from
outside the campus who might be instigators of these incidents.
llli
The FBI was asked to use not only its "existing sources," but also
"any other source you may be 'able to develop ..." 162
Despite the pressure for greater intelligence about campus groups,
Director Hoover decided "that additional student informants cannot
be developed." 1113 Nevertheless, the FBI field offices were instructed to
intensify their efforts: "It is ... recognized that with the graduation
of senior classes, you will lose a cert'ain percentage of your existing
student informant coverage. This decreasing percent of coverage will
not be accepted as an excuse for not developing the necessary
information." 164
One way to achieve this result without the FBI itself recruiting
additional student informants was to have local police do so. Thus,
when field officers were reminded of the need for gathering intelligence
so that the Justice Department could be provided "data regarding
developing situations having a potential for violence," FBI Headquarters
stressed the need for "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement
agencies." 165
In September 1969, the restriction on recruitment of new campus
informants was finally relaxed, although field officers were still forbidden
to develop informants under the age of 21. Procedures were
instituted, however, "for tight controls and great selectivity in this
most sensitive area". Field offices were given the following instruction:
Upon initial contact with a potential student informant or
source, informant or source should be requested to execute
brief signed written statement for the field file to the effect
that such individual has voluntarily furnished information to
the FBI because of his concern of [sic] individuals and groups
acting 'against the interests of his government and that he
understands that the FBI is not interested in the legitimate
adtivities of educational insti,tutions.
Field offices were also to submit quarterly reports assessing the productivity
of each student informant so as "to justify the continued
utilization of the source." 166
d. The HU8ton Plan's Recommendation for Expanded Oampus InfOT1JUlnt
Ooverage.-FBI Intelligence Division officials were greatly
dissatisfied with these restrictions, particularly the age restriction on
1dl Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the
Director FBI, 3/3/69.
,.. Ibia.
"" SAC Letter No. 69-16, 3/11/69.
.... Ibla.
t ... SAC Letter 69-44, 8/19/69. Local police use of intelligence undercover agents
in college classrooms in California was held by the California Supreme Court to
likely "pose ill substillnti'lll restraint upon the exercise of Fir;;t Amendment
rights." (White v. Davls, 533 Pac Rep. 2d., 222, 232. California Supreme Court,
1975.)
,.. SAC Letter No. 69-55, 9/26/69.
259
students informants.H;7 This dissatisfaction surfaced in June 1970 as
the Intelligence Community developed recommendations (the "Huston
Plan") for President Nixon for the relaxing of restrictions on
domestic intelligence operations.168 Among other items, the Huston
Plan recommended to the President:
Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded
coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related
groups. 169
Over Hoover's specific objection, this recommendation had also been
contained as an option in the earlier Special Report of the intelligence
agencies which led to the Huston Plan. In the Special Report, Hoover
noted his objection in the following words:
The FBI is opposed to removing any present controls and
restrictions relating to the development of campus sources.
To do so would severely jeopardize its investigations and
could result in charges that investigative agencies are interfering
with academic freedom. 17o
e. The Removal of the Age Restriction.-Despite Hoover's recorded
opposition in June 1970 to expanded campus informer coverage and
President Nixon's ultimate decISion not to implement the Huston Plan,
in September 1970 the FBI lifted the principal restriction on campus
informant use. On September 15, 1970, the FBI authorized its field
offices "to develop student security and racial informants who are 18
years of age or older." 171 FBI Headquarters pointed out to the field
that the removal of the age restriction presented the field "with a tremendous
opportunity to expand your coverage." 112
The expanded campus cove~e called for by FBI Headquarters was
quickly implemented at the FIeld Office level as part of the FBI's
effort to have New Left campus groups think "there is an FBI agent
behind every mailbox." 173 On September 16, 1970-the dILy following
the Headquarters letter lifting the age restriction-the Phila.delphia
Field Office for example, advised its agents:
The Director has okayed PSI's [potential security informants]
and 81's [security informants] age 18 to 21. We have
been blocked off from the critical age group in the past. Let us
take advantage of this opportunity.174
""Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), the
"Huston Plan," 6/70, (Hearings, Vol. 2, Exhibit No.1.) p. 34.
