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258 Superficially, the subsequent internal chain of oral approvals was complete, if somewhat complex. The TSD Chief personally contacted Karamessines, who "agreed in principle" but requested TSD to secure concurrences from the CI Staff and Howard Osborn (Director of Security) before he would approach the Director on this matter. The Deputy Chief of the CI Staff was briefed and concurred. (Despite a statement in the "dairy" that the Deputy Chief of the CI Staff "will clear with CICI [the Chief of the CI Staff]," this apparently was never done: .rames Angleton cannot recall ever having been informed about this project.259 ) On October 23, Osborn was also briefed by TSD and FE personnel; he approved, but conditioned his approval on clearance from the Director. Karamessines was told of Osborn's position on October 27, and together they briefed the Director. Helms reacted favorably and, on November 4,1969, TSD was advised to proceed with the project.260 The record does not reveal any specific authorization for the third trip, but a project justi'fication memorandum for the fourth trip was signed by Thomas Karamessines on September 20, 19'7'1. He recalled that this "Hitten 'authorization-unique for SOURDOUGH-was necessary to except the proje-ct from the snspension of certain types of Agency a.ctivities wi,th respect to an Asian conntry during the President's Asian trip, which had been requested by the State Department to avoid possible embarrassment to the United States.261 According to ... Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR DOUGH," undated. ... Angletou, 9/17/75, p. 101. 260 Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR DOUGH", undated. 261 Thomas Karaml"Ssines testimony, 10/8/75, pp. 14-16; CIA officer, (President's Commission staff summary), 3/17/75. 617 an October 1971 memorandum written shortly after the final trip, apprm"als had also been secured from Howard Osborn and Richard Helms.262 Although the authorization chain appears to be relatively complete, the testimonial evidence suggests that in 1009, when Karamessines, Osborn, and Helms approved phase two of the project, all three of these officials believed they were approving a mail cover-not a mail opening-operation. Osborn testified that the TSD and FE personnel who brIefed him on the project presented it as an operation "whereby they could inspect the exterior of envelopes to and from [an Asian country]." 263 He continued: "... I did not know ,that they were going to open it; I had no idea they opened the mail. And I found out socia~ ly and personally from one of t~e people involved about a year ago [I.e., 1974] that they opened the mall." 264 When asked whether or not he was misled in order to secure his approval, Osborn stated: Yes, indeed-I wasn't misled but perhaps it seemed when [they] got out there and found out how easy it was to get it-but I don't know, I wasn't told that they were to open mail. That isn't the circumstances under which I briefed Mr. Helms.... [If I had known it involved mail opening] I would not have approved it. The Director might have approved it, but it wasn't the way I briefed it....265 Karamessine.s sta.ted that the first time he can recall knowing that the project involved mail opening rather than a mail cover was in September 1971, when he signed the written authorization for the fourth San Francisco trip. He testified that when he a,pproved the project in 19'69 he, too, had been led to believe that it was simply a mail cover operation.266 Richard Helms cannot recall whether he understood the project to involve mail opening or not, but sta,ted that it is probable, in light 0'£ the testimony of Osborn and Karamessines, who were his only sources of information about SOURDOUGH, that he was unaware of its mail opening "aSpects.267 Thus, after the initial phase of the opeI'ation was completed, approvals were secured from the Deputy Direotor of Plans, the Director of Security, and the Dirootor, but it appears that these approvals, whether purposefully or inadvertently, were based on a fundamental misunderstanding about the narture of the project. Administrative Oontrols.-The documentary record reveals that five justification or summary memoranda were written for the project, four of which pertained to the last trip only. It is possible that more would have been written but for Howard Osborn's October 1969 admonition, reflected in the TSD agent's "diary," "to avoid preparing or exchanging any formal communications in writing re project." 268 262 MemOl'an{Ium from Iuentlty No. 15 "for the record," 10/19/71. ... Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 58, 59. ... Osborn, 8/28/75, p. 59. 085 Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 60, 64--65. ... Karamessines, 10/8/75, p. 12. :IIl7 Helms, 9/10/75, p. 127. WI Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR DOUGH," undated. 618 There is no indication in the r~ord that the San Francisco project was ever evaluated by the Inspector General's office. S. External Authorizatio-ns The pattern of external authorizations, or, more accurately, of the relative absence of external authorizations, also parallels that of the New York project. Those postal officials whose cooperation was necessary to implement SOURDOUGH were briefed, but none was told the true nature of the project. Although there are some suggestions in the record that the Attorney General and the President should be informed, and that the Postmaster General had been informed, there is no direct evidence that any of these briefings ever occurred. Postal Of!iciu1s.-James Conway, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector during the first three trips and Regional Postal Inspector in Charge during the fourth trip, was contacted by CIA agents about, and subsequently approved, all four of these operations. His uncontradicted testimony, however, is that he was never informed that the projoot involved mail opening and, in fact, that he explicitly instructed the agents not to open mall or remove it from postal facilities.269 At the first meeting between TSD personnel and Conway about the project on August 26, 1969, the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector waS told that the CIA's "interest lay in the possible use of international mail channels from [an Asian, country] for private correspondence involving secret writing." 270 According to an internal Agency memorandum prepared shortly after this meeting, however, it had been explained to him that "the survey we hoped to be able to conduct did not involve opening envelopes or photographing letters, but the possibility that this might become desirable in the future, though not mentioned, was not foreclosed." 271 At the subsequent meeting in September between Conway and these officers, one of the officers "brought up the question of broadening the scope of the survey to be performed in San Francisco to include chemical testing of the mail ..." 272 The memorandum on this meeting reads in part: "... he [Conway] acquiesced after brief deliberation when [the CIA officer] asked whether we could include this testing as part of the survey without going out of bounds. It was clear that the key factor in this decision was the fact that the envelopes would not be opened." 273 Conway agrees with this characterization of the basis of his decision, and testified that he explicitly instructed these agents that no mail should be opened.274 Conway approved the second stage of the project on January 13, 1970, after another meeting with Agency officials. In order to ensure his approval, these officials presented him with "an imaginative cover story" 275 to the effect that the project was necessary for certain scientific reasons.276 Conway nonetheless conditioned his approval on 261> James Conway testimony, 8/8/75, p. 30. 270 Memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB to "the File," 8/26/69. 271 Ibid. m Memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB "for the I!'ile," 9/15/69. 273 Ibit't. ,,. Conway, 8/8/75, p. 30. 27. Deputy Chief, Security Support Division memorandum, 12/24/74. 276 Blind memorandum, SUbject; "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR DOUGH," undated. 619 total Post Office control of the operations. According to the J anuary 13 entry in the TSD "diary," Conway "approved in principal 'processing' of material but on P. O. premises and under P. O. control ... Opening has not been mentioned." 277 In fact, the cover story was inaccurate, letters were surreptitiously removed from postal premises, and mail was opened. While Conway's approval was sought and received for the final two operations as well, all of the evidence, including his own testimony, suggests that he never learned of the mail opening aspect of the project. It is also the claim of the Regional Postal Inspector in Charge who worked out the local arrangements for the first three trips, that he was informed neither of the purpose of the project nor of the planned or actual mail openings.278 This claim is supported by the agency's own documents,278a Chief Postal Inspector William Cotter, who played a central role in the story of the New York project, was also aware of SOUR DOUGH, but, like Conway and the Regional Inspector, he has testified that he had no knowledge that it involved mail opening.278b In November 1969, Howard Osborn spoke to Cotter about the San Francisco project. Osborn, who stated that he did not know that mail opening was contemplated himself, assured the Chief Postal Inspector that for the Agency's purposes exterior testing and surveying was sufficient and that mail would not be opened.278e Cotter was not unreceptive but, according to an agency document explained that he wanted the project "to go slowly and develop gradually." 279 Because of his past CIA affiliation, Cotter also insisted that his assistant, Conway, should ultimately determine the degree of Postal Service Cooperation.280 He testified that he did not alert Conway to the possibility that the CIA agents may attempt to open the mail becausemail opening was not an aspect of the project as he understood it and because "one doesn't have to tell or admonish a seasoned Postal Inspector what his responsibilities are ..." 281 Cotter apparently had no further contact with the San Francisco project until the fall of 1971, when he was contacted about the planned fourth trip. According to an Office of Security trip report prepared in October 1971 : The Assistant Postmaster General for Inspection [Cotter] was contacted for his approval. He firmly indicated he did not know anything about the project, nor did he want to know. He stated, however, that he would advise James Conway, [now the] Regional Inspector in San Francisco, that I would be in touch with him on 27 September 1971, and that we should be guided by Conway's decision.2112 "7 Ibid. 278 Staff summary of Earl Ingebright interview, 5/30/75. 27lla Blind notes by CIA officer, undated, "Feb. 2" entry. 27,.. Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 113. 27& Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 60, 61, 65. "9 Blind memorandum, Subject: "Chronology of Authority for MKSOUR DOUGH," undated. 280 Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 70. m Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 72. 282 Memorandum from Identity No. 15, "for the Record," 10/19/71. 69-984 0 - 76 - 40 620 There is no evidence that Postmaster General 'Vinton Blount, the only Postmaster General under whom the project was conducted, ever knew of or approved SOURDOUGH. A 1973 CIA document addressed to Howard Osborn stated that "TSD understands (but has no eddence) that Mr. Helms briefed Postmaster Blount. Is this so, do you know?" 283 But Helms has made no claim that he did brief Mr. Blount about this project,284 and there is no testimonial or documentary indication that TSD's underst'anding on this matter was correct. Attorney Ge'Mral and President.-As noted above, when the Chief of TSD approved the formal institution of Sourdough on October 6, 1969, he stated that concurrences from the Deputy Director for Plans and "possibly [the] Attorney General or even the President" would be necessary prior to implementation. There is no evidence, however, that either Attorney General Mitchell or President Nixon, the only holders of these offices during the course of the project, were briefed about the San Francisco mail openings either before or after they occurred. President Nixon did state that he was "generally aware" of CIA mail covers "of mail sent from within the United States to ... the Soviet Union ... or the People's Republic of China," 284a but he disclaimed knowledge of any CIA mail opening program.2Mb Sourdough's record on external authorizations, in short, is even less complete than that of the New York project. Those postal officials who learned of the project in general terms were misled on the subject of opening and deceived on the subject of custody, and no Cabinet level official-or the President of the United States-apparently knew of the project at all. E. The New Orleans Maillntereept Project A third CIA mail intercept project, encrypted "Project SETTER," was conducted in New Orleans for two and one-half weeks during 1957. This project, which was conducted by the CI Staff with cover and support functions provided by the Office of Security, involved the screening and opening of first class international surface mail transiting New Orleans enroute to and from South and Central America. Unlike the New York and the San Francisco projects, SETTER was operated with the cooperation of the United States Customs Service. There is no record of any internal authorization above the level of Deputy Director of Security and Deputy Chief of the CI Staff, and the only apparent external approval was by a Division head in the Customs Service, who stated that he was unaware the project involved the opening of mail. According to Agency documents, the project generated no useful intelligence information. 1. Operation of the Project At the time of the New Orleans project, the Customs Service had Congressional authority under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 283 Transmitffil slip from CH/OCCR to Mr. Osborne (sic), 6/7/73. 2lI4 Helms, 9/10/75, p. 119. "". Response of Richard Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatories. 3/9/76, pp. 4, 5. 284. Response of Richard Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatories, 3/9/76, pp. 1, 5. 