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CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

461
Investigations in matters relating to the internal security
of the United States to be effective must be conducted in a
comprehensive manner, on a national basis, and by a single
central agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the
agency designated for this purpose. At this time, I request
that aU information concerning any activities within the
United States, its territories or possessions, believed to be of
a subversive nature, be reported promptly to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.348
Attorney General Clark's recommendation of a presidential statement
on FBI authority was made the day after he met with White
House aides Clark Clifford, Charles Murphy, and George Elsey to
discuss how the President should handle the Bentley and Chambers
allegations. At that meeting it had been decided that the President
should not make a statement on the espionage allegations and that
consideration would be given to "referring the question of Soviet
espionage in the Federal Government to a bipartisan commission,
such as the Hoover Commission." 349
Upon receiving the Attorney General's proposed statement, presidential
aide George Elsey asked Admiral Souers, Executive Secretary
of the National Security Council, "to undertake a review of the statement,
with a view to limiting the excessive authority granted to the
FBI, and in such other ways as he finds desirable in the light of his
experience in the National Security Council." 350 However, the revised
draft by Admiral Souers made no substantial change except to
include reference to "the intelligence services of the military forces."
Mr. Elsey and Admiral Souers passed the matter on to White House
aide Stephen Spingarn, who met with Assistant Director Ladd of the
FBI. Ladd urged "early issuance of the statement by the President"
and stated that its purpose "was to spike vigilante activity in the internal
security field by private organizations and persons." After this
meeting, Spingarn advised Clark Clifford that "the issuance of such
a statement at this time by the President might give rise to the impression
that he was making a rather transparent show of activity on
this matter as a result of needling from Congressional quarters...."
351
Nevertheless, the Justice Department did release a statement criticizing
the "political activity" of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities, and declaring that "all individuals and groups involved
in activities potentially dangerous to the security· of the nation are
subject to the continuous but quiet watchfulness of the Federal Bureau
of investigation." 352
:us Memorandum from the Attorney General to the President, 9/17/48. (Harry
S. Truman Library.)
... Memorandum from G. M. Elsey to Clark Clifford, 8/16/48. (Harry S. Truman
Library, Papers of George M. Elsey.)
... Memorandum from Elsey to Charles Murphy, 8/26/48. (Harry S. Truman
Library, Elsey Papers.)
3Gl Memorandum from S. J. Spingarn to Mr. Clifford, 9/21/48. (Harry S. Truman
Library, Official File.)
... Justice Department Press Release, 9/29/48. (Harry S. Truman Library,
Spingarn Papers.)
462
After the 1948 presidential election, the National Security Council
addressed formally the problem of coordination in the internal
security field. An understanding was reached by the Secretary of De.fense,
the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI on February
1, 1949; and recommendations were submitted thereafter to the
President for the establishment under the NSC of two committeetrthe
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security-and the designation of an.
NSC Representative on Internal Security "to perform coordinating
and advisory functions with the IIC and the ICIS...." 553 The.
President approved these recommendations and issued a directive on
coordination of internal security.354
The National Security Council then approved charters for the I;IQ
and the ICIS. They recited the provisions of Section 101 of the National
Security Act of 1947, which authorized the NSC to "advise the
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security," and also the President's
directive of March 1949. The purpose of the IlC, composed of the
FBI and military intelligence agencies, was to "effect the coordination
of all investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage,
sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting
internal security." The ICIS, made up of representativ~ from the
Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and the military, was assigned
responsibility for coordinating all non-investigatory internal
securityactivities.35s
The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the military
intelligence agencies was also revised in 1949. It allocated res~nsibilitles
among the agencies for the "investigation of all actiVIties
coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion,
and sabotage." Each agency was obliged "to exchange freely and
directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of
mutual interest." The FBI had specific responsibility for advising the
military agencies of "developments concerning the strength, composition,
and intentions of civilian groups within Its cognizance which are
classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the
security of the United States." The military agencies were limited to
investigations directly involving military personnel, civilian employees
of the military, and areas under milItary control.SS6
A supplementary agreement in June 1949 reguired FBI and military
intelligence officials in the field to "maintam close personal liaison"
and to pay "particular attention . . . to avoiding any
duplication in connection with the use of informers." The supplementary
agreement also stated, "Where there is doubt as to whether or not
one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it
.should be transmitted to the other agency." 357 .
... J. P. Coyne, Major Chronological Developments on the Subject of Internal
SecuritY,4/8/49. (Harry S. Truman Library, Spinga~ Papers.)
8M NSC Memorandum 17/4, 3/23/49. .
III NSC Memorandum 17/5,6/15/49.
... Delimitation of Investigative Dutie,s and Agreement for Coordination,
2/23/49.
... Supplemental Agreement No.1 to the Delimitations Agreement, approved by
nc, 6/2/49.
463
After the outbreak of the Korean War and in the midst of congressional
consideration of new internal security legislation in 1950, the
lIC under the chairmanship of FBI Director Hoover recommended
to the NSC "that a Presidential statement be issued to bring up to date
and clarify prior Presidential Directives ... outlining the responsibilities
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with
espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters." Attorney
General McGrath forwarded the draft to the President's
counsel.358
The NSC approved a revised version of the draft, and it was made
public on July 24, 1950. There is no record of why it chose the hroader
interpretation of the Roosevelt directives and declared that they had
provided that the FBI:
should take charge of investigate work in matters relating to
espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related ~tters.
359 [Emphasis added.]
President Roosevelt's directives had not used this language. (See pp.
--above.) Moreover, President Truman's domestic policy aides were
surprised by the release of the statement. One noted, "This is the
most inscrutable Presidential statement I've seen in a long time." Another
asked, "How in H--- did this get out 1" A third replied,
"Don't know-I thought you were handling." 360 Even before the statement
was issued, one of these aides had warned the President's counsel
that the Justice Department was attempting "an end run." 361
Despite this concern among his assistants, President Truman's statement
clearly placed him on record as endorsing FBI investigations of
"subversive activities." Neither the President's statement nor the secret
NSC charter nor the confidential Delimitations Agreement defined
"subversive activities" or "suhversion."
The President's announcement gave the FBI an opportunity to
make a statement of its own. The FBI statement denounced "hysteria,
witch-hunts and vigilantes" and affirmed the need for "protecting the
innocent as well as . . . identifying the enemies withlll our midst."
Nevertheless, the FBI advanced the following view of the threat:
The forces which are most anxious to weaken our internal
security are not always easy to identify. Communists have
been trained in deceit and secretly work toward the day when
they hope to replace our American way of life with a Communist
dictatorship. They utilize cleverly camouflaged movements,
such as some peace groups and civil rights organizations,
to achieve their sinister purposes. While they as individuals
are difficult to identify, the Communist Party line
is clear. Its first concern is the advancement of Soviet Russia
and the godless Communist cause. It is important to learn to
know the enemies of the American way of life.362
... Letter from Attorney General J. Howard McGrath to Charles S. Murphy,
Counsel to the President, 7/11/50.
... Statement of President Truman, 7/24/50.
-Notes initialed D. Bell, SJS (S. J. Spingarn), and GWE (George W. Elsey)
7/24-25/50. (Elsey .Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.)
.., Memorandum from G. W. Elsey to Charles S. Murphy, Counsel to the President,
7/12/50. (Murphy Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.)
36' Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, 7/26/50. (Harry S. Truman Library, Bontecou
Papers.)
464
Shortly after President Eisenhower took office in 1953, the FBI
advised the White House that its "internal security responsibility"
went beyond "statutory" authority. The Bureau attached a copy of
tJhe Truman statement, but not the Roosevelt directive. The FBI again
interpreted the Roosevelt directive as saying that it had authorIzed
"investigative work" related to "subversive activities." 3il3
In December 1953, President Eisenhower issued a statement reiterating
President Truman's "directive" (including its interpretation
of Roosevelt's orders) and extending it to matters under the Atomic
Energy Act.364 On the day this statement was released, Director
Hoover and Attorney General Herbert Brownell attended a National
Security Council meeting to discuss "additional funds" for FBI
"counterintelligence coverage." Director Hoover's memorandum after
the meeting stated that the President "wanted to have" the "additional
counterintelligence coverage." 365 There was no reference to
"subversiveactivities."
President Kennedy issued no public stJatement oomparn:bleto the
Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower "directives." However, in 1962
he did transfer the J;nterdepartJInental Intelligence Conference from
under the National Security Council to ''the supervision of the Attorney
General." 366 In 1964, Attorney General Robert Kennedy re-issue.d
the lIC charter, citing as authori,ty the President's 1962 order and
directing the lIC (still composed of the FBI and military intelligence
agencies) to continue:
the coordination of all investiga.tion of domestic espiomtge,
counterespionage, sabotage 'and subversion, and other relllJted
intelligence matters affecting internal security.
The charter added that it did not "modify" or ''affect'' the previous
"Presidential Directives" relating to the duties of the FBI, and thJat
the Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and military intelligence
"shall remain in full force and effect." 367
Thus, the Kennedy 'administration made no change in the vague
mandate for domestic intelligence activities, but merely pl'aced formal
control in the hands of the Attorney General.
J. FBI Intelligence and International Tension, 1961-1963
The basic policy theme for the entire 1945-1963 period is stated in
a report for the NllJtional Security Council on the "Intemal Security
Program" in 1954:
Communist doctrine provides that a period of peace is to be
used 1:0 consolidate and strengthen the Communist forces in
the world while at the same t'ime weakening and dividing', the
democratic nations including disruption of the internal life
of these nations economically, politically land socially. Thus
... Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President,
1/28/53, and attached memorandum on "FBI Liaison Activities," 1/26/53.
3M Statement of President Eisenhower, 12/15/53.
... Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Brownell, 12/29/53.
... National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
367 Memm-andum from Attorney General Kennedy to J. Edga·r Hoover, <Jhairman,
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, 3/5/64.
465
the present Soviet "peace tactics" emphasize that our internal
security protective coverllige must be maintained at a high
level. Soviet Russia can continue to increase subversive, disruptive
tactics without risk or cost to herself commensurate
with the potential beneficial results to the Soviet cause.
The Internal Security Program was formulated on the assumption
of a continuance of peacetime "cold war" oondiHons.
However, it includes the elements to be expanded for a
wartime oPeration.368
The scope and techniques of domestic security intelligence operations
during this period cannot he fully understood without recognizing
that this assumption preVlailed throughout 'all 'branches of the United
States government.369
In 1961, Director Hoover submitted a report to President Kennedy's
Special Assistant for National Security, McGeorge Bundy, on the
status of the internal security programs of the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference. It began by reviewing the charter of the nc
and the Delimitations Agreement among the FBI and military intelligence
agencies. The primary objective of the "investigative program"
was "to counter the ever-increasing and continual threat from international
communism and Soviet-bloc espionage and subversion." 370
In addition to reviewing counterespionage operations, the report described
programs for "identification and investigation of potentially
dangerous persons in the United States" and for "coverage of Communist
Party activities." The most significant recent change in operations
was expanded coverage of Cuban groups. The FBI's Security
Index program was explained in the following terms:
The FBI maintains a current list of individuals, both citizens
and aliens, to be considered for apprehension and detention,
if necessary, in a period of emergency. Approximately
12,000 individuals are listed at this time. This list is kept current
on a daily basis by the addition of new individuals whose
activities make them putentially dangerous to the United
States, and by the deletion of individuals who are no longer
engaged in subversive activities. Included on the list of po-
... Report on the Internal Security Program, prepared by the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal
Security, 3/5/54.
3" The Justice Department's 1959 annual report stated:
"Despite the 'thaw/real or apparent, in the Cold War, the [Communist] Party
has continued as an organized foree, cOnstantly 8eeking ta repair its l088e8 and
to regain its former position of influence. Ina number of fields its activities are
directed ostensibly toward laudable objectives, such as elimination of discrimination
by reason of race, low cost housing for ithe economically underprivileged,
and so on. These activities are pursued in 'large part a8 a way of extending the
influence of the Party and its contraets with other forces and currents in
American life, and with the hope of being able to "move in" on sueh movements
when the time is propirt.ious. As a conspiratorial activity the Party is still very
much alive." (Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp.
247-248.) [Emphasis supplied.]
370 J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligenee Conference, to
McGeorge Bundy, 'Special Assistant to the President, 7/25/61, enclosing lIO Report,
Statu8 of U.S. Internal Security Program8, July 1, 1960, ThJrough June 30,
1961.
466
tentially dangerous individuals are nearly 200 persons who
are engaged in pro-Castro Cuban activities or who sympathize
strongly with such activities. In addition to members
of the Communist Party, it also includes certain members of
such organizations as the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico,
the N'ation of Islam, and the Socialist Workers Party.
The FBI's "intensive coverage" of Cuban activities was required because
of "the close ties between the Castro government of Cuba and
the Soviet bloc." Particular attention was paid to the "July 26 Movement",
whi~h had been required to register under the ForeIgn Ar?ents
Registration Act, and to "tJhe Fair Play for Cuba Committee.' Regarding
the latter, the report stated :
The Fair Play for Cuba Committee is the principal outlet
for pro-Castro propaganda and agitation on the part of U.S.
nationals sympathetic to the Castro regime. There are indications
that this organization is receiving funds from the Cuban
Government. In addition, investigation has shown that this
group has been heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party,
USA (CPUSA), and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).
. . . In fact, some chapters of the group have been directly
organized by and under the complete control of the CPUSA
or the SWP. '
Finally, with respect to coverage of the Communist Party and related
groups, the report stated:
The CPUSA is active in agitation and spreading dissension
in the U.S., and during the current racial disturbances in the
South, it !uuJ attempted to take full advantage of 1;he situation.
The Party !uuJ endeavored to bring pressure to bear on
state and Federal officials through the press, labor unions,
and student groups....
At the present time, the FBI has under investigation two
hundred known or suspected communist front and communist-
infiltrated organizations. Many of these organizations
are national in scope with chapters in various cities throughout
the United States. These groups represent transmi~ion
belts through which the CPUSA oan further its line.m [Emphasis
added.]
The report did not say how effective the "attempts" and "endeavors"
of the Communists were, nor did it indicate Communist success was
increasing or decreasing.
The question of pro-Cuban activities had arisen earlier at a National
Security Council meeting in May 1961 after the Bay of Pigs
invasion. Director Hoover attended at the request of the Attorney
General. Hoover recorded after the meeting that he had "outlined to
the President the fact that the FBI had intensified its coverage of
Cubans in this country, both anti-Castro groups and pro-Castro
:m He Report, Status of U.S. Internal Secur1Jty Program, July 1, 1960 through
June 30. 1961.
467
groups." He had also "commented briefly upon the activities of the
Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the elements in back of it." 312
An FBI intelligence program aimed at Castro sympathizers had
originally begun in November 1960 when field offices were instructed
to consider "recommending for the Security Index those individuals
who are not now on the Security Index but who ... would be deemed
dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the U.S.
in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U.S." Such individuals
included both Cubans and non-Cubans "who have been engaged
in substantial activities in furtherance of the aims and purpose
of the Cuban government, in support of pro-Castro groups or organizations
or in furtherance of the communist or subversive infiltration
of pro-Castro groups." 313
After the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, FBI field officers were advised
that "increasing anti-United States attitudes and demonstrations
stemming from the Cuban situation and 'cold war' tensions are cause
for concernl
' and that pro-Castro groups might "react militantly to an
emergency situation." In particular, the activities of the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee revealed "the capacity of a nationality group organization
to mobilize its efforts in such a situation so as to arrange
demonstrations and influence public opinion." Hence, all field offices
were to "be most alert to the possibility of demonstrations by na,tion-
, ality groups which could lead to incidents involving violence." 374
Further instruotions covered both pro-Castro and anti-Castro
groups:
The failure of the recent invasion attempt by Cuban rebel
forces has accentuated the prdblem of investigating antiCastro
and pro-Castro woups and individuals 'in the United
States. In addition to dIscharging our security and criminal
responsibilities we are faced with the necessity of acquiring
and providing other agencies informative and valid intelligence
data relative to the objectives and activities of bothfactions
as well as data regarding key personalities. . . .
In order to discharge these investigative and intelligence
responsibilities with maximum effectiveness it is essential that
particular attention be afforded the development on a broadly
expanded basis of SOUl~esand informants in a position to provide
knowledgeable data regarding pro-Castro and antiCastro
activities.315
At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the FBI intensified its
program 'for placing pro-Cubans on the Security Index and established
a special "Cuban Section" of the Index. Among the activities to
be considered in placing Cuban aliens on the Index included:
(1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro
regime, (2) participatIOn in picket lines formed in
support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with
372 Memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover, 5/11/61.
..3 SAO Letter No. 60-04, 11/22/60.
..<SAC Letter No. 61-24, 4/27/61.
I1T6 SAC Letter No. 61-28, 5/28/61.
468
Cuban agents operating in this country on behalf of
the Cuban Government, or (4) statements or activities on
a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that
his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event
of armed conflict between the United States and Cuba.376
This program would have made it possible for the President, at the
height of the Cuban missile crisis, to declare an "internal security
emergency" and order ,the arrest and detention of those persons
deemed "potentially dangerous" because of their pro-Castro
sympathies.
In 1962 there were 11,165 persons on the Security Index, 969 persons
in Section A of the Reserve Index, and approximately 10,000
persons in Section B of the Reserve Index. An internal FBI memorandum
stated, "Essentially, all of the individuals included therein
fall within the emergency detention provisions in the Internal Security
Act of 1950 as well as the emergency detention provisions of the
Attorney General's Portfolio." 377 There is no indication that Justice
Department officials under the Kennedy Administration were informed
of the existence of the Reserve Index.
In late 1963 the Security Index contained the names of 10,519 individuals,
of whom 1,967 were designated for the Detcom Priority Apprehension
Program because "their training, violent tendencies and
prominence in subversive activity represent the greatest threat in time
of a national emergency...." 378 The procedures for Justice Department
review of the Security Index were described as follows:
The Department does not review individual cases prior to
the time they are placed on the Security Index.... In July
1955 the Department advised that it would engage in reviewing
a "sampling" of our Security Index cases and it has been
so enlmged since. We furnish the Department each month a
list ofour Security Index subjects for attachment to the Master
Waru-ant of Arrest maintained by the Department should
an emergency occur requiring their apprehension and from
this list the Department selects cases for reviewing. For information,
as of today approximately 59.4 percent of the Security
Index cases have been reviewed and approved by the Department.
We request the Department to conduct specific review of a
Security Index case when such a subject becomes (1) a U.S.
Government employee, (2) a, foreign government employee,
and (3) an employee of the United Nations. We a.lso request
the Department to specifically review a case previously reviewed
and approved by it prior to taking action with respect
to removing a subject's name from the Security Index. These
reviews are generally conducted by the Department within
a thirty~day period.379
376 SAC Letter No. 62-55, 10/5/62.
3'l7 Memorandum from .J. F. Bland to W. C. Sullivan, 6/7/62, 12/11/62.
371l Memorandum from W. O.Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 11/26/68.
m Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. nelmont, 12/9/63.
469
The date of this December 1963 memorandum, in response to a request
by Director Hoover, indicates high-level concern that Lee
Harvey Oswald was not on the Security Index.
Following the Kennedy assassination, the FBI Intelligence Division
proposed "a broadening of the factors which must be considered
in evaluating an individual's dangerousness." Six new criteria were
added:
1. Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc establishments (including
Cuba) where purpose of contact cannot be determined
or contact indicates communist sympathies.
2. Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc, Cuban, or Yugoslav intelligence
agents where purpose of contact cannot be determined
or contact indicates communist sympathies.
3. Individuals who have defected, revoked or sought revocation
of their United States citizenship in favor of a SinoSoviet-
bloc country, who have returned to the United States,
and who have taken no positive steps to counteract. such
action.
4. Statements or activities on a subject's part establishing
reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with
communist nations in the event of armed conflict between
the United States and communist nations.
5. Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or
intelligence activities.
6. A history of emotional instability or irrational behavior
on the part of an individual with a subversive background
whose prior acts depict a propensity for violence and hatred
against organized government.
It was pointed out that such criteria. were "sufficiently elastic so that
when applied with the necessary judgment the complex questions
which arise can be resolved." 380
These FBI domestic intelligence policies in 1961-1963 indicated the
central purpose of the Bureau's internal security assignment. International
tensions were still sufficiently intense that the FBI could reasonably
anticipate the possibility of an "internal security emergency."
The basic assumptions which had prevailed since World War II had
not been seriously questioned, and new events were viewed within that
:framework.
V. FBI INTELLIGENCE AND DOMESTIC UNREST, 1964-1974
"Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI had developed into an extraordinarily
independent agency within our Government. It is hard to
exaggerate that. Mr. Hoover, in effect, took orders only from himself,
sometimes from an Attorney General, usually from a President, and
~hat \vas it. He had created a kind of kingdom of which he was very
Jealous....
"Mr. Hoover built a position which I think is almost unparalleled in
the administrative branch of our Government, a combination of pro-
380 Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 12/11/63; SAC Letter
No. 63--()l, 12/17/63.
470
fessional performance on the job, some element of fear, very astute relations
with the Congress, and very effective public relations."
-Testimony of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 23,1974.
During the tumultuous years of the mid- and late-1960s and early
1970s, the FBI and other executive officials confronted entirely new
domestic security problems which did not fit the 'assumptions of the
past. Civil rights demonstrations, the violent Klan reaction, urban
ghetto disturbances, and protests against the Vietnam War raised substantially
different concerns for federal executives. They were essentially
law enforcement matters, requiring effective criminal investigation
of violent acts, improved police-community relations in the cities,
and careful planning to insure peaceful demonstrations. Nevertheless,
the FBI approached them within the framework of its domestic intelligence
operations, based on the concepts of previous decades; wd the
Justice Department did not attempt in any significant way to reorient
the Bureau away from its preoccupation with Communist "influence."
Instead, Attorneys General simply added new assignments for FBI
intelligence, in broad requests containing little guidance and even less
control.
A. Klan Irdelligence
During the first half of 1964 officials of the Justice Departmentincluding
Attorney General Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach, and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall
of the Civil Rights Division-were increasingly concerned about the
spread of Ku Klux Klan activity and violence in Mississippi and parts
of Louisiana and Alabama. Attorney General Kennedy sent a team
of lawyers experienced in organized crime investigations to Mississippi.
Based on their report and his own findings, Assistant Attorney
General Marshall prepared a memorandum for the Attorney General
to send to President Johnson in June 1964. Its purpose was to encourage
the FBI "to develop its own procedures for the collection of
intelligence." The memo to the President stated, in part:
... it seems to me that consideration should be given by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to new procedures for identification
of individuals who may be Or have been involved
in acts of terrorism, and to the possible participation in such
acts by law enforcement officials or at least their toleration
of terrorist activity. In the past the procedures used by the
Bure3IU for gaining information on known, local Klan
groups have been successful in many places, and the information
gathering techniques used by the Bureau on Communist
or Communist related organizations have of course been
spectacularly efficient.
The unique difficulty that seems to me to be presented by
the situation in Mississippi (which is duplicated in parts of
Alabama and Louisiana at least) is in gathering information
on ;fundamentally lawless activities which have the sanction
of local law enforcement agencies, political officials and a
substantial segment of the white population. The techniques
471
followe~ in t~e ~se o~ specially trained, special assignment
agents m the mfiltratlOn of Communist groups should be of
value. If you approve, it might be desirable to take up with
the Bureau the possibility of developing a similar effort to
meet this new problem.381
Shortly thereafter, when three civil rights workers disappeared in
Mississippi, President Johnson called on former CIA Director Allen
Dulles to evaluate the situation. After conferring with the Attorney
General, the FBI Director, and other Justice Department officials,
Dulles flew to Jackson, Mississippi. There he met with the Governor,
the head of the highway patrol, civic business leaders, black and white
religious leaders, and civil rights workers. Upon his return to Washington,
Dulles recommended to the President that a substantial increase
be made in the number of FBI agents in Mississippi to help
"control the terrorist activities". He announced publicly that the
President appeared to favor his proposal and had indicated it would
be implemented very shortly.382
According to an account based on FBI sources, President Johnson
directed J. Edgar Hoover "to put people after the Klan and study
it from one county to the next. I want the FBI to have the best in·
telligence system possible to check on the activities of these people." 383
Another account suggests that Hoover initially told the President to
send Federal marshals or troops to Mississippi, but finally agreed. that
the FBI would take on the assignment.384 Consequently, the FBI
opened a new field office in Jackson, Mississippi, in July 1964. In addition,
the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division set up a special
unit as "a central clearing house for information on Klan and Klantype
organizations and on acts of violence and intimidation found to
have been encouraged by the Klan." The unit maintained a current
listing of Klan membership; compiled information on the organization
of Klan federations and Klaverns and the relationship among
different groups; monitored trends toward growth or attrition, recruiting
activities, and changes in support for the Klan movement in particular
areas; and reviewed and recommended action against Klan
organizations where members were acting to violate Federal statutes.385
At FBI headquarters the supervision of investigations of Klan and
hate groups was transferred from the General Investigative Division
to the Domestic Intelligence Division, where it had been prior to 1958.
The Inspection Division prepared a study of the matter before the
1964 shift occurred. This study recalled that "one of the prime factors"
in the 1958 decision had been "the almost complete absence of
Communist Party activity in the racial area;" another factor had been
the need to "streamline operations." Because the General Investigative
Division handled "the investigation of individual cases, i.e., bombings,
... Quoted in Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New York: Atheneum 1971),
pp. 105-106.
3112 "Dulles Requests More FBI Agents for Mississippi," New York Times,
6/27/64; see a,lso Joseph Aloop, "oMu["der by Night," Wa8hinlf/ron POIJt, 6/'17/64.
... Don Whitehead, Attack Against Terror: The FBI Against the Ku KZua: KZan
in Mi88issippi, (1970), pp. 00-91.
... J'oselPh X'raft, "J. Edgar Hoover: The Oomplete Bureaucrat," O~tary
(February 19(5), pp. 59-62.
386 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1965, pp. 185-186.
472
murders, police brutality, etc.," there was an advantage in "having the
hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive
civil rights cases." This argument was repeated by officials opposed
to the transfer in 1964 :
[One official] believes the transfer of functions would create
an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that
our best chance to break major civil rights cases such as bombings,
murders, etc., is through information developed from
the inside as a result of coverage established in the community
where the crime occurred; i.e., informants and sources
in the Klan, hate groups, subversive organizations, but also
sources not connected with any group, who will report potential
violence and individuals prone to violence. We are following
the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to
violence even though they have not violated a federal law as
yet. He feels that the Division that is going to investigate
these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this
purpose.
The contrary argument was based on "the premise that organizations
like the KKK and supporting groups are essentially subversive in
that they hold principles and recommend courses of action that are
inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist
Party." The Domestic Intelligence Division had experienced with
aggressive techniques in the area of "subversion:"
[Another official] feels that the DID over the years has
developed wide experience in the penetration of subversive
organizations through informants, anonymous sources,
sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview
programs of highly specialized nature, etc., and that
his division could put this experience to excellent use in
penetra;ting the Khn and other hate groups.
It was also suggested that the Domestic Intelligence Division "would
be in a position to launch a disruptive counterintelligence program
against the Klan and other hate groups with the same effectiveness
that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party is
concerned."
The Inspection Division agreed that the Domestic Intelligence
Division had "achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the Communist
Party a.nd Soviet intelligence operations" and that "this
experience and knowhow could be put to good advantage in penetrating
the Klan and other hate groups." The Inspection Division also
"felt that a study of counterintelligence and disruption tactics against
the Klan certainly merits further consideration." On the basis of
this recommendation, Dir.ector Hoover approved the transfer.3sB
Former Attorney General Nicholas Ka,tzenibach vigorously defended
the FBI's 'broad intelligence-gathering program against the Klan in
his testimony before the Select Committee:
... Memorandum from J. B. Gale to Mr. Tolson, 7/30/64 ('See Report on
COINTELPRO) .
473
The Klan program involved the inveStigation and prosecution
of persons who engaged in' and who were committed to
the violent deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed rights
of others through murders, kidnappings., beatings and
threats of violence-all in contravention of federal and state
laws.... The Bureau was investigating and attempting to
prevent violence. To equate such efforts with surveillance or
harassment of persons exercising constitutionally guaranteed
rights is in my view unmitigated nonsense....