188 See the Detailed Report on the Huston Plan.
1110 Huston Plan, p. 36.
110 Huston Plan, p. 36.
171 SAC Letter 70-48, 9/15/70.
172 SAC Letter 70-48, 9/15/70.
m Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 9/16/70.
The Philadelphia Field Office pointed out that on September 10 and 11,1970, a conference
at FBI Headquarters on the New Left had reached a consensus that FBI
interviews with persons on campuses might result in identification of new campus
informants and "will further serve to get the point across there is an FBI agent
behind every mailbox." (Ibid.)
17< Ibid.
260
III. THE INTELLIGENC}~IXFOR~IANT:PROGRAM-SIZE, SCOPE AND STANDARDS
A. The Number of Intelligence Informants
As of June 30, 1975, the FBI was using over 1,500 domestic intelligence
informants.175 There were 1,040 FBI regular informants
approved by Bureau Headquarters (another 554 were in probationary
status pending establishment of their reliability).176 The FBI programmed
a total of $7,401,000 for its intelligence informants program
in Fiscal Year 1976. This amount is more than double the amount the
FBI programmed for its organized crime informant program in
1976.171
In addition to paid and directed informants, the FBI uses confidential
and panel sources in its intelligence investigations. Confidential
sources are defined by the FBI as individuals who furnish the
FBI information available to them through their employment or position
in the community.178 The FBI Manual cites as examples of confidential
sources "bankers, telephone company employees, and landlords."
179
In practice, FBI Field Offices designate individuals as confidential
sources who are logical and convenient points of contact and information.
The source then becomes a matter of administrative record and
is available to all agents in the Field Office, minimizing the need
for an agent to start from scratch in selecting persons to interview
when the need arises.180 Confidential sources are not usually informed
that they have been so designated, nor are they usually paid for any
information they provide.181 As of June 1975, there were 605 confidential
extremist sources, and 649 confidential subversive sources.
(By comparison, in 1973 there were 8'37 confidential sources and, in
1972,684 confidential subversive sources.) 181a
Panel sources are defined as individuals who are not involved in an
investigated group but who "will attend its public gatherin~on behaH
of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witnesses. ' 181b Panel
sources were first developed to meet the need for witnesses in the course
of Smith Act trials of Communist Party members in the 195~. In those
trials, it was necessary to prove, for example, simple facts as to the
existence of the Communist Party, the dates and places of public
meetings held by the Party, and similar matters. To avoid surfacing
17. Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 11/28/75..
lt8 By comparison, in 1971 the FBI had 1,731 regular informants, nearly 700
more than in 1975, and, as of 1972, 7,482 informants in the Ghetto Informant Program.
The decline since 1971 in the number of regular informants is largely attributable
to the decline in dissident political activity with the end of the Vietnam
War and the institution of somewhat stricter standards for the opening or continuation
of domestic intelligence investigations. As discussed above, the Ghetto
Informant Program was discontinued in 1973.
177 FBI, Overall Intelligence Program, FY 1977 Budget Compared to FY 1976.
The cost of the intelligence informant program comprises payments to informants
and FBI personnel, and overhead costs.
17" FBI, MOl Sec. 107, A(4).
170 FBI, MOl Sec. 107, A(4).
18O FBI deposition, 2/10/76, p. 13.
lSl FBI deposition, 2/10/76, PP. 10-12.
iSla Ibid.
lSlb FBI, MOl, Sec. 107, A.
261
regular informants within the Party to establish such facts, panel
SOurces were developed. Panel sonrces are used for similar purposes
today.182 As of 1975, there were approximately 200 panel sources.183
As discussed in more detail above, there were 7,482 informants in
the Ghetto Informant Program in 1972, the year before its termination.