621 as amended by the Cunningham Act, to intercept and examine third and fourth class incoming mail from abroad which was suspected to contain Communist propaganda. In the early 1950's, Customs had estahlished its first "control unit" designed to accomplish that purpose; additional "control units" were subsequently set up in at least nine other cities in the United States. Under pressure from certain members of Congress who were outraged at the "venomous propaganda" 285 passing through Kew Orleans, the Customs Service planned a feasibility. survey in August 1957 to determine whether or not it would be possIble to establish a "control unit" in that city as well. The Agency learned of the planned survey and in mid-July a meeting, attended by the Deputy Chief of the CI Staff, the Deputy Director of Security, and Soviet Bloc Division personnel, was called to discuss its possible exploitation by the CIA. "Based on experience with SRPOINTER [the New York project]," an Agency document reads, "CI Staff and O/S personnel ... agreed that CIA personnel would participate in the survey at New Orll:'ans." 286 Even prior to this meeting, Irving Fishman, the head of the Customs Service's Restricted Merchandise Division, which maintained the "control units'" had apparently agreed in principle to CIA participation in the survey. He was contacted in New York by the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Office of Security's Manhattan field office on .Tuly 18 "to discuss details of the operation." 287 Fishman and two of his associates left New York for New Orleans at the end of July to work out the arrangements for the Customs survey with the local postmaster. They w('rl:' joined by four CIA agl:'nts during the first week of August, and the operation began on August 6. Each working day for the next two and one-half weeks, one of the Customs personnel went to the Xew Orleans mail dock to select approximately 25 bags of surface mail from various Central and South American locations that had been unloaded in New Orleans for transshipment to other points in Central and South America. These bags were brought to an office in the Parcel Post Annex of the Federal Building each morning for Customs and CIA scrutiny. While Fishman and the other Customs Service employees searched for communist propaganda by opening third and fourth class mail in the office itself, the CIA a.gents screened, opened, and photographed first class mail in an adjacent walk-in vault. The agents' CIA affiliation was known to at least two of the Customs officials; postal employees who worked in the building, however, were informed that they were Customs Service personnel. At the end of each day, the mail would be re-sealed, rebagged, and returned to the mail dock. Between August 6 and August 23, when the project was terminated, a total of 700 items were photographed and 60 items, mainly first class letters, were opened for examination and photographic reproduction of the contents.288 2Sli Rtaff summary of Customs Ag-ent interview, R/19/75. 288 Blind memorandum. Subject: "Project SETTER," undated. '81 Memorandum from "Identity #13" to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57. '88 Blind memorandum, Subject: "Project SETTER," undated; Memorandum from Identity #13, to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57. 622 ~. Nature and Value of the Product Selection Oriteria.-The agents who participated in the New Orleans project were furnished a "Wateh List" of names by the 01 Staff to aid in the selection of items for opening.289 Beyond the Watch List itself, however, it appears that the members of the interception team were given little guidance by their superiors. One member of this group stated that at no time was he instructed what types of items to se.lect,290 According to a project summary prepared in October 1957, "... an effort (was) made to obtain a representative sampling from the various countrIes available. Both business and personal mail was examined...." 291 Value of the ProdJuet.-Agency memoranda indicate that SEITER resulted in the collection of no useful intelligence information. The project summary, for example, states: "On-the-spot check of items examined against CI Staff Watch List, and subsequent CI Staff examination of the material processed to date has developed no 'hits' on Watch List names, and, other than propaganda, no material having an intelligence value." 292 3. Termination The lack of any significant intelligence value, coupled with the stated impossibility of examining a representative sample of the 20,000 bags of mail that transited New Orleans weekly:21l2a apparently led to the tennination of Project SEITER.. No fonnal tennination of the project is recorded, however. 4. Autlwmations Internal Authorization.s.-Both the Deputy Director of Security and the Deputy Chief of the cr Staff attended the July 1957 meeting at which CIA participation in the New Orleans survey was agreed upon. There is no evidence, however, of any internal authorization above the level of these officials. Although the 01 Staff had sole operational responf'ibility for the project.Tames Angleton, the Chief of the CI Staff at the time, testified that he had no contemporaneous knowledge of iU93 ErJJternril Authorizations.-The only documented approval by a government official outside the CIA was that of Irving Fishman, the head of the Restricted Merchandise Division of the Customs Service. Only through his cooperation, both before and during the period of activity, was the implementation of the project possible at all. According to the October 1957 project summary, Fishman and one of his two associates "were aware, prior to the inception of the operation, of the nature of the BANJO [mail opening] ope:mtion." 294 Both Fishman and the associate referred to in the memorandum, how- '80 Memorandum from Identity #13 to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57. lll10 Statl' summary of "OIA officer" interview. 6/19/75. 291 Memorandum from Identity #13 to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57. ... Memorandum from Identity #13 to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57. ""'. Blind memorandum, subject: "Project SETTER," undated. ... Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 101. ... Memorandum from Identity #13, to the Deputy Director of Security, 10/4/75. 623 ever, have stated that they cannot recall any opening of first class mail by the CIA agents.295 . There is no evidence that the Postmaster of New Orleans, who arranged for the Customs survey, knew of any mail opening by the CIA in connection with the project. The Customs survey itself, of which he ,vas evidently aware, was entirely legal at the time. O. The Hawaiian Mail Intercept Project A fourth CIA mail intercept project was conducted in the Territory of Hawaii for about one year during the mid-1950's.295& It was initiated, without prior authorization from Headquarters, by the Agency's sole representative in Honolulu. Like the New Orleans project, it involved the cooperation of the Customs Service. According to the agent who conducted the Hawaiian project, local personnel of the Customs Service approached him in late 1954 to request his assistance in identifying incoming political propaganda from Asia that had been intercepted by Customs officials acting under the Cunningham Act.296 The CIA officer agreed and, after a short period of time, noticed the presence of censorship chemicals on a portion of the mail from one of the country's being covered. Less than a week after he began to assist the Customs personnel, he started surreptitiously remo-ving packets of mail for further exterior examination. By early 1955, without the knowledge of Customs officials, the agent was both opening and photographmg items he had removed from the Customs facility. In March 1955, he sent a formal report of these activities to CIA headquarters, noting that he had photographed the contents of approximately six hundred communications and tested four hundred. Included in the report was an evaluation of the results to date; specifically, an analysis of the Asian country's censorship techniques and other postal and positive intelligence information he had collected. According to the CIA officer, his report was very favorably received and he was encouraged to continue. The CIA officer stated that for approximately two months in early 1955, he was joined by an FBI agent as well. A local FBI agent in Honolulu, who had received instructions to concentrate on Asian counterintelligence matters, apparently learned from Customs officials that the CIA officer participated in their examination of incoming propaganda. He contacted the CIA officer, was informed of the project, and notified Bureau Headquarters. The CIA officer stated that with his concurrence, an FBI agent trained in mail opening techniques was assigned the task of assisting him in his interception effort. The Bureau can locate no documents pertaining to this operation, however. The CIA officer continued the project on his own after FBI participation ceased. In November 1955, he was transferred to a station in the continental United States~ and the Hawaiian project was terminated. "'" Staff' summary of Irving Fishman interview, 8/12/75; staff' summary of Customs agent interview, 8/9/75. ""'. The description that follows is based on an interview of the participating agent by the Rockefeller Oommission staff'. ... President's Commission on CIA Activities Within The United States' stall summary of a CIA officer interview, 3/lR/75. 624 D. Isolated Instances of 01AMail Opening In addition to generalized mail intercept projects, the CIA has also targeted the mail of particular individuals within the United States. At least twelve such instances of mail opening, directed against foreign nationals, Agency employees, and American citizens unconnected with the CIA are recorded in Agency files. 297 PART III: PROJECT HUNTER I. INTRODUCTIOK AND MAJOR FACTS "Project Hunter" was the cryptonym given by the FBI to the receipt of information from the CIA's New York mail intercept program. The FBI first became aware of this operation in January 1958, approximately three and one-half years after the CIA began opening mail between the Soviet Union and the United States. In February 1958, the Bureau began to levy requirements on the CIA's project and received product from it continually from that time until the discontinuance of the project. In total, copies or summaries of more than 57,000 items of intercepted correspondence were disseminated by the CIA to the FBI, either on the basis of general guidelines establIshed by the Bureau or on the basis of particular names of individuals and organizations for which the Bureau desired coverage. While most of these nameS and categories could reasonably be expected to generate counterespionage information-which was the stated purpose of the FBI's collaboration on the project-Bureau targets also included peace organizations, antiwar leaders, black activists, and women's groups. When the New York mail intercept project was terminated III 1973 and the FBI declined the opportunity to assume responsibility for it, Project Hunter ceased after fifteen years of operation. The most pertinent facts about Project Hunter may be summarized as follows: (a) The FBI knew of and levied requirements on the CIA's New York mail intercept project from 1958 until the project was terminated in 197a. (b) Although the collection of counterespionage information was the stated purpose of Project Hunter. the Bureau specifically requested information on numerous individuals and organizations in the antiwar, civil rights, and women's movements, and on such general categories as "government employees" and "protest organizations." (c) The FBI received copies or summaries of more than 57,000 intercepted communications between 1958 and 1973. At the height of the project in 1966, the CIA disseminated 5,984 of the 15,499 items that had been opened to the Bureau-more than were disseminated to any one customer component of the CIA itself. (d) The product was moderately valuable in terms of the FBI's counterespionage mission, but much of the corn'spondence has been characterized as "junk" by FBI personnel familiar with the program. It provided no leads to the identification of foreign illegal agents. (e) No consideration was given to terminating FBI involvement in the OIA's New York intercept program when the Bureau's own projll97 Blind memorandum, Subject: "Domestic Surveillance," undated. 625 ects were terminated in 1966 because information from the project was received at no expense or risk to the FBI. (f) FBI officials decided against assuming responsibility for the CIA's New York mail intercept project in !flo8 and again in 1973 because of its complexity, expense, and the inherent security risks, not. primarily because of legal considerations. II. FBI "DISCOVERY" OF THE CIA'S NEW YORK MAIL INTERCEPT PRo.TEeT: 19 i'i 8 A. A Proposed FBI Jlail Opening P1'ogram for United States-Soviet Union JJfail In 1957, FBI officials were extremely concerned about the presence of Soviet and other hostile illegal intelligence agents in the United States.298 The FBI had recently uncovered Rudolph Abel and at least three other illegal agents, yet no effective methods of locating and identifying illegal agents genemlly were then known. Bureau officials did not feel that they had been entirely successful in their attempts in the past, and searched for a means by which the communication links between the illegal agents and their principals could be intercepted.299 On January 10, 1958, an allied nation's counterintelligence agency informed the FBI that when Soviet illegal agents throughout the world wished to meet with their principals, they were under instructions to send a communication to a particular address in the Soviet Union.30o Against the background of the Bureau's concern for locating and identifying illegal agents, the significance of this information was readily apparent: if the FBI could screen mail between the United States and the Soviet Union, it would be possible to intercept communications bearing this particular address and, it was hoped, trace the letter back to the illegal agent. In 1958, mail between the United States and the Soviet Union was routed through air mail facilities in New York City and Washington, D.C. On the basis of its newly-acquired information, therefore, FBI Headquarters immediately instructed the New York and Washington Field Offices "to institute confidential inquiries with appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing correspondence from the P.S. to the U.S.S.R., looking toward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned address." 301 On January 21, !flo8, the Special Agent in Charge of the New York Field Office, notified Headquarters that his prelimmary inquirie.'l indicated that covert mail coverage would be possible at LaGuardia airport. This was not the FBI's first attempt to utilize mail opening as an investig-ative technique in the counterintelligence field: at the time these inquiries were being made, the Bureau was conducting two mail onening programs of its own in the cities of Washington, D.C. and San Francisco (see Part IV, p. 6~6), and in the case of the Washington, D.C. program, the cooperation of the Post Office Department had been enlisted in delivering mail to Bureau agents. ... Donald E. Moore testimony, 10/1/75, p. 9. 290 Ibid. 300 Memorandum from J>,.. H. Belmont to Mr. Boardman. 1/22/58. 001 Ibid. 626 B. Referral to Post Office Headquarters in Washington, D.O. After the SAC in New York had made his preliminary inquiries, which made the prospects for successful implementation of the project appear favorable, he received a telephone call from the Chief Postal Inspector, David Stephens, in Washington, D.C., who informed him that he could not authorize Post Office cooperation after all because "something had happened in Washington on a similar matter." 