It is true that the FBI program with respect to the Klan
made extensive use of informers. That is true of virtually
every criminal investigation with which I am familiar. In
an effort to detect, prevent, and prosecute acts of violence,
President Johnson, Attorney General Kennedy, Mr. Allen
Dulles, myself and others urged the Bureau to develop an
effective informant program, similar to that which they had
developed with respect to the Communist Party. It is true
that these techniques did in fact disrupt Klan activities,
sowed deep mistrust among Klan members, and made Klan
members aware of the extensive informant system of the FBI
and the fact that they were under constant observation. Klan
members were interviewed and r,einterviewed openly-a fact
which appeared in the public press at the time. They were
openly surveilled. These techniques were designed to deter
violence-to prevent murder, bombings and beatings. In
my judgment they were successful. I was aware of them and
I authorized them. In the same circumstances I would do so
again today.387
Mr. Katzenbach spoke of the FBI's intensive investigation of individuals
and groups with a "propensity for violence." The FBI Manual
did, in fact, attempt to focus Klan intelligence investigations in this
manner. The basic standard for opening an investigation was whether
organizations or individuals "have adopted a policy or have allegedly
adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of
force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution."
The FBI Manual stressed:
The fundamental objective is to identify those who may be
engaged in or responsible for acts of violence, and care must
be taken to avoid becoming involved in widespread, nebulous
investigation which does not go to the heart of the problem at
hand. When a case is opened, it should receive immediate
and continuous attention until the initial allegation is resolved.
The case should be promptly closed if it is definitely
determined that it does not fall within the criteria set out ...
above.
. . . wholesale investigations of individuals associated with
these organizations should not be undertaken. Individuals
investigated should be those key personnel who have the propensity
for violence and actually formulate and carry out
38'l NichoLas deB. Katzenbach temimony, lQj3/75, Hearings, ¥ol. 6, p. 207.
474
the organization's policies and not those individuals who
merely attend meetings on a regular basis.
However, general intelligence collection did go beyond these limits.
Field officers were instructed to "follow through public source material
and established sources activities of organizations which do
not qualify for investigation under above standards." 388 •
The Domestic Intelligence Division chafed under these restrictlOns,
which were held over from when Klan investigations had been under
the General Investigative Division. Assistant Director William C.
Sullivan, head of the Intelligence Division, told the FBI Executives
Conference in 1966 that
. . . in his strong opinion the FBI is not adequately coping
with the problems created by the Ku Klux Klan. He
had in mind bombings, beatings, civil rights violations, etc.
Mr. Sullivan pointed out that there are 14,000 members of the
Klans in the United States today. The FBI's policy calls for
investi~atin~ all officers of the Klan and all Klan members
who are violence prone. He said there are 4,500 officers and
to date we have investigated only 1,500 of them, and only 300
violence-prone of whom there are many more.
Sullivan specifically cited the problem in North Carolina where there
were 152 Klaverns and the FBI needed informant coverage of 81.
He urged that the Bureau give "sufficient manpower ... and direction
to seriously disrupt and reduce their activities and practices." 389
Thereafter, in 1967 the FBI Manual was revised to direct field offices
specifically to furnish "details concerning rallies [and] demonstrations"
by Klan or hate-type organizations.39o In 1969 these instructions
were broadened to "include full details concerning the
speeches made at the rallies or demonstrations, as well as the identities
of the speakers." 391
In 1971 the criteria for investigating individuals were widened still
further. iSpecial Agents in Charge of field offices were instructed to
investigate not only persons with "a potential for violence," but also
anyone else "who in judgment of SAC should be subject of investigation
due to extremist activities." 392
Thus, the FBI gradually -expanded its Klan intelligence investigations,
moving beyond information related to possible violence. By 1971
the FBI program for investigating Klan and hate-groups dele~ated
virtually unlimited discretion to the field and specifically required
FBI agents to report on lawful political speeches.
For example, the FBI's collection of intelligence about "white militant
groups" included groups "known to sponsor demonstrations
against integration and against the bussing of Negro students to white
schools." As soon as a new organization of this sort was formed, the
Bureau used its informers and "established sources" to determine "the
"'1005 FBI MaDual Section 122, pp. 1-2.
... Executives Conference Memorandum, 3/24/66.
"'1967 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 2.
"'1969 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 2.
.. 1971 Manual Section 122, p. 2.
475
aims and purposes of the organization, its leaders, approximate membership"
and other "background data" bearing upon "the militancy"
of the group.393
B. FBI Intelligence and the Black Community
Events in 1964 also led to a substantial change in FBI intelligence
programs dealing with black "extremists" and civil disorders, in addition
to the Klan. During the first urban ghetto riots in the summer of
1964, President Johnson instructed the FBI to investigate their origins
and ext~nt. The Bureau's report was made public in late September.
'J1he FBI had surveyed nine cities where riots had occurred and
gathered information "from public officials, police officers, clergymen,
leaders of responsible organizations and individuals considered to be
reliable." The basis for the inquiry was explained in the most general
terms:
It is 'a truism that the first duty of all government is to
maintain order, else there is no government. Keeping the peace
in this country is essentially the responsibility of the state government.
'Where lawless conditions arise, however, with similar
characteristics from coast to coast, the matter is one of national
concern even though there is no direct connection between
the events and even tlwugh no federal law i8 violated.
[Emphasis added.]
The FBI's findings served to reassure the public: there was no evidence
"that the riots were organized on a national basis;" none of the incidents
was a "race riot" involving interracial violence; and none was a
"direct outgrowth of conventional civil rights protest." However, the
FBI did report the role of "a Marxist-Leninist group following the
more violent Chinese Communist line" and other individuals "with
histories of Communist affiliation" in alleged attempts to instigate riot
activity. The FBI also called attention to the growth of black militancy,
asserting that "a number of violent agitators" had arisen. Without
mentioning his name, the FBI report described the activities of
Malcolm X as one example of a leader urging blacks "to abandon the
doctrine of non-violence." 394
These developments in the North and the increasing number of civil
rights demonstrations in the South were the background for an expansion
of the FBI program for collecting intelligence on "General
Racial Matters" in early 1965. The FBI Manual was revised to CQver
demonstrations, racial violence and riots. These revisions included the
following:
In order that the Bureau's information will be complete
regarding planned racial activity, such as demonstrations,
rallies, marches, or threatened opposition to activity of this
kind, each office must assume responsibility for following up
the planned activity and promptly advising the Bureau by
teletype of subsequent developments even though the develop-
... SAO Letter 68-25, 4/30/68.
llO4 "Text of FBI Report on Recent Racial Disturbances," New York Times,
9/27/64.
69-984 6l - 76 - 31
476
ment may be a postponement or cancellation of the planned
activity.
In the event of an outbreak of mob violence or rioting ...
you must: Immediately launch a vigorous investigation to
determine the causes and forces behind the threatened or actual
mob violence or rioting and whether there is an organized
pattern underlying it emanating from subversive or radical
groups or other outside sources ... [and] afford specific
assignments to informants, and keep them assigned, to determine
the underlying cause of the mob violence or riot.... 395
At this time the FBI Director testified before the House Appropriations
Committee that the FBI was following "the racial situation
from an intelligence viewpoint." The Justice Department reported
that this intelligence had already made it possible for the Civil Rights
Division to keep "a close and continuing watch on civil rights demonstrations
which totaled 2,422 in almost all states during the year ending
April 1964." 396
In late 1966 after two more "long hot summers," including the 1965
Watts riot in Los Angeles and many smaller-scale disorders, the FBI
instituted a program for preparing semi-monthly summaries of possible
racial violence in major urban areas. Field offices were instructed
to conduct "a continuing survey to develop advance information concerning
racial developments which clearly point to the possibility of
mob violence and riotous conditions."
This survey should afford the Bureau a realistic, comprehensive
picture of the existing racial conditions in major urban
areas on a current basis and this can only be accomplished by
maintaining a constant and effective check on existing conditions
through racial, criminal, and security informants and
through established logical sources. Information ... should
cover the following categories :
(1) Name of community....
(2) General racial conditions....
(3) Current evaluation of violence potential. ...
(4) Identities of org-anizations involved in local racial
situations. Such organizations may include not only civil
rights organizations but 'also subversive organizations, black
nationalist org'anizations, Klan <.>rganizations, hate-type
groups, and others. Include a conCIse summary of the general
programs of such organizations relating to the racial
issue. In particular include any indications of subversive or
radical infiltration of organi~ationsand any indication that
organizations involved in the racial issue advocate or may
resort to extralegal action or violence.
(5) Identities of leaders and individuals involved. Include
the identity of leaders and individuals in the civil rights
movement as well as readily available personal background
data, any pertinent information contained in office files
-1965 FBI Manual Section 122, pp', 6-8.
... Depwrl:ment· of' Justice Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1966; Hearings beforo
the House AppropriatiO'ns Oommittee (1965), pp. 175, 342-348, 348. '
477
showing affiliation or association with Klan-type, communist
or related subversive organizations and/or statements made
by such individuals advocating racial violence and/or extralegal
activity.
(6) Existence of channels of communication between minority
leaders and local officials. . . .
(7) Objectives sought by minority oommunity, and possible
points of contention. . . . Describe the number, character,
and intensity of the techniques used by the minority community,
such as picketing or sit-in demonstrations, to enforce
their demands.
(8) Reaction of leaders and members of the community to
minority demands ...391
The Bureau concentrated investigations in this field on "black nationalist
groups," described as "hate-type org'anizations" with a "propensity
for violence and civil disorder." 398 The term "militant black
nationalist" was not defined with any precision. Such "racial militants"
were deemed a "threat to the internal securitv" because of their "anarchistic
tendencies" 399 or their "propensity tor fomenting racial disorder."
400 Leaders and members of "black nationalist" groups were
investig-ated under the Emerg-ency Detention Program for placement
on the FBI's Security Index.4Ol
The standards were so va~e, however, that the FBI included Dr.
Martin Luther King' and his nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership
Conference in the "radical and violence-prone" category, because
Dr. King might "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white, liberal
doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism." 402
Another leadin1! civil rights woup, the Council on Racial Equality
(CORE). which had "neg:ligible" Communist infiltration, was investigated
under the "Racial Matters" Prog'ram because the Bureau concluded
that it was moving "away from a legitimate civil rights organization"
and was "assuming a militant black nationalist posture."
The FBI reached this conclusion on the e:ronnds that "some leaders in
their public statements" had condoned "violence as a means of attaining'
Nep:ro rights." The investhration was intensified, even though there
was as yet no information that its members "advocate violence" or
"participate in actual violence." 403
The Justice Department provided little g'uidanee for FBI intelligence
investi!J'atlons. The Nation of Islam ag'ain provides an example.
In 1962. the FBI asked if the group could be prosecnted or designated
for the "Attornev Genf>ral's list." In replv, the Internal Security Division
repeated its earlier position that there was not "sufficif'nt evidence
to warrant prosecutive action." but that the FBI should "continue
its investig'ation ... because of the radical. semi-secret, and violent
nature of this organization, and the continuing tendency on the
tIt¥T FRIMannal Se<>t1on 122. N'vil'lM 12/13/66. pp. R-!).
.... Memorandum from FBI HeadQuarlel"l'l to all S'AIOs, 8/25/67.
... Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan. 4/30/68.
coo Mf'moranduffi from P. L. Cox to Mr. Sullivan. 9f!)/67.
i01 Memorandum from Brennan to SUlliV'lln, 4/30/68.
MIl Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/4/68.
... SAO Letter 68-16, 3/12/68.
478
part of some of its leaders to use language of implied threats against
the Government." 404 Although the Division did not mention the Security
Index, the FBI believed that the investigation was conducted
primarily so that leaders and/or active members could be considered
"for apprehension during the period of a national emergency and for
inclusion in the Security Index." 405
The FBI again asked for the Justice Department's opinion in 1963.
An official of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division observed to his
superior, "Inasmuch as the Department is in possession of all pertinent
information regarding the NOI and its teachings, it appears the Department
is trying to get the Bureau to do the Department's work." 406
The Internal Security Division replied only that there was "insufficient
evidence" for prosecution and said nothing about further
investigation.407
Nevertheless, the FBI did continue investigating "because of the
radical, semisecret and violent nature of the organization." In 1964, it
once again asked for the Department's opinion "as to whether the activities
of the NOI come within the criteria of Executive Order 10450 or
whether its activities are in violation of any other Federal statute." 408
The Internal Security Division's answer reiterated that there was "insufficient
evidence" for prosecution, and went into greater detail regarding
applicability of the criteria for the Employe~ Security Program
under Executive Order 10450 :
The activities reported must be shown to be more than mere
prophecies or utt~rances made with the hope of ultimate
attainment of their desired aims. For example,
while teaching that the white man must be exterminated
they do not say by whom or how. There should be availruble
evidence to show that the advocacy or approval of the commission
of acts of violence to deny others their Constitutional
rights is calculated to incite the members to action
now or in the foreseeable future. Evidence is needed to show
the specific acis taken by particular individual leaders in advocating
or approving acts of force and violence'; not that
"heads will roll in the streets", which could be merely a prediction,
but rather what specific plan of action, direction or
urging has been made to bring about such an event; not the
abstract teaching that Allah will cause the desired event, but
the concrete steps taken by specific individual leaders to effectuate
their goals. It is fully realized that such evidence
is not easily obtained even if its exists; and finally there seems
to be some indication that the leaders are becoming more
cautious in their utterances.401
... Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the FBI
Director, 1/25/62.
... Note on Memorandum from the FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General
J. Walter YeaA"ley, 1/10/62.
.... Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 2/21/63.
4<11 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter ~eagleyto the FBI
Dirpctor, 5/16/63.
... Memorandum from the FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General J. Walter
Yeagley. 1/31164.
... ME'Ilwrnndnm from AssistaIlt Attorlll'Y (l(,I\C'rnl J. WlIltl'r Yeagley to thE' FBI
Director. :1/8 '64.
479
Despite this formal opinion, the FBI continued to investigate and to
furnish the results to the Department in reports and memoranda.
FBI intelligence officials assumed they could go ahead not only because
the Justice Department did not say "stop the investigation,"
but also because the FBI still included "names of appropriate Nation
of Islam officials ... in our Security Index" (which was reviewed by
the Internal Security Division). In mid-1966 an FBI intelligence official
observed, "The Department apparently has no intention of
authorizing prosecution of the Nation of Islam, in absence of the
Nation of Islam causing large-scale riots, or virtual insurrection. However,
it appears to be in the Bureau's best interests to put the Department
on record once again as to whether a prosecutable violation
exists...." 410
This time the Internal Security Division specifically asked the FBI
to continue "active investigation ... for possible violation of Federal
statutes or for possible designation under the provisions of Executive
Order 10450." This request was made despite the Division's conclusion
that there was still "insufficient evidence" and that in the previous two
years there had "been no siP.'llificant changes as to the character and
tactics of the organization." The only reason offered for this Departmental
instmction to continue the investigation was that the group's
leaders "advocate disobedience of any law contrary to the beliefs of
Muslims." 411
There were no further FBI requests for Departmental opinion or
instMlCtions provided by the Internal Security Division regarding the
continued intelligence investigation of the Nation of Islam from 1966
unti11973.
O. OOMINFIL Investigations-"Racial Matters"
In .Tune 1964. the FBI established a "special desk" in the Domestic
Intelligence Division to supervise an "intensification of the investigation
of communist influence in racial matters." 412 The chief of the Division's
Internal Security Section stressed that civil rights was ''the
primary do~estic issue on the political front today," and that "both
sides" in the Senate debate on the Civil Rights Bill might "ask the
Bureau" for information about "communist penetration into the racial
movement." Thus, the FBI had to be prepared to make "a proper
presentation of the facts." The Bureau's Inspection Division endorsed
this step, noting that the "urgency" for the FBI to "stay ahead" of
the situation was tied not only to the civil rights bill, but to "the complex
political situations in an election year where civil rights and
social disturbances will playa key role in campaign efforts and possibly
election results." 413 Instructions to the field in August 1964
stated:
There are clear and unmistakable signs that we are in the
midst of a social revolution with the racial movement at its
core. The Bureau, in meeting its responsibilities in this area,
is an integral part of this revolution.414
no Ml'morantlnm from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan. 7/15/00.
m Mpmol"andum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the
FBI Director, 7/28/66.
41' Memorandllm from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan. 10/1/64.
41SMemorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivlln, 5/20/64.
U4 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/28/64.
480
The part the FBI played in this "revolution" in American race
relations was not a noble one. Director Hoover's formal statement to
the Appropriations Committee, published in April 1964, discussed at
great length the "Communist interest in Negro activities." He concluded
that "Communist influence" in the "Negro movement" was
"vitally important" because "it can be the means through which large
masses are caused to ... succumb to the party's propaganda lures."
The number of Negroes recruited by the Communists was "not the important
thing." Rather, Director Hoover said it was "an old Communist
principle" that: "Communism must be built with non-Communist
hands." 415
Direotor Hoover's public and private message in 1964, on this and
other occasions, was that the "importance of the Communist influence
in the Negro movement" could not be "ignored or minimized." 416 Most
Americans at that time would not have questioned Hoover's preeminence
as an expert on Communism.417 Nevertheless, Bureau records indicate
that he rejected the findings of the FBI's most experienced intelligence
officials on this issue, that he influenced his subordinates to
abandon their own judgments and to exaggerate Communist influence
in the civil rights movement, and that these subordinates then instituted
massive investigative efforts to find every possible bit of
evidence of Communist links in order to substantiate the Director's
preconception.418
The August 1963 March on Washington had a dramatic impact on
the nation-and devastating consequences within the FBI. Shortly
before the March, Bureau intelligence officials summarized the results
of extensive investigations (initiated a month before the March).419
There was no evidence that the March was "actually initiated" or
"controlled" by Communists, although they did plan to participate.
There had been "an obvious failure" of the Communists "to appreciably
infiltrate, influence, or control large numbers of American
Negroes." The report concluded that "time alone will tell" whether
the Communists would have "great success" in the future.4
2'1
Director Hoover, upon reading the report, sharply. rejected its
finding that Communist influence was "infinitessimal." 42'2 His subordinates
got the message. "The Director is correct," wrote the head of
the Domestic Intelligence Division, adding, "We regret greatly that
the memorandum did not measure up to what the Director has a right
to expect from our analysis." 423
The Division head advised another Bureau official: "It is obvious
that we did not put the proper interpretation upon the facts which
we gave to the Director." He promised to "do everything that is
416 Justice Department Appropriation for FY 1965, Hearings before the House
Appropriations Subcommittee, 88th Congo (1964), p. 309.
418 Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Edwin O. Guthman, Special Assistant
to the Attorney General for Public Information,5/14/M. (Enclosure)
'" His book, Masters Of Deceit: The Story of Oommunism in America and How
to Fight It (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), was a best-seller and was used in
schools across the country.
4lS See Committee Report on Dr. Martin Luther King.
<to Memorandum from F..1. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 8/22/63.
<21 }Iemorandum from F..J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 8/23/63.
<22 J. Edgar Hoover's note on Baumgardner memorandum, 8/23/63.
<23 Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont, 8/30/63.
481
humanly possible to develop all facts nationwide relative to Communist
penetration and influence over Negro leaders and their
organizations." 42'4
This exchange set in motion a disastrous series of events. The
Domestic Intelligence Di,'ision recommended asking the Attorney
General to approve a wiretap on Dr. Martin Luther King/2'5 intensifying
field investigations to uncover "communist influence on the
Negro" using "all possible investigative techniques," and expanding
COINTELPRO operations using "aggressive tactics" to "neutralize
or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field." 426 After a sarcastic
initial rejection of these plans, Director Hoover approved a new
Intelligence Division memorandum on "Commnnism and the Negro
Movement-A Current Analysis" and noted, "I am glad that you
recognize at last that there exists such influence." 42'7
Approving a recommendation after ·a December 1963 conference
that the Bureau take Dr. King "off his pedestal" and promote someone
else to be his successor as the new "national Negro leader," FBI
Director Hoover observed:
I am glad to see that "light" has finally, though dismally delayed,
come to the Domestic Int. Div. I struggled for months
to get over the fact that the Communists were taking over the
racial movement but [illegible] couldn't or wouldn't see it.428
Director Hoover's exaggeration of Communist influence in the civil
rights movement (especially his 1964 appropriations testimony)
risked poisoning the political climate in the months before passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.429 And the investigation of the civil rights
movement to uncover any shred of evidence of Communist influence
added massive reports to the files of the Bureau and other agencies on
lawful political activity and law-abiding Americans.
To achieve this end FBI Manual provisions for internal security
intelligence were revised substantially without any outside supervision.
New instructions were added to intensify FBI intelligence investigations
of Communist influence in the civil rights movement and
in protest demonstrations. First of all, field offices were to identify all
Negro members of the Communist Party. Second, a new program codenamed
CIRM (Communist Influence in Racial Matters) was instituted.
Quarterly reports from the field offices were to include information
on:
... communist infiltration in various organizations, such
as the Congress of Racial Equality, Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee, and the like; investigations of su'bversive
individuals active in the racial movements; investigations
of communist fronts and other miscellaneous organizations;
and racial disturbances and other racial matters.
. . . These reports shall be designed to precisely spell out the
full extent of the communist influence in racial matters. They
4IJ< Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont, 9/25/63.
<21\ Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 10/7/63.
420 :\Iemorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to "'. C. SUllivan, 9/16/63.
"" Note on Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson, 10/17/63.
<28 Note on memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont, 1/8/64.
."" "Rights Bill Crippling is Feared," Wasllington Post, 5/11/64.
482
should separate words and intentions from actions; mere participation
from direct influence; and the bona fide communist
from the mere "do-gooder". They should not include information
concerning legitimate efforts in the racial movement
where there is no communist taint.
The FBI Manual also required field office reports on protest activities
where Communists might be involved including:
Information on communist direction and influences of and
participation in racial demonstrations, disturbances, drives,
boycotts, and any other similar activities with racial overtones.
This part will illustrate how communist activities attempt
to exploit radical situations and expand communist influence,
thus furthering communist objectives.... [Emphasis
added.]
Under each subheading include such information as nature
of event; sponsoring and participating groups; total participants;
number and identities of subversives involved; specifics
as to whether subversives directed, controlled, instigated, or
merely participated; whether violence resulted and, if so,
whether subversives involved; arrests of subversives and court
disposition; and any other information believed pertinent
to the over-all picture of communist influence. Efforts 'by supporting
groups to avoid communist involvement should also be
reported. If a particular event had no communist involvement,
it should, of course, not be included in the report.
The last restriction had somewhat less effect, because FBI offices were
advised that "the term 'communist' should be interpreted in its broad
sense as including persons not only adhering to the principles of the
CPUSA itself, but also to such splinter and offshoot groups as the
Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, and the like."
'Whenever a group was subject to Communist influence, field offices
had to report:
... pertinent data as to the national headquarters, as well as
any local affiliates.... The number of members, nationally
and by locals, should be indicated. Include under each organization
information as to officers and others in positions of
influence who have present or Pa8t subversive connections;
information as to other subversives who are merely mem'bers;
specific evidence of influence wielded by subversIves; policy
concerning communist participation in the organization's activities,
such as prohibition of communists holding office or
membership (if no such stated policy, so indicate) ; and use
and distribution of communist propaganda. [Emphasis
added.] 430
These instructions continued in effect until the early 1970's. Their
application to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference are described elsewhere.430a
... FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 12a-12c, revision of 9/18/64.
<lIOa See Committee Report on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
483
Under this program the FBI also intensified investigations of moderate
groups like the NAACP, which had been under investigation
since the 1940's. For example, the Detroit office relied on six informants
to "follow and report on all efforts by the Communist Party to infiltrate
the NAACP." 431
The New York Field Office used sixteen informants and confidential
sources "to follow CP infiltration of the national organization of the
NAACP and local branches of the NAACP." All the national officers
and board members of the NAACP were listed, and any data in FBI
files on their past associations with subversives were included. Most of
this information went back to the 1940's. Copies of the report were disseminated
to local military intelligence officers.432
The FBI's Chicago office prepared a Letterhead Memorandum (a
report designed for dissemination to other Executive Branch agencies)
on the plans of Communist leaders to have "the Party forces"
at the NAACP National Convention press for certain policies. The
memorandum did not indicate how extensive or influential these "Party
forces" would be.433 The St. Louis office used eleven informants and
confidential sources to "follow and report interest and activity of the
CP and SWP in the NAACP in St. Louis." 434 The New York office
reported changes in the leadership and board of the NAACP in 1966,
once again going back in FBI files to uncover any subversive associations
in the 1940's.435 The ,FBI did close cases on specific chapters where
there were very few Communists involved.436 In order to reach the
point of closing a case,'however, FBI offices submitted reports listing
all officers of the NAACP chapters and the number of members. Membership
figures were sometimes obtained by "pretext telephone call ...
utilizing the pretext to being interested in joining that branch of the
NAACP." (Copies of all reports were disseminated to local military
intelligence offices "in view of their interest in matters pertaining to
infiltration of the NAACP.") 431
D. OOMINFIL Investigati<YIUJ-The Antiwar M(YI)e'l'lWnt and Student
(houps
The scope of FBI intelligence investigllitions of Communist infiltration
of civil rights groups was matched, if not exceeded, by its investigations
of Communist links to the antiwar movement. As early as
1964 the FBI reported publicly that the Communist Party was conducting
"an intensive oampaign for the withdrawal of American
forces from South Vietnam." 438
In April 1965, President Johnson's Assistant for National Security
Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, asked the FBI for information concerning
the Communist role in criticism of American policy in Vietnam. The
following day Director Hoover met with the President to discuss this
matter. Accqrding ,to Hoover's account:
43l Memorandum from Detroit Field Ofike to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.
... Memorandum from New y,ork Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.
... Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/7/65.
... Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/66.
<as Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office, 5/4/66.
"" Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/5/65.
... Annual Report of the Attorney General for fiscal year 1964, pp. 37~76.
484
The President informed me that he was quite concerned
over the anti-Vietnam situation that has developed in this
country and he appreciated particularly the material that we
sent him yesterday containing clippings from various columnists
in the country who had attributed the agitation in
this country to the communists 'as there was no doubt in his
mind but that they were behind the disturbances that have
already occurred. °He said he had just received from Mr.
McCone, the outgoing Director of the Central Inltelligence
Agency, a letter in which the Central Intelligence Agency
stated thai their intelligence showed that the Chinese and
North Vietnamese believe that by intensifying the agitation
in this country, particularly on the college CaJInpUS levels it
would so confuse and divide the Americans that our troops
in South Vietnam would have to be withdrawn in order to
preserve order here and it would enable North Vietnam to
move in 'at once. . . . He stated he would like me to take
prompt and immediate steps to brief at least two Senators
and two Congressmen, preferably one of each Party, on the
demonstrations in this country of the anti-Vietna,m groups so
that they might in turn not only make speeches upon the
floors of Congress but also publicly....
I informed the President that I had just received word
this morning before coming to the White House that plans
had been made from Ma,y 3 to May 9 to dOOlonstrate in 85
cities of this country by the Students for Democratic Society,
which is l'argely infiltrated by communists and which has
been woven into the civil rights situation which we know has
large communist influence. I told the President we were preparing
a memorandum on the Students for Democratic Society
which I would try to get to him by tomorrow....
I also told the President that we were preparing, in response
the request he had made through Honorable McGeorge Bundy
at the White House an over-all memorandum on the Vietnam
demonstrations and communist influence in the same....
Director Hoover issued the following instructions to his subordinates
after his meeting with the President:
... I want prepared immediately a. memorandum which I
can transmit to the President containing what we know about
the Students for Democratic Society. While I realize we may
not be able to technically state that it is an actual communist
organization, certainly we do know there are communists in it.
lt is somewhat similar to the situation we found in the Selmato-
Birmingham March in which we were able to identify 75
communists from New York City as being in that march even
though there were many others in the march who were not
communists and we could not be certain it was a communist
demonstration. What I want to get to the President is the
background with emphasis upon the comTTlJlJJll,ist influence
therein so that he will know exactly what the picture is. [Emphasis
added.]
485
I believe we should intensify through all field offices the
instructions to endeavor to penetrate the Students for Democratic
Society so that we will have proper informant coverage
similar to what we have in the Ku Klux Klan and the Communist
Party itself.
The Director also issued instructions for the overall memorandum on
antiwar demonstrations "so that it can be used publicly by prominent
officials of the Administration whom the President intends to send in
various parts of the country to speak on the Vietnam situation."