B. The FBI AdminUitrative System for Intelligence Informants
The FBI administers its intelligence informants through a centralized
system from Bureau Headquarters. FBI Special Agents may
not operate or pay informants and sources without approval of FBI
Headquarters or the Special Agent in charge of a Field Office. FBI
Headquarters approval is reqmred to designate an individual as a
potential subversive informant/84
All potential informants are subjected to a background check.
Military records, police files, and employment and credit history are
typical items reviewed.185 The results of this background investigation
are submitted to Bureau Headquarters. Potential extremist Informants
may be operated on the personal authority of the Special
Agent in Charge at the Field Office level, unless the individual is in a
sensitive position where his disclosure as an informant "could cause
inordinate concern to the Bureau," is a member of or may soon join an
extremist organization, or has a criminal or other unsavory background.
186 In such instances FBI Headquarters' authority must be
obtained, along with a statement outlining the intended use of the
informant.187
Although titled "potential" informants, such individuals nevertheless
provide the FBI with intelligence information during this initial
stage and are paid for what they supply.188
Special Agents in Charge may pay an informant up to $400 on their
own authority; 189 after that amount has been expended Bureau Headquarters
authorization is required for any additional payments.190
Although there is no formal ceiling on payments for services (i.e.,
information provided) FBI informants average approximately $100
a month, with the most valuable and productive informants, such as
Rowe and Cook, earning in the range of $3()().....$400 monthly.l9l
FBI Headquarters approval is required to raise both potential subversive
and extremist informants to regular informant status. The
request must be initialed by the Field Office SAC or his Deputy.192
In addition, every six months FBI Headquarters reviews a completed
form on each informant submitted by the Field Office. The form
summarizes the informant's activities, his pay, the type of information
supplied (including the percentage verified from other sources)
and an assessment of his value. On the basis of this report, and a
182 FBI deposition, 2/10/76, pp. 16--] 7.
'83 Ibid.
"" FBI, MOl Sec. 107, D(l).
186 FBI, MOl, Sec. 107.0.
,.. FBI, MOl, Sec. 130, 0 (1 and 2).
,., FBI, MOl, Secs.107, 0; 103, D(l).
1llllFBI, MOl, Sec. 107, D(5).
,.. FBI, MOl, Sec. 107, I (2a).
'00 FBI, MOl, Sec. 107, L(3).
,., FBI deposition, 2/10/75, p. 6; Oook,12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p.12.
102 FBI, MOl, Sec. 106, D (10).
262
comparison of the informant's information with that of others in similar
circumstances, a monthly payment limit is established for the next
six-month period.193
There are periodic reviews of informant activities in addition to
those described above. The FBI Manual provides that every sixtv days
the SAC or his deputy are to review each informant's file.194 In addition,
the Inspection Division reviews informant files during its annual
inspections of each Field Office.195
To operate confidential and panel sources, FBI Headquarters approval
is also required. Background investigations are also performed
on these sources and the results submitted to Bureau Headquarters.196
Each informant is assigned a "handling agent," an FBI Special
Agent who is in contact with the informant on a regular basis, receives
the informant's information, and pays him, usually on a
monthly basis. The Manual provides that the handling agent "should
not only collect information, but direct the informant, be aware of his
activities, and maintain such close a relationship that he knows informant's
attitude towards the Bureau." 191
The FBI Manual contains detailed provisions for the correction
of false information.l91a If it is learned an informant has given false
information, "all communications which have been disseminated to
(FBI HQs), other Bureau offices and to outside agencies must be
corrected." 198 In addition, corrective letters are to be written to amend
any reports which contain the incorrect information. Moreover, a
control file is to be established and a letter to FBI HQs must be sent
which is to be used "to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that
necessary corrective action has been taken." 199
The Manual also provides that informants must submit written
reports or sign transcriptions of their oral reports.199a A limited exception
to this rule exists for extremist informants who may submit
oral reports in cases of imminent violence.199b
O. Standards for the Use of Intelligerwe Informants
There are three types of standards for intelligence informants.
These are (a) the criteria that govern the decision to use informants
against groups and individuals; (b) the limits that are set on the
type of information an informant may report to the FBI; and (c)
the limits that are placed on an informant's conduct.