302 He advised that FBI Headquarters should discuss the matter further with his office in 1Yashington. O. .James Angleton's Initial Oontact 'with Sam Papich Regarding HTLINGUAL The SAC in New York relayed the Chief Postal Inspector's advice to FBI Headquarters, but before Headquarters was able to initiate a meeting with Postal officials in 1Vashington, James Angleton, then Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff of the CIA, contacted Sam J. Papich, FBI Liaison to the CIA, on the matter to which Stephens had apparently referred.303 Angleton stated that it had come to his attention, through the Post Office, that the FBI was making inquiries into the possibility of covering mail between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that the CIA expected to be contacted by the FBI concerning this possibility. He then informed Papich "on a personal basis" 304 that the CIA was already conducting an extensive operation, based in New York, which involved the opening of mail to and from the Soviet Union. He stated that this project was one of the largest and most sensitive of all CIA covert operations, and that "the sole purpose for the coverage ,vas to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in their countries as contacts and sources for the CIA." 3G~ Alan Belmont, then Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelligence Division, was informed of this operation by Papich and noted in a memorandum to Mr. Boardman, then Assistant to the Director, that "[i]t would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in New York have flushed out a most secret operation of the CIA." 306 D. Decision Not to Ohallenge 01A .lurisdiction Papich testified that FBI officials were greatly concerned over what was viewed as a possible intrusion by the CIA into the counterintelligence jurisdiction of the FBI, and he stated that he "anticipated all hell was going to break loose." 307 In fact, however, the jurisdictional dispute which Papich anticipated never occurred. Rather, the FBI decided to capitalize on the situation by receiving the benefits of the program without the expense and manpower requirements which would accompany a more active role in its operation. Belmont wrote to Boardman: The question immediately arises as to whether CIA in effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our juris- ... Ibid. ... Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58; Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 42. ... Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58. "'" }Iemorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58: This was clearly not the sole purpose of the New York Project even in the 1950's. See pp. 567-568. ... Memorandum from Belmont ro Boardman, 1/22/58. 30' Papich, 9/22/75, p. 67. 627 diction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a legitimate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set up, namely, the development of contacts and sources of information behind the Iron Curtain.... At the same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, nl;\mely, the identification of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. 'Vhile recognizing this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size, and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible to share their coverage with us.30S This memorandum was routed to the Director, and Hoover's approval- the phrase "OK. H."-appears on the last pa~e. E. FBI Briefing at OIA On .Tanuary 24,1958, Sam Papich met with James Angleton, Sheffield Edwards, and a third CIA officer at the Agency.309 Papich told the group that he had reason to believe, from the FBI inquiries of Post Office officials in Ne'" York (and without mentioning Angleton's admission two or three days earlier), that the CIA had a mail coverage project in New York. The CIA representatives then proceeded to give Papich a full briefing on the CIA's mail intercept program, and agreed to "handle leads" for the Bureau.310 Papich was also told that Postmaster General Summerfield had approved the photographing of mail by the CIA but that the CIA did not have permission of the Post Office Department to open mail.311 In addition, the address given the Bureau by the allied counterintelligence agency was supplied to the CIA for use in the New York project. Neither Angleton nor anyone else in the CIA was told at this time of either of the FBI's own on-going mail opening programs. According to the testimony of William Branigan, former FBI Section Chief of a section dealing with espionage matters, there was no reason to inform CIA about the Bureau's own mail opening programs since both of the programs then involved "strictly a domestic situation involving persons in the United States ... [and] solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI." 312 III. REQUESTS LEVIED BY THE FBI ON THE CIA'S NEW YORK MAIL INTERCEPT PROJECT A. The Procedure Established The "Hunter" procedure for requesting and receiving information was established in early February 1958. On February 6, James Angleton wrote the FBI Director to advise the Bureau of the form in which 308l\:1emorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58. 309 Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 2/6/58. 310 Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 2/6/58. 311 Papich, 9/22/75, p. 37. m William A. Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 11. 628 requests should be made and information would be disseminated.313 Designating correspondence between the two agencies which related to the New York project as "Project Hunter", Angleton suggested that the Bureau number all requests for placing particular persons on the Watch List in consecutive order as "Hunter Request Number -." Identifying data about the requested person should be placed on a three by five card, with instructions as to the duration of the person's name on the Watch List and the type of treatment desired ("e.g., photograph exterior only; open and photograph contents as well, etc."). General requirements bU8ed on letter content or the class of the sender or addressee, could also be accommodated by the CI Staff project analysts. Correspondence from the CIA to the FBI which contained information derived from the project was to be labeled consecutively, "Hunter Report Number -.". B. Oategcn-W8 of Oorrespondence f01' Requested Oovemge At least five sets of categories of correspondence for which the Bureau desired coverage were transmitted to the CIA between 1958 and 1973. The focus of the original categories was clearly counterespionage, but sub~uent general requirements became progressively more domestic in theIr focus and progressively broader in their scope. By the end of the project, one requirement simply asked for the intercepted correspondence of "New Left activists, extremists and other subversives." 314 The first set of categories of correspondence for which the FBI desired coverage was set forth in a memorandum from Alan Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated February 6, 1958.315 This memorandum was approved by Hoover, and Sam Papich advised the CIA of the Bureau's interest in these categories on February 11. They were: (1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, et cetera. (2) All correspondence indicating that the Soviets may be utilizing a hostage situation, i.e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on Soviet citizens who have close relatives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U.S. (3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such indIviduals for defection or double agent purposes. (4) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating Soviet control of direction of the CPUSA. [Communist Party, USA.] 316 If the CI Staff analysts were not certain whether a particular letter fit into one of these four categories, they clearly gave the Bureau the benefit of their doubt. In August 1961, these categories had to be refined because of the large percentage of valueless letters (95% by one informed estimate) 317 which the CIA disseminated to the Bureau 313 Memorandum from James Angleton to Director, FBI, 2/6/58. '" See p. 630. :ns Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 2/6/58. 31' Ibid. "7 Project Supervisor #1 testimony, 10/1/75, p. 60. 629 in the first three and one-half years of the Hunter operation.318 The FBI informed the CIA that it ,vas not interested in correspondence involving general travel arrangements of Americans travelling to Russia, personal letters with no intelligence value, letters to and from exchange students, and "holiday greeting" traffic.319 The Bureau stated, however, that it was specifically interested in receiving any correspondence in the following categories: (1) Any traffic in the above-mentioned non-desired categories wherein the translator feels there is some intelligence significance.... (2) Any traffic wherein it is revealed U.S. addressee or addressor is a U.S. Government employee or is employed in a sensitive industry, i.e., missile field. (3) Any traffic wherein we have an obvious intelligence interest such as an open offer by an individual to assist Soviets, an indication an individual is going to Russia and wants to become a citizen or wherein an indIvidual professes proSoviet or pro-communist sympathies.320 Other categories relating to particular espionage cases were also set forth. The reference to "U.S. Government employee[sJ" in category (2) was intended to be limited to employees in sensitive positions, according to one of the Bureau officials who formulated these categories.321 But such limitation is not evident on the face of the request. The Bureau literally requested all intercepted correspondence to or from all federal employees, from the lowest Civil Service level to, presumably, the level of the Cabinet, the Congress, and the President. On February 13, 1962, an additional category was requested 'by the FBI.",z2 This request was for any correspondence from the United States to the Soviet Union which contained any of the "indicators" on the outside of the envelope which suggested that the correspondence was from an illegal agent to his principal. The Bureau had acquired knowledge of these indicators in 1959 and used this knowledge in connection with several of its own mail opening programs in the period 1959 through 1966. Dissemination by the CIA to the FBI of correspondence which was opened on the basis of these indicators was code-named "Hunter-Don." The categories were enlarged again on October 31, 1962. Among the llew categories of correspondence desired by the FBI were the following: (1) All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an antiU. S. nature and pro-Soviet. (2) Data re V.S. peace groups going to Russia and while in Russia. (3) Data indicating death of any U.S. Communist abroad. (4) Any traffic from or to U.S. students in Moscow or to U.S. persons who were former students in Moscow. 318 Project Supervisor #1 testimony, 10/1/75, p. 60; Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 81. 3l"Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan (attachment), 8/21/61. '00 Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, (attachment), 8/21/61. 3Z1 Branigan testimony, 10/9/75, p. 70. m Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 2/15/62. 630 (5) Any traffic between U.S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR.323 In addition, the CIA was informed that the FBI had no interest in the correspondence of Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate to the Soviet Union, legitimate American tourists in the Soviet Union, and American professors in academic research who corresponded with their counterparts in the Soviet Union. A final revision of the guidelines occurred in March 1972, when .James Angleton was told that bhe following were among the types of traffic which continues to be of interest to the FBI: 1. Current and former Soviet exchange students, visitors, researchers and scientists. 2. Current and former Soviet official visitors. 4. U.S. exchange students, researchers, and persons who have been in the USSR with American exhibitions and delegations. 6.... [PJersons on the 'Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists and other subversives; suspected and known espionage agents; individuals known to be of interest to the Soviets because of their specialized knowledge or work on classified matters . . . 7. Communist party and front organizations ... extremist and New Left organizations. 8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee, and Women's Strike for Peace. 9. Communists, Trotskyites and members of other MarxistLeninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the BhlCk Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalists and Liberation groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos organimtion, Weathermen, Progressive Labor Party, 'V"orker's Student Alliance, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union, and other New Left groups. This would include persons sympathetic to the Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam and Red China. 10. Cubans and pro-Castro individuals in the U.S. 11. Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies."u This final set of requirements clearly reflected the domestic turmoil of the late 1960's and early 1970's. The process that began fourteen years earlier as a means of discovering Soviet intelligence efforts in the United States had expanded to encompass detection of the activities of ... Ibid. ... Routing slip from J. Edgar Hoover to James Angleton (atttachment), 3/10/72. 631 domestic dissidents of all types. Even those merely "sympathetic"-in the opinion of CI Staff analysts-to selected communist nations fell within the scope of the requirements. C. Individuals and Organizatio'n..~ Placed on the "TVatch List In addition to the general categories set forth above for which the FBI desired CIA mail coverage, the Bureau also submitted the names of particular individuals and organizations for inclusion on the CIA's "Watch List. According to existing FBI records, "Hunter Request" numbers reached 286 by 1973, that is, the names of 286 individuals and organizations were submitted by the Bureau during the course of the Hunter Project.325 The majority of these names were clearly in the counterespionage area, but the specific requests also included: The National Guardian, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Students Tor a Democratic Society, Ramparts, Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, the Liberation News Service, Jeremy J. Stone (Director of the Federation of American Scientists), Center for the Study of Public Policy, Linus Pauling, and the Institute for Policy Studies..326 Aside from the 286 "Hunter Request" names submitted by the FBI for inclusion on the Watch List, about 180 more names were provided to the CIA for use in the special Latin America mail screening operation, known as Hunter-Vince, which was run in conjunction with Hunter and which lasted for approximately one month in 1963.327 On December 12, 1962, Liaison Agent Sam Papich had been informed by the CIA that because mail from the "United States to a Latin America country was temporarily discontinued, all such mail would be shipped to that country from New York City, and the CIA intended to expand their coverage to include the screening and opening of a portion of this mai1. 