I want it prepared in such a manner that there will be nothing
to uncover our informant coverage but be a good, strong
memorandum that will pinpoint that these demonstrations
which have occurred, particularly on the campuses of the
colleges and universities have been largely participated in by
communists even though they may not have initiated them
but they at least have joined and forced the issue such as has
been done at Berkeley, California, and as they are doing at
Ohio State University at the present time. Give this matter
immediate attention and top priority as the President is quite
concerned about the situatIOn and wants prompt and quick
action.439
The resulting report on "Communist Activities Relative to United
States Policy on Vietnam" presented extensive information showing
the Communist Party's desire to influence antiwar activity-by sending
letters to the President and Congressmen, issuing press releases,
delivering speeches on campuses and elsewhere, distributing Party
propaganda, and participatmg in protest demonstrations. Only one
antiwar group other than the Party itself was reported as being significantly
influenced-the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs allegedly formed in
1964 "as a result of a mandate by the Communist Party." The Party
had instructed its district leaders "to organize activities in the tradeunion
movement, in youth groups and in religious organizations until
peace is achieved." The extent or success of this effort was not discussed.
Instead, a recent demonstration of some 15,000 persons in
Washington, D.C., "was not communist instituted, dominated or controlled,"
although party members participated. Party members also
were "participants" in a "vigil" at the LBJ ranch. 440
FBI field offices were instructed in 1965 to intensify their investigation
of "subversive activiti' among student groups.441 However, in
1967, there was concern that FBI intelligence activity on college campuses
might be exposed by the controversy over CIA links with the
National Student Association. Therefore, field offices were advised:
It is possible that this current controversy could focus
attention on the Bureau's investigations of student groups on
college campuses. It is also possible that student 1=,'TOUpS such
as the Students for a Democratic Society and the W.E.B.
DuBois Clubs of America could use this controversy as a
vehicle to create some incident to embarrass the Bureau by
... Memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover, 4/28/65.
... Letter to McGeorge Bundy, 4/28/65, enclosing FBI memorandum, 4/28/65.
"' SAC Letter No. 65--44, 8/17/65.
486
claiming' that we are infringing on academic freedom by investig'ating
such groups. You should, therefore, bear in mind
that in our continuing investigations to keep abreast of subversive
influence on campus groups, in discharging our responsibilities
in the internal security field, such investigations
should be conducted in a most discreet and circumspect manner.
Good judgment and common sense must prevail so that
the Bureau is not compromised or placed in an embarrassing
position.
Field offices were reminded that existing FBI policy required approval
from headquarters before investigating individuals or groups
"connected with an institution of learning," before interviewing students
or faculty members, and before developing a student or faculty
member "as an informant or source." These interviews or contacts were
also to "be made away from the campus." 442
When the Katzenbach committee issued its report on CIA involvement
with student groups, FBI Director Hoover canceled all outstanding
authorizations "to contact students, graduate students, and
professors of educational institutions in security matters ... [including]
established sources, informants, and other sources." Field offices
were instructed to request new authority from FBI headquarters
"where contacts with such individuals are particularly important and
necessary." 443
Thus, at least one dimension of the FBI's expanding domestic
intelligence program in the 1960s was temporarily cut back to avoid
criticism. Director Hoover's restrictions imposed in 1966-1967 on the
use of other sensitive techniques, including electronic surveillance
and surreptitious entries, are discussed elsewhere.443
&
The FBI's desires for intelligence conflicted directly with its fear
of "embarrassment." Shortly after the cutback in campus coverage, the
FBI formally characterized the Students for a Democratic Society for
the first time. The characterization (or "thumbnail sketch") stressed
the following information on "subversive" connections with SDS.
Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when
interviewed by a representative of United Press International
in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described
the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the
Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965, SDS National
Convention, an anticommunist proviso was removed from the
SDS constitution. In the October 7,1966, issue of "New Left
Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman
stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are
welcome. 444
As intelligence investigations of SDS cha.pters expanded, FBI officials
realized that the restrictions on campns contacts "impose problems
for the field." Field offices were advised to stress "the development
of noncampus informants and sources" to maintain intelligence
... SAC Letter No. 67-13, 2/21/67.
... SAC Letter No. 67-20, 4/7/67.
.... See Reports on Warrantless FBI Electronic Surveillance; Warrantless FBI
Surreptitious Entry; and CIA and FBI Mail Opening.
... SAC Letter No. 67-23, 4/25/67.
487
coverage of "subversive" activity at educational institutions.445 Shortly
thereafter, the restriction was lifted for contacts on campuses with
"established sources functioning in an administrative capacity such as
a Registrar, Director of Admissions, Dean of Men, Dean of ",Vomen
and Security Officer, and their subordinates." Headquarters approval
was still needed to contact students or professors.446
An example of the scope of these investigations is the coverage of
various antiwar teachins and conferences sponsored by the Universities
Committee on Problems of "'Val' and Peace. A forty-one page
report from the Philadelphia office, based on coverage by thirteen
informants and confidential sources, described in complete detail a
"public hearing on Vietnam."
A Communist Party official had "urged all CP members" in the
area to attend, and one of the organizers was alleged to have been a
Communist in the early 1950s. Upon receipt from an informant of a
list of the speakers, the FBI culled its files for data on their backgrounds.
One was described by a source as a Young Socialist Alliance
"sympathizer." Another was a conscientious objector to military service.
A third had contributed $5.00 to the National Committee to Abolish
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. A speaker representing
the W.E.B. DuBois Club was identified as a Communist. The
FBI covered the meeting with an informant who reported practically
verbatim the remarks of all the speakers, including the following:
The Chairman of the Philadelphia Ethical Society;
A representative of the American Civil Liberties Union;
A representative of the United Electrical Workers;
A spokesman for the Young Americans for Freedom;
A member of the staff of the "Catholic Worker";
A minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church;
A minister of the Episcopal Church;
A representative of the Philadelphia Area Committee to End
the War in Vietnam;
A professor of industrial economics at Columbia UniverSIty;
A representative of the Inter-University Committee for
Debate on Foreign Policy;
A member of Women's Strike for Peace who had traveled
to North Vietnam; .
A member of Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom who had visited South Vietnam;
A chaplain from Rutgers University;
A professor of political science from Villanova University;
Another member of Young Americans for Freedom;
The former Charge d'Affaires in the South Vietnamese Embassy.
This informant's report was so extensive as to be the equivalent of a
tape recording, although the FBI report does not indicate that the in-
... SAC Letter No. 67-24. 5/2/67.
... SAC Letter No. 67-29, 5/24/67.
488
formant was "wired." Another informant reported the remarks of
additional participants:
An official of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy;
A minister of the Church of the Brethren;
A Unitarian minister;
A representative of United ·World Federalists;
A member of Students for a Democratic Society;
A member of the Socialist Workers Party;
A spokesman for the W.E.E. DuBois Clubs.
The report was prepared as a Letterhead Memorandum with fourteen
copies for possible dissemination by the FBI to other Executive branch
agencies. Copies were disseminated to military intelligence agencies,
the State Department, and the Internal Security and Civil Rights
Divisions of the Justice Department.447
Even where there was no specific prior indication of Communist
involvement, the FBI investigated emerging "New Left" groups such
as "Free Universities" attached to various college campuses. For example,
when an article appeared in a Detroit newspaper stating that a
"Free University" was being formed in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and
that it was "anti-institutional," FBI headquarters instructed the Detroit
Field Office to "ascertain through established sources the ori,gin
of this group and the identity of the individuals who are responsible
for the formation of the group and whether any of these individuals
have subversive backgrounds." A note on the instruction stated.
Several "Free Universities" have been formed in large
cities recently by the Communist Party and other subversive
groups. We are therefore conducting discreet investigations
through established sources regarding all such "Free Universities"
that come to the Bureau's attention to determine
whether they are in any way connected with subversive
groUps.448
The field office contacted five informants and confidential sources,
prepared a ten-page letterhead memorandum describing in detail the
formation, curriculum content, and associates of the group--including
several members of Students for a Democratic Society and the Socialist
Workers Party. Although no further investigation was recommended,
the report was disseminated to local military intelligence and
Secret Service office, military intelligence and Secret Service headquarters
in Washington, the State Department, and Internal Security
Division of the Justice Department.449
Intelligence developed under what the Bureau called its VIDEM
Program on Vietnam demonstrations was teletyped to headquarters
"for immediate dissemination to the ·White House and other interested
Government agencies, followed by . . . routine dissemination to the
intelligence community." 450 The White House not only received the
product of FBI intelligence on antiwar demonstrations, but it also
asked the Bureau to conduct "name checks" of its files on dozens of
4<7 Memorandum from Philartelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarter"" 3/2/66.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 2/17/66.
..9 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
<:iO SAC Letter No. 68-20,3/26/68.
489
persons who signed telegrams critical of U.S. Vietnam policy.451 An
assistant to President Johnson also requested that the FBI monitor
the televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
Vietnam policy and prepare a memorandum comparing statements of
Senators William Fulbright and Wayne Morse with "the Communist
Party line." 452 Another White House aide requested name checks on
persons whose names appeared in the Oongressional Record as signers
of letters to Senator Morse expressing support for his criticism of U.S.
Vietnam policy.453
A similar request was channeled through Attorney General Ramsey
Clark, who supplied a Presidential aide (at the latter's request) with a
summary of information concerning the National Committee for a
Sane Nuclear Policy!54 This same aide summarized for the PresideI!t
an FBI memorandum on "peace" demonstrations, pinpointing those
particular examples which gave evidence that (as quoted from the
Bureau report) :
The Communist Party and other organizations are continuing
their efforts to force the United States to change its present
policy toward Vietnam 455 .
The exaggeration of Communist participation, both by the FBI and
·White House staff members, could only have had the effect of reinforcing
President J ohnEOn's original tendency to discount dissent against
the Vietnam 'Var as "Communist inspired." It is impossible to measure
the larger impact on the fortunes of the nation from this distorted perception
at the very highest policymaking level.
E. Oivil Disturbance Intelligence
'While no explicit directive from the Attorney General authorized
the FBI's collection of intelligence about protest demonstrations in
the early sixties, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division made
"oral requests" to the FBI for intelligence, including for example a
tape recording of a speech by Governor-elect George Wallace of Alabama
in late 1962 456 and "photographic coverage" of a civil rights
demonstration on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.
457 The FBI advised the Division of information from a "confidential
source" about plans for a demonstration in Virginia, including
background data on its "sponsor" and the intention to make "a test
case." 458 The Division prepared regular summaries of information
from the Bureau on "demonstrations and other racial matters." 459
"" Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the
President, 6/4/65.
... FBI Summary Memorandum, 1/31/75.
4M Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Manin ·Watson, Special Assistant to the
President, 7/15/66 (cites request of "Mr. Jake Jacobsen, Legislative Counsel to
the President") .
... Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Marvin Watson, 4/8/67,
enclosing memordandum from Director, FBI, to the A<ttorney General, 4/7/67.
... Memorandum from Marvin (Watson) to the President, 5/16/67.
... Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall (Civil Rights Division), 12/4/62.
~7 Memorandum from St. J. B. (St. John Barrett) to Mr. Marshall, 6/18/63.
.... Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/11/63.
~'Memorandum from Carl W. Gabel to Burke Marshall, 7/19/63. This memorandum
described 21 such "racial matters" in ten states, including Ohio, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Xevada outside the South. While some of the
(Continued)
490
The only formal directive on this intelligence activity was sent by
Attorney General Kennedy to U.~. Attorneys throughout the E\.outh
in May 1963. It instructed them to "make a survey" to ascertain "any
places where racial demonstrations are expected within the next
30 days" and to make "assessments of situations" in their districts.
The FBI was "asked to cooperate" with the U.S. Attorneys.46o
During the first small-scale Northern ghetto disturbances in the
summer of 1964, President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate
their origins and extent.461 However, after the FBI submitted a report
on the Watts riots in' Los An~eles in 1965, Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach advised President Johnson that the FBI would
only investigate "directly" the possible "subversive involvement." He
did not believe the FBI should conduct a "general investigation" of
"other aspects of the riot." The President approved this "limited
investigation." 462 As described earlier (at pp. 475-477), internal
Bureau instructions in 1965 and 1966 went far beyond this limitation.
Instructions to all FBI offices in 1966 stressed the nee.d for "expanding
awareness and alertness" regardin~ demonstrations against
the Vietnam "Val'. Director Hoover stated:
There are increasing indications that the public is losing
patience with the continued succession of demonstrations
which have been occurring in all parts of the nation. This
rising tide of public indignation is more and more creating
waves of retributive action directed at the demonstrators. Increasingly,
irate spectators are rejecting their passive roles
and expressing their opposition and indignation toward the
demonstrators by attacking them physically.
On the other hand, leaders of many of the groups involved
in demonstrations have been exhorting their followers to
more "direct action tactics" to gain their ends. Thus, the
demonstrations have been marked by a growing militancy.
Clearly, the situation is one in which the conflict of interests
produces a growing tension. With summer approaching,
the potentialities for violent outbreaks will increase immeasurably,
whether demonstrations are directed at opposition
toward United States foreign policy in Vietnam or protests
involvin~racial issues.
We must not only intensify and expand our coverage to
insure prompt and accurate reportin~ of violent outbreaks
of this nature but also to insure that advance signs of such
outbreaks are detected and disseminated to appropriate
authorities.
(ContinuPd)
items i~ this and later summaries related to violE-nt or potentially violent protest
actIvity, or to the role of all~ed "subversiveR" in the demonstrations, they
went bE-yond those limits to include entirely peaceful protest activity and group
activities (such as conferences, meetings. IffidE-rRhip chan~s) unrelated to demon~
rations. (Memoranda from Gabel to Marshall, 7/22/63, 8/2/63 and 8/22/63.)
Memorandnm from Attornf>Y General Kennedy to U.S. Attorneys, 5/27/63.
<6l "Text of FBI Report on Recent Racial Disturbances," New York Times,
9/27/64.
"'Memorandum from Attorney General Katzenbach to President Johnson.
8/17/65.
491
I want to stress to you that the emphasis in these matters
must be on advance detection. Post mortem reporting is of
secondary consequence. 'Ve are an intelligence agency and as
such are expected to know what is going to or is likely to
happen. National, state, and local authorities rely upon us
to obtain this information so they can take appropriate action
to avert disastrous outbreaks.463
Thc urban riots of the summer of 1967 greatly intensified FBI
domestic intelligence operations. Equally important, the Detroit and
Newark riots brought other agencies of the Federal government into
the picture. A Presidential Commission was established to study civil
disorders, the Attorney General reexamined the intelligence capabilities
of the Justice Department,and the use of Federal troops in
riot torn cities led to widespread military intelligence surveillance of
civilians. It was a period of intense pressure and little coordination.
Antiwar protests under the balmer of "Resistance to Illegitimate
Authority" culminated in a massive march on the Pentagon in October
1967. The combination of ghetto violence, the highly-publicized milit'ant
rhetoric of figures like Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown,
widening protest against the Vietnam war, and increasing acts of civil
disobedience during antiwar demonstrations generated intense demands
for domestic intelligence.
In late July 1967 President Johnson created the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders to investigate and make recommendations
with respect to :
(1) The origins of the recent major civil disorders in our
cities, including the basic causes and factors leading to such
disorders and the influence, if any, of organizations or individuals
dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of
violence.
(2) The development of methods and techniques for averting
or controlling such disorders . . .
The President directed the FBI, in particular, to "provide investigative
information and assistance" to the Commission. The President
stated publicly that the FBI would "continue to exercise its full
authority to investigate these riots, in accordance with my standing
instructions, and continue to search for evidence of conspiracy." 464
Director Hoover appeared before the Commission on August 1, 1967.
He discussed the role in certain disturbances of "ntbble-rousers who
initiate action and then disappear;" and he identified Martin Luther
King, Floyd McKissick (of the Congress of Racial Equality), and
Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael (of SNCC) as "vociferous firebrands
who are very milit'ant in nature and who at times incite great
numbers to activity." When asked about proposed Federal antiriot
legislation, Hoover expressed the "opinion that any law which allowed
law enforcement the opportunity to arrest militant and vicious rabblerousers
like Carmichael and Brown would be healthy to have on the
... SAC Letter 66-27, 5/3/66.
... Executive Order 11365, 7/29/67; Remarks of the President 7/29/67, in
Report of the NationaZ Advisory Commission on CiviZ Disorders (1968), pp. 534537
(Bantam Books ed.).
69-984 0 - 76 - 32
492
books." New York Mayor John Lindsay asked the FBI Director "if
it would be possible to total up and fully identify the number of militant
Negroes and whites who were in the same category as Carmichael
and Brown" so that the Commission could learn "just exactly what
the hard core in this country amounted to." Director Hoover replied
"that the FBI, through its intelligence gathering, was of course capable
of identifying and totaling up such individuals." Mayor Lindsay
also asked "if the FBI had any intelligence regarding Negroes or
white groups shifting money or firearms to foreign countries." Hoover
answered "that the FBI had no such intelligence," but that Stokely
Carmichael's travel to Cuba and other countries "should not be overlooked."
Lindsay then observed that "such travels were apparently not
widespread."
In his discussion of the riots in Watts, Newark, and Detroit, the FBI
Director pointed out that the FBI "had no intelligence reflecting an
overall organized conspiracy" and "that many of the riots occurred as
the result of an incidental spark." However, he added "that the communist
and other subversive forces always, while not initiating the
riots, certainly attempted to exploit them once the riot started." The
chairman, Governor Otto Kerner, asked that FBI reports be made
available to the Commission. Director Hoover replied:
... that it should be definitely understood that the FBI
cannot make individual investIgations, but that the FBI
would be most willing to make inquiries in communities where
there are allegations of subversive influences, involvement of
out-of-state influences, and the like.... [V]olumes on subversive
organizations, as well as a rundown on major disorders
and riots of this summer, would be left with the Commission
at this time.
Following his meeting with the Oommission, Director Hoover ordered
his subordinates to intensify their collection of intelligence about
"vociferous rabble-rousers." 465
Parallel with the FBI's expansion of domestic intelligence operations
in 1967-1968, the Justice Department developed a mechanism for
the analysis and evaluation of civil disturbance intelligence. Indeed,
one substantial basis for FBI intelligence authority in this period was
a memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to Director
Hoover in September 1967 :
Although the bulk of criminal offenses occurring in the
course of recent riots have been local rather than federal in
nature, the question as to whether there was an organization
which (a) had made advanced plans for, and (b) was active
during any of the riots in the summer of 1967 is one that canllot
always be readily resolved by local authorities. In view of
the seriousness of the riot activity across the country, it is most
important that you use the maXImum resources, investigative
and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon
the question as to whether there has bePll or is a scheme or
conspiracy by any group of whatel'er size. effer,tiveness O'r
affiliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.
[Emphasis added.]
... Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 8/1/67.
493
Attorney General Clark listed numerous Federal statutes which "could
be applicable" in a specific situation, including criminal statutes on
rebellion or insurrection, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of violent
overthrow of the government (Smith Act), activities affecting the
armed forces, Selective Service, interstate travel to commit arson or
transport explosives, assault on a Federal officer, destruction of government
property, firearms regulation, and crimes on Federal reservations.
The Attorney General added:
I appreciate that the Bureau has constantly been alert to
this problem and is currently submitting intelligence reports
to us about riots and about the activity of certain groups and
individuals before, during and after a riot. Indeed, the President
has said both publicly and privately that the FBI is conducting
extensive and comprehensive investigations of these
matters.
There persists, however, a widespread belief that there is
more organized activity in the riots than we presently know
about. We must recognize, I believe, that this is a relatively
new area of investigation and intelligence reporting for the
FBI and the Department of Justice. We have not heretofore
had to deal with the possibility of an organized pattern of
violence, constituting a violation of federal law, by a group
of persons who make the urban ghetto their base of operation
and whose activities may not have been regularly monitored
by existing intelligence sources.
In these circumstances, we must make certain that every
attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon
these problems; to take every step possible ,to determine
whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so,
to determine the identity of the people and interests involved;
and to deter this aotivity by prompt and vigorous legal action.
As a part of the broad investigation which must nec~rily
be conducted ... sources or informants in black nationalist
organizations, SNCC and other less publicized groups should
be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose
of these groups and their relationship to other groups,
and also to determine the whereabouts of persons who might
be involved in instigating riot activity in violation of federal
law. Further, we need to investigate fully allegations of conspiratorial
activity that come to our attention from outside
sources ....466 [Emphasis added.]
In furtherance of the Attorney General's instructions, the FBI advised
its field offices in October 1967 that there was "a definite need to
develop additional penetrllitive coverage of the militant black nationalist
groups and the ghetto areas immediately to be in a position to
have maximum intelligence in anticipation of another outburst of
racial violence next summer." For this purpose the FBI instituted a
program for "the development of ghetto-type racial informants." In
addition, the FBI intensified its existing "Black Nationalist Groups
'00 Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the FBI Director,
9/14/67.
494
TOPLEV Infonnant Program." Racial informants were to be "directed
to obtain information concerning individuals who may be stockpiling
firebombs, Molotov cocktails, weapons, and to identify any
groups of terrorists who may be pIarming on carrying out a type of
guerrilla warfare during riotous situations." 467
In contrast to previous policies for centralizing domestic intelligence
investigations of "subversives," local police were encouraged
to establish intelligence programs both for their use and to feed into
the Federal intelligence gathering process, thus greatly expanding the
domestic intelligence apparatus and making it harder to control.
In reaction to civil disorders in 1965-1966, Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach had turned to the newly-created President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice for advice.
After holding a conference with police and National Guard officials,
the crime commission urged police not to react with too much force to
disorder "in the course of demonstrations," but to make advance plans
for "a true riot situation." This meant that police should establish
"procedures for the acquisition and channeling of intelligence" for the
use of "those who need it." 408 Former Assistant Attorney General
Vinson recalls the Justice Department's concern that local police did
not have "any useful intelligence or knowledge about ghettos, about
black communities in the big cities." 469
During the winter of 1967-1968, the Justice Department and the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reiterated the
message that local police should set up "intelligence units" to gather
and disseminate information on "potential" civil disorders. These units
would use "undercover police personnel and informants" and draw on
"community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto." m
The Commission also urged that these local units be linked to "a national
center and clearinghouse" in the Justice Department.471 The unstated
consequence of these recommendations was that the FBI, having
regular liaison with local police, served as the channel (and supplementary
repository) for this intelligence data.
These federal policies led to the proliferation of police intelligence
activities, often without adequate controls. For example, a recent state
grand jury report on the Chicago Police Department's "Security
Section" revealed its "close working relationship" with federal intelligence
agencies, including Army intelligence and the FBI. The report
found that the police intelligence system produced "inherently inaccurate
and distortive data" which contaminated Federal intelli?,ence.
For example, one police officer testified that he listed "any person' who
attended two "public meetings" of a group as a "member." This conclusion
was forwarded "as a fMt" to the FBI. Subsequently, an agency
seeking "background information" on that person from the Bureau
would be told that the individual was "a member." The grand jury
stated:
.., SAC Letter No. 67-72, 10/17/67.
... President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
The Challenge 01 Crime in a Free Society (1967), pp. 118--119.
.. Fred Vinson testimony, 1/27/76, p. 32.
4'" RepQrt 01 the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968),
p. 487 (Bantam Books ed.).
4'/1 Ibid, p. 490.
495
Since federal agencies accepted data from the Security Section
without questioning the procedures followed, or methods
used to gain information, the federal government cannot
escape responsibility for the harm done to untold numbers
of innocent persons.472
Several urban police departments have more recently attempted to
set "guidelines" for their security intelligence activites.473
F. The Jwstwe Department and the IDIU
Joseph Califano, who was President Johnson's assistant in 1967, has
testified that the Newark and Detroit riots were a "shattering experience"
for Justice Department officials and "for us in the White
House." They were concerned about the "lack of intelligence," since
they "didn't know what the black groups were" in Detroit. Consequently,
"there was a desire to have the Justice Department have hettel'
intelliEence, for lack of a better term, about dissident groups;"
and this' precipitated the intelligence unit" set up by Attorney General
Rwmsey Clark in late 1967. The President and the White House
staff were saying, "There must be a way to 'predict violence. We've
got to know more about this." 474
In 1966 the Justice Department had started an informal "Summer
Project," staffed by a handful of law students, to pull together data
from the newspapers, the U.S. Attorneys, and "some Bureau material"
for the purpose, according to former Assistant Attorney General Fred
Vinson, Jr., of finding out "what's going on in the black community."
475 Vinson has recalled that many people "jumped to a conspiracy
theory," and the government "would have been remiss" if it had not
investigated.476
In September 1967 Attorney General Ramsey Clark asked Assistant
Attorney General John Doar to review the Department's "facilities
for keeping abreast of information we receive about organizations and
individuals who mayor may not be a force to be taken into account in
evaluating the causes of civil disorder in urban areas." After conferring
with Assistant Attorneys General Fred Vinson of the Criminal Division
and J. Walter Yeagley of the Internal Security Division, Doar
m "Improper Police Intelligence Activities," A Report by the Extended March
1975 Cook County (Illinois) Grand Jury, 11/10/75. The report also stated:
"Finally, political spying by police lowers the community's respect for law
enforcement. Without the respect and support of the community, law enforcement
agencies cannot operate effectively. The decision by high police officials to indiscriminately
infiltrate community groups makes the difficult job of responsible
law enforcement even more difficult."
.,. For example, Procedures: Public Security Activities of the Intelligence Division,
~ew York City Police Department, published in "Domestic Intelligence
Operations for Internal Security Purposes," Hearings before the Committee on
Internal Security, House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), pp.
3747-3792; and Standards and Procedures: Public Disorder Intelligence Division,
Los Angeles Police Department, April 10, 1975.
... Joseph Califano testimony, 1/27/76, pp. ~9. Califano states in retrospect
that the attempt to "predict violence" was "not a successful undertaking," that
"advance intelligence about dissident grOUps" would not "have been of much
help," and that what is "important" is "physical intelligence" about geography,
hospitals, power stations, etc. (Califano, 1/27/76, pp. 8, 11-12.)
'75 Vinson, 1/27/76, p. 33.
... Vinson, 1/27/76, pp. 37-38.
496
reported their joint recommendation that the Department establish
"a single intelligence unit to analyze the FBI information we receive
about certain persons and groups who make the urban ghetto their
base of operation." Doar also proposed that other Divisions of the
Justice Department, including the Community Relations Service,
should "funnel information to this unit." He recognized that the Community
Relations Service risked losing "its credibility with people in
the ghetto," but he believed the Department could develop safeguards
to maintain "the confidentiality of the information." In addition, Doar
recommended,
Other agencies of the government might become a source of
intelligence information. This is a sensitive area, but the poverty
programs, the Labor Department programs, and the
Neighborhood Legal Services, all have access to facts which
a unit in the Department might find helpful. At the very least
the intelligence unit should know where the poverty programs
are operating, where the Neighborhood Legal Services are
located, who is staffed there so that if there were a need in a
particular area the unit would know where to go to get additional
factual material.
Other investigative agencies of the federal government
might also furnish intelligence information, for example, the
intelligence unit of the Internal Revenue Service. I found
that in Detroit this unit under the direction of John Olszewski,
had by far the best knowledge of the Negro areas in Detroit.
According to Olszewski, the Alcohol, Tax and Tobacco
Unit has the best intelligence on the geography of ghetto
areas. The Narcotics Bureau is another possibility, and, finally,
my experience in Detroit suggests that the Post Office
Department might be helpful. Perhaps utilization of other
agencies intelligence potential is too big and difficult a task,
but I raise it for your consideration.
Beyond the FBI and other governmental sources Doar expected
that the unit would become familiar with "the literature"-including
Jack Newfield's The Prophetic Minority, Howard Zinn's The New
Abolit'!onists, and writings on the "New Left" by Andrew Kopkind
and NIcholas von Hofflman-and with the work produced by the Institute
for Policy Studies and Studies on the Left. The unit would
undertake "critical analysis" of intelligence data and prepare periodic
reports and evaluations for the Attorney General "on the Organizations.
on individuals and on particular urban areas." .
It is evident from Assistant Attorney General Doar's memorandum
that the primary purpose was to have a unit that would "include conclusions
and recommendations" in its civil disturbance intelligence
reports. This was a function the FBI would not perform. Instead,
FBI rpwrts to the Department normally carried the form statement:
"This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusion"!
of the FBI." Doar described current procedures for evaluation
of intelligence: .
The Internal Security Division has been engaged in evaluating
FBI reports involving several thousand alleged Communists
in order to determine their individual dangerousness
497
(2300 per year). It also reviews FBI reports on more than
125 organizations and their officers. Internal Security says
that it received 16,192 FBI reports and memoranda last
year ...
I note from Mr. Yeagley's memorandum ... that for the
most part he restricts his lawyers to summarizing the pertinent
facts in the memorandum and has discouraged them
from injecting personal opinions or indulging any prognostication.
He limits analysis to the recognition of whether
particular information represents a fact, a probable fact or
only a possible fact, or is pure fiction in evaluating material
found in FBI reports, publications or other source material. I
am not sure that I understand this distinction.