At present, the standards for intelligence informants are contained
in internal FBI directives. There are no statutes or published government
regulations to govern the use of intelligence informants.
1llO FBI, MOl, See. 107, L(3).
1lN letter from the FBI to the Senate Seleet Committee, 12/2/75, Hearings,
Vol. 6, Exhibit 33.
uo Ibid.
196 FBI, MOl Sees. 107, R(5), S(2)
10'7 FBI, MOl Sees. 107, R(5), 8(2).
1ll'I' The process for verifying any informant's information is a continuous one
in which the Handling Agent cross checks an informant's reports through other
sources and separate investigation. Memorandum from the FBI ,to the Senate
Select Committee, 12/2/75, p. 4.)
198 FBI, MOl Sec. 107, Q(4).
"'" FBI, MOl See. 107, Q(9).
1'" FBI, MOl See. 107(G), 130(M)
""'b FBI, MOl See. 130(M-1d)
263
Unlike wiretap and electronic surveillance, which are subject to
an elaborate syst€m of review and approval by the Department of
Justice and the courts, there is no review outside the FBI of decisions
on intelligence informants. Thus, decisions as to intelligence informant
coverage-e.g., the number of informants to be used in an investigation,
the scope and duration of their reporting-are made exclusively
by FBI officials. In addition, since the standards for informant use
are in internal FBI directives, it is also within the discretion of FBI
officials to change these standards.
1. Criteria for the Decision to Use Informants
Under the FBI Manual, once a full intelligence investigation of a
group or individual is opened, informants can be used without limitation.
In a preliminary investigation, established informants may supply
informatIOn, but new informants may not be recruited.20o
Since September 1973, the FBI has distinguished between full intelligence
investigations and preliminary ones, and has imposed differing
limitations on the length, scope, and sources of information for preliminary
investigations. A preliminary investigation may be undertaken
when the subject's involvement in subversive or extremist activities
is questionable or unclear to further define his involvement and
to determine whether a statutory basis exists for a full investigation.
A preliminary investigation is supposed to be confined to a review of
public source documents, record checks, and established sources and
informants. The General Accounting Office Study on FBI domestic
intelligence operations found, however, that in practice, FBI Field
Offices have not adequately distinguished between the two types of investigations.
201 In particular, the GAO found that the limits on the
use of informants in preliminary investigations was subject to varying
interpretations and loose observance. The GAO Study stated:
Althou~h the Manual of Instructions confines the scope
of prelimmaries to the use of established sources, our review
of the cases showed that the 10 field offices generally used the
same sources in the preliminary cases as full-scale cases.
Most of the field offices interpreted "established sources"
broadly and did not believe the type of investigation placed
restrictions on who was contacted. An "established source"
was generally described by the field offices as 'being any source
preVIOusly used by the Bureau. In addition, some field offices
indicated that information could come from whatever
source-established or otherwise-which is necessary to establish
a subject's identity and subversive or extremist affiliation.
202
Under current standards, full domestic intelligence investigations
may be opened on groups and individuals-and thus informants may
be recruited and targeted against them-if (1) they have, or allegedly
... FBI, MOl Sec. 87, (F).
""t GAO Study, p. 27.
... GAO Study, pp. 113-114.
264
have, violated certain statutes; 203 (2) they are "engaged in activities
which may result in" a violation of these statutes, (3) they advocate
activities which may result in a violation of these statuteS.204
Informants may also infiltrate groups who are not the subject of
intelligence investigations under certain circumstances. The FBI
Manual provides that if a group which is the subject of a subversive investigation
is seeking "to systematically infiltrate and control" another
group, an intelligence investigation of the infiltration (as opposed
to the second group itself) may be opened.~05 Informants may
join or participate in the activities of the second group if requested
by the first group.
In addition, su'bversive investigations under Section 87 of the FBI
Manual examine any significant connections or cooperation between a
group under investigation and any other groups.206
Thus, under this standard, informants in the group under investigation
may report on those who happen to work with the group or its
members under investigation, even if the cooperation involves lawful
activity.