328 The FBI expressed an interest in sharing the benefits of this coverage and submitted approximately 180 names of American and foreign citizens who were on the Security Index..328a This aspect of the program, which commenced on February 21, 1963, was suspended on March 19, less than one month later.. IV. PRODUCT RECEIVED BY THE FBI FROM THE CIA'S NEW YORK MAIL IN'rERCEPT PROJECT A .. Volume According to a CIA document dated J annary 23, 1975, a total of 57,846 separate items were disseminated to the FBI from the CIA project.329 The yearly figures, from 1958 when the first product was 325 Staff summary or Project Hunter index file review, 10/20/75. 326 Staff summary of Project Hunter file review, 10/20/75: Staff summary of HTLINGUAL file review, 9/5/75. 321 Memorandum from S. J. Papich to D. J. Brennan, 12/13/62. 328 Memorandum from S. J. Papich to D. J. Brennan, 12/13/62. 328. The Security Index was a list of people to be detained in time of war or national emergency. 329 Blind CIA "Memorandum for the Record," SUbject: "Approximate Statistics on CI Staff Project, HTLINGUAL Material," 1/23/75. 632 disseminated to the Bureau, until the termination of the project, are as follows: Year Total items opened Items disseminated to FBI 6£6 1,964 2,342 3,520 3,017 4,167 5,396 4,503 5,984 5,863 5,322 5,384 4,975 2,701 1,~~ 130 57,846 8,633 13,299 12,725 14,025 13,932 16,748 14,904 13,309 15,499 23,617 12,288 9,821 10,207 9,018 8,060 2,273 215,820 1958 ._ _. _ 1959 ._. _ 1960 _ 1961 _ 1962 _ 1963 _ 1964 ._._._. _ 1965 _ 1966 _ 1967 _ 1968 _ 1969 _ 1970 _ 1971 ._ 1972 _ 1973 _ -------- Total (entire duration) _ 330 Blind CIA memorandum "for the Record," 1/23{75. B. Admini8trative Processing of the Product Receimed After the FBI liaison agent picked up the Hunter reports at CIA Headquarters, he would bring them to a single desk within the Soviet Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division. The person in charge of this desk was responsible for reviewing all of the correspondence and routing it to interested supervisors in the Division. Copies of the. c~rrespondence would then be returned to the control desk and eIther destroyed, if deemed to be of no value, or filed in a secure area, separated from the rest of the FBI files. Due to the sensitivity of the project, copies of the correspondence never went into a case file directly, although a cross-reference in the case file allowed the retrieval of any relevant correspondence. Knowledge of the project was limited to the operational sections within the Domestic Intelligence Division at Headquarters. Neither the Criminal Division nor any of the field officers were ever advised of the nature of the source. When significant information was developed from Hunter, it would be paraphrased to disguise the true source prior to dissemination to the field officers or other divisions: an informant symbol replaced the term "Project Hunter" on all such correspondence. Field offices would be informed that "[Informant symbol], a most sensitive and reliable source, advised that (individual or organization) of (address) was in contact with (individual or organization; address) during (month, year) .... According to the informant...." 332 The field offices were also warned that information from this source should not be disseminated outside the Bureau nor set out in any investigative report, and that information from the informant should be utilized for lead purposes only.333 O. Nature and Value of the Product Received Durin!! the fifteen years of Hunter's operation, the Bureau received information which was considered valuable in both its counterintel- ... Memorandum from FBI SA #4 to W. A. Branigan, 11/26/62. ... Ibid. 633 ligence and its domestic intelligence efforts; it also received a significant volume of material that was valueless. Project Hunter revealed, for example, the location and future plans of a large number of individuals of im'estigative interest to the FBI, and the "pro-communist sympathies" of numerous American citizens, but it did not lead to the identification of any foreign illegal agents.3 3< TypicaI counterintelligence information generated from the program, as stated in the annual FBI evaluation reports, included: "travel plans to the rSSR of nunwrous Communist PaI'ty subjects; ... data indirating pro-Sm'iet sympathies of es. individuals; ... data indirating a F.S. person may be serving as a Soviet courier; ... data indirating the existence of particular Russian sorial and art clubs in the F.S.; data indicating a desire of F.S. students to study in USSR; contacts in this country of Secmity Index (SI) subjects vacationing and studying abroad; ... [d]ata regarding current and former U.S. exchange students show[ingJ Soviet and U.S. contarts before and after return, romantic involvements, sympathies and difficulties encountered in Russia; ... plans of seven individuals to repatriate to the rSSR; ... U.S. contacts with current and former known and suspected Soviet agents now in the USSR ..." 335 In addition, essentially domestic intelligence was received "regarding persons involved in the peace movements, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, women's organizations, 'teach-ins' ..., racial matters, Progressive Labor Party, Students for a Democratic Society, DuBois Clubs, Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and other organizations." 33r. The fact that an aide to a United States Senator requested a Moscow dance company to perrorm in the United States was discovered through Hunter and duly filed,337 as was the fact that the foreign-born wife of a man who would shortly become an aide to Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman expected to be in a position to become friendly with President Kennedy.33s Information such as that listed above was considered to be valuable by the Bureau.339 A 1966 evaluation or Hunter by the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division stated that "[t ]he value or this material is shown by the ract that there was an increase or 53% in the number of new cases opened on the basis or inrormation rurnished by the source. . . . More than 260 new eases were opened and 96 cases were reopened. The majority of new cases were opened on the basis or travel to the USSR and contacts or U.S. citizens~ Latin Americans, and 33< Branigan, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 168. The FBI defines "illegal agent" as "a highly trained specialist in espionage tradecraft. He may be a [foreign] national and/or a professional intelligence officer dispatched to the United States under a false identity. SOme illegals are trained in the scientific and technical field to permit easy access to sensitive areas of employment". (FBI Monograph, "Intelligence Activities Within the United States by Foreign Governments," 3/20/75.) .... Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 12/5/60; memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 6/9/61: memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan 12/5/61; memorandum from Supervisor #1 to W. A. Branigan, 10/29/62; memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 11/2/62; mf'morandum from Project Supervisor #2 to W. A. Branigan, 8/21/64, 8/30/65, 8/24/66, and 8/28/69. ... Memorandum from Project Supervisor #2 to W. A. Branigan, 8/24/66. :J3T Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan. 6/9/61. ... [md. ... Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 73. 634 Cubans in the U.S. with individuals in the USSR." 340 A 1973 informational memomndum routed to Acting Director Patrick Gray noted that" [w]e have always considered the product from Project Hunter as valuable to our investigative interests." 341 As discussed in Part II above, however, this projeot was not as valuable to the FBI's counterespionage mis;;ion as CIA officials assumed it to be. Large numbers of inter~pted communications were received from the Agency, but many of them-95 percent according to the FBI Special Agent 342 who was in charge of the administrative aspects of Hunter for five 'years-were considered valueless, either because they contained nothmg of counterintelligence value or because the information supplied merely duplicated information already in the Bureau case files. 343 William A. Branigan agreed that much of the product could be characterized as "junk," 344 and asserted that the relative value 01 this project must be evaluated in light 01 the fact that this source cost the Bureau nothing, either in terms of dollars or in terms of manpower.345 V. TERMINATION OF THE PROJECT All of the FBI's own mail opening programs were discontinued in mid-1966,346 yet Bureau officials gave no thought at that time to terminating the Hunter Project. As explained by Mr. Branigan, Hunter was considered to be a CIA operation. It was operated at no cost or risk to the Bureau. There was therefore no reason to cut off this source when the Bureau's own programs were terminated.347 Thus, the FBI continued to receive the fruits of mail opening long after its own agents were prohibited from opening the mail themselves. Project Hunter was also not terminated for approximately three years after J. Edgar Hoover wrote a footnote in the 1970 "Huston Report" which contained this language: "The FBI is 0Pl?osed to implementing any covert mail coverage [i.e., mail openingJ because It is clearly illegal and it is likely that, if done, information would leak out of the Post Office to the press and serious damage would be done to the intelligence community." 348 The FBI Director, therefore, was apparently willing to allow the Bureau to receive information from a source that he himself described as "clearly illegal" and which he believed could seriously jeopardize the American intelligence community. Project Hunter was only terminated when the CIA itself suspended the New York operation in mid-February 1973, for reasons which are discussed in Part II aJbove. At that time, the FBI was approached by Agency representatives to determine whether or not the Bureau wished to assume responsi1bility for the project, since the Bureau had 'been ... Memorandum from Project Supervisor #2 to Branigan, 8/24/66. "1 Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to E. S. Miller, 2/15/73. ... Project Supervisor #1, 10/l/75, p. 60. M3 Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 81 ; Project Supervisor #1, 10/1/75, p. 60. ... Branigan, 10/24/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 168. ... Staff summary of W. A. Branigan interview, 9/11/75. :M6 See pp. 668-670. .., Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 89. "'" Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1WO. p.31. 635 the largest consumer of information developed from this source.349 Lieutenant General Vernon A. 'Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA, scheduled a meeting with Acting FBI Director Gray on February 16, 1973 to discuss this possibility.350 The Bureau, however, declined to assume responsibility for the project, primarily because of the attendant expense, manpower requirements,and security prdblems. According to "William Branigan, legal considerations were not a factor in this decision; it was simply thought to be too large and risky an operation to be undertaken by Bureau agents.351 The suspension of operations therefore proved to bp permanent. VI. IXTERXAL AlJTIIORIZATIOX AXD COXTROLS A. Initial Approt'al by and Oontinuing Knowledge of the Director It is dear that FBI Director Hoover personally approved Project Hunter from its inception. Hoover's initial and his written "OK" are signed on the first document in the Project Hunter policy file, the January 22,1958, memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, which sets out the basic facts regarding CIA coverage and possible use of such coverage.352 He also personally approved the first (1958) and the final (1972) guidelines that went to the Agency,353 the initial policy memorandum dealing with the handling of Hunter material,354 and informational memoranda regarding the "HunterVince" (Latin American mail) aspect of the program.355 In March 1961, the FBI was informed by .James Angleton that the CIA had developed a laboratory capability in New York City to test intercepted correspondence for microdots and other secret writing techniques.356 The CIA offered the use of this laboratory to the Bureau if Bureau agents should ever want to use it. (Apparently this was never used by the FBI.) 357 Hoover was informed of the laboratory and the CIA offer in a 'March 10, 1961, memorandum, on which he penned the phrase "Another inroad !" 358 Acting Director L. Patrick Gray was also made aware of Project Hunter by at least February 16, 1973, the date he initialed the February 15, 1973, memorandum from W. A. Branigan to E. S. Miller and was scheduled to meet with Lt. General Walters regarding the possible take-over of the project by the FBI.359 This, however, was one day after the project was actually terminated. H. I nte1"11lJ1 0 ontrols Several of the internal controls which were developed for Project Hunter have already been noted. Knowledge of the true nature of ... Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 42; Papich, 9/22/75, p. 79. 350 Memorandum from Branigan to Miller, 2/15/73. 361 Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 89. ... Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 1/22/58. 3M Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 2/6/58; J. Edgar Hoover routing slip (attachment), 3/10/72. ... Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 4/21/58. 3M Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 3/27/63. 366 Memorandum from D. E. Moore to A. H. Belmont, 3/10/61. u7Moore, 10/1/75,p. 15. ... Memorandum from Moore to Belmont, 3/10/61. ... Memorandum from Branigan to Miller, 2/15/73. 