Doar also presented a sample from the FBI memoranda which came
to the Civil Rights Division and showed the broad range of FBI
intelligence reports. He did not recommend placing any limits l;m
FBI intelligence collection. Instead, he proposed "that the scope be
very broad initially."
",Ve have not taken a broad spectrum approach to collection
and analysis of intelligence. Rather, we have focused
narrowly on individuals, a limited number of traditional subversive
groups, and intelligence information about a suspect
who may have become a subject ofa specific statutory violation.
As the unit became knowledgeable and sophisticated.
and could make reasonable judgments and could measure the
influence of particular groups or organizations, then it could
narrow its spectrum to a more limited target.
Doar anticipated that the unit would need five or six lawyers and
six to eight college graduate research analysts. The lawyers would
go out in the field to "become familiar with urban areas." 477
Attorney General Clark did not implement Doar's plan at once,
but appointed a committee to study the matter further. In the meantime
the Internal Security Division began "compiling an index and
abstracts on individuals and organizations connected with civil disturbance
matters." Approximately 1400 cards were prepared in the
first two months. The Departmental committee made its report in
December 1967. A careful review of the FBI's intelligence reports
to the Internal Security Division disclosed that reports and files were
being maintained on approximately 400 organizations, more than
one-third relating directly "to the civil disturbance problem (due to a
characterization as black power, new left, pacifist, pro-Red Chinese,
anti-Vietnam War, pro-Castro, etc.)." The committee recommended
that the new intelligence unit collate this data so as to develop "a
master index on individuals, or organizations, and by cities." Departmental
attorneys would prepare "monographs" on particularly important
organizations, including "a statement of its purposes, its relevant
activities within the past few years, the location of the headquarters
and all branch offices of the organization, activities and significant
background information concerning its officers and active
'1'1 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General John Doar to the Attorney
General, 9/27/67.
498
members, etc." The unit would also draw on the Departmental files on
individuals maintained under the Emergency Detention Program,
which contained "brief synopses of approximatelv 10,000 indiv!duals
who are members of the Communist Party. the SWP, the NatIOn of
Islam, etc." However, the committee stressed that the unit's "primary
goal ... must be the meaningful evaluation of information received
rather than preparation of an exhaustive index." There was also a
potential for "computerizing the master index." Possible links to other
government ag-encies were sug-gested :
As he becomes familiar with the subjects involved, the head
of the Intelligence Unit should develop contacts with other
intelligence gathering agencies. Since this may represent a
duplication of the liaison established with the FBI, it should
be undertaken with care. Possible sources of outside intelligence
include the President's Commission on Civil Disorders,
various corresponding state agencies such as the New Jersey
Blue Ribbon Commission, CIA, State Department, Army
Intelligence, National Security Agency, and Office of Economic
Opportunity. In addition, other federal agencies may
have relevant information. These perhaps would include Department
of Labor, Migration and Unemployment studies,
Department of Housing and Urban Development surveys and
Model City applications, the Treasury Department's Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax Unit and Narcotics Bureau, and the
general background information available from the Post
Office Department Postal Inspector's Branch.
The committee did not seriously consider assigning the unit's analysis
and evaluation functions to the FBI. It was divided as to whether
the unit should be placed in the Internal Security Division or directly
under the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. In
either case, there was a pressing need for "coordination" because 01
"the heavy flow of FBI reports to the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, and the Internal Security, Criminal, and Civil
Rights Divisions." On the other hand, it did "not seem wise to establish
an elaborate organizational structure" because it was "impossible
to tell how long the Intelligence Unit will need to exist." 477s
Attorney General Clark adopted the committee's recommendation
and established a permanent Interdivision Information Unit (IDm).
He noted that it would "take over and extend the activities of the socalled
Summer Project of the past two years" (in the Criminal Division).
The IDIU was placed under the supervision of a Committee
composed of the Director of the Community Relations Services and
the Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the Civil Rights, Criminal,
and Internal Security Divisions. The IDIU "charter" stated:
The Unit shall function for the purposes and within the
guidelines expressed in my memorandum of November 9 and
the report of December 6, 1967. It is enough to state here that,
in the main, it shall be responsible for reviewing and reduc-
.,.,. Memorandum from Kevin T. Maroney, et aI., to Attorney General Clark
12/6/67. '
499
ing to quickly retrievable form all information that may come
to this Department relating to organizations and individuals
throughout the country who may play a role, whether purposefUlly
01' not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders.
or in preventing 01' checking them.478 [Emphasis
added.]
The memorandum of November 9, appointing the study committee
had also stated:
It is imperative that the Department seek and obtain the
most comprehensive intelligence possible regarding organized
or other purposeful stimulation of domestic dissention, civil
disorders, and riots. To carry out these responsibilities we
must make full use of, and constantly endeavor to increase
and refine, the intelligence 'av,aila:ble to us, 'both from internal
and external sources, concerning organizations and individuals
throughout the country who may playa role either in
instigating or spreading disorders or in preventing or checking
them. However, we do not now adequately use such intelligence
or develop and implement methods of improving
intelligence. Thus, we do not have any systematic means at
present of compiling and analyzing the voluminous informamation
about various persons or organizations furnished to
us by the FBI, and we make very little effort to obtain information
elsewhere.479 [Emphasis added.]
Finally, the committee report had formally defined the IDIU's responsibilities
as follows:
1. Gathering facts from sources within and without the
Department relating to organizations and individuals whose
activities are or may be related to planning for or participating
in civil disturbances.
2. Systematically collating, evaluating and recording such
information so that it is subject to convenient and expeditious
recalls.
3. Preparing periodic intelligence summaries, from time to
time, or as directed by the Attorney General on persons,
organizations and places including therein estimates and evaluations
of potential distul'bances.
4. Report immediately to the Attorney General the receipt
of information indicating plans or attempts by individuals or
organizations to foster or promote civil disorders, including
therewith an evaluation of the source and pertinent background
material.
5. Recommending to the Attorney General means for obtaining
additional intelligence.
6. Consulting with the Assistant Attorneys General of Internal
Security, Criminal and Civil Rights Divisions and the
"8 Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to Assistant Attorneys
General John Doar, Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Roger W. Wilkins, and J. Walter
Yeagley, 12/18/67.
4'1'1 Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Kevin T. Maroney, et al,
11/9/61.
500
Director of the Community Relations Service on each of the
aoove functions.48o
The IDIU, later renamed the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit,
obtained computer facilities in 1968 and continued to function as the
Attorney General's main source of civil disturbance intelligence analysis
until 1971, when the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was created
in the aftermath of the "Huston Plan." 480' The IDIU and the
lEO both existed from 1970 until 1973, when the IEC was abolished.
The IDIU has been renamed the Civil Disturbance Unit and remains,
on a more limited basis, the Attorney General's principal source for
regular summaries of information about civil disturbances.
The IDIU's work in 1968 was summarized as follows by Assistant
Attorney General Yeagley:
The Unit, immediately upon its establishment, embarked
on an information retrieval system utilizing automatic data
processing, whieh ... constitutes probably the best information
retrieval system in the Department. In pursuit of its
duties, the 'analysts 'and attorneys during the year 1968 reviewed
more than 32,000 FBI investigative reports, teletypes,
army intelligence reports and other material concerning individuals
and organizations involved primarily in the area of
racial agitation. In addition, hut on ,a more selective basis,
the Unit has also followed certain other 'activities, when
related.... Information concerning individuals and organi:
zJations who are the subjects of the reports coming into the
Unit is a;bstracted by the analysts and put on special forms
for automatic data processing. The information input concerns
itself with data regarding disturbances 'and incidents
such as individual fire bom1bings, gunfire, atJtaeks on police
or other officials, vandalism, ete., which may occur in a particular
looality which 'appear to be oaused by or to contribute
to racial unrest. [Emphasis'added.]
The computer system could generate reports listing all individuals
"who are members or 'affiliates of any particular organization," as
well 'as their location 'and travel. IDIU also had the capwbility to produce
reports on:
All 'incidents relating to specific UJs'Ues or specific coded events
such as all Black Power activity or all incidents relating to
convention demonstrations or all information to some future
and planned specific demonstration, such 'as we had in connection
wiibh the Chi~go Democratic Convention and the
demonstrations on Inaugural weekend in Washington.481
A 1aOOr review of IDIU operations states that "1968 entries in the
IDIU files include numerous anti-war activists and other
dissidents." 482
... Memorandum from Maroney, et aI, to Attorney General Clark, 12/6/67.
.... 'See Report on The Huston Plan.
.., Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to Deputy
Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst, 2/6/69.
48:1 Satement of Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman, .Justice
Department Press Release, 1/14/75.
501
The IDIU's receipt and use of Army intelligence reports in 1968
had the etl'ect, if perbaps not the full intent, of providing the Attorney
General's implicit authorization for a vast expansion of military
surveillance of civilians during tbis period. At a Wbite House meeting
in January 1968, Attorney General Clark told those present (including
Defense Department ofiicials) that "every resource" must be used
in the domestic intelligence effort, although he asked the Army to be
more selective in the reports it sent to tbe Justice Department.483 The
Army's intelligence collection plans of February 1, 1968, and May 2,
1968, were circulated to the Justice Department; and Army intelligence
officers received specific oral requests from the Justice Department.
483
& There was never a formal decision by civilian officials
in the Defense Department or ,the Justice Department which explicitly
authorized Army surveillance of civilian political activity.
However, the practice was accepted without challenge by those responsible
officials who received the intelligence product. For example,
Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher thanked an Army
intelligence officer for the Army's spot reports and daily summaries,
although he explained that the FBI would be in charge of distributing
intelligence to other agencies and that the IDIU provided analyses
for intradepartmental use only.484
As a result of the long-standing Delimitations Agreement, the FBI
and military intelligence shared their intelligence product. Consequently,
FBI reports constituted a substantial part of the information
about civilians stored in the Army's computerized data banks. Likewise,
the military's surveillance efforts complemented the FBI's intelligence
coverage, especially with respect to groups which could be
infiltrated by Army intelligence agents more readily than by FBI
agents or FBI-recruited informants. Thus, by the end of 1968 a massive
domestic intelligence apparatus had been established in response
to ghetto riots, militant black rhetoric, antiwar protest activity, and
campus disruptions. To a great extent each component of the structure-
FBI, IDIU, military-set its own generalized standards and
priorities.
In the first year of the Nixon Administration, Attorney General
John Mitchell and Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst
sought to bring greater order and coherence to the domestic intelligence
operations set in motion by their predecessors. The Attorney
General and the Secretary of Defense developed an "Interdepartmental
Action Plan for Civil Disturbances" under which the Attorney
General was designated "as the chief civilian officer in charge of
coordinating all Federal Government activities relating to civil disturbances."
The plan provided:
Under the supervision of the Attorney General, raw
intelligence data pertaining to civil disturbances will be
acquired from such sources of the Government as may be
available. Such data will be transmitted to the Intelligence
... Memorandum for the Unldersecretary df the ATmy, printed in Federal Dat,a
Bank8, Co-mputers, and the Bill of Rigkt8, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights (19711), pp. 1278-'1281.
.... :See Report!; on Improper Survei'1lance of Private Citizens by the l\filitllry.
... Letter from Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher to Maj. Gen.
William P. Yarborough, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 5/15/68.
502
Unit of the Department of Justice, and it will be evaluated
on a continuing basis by representatives from various departments
of the Government. After evaluations have been
made, the data will be disseminated to the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Defense, and the White House. [Emphasis
added.]
During the early stages of a crisis in which it appears
that a request for Federal military assistance may be forthcoming,
the intelligence organization of the Department of
Justice will alert the Attorney General and the Secretary
of Defense. It is expected that responsible State and local
officials will promp-tly inform the Attorney General of the
situation and WIll thereafter keep him informed of
developments. When advised that a serious disturbance is in
the making, the Attorney General will immediately inform
the President.
If time permits, the Attorney General and the Secretary
of Defense may dispatch their personal representatives to
the disturbance area to appraise the situation before any decision
is made to commit Federal forces. Such action can help
to assure that the Federal Government responds in accordance
with the realities of the situation as perceived by its
own observers.485
The plan formalized the use of civil disturbance teams to be sent
out from Washington when IDIU evaluations indicated possible
serious disorder. Ifowever, it did not clarify which federal agencies
would collect civil disturbance intelligence, thus permittin~ the
Army to continue its surveillance of civilian activity. Military intelligence
operations continued unabated until 1970, when public
exposure and Congressional criticism led to a substantial curtailment.
488 -
Pursuant to the plan, the first Intelligence Evaluation Committee
was created to advise the Attorney General as to the steps to be taken
in case of possible serious disorders. Its members included the heads of
the Internal Security and Criminal Divisions, the Community Relations
Service, and the IDIU, as well as representatives from the Civil
Rights Division, the Secret Service, and Army Intelli~ence.The chairman
was the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, Caltha DeLoach.
This prominent role for the FBI was 11. significant departure from previous
practice under Attorney General Clark.t87 The head of the IDIU,
James T. Devine, described its functions in 1970:
The Information Unit is responsible for collecting,
'l1nalyzin~, and computerizing all intelligence information
received by the Department in the area of civil disorders and
campus diaturbanee8. This intelligence encompasses informa-
... Memorandum from Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, and John N.
Mitchell, Attorney General to the President, 4/1/60.
.. Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens 'by the Military.
III Memorandum from Attorney General John N. Mitchell to Deputy Attorney
General Ri'chard G. Kleindien'9t, 7/22/00.
503
tion on both events and individuals past, prior,and during
actual disorders. Intelligence information is received from the
FBI, the U.S. Attorneys, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Military Intelligence, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
Division of the Treasury Department and other intelligence
gathering bodies within the Executive Branch. These intelligence
reports run in excess of 42,000 a year. [Emphasis
added.]
The Unit produces a daily morning and evening report on
disturbances nation-wide and a summation weekly report....
The Unit produces a complete print-out of all intelligence
within the ADP system on a weekly basis for study as to the
~egree of civil disturbance intensity throughout "Y8:rious sectIOns
of the country. Upon request by concerned cItIzens, special
printouts are made on such subjects as BPP [Black
Panther Partr] activities, f01'eign travel, assaults on police,
bombings durmg a given period, high school disorders, etc....
[Emphasis added.]
The Chief ... is chargeable with the intelligence hriefing
of all Civil Disturbance teams prior to their commitment to a
given area. Intelligence briefings are also provided on an intermittent
hasis to senior officials of the Department of Defense.
This office is further charged with maintaining liasion
with Chiefs of Police, Public Safety Directors and the offices
of Mayors and State Governors as a situation warrants.488
The references to campus distuflbances, the Black Panther Party,
and foreign travel indicate some of the highest priorities for domestic
intelligence in 1969-1970. In addition Assistant Attorney General
Jerris Leonard of the Civil Rights Division, who was assigned as the
AtJtorney General's Chief of Staff for the Civil Disturbance Group,
arranged. in 1970 for the Justice Department "to make lavailwble for
examination or copying, to designated officials of the Central Intelligence
Agency, computerized tapes of information submitted by the
IDIU." An inquiry in 1975 concluded thllit the Depar'lJrnent "initiated
the transaction by requesting the CIA to check against its own sources
whether any of the individuals on 'the IDIU list were engaged in foreign
travel, or received foreign assistance or funding. At the time it
was proVided to the CIA, the IDIU subject list contained records of
approximately ten to twelve thousand individuals. The records conOOiined
identifying information, aliases, brief narratives and file
sources of the data, including FBI inputs." 489
An examinat'ion of the IDIU computer printout in 1971 disclosed
such prominent names as Rev. Ralph A'bernathy, Cesar Chavez, Bosley
Crowther (former New Y O1'k Times film critic), Sammy Davis,
Jr., Charles Evers, Ja;mes Farmer, Seymour Hersh, Julius Hobson,
and Mrs. Coretta King. Organizations noted in the computer printout
included the NAACP, the Congress of Riacial Equality, the Institute
for Policy Studies, VISTA, United Farm Workers of California, and
... James T. Devine, Interdivi8WnaZ Informatiml, Unit, Oi,,;u Disturbance Group,
9/10/70.
... Statement of Deputy Attorney General Daurence H. SiLberman, Justice
Department Press Release, 1/14/75.
504
the Urban League. Many ordinary people who were not prominent
nationally had their names included in the IDIU subject data listing.
One was described as "a local civil rights worker," another as "student
at Merritt College and member of Peace and Freedom Party as of
mid '68," and another as "a breaded militant who writes and recites
poetry." 490
There were some congressional misgivings expressed 'about the Justice
Department's procedures for handling demonstrations in Washington,
D.C. To allay these concerns, the Department prepared a
report on Demonstration and Dissent in the Natiun's Oapital. With
respoot to intelligence, the report stated :
Accurate and complete information is essential for the
planning necessary to achieve peaceful demonstrations and
for dealing with disorders. It is not only important to know
how many are coming at a particular time, hut who they
might be and why they are ooming. This kind of releva:nt
information is freely available to anyone; it is only necessary
to colloot it in one place and, having collected <it, to evaluate
it in order to make wlue judgments and to formull8lte a plan
of action. To provide the concerned departments and agencies
with reliable information, there hasheen esta:blished within
the Depart,ment of Justice an Interdivisional Information
Unit (IDIU) and an Intelligence Evaluation Committee.
Whenever the infonnation indicates a large demonstration
may occur, all intelligence concerning that pd.ential demonstrntion
is reviewed by the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.
The Intelligence Evaluation Committee is composed of
officials of the Executive Branch experienced· with demon-.
strations and in assessing the potential for disorders. The
Intelligence Evaluation Committee weighs all of the available
information and reports its conclusions regarding the
potential for disorder to the Attorney General.491 [Emphasis
added.]
The Justice Department report did not make clear that the IDID
and the first lEO received and evaluated not only publicly available
information, but also data provided from clandestine intelligence investigations
by the FBI and military intelligence.
In 1971, Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian issued new
"guidelines" for the IDIU, which stated in part:
. . . IDIU must analyze and monitor all information relating
to past civil disorders as well as information relating
to the potential for civil disorder....[W]e must identify and
understand the philosophies of organizations and individuals
who have engaged in civil disorder or have demonstrated a
propensity to do so.
In carrying out our purpose, it is imperative that the analysts
involved keep clearly in mind that IDIU is not an
investigative agency. Its mIssion, reduced to its simplest es-
- ,Sltaff Memorandum for t!he SUlbcommittee on ConstitUltion'lll Rights, United
States 'Senate, 9/14/11.
401 Department of Justice Report, Demonstration tmd Dissent 1m. the Nation's
Oapital, in Hearings before the Senate SubcommiUee Qn AdministrativePraetice
and Procedure, FederaJ Han/fling of Demonstrations (1970), pp. 52-53.
505
sential, is merely the indexing and filing of information collected
by investigatory agencies, princIpally the FBI, and
information furnished by the news media ill a quickly :retrievable
form. .
... [W]e must take every reasonable precaution to insure
that the identity of individuals included in our indexes be
protected from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. We
must keep clearly in mind that it is the use to which the information
is put rather than the collection of the information
itself that gives rise to the greatest possibility of abuse....492
These "guidelines" were prepared shortly before Assistant Attorney
General Mardian and other Justice Department officials were called to
testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
which was inquiring into military surveillance and other domestic
intelligence collection programs. At those hearings Mardian did explain
that IDIU relied on FBI reports for most of its information;
but Justice Department officials did not disclose the reorganized IEC,
nor did they provide the Subcommittee with FBI's standards of intelligence
collection.493
Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist defended the power
of the executive to collect any information which was "legitimately
related to the statutory 01' constitutional authority of the executive
branch to enforce the laws." [Emphasis added.] He cited the Supreme
Court's opinion in In Be Neagle, 135 U.S. 1,64 (1890), interpreting
the President's duty to "take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed" under Article II, section 3 of the Constitution. The Court
had construed the word "Laws" to encompass not only statutes enacted
by Congress, but also "the right, duties and obligations growing out
of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection
implied by the nature of government under the Constitution."
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist also cited as a basis for gathering
intelligence about both protest demonstrations and ghetto unrest
Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution which provides, "The United
States shall guarantee every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and
on Application of the LegIslature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic violence." This proVIsion
had traditionally been understood as authorizing the President
to dispatch federa,l troops under implementing statutes passed in 1792
and the 1860's. But the Justice Department now asserted that it was
"another basis of the information gathering authority of the Executive
Branch," therefore justifying "investIgative activities ... directed
to determine the possibility of domestic violence occurring at
a pa,rticular place or at a, particular time." 494
G. "New Left" Intelligence
The FBI collected intelligence under its VIDEM (Vietnam Demonstration)
and STAG (Student Agitation) programs on "anti-Government
demonstrations and protest rallies" whIch the Bureau con-
.... Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian to all
IDIU personnel, 3/5/71.
... Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill 01 Rights, Hearings before
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (1971), pp. 867-877.
... Federal Data Banks, 1971 Hearings, pp. 598-601.
506
sidered "disruptive." Field ol!ices were warned against "incomplete
and nonspecific reporting," which neglected such details as "number
of protesters present, identities of organizations, and identities of
f:peakers and leading activists." Although every person arrested at a
demonstration was not automatically investigated by the FBI, all that
was needed to open an individual case was some "propensity for violence"
or association with "subversive or revolutionary activity." 495
After the disorders at Columbia University and other campuses,
in 1968, FBI field offices were instructed:
The most recent outbreak of violence on college campuses
represents a direct challenge to law and order and a substantial
threat to the stability of society in general. The Bureau
has an urgent and pressing responsibility to k'eep the intelligence
c01TI!mJUnity informed of plans of new left groups
and student activists to engage in acts of lawlessness on the
campus. We can only fulfill this responsibility through the
development of hig-h quality informants who are in a position
to report on the plans of student activists to engage in
disruptive activities on the campus. [Emphasis added.]
In view of the increased agitational activity taking place
on college campuses, each office is instructed to immediately
expand both its coverage and investigation of campus-based
new left groups and black nationalist organizations with the
objective of determining in advance the plans of these elements
to engage in violence or disruptive activities on the
campus. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that all offices
are expected to develop and maintain adequate sources to enable
the Bureau to determine in advance and promptly report
agitational activities being planned by campus-based
groups. In carrying out these instructions, you should, of
course, be guided by existing regulations which require that
Bureau authorization be obtained prior to the development
of informants and sources on college campuses ... 496
The possibility of "embarrassment" placed some limits on intelligence
operations, especially when there was adversepnblicity. The following
is one example:
At a recent antidraft demonstration, a Bureau Agent
posing as a newsman was reco~ized by a representative of
a newspaper that has been traditionally hostile to the FBI.
The Special Agent involved was attempting to identify the
demonstrators and those who were burning their draft cards,
and to record statements of various individuals participating
in the demonstration. A distorted news item regarding the
Agent's activities appeared in a subsequent issue of that
paper reflecting the Bureau in an unfavorable light.
Consequently, you should instruct your Agent personnel
that, henceforth, no matter what the justification, they are
not to pose as newsmen or representatives of any wire service
for the purpose of establishing an investigative cover.497
... SAC Memorandum 1-72, 5/23/72.
"" SAC Letter No. 68, 5/21/68.
m SAC Letter No. 68-38, 6/2/68.
507
The FBI attempted to define the "New Left," but with little
success. Field offices were told that it was a "subversive force"
dedicated to destroying our "traditional values." Although it had "no
definable ideology," it was seen as having "strong Marxist, existentialist,
nihilist and anarchist overtones." Field offices were instructed
that "proper areas of inquiry" regarding the subjects of "New Left"
investIgations were "public statements, the writings and the leadership
activities" which might establish their "rejection of law and
order" and thus their "potential threat to the security of the United
States." Such persons would also be placed on the Security Index
because of these "anarchistic tendencies," even if the Bureau could
not prove "membership in a subversive organization." 498
Later instructions to the field stated that the term "New Left" did
not refer to "a definite organization," but to a "loosely-bound, freewheeling,
college-oriented movement" and to the "more extreme and
militant anti-VIetnam war and antidraft protest organizations." These
instructions initiated a "comprehensive study of the whole movement"
for the purpose of assessing its "dangerousness." Quarterly reports
were to be prepared, and "subfiles" opened, under the following
headings:
Organizations ("when organized, objectives, locality in which
active, whether part of a national organization") ;
Membership (and "sympathizers"-use "best available
informants and sources") ;
Finances (including identity of "angels" and funds from
"foreign sources") ;
Communist influence;
Publications ("describe publications, show circulation and
principal members of editorial staff") ;
Violence;
Religion ("support of movement by religious groups or
individua.ls") ,.
Race RelatIons i
Political ActiVIties ("details relating to position taken on
political matters including efforts to influence public
opinion, the electorate and Government bodies") ;
Ideology;
Education ("courses given together with any educational outlines
and assigned or suggested reading") ;
Social Reform ("demonstrations aimed at social reform") ;
Labor ("all activity in the labor field") ;
Public Appearances of Leaders ("on radio and television"
and "before groups, such as labor, church and
minority groups," including "summary of subject matter
discussed") ;
Factionalism;
Security Measures;
... SAC Letter No. 68-21, 4/2/68. This directive did caution that "mere dissent
and opposition to GQvernmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional manner"
was "not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index." Moreover,
"anti-Vietnam or peace group sentiments" were not, in themselves, supposed
to "justify an investigation."
69-984 a • 76 - 33
508
International Relations ("travel in foreign countries,"
"attacks on United States foreign policy") ;
Mass Media ("indications of support of New Left by mass
media").
Through these massive reports, the FBI hoped to discover "the true
nature of the New Left movement." 499 Few Bureau programs better
reflect "pure intelligence" objectives going far beyond even the most
generous definition of "preventive intelligence."
The FBI prepared a study of "Youth in Rebellion" early in 1969.
This "comprehensive document on new left 'and black extremist activities"
was designed to review the "worldwide ramifications of these
movements as well as their impact on the internal security of the
country." 500 When the FBI completed this report, the Internal Security
Division of the Justice Department specifically authorized the
FBI to conduct investigations "to determine whether there is any
underlying subversive group giving illegal directions and guidance to
the numerous campus disorders throughout the country." The Internal
Security Division also submitted "suggested areas of particular interest
for future investigative efforts." 501 These instructions were
generally comparable to Attorney General Clark's September 1967
memorandum regarding ghetto riots and civil disturbance intelligence.
Both were taken by the FBI as broad authorizations for domestic
intelligence investigations.502
An additional request from the Internal Security Division in March
1969 advised. the FBI that the Justice Department was "considering
the possibility of conducting a grand jury investigation of some
future serious campus disorder" with a view towards prosecution
under the antiriot act, the Smith Act, the Voorhis Act, 'and statutes
on seditious, conspiracy and insurrection. Consequently, the Internal
Security Division asked the FBI:
... to secure in advance the names of 'any persons planning
activities which might fall within the proscription of any of
the foregoing statutes. It would also be important for us to
know the identities of the officials of any ,participating organizations
who have custody or control of records concerning
the activities of such organizations which we would seek to
obtain by means of subpoenas duces tecum.
It would also be most helpful if you wereahle to furnish
us with the names of any individuals who appear at more
than one campus either before, during, or after any active
disorder or riot and the identities of those persons from outside
the campus who might be instigators of these incidents.
The FBI was asked to use not only its "existing sources" but also "any
other source you may be able to develop.... " 5'03
Despite the pressure for greater intelligence about campus groups,
Director Hoover decided "that additional student informants cannot
<OIl ~Iemorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 10/28/68, and enclosure.
..., SAC Letter No. 69--14, 2/25/69.
601 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the
FBI Director, 2/18/69.
.... FBI Intelligence Division, Position Paper on Jurisdiction, 2/13/75.
"'Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to the
FBI Director, 3/3/69.
509
be developed." Nevertheless, the FBI field offices were instructed to
intensify their efforts: "It is ... recognized that with the graduation
of senior classes, you will lose a certain percentage of your existing
student informant coverage. This decreasing percent of coverage will
not be accepted as an excuse for not developing the necessary information."
.04 One way to achieve this result without the FBI recruiting
additional student informants was to have local police do so. Thus,
when field offices were reminded of the need for gathering intelligence
so that the Justice Department could provide "data regarding developing
situations having a potential for violence," FBI headquarters
stressed the need for "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement
agencies." 505 The restriction on new campus informants was finally
rela,xed, although field officers were still forbidden to develop informants
"under the age of 21" and procedures were instituted "for tight
controls and great selectivity in this most sensitive area."
Upon initial contact with a potential student informant or
source, informant or source should be requested to execute a
brief signed written statement for the field file to the effect
that such individual has voluntarily furnished information
to the FBI because of his concern of individuals and groups
acting against the interests of his government and that he understands
that the FBI is not interested in the legitimate
activities of educational institutions. [Emphasis added.]