In summary, the scope of informant coverage may extend to (1)
groups that are the subject of intelligence investigations; (2) groups
which an investigated group is attempting to infiltrate or control; and
(3) groups having "significant connections," or which cooperate with
investigated groups.
2. Limits on the Information an Informmnt May Report
There are few limits on the information an informant may report
to the FBI. The FBI Manual does not limit an intelligence informant's
reporting to information relating to the planning or commission of
criminal offenses or violence. As indicated by the case histories examined
earlier, informants are expected to report virtually everything
they observe regarding a group or individual's activity to fulfill their
intelligence purpose.
One rationale for this unlimited reporting was expressed by FBI
officials in their testimony to the Committee. In response to a question
as to the desirability of limiting an informant's reporting to information
pertaining to violence or criminal activity, Deputy Associate
Director Adams stated;
Here is the problem that you have with that. When you're
looking at an organization, do you report only the violent
... For subversive intelligence investigations, the principal statutes are 18 U.S.C.
2383-85 relating to rebelliOn or insurrection, seditious conspiracy, and advocating
the overthrow of the government. The same statutes are involved in extremist
investigations as well as the Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 24l.
""'FBI Manual of Instruction, Section 87, A.(1) (4); Section 122, A.(I) (2).
Section 87, A.(I) dealing with subversive investigations, provides, for example:
"Investigations conducted under this section are to be directed to the gathering
of material pertinent to a determination whether or not the subject has
violated, or is engaged in activities which may result in a violation of [certain
statutes] or in fulfillment of Departmental instructions." [Emphasis added.]
The manual further provides that "subversive organization" or "subversive
movement" denotes a (FBI, :\101 Sec. 107,A(4» group "which is known to ...
advocate subversive activities." [Emphasis 'added.] Subversive activities are
defined in terms of activities which violate or may violate relevant statutes.
(FBI. MOl Sec.l07,A(l).)
... FBI, MOl, Sec. 87, B.4.
,.,. FBI, MOl Sec. 107,B(3-9)
265
statements made by the group or do you also show that you
may have one or two violent individuals, but you have some
of these church groups that were mentioned, and others, that
the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the statutes.
You have to report the good, the favorable along with the unfavorable,
and this is a problem. We wind up with information
in our files. vVe are accused of being vacuum cleaners,
and [we] are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the real
purpose of an organization, do you only report the violent
statements made and the fact that it is 'by a small minority,
or do you also show the broad base of the organization and
what it really is? 207
However, FBI officials indicated that new limits on the scope of an
informant's reporting were needed. As Adams stated "... we have to
have guidelines ... we have to narrow down [informant reporting]
because we recognize we do wind up with too much information in
our files.2078
The FBI Manual does proscribe the reporting of certain types of
information. First, informants are not to report certain legal defense
information. The ~fanual states intelligence informants should decline
to assist in legal defense matters or to "handle an assignment
where such information is readily available." 20~ If an informant cannot
avoid involvement, his handling agent is to instruct the informant
"not to report any information pertaining to defense plans or
strategy," 209 The Manual's limitations on legal-related information are
as follows:
If an informant is present in conversation between an attorney
and individual under criminal indictment, he should immediately
leave. If he is unable to do so and inadvertently
learns of defense plans or strategy, he is not to report the
substance of any conversation to the FBI. Additionally, the
informant is not to engage in or report the substance of a conversation
with a criminal defendant dealing with the offense
for which the defendant is under indictment.2lO
The FBI interprets these provisions as prohibiting only the reportmg
of privileged attorney-client communications or legal defense matters
in connection with a specific proceeding. So-called "standard"
legal defense information, such as manuals for general use in legal
matters, can be taken by an informant and given to the FBI. The
meaning of legal "defense plans or strategy" is not defined in the FBI
Manual and can lead to varying interpretations of what can be reported.
Thus, as indicated above, Cook's FBI handling agent testifified
he took from Cook papers discussing legal matters involving the
VVAW.