69-984 0 - 76 - 4i 636 this source was closely held to those sections within the Domestic Intelligence Division which had a nood-to-know; dissemination of information outside Headquarters was always disguised and Field Offices were cautioned that the information could be used for lead purposes only. In addition, the project was evaluated at least annually by the Project Supervisor. These evaluations, which summarized the information received from the project during the previous year, were passed up through channels and generally were reviewed by at least an Assistant to the Director.3GO VII. EXTERNAL AUTHORIZATION A. Attorneys General There is no evidence that any Attorney General was ever informed by Bureau officials about the existence of Project Hunter. It was explained by one Bureau official that since the project was a CIA rather than an FBI project, there was no need to seek Justice Department approv'al or even to inform Justice Department officials about the fact that mail was being opened in the project.361 B. Postmd8ters General There is also no evidence that any FBI official ever informed any Postmaster General or Chief Postal Inspector about Project Hunter. The February 15, 1973 memorandum from W. A. Branigan to E. S. Miller states that "[a]rrangements for the [CIA projectJ were obviously worked out between the Agency and Post Office officials and we are not privy to the detuils".362 O. Presidents There is similarly no evidence that any President was aware of Project Hunter. PART IV: FBI MAIL OPENING I. INTRODUCTION AND MAJOR FACTS The FBI, like the CIA, conducted several mail opening programs of its own within the United States. Eight programs were conducted in as many cities between the years 1940 and 1966; the longest was operated, with one period of suspension, throughout this entire twentysix year period; the shortest ran for less than six weeks. FBI use of this technique was initially directed against the Axis powers immediately before and during World War II, but during the decade of the 1950's and the first half of the 1960's all of the programs responded to the Bureau's concern with communism. At least three more limited instances of FBI mail opening also occurred in relation to particular espionage cases in the early 1960's. Significant differences may be found between the FBI mail opening programs and those of the CIA. First, the stated purposes of the two sets of program generally reflects the agencies' differing intelligence 360 Project Supervisor #1, 10/1/75, p. 38. 381 Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 90. 36' Memorandum from Branigan to Miller, 2/15/73. 637 jurisdiction: the FBI programs were, in the main, fairly narrowly directed at the detection and identification of foreign illegal agents rather than the collection of foreign positive intelligence. Thus, no premium was placed on the large-scale collection of foreign intelligence information per se; in theory (if not always in practice), only information that might reasonably be expected to provide leads in counterespionage cases was sought. Because of this, the total volume of mail opened in Bureau programs was less than that in the CIA programs. An equally important factor contributing to the smaller volume of opened mail lay in the selection criteria used in several of the FBI's programs. These criteria were more sophisticated than the random and Watch List methods used by the CIA; they enabled trained Bureau agents to make more reasoned determinations, on the basis of exterior examinations of the envelopes, as to whether or not the communications might be in some sense "suspect." Third, the FBI mail opening programs were much more centralized and tightly administered than the CIA programs. All but one (which resulted in a reprimand from the Director) received prior approval at the highest levels of the Bureau. They were evaluated and had to be reapproved at least annually. Several of them-unlike the CIA's New York projectwere discontinued on the basis of unfavorable internal evaluations. This high degree of central control clearly mirrored the organizational differences between the FBI and the CIA, and is not limited to mail opening operations alone. Finally, there is less evidence that FBI officials considered their programs to be illegal or attempted to fabricate "cover stories" in the event of exposure. Bureau officials, for the most part, apparently did not focus on questions of legality or "flap potential" strategies; they did not necessarily consider them to be legal or without the potential for adverse public reaction, they simply did not dwell on legal issues or alternative strategies at all. In some respects, the Bureau's mail opening programs were even more intrusive than the CIA's. At least three of them, for example, involved the interception and opening of entirely domestic mailthat is, mail sent from one point within the United States to another point within the United States. All of the CIA programs, by contrast, involved at least one foreign "terminal". The Bureau programs also highlight the problems inherent in combining criminal and intelligence functions within a single agency: the irony of the nation's chief law enforcement agency conducting systematic campaigns of mail opening is readily apparent. Despite their differences, however, the FBI mail opening programs illustrate many of the same themes of the CIA programs. Like the CIA, the FBI did not secure the approval of any senior official outside its own organization prior to the implementation of its programs. While these programs, like the CIA's, involved the cooperation of the Post Office Department and the United States Customs Service, there is no evidence that any ranking official of either agency was ever aware that mail was actually opened by the FBI. Similarly, there is no substantial evidence that any President or Attorney General, under whose office the FBI operates, was contemporaneously informed of the programs' existence. As in the case of the CIA, efforts were also made to prevent word of the programs from reaching the 638 ears of Congressmen investigating possible privacy violations by federal agencies. The record, therefore, again suggests that these programs were operated covertly, by virtue of deception, or, at a minimum, lack of candor on the part of intelligence officials. Although the FBI relied on more sophisticated selection criteria in some of their programs, morover, one again sees the same type of "overkill" which is inherent in any mail opening operation. These criteria, while more precise than the methods used by the CIA, were never sufficiently accurate to result in the opening of correspondence to or from illegal agents alone. Indeed, even by the Bureau's own accounting of its most successful program, the mail of hundreds of American citizens was opened for every one communication that led to an illegal agent. And several of the FBI programs did not employ these refined criteria: mail in these programs was opened on the basis of methods much more reminiscent of the CIA's random and Watch List criteria. In the FBI programs one again sees the tendency of this technique, once in place, to be used for purposes outside the agency's institutional jurisdiction. 'While the Bureau has no mandate to collect foreign positive intelligence, for example, several of the programs did in fact result in the gathering of this type of information. More seriously, the record reveals for a second time the ease with which these programs can be directed inward against American citizens: the Bureau programs, despite their counterespionage purpose, generated at least some information of a strictly domestic nature, about criminal activity outside the national security area, and, significantly, about antiwar organizations and their lel1ders. Perhaps the most fundamental theme illustrated by both the FBI's and the CIA's programs is this: that trained intelligence officers in both agencies, honestly perceiving a foreign and domestic threat to the security of the country, believed that this threat sanctionedeven necessitated-their use of a technique that was not authorized by any President and was contrary to law. They acted to protect a country whose laws and traditions gave every indication that it was not to be "protected" in such a fashion. The most pertinent facts regarding FBI mail opening may be summarized as follows: (a) The FBI conducted eight mail opening programs in a total of eight cities in the United States for varying lengths of time between 1940 and 1966. (b) The primary purpose of most of the FBI mail opening programs was the identification of foreign illegal agents; all of the programs were established to gather foreign counterintelligence information deemed by FBI officials to be important to the sect;rity of the nnited States. (c) Several of these programs were successful in the identification of illegal agents and were considered by FBI officinls to be one of the most effective means of locating such agents. Several of the programs also generated other types of useful counterintelligence information. (rl) In general, the administrative controls were tight. The pro639 grams were all subject to review by Headquarters semiannually or annually and some of the programs were terminated because they were not achieving the desired results in the counterintelligence field. (e) Despite the internal FBI policy which required prior approval by Headquarters for the institution of these programs, however, at least one of 'them was initiated by a field office, without such approval. (f) Some of the fruits of mail openings were used for other than legitimate foreign counterintelligence purposes. For example. information about individuals who received pornographic material and about drug addicts was forwarded to appropriate FBI field offices and possibly to other federal agencies. (g) Although on the whole these programs did not stray far from their counterespionage goals, they also generated substantial positive foreign intelligence and some essentially domestic intelligence about United States citizens. For example, information was obtained regarding two domestic anti-war organizations and government employees and other American citizens who expressed "pro-communist" sympathies. (h) A significant proportion of the mail that was opened was entirely domestic mail, i.e., the points of origin and destination were both within the United States. (i) Some of the mail that was intercepted was entirely foreign mail, i.e., it originated in a foreign country and was destined to a foreign country, and was simply routed through the United States. (j) FBI agents opened mail in regard to particular espionage cases (as opposed to general programs) in at least three instances in the early 1960's. (1::) The legal issues raised by the use of mail opening as an investigative technique were apparently not seriously considered by FBI officials while the programs continued. In 1970, however, after the FBI mail opening programs had been terminated, J. Edgar Hoover wrote that mail opening was "clearly illegal". (l) At least as recently as 1972, senior officials recommended the reinstitution of mail opening as an investigative technique. (m) No attempt was made to inform any Postmaster General of the mail openings. (n) The Post Office officials who were contacted about these programs, including the Chief Postal Inspector, were not informed of the true nature of the FBI mail surveys, i.e., they were not told that the Bureau contemplated the actual opening of mail. (0) The FBI neither sought nor received the approval of the Attorney General or the President of the United States for its mail opening programs or for the use of this technique generally. (p) Although FBI officials might have informed Justice Department attorneys that mail was opened in two or three particular espionage cases and might have informed an Attorney General of some mail screening operations by the Bureau, no attempt was made to inform the Justice Department, incuding the Attorney General, of the full extent or true nature of these operations. (q) There is no evidence that any President of the United States ever knew of any ongoing FBI mail opening program. 640 II. DESCRIPTIO1'\" OF FBI JlIAIL OPENING PROGRAMS The eight FBI mail opening programs aI'£' summarized below. A. Z-Ooverage Z-Coverage, the first and the longest-running FBI mail opening program. originally involved the opening of mail addressed to the diplomatic establishments of Axis powers in W·ashington, D.C.; in later years, mail coming to similar establishments of several communist nations was targeted. The stated purpose of the prog-ram was "to detect individuals in contact with these establishments who might be attempting to make contact for espionage reasons, for purposes of defecting or who might be illegal agents." 363 This program was initiated in 1940, before the United States entry into ·World 1Var II, with FBI agents who had been trained in the technique of "chamfering" (mail opening by representatives of an allied country's censorship agency.364 It was suspended after the war but reinstituted in 1Vashington, D.C. in the early or mid-1950's on the recommendation of the local FBI field oflice. 365 For more than a decade, mail from both foreign and domestic points of origin was intercepted at tIl(' Main Post Office, brought to the FBI Laboratory for opening and photographing, and returned to the Post Office prior to deli very. In 1959, Z-Coverage was extendecl to New York City as well. As implemented in New York, about 30 to 60 letters addressed to various diplomatic establishments in that city were intercepted at the Grand Central and Lenox Hill Post Offices each day for opening and photographing at the New York Field Office. 366 Some registered mail sent to these establishments was opened as well.367 Despite its perceived success at both locations, Z-Coverage was terminated in July 1966. B. Survey No.1 Survey No.1 operated in a total of six cities for varying len~hs of time between 1959 and 1966. It involved the opening of certam outgoing mail to selected cities in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, and was considered to be the most successful of all the FBI's mail opening programs. Its purposes, as summarized in a 1961 FBI memorandum, were two: " (1) to identify persons corresponding with known espionage mail drops in Europe, and (2) to identify persons in the United States who are directing letters to possible mail drops in Europe and whose letters appear to be the product of an illegal agent." 368 Survey No.1 was first instituted in New York City on October 1, 1959, as a direct result of knowledge the FBI had recently acquired about the means by which foreign illegal agents communicated to their principals abroad. Once in operation, Bureau agents, in a secure room 363 Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/8/7;;. 36< Memorandum from C. E. Hennrich to A. H. Belmont, 9/7/51. 365 )!emorandum from E. T. Turner to C. E. Hennrich. 6/25/51; FBI SA #5 testimony, 10/10/75, pp. 4, 5. 3M FBI Spl'cial Agl'nt #1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 23. ""' FBI Special Agent #] statement. 9/]0/75. pp. 38, 39. ... Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 5/25/61. 641 at Idlewild Airport's Airmail Facility screened more than 425,000 letters from the Lnited States to points in ·Western Europe each week.369 Selected item&-a total of 1,011 in seven years-370 were returned to the New York Field Office for opening and photographing prior to reinsertion into the mailstream. In August 1961, after nearly two years of operation in New York, FBI officials believed that Survey No.1 was so successful that it was extended to four additional cities--Boston, Los Angeles, Seattle, and ",Vashin6>i:on, D.C. 371-where coverage included mail not only to European cities but to Asia and the Americas as ,veIl. Survey No.1 was also extended to Detroit on a sixty-day trial basis in April 1962.372 The expanded coverage in all c.ities but ·Washington did not prove to be as successful as the original effort in New York, however. After thirteen months of operation in Los Angeles, seventeen months in Seattle, one year in Boston, and four months in Detroit, a decision was made at Headquarters to terminate the program in these cities because of "unproductivity and manpower needs." 