Field offices were also to submit quarterly reports assessing the productivity
of each student informant so as "to justify the continued
utilization of the source." 506 FBI Intelligence Division officials were
greatly dissatisfied with these limits, as became clear in the preparation
of the "Huston Plan" in 1970.507
FBI intelligence surveillance of the New Left was further expanded
in early 1970 afror an explosion at a New York City townhouse killed
several youthful bomb-makers and dramatized the violence potential
of the Weatherman faction of SDS. Because mEmbers of the Weatherman
faction we,re believed to live in communes, all FBI field officers
were instructed :
For the purposes of Bureau investigations, a commune is
defined as a group of individuals residing in one location who
practice communal living, i.e., they share income and adhere
to the philosophy of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-oriented violent
revolution.
A rebuttable presumption exists that persons having a past
history of participation in violent leftist radical activity, or
leftist terrorist activity, living in a communal relationship
constitutes a commune within the above definition.
When information is received by an office that indicates a
commune exists, falling within the above definition, it is incumbent
upon that office to conduct sufficient investigation to
determine, the identity of all members. Each member must be
... SAC Letter No. 69--16, 3/11/69.
.... SAC Letter 69--44, 8/19/69.
""" SAC Letter No. 69--5."1, 9/26/69.
001 See Report on the Huston Plan.
510
investigated as a suspected extremist within the framework
of existing instructions to determine whether they should be
included on the Security Index. Every effort must be made by
the office to obtain informant andlor sophisticated coverage
of the commune and its participants to develop advance
knowledge of any planned violence so that preventative action
can be initiated and prosecutive action brought to bear where
IXJ6Sible.50l1
To conduct more intensive investigations of "terrorism by New Left
extremists," the FBI Intelligence Division requested that additional
manpower be assigned. Director Hoover noted, "O.K. but it must be
kept in mind that we will get no additional personnel until July 1971
so whatever personnel is needed now will have to come from cutbacks
in other programs." 509 To a significant extent these resources were
drawn away from the FBI's counterintelligence effort against hostile
foreign intelligence operations in the United States.510
By the time of the widespread disturbances following the Cambodian
invasion and Kent State, the Intelligence Division believed 451 additional
agents were needed for New Left investigations, with an increase
to 741 "for peak periods." The Intelligence Division explained
the need for more agents in the following terms:
The tragic, violent aftermath of violence and destruction on
our campuses following the President's speech on Cambodia
is a clear warning of the impact of New Left terrorist philosophy
and advocacy of street action. The ability of radical
activists to seize a controversial issue and whip up violent reaction
among large crowds is again demonstrated. The threat
to the Nation's ability to function in a crisis situation posed by
New Left extremists has never been more clearly drawn. This
grave threat requires immediate and positive steps be taken
to fulfill our responsibilities for protection of the internal
security of the Nation.511
Subsequent instructions to the field stressed intensified investigation
of persons adhering to the "Weatherman ideology of violence and revolution",
and again observed that "communal living follows Weatherman
lifestyle and is good guide to individual's adherence to Weatherman
ideology." Persons who used "terroristic tactics in furtherance of
revolution" were to be considered "for inclusion in Priority I of Security
Index." Field offices were directed to "begin shifting personnel
to this work from other work areas, except for personnel specifically
designated for organized crime work ..." 512
H. Target Luts and the Security InderIJ
After meeting with the President's Commission on Civil Disorders
in 1967, FBI Director Hoover instructed "that an index be compiled of
racial agitators and individuals who have demonstrated a propensity
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 4/17/70.
... Note on Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/16/70.
•,0 C. D. Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 177.
on Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. SUllivan, 5/11/70.
m Memorandmn from Headquarters to all SAC's, 5/13/70.
511
for fomenting racial discord." 513 Standards for the Rabble Rouser
Index were then sent to the field:
The Index will consist of the names, identifying data, and
background information of individuals who are known rabble
rousers and who have demonstrated by their actions and
speeches that they have a propensity for fomenting racial disorder.
It is desired that only individuals of prommence who
are of national interest be included on this index. Particular
consideration should be given to recommending those individuals
in this category who travel extensively ... The fact that
an individual is on the Security Index or Reserve Index does
not preclude his inclusion on the Rabble Rouser Index.514
The initial effect of the Rabble Rouser Index was to collect in files
at FBI headquarters all information from the field offices about persons
on the Index. Field offices were also to provide information about
their "possible foreign travel." 515 The first Index contained less than
100 names."16
At the same time as the creation of the Rabble Rouser Index, the
FBI instituted a COINTELPRO program aimed at disrupting and
discrediting black nationalist or black "ex:tremist" groups and individuals.
The Rabble Rouser Index served as a convement list of
primary targets for OOINTELPRO activity.517 Within the FBI Domestic
Intelligence Division, there was a substantial reorganization to
take accoun,t of these new functions in 1961. The Subversives Control
Section was abolished and its supervision of investi~tions of individual
"subversives"-both "Old Left" and "New Left"-were transferred
back to the Internal Security Section. A new Racial Matters
Section was established to supervise intelligence investigations of black
and white "extremist" groups.
The standards for the Rabble Rouser Index were broadened in November
1961 to cover persons with a "propensity for fomenting" any
disorders affecting the "internal security," not just racial disorders,
and to include persons of local as well as national interest. A rabble
rouser was defined "as a person who tries to arouse people to violent
action by appealing to their emotions, prejudices, et cetera; a demagogue."
The purpose of this expansion to develop a nationwide index
"of agitators of all types whose activities have a bearing on the national
security." This included "black nationalists, whIte supremacists,
Puerto Rican nationalists, anti-Vietnam demonstration leaders,
and other extremists." 518 Standardized forms for automatic data processing
of the Index by computer included the following organizational
affiliation categories:
American Nazi Party
Anti-Vietnam
Black Nationalist
513 Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/3/67.
51< SAC Letter No. 67--47, 8/4/67.
515 SAC Letter No. 67-56, 9/12/67.
516 Memorandum from P. L. Cox to Mr. Sullivan, 9/5/67.
517 See Report on COINTELPRO.
51B SAC Letter No. 67-70, 11/28/67.
512
Black Panther Party
Communist
Congress of Racial Equality
Ku Klux Klan
Latin American
Minuteman
Nation of Islam
National States Rights Party
Progressive Labor Party
Nationalist groups advocating Independence for Puerto Rico
Revolutionary Action Movement
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
Students for a Democratic Society
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
SocialistWorkers Party -
Workers World Party
Miscellaneous 519
The overlap with the Security Index is indicated by the inclusion in
1968 of Students for a Democratic Society and the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee in a list of organizational affiliations for
the Security Index. By 1968 the Security Index also contained persons
without organizational affiliation designated "Anarchist" and "Black
Nationalist." 520
The Rabble Rouser Index was renamed the Agitator Index in
March 1968, and field offices were directed to obtain a photograph of
each person on the Index.521
The Domestic Intelligence Division also stressed the dangerousness
of the "New Left" movement and the need to include its "leading
activists" on the Security Index.
The emergence of the new left movement as a subversive
force dedicated to the complete destruction of the traditional
values of our democratic society presents the Bureau with an
unprecedented challen.!!e in the security field. Although the
new left has no definable ideology of its own, it does have
strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and anarchist overtones.
While mere membership in a new left group is not
sufficient to establish that an individual is a potential threat
to the internal security of the United States, it must be
recognized that many individuals affiliated with the new
left movement do, in fact, engage in violence or unlawful
activities, and their potential dangerousness is clearly demonstrated
by their statements, conduct and actions.
The Bureau has recently noted that in many instances
security investigations of these individuals are not being
initiated. In some cases, subjects are not being recommended
for inclusion on the Security Index merely because no membership
in a basic revolutionary organization could be established.
Since the new left is basically anarchist, many of the
619 SAC !Jetter No. 68-5, 1/16/68.
... SAC Letter No. 68--14, 2/20/68.
521 l\Il'morandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC'!!, 3/21/68.
513
leading activists in it are not members of any basic revolutionary
group. It should be borne in mind that even if a
subject's membership in a subversive orp;anization cannot be
proven, his inclusion on the Security Index may often be
justified because of activities which establish his anarchistic
tendencies. In this regard, you should constantly bear in mind
the publw statements, the 1JYritings and the leadership activities
of subjects of security investigations which establish
theJ.ll as anarchists are poper areas of inguiry. Such activity
should be actively pursued through investigation with the
ultimate view of including them on the Security Index. It
is entirely possible, therefore, that a subject without any
organizational affiliation can qualify for the Security Index
by virtue of his public pronouncements and activities which
establish his rejection of law and order and reveal him to be
a potential threat to the security of the United States. [Emphasis
added.]
Field offices were cautioned, however, "that mere dissent and opposition
to the Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional
manner are not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index."
Agents were to report information "to show the potential threat
and not merely show anti-Vietnam or peace group sentiments without
also revealing advocacy of violence or unlawful action which would
justify an investigation." 522
At the same time that these instructions were issued, the FBI
instituted a COINTELPRO program against the "New Left." The
Agitator Index and the Security Index served as indicators of the
prime subjects for efforts under COINTELPRO to disrupt groups
and discredit individuals in the "New Left." 523
The FBI did not develop its new Security Index policies alone.
As the Commission on Civil Disorders had encouraged the FBI to
identify "rabble rousers," so President Johnson ordered a comprehensive
review of the Government's emergency plans after the October
1967 March on the Pentagon against the Vietnam war.
Attorney General Ramsey Clark was appointed chairman of a committee
to review the Presidential Emergency Action Documents
(PEADs) prepared under the Emergency Detention Prowam. Subsequent
decisions were summarized in an FBI memorandum:
After extensive review, in which the FBI participated, a
proposal was submitted to the President that certain documents
be revised. It was proposed that the Emergency Detention
Program be revised to agree with the provisions of
the Emergency Detention Act [of 1950].
The Internal Security Division (ISD) of the Department
has raised questions as to the ability to discharge the responsibil.
ities of the Attorney General under the Emergency DetentIOn
Act of 1950. By letter dated 2/26/68 the Department
requested a conference with the FBI for the purpose of
reviewing the implementation of the Emergency Detention
Program ...
522 SAC Letter No. ~21, 4/2/68.
523 See Report on COINTELPRO.
514
One of the changes in PEAD pertains to the definition of
a "dangerous individual". The document, which has been approved
by the President, now states, "The Attorney General
acting through such officers and agents as he may designate
for the purpose, shall apprehend, and by order detain, pursuant
to the provisions of the Emergency Detention Act,
each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe
that such person probably will engage in, or probably will
conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage and
sabotage, including acts of terrorism or assassination and
any interference with or threat to the survival and effective
operation of the national, state, and local governments and
of the national defense effort." As used in this section, the
term "person," shall mean any citizen or national of the
United States, or any citizen, subject or national of any foreign
nation, or any stateless person.
The above is an all encompassing definition of a "dangerous
person". This will extend the criteria for the Security
Index.
During the conference of 4/22/68 with lSD, the definition
of a dangerous individual was discussed,and it was decided
that Item D of the SI criteria should be expanded to include
the definition as stated in the new PEAD 6 ...
With the emergence of the New Left and the intensification
of activities by the racial militants and black nationalists,
who are not affiliated with basic revolutionary organizations
but because of their anrurchist tendencies do present
a threat to the internal security of the United States, it has
become apparent that these individuals warrant inclusion on
the SI.
Many individuals on the SI, because of their violent tendencies
and their representation of top leadership of subversive
organizations, are scheduled for priority apprehension.
The administrative procedures developed to make these apprehensions
are referred to as the Detcom Program. In an allout
emergency, all subjects whose names are in the SI will be
considered for immediate apprehension.
The new priorities for apprehension under Detenti.on Program were
described as follows:
Priority I.-Top national and state leadership of basic subversive
organizations, leaders of anarchistic groups, individuals
who have shown greatest propensity for violence, as well
as those who have special training in sabotage, espionage,
guerrilla warfare, etc....
Priority II.-Second level leadership and individuals who
present significant threat but are in less influential positions
than Priority I . . .
Priority III.-All other individuals on S1. Made up mainly
of rank and file members . . .
515
Results of FBI investigations would continue to be provided to the
Justice Department "for its concurrence and approval of the persons
listed for apprehension".524
The FBI formally requested Departmental approval for the broader
Security Index criteria and the standards for the Priority Apprehension
Program.525 Even though the Department's formal reply was
that the criteria were "under study," the FBI went ahead with Manual
revisions and new instructions to the field. 526 There was "informal"
Departmental approval for these changes, as noted in a later memorandum.
527
The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel eventually approved
a modified version of the Security Index criteria in September
1968. Since this was the first time since 1955 that the Department had
fully considered the matter, it is important to stress that the previous
policy of disregarding the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was now
formally abandoned. If an emergency occurred, the Attorney General
would abide by "the requirement that any person actually detained will
be entitled to a hearing at which time the evidence will have to satisfy
the standards of ... the Emergency Detention Act". However, the
Security Index criteria themselves could be less precise because of "the
needed flexibility and discretion at the operating level in order to
carry on an effective surveillance program." As revised by the Office
of Legal Counsel, the Security Index criteria read as follows:
A. Membership or participation in the activities of a basic
revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown
by overt acts or statements established through reliable
sources, informants or individuals.
B. Subject has had membership or participation in the
affairs of one or more front organizations which adhere to
the policies and doctrines of a basic revolutionary organization,
in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation
in the furtherance of those aims and purposes of
the front organiz3ltion which coincide with those of a basic
,revolutionary organization, within the last three years as
shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable
sources, informants, or individuals.
C. Investigation has developed inform'ation that an individual,
though not a member of or a participarnt in the
activities of a basic revolutionary or front organization, has
anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon
the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit
acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism,
assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival
and effective operation of the national, state and local
governments and of the defense effort. [Emphasis added.]
"'< Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.
... Memorandum from the FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General J.
Walter Yeagley, 5/1/68.
... Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to the FBI Director,
6/17/68; memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 6/19/68; SAC
I.etter No. 68-36, 6/21/68.
.., Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Frank M. Wozencraft, Office
of Legal Counsel, to Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley, 9/9/68.
516
D. Although investigation has failed to establish the facts
required by (A), (B) or (C) above, either as to the substance
of those oriteria or because there have been no overt
acts or statements within the time limits prescribed, facts
have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict
the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected
to commit acts of the kind described in (C) above.528
The Internal Security Division forwarded the Office of Legal Counsel's
memorandum to the FBI, and the Bureau agreed that it would
"be guided by these revised criteria of 1968." The FBI Manual was
changed accordingly.529
Their expanding size made the Agitator Index and the Security
Index less valuable for most efficiently concentrating FBI intelligence
investigations. Consequently, the Domestic Intelligence Division
developed more refined tools for this purpose-including the Key
Activist Program and the Black Nationalist Photograph Album.
Instructions went out to ten major field offices in ,Tanuary 1968 to
designate certain persons as "Key Activists," defined as "individuals
in the Students for a Democratic Society and the anti-Vietnam war
groups [who] are extremely active and most vocal in their statements
denouncing the United States and calling for civil disobedience and
other forms of unlawful and disruptive acts." [Emphasis added.]
There was to be "an intensive investigation" of each Key Activist:
. . . with the objective of developing detailed and complete
information regarding their day-to-day activities and future
plans for staging demonstrations and disruptive acts directed
against the Government. Because of their leadership and
prominence in the 'new left' movement, as well as the growing
militancy of this movement, each office. must maintain highlevel
informant coverage on these individuals so that the Bureau
is kept abreast of their day-to-day activities as well as the
organizations they are affiliated with, to develop informationregarding
their sources of funds, foreign contracts, and
future plans.
In the event adequate live informant coverage is not immediately
available on these individuals, othl'r types of coverage
such as technical surveillances and physical surveillances
should be considered as temporary measures to establish the
necessary coverage.530
In May 1968, the FBI obtained the Federal income tax returns for
Key Activists and, in some instances, used this and other intelligence
information as part of COINTELPRO operations to disrupt an individual's
activities.531
The Key Activist Program was expanded to virtnally aU field offices
in October 1968. The offices were instructed to recommend additional
... Memorandum from Wozencraft to Yeagley. 9/9/68.
520 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to the FBI Director,
9/19/68; memorandum from FBI Director to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley,
9/26/68; FBI Manual Section 87. p. 45, revised, 10/14/68.
530 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 1/30/68.
IS31 Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/24/68.
517
persons for the program and to "consider if the individual was rendered
ineffective would it curtail such [disruptive] activity in his area
of influence." The importance of the program was explained by stressing
"the shift to violence in the New Left movement."
Sabotage, arson, bombing, and a variety of obstructive tactics
have been openly advocated during the past year. In September,
1968, within a five-day period three ROTC establishments
were sabotaged and a fourth threatened. In addition, a
Central Intelligence Agency office at Ann Arbor, Michigan,
was bombed during that month. These instances of openly
made plans for violence and the brazen follow through of
action are examples of the problems facing the Bureau in this
field and the absolute necessity for intensive investigative efforts
in these matters. Successful prosecution is the best deterrent
to such unlawful activity. Intensive investigations of
Key Activists under this Program are logically expected to
result in prosecutions under substantive violations within the
Bureau's investigative jurisdiction.5
:
i2
While the FBI considered Federal prosecution a "logical" result, it
should he noted that Key Activists were not chosen because they were
suspected of having committed or planning to commit any specific
Federal crime.
A counterpart to the Key Activist Program for the "New Left" was
the Black Nationalist Photograph Album, which grew out of a conference
of FBI agents from forty-two field offices. The conferences
recommended concentrating on no more than fifty prominent "militant
black nationalists" who traveled extensively. Each field office would
have a copy of the Album, including photographs and "biographical
data," so that they could be identified "should they turn up in different
areas of the country." 533
The Key Activist Program, the Black Nationalist Photograph Album,
the Agitator Index, and the revised Security Index identified
the prime subjects for domestic intelligence investigation. However,
the scope of inquiry went far beyond these defined targets. Inflammatory
reports about possible "catastrophes" intensified hea.dquarters
pressures on the field to produce more intelligence in 1968 :
Recently we have boon a.dvised by informants that militant
black nationalist organiZiations, as well as independent
Negro extremists are talking or taking such action as dynamiting
the Empire State Building in New York City, throwing
dynamite on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange
and possibly assassinating some white political candidates as
a means of retaliating for the killing of Martin Luther King,
Jr. We have also received information that militant black
racial extremists reel that all white people should be killed
and one has stated that he believes if the right contact is made
wi~h the White House staff, a plan might be formulated to
pOlson 500 to 600 people attending functions at the White
House.
532 :\Il'morandum from FBI Hl'adquarters to all SAC's 10/24/68.
533 :\Il'morandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/11/68.
518
With the increased number of violent statements coming
to the attention of the Bureau, you must be alert. to
promptly run out all rumors of violence connected WIth
racial activity for the purpose of either proving or disproving
these rumors.
In addition, our experience in the past has shown that
often when an individual is confronted concerning a violent
statement he is alleged to have made, it will deter him from
taking any such action. In view of this, whenever possible,
interview individuals who are alleged to have made violent
statement.<;. . . .534
This latter form of deterrent "preventive action" proceeded independently
from FBI COINTELPRO operations.
In early 1969, the FBI stepped up its Key Activist Program.
Reports on Key Activists were to be made every ninety days, and
"particular effort" was to be made "to obtain recordings of or reliable
witnesses to inflammatory speeches or statements made which may
subsequently become subject to criminal proceedings." m The FBI
Intelligence Division also compiled a Key Activist Album containing
photographs and biographies of each Key Activist for distribution
to all field offices.53G At this time there were 55 individuals covered
by the program. To expand this number, FBI field offices were instructed
to investigate all persons connected with the regional offices
of Students for a Democratic Society-----'to determine whether they
should be included in the Security Index or the Key Activist
Program.5ST
The Black Nationalist Photograph Album was also expanded in
early 1969 "to include the photographs of the principal leaders of
any black extremist organization," not just those specifically known
to traveV38 Later in the year the FBI broadened the scope of its
Racial Calendar, which had been established in 1968 to advise each
field office of "the dates of black nationalist type conferences and
... racial events and anniversaries." Because of increasing cooperation
between "black extremists and white subversives," the Racial
Calendar would now include demonstrationiO and conferences "of the
antifascist, antidraft and anti-Vietnam variety" which would "easily
develop into a racial event." 539
In anticipation of possible 'racial unrest in the summer of 1969,
FBI headquarters reemphasized to the field the need for "developing
a network of ghetto-type informants . . . to enable you to advise
appropriate local and Federal authorities in advance of potential
large scale racial violence." The FBI was particularly concerned that
the "radical Negro students on college campuses" would seek "to
promote racial violence" in the ghettos. Therefore, it was deemed
necessary "to thoroughly S!liturate every level of activi,ty in the
ghetto." 540
eM SAC Letter No. 68-32, 6/4/6R.
5,. ~femorandl1m from FBI Headquartern to all SAC'R, 3/10/69.
53' :Uemoranrll1m from FBI HearlqnarterR to all SAC'R. 4/2/69.
S31 ~femoranrll1m from FBI HeadquarterR to all SAC'R. !,>/22/69.
538 ~Iemorandnm from FBI HearlqnarterR to all SAC'R, 1/17/69.
113II Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. SUllivan, 9/2/69.
... SAC Letter No. 69-30, 5/21/69.
519
I. Investigations of "Foreign Influence" on Domestw Unrest
The FBI was increasingly interested in possible foreign influence on
domestic violence and protest, partly at the urging of President J ohnson.
As early as 1963 the FBI Manual had authorized requests for CIA
investigations of Americans abroad for internal security purposes.
Prior thereto the sole purpose of advising the CIA of foreign travel
by domestic "subversives" was "to place stops with appropriate security
services abroad to be advised of the activities of these subjects." 541
This provision was revised as follows in 1963 :
Information concerning these subjects' proposed travel
abroad, including information concerning their subversive
activities, is furnished by the Bureau to the Department of
State, Central Intelligence Agency, and legal attaches if the
proposed travel is in areas covered by such.... In the cover
letter accompanying the letterhead memorandum, indicate
extent of foreign investigation recommended or whether O'fIly
stops should be placed with appropriate security services
abroad.542 [Emphasis added.]
It was through these procedures that the FBI secured the assistance of
the CIA in the investigation of antiwar activists and black militant
leaders who traveled overseas.543
In 1966 the FBI and CIA negotiated an informal agreement to regularize
their "coordination." TIus agreement had as its "heart" that the
CIA would "seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI" before
engaging in clandestine activity in the United States, and that the FBI
would "concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict
with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation
[by] the FBI." 544 Moreover, when an agent recruited by the CIA
abroad arrived in the United States, the FBI would "be advised" and
the two agencies would "confer regarding the handling of the agent in
the United States." The CIA could "continue" its "handling" of ,the
agent for "foreign intelligence" purposes, and the FBI would also
become involved where there were "internal security factors," 545 although
it was recognized that CIA might continue to "handle" the
agent in the United States and provide the Bureau with "information"
bearing on "internal security matters."
The term "internal security factors" used in the agreement meant
that CIA agents were used after 1966 to report on domestic "dissidents"
for the FBI. There were instances where, according' to the
former FBI liaison with CIA:
CIA had penetrations abroad in radical, revolutionary
organizations and the individual was coming here to attend
a conference, a meeting, and would be associating with leading
dissidents, and the question came up, can he be of any use
to us, can we have access to him during that period.
In most instances, because he was here for a relatively short
period, we would levy the requirement or the request upon the
041 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 33.
04. FBI Manual Section 87, p. 33a, revised 4/15/63.
.., See Report on CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans.
... Former FBI liaison with the CIA testimony, 9/22/75, p. 52.
646 Liaison testimony, 9/22/75, p. 55.
520
CIA to find out what was taking place at the meetings to get
his assessment of the individuals that he was meeting, and
any other general intelligence that he could collect from his
associations with the people who were of interest to US.546
The policies embodied in the 1966 agreement and the practice under
it clearly involved the CIA in the performance of "internal security
functions." At no time was Congress asked to amend the 1947 Act to
modify its ban against CIA "internal security functions."
As previously noted (p. 484). President .Johnson and Director
Hoover had been seeking proof that Communists were behind the antiwar
movement since 1965. The CIA increasingly was drawn into that
quest, in part in response to Bureau requests. .Joseph Califano, a principal
assistant to President .Johnson, testified that high governmental
officials could not believe that
a cause that is so clearly right for the country, as they perceive
it, would be so widely attacked if there were not some [foreign]
force behind it.547
The same pressures and beliefs led to FBI investigations of possible
"foreign influence" on "militant black nationalists" and radical
students.
Within the United States the FBI established intelligence coverage
on domestic groups if a Communist country appeared interested in exercising
influence. For example, on the basis of information that a
black American fugitive was in the People's Republic of China and
that the Chinese government was making propaganda statements "to
promote and abet racial strife in this country," the FBI instructed
its field offices in 1967 "to be on the alert constantly for information
indicating Chicom attempts to influence groups or individuals
involved in the racial movement and ... that development of live
formants who can become knowledgeable of such attempts is vital." 548
Similarly, information that Cuba had plans for "the use of American
Negroes, Indians, and Communists to methodically sabota~e our installations
throughout the Western Hemisphere" and that Cuban officials
had offered arms and assistance to "Puerto Rican revolutionary
groups" led the FBI to alert its informants in defense plants and to
ask its "trustworthy police contacts ... to alert their racial and security
informants" so that they would report information about "dissident
groups, including 'black nationalist' organizations, which have
potential for carrying out sabotage or other disruptive activities on behalf
of Cuba." 549
In addition to these specific problems, the FBI issued general instructions
to the field for collecting intelligenee on "foreign influences
in the Black Nationalist movement" :
The potential for foreign influences in these matters certainly
exists as evidenced by wide travel in communist countries
of such militant black nationalists as Stokely Carmichael
who, within the recent past, has visited, such far-flung places
... Liaison testimony, 9/22/75, pp. 57-58.
.., Califano, 1/27/76, p. 70.
548 SAC Letter No. 67-56, 9/12/67.
... SAC Letter No. 67-62, 10/17/67.
521
as Cuba, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Algeria, United
Arab Republic, and other countries abroad. Other individuals
connected with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
as wen as individuals affiliated with other black nationalist
organizations are known to have traveled in communist
countries.
Each office should review its files for the identities of any
known black nationalists who have traveled to Iron Curtain
countries and other communist countries during the past two
years ... [I]n instanc~s in which investigations have not been
conducted, penetrative investigations should be initiated at
this time looking toward developing any information regarding
contacts on the part of these individuals with foreign
elements and looking toward developing any additional information
having a bearing upon whether the individual
involved is currently subjected to foreign influence or direction....
During your investigative coverage of an militant black
nationalists, be most alert to any foreign travel. Advise the
Bureau promptly of such in order that appropriate ove~as
investigations may be conducted to establish activities and
contacts abroad.
In addition, each office should submit a letterhead memorandum
... to include indications of foreign support, direction,
guidance or influence, as well as a listing of individual
black nationalists ... who have traveled to communist countries
within the past two years.... 550
The FBI passed such information on to the CIA, which in turn began
to place individual black nationalists on a "watch list" for the interception
of international communications by the National Security
Agency.551 One purpose for the FBI effort to obtain income tax returns
of Key Activists was "to determine whether their income
supports their ability to travel throughout this country, and abroad
as part of the New Left revolt." 552
The IDIU's transfer of its computer printout to the CIA was just
one instance of the substantial flow of domestic intelligence to and
from the foreign intelligence agencies. The FBI was the main ohannel
for mobilizing foreign intelligence resources and techniques against
domestic targets. The FBI began submitting names of citizens engaged
in domestic protest and violence to the CIA not only for investigation
abroad (as had been the case before 1969), but also for plaooment on a
"watch list" to 'be used in conjunction with the CIA's mail opening
project.553 Similar lists of names went from the FBI to the National
Security Agency, for use ona "watch list" for monitoring other
channels of international communication.554
In 1970 these agencies attempted to obtain formal authorization to
use these techniques, and to resume previously forbidden methods such
5liO SAC Letter No. 67-66, 11/7/67.
561 See Report on National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans.
5S2 ~Iemorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/24/67.
553 See Report on CIA and FBI Mail Opening.
504 See Report on National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans.
522
as FBI "black bag jobs," for domestic intelligence purposes.555 These
efforts to broaden intelligence surveillance resulted largely from intense
pressures from the White House to determine whether there was
foreign direction or financing of domestic protest activity. Rather
than relying on intelligence coverage of foreign governments and
their officials or agents, the FBI and the foreign intelligence agencies
targeted American citizens in the hope of finding foreign influence
even when there was no prior indication of contact with foreign
agents.