She 'brought back several things. . . various position papers
taken by various legal defense groups, general statements of
. . . the VVAW·, legal thoughts on various trials, the Gaines-
"'" James Adams testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135. =a Ibid.
fJ08 FBI, MOl Sec. 107, A(l2).
209 Ibid.
"'. FBI, MOl Sec. 107, F(12e)
266
ville (Florida) 8 ... the Camden (New Jersey) 9.•.. Various
documents from all of these groups.m
Cook also testified that she gave the FBI a confidential legal
manual prepared by VVAW attorneys as a guide for legal defense of
VVAW members in the event of prosecution for dissident activity.'212
Since this manual did not derive from an attorney-client communication
in connection with a specific court proceeding, the FBI considered
the VVAW legal defense manual could be taken.
Besides the above limit on legal information, the only other limitations
in the FBI Manual on reporting concern informants in labor
unions and at colleges and universities. The Manual states that if an
informant "is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him
that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships as
such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration
of unions by subversive elements." 213 Similarly, student informants or
sources at colleges and universities are to be told that the FBI "has
no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities." 214
3. Limit.s on an Informant's Oondtwt and Behav1ffr
The FBI Manual contains provisions dealing with the "direction
and control of informants." The Manual states:
Contacting Agent should not only collect information but
direct informant, be aware of his activities....
Close control must be exercised over activities of informants
to obtain maximum results and prevent any possible
embarrassment to Bureau.215
The Manual speaks of exercising control in order to obtain "maximum
results" and prevent "embarrassment" to the Bureau; it does
not, however, contain any guidelines as to the limits on informant
conduct with respect to violence or illegal conduct.
The FBI points to the limits on FBI Special Agents as the means
by which guidelines for intelligence informants are applied. The
FBI memorandum to the Committee states: "Specifically, informant
development and handling are extensively discussed in the FBI's
training programs and there is no question as to Special Agents being
aware that informants cannot be directed to perform a function that
the Special Agent may not legally perform." 216 The FBI memorandum
also points to the FBI Rules and Regulations which state that
FBI employees "must not engage in any investigative activity which
could abridge in any way" constitutional rights of citizens.217
These limits apply to FBI Agents and employees in their handling
of informants. However, the FBI does not consider informants as
FBI employees or "undercover agents," and informants are so
advised.218 Thus, these limits are not directly applicable to informants.
211 Special Agent 11/2(}j75, pp. 15--16.
au Cook deposition, 11/14/75, p. 36.
... FBI, MOl Sec. 107D(2d).
2UFBI, MOl, Sec.107U(1-b).
""'Manual, Section 1m, F(4) (7).
218 FBI Memorandum, 2/2/76, p. 3.
%11 Ibid.
%18 FBI, MOl Sec. 107,0(7).
267
On December 23, 1974, FBI Headquarters reiterated the rules for
FBI employee conduct by the Director to all FBI Field Offices and
further stated: "You are reminded that these instructions relate to
informants in the internal security [domestic intelligence] field and
no informant should be operated in a manner which would be in contradiction
of such instructions." 219 This instruction appears to be the
only written provision applying FBI employee conquct standard!;
to informants.220 Prior to the issuance of this instruction in 1974,
there were no formal or specific provisions relating to informant conduct
in FBI directives. The resulting effect on FBI agent direction of
informants can be illustrated by two additional cases. The first case
involved an FBI informant in a group of anti-war protestors. In
August 1970, this group broke into the Camden, New Jersey, Draft
Board, after several months of planning and preparation. The informant,
Robert Hardy, testified that he provided essential direction
and materials to the group, making the break-in possible. Hardy
testified:
Everything they learned about breaking into a building or
climbing a wall or cutting glass or destroying lockers, I
taught them. I got sample equipment, the type of windows
that we would go through, I picked ul? off the job and taught
them how to cut the glass, how to drIll holes in the glass so
you cannot hear it and stuff like that, and the FBI supplied
me with the equipment needed. The stuff I did not have, the
[FBI] got off their own agents.221
Second, in late 1966 or early 1967 the FBI Field Office in San Diego,
California was approached by one Howard Berry Godfrey. Godfrey
testified that he was "approached" by a member of a right-wing
paramilitary group tojoin. The Committee received varying mformation
concerning why Godfrey contacted the FBI and at whose initiative
the informant relationship arose.222 In any event, Godfrey and
the FBI entered into a relationship in 1967 by which Godfrey would
provide the Bureau information. This relationship was formalized in
August of 1967 when Godfrey was officially "approved" by the FBI's
Washington Headquarters as an informant.