373 After February 1963, therefore, Survey No.1 operated only in New York and Washington. In these two cities the annual evaluations 374 continued to praise the effectiveness of Survey No.1 and it was continued to operate at both locations until all of the mail opening programs were terminated in mid-1966. O. Survey No.2 Survey No.2 operated in New York City, Detroit, and San Francisco for varying lengths of time between March 1961 and March 1962; its purpose was again the location and identification of illegal agentsY5 No.2 was, in essence, an inverse No.1: incoming mail to urban postal zones in which illegal agents were believed likely to reside was screened and opened, on the basis of the same criteria used in Survey No.1, in an attempt to intercept the other half of the communication link between illegal agents and their principals. Since mail coming into these postal zones was screened irrespective of the point of origin, much of the mail that was opened was entirely domestic maIl.376 Survey No.2 originated as an outgrowth of No. 1. It was first implemented on March 8, 1961, in postal zones 23, 24, and 25 in New York City, with Post Office employees rather than Bureau agents screening the in-coming mail.377 The Post Office personnel were briefed by the FBI as to the selection criteria but were not informed of the true nature of the program. ",Vhen they discovered a suspect commu- "'" Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 8/31/61. :m> W. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/22/75. p. 5. 371 Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/4/61. .,. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroi,t Field Office, 4/13/62; Serious consideration was given by FBI officials to extending this program to five other American cities as w.ell. Such an extension was rejected largely for security reasons. (Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/4/61.) 373 Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/8/64, 370 E.g., Memorandum from New York Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 4/5/66. ..,. Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/8/75. 37. Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 5. 37' Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 8/31/61. 642 nication, it was turned over to the FBI and, without their knowledge, opened and photographed at the field office before being returned to the mailstream. On the basis of "test" letters sent by the Bureau, however, their performance was judged inadequate and, in September 1961, FBI agents replaced the postal workers in screening the mail.378 In October 1961, the program was also extended to both Detroit (zone 31 and the Hamtramck area) 379 and San Francisco (all mail sent to that city from New York and 'Washington) on a trial basis. ;80 Survey No. 2 was considered unsuccessful in all of these cities and was consequently discontinued in Detroit and San Francisco in February 1962, and in New York-after a total of approximately 2,350 letters had been opened-38l on March 9, 1962.38la D. Survey No.3 Survey No. 3 was conducted in New York City from June 1963 to June 1964, and involved the opening of mail (irrespective of point of origin) addressed to known or suspected intelligence agents employed at a diplomatic establishment. The purpose of Survey No.3 was to detect contacts of an intelligence nature with these agents, who, FBI officials believed, received such mail using the secure cover of their diplomatic employment.382 This program was appa,rently an outgrowth of the Bureau's coverage of mail to various other diplomatic establishments in New York (Z-Coverage). Although its precise genesis is undocumented, one of the participants in the program recalled that the idea originated with another lligent, then involved with Z-Coverage, who felt that existing coverage was inadequate and should be expanded.383 Headquarters subsequently approved the idea, and, on .Tune 25, 1963, Survey No.3 was instituted in New York. Each working day for the next year, a single agent from the New York office went to the Grand Centra,l Post Office where a postal clerk brought him all the mail that was addressed to the Post Office box of the t,argeted diplomatic establishment-approximllitely 200 letters per day, according to the lligent who was assigned to this task.38 On the basis of a list of about thirty diplomatic officials, which was compiled from public source information, the agent segregated the mail addressed to these officials and carried the letters----estimated by him to average five Or six per dlliy_385 to the New York office for opening and photographing. Survey No. 3 was not considered to be successful by the Bureau and was discontinued on .June 26, 1964. 378 Ibid. aT, Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. O. Sullivan, 10/2/61. 389 :Uemorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 10/18/61. 381 :\Iemorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, 8/31/61; memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 12/21/61; memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/5/62. asta Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/3/62. ... Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/8/75. 383 Staff' summary of FBI Special Agent #6 interview, 8/12/75. ... Ibid. 380 Ibid. 643 E. Survey No. 4 Survey No.4 was conducted in Miami, Florida, between January 1963 and July 1966. It involved the screening and opening of certain airmail from Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico, to two Latin American countries for the purpose of locating clandestine communications in particular espionage cases.3S c, Survey No.4 developed from an espionage ease in which the Bureau had leaJ'lH'd that a Latin American intelligence agent who operated in the rnited States hut whose true identity was unknown, was under instmctions to transmit material to his country's intelligence service by mail. In order to intercept this agent's written communications, Bureau officials at Headquarters formulated a plan to screen and seleetively open mail from San Juan and Miami to that country utilizing their knowledge of its intelligence correspondence, and on December 21, 1962, they authorized the Miami Field Office to implement the program.387 While the program was initially instituted as a response to a single espionage case, it soon developed into a more generalized survey W detect clandestine communications from any suspected espionage agent working for the same country. Its scope was further broadened on December 9, 1963, when the Miami office was instructed to cover mail from that city to another Latin American country as well.3sB Bureau agents in Survey No.4 screened between 12,000 and. 20,000 letters per day at the Biscayne Annex Post Office in Miami.389 A total of 400 letters were opened,390 either in the Post Office itself, or, when secret writing or microdots were suspected, in the FBI Laboratory in 'iVashington, to which they were flown for more sophisticated examination before reinsertion into the mailstream.391 Survey No. 4 was considered to be successful but was terminated along with other FBI mail opening programs, in July 1966. F. >Survey No. 5 Survey No. 5 was the first of three FBI mail opening programs which were conducted in San Francisco and directed against Asian communists and their sympathizers. It began in September 1954 and continued until January 1966. This survey originally involved the physical inspection of third and fourth class propaganda from a Far East Asian country; after August 1956, incoming first class letter mail was selectively opened and photographed as well. The stated purpose of this program was to identify individuals in the United States who, because of the nature of their foreign contacts, were believed to constitute a threat to the internal security of the United States.382 Like the CIA's New Orleans and Hawaiian mail intercept projects, Surv,ey No.5 was initially an extension of the Customs Service examination of propaganda material entering the United States from abroad. ... w. R. Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 21. 387 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/21/62. 388 ~lemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/9/63. 380 Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 36. ... Wannall, 10/22/75, p. 12. 811' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/21/62. ... Memorandum from S. B. Donahoe to W. C. Sullivan, 9/15/61. 644 Customs Service cooperation ceased, however, on May 26, 1965, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Lamont v. Postrrwster General of the United States, :381 U.S. :301 (1965), which invalidatd the statutory authority under which Customs conducted its propaganda inspection.393 Contact was subsequently made with officials of the Post Office and, with their assistance, No. 5 Survey recommenced at the Hincon Annex Post Office on July 7, 1965. Approximatey 13,500 items of mail were screened in two hour periods each day by Bureau agents who participated in this program. 394 A daily average of 50 to 100 of these letters were returned to the San Francisco Field Office for opening and photographing prior to their reinsertion into the mailstream.395 Survey No.5 was terminated on .Tanuary 24, 1966, "for security reasons lllvolving local changes in postal personnel." 396 G. Survey No.6 Survey No.6 was also conducted in San Francisco, operating from January 1964 until January 1966. This program involved the screeninp; and opening of outgoing mail from the United States to the same Far East Asian country; it was essentially an inverse Survey No.5. The stated purposes of Survey No. 6 were to obtain foreign counterintelligence information concerning Americans residing in the Far East Asian country; to detect efforts to persuade scientists and other persons of Asian descent residing in the United States to return to that country; to develop information concerning economic and social conditions there; and to secure information concerning subjects in the United States of a security interest to the Bureau who were corresponding with individuals in that Asian country.397 In June 1963, the New York Field Office had extended its Survey No.1 coverage to include airmail destined for Asia, which was then handled at the same location where European mail was processed. When Post Office procedures changed a few months later, and the Asian mail was routed through San Francisco rather than New York, Headquarters instructed the San Francisco office to assume responsibility for this coverage. The program operated, with one period of suspension, for two years until .Tanuary 24, 1966, when it was terminated for the same security reasons as the Survey No. 5.398 Figures as to the volume of mail screened and opened cannot be reconstructed. H. Survey No.7 Survey No. 7 was conducted in San Francisco from .Tanuary to November 1961. It involved the screening and opening of mail be- 303 See p. 563, W. Raymond Wannall testifiw: "I don't think [this] decision made any difference with regard 00 the legality or illegality of that operation which we were conducting or the illegality of the operation which was beyond the interception of the propaganda starting in 1956." W. Raymond Wannall 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 169, 1970. ... Memorandum from S. R. Donahoe to A. H. Belmont, 2/23/61. 3""l\Iemorandum from Donahoe to Belmont, 2/23/61; memorandum from Han Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60. 396 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, ;'/19/66. "'" Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 9/8/75. 398 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/66. 645 t\veen North Americans of Asian descent for the purpose of deteetin,g Communist intelligence efforts directed against this country.399 Survey No.7 evolved from the Survey No.5 and particular espionage cases handled by the San Francisco Field Office. Without instructions from Headquarters, that office initiated a survey of mail between North Americans of Asian descent in January 1961, and informed Headquarters of the program shortly after it was implemented. On February 28, 1961. Headquarters officials instructed San Francisco to terminate the program because the expected benefits were not believed to justify the additional manpower required by the FBI Laboratory to translate the intercepted letters.4oo The San Francisco Field Office was permitted to use this source when it was deemed necessary in connection with particular espionage cases, but even this limited use proved unproductive. It was terminated on November 20, 1961, after a total of 83 letters had been opened.401 I. Typical Operati011al Details The specific operabional details of the eight programs descri'bed above obviously varied from program to program. The New York Field Office's conduct of Survey No.1 represented a pattern that typified these programs, however, in terms of mechanical aspects such as the physical handling of the mail itself. In August 1961, before the extenSIOn of Survey No.1 to Boston, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Washington, D.C., the New York Office was instructed to describe the operational detalils of this Survey as implemented in that city for the benefit of field offices in the four additional cities. A memorandum was subsequently prepared for distribution to these cities, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below: [Survey No.1] in New York is located in a secure room at the U.S. Post Office Airmail Facility, New York International Airport, Idlewild, New york.... This room . . . measures approximately 9 feet wide by 12 feet long and . . . is locked at all times, whether or not ,the room is in use ... Postal employees have no tlccesS to this room which is known to them as the Inspector's Room. Seven Special Agents are assigned to [Survey No.1] on a full-time basis. The survey operates 7 days a week and personnel work on rotating 8-hour shifts ... Personnel assigned to the survey work under the guise of Postal Inspectors and are known to Post Office personnel as Postal Inspectors working on a special assignment.... . . . [B]y arrangement with the postal officials, [mail] pouches to destinations in which we have indicated interest are not sealed but are placed in front of the [Survey No.1] room. The [Survey No.1] personnel then take the bag into the room, open the pouch, untie the bundles, and review the ... Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/61 ; M~~orandum from San Franciso Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/27/61. Memorandum from FBI Headquarter to San Francisco Field Office 2/28/61. '0' WannalI, 10/22/7fi, p. 16; Memol'Undum from San Franciso Field Office to FBI Ht>adquartt>rs, 11/27/61. 