A good picture of the FBI's basic approach to the issue of foreign
influence is provided by a memorandum prepared in the Intelligence
Division early in 1969 summarizing its "coverage of the New Left:"
Foreign influence of the New Left movement offers us a
fertile field to develop valuable intelligence data. To date
there is no real cohesiveness between international New Left
groups, but such an effort was initiated in September, 1968,
at an International Student Conference at Columbia University.
This conference disclosed that despite the factionalism
and confusion now so prevalent, there UJ great potential for
the development of an international student revolutionary
movement. We are initiating investigations aimed at identifying
prominent foreign New Left leaders and activists and to
increase our reservoir of background information regardin~
foreign New Left organizations. This also encompasses travel
on the part of groups or individuals either to or from the
U.S., and will include international conferences....
Furthermore, it is apparent that the old-line communist
~roups such as the Communist Party, USA, the Prowessive
Labor Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and particularly
its youth affiliate, the Youn~ Socialist Alliance are making
a determined effort to move into the New Left movement to
exert a greater influence and control over its future activities.
More and more we see the New Left movement hoMing up as
heros international communists such as Fidel Castro, Ho Chi
Minh, 'and Mao Tse-tung. More and more we also see old-line
leftist groups influerwing the thinking of the New Left along
Marxist lines and ~iving direction to attacks against the
police in general and the FBI in partieular, to drive us off the
campuses; as well as attacks against the new administration
to degrade President Nixon. We can expect this activity to
intensify greatly in the future. 556 [Emphasis added.]
There was no mention of, or apparent concern for, direct influence or
control of the "New Left" by agents of hostile foreign powers. Instead,
the stress was almost entirely upon ideological links and similarities,
and the threat of dangerous ideas.
"White House interest in the financing of New Left protest activities
intensified FBI intelligence investigations in early 1970. In responSe to
a specific request, the FBI furnished the "White House "material concerning
income sources of revolutionary groups" in February 1970.
... See Report on the Huston Plan.
.... Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 2/3/69.
523
FBI officials observed that this request was "indicative of high-level
interest" in the question. Consequently, the Intelligence Division instructed
field offices "to develop information indicative of support of
the New Left Movement by tax-exempt charitable foundations or financial
'angels' . . .as well as support by politically oriented groups
such as the Vietnam Moratorium Committee to End the War in Vietnam."
The field was advised that such support might include "furnishing
bail money to arrested demonstrators, furnishing printing equipment
or office space, and underwriting the cost of conventions or
rallies." FBI officials realized, however, that "direct intensive financial
investigation of large foundations, prominent wealthy individ~als,
. . . or politically oriented groups such as the Vietnam MoratorIUm
Committee" might result in "embarrassment to the bureau." 557
It was in this climate of stress tha:t the Assistant Director in charge
of the Intelligence Division, William C. Sullivan, and the chief of
the Internal Security Section, Charles D. Brennan, played influential
roles in the development of the "Huston Plan" in June 1970.558 These
officials saw the threat as essentially domestic in nature. Mr. Brennan
has testified that the FBI "never developed any information to indicate
that communist sources abroad were financing the anti-war activities
in the United States." The only significant foreign conneotions
were that "many activists in the anti-war movement had traveled to
foreign countries, had attended communist conferences in various
countries abroad and appeared to be getting some degree of propaganda,
if not indirectly some guidance which they applied in the conduct
of the anti-war demonstrations here." 559
Mr. Brennan gave one example of this influence:
They attended conferences in various ... countries abroad
which were sponsored by Communists. The peace movement
in the United States was generally discussed and I recall in
one instance, for example, where several of the activists were
involved in the policy committee of the anti-war 'aotivities ...
and attended conferences where these issues were the subjeot
of discussion with many Communist representatives. And at
the time, the general feeling of the antI-war movement here
was that the next step in the stage should be protest demonstrations
around the United States.
Jot is my recollection that information at the Communist
Conference abroad led to the conclusion that there should be
instead a concentrated demonstration in Washington D.C.
And. following the return o~ these indi.viduals0 this co~ntry,
I thlllk they served to proJect that VIew and mdeed we did
~a.ve a concentra~ed demonstration in Washington, D.C., and
It IS my recollectIOn that when that demonstration took place,
there were also concerted demonstmtions at American embassies
in many foreign countries on the same day.
..., Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. SUllivan, 3/12/70; Memorandum
fr~n FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/16/70.
See Report on the Huston Plan.
.... C. D. Brennan deposition, 9/23/75, p. 4.
69-984 0 - 76 - 34
524
This kind of indirect "guidance" was not matched by financial support
or direct control. l\Ir. Brennan stated, "I personally held the feeling
that we were dealing with what I term credit card revolutionaries,
and that the individuals involved in this type of activity in the United
States had ample resources of their own ... to finance these activities.
I never saw anything to the contrary." 560 Nevertheless, Brennan
pointed out that the FBI was "constantly being asked by the White
House as to whether or not there was foreign funding ... and in response
to that, then I felt it was necessary for us to try to respond to
the question." 561
From Brennan's point of view, the problem was much broader
than foreign influence. He explained:
I think you have to look at the social, political, and economic
complexities that were related, which built tremendous
pressures on the ·White House, and these, I think, stem
from the thousands of bombings, the arsons, the disruptions,
the disorder. Our academic communities were being totally
disrupted, and I think that a vast majority of American people
were subjecting the representatives of Congress and ...
the White House staff and other people in Government to
a great deal of pressure, as to why these things were taking
place and why something wasn't being done about these, and
I think in a broader context, then, the FBI was getting a
tremendous amount of pressure from the White House, in re- '
sponse to the overall problem. 562
In addition to these outside pressures, FBI intelligence officials themselves
had their own reasons for conducting extensive intelligence investigations.
This view is illustrated in the following testimony when
Brennan was asked about decisions expanding intelligence coverage
in the fall of 1970 :
I believerd] that the leaders of the New Left movement had
publicly professed their determination to act to overthrow
the government of the United States. And I felt that with
them on public record as having this basic objective, anyone
who joi~ed in membership in their cause, possibly should
have theIr names recorded for future reference in FBI files.
And I was reminded of the circumstances of the 1930's, when
a great deal of individuals, who at that time were involved
and concerned as a result of the economic depression, they
became involved with communist activities.
A great deal of communist cells developed, and many of the
individuals who, at that time, were in colleges, subsequently
were employed in sensitive positions of government, and
government had no record of their previous communist involvement.
I did not want to see a repetition of that sort of
circumstances come about. .
So that when individuals did profess themselves to be in
adherence to concepts which aimed at, or called for the over-
... C. D. Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 104.
561 Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 107.
... Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2. p. 108.
525
throw of the government, I did feel that the FBI had the responsibility
to record that type of information so if they ever
obtained sensitive government positions that could be made
known, and known to the agency for which they were going
to go to work.563
Brennan admitted that this policy meant putting greater emphasis
on FBI domestic intelligence and less on counterintelligence operations
directed at hostile foreign intelligence activities in the lTnitecl
States. He stated, "I personally felt that the domestic situation had a
higher priority at that particular given time." 564
Brennan advanced one additional reason for domestic intelligence
investigations, completely separate and apart from prevention or
prosecution of violent crime and maintenance of the government's
security against disloyal employees. He stated:
I think that basically intelligence investigations are designed
not specifically for prosecutive intent, but basically to develop
intelligence information which will be provided to
officials of the United States Government to enable them to
possibly consider ne'w types of legislation which may be affecting
the security of the country....565 [Emphasis added.]
This "pure intelligence" function meant that even if Congress had not
made an activity a Federal crime, the FBI could be authorized to
investigate it so that the President and Congress could consider making
it a crime.
J. Inte1UJijicati01UJ After the 1970 "Huston Plan."
There are several dimensions to the expansion of FBI domestic
intelligence operations during the fall of 1970, in the aftermath of
the "Huston Plan." Field offices were instructed in mid-September
"to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing new
productive informants ,vho can infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations,
their collectives, communes and staffs of their underground
newspapers." Specifically implementing one of the provisions of the
"Huston Plan," the FBI authorized its field offices "to develop student
security and racial informants who are 18 years of age or older."
This removal of the previous restriction on recruiting informants
under the age of twenty-one presented the field "with a tremendous
opportunity to expand your coverage." 566
Futher intensifications occurred following a series of conferences
held at FBI headquarters for domestic intelligence supervisors from
the field. There is some dispute as to whether the decisions made at
this time were the result of the recommendations made at these conferences,
of an attempt by FBI executives to implement certain elements
of the "Huston Plan," or of Director Hoover's desire to increase
caseloacl statistics in order to justify a larger appropriation for the
FBI. All three factors contributed to some extent.
The head of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, William C.
Sullivan, was promoted in the summer of 1970 to be Assistant to the
... Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 117.
.., Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 117.
560 Brennan, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 10l.
.... SAC Letter 70-48, 9/15/70.
526
Director in charge of all investigative and intelligence activities. His
successor as Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelligence Division
was Charles D. Brennan, previously chief of the Internal Security
Section. Both men had participated in drafting the "Huston Plan"
and were now in positions of greater influence within the Bureau.
Brennan has testified that their success in persuading the FBI
Executives' Conference to expand domestic intelligence coverage was
partly due to "budgetary considerations." He stated:
I believe ... that the Bureau of the Budget had questioned
the Bureau's appropriation request, pointing to a drop in what
was categorized as certain types of security cases, and apparently
it involved a practice whereby there were cases listed
which consisted mostly of name checks and the like, and
because of this apparent drop in security cases, the budget
question [was] whether or not the Bureau's request for
appropriations was consistent. And this, as I understand, was
the basis on which they suddenly saw a need to open a
number or more cases.561
The relationship between the "Huston Plan" and the intensification
programs in the fall of 1970 was described 'by Mr. Brennan in the following
exchange with Committee counsel:
Mr. BRENNAN. The Huston Plan really had nothing to do
with it. What was essential here was the recognition of what
was taking place inside the country and the recognition of
the individuals, whether the Division, whose responsibility it
was to cope with the growing violence, to recommend the types
of action and programs which they thought necessary to cope
with the problem.
Q. Well, let me ask this question another way. Did these
programs emanate from Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, or any other
part of the Bureau, except the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
• 2
SlOn. .
Mr. BRENNAN. Definitely not. They emanated from indio
viduals within the Domestic Intelligence Division with the
exception of the opening of a number of cases which you mentioned,
which were the subject of the discussion at the Executive
Conference.
Q. But, on the whole, it represented an effort by intelligence
professionals who recognized what they perceived to be the
extreme nature of the domestic violence in this country.
Mr. BRENNAN. Right, definitely.
Q. And these same individuals would have been much happier
if the Huston Plan had been implemented at the same
time. Is that correct?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I think so. The general feeling was that
there was a greater need for the types of sophisticated techniques
which had been eliminated. This would have given us
a greater capacity to cope with the problem.
Q. This program was the next best thing. Is that correct?
Mr. BRENNAN. Well, you did everything that you did con-
661 Brennan, 9/23/75, pp. 31-32.
527
sistent with your continuing determination to try to do your
job.
Q. And this was done in spite of Mr. Hoover and some of
the top executives of the FBI.
:Mr. BREXXAX. ~Iostly, I think, it was done oyer their
grudging acquiescence.568
The decisions of the FBI Executive Conference increasing the
domestic intelligence caseload were recorded in the following memorandum:
Lifting of existing moratorium 01t report writing and investigation
of Priority II a:nd Pri01ity III, Security Index
cases.
There are approximately 10,690 individuals currently included
in Priority II and Priority III of the Security Index.
Virtually no investigation has been conducted regarding approximately
6,924 of these individuals since the imposition of
the moratorium in February, 1969. Many of these in~ividuals
have changed residence and/or employment and theIr whereabouts
are unknown. To fulfill our current responsibilities,
we should know where they are. . . .
Black Student Unions and similar group8 on college campuses.
In 1967, black students began fonning their own groups to
project their demands, many of which indicate a commitment
to black nationalism. These groups are autonomous and have a
strong sense of common purpose. The Black Panther Party
has made open efforts to organize the Black Student Unions
nationally and other black extremist groups have used these
org-anizations to project their extremism and separatism.
Campus disorders involving black students increased 23
percent in the 1969-1970 school year over the previous year
indicating that these groups represent a real potential for violence
and disruption. In the past, we have opened cases on
these organizations following evidence of black extremist activities;
however, ,in view of the vast increase in violence on
college campuses, it is felt that every Black Student Union
and similar group, regardles8 of their past or present involvement
in disorders, should be the subject of a discreet
preliminary inquiry through established sources and informants
to determine background. aims and purposes, leaders and
key activists. It is estimated that this would cause the field to
open approximately 4.000 cases involving organizations and
the key activists and leaders connected therewith. [Emphasis
added.]
Students for a Democratic Society (SDB) and militant
New Left campus organizations.
At t,he end of the 1969-1970 academic year, the various
factions of the SDS. excluding the Weatherman faction,
which has become an organization in its own right, consisted
of a membership of approximately 2,500 individuals. In addition
to the SDS groups, there are about 252 totally inde-
60S Brennan, 9/23/75, pp. 29-31.
528
pendent groups on college campuses which are pro-communist
New Left-type and are followers of the SDS ideology.
It is estimated that the membership of these organizations
consists of about 4,000 members. At the present time, we are
conducting investi~ations of all these organizations but have
not, in the past, mitiated investigations of the individual
members of such organizations, with the exceptions of the
key activists and individuals who are known to be violence
prone.
Major campuses across the nation have been completely
disrupted by violent demonstrations, bombings, arsons and
other terroristic acts perpetrated by these organizations. It is,
therefore, proposed that cases be opened on all i1Ulimiduals
belonging to such organizations to determine whether they
have a propensity for violence. If this proposal were implemented,
it is estImated that the field would be required to
open approximately 6,500 new cases.569 [Emphasis added.]
Subsequent instructions to the field regarding Black Student Unions
stressed the need to "target informants and sources to develop information
regarding these groups on a continuing basis to fulfill our responsibilities
and to develop such coyerage where none exists.570
The directive on New Left campus groups stated, in part:
As you are aware, SDS and other similar subversive campusoriented
groups are clearly symbolic of violence and MarxistLeninist
revolution on the Nation's campuses. As their intent
has crystallized, the adherence to this phiW80phy of revolution
and violence is, of necessity, more inherent among
members and followers. These groups are undoubtedly the
breeding ground for revolutionaries. extremists and terrorists.
Logic and good judgment should be used in these investigations,
bearing in mind the objective is to identify potential
and actual extremists, revolutionaries and terrorists and to
.assess their threat to the internal security of the Government.
[Emphasis added.]
Field offices were also reminded, "Each individual investigated should
be considered for inclusion on the Security Index." 571
The Domestic Intelligence Division convened a conference of
racial intelHgence supervisors from the field in late October 1970. In
preparation for this conference, Division officials and Assistant to the
Director Sullivan proposed that a Justice Department representative
be invited to attend a session on the Black Panther Partv. The chief
of the Racial Intelligence Section explained: •
One of our primary objectives in the investigation of the
BPP is to develop information which could be used to prosecute
the Party and its leaders. The Department has had in
operation for little over a year a special task force looking into
all phases of BPP operations and currently is presenting evi-
... Memorandum from Executives Conference to Mr. Tolson, 10/29/70.
m ~rpmorandum from FBI Headqnarters to all SAC's, 11/4/70.
571 :Uemorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 11/4/70.
529
dence to a Federal Grand .Jury looking towards indictments
of BPP leaders on Smith Act violations. 'We have not received
any concrete information from the Department which would
indicate prosecutions are imminent.
The Section Chief added "that these discussions will impress the
Departmental representative as to our seriousness in our efforts to put
the violent BPP leaders in jail as quickly as possible." Assistant to the
Director Sullivan appended a note stating, "The Department needs
to be not only educated to some of the ugly realities of the Black
Panthers, but also the Department needs to be pushed into getting
some prosecutive action underway. People about the country are beginning
to wonder why something isn't being done." The proposal
was rejected. Associate Director Clyde Tolson wrote, "I doubt the
wisdom of this." And Director Hoover noted, "I agree with Tolson." 572
One of the recommendations growing out of the confereJIlce was a
revision of the Agitator Index, which was described as "a ready
reference to individuals who have demonstrated a propensity for
fomenting disorder of racial and/or security nature." The Agitator
Index was viewed as "a valuable and necessary administrative tool,"
although it was observed that the Justice Department had "not been
advised as to the establishment of the AI." Since many of the "extremist
and revolutionary" individuals on the Agitator Index were
now included in the Security Index, however, field offices were instructed
to delete persons on the Security Index from the Agitator
Index.573
There was serious concern at the conference about the contemporaneous
events in Canada, where terrorist activities in Quebec had
led the Canadian government to impose a state of emergency and
suspend certain legal guarantees. Of equal concern were the reports
that at least one antiwar group in the United State&-the East Coast
Conspiracy to Save Lives, involving Father Philip Berrigan-was
considering the kidnaping of American government officials. Summarizing
the conference results, the head of the Racial Intelligence
Section stated,
The conference was most timely and productive in light of
the present terroristic activities in Canada and the imminent
concern of the 1Vhite House concerning the probability of
extremist groups taking action against Government officials
or their families.
The topics discussed at the conrerence covered the entire
spectrum of the problems inherent in investigating and developing
informants in the BPP as well as related extremist
matters. These topics included detailed discussion concerning
the need for full penetration or extremist groups to obtain
information coneerning terroristlc activities which may be
aimed against Government officials. In addition, the conference
took note that maximum attention should be given to the
67' Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 9/22/70.
'" Memorandum from G. C. )Ioore til C. n. Brennan. 11/3/70; SAC Letter Xo.
70-64, 11/10/70.
530
extremist activities in Canada in connection with our investigations
as well as intensifying our investigations having
international ramifications. . ..574
The conference also reviewed COINTELPRO operations directed
against black extremists:
Our experience over the past year and the growth. of our
knowledge regarding black extremist activities have resulted
in utilization of increasing number of sophisticated techniques....
Among highly successful tangible results realized
during the past year, as a result of this program, were
the disbandment of a Black Panther Party (BPP) front
group in ... Mississippi; the transfer of an energetic organizer
and key leader of the . . . BPP chapter to a less
influential post ... ; and the complete 'disruption of a
planned conference of the violence-prone Republic of New
Africa....575
Following the conference, FBI intelligence officials developed
a Key Black Extremist program for concentrated investigation and
COINTELPRO operations. The program was justified in the
following terms:
The information submitted by the field indicates that there
is a need for intensified coverage on a group of black extremists
who are either key leaders or activists and are particUlarly
extreme, agitative, anti-Govern~nt, and vocal in their
calls for te1'1'ori8m and violence. Leaders of the violenceprone
Black Panther Party have indicated that the "revolution"
is entering the beginning phases of actual armed struggle
and our investigations indicate there are certain extremists
more likely to resort to or to order terrorism as a
tactic and therefore require particular attention. [Emphasis
added.]
FBI officials envisioned that about ninety cases would be involved. 578
All field offices were sent a list of Key Black Extremists (KBEs)
and instructed to "remain alert for additions to the KBE list." The
following measures were to be taken:
(1) All KBEs must be included in Priority I of the
Security Index....
(2) All KBEs must be included in the Black Nationalist
Photograph Album (BNPA) ....
(3) All aspects of the finances of a KBE must be determined.
Bank accounts must be monitored. Safe deposit boxes,
investments, and hidden assets must be located and available
information regarding them must be reported.
(4) Continuing consideration must be given by each office
to develop means to neutralize the effectiveness of each KBE.
Any counterintelligence proposal must be approved by the
Bureau prior to implementation.
074 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 10/27/70.
ll75l\Iemorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 10/29/70.
516 )'lpmorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 12/22/70.
531
(5) Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each KBE
to be placed in the National Security File in the Laboratory....
(6) Particular efforts should be made to obtain records of
and/or reliable witnesses to, inflammatory statements made
which may subsequently become subject to criminal
proceedings....
(7) Where there appears to be a possible violation of a
statute within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau,
the ... possible violation [should be] vigorously investigated
in accordance with existing instructions.
(8) Particular attention must be paid to travel by a KBE
and every effort made to determine financial arrangements
for such travel. ...
(9) The Federal income tax returns of all KBEs must
be checked annually in accordance with existing instructions.
R.eports on all KBEs were to be submitted every ninety days, and
the field offices were urged to use "initiative and imagination in order
that the desired results are achieved." 577
K. The 1971 ImpectionReports
The annual inspection of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division
in January 1971 reflected the increasing intensification of FBI domestic
surveillance programs. The role of the Inspection Division
was to encourage more aggressive measures. One example involved
the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL), the group associated
with Father Philip Berrigan which allegedly had planned to
kidnap government officials. Inspector E. S. Miller advised the Domestic
Intelligence Division:
The field should be appropriately instructed to keep the
Bureau fully advised of all demonstrations, vigils, harassment
tactics, etc., conducted by sympathetic groups and followers
of the ECCSL. Such vigils and demonstrations should
be afforded sufficient appropriate coverage to develop identities
and backgrounds of leading activists and sponsors of such
sympathetic activities.
Field offices should also be alerted to other retaliatory actions
by sympathetic groups attempting to capitalize on the
"persecution" theory thereby exploiting the recent indictments
as a sympathetic rallying point for more conspiratorial
activities.578
The Inspector also recommended using the facilities of the FBI
Identification Division and the computerized National Crime Information
Center for intelligence purposes in locating members of the
Venceremos Brigade (VB) who had visited Cuba:
While no evidence has been received that those persons who
travel to Cuba received g'uerrilla warfare training in Cuba,
they were constantly told that they were the vanguard of the
Revolution in the United States....
57T Memorllndum from FBI HeadQuarters to all SAC's. 12/23/70.
67. Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 118--26/71, p. 7.
532
Inasmuch as some of the VB members have indicated they
were going underground and the fact that a majority have
not been located for interview, you should consider placing
name stops in the Identification Division so that if these persons
are arrested or an inquiry is made by local law enforcement
authorities, this fact will be immediately brought to the
attention of the Bureau. In addition, a stop file is now being
set up by the NOlO Unit for persons other than fugitives
concerning whom the Bureau has an interest.... Every effort
should be made to utilize stops with the Identification Division
and the NOlO Unit on these persons.579
This proposal was implemented shortly thereafter and the field advised
"to submit stop notices for Identification Division and NOIC,
concerning Venceremos Bri~ade (VB) subjects whose whereabout
are not known...." 580 Although Inspector Miller criticized to
some extent the Domestic Intelligence Division's shortcomings in the
foreign counterintelligence field, he placed great emphasis on the opportunities
in the domestic area:
You should bear in mind that the attitude and instructions
expressed by the President, the Director, and many of the legislators
in Congress, have been to curtail the militant actions
and violent activities on the part of a significant group of
young people in the United States today. The thinking of the
Supreme Court of the United States with its several recent
changes may be along the lines of suppressing the activities of
those who openly espouse the overthrow of all forms of democratic
authority in the United States. In addition, the Internal
Security Division of the Department of Justice has 'been
specifically enlarged and strengthened to deal with these
matters. 581
The details of many of the FBI's most disruptive OOINTELPRO
operations were set out in the Inspection Report as significant "accomplishments"
of the Domestic Intelligence Division.
Among additional measures taken in 1971 were the following, as
summarized in the next Inspection Report prepared in August~
September:
In March, 1971, a coalition of leftist individuals including
subversives and extremists under the sponsorship of the
Olergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, American
Friends Service Committee, and Fellowship of Reconciliation
traveled to Paris, where they were in contact with the North
Vietnamese and other elements antagonistic to the U.S. We
developed two informants to participate in this travel and as
a result, identified all 170 people in attendance, their activities,
contacts, and objectives. All information developed was afforded
dissemination to appropriate government agencies and
5'9 Inspection Rl?port, Dome!<tic Intelligencl? Division, 1/1"--26/71, pp. 234-236.
IillO Memorandum from R. L. Shackelford to C. D. Brennan, 3/9/7l.
081 Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 1/8--26/71, p. 239.
533
we were commended by one intelligen~ agency for the excellent
coverage. 582
Through the Key Activist Program, we have focused investigative
attention on the leaders of the New Left Movement
with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate
statutes, federal or local, wherever possible. This program
has proved successfnl in that we have been able to follow
closely the activities of these individuals and furnish interested
agencies and high government officials with information
concerning their subversive and agitational activities. Of particular
note is the fact that more than half of the 73 individuals
designated as Key Activitists are subjects of some type
of prosecutive action. 583
Extremist intelligence information gathered throug-h our
informants and investig-ations makes up a major portion of
the Bureau's sophisticated document which is disseminated
to the 'White House and other high level government agencies.
This document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist
Activities" furnishes the 'White House and other agencies
with a digest of the extremist problem in the United States.584
By airtel to all offices dated 6/15/71 the field WaS advised
that a new "Stop Index" program had been instituted in the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This program
is for Bureau use only and concerns extremists who are in
Priority I of the Security Index and who are not already carriedin
the NCIC wanted persons file. Through this program,
the field obtains prompt notice from NCIC by telephone
whenever a police agency makes inquiry concerning one of
these extremists, which enables the field to better follow the
activities and movements of extremists.
By SAC Letter 71-37 (E) dated 8/10/71 captioned "Security
Flash Notices Regarding Security Index Subjects~"
the field was advised of new procedures which enable the
Identification Division to better disseminate arrest information
on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints
are on file in the Identification Division. This is accomplished
by periodic submission by the field of Security Flash Notices
... which determine if fingerprints of a Security Index
subject have been received since the last check and if so, a
stop is placed in the fingerprint record to assure that the field
is advised of all subsequent fingerprint submissions. The Security
Flash Notice is periodically submitted at different intervals
depending on the priority of the subject's Security
Index status. 585
582 Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 34.
""" Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 56.
'" Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence DiYision, 8/17-9/9/71. p. 72.
68S Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 104.
534
New University Conference (NUC)
The NUC, composed of radical professors, graduate students,
and teachers, is committed to the growth of a revolutionary
socialist movement in the U.S., with educational institutions
and professional associations being their main targets.
In Bureau airtel 6/4/71, the attention of Chicago Division,
Office of Origin, was directed to the fact that the ~LJC
claimed 42 national chapters plus 15 pre-chapter groupings,
with 675 national members, and anticipated further expansion.
Chicago Division was instructed to ensure appropriate
leads were set out to confirm the existence of all NUC chapters
and to conduct appropriate investigations in accordance
with Bureau instructions relating to investigations of organizations
connected with institutions of learning. It was further
instructed these investigations should include information
concerning the leaders and leading activists, aims and objectives
and the activities of these chapters.58G
Viet7/D,m Veterans Against the War (VVA W)
Letter to all offices dated 8/3/71 instructed each office to
initiate a survey to determine existence of VVAW. This
action was necessary in the light of increasing indication that
the VVAW may be a target for infiltration by subversive
groups such as the Communist Party USA and the Socialist
Workers Party and their respective youth groups. VVAW
has also been involved in aiding and financing U.S. deserters,
including false identity papers and reportedly in one area has
a cache of arms. VVAW has become increasingly active in
the antiwar field and must be considered a prime target for
infiltration.587
Computerized Telephone Number File (CTNF) was expanded.
on 2/26/71, to include telephone numbers of black,
New Left, and other ethnic extremists. As a result, black extremist
groups, black extremist Security Index subjects, and
individuals included in the Black Nationalist Photograph
Album have been entered into the CTNF. This has proven
to be extremely valuable investigative tool and has saved the
field considerable investigative tIme in ascertaining subscribers
of telephone numbers since "hits" are made on 15.5% of
numbers checked against the file. 588
During 1971, Assistant to the Director Sullivan and Assistant
Director Brennan made proposals for major reorganization of the
Domestic Intelligence Division, Sullivan suggested that it be divided
into two separate divisions-one for Domestic Intelligence (including
a New Left Section, an Extremist Intelligence Section, and an Internal
Security Section) and the other for Counterespionage-Foreign
Intelligence. In addition, Brennan proposed that supervision of spe-
... Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division 8/17-9/9/71. p. 107.
587 Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 111.
588 Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-919171, p. 127.
535
cific .antiriot and bombing criminal investigations be transferred from
the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division.
These recommendations were examined in the second 1971 Inspection
Report.
Regarding the proposal for two separate divisions, Assistant Director
Brennan stated that the advantage of having "smaller divisions
thus allowing for tighter and more effective supervision" vms outweighed
by the disadvantages: .