Godfrey's relationship with the FBI lasted over five years, terminating
in November of 1972. Godfrey was paid varying amounts from
1967 through 1970 when he began to rec,eive $250 per month plus up
11. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 12/23/74.
220 FBI officials testified, however, that it is unwritten Bureau practice to instruct
informants that they are not to engage lin violence or unlawful activity and,
if they do so, they may be prosecuted. FBI Deputy Associate Director Adams
testified :
"... we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law,
and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the su1:J..
ject, and have prosecuted, I would say, offhand ... around 20 infonnants...."
(Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 150.)
221 Hardy testimony, 9/29/75, pp. 16-17.
:m Stafl' summary of Howard Berry Godfrey interview, 1j18/76.
69-984 0 - 76 - 18
268
to $100 per month in expenses!24 He continued at that level until his
termination.225
Godfrey's case study, albeit dealt with here briefly, illustrated a
number of the issues which wove their way through the Committee's
inquiry into the FBI's use of informants. The first issue is control
over the informant by the Bureau. In accord with FBI procedure,
Godfrey always was assigned to a principal case agent. The Committee's
investigation determined, however, that the actions of Godfrey
and his cohorts in the San Diego area were rife with destruction
and violence. There is little evidence, other than Godfrey's less than
convincing claims, that he actually prevented any violence or destruction
from occurring. As a member of the District Attorney's office
told the Committee:
They [the FBI] couldn't control him [Godfrey]. Godfrey's
actions went well beyond those which we would allow any
informant operating under this office to become involved
in.226
For a large part of his time as an FBI informant, the responsibility
for monitoring Godfrey was in the hands of a single FBI agent.
Moreover, under Bureau procedure, the reports of the informant
are only sent to Washington every six months. And, the .reports in
the case of Godfrey were largely "form" type responses, providing
an inadequate basis for any reviewing authority in Washington to
determine Godfrey's usefulness.
The second overriding issue present in the Godfrey case study was
how the Bureau could prevent the informant from actually inciting,
encouraging or participating in violence and/or destruction without
losing his utility as an informant. Godfrey admits to participating in
some violence and destruction and the record suggests that he may .
have participated in even more than he now admits to.227
Examples of the types of actions Godfrey and/or the Secret Army
were involved in include firebombing, smashing windows, placing
stickers bearing SAO or Minutemen symbols on cars and buildings,
propelling lug nuts through windows with sling shots, and breaking
and entering.228
Upon questioning by the Committee, all FBI agents who dealt
with Godfrey testified that while Godfrey was specifically instructed
never to engage in illegal acts such as firebombings, etc., they recognized
that this was often difficult if not impossible to accomplish.
One FBI agent put itthis way:
Well, I remember almost on a daily basis, this matter would
come up. What can I do such and such. And I've said, well,
obviously you can't do that. Stay with them as long as you
... It should be noted, however, that Godfrey did not always receive exactly
$250; it often depended upon the degree of his activity.
-As earlier referenced, the average FBI informant salary was $100 per month.
... Staff summary of member of San Diego District Attorney's office interview
1/22/76. '
227 Staff summary of Godfrey interview, 1/18/76.
m Indeed, the literature of the Secret Army features a pamphlet which
instructs the public in the art of burglary complete with diagrams of "forced
entry of building."
269
can and then find some logical excuse to bow out at the last
minute. But he was never asked by me to participate in anything
that I would consider illegal or that I think that he
would consider illegal and to the best of my recollection,
during our association. I can't recall anything specific ...