646 mail. Any suspect letters are held aside and the rest are rebundled and returned to the pouch. The pouch is then closed and placed outside the door to the room on a mail skid. Postal employees then take that pouch, seal it with a lead seal and place it aside for, or turn it over to, the carrier.... It should be noted that the mail must be turned over by the the Post Office Department to the carrier one hour before departure time ... . . . Each day, one of the Agents is selected as a courier, al~d when the. opportunity presents itself, he returns to the FIeld Office wIth the suspected communications. At the Field Office, he or a.nother 1\gent who has been trained by the Bureau m certam techmques opens the communications. The envelope and its contents are photographed ... There will be instances where the Field Office, upon opening the communication, may deem it advisable to immediately notify the Bureau and possibly fly it by courier to the Bureau for examination by the Laboratory. Before making any arrangements to fly the communication to the Bureau, the Field Office should consider the time the examination will take and the time the suspected communication may be placed back in the mail without arousing any suspicion on the part of the addressee. After the communication has been photographed and resealed, the courier returns to the airport and places the sus· pected communication in the next appropriate outgoing pOlich examined in the [Survey No.1] Room. If time permits. the pouch is held in the room until the suspected communication is returned.402 A device developed by the FBI Laboratory and maintained at participating field offices facilitated the opening process. While this device was relatively simple, it was not as primitive as the kettle and stick method utilized by the CIA agents who opened mail in the New York project and allowed for greater efficiency: the FBI's opening process was reported to take only a second or two for It single letter,403 in contrast to five to fifteen seconds for the CIA. According to one of the agents involved, special training in the USe of this device was given at the field office rather than at Headquarters, and was only of one or two days duration,404 in contrast to the week-long training sessions required of CIA mail openers. Filing and internal dissemination procedures also varied somewhat from program to program. In Z-Coverage, the negatives of the photographic copies were filed at the field offices in New York and 'Vashfngton for approximately one year after interception, after which time they were destroyed.405 If the developed prints were believed to co~tain valuable cOllnterintellig-ence information, thev would be dissemInated to appropriate supervisors within the field office for placement in a confidential central file or a particular case file. In the latter case. 4.. Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/29/61. 4<1. FBI Special Agent 1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 14. 404 FBI Special Agent 1 statement, 9/10/7;), pp. 11,12. 405 Staff summary of FBI Special Agent 7 interView, 9/15/75. 647 the true source would be disguised by an informant symbol, although, as one supenisor in the New York ofike noted, the nature of the source would be clear to those familiar with Bureau operations.406 No index was maintained of the names of all senders and/or addressees whose mail "'as intercepted, as was maintained by the CIA in the Xew York project. In rare cases when a letter was conside, red to be of exceptional counterintelligence value, a photograph would be sent to Headquarters as well. As a general rule, however, there was no dissemination, either of the photographs themselves or of abstracts of the letters, to other field office,s.407 These procedures generally applied to Survey No.1 and Survey No. 2 as weE, but in these t,vo surveys the photographs of intercepted letters were dated and numbered, and one copy or abstract was placed in a control file maintained by each participating field office. In Surveys No. is and No.6, the San Francisco Field Office was responsible for conducting "name checks" on all individuals sending or receiving mail that had been opened. If, on the basis of the name check or the text of the letter itself, it was determined that the intercepted letter had intelligence value, a copy of the letter (if written in English) 01' of the translation (if ,nitten in a foreign language) was placed in the main files of the San Francisco office. That office was also responsible for paraphrasing the contents of letters in which other field offices may have had an intelligence interest, and disseminating the information to them in a manner which would not reveal the true souree of the information. Except for letters written in a foreign language, photographs of which were sent to 'Vashington for translation, copies were not sent to Headquarters unless the letter was of particularly great intelligence value. ,T. Other Instances of FBI "Afa,il Opening In addition to the eight mail sun'eys described in sections A through H above, it has also been alleged tha't a Bureau agent actively participated in the CIA's Hawaiian mail intercept project during the mid-1950s. The CIA representative in Honolulu who conducted this operation stated that an FBI agent assisted him in opening and photographing incoming mail from Asia for a period of two months in early 1955.408 No supporting Bureau documents could be located to confirm this participation, however. Aside from generalized surveys of mail, several isolated instances of mail opening by FBI agents occurred in connection with particular espionage eases. It was, in faet, a standard practice to attempt to open the mail of any known illegal agent. As stated by one former Bureau intelligencp officer: "... anytime ... we identified an Illegal agent ... we would try to obtain their mai1." 409 FBI agents were successful in this endeavor in at least three cases, described below. 1. lVashil1gton, D.C. (1.961) One isolated instance of mail opening by FBI agents occurred in 'Washington, D.C., in 1961, preceding the local implementation of <00 Ibid. <01 Ibid. '0' Sl'e p. 623. '00 Moore. 10/1/75. p. 75. 648 Suney No. 1. This case involved the opening of sevBral itBms of correspondence from a known illBgal agBnt rBSiding in the Washington area to a mail drop in Europe. The letters, which \vere returned to the FBI Laboratory for opening, were intercepted over a period in excess of six months.410 2. Washington, D.C. (1.963--64) A second mail opening project in regard to a particular espionage case occurred for approximately one and one-half years in Washington, D.C., in 1963 and 1964, in connection with the FBI's investigation of known Soviet illegal agents Robert and Joy Ann Baltch. This case was subsequently prosecutBd, but the prosecution was ultimately dropped, in part, according to FBI officials, because some of the evidBnce was tainted by usc of this tBchniquB.4l1 S. Southern California A third isolatBd instance of mail opening occurred in a southern California city for a one to two-month period in 1962. This project involvBd the opening of approximately one to six letters received each day by a suspBeted illegal agent who resided nearby. The suspected agent's mail was delivered on a elaily basis to three FBI agents who workeel out of the local resielent FBI office, anel \\'as opened in a back room in that office.412 III. NATURE AND VALUE OF THE PRODUCT A. Selection Criteria Those FBI mail opening programs which were designed to cover mail to or from foreign illegal agents utilized selection criteria that werB more refined than the "shotgun" method m used by the CIA in the New York intercept project. Mail \vas opened on the basis of certain "indicators" on the outside of the envelopes that suggested that the communicwtion might be to or from an illegal agent. The record reveals, however, that dBSpite the claimed success of these "indicators" in locating such agents, they were not so precise as to eliminate individual discretion on the part of the agents who opened the mail, nor could they prevent the opening of significant volumes of mail to or from entirely innocent American citizens. Mail in those programs which were designed for purposes other than locating illegal agents, moreover, was generally opened on the basis of criteria far less narrow and even more intrusive than these "indieators." 1. The Programs Based O1VlndicatoTs Before 1959, the FBI had developed no effective means to intercept the communication link between illegal agents and their principals. In Z-Coverage, selection was originally left to the complete discretion of 4tO Moore, 10/1/74, pp. 72-74; Branigan 10/9/75, pp. 33, 34; memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/4/61. 411 Moore, 10/1/75, p. 38; Branigan, 10/9/75, pp. 34, 35..Justice Department officials have testified that the prosecution was dropped for other reasons. See pp. 664-665. m Postal Inspector #1 deposition, 9/16/7;', pp. 23, 46; Branigan, 10/9/75, !lP.30-32. 413 Angleton 9/17/75, p. 28. 649 the agents who screened the mail based on their knowledge and training in the espionage field. The focus was apparently on mail from individuals rather than organizations, and typewritten letters were considered more likely to be from foreign agents than handwritten letters.414 In March 1959, however, the FBI was able to develop much more precise selection criteria through the identification and subsequent incommunicado interrogation of an illegal agent. During the course of his interrogation by Bureau agents, he informed the FBI of the instructions he and other illegal agents were given when corresponding with their principals.415 Particular characteristics on the outside of the envelope, he advised them, indicated that the letter may be from such an agent. Armed with a knowledge of these "indicators," the FBI agents involved in Z-Coverage were capable of a more selective and accurate means of identifying suspect communications. Survey No. 1 and Survey No.2 were expressly developed to exploit this knowledge.416 'Vhile Survey No. 1 also utilized a Watch List which consisted of the addresses of known or suspected mail drops abroad, as well as the (generally fictitious) names of known or suspected foreign intelligence agents,417 the primary selection criteria in both Surveys No.1 and No. 2 were the "indicators" about which the Bureau learned in early 1~il9.418 By means of the "indicators," the Bureau did, in fact, identify three illegal agents through these programs.419 But even by the Bureau's own accounting of the number of letters that were opened in the programs, it is clear that the mail of hundreds of innocent American citizens was opened and read for every successful lead obtained.420 The random element in the selection process was never eliminated: although FBI officials at Headquarters instructed agents in the field to select only letters with multiple "indicators" on their face,m the field agents frequently opened letters with but one "indicator", which could often be of such a common nature that it could be found on most letters mailed in the United States.423 One of the FBI agents who opened mail stated that he was trained in counterespionage work generally, and in the identification of the indicators specifically, but he conceded that in the final analysis "it was strictly my own judgment" as to which items would be selected for opening.424 Perhaps as a result of such personal discretion on the part ." FBI Special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 20. m Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 3. '" Staff Summary of Branigan interview, 9/11/75. <I7 Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/27/68. ". Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 3. .,~ Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 5. '" In Z-Coverage, one participating agent testified that he opened 30 to 60 letters each day. (Note 366, 8upra.) In Survey No.1, a total of 1,011 were opened in New York City alone; statistics on the number of letters opened in the five other cities in which this survey operated cannot be reconstructed. (Note 370, supra.) In Survey No.2, 2.350 letters were opened by the New York office; statistics for the Detroit and San Francisco offices are unavailable. (Note 381, 8upra.) <n Branigan, 10/9/75, pp. 21, 22. ... FBI special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 25. ... FBI Special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 19. 650 of participating agents, Survey No.1 generated essentially domestic intelligence on at least two American antiwar organizations as well as genuine counterespionage information.425 In short, knowledge of the indicators did enable the Bureau to be more 'precise in the selection of mail than was previously possible, but thIS knowledge was not so precise as to totally eliminate the discretion- or bias-of the agents involved. 2. The Latin American-Oriented Program In Survey No.4, which involved the interception of mail to two Latin American nations, letters were selected for opening on the basis of lists of (a) known fictitious names used by illegal agents to address correspondence to their principals, and (b) accommodation addresses used by a foreign intelligence service for receiving clandestine communications.426 The "indicators" discussed above were not utilized in this or the Asian-oriented mail opening programs. 3. The Asian-Oriented Programs Survey No.5 and Survey No.6 both employed seven general categories as selection criteria: (a) Letters to or from a university, scientific, or technical facility; (b) Letters to or from a doctor; (c) Letters to or from selected Security Index subjects residing in the United States; (d) Letters to or from an Asian country where certain scientific activities were reportedly taking place; (e) LctJters to or from individuals who were known to be "turncoats" from the Korean conflict; (f) LOOters believed to emanate from an Asian Communist intelligence service based on covers of which the FBI was aware; and (g) Letters indicating illegal travel of Americans to denied areas in Asia.427 Even if one la8Sumes that these guidelines were strictly observed by the agents opening the mail, (which, given some of the results of these programs as set fovth below,428 is not necessarily as accur3Jte assumption) there was obviously 'ample room for the capture of large numbers of entirely personal communio3Jtions with no counterintelligence value at all. The selootion cfliterua utilized in Survey No. 7 cannot be reconstructed. B. Requests by Other Intelligence Agencies . No large-scale requirements were levied upon the FBI's ma:il openmg programs by any other intelligence agency. Bureau officials, in fact, severely restricted knowledge of their programs within the in- <'" See p. 655. ,. Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 22. m LelJter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 10/29/75. This letter also stated that no "Watch list" was maintained because "the limitations involved in reviewing over 13,000 letters a day within a two-hour period did not allow sufficient time to compare these letters with a list of names." <,. See pp. 654--655. 