(a) The nature of the work of DID does not readily lend
itself to division. The interrelationship of foreign influence in
domestic subversion cases is well established and requires close
coordination within the Division.... Our goal should be to
obtain maximum utilization of the knowledge and expertise of
supervisory personnel, and division of DID would obviously
result in diffusion of related talents....
(b) Budgetary considerations and administrative efficiency
would be affected by imposing an additional Divisional superstructure.
. ..
Brennan noted that when Sullivan had originally made the proposal
in a memorandum to Associate Director Tolson in June 1971, Director
Hoover had noted, "I do not approve. 'Ve do not have any provision
for another Assistant Director and all hearings before Budget Bureau
and Congress have been concluded for Fiscal Year 1972." 589
Assistant Director Brennan's proposal for shifting bombing oases
was not a new one. In 1968, the Inspection Division had conducted a
study of the desirability of transferring antiriot and bombing investigations
from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence
Division. The two divisions had jointly proposed the shift
because the sI?ecific criminal investigations in these areas were "so
interrelated WIth the gathering of intelligence in the racial and security
fields that overlap constantly occurs." The Inspection Division had
endorsed the transfer:
The logic of the proposed reassignments, appears unassailable.
In both categories of cases the principle involved is the
same, namely, that individual violations of applicable statutes
arising from the a.ctivities of subversive organizations or
groups should be supervised within the same division (DID)
that has the basic and continuing responsibility for supervision
of the overall investigations of these organizations and
groups as well as of the members thereof and the development
of informants within the groups. The obvious benefit ... is
the avoidance of duplication of supervisory reviews of these
interrelated mutters and the ready identification of individuals
who may be involved in a specific violation with persons
already under investigation from an intelligence standpoint.
Informants who may be utilized in specific violations or who
are developed in the course of investigation of such violations
must of necessity be closely correlated with the supervision of
these informant programs which now rests with DID....590
"" Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, pp. 216-223.
"" Memorandum from W. aI. Fl'lt to Mr. Tolson, Re: Proposed Transfer of
Supervisory Responsibility, 8/30/68.
536
Despite this general agreement among middle-level FBI executives,
the 1968 recommendation was not implemented. Associate Di~tor
Tolson and Director Hoover were "opposed to this proposed transfer
of duties." One consideration which weighed against the shift was that
the Justice Department divided supervision of these criminal cases:
"antiriot cases are handled in the Criminal Division of the Department,
racial bombings in the Civil Rights Division and nationalist
bombings in the Internal Security Division." 591
By 1971 the Justice Department had consolidated these responsibilities.
Assistant Director Brennan pointed out that the Department
had "moved to invest the Internal Security Division with the overall
responsibility of prosecuting terrorist activities regarding above-mentioned
matters." Consequently, he contended that "similar reorganization"
within the FBI would "enhance more effective supervision."
Assistant Director Rosen of the General Investigative Division
agreed.:
As a practical matter substantially all antiriot laws investigations
involve extremists and political terrorists. With regard
to bombings, substantially all investigations deal at the outset
with unknown subjects and it would be most impractical to
attempt to delineate between bombings which do or do not involve
terrorists. Since the act of bombing is in itself an act
of terror it is logical to assume at the outset that terrorists are
involved and the types of bombings delegated to the FBI by
the Department's guidelines are limited to those targets most
likely to be selected by political terrorists. (These targets pertain
to Government property or functions, federally funded
projects, diplomatic establishments, colleges and UnIversities,
and those probably perpetrated by terrorists.) 592
The joint recommendation of Assistant Directors Brennan and Rosen
was carried out later in 1971, and the unit in the General Investigative
Division which supervised bombing investigations was transferred to
the Domestic Intelligence Division.593
L. The "New" Internal Security Di-vision and Turmoil in the FBI,
1971.
In late 1970, the Justice Department's Intelligence Evaluation
Committee was secretly reconstituted as a permanent body including
officials from the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Agency. This reorganization implemented one feature of the
"Huston Plan," and the new lEe assumed broader functions in
preparing regular domestic intelligence evaluations for the White
House.594 The creation of a new IEC was one of several measures
taken in late 1970 and early 1971 by Assistant Attorney General Robert
Mardian, who replaced J. Walter Yeagley as head of the Internal
51" Memorandum from W. M. Felt to Mr. Tolson, 9/4/68.
59'J Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division. 8/17-9/9/71. pp. 224-238.
"'" Assistant Director Rosen's reference to Justice Department guidelines pertained
to an agreement bf'tween thf' Justice Department and the Bureau of Alcohol.
Tobacco, and Firearms of the Trpasury Dpllartment definin~ their l'Pspective
jurisdictions under the antibombing legislation enacted in 1970.
SIlo See Report on the Hust~n Plan.
537
Security Division. Under Mardian the Internal Security Division took
over from the Criminal Division the supervision of prosecutions in
cases of extremist violence and Selective Service violations.
One of Assistant Attorney General Mardian's most significant actions
in 1971, from the viewpoint of domestic intelligence, was the
preparation of a new Executive Order on federal employee security.
Its first purpose was to update the standaTds for evaluating the "subversive
activity" of potential Federal employees. In addition, the
order was designed to reinvigorate the Subversive Activities Control
Board, which had been created by the Internal Security Act of 1950
to register Communist organizations and their members.595 The Supreme
Court had declared the provision for registration of individuals
unconstitutional as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination
in 1965.596 According to Assistant Attorney General Mardian,
there was a "problem resulting from the fact that the Attorney General's
list has not been updated for 17 years-a failure which required
Federal agencies to individually evaluate information regardin~
membership in allegedly subversive organizations based on raw data
furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other governmental
sources." Mardian expected that the SAeB would be able to
"deal specifically with the revolutionary/terrorist organizations which
have recently become a part of our history." 597
FBI intelligence investigations of organizations were based in
part on the standards for the "Attorney General's list" under
Executive Order 10450, issued hy President Eisenhower in 1953. Consequently.
the new Executive Order 11605 issued by President Nixon
in 1971, amending Executive Order 104ilO, substantially redefined FBI
authority. The basic definitions of "subversive" organizations in the
two orders compare as follows:
Executive Order lO4JjO (1953)
... totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or having
adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission
of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under
the Constitution of the United States, or seeking to alter
the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional
means.
Executive Order 11605 (1971)
... totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or which
has adopted a policy of unlawfully advocating the commission
of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State,
or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United
States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful
means. [Emphasis added.]
... The new order assigned to the Suhversive Activities Control Board the function
of designating org.anizations for what had been the "Attorney General's list,"
to be used in evaluating applicants for Federal employment.
... Albertl!on v. Subverl!ive Activitie8 Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965) .
.., Robert C. Mardian, Address before the Atomic Energy Commission Security
Conference, Washington, D.C.. 10/27/71.
538
The 1971 order was more restrictive in its requirement of "unlawful"
advocacy, but it was far broader in extending to state and local matters.
The breadth of the order is shown in its more detailed standards
for designation of an organization by the SACB. A group could be
put on the "SACB list" if it:
engages in, unlawfully advocates, or adopts as a means of
obtaining any of its purposes or objectives-
(1) The commission of acts of force or violence or other
unlawful acts to deny others their rights or benefits guaranteed
by the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
the several States or political subdivisions thereof; or
(2) The unlawful damage or destruction of property; or
injury to persons; or
(3) The overthrow or destruction of the government of
the United States or the government of any State, Territory,
district, or possession thereof, or the government of any
political subdivision therein, by unlawful means; or
(4) The commission of acts which violate laws pertaining
to treason, rebellion, or insurrection, riots or civil disorders,
seditious conspiracy, sabotage, trading with the enemy,
obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service of the
United States, impeding officers of the United States, or
related crimes or offenses.598
Testifying before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, Assistant
Attorney General Mardian linked the new order directly with
FBI investigations: "We have a new brand of radical in this country
and we are trying to address ourselves to the new situation. With
the investigative effort of the FBI we hope to present petitions to
the Board in accordance with requirements of the Executive Order." 599
FBI intdligence officials anticipated that the Executive Order
would have a substantial impad on their operations,as indicated in
the Inspection Report:
The im:plement'ation of Executive Order 11605 will affect
primarily the work of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence
Section and Intemal Security Section....
So far, the Department has indicated that it intends to
initirute proceeding.;; against the Black Panther Party: Progressive
lJabor Party, Young Soci'alist Alliance, and Ku Klux
Klan; however, we have not 'as yet had any specific requirements
levied upon by the Department in these cases. Based
on past experience, it can be anticipated the services of one
supervisor, full time, will be required to prepare each of these
cases for presenblJtion to the SACB.
The language of Executive Order 11605 is very broad and
generally coincides with the basis for our investigation of
extremist groups. ConceiV'ably, consistent with manpower
available, proceedings could be initiated on most of the or-
60S Executive Order 11605, 7/2/71.
... Hearings on the Appropriation for the Department of Justice before the
House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 673 (1972).
539
ganizations we have under investigation although the Department
has not indicated ilIt this time that they will undertake
'any wholesale action.6oo
From the outset the Executive Order was the subject of serious criticism
in the United States Senate, primarily on the ground that the
President did not have the power to assign this new function to a
Board created by statute to perform different duties. Congress ultimately
refused to appropriate funds for the implemenbartion of the
order. Nevertheless, the order's provision broadening the definition
of "subversive" groups still remained in effect as the standard for
evaluating prospective federal employees and for FBI investigations
conducted for the federal employee security program.
Hearings on Army surveillance before the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights in the spring of 1971, and the furor over the
SACB order, marked the beginning of a change in the climate of opinion
regarding domestic intelligence. In this environment Director
Hoover and his top .associates expressed growing concern over the close
relationship established by Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan
and other FBI intelligence officials with Assistant Attorney General
Mardian in the Justice Department.
A memorandum of an Executives Conference meeting in June
1971 exemplifies the increasing tensions within the FBI. Director
Hoover's "instructions relative to being very careful in our dealings
with Assistant Attorney General Mardian" were pointed out. It was
made clear that Assistant Director Dwight Dalbey of the Office of
Legal Counsel was to attend "at any time officials of the Department
are being contacted on any policy consideration which affects the Burean."
It was specifically noted "that this was not done in connection
with a recent conference held between Supervisors of the Domestic Intelligence
Division and Deputy Assistant Attorney General A. William
Olsen of the Internal Security Division of the Department at
which time discussion ensued as to proposed changes in procedure
requesting Attorney General authority for electronic surveillance." 601
The conflicts within the FBI that had been muted at the time of the
"Huston Plan" in 1970 were now coming into the open.
One of the issues which triggered the break between Director
Hoover and Assistant to the Director Sullivan had little to do with
domestic intelligence. Instead, it involved an expansion of the number
of FBI Legal Attache offices abroad. The details of the controversy
need not be reviewed here. 'What is most significant is that five days
after the Executives Conference meeting described above, Sullivan
began expressing strong opposition to the program for expanding
Legal Attache offices.6M Director Hoover solicited the views
600 Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71.
001 Executiws Conference Memorandum, 6/2/71. The first Assistant Director
for the Office of Legal Counsel was Dwight Dalbey, who had for years been in
charge of the legal training of Bureau agents. Dalbey's elevation early in 1971.
and Hoover's requirement that he re"iew all legal aspects of FBI policy, including
intelligence matters, were major changes in Bureau procedure. (Memorandum
from Hoover to all Bureau Offidals and Supenisors. 3/8/71.)
""" )Iemor;mdnm from 'V. C. Snlliyan tn Mr. Tnlson. Re: Eatimated Coat of
PropOacd Empanaion of Foreign LiaMon, June 7, 1971.
69-984 0 - 76 - 35
540
of other FBI officials, who supported the expansion. Sullivan then
replied most forcefully, making the following statements among
others:
I have read the comments of the above-named men. It
was somewhat more than mildly distressing and saddening
to me to observe the lack of objectivity, originality, and
independent thinking in their remarks. The uniformity and
monolithic character of their thinking constitutes its own
rebuttal. While I am certain it was not the intention of these
important Bureau officials, who occupy unique roles, to create
the impression in the reader's mind that they said what they
did because they thought this was what the Director wanted
them to say, nevertheless it seems to me this is the impression
conveyed.
. . . [T]he evidence points to the fact that, because of
racial conflict, student and academic revolution, and possible
increase in unemployment, this country is heading into ever
more troubled waters, and the Bureau had better be fully prepared
to cope with the difficulties which lie ahead. This cannot
be done if we spread ourselves too thin and finance operations
which do not ¢ve us proper returns for the dollars
spent....
Lastly, I am not unmindful of the fact that the Director
pointed out that we could get along quite well without an
expensive domestic liaison section and, therefore, he dissolved
it. Applying the Director's reasoning foreign liaison,
I think certainly the conclusion is valid that we can at least
reduce it, with benefits to the Bureau.GOa
The final passage had reference to Director Hoover's decisions in 1970,
first, to a:bolish the position of FBI liaison officer with the CIA,
and then to eliminate the entire FBI Liaison Section dealing with
other federal agencies.G04
Upon reviewing Sullivan's second memorandum. one high FBI
official advised Director Hoover that it apPeared "more definite to
me that he is more on the side of CIA. State Department and Military
Intelligence Agencies, than the FBI." This official added. "There has
to be something wrong for him to do such an abrupt about face at this
time, after agreeing with what we have done in the past and now
being unalterably opposed to any further expansion...." 605
Within less than a month, Director Hoover had appointed ·W. Mark
Felt, formerly Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division,
to a newly created position as Sullivan's superior. During this period,
Sullivan gave Assistant Attorney General Mardian the FBI's
documents recording the authorization for and dissemination of information
from certain wiretaps placed on executive officials and journalists
during 1969-1971. The absence of these materials was not dis-
... Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to the Director. Re: FBI Foreign Lia.ison
Program, 6/16/71.
... See report on the Huston Plan.
.... R. R. Beaver, Memorandum for the Director's Personal Files, Re: W. C.
Sullivan, 6/18/71.
541
covered by other FBI officials until after Sullivan was forced to
resign in September 1971.606
Additional friction within the FBI developed in mid-1971 during
the investigation of the "Pentagon Papers" matter and Daniel
Ellsberg.
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan of the Domestic Intelligence Division
considered the "Pentagon Papers" case a matter of overriding
importance, especially in view of the 1Vhite House interest. Brennan's
views were summarized in an Inspection Report:
... [H]e commented upon the fact that the Ellsberg case
might be a landmark in historical significance in view of the
long range potential regarding governmental operations and
the FBI's role in relation thereto. He stated that the leak
in this case represented a deliberate and determined effort on
the part of certain individuals to seriously disrupt and destroy
the government's capacity to carry out effectively its
foreign policy in various areas. Mr. Brennan noted that the
past 15 to 20 years had witnessed the evolution of a new breed
of fanatics who were determined to disrupt and destroy
governmental operations and to alter this country's foreign
policy. He further noted that the movement supported by
these fanatics bordered on treason which must be dealt with
if our current form of government is to survive.
In early July 1971 Director Hoover advised his subordinates that
Presidential assistant H. R. Haldeman had called about the Ellsberg
case and said that the President wanted regular reports. A month
later, Assistant Director Brennan and other officials met with White
House aide Gordon Liddy, who was "coordinating all White House
interest in this matter." Liddy explained that the White House wanted
the case handled as a "Bureau special". Although the FBI devoted
substantial resources to the investigation, there was resistance to attempts
by Assistant Attorney General Mardian and the Internal Security
Division to direct the details of the FBI's inquiry.6Q7
Moreover, Assistant Director Brennan was removed from his position
in the course of the investigation. His replacement as Assistant
Director for the Domestic Intelhgence Division was Inspector E. S.
... Memor,andum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 5/13/73; FBI Summary of
Interriew with Robert Mardi-an, 5/10/73. William C. Sullivan stated that he
"turned over the matprial, following a discnssion in dppth with Mr. Mardian
relath'e to security and possible abuses of the material." (Memorandum from
W. C. Sullivan to Acting FBI Director Ruckelshaus, 5/11/73.) Robert Mardian
recalled that Sullh'an told him Directnr Hoorer "might use these tapes for the
purpose of preserving his position liS Director of the FBI." (Mardian testimony,
Senate Watergate Hearings, 7/20/73, p. 2393.)
Former Attornpy Gpnpral John Mitchpll recalled that Mardian had indicated
to him "that Sulliran was furious orer the way he was bping treated by the
Direetor and that for tllis reason he disclosed the information concerning the
wiretaps to Mardian." Mitchell also said that Director Hoorer had "advised him
of the problems he was having with SUllh"an," and Mitchell recalled "telling
Mr. Hoover that he had no choice but to get rid of Mr. Sullivan." (FBI interview
with John Mitchell, 5/12/73.)
fKJI Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, pp. 4-10.
542
Miller, who had conducted two inspections of the Division during
1971.601a
M. The "Administrative Index"
In the fall of 1971 the FBI confronted the prospect of the first serious
Congressional action which might curtail domestic intelligence
operations-repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950. The Inspection
Report completed in September 1971 viewed the possibility
of repeal without great alarm:
Legislation has been introduced in the 92d Congress to
repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. In the event Title II should
be repealed at a future date under new legislation, the Government's
inherent right to protect itself internally will continue
to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic responsibility
for protecting the Nation's internal security.60B [Emphasis
added.]
Congress passed the repeal measure shortly thereafter. FBI intelligence
officials began at once to consider the impact on the Security
Index program. They believed the Security Index should still be maintained
"since the 'potential dangerousness of subversives is probably
even greater now than before the repeal of the Act, since they no doubt
feel safer now to conspire in the destruction of this country." However,
they also saw a need to consult the Justice Department "to determine
if there is any manner in which the essence of the Security Index and
emergency detention of dangerous individuals could be utilized under
Presidential powers." 609
The argument for keeping the Security Index in the event of an
emergency was elaborated further:
Those listed now or included under existing criteria in the
future will continue to represent a potential danger to the national
defense. Should this country come under attack from
hostile forces, foreign or domestic, there is nothing to preclude
the President from going before a joint session of Congress
and requesting necessary authority to apprehend and detain
those who would constitute a menace to national defense. At
this point it would be absolutely essential to have an immediate
list, such as the SI, for use in making such apprehensions.
The SI, backed by our investigative files, would provide documentation
of subversive backgrounds during any hearings
which might be required following apprehensions.
""'. According to former FBI executive W. Mark Felt, Brennan was replaced as
a matter "of policy." The purpose was "to put someone else into that spot who
was not a protege of Sullivan," as a means of "controlling the Domestic Intelligence
Division." It was Felt's "understanding" that Director Hoover "felt
that Sullivan was out of hand."
Brennan was also disciplined for one aspect of his handling of the "Pentagon
Papers" investigation. According to Mark Felt, "Mr. Hoover was convinced that
Mr. Brennan deliberately disregarded his instructions" not to interview Louis
Marx, father-in-law of Daniel Ellsberg. Felt thought Brennan "got a bum rap"
and that "it was an honest error." (Felt, 2/3/76, pp. 67-71.)
... Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 98.
... Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to E. S. Miller, Re: Emergency Detention
Act, 9/17/71.
543
The Security Index also served useful purposes in connection with the
FBI's day-to-day intelligence operations:
The SI constitutes an extremely valuable list of subversives
and malcontents who constantly pose a threat to the safety of
the President. Secret Service is provided a constant flow of
data concerning current whereabouts and backgrounds of
individuals on the S1. In addition, the 81 would immediately
pinpoint for our own use the identities of subversives who
would require intensified investigative attention to provide
evidence of espionage, sabotage, or the like. . . .
Quarterly we have furnished Passport Office of State
Department a list of those on Priority I (the most potentially
dangerous) so that we can be advised of travel abroad by these
subjects. The list is not identified in any way as SI and since
it is beneficial to us, it is believed we should continue to send it.
Repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was not thought to
affect the basis for FBI investigative authority:
Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which relates
to Subversive Activities Control Board, strengthened by
Executive Order 11605 dated 7/2/71, provides investigative
authority as do Smith Act of 1940, Communist Control Act
of 1954, Fraud Against the Government, Rebellion and Insurrection,
Sedition and Seditious Conspiracy, among others.
However, FBI intelligence officials believed that the Bureau's "Office
of Legal Counsel should examine this more critically from a legal
standpoint." 610 Assistant Director D. J. Dalbey, head of the Office of
Legal Counsel, agreed that the repeal did not affect the FBI's "basic
investigative authority:"
Our basic investigative authority for this type of case is in
the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, which still
remains in effect, with updatings. In addition to that there is
a host of criminal statutes which are particularly applicable
to the type of action-oriented subversives with whom we now
deal. Principal subversives now carry guns, rob banks to get
money, steal arms and ammunition, commit arson, set off
bombs, incite riots, and do many other things which violate
one or more criminal statutes over which this Bureau has
investigative jurisdiction. From a combination of those statutes,
plus the original Presidential directive on internal security,
we have wide investigative authority.
Assistant Director Dalbey also endorsed the position of FBI intelligence
officials regarding the Security Index:
... [E]limination of the Emergency Detention Act does
not prevent this Bureau from carrying in its files an assessment
of each principal subversive which would be sufficient to
mark him for Government attention should a need arise in a
national emergency.
610 Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to E. S. Miller, Re: Emergency Detenti&n
Act, 9/21/71.
544
Bearing in mind that the Emergency Detention Act could
as easily be put back in force should an emergency convince
Congress of its need, this Bureau would then be expected to
have on hand the necessary action information pertaining to
individuals.
Nevertheless, the FBI's Legal Counsel strongly urged that "a letter
should be written to the Attorney General in which this Bureau asks
for a reassessment of our investig-ative and record-keeping- authority
concerning subversive matters." This would "protect" the FBI in case
"some spokesman of the extreme left" claimed that repeal of the Detention
Act did, in fact, eliminate the Bureau's investigative authority.6ll
FBI intelligence officials became increasingly concerned about possible
"charges by the Bureau's critics that we are evading the will of
Congress." They believed it was necessary to "get some written authority
from the Attorney General, not only to keep records which, in effect,
represent a workable substitute for the Security Index, but aiso serves
as a mandate for our continued investigation of subversive activity and
related matters." 612
Thereupon, a letter was sent to Attorney General Mitchell soliciting
his views "concerning FBI authority to continue investigations of subversive
activity covered, in part, by this [Emergency Detention] Act."
The letter cited as bases for continuing FBI authority the Smith Act,
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, the Communist Control
Act of 1954, statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, rebellion and
insurrection, sedition, and seditious conspiracy, as well as "certain
Presidential Directives." The line of Presidential directives from
:President Roosevelt's order of June 26, 1939, through President
Eisenhower's statement of December 15, 1953, was reviewed. The FBI
Director's letter concluded:
I strongly feel that irrespective of the repeal of the Emergency
Detention Act, the Federal Government must take
whatever steps are necessary, within the law, to protect itself
from all hostile forces bent on its destruction. We, therefore,
feel that it is absolutely incumbent upon the FBI to continue
investigations of those who pose a threat to the internal security
of the country and to maintain an administrative index
of such individuals as an essential part of our investigative
responsibility. Such an index not only enables the FBI to
pinpoint individuals who have exhibited a propensity to conduct
acts inimical to national security, but also serves as an
extremely valuable list of individuals who pose a continuing
threat to the safety of the President and thereby enables us to
provide current data to U. S. Secret Service concerning backgrounds
and whereabouts of such individuals.613 [Emphasis
added.]
<11 Memorandum from D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, Re: Emergency Detention
A.ct RepeaZ. 9/24171.
ll1l! Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to E. S. Miller, Re: Emergency Detention
Act RepeaZ, 9/29171.
lll3 Memorandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, Re: Emergency
Detention Program, 9/30/71.
545
The FBI made no mention of the Agitator Index, which had been
abolished earlier in 1971 because "extremist subjects" were now "adequately
followed" through the Security Index.61
'
There was also no allusion to the theory advanced within the FBI
that the new "administrative index" could serve as the basis for a
revived Detention Program in some future emergency.
The Attorney General replied that the FBI's authority to investigate
"subversive activities" on the bases cited by the Bureau was "unaffected
by the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act." With respect to the
Security Index, the Attorney General advised:
... [T]he repeal of the aforementioned Act does not alter
or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file
and index information secured pursuant to its statutory. and
Presidential authority. An FBI administrative index compiled
and maintained to assist the Bureau in making readily
retrievaJble and available the results of its investigations into
subversive activities and related matters is not prohibited by
repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.
While the Department does not desire a copy of any lists
that you may compile on the basis of such records or indices,
the Internal Security Division should be furnished a monthly
memorandum reflecting the identity of government employees
who by significant acts or memhership in subversive organizations,
have demonstrated a propensity to commit acts inimical
to our national security.
The Justice Department was studying what to do with the "Attorney
General's portfolio"-the secret plans for emergency detention.615
Several months later the FBI was instructed to destroy the materials
prepared for the "Attorney General's portfolio." 616
Upon receipt of the Attorney General's memorandum, the FBI
reconstituted the Security Index as an Administrative Index
(ADEX) with revised standards. FBI intelligence officials explained
that, since the Justice Department would no longer review the names
on the list, the FBI was "now in a position to make a sole determination
as to which individuals should be included in 'an index of subversive
individuals. Previously, the Justice Department had "frequently
removed individuals who in the strictest legal interpretation
should not be considered for arrest and detention." Under the new
procedure the FBI could make its own "determination based not on
arrest and detention but rather on overall potential for committing
acts inimical to the national defense interest." This meant restructuring
the Index so that it no longer stressed "membership in or affiliation
with old line revolutionary organizations," such as the Communist
Party. Instead, it would concentrate on the "new breed of subversive
individual" :
6" Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, Re: Agitator Index,
4/21/71; SAC Letter No. 71-17, 4/27/71.
"'. Memorandum from Attorney General John N. Mitchell to the FBI Director,
Re: Emergency Detention Program, 10/22/71.
"'. Memorandum from Assistant General Robert C. Mardian to the FBI Director,
Re: Emergency Detention Program, 2/9/72.
546
He may adhere to old-line revolutionary concepts but he is
unaffiliated with any organization. He may belong to or follow
one New Left-type group today and another tomorrow.
He may simply belong to the loosely knit group of revolutionaries
who have no particular political philosophy but who
continuously plot the overthrow of our Government. He is
the nihilist who seeks only to destroy America.
On the other hand, he may be one of the revolutionary
black extremists who, while perhaps influenced by groups
sU'ch as .the Black Panther Party, he is also unaffiliated either
permanently or temporarily with any black organization but
with a seething hatred of the white establishment will assassinate,
explode, or otherwise destroy white America.
The previous Reserve Index, which had never been disclosed to the
Justice Department, would now be incorporated into Category IV of
the new ADEX. It included "teachers, writers, lawyers, etc." who did
not actively participate in subversive activity "but who were nevertheless
influential in espousing their respective philosophies." It was estimated
that the total case load increase under the ADEX would be "in
excess of 23,000 cases the first year," including 17-18,000 individuals
who "are either now being investigated or who have been investigated
in the past." 611
The following- standards for placing subjects of "security investigations"
on the ADEX were sent out to the field offices :
Oategory I
(1) All national leaders of revolutionary organizations
whose aims and purposes include the overthrow and destruction
of the Government by force and violence or other unconstitutional
means, and individuals affiliated therewith who
have demonstrated propensity for violence ag-ainst the person
rather than property or have received special training- in
sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare or have engaged in
underground-type operations.
(2) Revolutionaries, though unaffiliated with any specific
organization, who have demonstrated by acts or statements a
propensity for violence, including- acts 'of terrorism, assassination,
or any interference with or threat to the survival and
effective operation of national, state, or local Governments
and of the defense efforts.
(3) National leaders of black extremist separatist
organizations.
(4) Any individual who qualifies for the ADEX should be
included in Category I if he is employed in or has access to
a key facility.
Oategory II
(1) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and black extremist
separatist org-anizations. Secondary leadership would
comprise, for example, reg-ional, state, and local leadel's who
are involved in policy making in fulfilling anti-US. objec-
... Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, Re: Security Inve8tigation8
01 Individua18, 11/11/71.
547
tives of their respective revolutionary organizations and
whose activities do not justify their inclusion in Category I.
(2) Active participants in furthering the aims and purposes
of the revolutionary or black extremist separatist organization
with which affiliated.
(3) Other unaffiliated revolutionaries who have derrionstrated
by acts or statements a propensity for violence against
property rather than persons.
Oategory III
(1) Rank-and-file membership in, or participation in actiVIties
of, revolutionary organizations within the last five
years as evidenced by overt acts or statements established
through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
(2) Leadership or activist position in affiliated fronts of
revolutionary organizations within the last three years as
shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable
sources, informants, or individuals.