Now there were occasions when I know that he didn't get out
of it. He might have been in one, he had to go and be involved
or he would have been out of the group. I really don't remember
anything right definite at this time but there were
several of those cases, no question about it.229
And, Godfrey himself described his instructions as:
Q. Was there ever a conversation in which [you and the
FBI agent] decided [that] while you would attempt to stay
out of [a violent or destructive activity] if it came down to
either getting involved in it, or having to just leave the scene
[with] a number of questions [being] asked later, under
those circumstances that you would go ahead and do the
particular activity?
A. Yes.230
The SAO's actions escalated to a level of violence and destruction
where Godfrey's name had to be revealed as an FBI informant. Two
events precipitated this. The first was the shooting of Paula Tharp,
who was in the residence of the San Diego State University professor
Peter Bohmer. Briefly, while Godfrey and an SAO associate were
"on a surveillance" of Bohmer's residence (instituted by Godfrey), the
associate, according to Godfrey, ~icked up a gun Godfrey had under
the seat of his car and fired shots mto the Bohmer house, one of which
struck Ms. Tharp.231 Previously the SAO and Godfrey had singled
out Professor Bohmer in their literature for special attention:
For any of our readers who may care to look up Red Scum,
and say hello, here is some information that may help. His
address is 5155 Muir, Ocean Beach, telephone number is
222-7243, he drives a dark blue HI68 VW Sedam, California
licence DKY 147.•Just to make sure you talk to the right guy
here is his description: he has dark brown shoulder length
hair, green eyes, weight is about 160 lbs. and he is 5'10" tall.
Now in case any of you don't believe in hitting people who
wear glasses, to be fair I guess we will have to tell you he
wears contact lences. [sic]
The significant factor for the Committee's analysis of FBI informants
is that even this shooting incident did not immediately
terminare Godfrey as an informant. Rather the FBI records show
that Godfrey remained on the Bureau payroll until November, 1972.
229 Staff summary of FBI Agent #1 interview, 1/22/76, pp. 26-27.
2W Staff summary of Godfrey interview, 1/18/76, pp. 54-55.
231 This incident is not only a matter of pending civil litigation but Godfrey's
SAO associate was convicted in a criminal trial in San Diego. The details of the
shooting are a matter of public record in the trial transcript.
270
And, it was not until the second major act of destruction that Godfrey
was "surfaced" as an informant.232
The second major act of destruotion which occurred was the bombing
of the Guild theatre in San Diego. According to Godfrey, the
bombing was perpetrated by his subordinate in the SAO, one William
Yakopec.233 Godfrey participated in the SAO sale of some explosives
to Yakopec. Yet, he promptly notified the FBI of Yakopec's
alleged involvement in the Guild Theatre bombing. Yakopec, who
maintains his innocence, was subsequently indicted and convicted
of the bombing offenses in the local courts of San Diego.
Godfrey testified publicly at both the Yakopec and Hoover trials
and was thereafter re-Iocated to another part of California and
ceased to serve as an FBI informant. Godfrey's use as a Government
informant is now in litigation.
The intelligence informant technique is not a precise instrument.
By its very nature, it risks governmental monitoring of Constitutionally-
protected activity and the private lives of Americans. Unlike
electronic surveillance and wiretaps, there are few standards
and no outside review system for the use of intelligence informants.
Consequently, the risk of chilling the exercise of First Amendment
rights and infringing citizen privacy is increased. In addition,
existing guidelines for informant conduot, particularly with respect
to their role in violent organizations and FBI use of intelligence informants
to obtain the prIvate documents of groups and indIviduals,
need to be clarified and strengthened.
.... Godfrey did turn over the weapon to his FBI supervisor after the shooting.
The FBI did tell a representative of the San Diego police department that they
had an informer who was a witness to the shooting, but neither this information
nor the existence of the gun was furnished to the unit of the San Diego Police
Department which investigated the Tharp shooting for several months.
.... Godfrey testified before a San Diego grand jury that Yakopec was a "li{'utenant
in my-an assistant San Diego County commander."

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