(3) An individual who, although not a member of or participant
in activities of revolutionary organizations or considered
an activist in affiliated fronts, has exhibited a revolutionary
ideology and is likely to seize upon the opportunity
presented by national emergency to commit acts of espionage
or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any
interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation
of national, state, and local Governments and of the
defense efforts. [Emphasis added.]
Oategory IV
(1) Individuals whose activities do not meet criteria of
Categories I, II, or III but who are in a position to influence
others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or
are likely to furnish financial aid or other assistance to revolutionary
elements because of their 8ympathy, associations,
or ideology. [Emphasis added.]
Field offices were also instructed to review the cases of persons on
the Reserve Index and, "where appropriate", recommend them for
inclusion in the ADEX.618
The assumption that the ADEX could be used as the basis for detention
or other action in an emergency was made clear in the standards
for Category III (3). However, when these criteria were supplied
to the JustIce Department in 1972, the Attorney General did
not question the fact that the ADEX was more than just an administrative
aid for conducting current investigations.619
One Bureau memorandum indicates that "representatives of the
Department" in fact agreed with the view that there might be
"circumstances" where it would be necessary "to quickly identify
persons who were a threat to the national security" and that the
618l\I(>morandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC·s. R(>: S(I~urity Investigations
of Ind.ivid.uaZs, 11/15/71.
019 M(>morandum from the FBI Director to the Attorney General, Re: Security
Investigations of IndividuaZs, 2/10/72.
548
President could then go to Congress "for emergency legislation permitting
apprehension and detention." 620
Thus, although the Attorney General did not formally authorize
the ADEX as a continuation of the previous detention list, there
was informal Departmental knowledge that the FBI would proceed
on that basis. One FBI official later recognized that the ADEX
could be "interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency
Detention Act." 621
N. Curtailment of FBI Domestic Intelligerwe
In 1971, the first serious congressional inquiry into domestic intelligence
policy influenced the Army to curtail its extensive surveillance
of civilian political activity and led, after Director Hoover's
death in 1972, to serious reconsideration by the FBI of the leWtI
basis for its domestic intelligence activities and eventually to a request
for clarification of its authority by the Attorney General.
In February 1971, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Ri~hts of
the Senate Judiciary Committee began a series of hearings on federal
data banks and the Bill of Rights which marked a crucial turning
point in the development of domestic intelligence policy. The Subcommittee,
chaired by Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina, reflected
growing concern among Americans for the protection of "the
privacy of the individual against the 'information power' of government."
622 Senator Ervin declared that a major objective of the inquiry
was to look into "programs for taking official note of law-abiding
people who are active politically or who participate in community
activities on social and political issues." The problem, as Senator
Ervin saw it, was that there were citizens who felt "intimidated" by
these programs and were "fearful about exercising their rights under
the First Amendment to sign petitions, or to speak and write freely
on current issues of Government policy." The ranking minority members
of the Subcommittee, Senator Roman Hruska, endorsed the need
for a "penetrating and searching" inquiry.823
Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian testified before the
Constitutional Rights Subcommittee in March 1971. He declared that
the Justice Department's IDIU did not itself collect intelligence, but
rather it relied upon information from "public sources" and from the
FBI. Under questioning, Mardian admitted that neither the Department
nor the Bureau had "any specific published rewtiation or guideline"
for the collection of intelligence about civil disturbances.824
When this statement appeared in the press, Director Hoover asked,
"What about this~" 625 In response, FBI officials prepared a summary
of the relevant Bureau Manual provisions and submitted it to the Director
as the FBI's "Guidelines." 628
em Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/29/72.
on Domestic Intelli~ence Division, Position Paper: Scope of Authority, Jurisdiction
and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations, 7131/72.
... Federal Data Bwnks, 1971 Hearings, p. 1.
... Federal Data Banks, 1971 Hearings, pp. 4, 7.
... Federal Data Banks, 1971 Hearings, p. 873.
... Note on news article attached to memorandum from R. D. Dotter to C. D.
Brennan, 3/18/71. Hoover also noted on a column in the Wasbington Post by
Alan Barth, "We must get together at once all out guidelines." Routing slip,
3/25/71.
... Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to C. D. Brennan, 3/25/71.
549
There is no indication that the "guidelines" material or the FBI
Manual provisions themselves ,vere submitted to, or requested by, the
Justice Department in 1971.627 Indeed, when Deputy Attorney General
Richard Kleindienst testified in February 1972 at the hearings on
his nomination to be Attorney General, he stated that he was "not
sure" what guidelines were used by the FBI. Kleindienst also stated
that he believed FBI investigations were "restricted to criminal conduct
or the likelihood of criminal conduct." 628 Director Hoover
noted on a newspaper report of the testimony, "Prepare succinct memo
to him on our guidelines." 629
The FBI's summary of its "guidelines," submitted to the Acting
Attorney General, in 1972, stated that the Bureau investigated "any
individual" who is "affiliated with or adheres to the principles of'
an organization "which has as an objective" the violent overthrow
of the government or "other criminal activity detrimental to the
National defense." 630 The Bureau also made clear that the purpose of
these investigations was not just to "obtain evidence for prosecution,"
but also
to obtain intelligence data in order to have day-to-day appraisal
of strength, dangerousness, and activities of the
organization; and to keep the Department of Justice and
other affected Government agencies advised.
These investigations were partly based on criminal statutes, although
the Bureau admitted that "subversive activity ... often does not
clearly involve a specific section of a specific statute." They were also
based on the 1939 Roosevelt directives which were said to have been
"reiterated and broadened by subsequent Directives." 631 [Emphasis
added.]
Shortly thereafter (and only two days before Director Hoover's
death), the Bureau advised Kleindienst that it was abandoning the
use of the term "New Left" and substituting "Revolutionary Activities"
so as to more accurately "depict" the "militant, violence-prone
revolutionaries with whom we are concerned in our current
investigations." 632
After Director Hoover's death in May 1972, FBI intelligence officials
prepared a "position paper" for Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, in
627 After repeal of the Emergency Detention Act in the fall of 1971, the FBI's
Assistant Director for Le~al Counsel recommended that the Bureau's request for
approval of its new ADEX also include a more general request for reaffirmation
of FBI domestic intelligence authority to investigate "subversive activity."
(Memorandum from D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, 9/24/71) The letter to the
Attorney General reviewed the line of "Presidential directives" from 1939 to
1953. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 9/30/71) The Attorney General
replied with a general endorsement of FBI authority to investigate "subversive
activities." (Memorandum from Mitchell to Hoover, 10/22/71)
... Richard Kleindienst testimony, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Com·
mist.tee. 2/24/72, p. 64. FBI routing slip attached to Washington Post article, 2/24/72.
.... The summary also stated that "affiliation" with "basic revolutionary front
groups" was not a "prerequisite" for investigation, since "other indiViduals with
anarchistic, revolutionary or extremist beliefs" were also investigated. (Attach~
ment to Memorandum from Hoover to Kleindienst, 2/25/72.)
631 JIemorandum from Hoo,'er to Kleindienst. 2/25/72 (attachment) .
... Mem()randum from the FBI Director to Acting Attorney General Kleindienst,
4/28/72.
550
response to his request for a review of Bureau "authority" for investigations
"where there is no direct violation of law." This paper merely
recited the various Presidential directives, Executive Orders, delimitations
agreements, and general authorizations from the Attorney General,
with no attempt at analysis. The need for "intelligence collection"
to assure "proper vigilance" was introduced in the following terms:
It is clear that the aspirations of most revolutionary groups
far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate objectives.
They are, however, quite capable of eroding the integrity of
the democratic system by lesser acts and, if not discouraged
or thwarted, might well accumulate the will and power for
more decisive action. The dramatic success of the Castro revolution
is a sufficient example.633
At the same time, the FBI Office of Legal Counsel began its own review
of the constitutional issues; and one memorandum, anticipating
the likelihood of further "congressional intervention," recommended
the development of "tight internal controls and carefully developed
guidelines." 634
There was a sharp split within the Domestic Intelligence Division
over whether or not the Bureau should continue to rely on the various
executive orders as a basis for its authority. One official concludedthat
the FBI had "overstated our authority supposedly derived from Presidential
directives," and that the Attorney General should be called
upon "to provide legal guidance and advice as to just how much
authority we have or need." Other intelligence officials believed that
FBI policies might be "undermined" if it attempted to rely solely on
"statutory authority." 635 Nevertheless, a new Division position paper
concluded that domestic intelligence investigations could practicably
be based on the "concept" that their purpose was "to prevent a violation
of a statute." The paper also indicated that the ADEX would
be revised so that it could not be "interpreted as a means to circumvent
repeal of the Emergency Detention Act." 636
One of the arguments for not relying on the authority of the Presidential
orders was the risk of abuse of the FBI by the White House :
Over the years it became common practice for White House
staff members to telephone requests for information or investigations
to Mr. Hoover's office or the office of one of his
officials. Such requests were usually considered as being
within the constitutional Executive power, and for the most
part such requests were completely legitimate and well
within the recognized Scope of the FBI investigative
authority.
OccaSIOnally, however, requests were made--and complied
with-which in retrospect appear to have been beyond any
... FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, Position Paper: Investigations of Subversion,
5/19/72. Assistant Director E. S. Miller, head of the Domestic Intelligence
Division, withdrew this paper at a conference with Gray and other top Bureau
officials; Miller then initiated work on a more extensive position paper, which
was completed in July. (T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/1/72)
... Memorandum from J. B. Dotis to D. J. Dalbey, 5/18/72.
... Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/1/72.
... Domestic Intelligence Division, Position Paper: Scope of Authority, Jurisdiction
and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Inves~gations, 7/31/72.
551
recognized Executive authority. An example is a telephone
request to furnish all available information to the White
House concerning a forthcoming Earth Day rally in 1970.
The rally, which was sponsored by groups concerned with
pollution and ecology, attracted the attention of a few subversive
elements, but appeared to be very much under the
control of the sponsors. Senator Edmund S. Muskie spoke at
the rally in Washington, D.C., and Rennie Davis, an antiwar
actIvist with a subversive background, appeared on the
same platform with Senator Muskie. A few minor disturbances
erupted in some areas, but overall the Earth Day rallies
were peaceful and attained their general objective, the calling
of attention to environmental problems. Senator Muskie,
who learned that the FBI covered the rally in Washington,
was incensed that the FBI was involved. We had a poor
defense and in this case, at least, it is doubtful that there was
any legitimate Executive authority to have the FBI involved.
In any event, it would appear that such requests should flow
through channels, including the Department of Justice where
possible, to assure that unreasonable and improper requests
are [not] made for investigative activity.636a
Acting Director Gray postponed making any formal request for
advice from the Attorney General in 1972.637 ~feanwhile, the Domestic
Intelligence Di'dsion proceeded on its o,vn to revise the pertinent
Manual sections and the ADEX standard. One official observed that
there were "some individuals now included in ADEX even though
they do not realistically pose a threat to the national security." He
added that this would leave the Bureau "in a vulnerable position if
our guidelines were to be scrutinized by interested Congressional committees."
Thus, it was recommended that the list be trimmed to those
who were "an actual danger now," reducing the number of persons
on the ADEX by two-thirds.638 The Justice Department was advised
of this chang-e.639
The revision of the Manual was completed by May 1973. It was described
as "a major step" away from "heavy reliance upon Presidential
Directives" to an approach "based on existing Federal statutes."
."'- Position Paper, 7/31/72. For an examination of other instances of political
abu'll" of the FBI. Sf'(> the Final Report on Domestic Intelligence.
.... Gray did order that the Bureau should indicate its "jurisdictional authority"
tp investigate in every case, "by citing the pertinent provision of the U.S.
Code, or other authority," and also that the Bureau should "indicate whether or
not an investigation was directed by DJ (Department of Justice), or we ,opened
it without any request from DJ," In the latter case, the Bureau was to "cite
our reasons." Note on FBI routing slip, 8/27/72.
... Memorandum from Smith to Miller, 8/29/72. The anticipated reduction was
from 15,259 (the current figure) to 4,786 (the top two priority categories) .
... Memorandum from Gray to Kleindienst, 9/18/72. The basic standard for
the revised ADEX read as follows:
"Individuals, whether affiliated with organized groups or not, who have shown
a willingness and capability of engaging in treason, rebellion, or insurrection,
seditious conspiracy, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, assassination
of Government offidals or leaders, or other such acts which would result
In interference with or a threat to the survival and effective operation of national,
state or local government,"
552
Draft c~pies were distributed to the field for suggestions.640 The field
was advIsed that the "chief statutes" upon which the new criteria were
based were those dealing with rebellion or insurrection (18 U.S.C.
2583), seditious conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 2584) and advocating overthrow
of the government (18 U.S.C. 2528). The ADEX was to be
"strictly an administrative device" and should play no part "in investigative
decisions Or policies." The revision also eliminated "overemphasis"
on the Communist Party. Although field offices were
instructed to "close" investigations not meeting the new criteria,
headquarters did not want "a massive review on crash basis" of all
existing cases.641
A series of regional conferences were held with field office supervisors
to discuss the new standards, after which they were revised to allow
greater flexibility. For example, the supervisors saw the need to
undertake "preliminary inquiries" before it was known "whether
a statutory basis for investigation exists." This specifically applied
where a person had "contact with known subversive groups or subjects,"
but the Bureau did not know "the purpose of the contact."
These preliminary investigations could go on for 90 days "to determine
whether or not a statutory basis for a full investigation
exists." Moreover, at the urging of the field supervisors, the period
f?r a preliminary investigation of an allegedly "subversive organization"
was expanded from 45 to 90 days.642
For the first time in FBI history, a copy of the Manual section for
"domestic subversive investigations" was sent to the Attorney General,
apparently "in connection with" a request made earlier by Senator
Edward M. Kennedy who had asked to see a copy of this section at
the time of the confirmation hearings for Attorney General Kleindienst
in 1972.643
After Clarence M. Kelley was confirmed as FBI Director, he requested
guidance from the Attorney General. In a memorandum to
Attorney General Elliott Richardson, Director Kelley cited Senator
Sam J. Ervin's view that the FBI should be prohibited by statute
"from investigating any person without that individual's consent,
unless the Government has reason to believe that the person has
committed a crime or is about to commit a crime." He then summarized
the position paper prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division and
the Bureau's current policy of attempting to rely on statutory authority.
However, he observed that the statutes upon which the FBI was
relying were either "designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth
Century" (the seditious conspiracy, rebellion and insurrection laws)
or had been "reduced to a fragile shp11 by the Suprpme Court" (the
- Memorandum from E. S. Miller to Felt, 5/22/73. This memorandum also
stated, looking back on past Bureau policy, that since the FBI's authority to
investigate "subversive elements" had never been "seriously challenged until
recently." Bureau personnel (and "the general public") had accepted "the
FBI's right to handle internal security matters and investigate subversive
activities without reference to specific statutes." But the "rationale" based on
"Presidential Directives" was no longer "adequate."
84' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's. 6/7/73.
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/8/73.
... Kleindienst, 'Senate Judiciary Committee, 2/24/72, p. 64; memorandum
from Kelley to Richardson, 8/7/73.
553
Smith Act dealing with advocacy of overthrow). Moreover, it was
difficult to fit into the statutory framework groups "such as the Ku
Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but
nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally
guaranteed rights."
Kelley stated that, while the FBI hlJ,d "statutory authority," it still
needed "a definite requirement from the President as to the nature
and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of hi.g responsilbilities
based on our statutory authority." ['Emphasis added.] While
the statutes gave "authority," an Executive Order "would define our
national security objectives." The FBI Director added,
It would appear that the President would rather spell out his
own requirements in an Executive Order instead of having
Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill
his obligations and responsibilities as President.
Kelley concluded that it "would be folly" to limit the Bureau to
investigations only when a crime "has been committed," since the
government has to "defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist
efforts to destroy it." Consequently, he urged that the President exercise
his "inherent Executive power to ernpand by further defining
the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance
information" about the plans of "terrorist and revolutionaries who
seek to overthrow or destroy the Government." 644 [Emphasis added.]
Director Kelley's request initiated a process of reconsideration of
FBI intelligence authority by the Attorney General. Even before
Kelley's request, Deputy Attorney General-Designate William Ruckelshaus
(who had served for two months as Acting FBI Director between
Gray and Kelley), sent a list of questions to the Bureau to begin "an
indepth examination of some of the prOblems facing the Bureau in
the future." 645 The Ruckelshaus study was interrupted by his departure
in the "Saturday Night Massacre" of Ocrober 1973.
The Ruokelshaus study and Kelley's request were superseded in December
1973, when Acting Attorney General Rabert Bork in consultation
with Attorney General-Designate William Saxbe gave higher
priority to a Departirnental inquiry into the FBI's COINTE,LPRO
practices. Responsibility for this inquiry was assigned to a committee
headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.646 Even at
this stage, however, the Bureau resisted efforts by the Department to
look too deeply into its operations. Director Kelley advised the Acting
AtJtorney General that the Department should exclude from its review
the FBI's "extremely sensitive foreign intelligence collection techniques,"
which were handled within the Bureau "on a strictly need-toknow
basis" and thus should not be included in a study "which will be
beyond the control of the FBI." 647
As a result, the Petersen committee's review of COINTELPRO did
not consider anything more than a brief FBI-prepared summary of
... Memorandum from Kelley to Richardson, 8/7/73.
MIS Memorandum from Ruckelshaus to Kelley, 7/20/73.
... Memorandum from Bork to Kelley, 12/5/73.
0;' Memorandnm from Kelley to Bork. 12/11/73.
554
foreign counterintelligence operations.648 Moreover, the inquiry into
domestic COINTELPRO cases was based mainly on short summaries
of each incident compiled by FBI agents, with Department attorneys
making only spot-checks of the underlying files to assure the accurateness
of the summa.ries. Thus, the 'inquiry did not consider the
complete story of COINTELPRO as reflected in the actual memoranda
discussing the reasons for adopting particular tactics and the means
by which they were implemented.649
One Bureau memorandum to the Petersen committee even suggested
that the Attorney General did not have authority over the FBI's foreign
counterintelligence operations, since the Bureau was accountable
in this area directly to the United States Intelligence Board and the
National Security Council. The Peterson Committee sharply rejected
this view, citing the fact that the ad hoc equivalent of the U.S. Intelligence
Board had approved the discredited "Huston plan" in 1970 and
declaring, ''''Ilhere can be no douibt tha.t in the area. of foreign counterintelligence,
as in all its other functions, the FBI is subject to the
power and authority of the Attorney General." 650
Thus, while the Bureau was seeking guidance and clarification of
its authority, at the same time vestiges remained of its past resistance
to outside scrutiny and its desire to rely on Executive authority, rather
than statute, for the definition of its intelligence activities.
O. Be-Authorization of FBI Dome.'5tic Intellige'TUJe
In the absence of a.ny new standards imposed by the Attorney Genera.
l via "guidelines" or established by statute, the Burea.u continued
to conduct domestic intelligence investigations under broad authorizations
issued by the Justice Department in 1974. These authorizations
were explicitly based on conceptions of inherent executive power,
broader in theory- than the FBI's own cla.im, in 1973, tha.t its a.uthority
could be found m the criminal statutes.
(1) Ewe(JUtive Order 101,50, as (JIlTl.ended
The Federal employee security program continued to be, according
to the Justice Depa.rtment's 1974 instructions, a substa.ntive basis for
F'BI domestic intelligence investigations. An internal Bureau memorandum
stated that this order:
specifically requires the FBI to check the names of all civil
31pplicants and incumibents of the Executive branch against
our records. In order to meet this responsibility FBIHQ records
must conta.in identities of a.ll persons connected with
subversive or extremist activities, together with necessary
identifying information.651
FBI field offices were instructed in mid-1974 to report to Bureau headqua.
rters such data as the following :
Identities of subversive and/or extremist groups or movements
(including front groups) with which subject has been
... FBI memorandum, "Overall Recommendations-Counterintelligence Activity."
... Henry Petersen testimony, 12/8/75, Hearings, Vol. 6,pp. 27()"'271.
6llO Petersen Committee Report, p. 35.
651 Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. Wannall, 7/10/74.
555
identified, period of membership, positions held, and a summary
of the type and extent of subversive or extremist activities
engaged in by subject (e.g., attendance at meetings or
other functions, fund-raising or recruiting activities on behalf
of the organization, contri'butions, etc.).652
In June 1974 President Nixon formally abolished the "Attorney
General's list," upon the recommendation of Attorney General Saxbe.
However, the President's order retained a revised definition of the
types of organizations, association with which would continue to be
taken into account in evaluating prospective federal employees.65s The
Justice Department instructed the FBI that it should undertake to
"detect organizations with a potential" for falling within the terms
of the order and to investigate "individuals who are active either as
members of or as affiliates of" such organizations. The Departmental
instructions added:
It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation
is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the
availahle information suggests that the activities of the organization
may faU within the proscription of the Order....
It is not J!Ossible to set definite pararrl.ete1'8 covering the initia,
tion of mvestigations of potential org-anizations falling
within the Order but once the investigatIon reaches a stage
that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal
in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation
suggests a determination that the organization is
engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it
should continue. [Emphasis added.]
The Department applied "the same yardstick" to investigations of
individuals "when information is received suggesting their involvement.
654
With respect to one organization, the Department advised the Bureau
that "despite the abolition" of the Attorney General's list, the
group "would still come within the criteria" of the employee security
program if it "may have engaged in activities" of the sort proscribed
by the revised executive order.655
(2) Oivil Duomers Intelligence
The Justice Department also instructed the FBI in 1974 that it
should not, as the Bureau had suggested, limit its civil disturbance
... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/16/74.
61>3 Executive Order 11785, 6/4/74. The new standard was:
"Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or
adhf!remJe to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization,
association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to
as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of
acts of violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Const!tuition
or laws of the United States or any State or or of amy state, or which
seeks to overthrow tilie GoverIlJment <1f .the UnHed States or sublUvwWn thereof by
unla'wful means." [Emphoasois added.)
OM Memorandum from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for
Administration, to Kelley, 11/17/74.
..... Memorandum from Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division. to Kelley, 11/13/74.
69-984 0 - 76 - 36
556
reporting "to those particular situations which are of such a serious
nature that Federal military personnel may be called upon for assistance."
The Department advised that this suggested "guideline" was
"not practical" since it "would place the burden on the Bureau" to
make an initi'al decision as to "whether military personnel may ultimately
be needed," and this responsibility rested "legally" with the
President. Instead, the FBI was ordered to "continue" to report on
all significant incidents of civil unrest and should not be restricted
to situations where, in the judgment of the Bureau,
military personnel eventually may be used.656
Moreover, under this authority the Bureau was also ordered to "continue"
reporting on
all disturbances where there are indications that extremist
organizations such as the Communist Party, Ku Klux Klan,
or Black Panther Party are believed to be Involved in efforts
to instigate or exploit them.
The instructions specifically declared that the Bureau "should make
timely reports of significant disturbances, even when no specific
violation of Federal law is indicated." This could be done, at least in
part, through "liaison" with local law enforcement agencies. The FBI
was expected to "be aware of disturbances and patterns of disorder,"
although it was not to report "each and every relatively insignificant
incident of a strictly local nature." 651
The Justice Department abolished the Intelligence Evaluation Committee,
set up in partial implementation of the "Huston Plan," after
its existence was publicized in 1973.658 The IDIU also dismantled
its computerized data bank even though the basic functions of the
IDIU continued to be performed by a Civil Disturbance Unit in the
office of the Deputy Attorney General, and the FBI was under instructions
to disseminate its civil disturbance reports to that Unit.659
FBI officials considered these instructions "significant" because
they now gave it "an official, written mandate from the Department."
The Department's desires were viewed as "consistent with what we
have already been doing for the past several years," although the
Bureau Manual was rewritten to "incorporate into it excerpts from
the Department's letter." 660
From a legal point of view, the instructions were significant because
they relied for authority on the President's powers under Article IV,
section 4 of the Constitution to protect the states, upon application of
the legislature or the executive, against "domestic violence," as well
... "On the other hand," the instructions stated, "the FBI should not report
every minor local disturbance where there is no apparent interest to the President,
the Attorney General or other Government officials and agencies." (Memorandum
from Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
to Kelley, 10/22/74.)
161 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74.
... Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Petersen to Col. Werner Michel,
6/11/73.
... Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74 ;
Frank Nyland testimony, 1/27/76, pp. 46-58.
... Memorandum from J. G. Deegan to W. R. Wannall, 10/30/74.
557
as upon the statute (10 U.S.C. g:n, et seq.) authorizing the use of
troops and upon the Presidential directive of 1969 desIgnating the
Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the Government's
response to civil disturbances.661
(3) "Potential" Orimes
The FBI has recently abolished completely its ADEX, or administrative
index of persons considered "dangerous now." However,
in 1974, the Justice Department elaborated a theory to support broad
power of the Executive branch to investigate groups which represent
a "potential threat to the public safety," or which have a "potential"
for violating specific statutes. In the case of one group, for example,
the Department advised the FBI that the General CrImes Section of
the Criminal Division had "recommended continued investigation" on
the basis of "potential violations" of the antiriot statutes, 18 U.S.C.
2101-2102. These same instructions added that thp,re need not be a
"potential" for violation of any specific statuti." :
[W]ithout a broad range of intelligence information, the
President and the departments and agencies of the Executive
branch could not properly and adequately protect our nation's
security and enforce the numerous statutes pertaining thereto
... [T]he Department, and in particular the Attorney
General, must continue to be informed of those organizations
that engage in violence which represent a poterntial threat to
the publi(} safety.663 [Emphasis added.]
The Department's theory of executive power was also spelled out
in 1974 testimony before the House Internal Security Committee.
According to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney,
"the ~rimary basis" for FBI domestic intelligence authority was "the
constItutional powers and responsibilities vested in the President under
Article II of the Constitution." These powers arise from the President's
duty in his oath of office to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States," &64 the Chief Executive's duty to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed," 665 the President's responsibilities
as Commander-in-Chief, and his "power to conduct our foreign
relations." The latter power was said to relate "more particularly
to the Executive's .power to conduct foreign intelligence activities here
and abroad." Nevertheless, Mr. Maroney added,
We recognize the complexity and difficulty of adequately
spelling out the FBI's authority and responsibility to conduct
.... Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74; Directive of 4/1/69, dis('
ussed at pp. 501-502.
00. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Petersen to Kelley, 11/13/74.
6M The opinion of the Supreme Court in UnUed States v. United St(JJte8 District
(Jourt, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)-the domestic security wiretapping case-stated, "Implicit
in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who
would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means."
... A 19th century Supreme Court opinion was cited as having interpreted the
word "laws" broadly to encompass not only statutes enacted by Congress, but
also "the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself,
our international relations and all the protection implied by the nature of Government
under the Constitution." [In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).]
558
domestic intelligence-type investigations. The concept of national
security is admittedly a broad one, while the term subversive
activities is even more difficult to define.666
The chairman of the Internal Security Committee, Rep. Richard
H. Ichord, stated at that time that, except in limited areas, the Congress
"has not directly imposed upon the FBI clearly defined duties
in the acquisition, use, or dissemination of domestic or internal security
intelligence.667 Subsequently, the FBI Intelligence Division revised
its 1972-1973 position on its legal authority, and in a paper completed
in 1975 it returned to the view "that the intelligence-gathering activities
of the FBI have had as their basis the intention of the President
to delegate his Constitutional authority," as well as the statutes "pertaining
to the national security." 668
The generalized instructions issued by the Justice Department in
1974, when viewed in the larger framework of the theory of executive
power upon which they were based, have presented the Congress with
the formidable but essential task of developing statutory standards for
FBI domestic intelligence to replace vague executive mandates. The
record clearly indicates that, even though the Attorney General has
promulgated more precise "guidelines," the broad claims of power in
the hands of the Executive branch could readily permit a return to
the vague and overbroad domestic intelligence policies of the past.669
... Kevin Maroney testimony, Domestic Intelligence Operations tor Inter'1UJl
Security Purposes, Hearings before the House Committee on Internal Security,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), pp. 3332-3335. Mr. Maroney also cited the following
from the Supreme Court's opinion in the domestic security wiretapping case:
"The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation
of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such
surveillance may be more difficult to identify . . . Often, too, the emphasis of
domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the
enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some pOSsible crisis or emergency.
ThUS, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that
directed against more conventional types of crime." (United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).)
... House Committee on Internal Security Hearings, (1974) pp. 3330-8331.
"'" W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director for the Intelligence Division,
unaddressed memorandum re: "Basis for FBI ~ational Intelligence Investigations,"
2/13/75.
... The "guidelines" for FBI domestic security investigations developed by Attorney
General Edward H. Levi and other recent developments are discussed in
the Committee's Final Report on Domestic Intelligence.

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