651 rtelligence community; only the CIA knew of any of the Bureau's programs, and officers of thaJt agency were formallyadviserl about the existence of only one of the f'ight, Survey No. 1. In .July 1V60, Bureau Headquarters originally rejected the recommendation of the Xe,v York Field Office to inform the CIA of Survey No.1 in order to obtain from it a list of known mail drops in Europe for use in the progralll,<29 Headquarters then wrote: "Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the source ..., the Bureau is very reluctant to make any contacts which could possibly jeopardize that source. Therefore, the Bureau will not make any contact with CIA to request from it [such a] list ... The Bureau will, however, continue to exert every effort to obtain from CIA the identities of all such mail drops in the normal course of operations." 430 Within six months of this rejection, however, Headquarters officers changed their minds: Donald Moore, head of the Espionage Research Branch and Sam Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, met with CIA representatives in January 1961 to inform them of Survey No.1 and to exchange lists of known or suspected mail drops.431 CIA provided ,the Bureau with a list of 16 mail drops 'and accommodation addresses and the name and address of one Communist Party member in Western Europe,432 all of which were subsequently furnished the New York office for inclusion in Survey No. 1 coverage. The exchange of this information did not evolve into a reverse Project Hunter, however. While the Agency may have contributed a small number of additional addresses or names during the next five years, no large-scale levy of general categories or specific names was ever made by the CIA or solicited by the FBI. According to Donald Moore, the particularized nature and objectives of Survey No.1, especially when contrasted with the CIA's New York project, precluded active CIA participation in the program.433 While there is no other evirlence that any members of the intelligence community knew of or ever levied requests on the Bureau's mail opening programs. they did receive sanitized information from these programs when deemed relevant to their respective needs by the Bureau.434 O. Results of the Programs In terms of their counterespionage and counterintelligence raison d'etre, several of the Bureau's programs were considered to be successful by FBI officials; others were concededly ineffective and were consequently discontinued before the termination of all remaining FBI surveys in 1966. Significantly, some of the surveys also generated large amounts of "positive" foreign intelligence-:the collection of which is outside the Bureau's mandate-and information regarding the domestic activities and personal beliefs of American citizens, 'at least some of which was disseminated within and outside the FBI. The Bureau surveys did remain more focused on their .,. Memorandum from Director, FBI to SAC, New York, 7/11/60. 4:» Ibid. .., Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 2/28/61. 4a2 Ibid. 483 Moore, 10/1/75, p. 55. 434 See p. 654. 69-984 0 - 76 - 42 652 original goal than did the CIA programs. But in them-whether because the selection criteria were overbroad, or because these criteria were not scrupulously adhered to, or both-one again sees the tendency of mail opening programs to produce information well beyond the type originally sought. 1. OounterintelUgence Re8ult8 Five of the eight FBI mail openings programs-Z-Coverage, Surveys 1, 4, 5, and 6-,,,ere clearly seen to have contributed to the FBI's efforts in the area of counterintelligence. The relative success of these programs, in fact. led many Blll'eau officials to conclude that mail opening- despite its legal status--was one of the most effective counterespionage weapons in their arsena1.435 The primary value of these five programs to the Bureau is summarized below: Z-001!erage.-A lack of pertinent documentary and testimonal evidence prevents a meaningful evaluation of Z-Coverage during World War II, but a 1951 memorandum reflecting the Washington Field Office's recommendation for its reinstitution noted that "while Z-Coverage was utilized valuable information of an intelligence nature was obtained ..." 436 In evaluating the program during the 1950s and 1960s, Bureau officials have rated it highly in terms of the counterintelligence results it produced. 'V. Raymond W'annall, former Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, testified about two specific examples of mail intercepted in Z-Coverage which revealed attempts on the part of individuals in this country to offer military secrets to foreign governments.437 In the first case, the FBI intercepted a letter in July 1964. which was sent by an employee of an American intelligence agency to a foreign diplomatic establishment in the United States. In the letter, the employee offered to sell information relating to weapons systems to the foreign government and also expressed an interest in defecting. The Defense Department was notified, conducted a potential damage eVlllluation, and concluded that the potential damage could represent a cost to the Fnited States Government of tens of millions of dollars. In the second case, which occurred in mid-19M, an individual on the 'West Coast offered to sell a foreign government tactical military information for $60,000. Survey No. i.-Survey No.1 was considered to be one of the most successful of all the Bureau mail opening programs. In New York and Washington, a total of three illegal agents--the identification of which has ooen described by one senior FBI official as the most difficult task in counterintelligence work438-were located through No. 1.439 In addition. numerous letters were discovered which contained secret writing and/or were addressed to mail drops in Western Europe. Survey No.1 in Boston, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Detroit was not successful, however, and as noted above, was discontinued in those cities on the basis of "unproductivity and manpower needs." 440 "'" E.g., FBI Special Agent #2 deposition, 9/16/75, pp. 61, 62. ... Memorandum from E. T. Turner to C. E. Hennrich, 6/25/51. ....., Wannall, 10/22/75, pp. 1~18. ... Staff Summary of Branigan interview, 9/11/75. ... Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 5. ..0 Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, 4/8/64. 653 Survey No. 4.-SUlTey No.4 resulted in the identification of the illegal agent \vhose presence in tlU' rnited Stutes had originally motivated development of the survey. In addition. this prof,JTum led to the detection of a :oecond intelligence agent opf'rating in this count ry and to the disco\'ery of approximately 60 items of correspondence which contailH'd spcret writing f'ither on the letter itself or on the envelope containing the lettf'r. 441 Survey No. 5.-FBI officials haH' testified that Survey No. I) was a \'ery valuable source of cOllnterintelligence (and interrf'lated positive intf'lligence) information about an Asian country. 1Y. Raymond 1Vannall stated that its "principal \'ulue probably related to the identification of r.s. trained scientists of [Asian] descent who were recalled or who \wnt voluntarily back to [an Asian country]."442 Because of this, he continued. the FBI was able to learn vital information about the progress of weapons research abroad.443 Sun'ey No. B.-Survey No.6 was also believed to be a valuable program from the perspectiye of counterintelligence, although it was suspended for a nine-month period because the manpower requirements were not considered to outweigh the benefits it produced. Through this surH'y the FBI identified numerous American subscribers to Asian communist publications; determined instances of the colh'etion of scif'ntific and technical information from the United States by a foreigll country; and recol'ded contacts between approximately fifteen Secnrity Index subjects in the United States and Communists abroad,<44 . The Other Progmm,~.-Three of the FBI's programs were not believed to have produced any significant amount of counterintelligence information. Bureau officials testified that they "had very little success in connection with [Survey No. B]," 445 and it was consequently discontinued after one year of operation. Similarly, no positive results were obtained through Survey No.2 in any of the three cities in which it operated. Although the San Francisco office, for example, opened approximately 85 new cases as a result of Survey No.2, all of these cases were resolved without the identification of any illegal agents, which was the goal of the program.446 As one Bureau official stated in regard to Survey No.2: "The indicators were good, but the results were not that good." 447 It, too, was terminated after approximately one year of operation. Finally. the results of Snrvcy No. i, which was initiated without prior approY:ll by Headquarters, were also considered to be valueless. Of the 83 letters intercepted in the program, 79 were merely exchanges of personal news between North Amf'l'icans of Asian descent. The other fonr were letters from individuals in Asia to individuals in the United States, routed through contacts in North America, but were '" Wannall. 10/22/75. p. 12. .... Wannall, 1O/UI/75, p, 77. 44. Wannall, 10/13/7;), pp, 77-78. '" Memorandum from W, R. Wannall to W. C, SUllivan, 5/22/64. ,.. Wannall, 10/22/75, p, 11. ,.. Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/3/62. "1 Branigan, 10/22/75, p. 9. 654 solely devoted to personal information.H8 As noted above, Headquarters did not believe that this coverage justified the additional manpower necessary to translate the items and the San Francisco Field Office was so advised. 92. "Positive" Foreign Intelligence Results Although the FBI has no statutory mandate to gather positive foreign intelligence, a great deal of this type of intelligence was generated as a byproduct of several of the mail opening programs and disseminated m sanitized form to interested government agencies. In an annual evaluation of Survey No. '3, for example, it was written: This source furnishes a, magnitude of vital information pertaining to activities within [an Asian country] ; including its economical [sic] and industrial achievements ... A true picture of life in that country today is also related by the information which this source furnishes reflecting life in general to be horrible due to the lack of proper food, housmg, clothes, equipment, and the complete disregard for a human person's individual rights.449 Another evaluation stated that this program had developed information about such matters as the "plans and progress made in construction in railways, locations of oil deposits, as well as the location of chemical plants and hydraulic works." 450 It continued: "vVhile this is of no interest to the Bureau, the information has been disseminated to interested agencies." Suney No. 6 even identified, through the interception of South American mail routed through San Francisco to an Asian country, numerous "[Asian] Communist sympathizers" in Latin America.451 VV. Raymond vVannall, former head of the Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division, explained that "as a member of the intelligence community, the FBI [was aware] of the positive intelligence requirements [which were] secularized within the community in the form of what was known as a current requirements list, delineating specific areas with regard to such countries that were needed, or information concerning which was needed by the community. So we contributed to the overall community need." 452 He conceded, howe\"er, that the FBI itself had no independent need for or requirement to collect such positive intelligence. 453 Just as the CIA mail opening programs infringed on the mtelligence jurisdiction of the FBI, therefore, so the FBI programs gathered information which was without value to the Bureau itself and of a variety that was properly within the CIA's mandate. 3. Domestic Intelligence Re8Ults In addition to counterespionage information and positive foreign intelligence, the FBI mail opening programs also developed at least some information of an essentially domestic nature. The collection of WI Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 2/28/6l. ..9 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60. '50 ;\Iemorandum from S. B. Donahue to A. H. Rplmont, 2/23/6l. 451 Memorandum from San Francisco Fipld OfficI', to FBI Headquarters, 4/29/64. 452 Wannall, 10/13/75, pp. 59, 60. 453 Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 60. 655 this type of information was on a smaller scale and less direct than was the case in the CIA's Xew York project, for none of the FBI programs im'olyed the wholesale targeting of large numbers of domestic political acti yists or the purposefully indiscriminate interception of mail. Nonetheless. the Bureau programs did produce domestic intelligence. An April 1966 evaluation of Suney No.1, for example, noted that "organizations in the rnited States concerning whom informant [the suryey] has fnrnished information include ... [the] Lawyers Committee on American Policy towards Yietnam, Youth Against tVar and Fascism ... and others."454 An evaluation of the Suryey No.5 stated that that program had developed "considerable data" about government employees and other American citizens who expressed pro-Communists sympathies, as well as information about indiyiduals, including American citizens, who were spe~ifically targeted as a consequence of their being on the FBI's Security Index.455 Examples of the latter type of information include their current residence and employment and "anti-U.S. statements which they have made." 456 Anothei· evaluation of a Bureau program noted that that program had identified American recipients of pornographic material and an .\merican citizen abroad who was a drug addict in correspondence with other addicts in the New York City area; 457 it indicated that information about the recipients of pornographic material 'Was transmitted to other field offices and stated that "pertinent" information was also forwarded to other Federal agencies.458 Given the ready access which Burean agents had to the mail for a period of years, it is hardly surprising that some domestic intelligence was collected. Indeed, both logic and the evidence support the conclusion that if any intelligence agency undertakes a program of mail opening within the United States for whatever purpose, the gathering of such information cannot be avoided. IV. IXTERXAL ADTJIORIZATIOX AND CONTROLS "While the FBI and the CIA mail opening programs were similar in many respects, the issues of authorization and control within these agencies highlight their differences. The pattern of internal approval for the CIA mail opening programs was inconsistent at best: the New York project began without the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence; at least two Directors were apparently not even advised of its existence; and it is unclear whether any Director knew the details of the other mail opening programs.459 Administrative controls in most of the CIA projects, especially the twenty-year Xew York operation, were clearly lax: periodic reevaluation was non-existent and operational responsibility was diffused!60 ".. :\felllorandulll from Xew York Field OffiC(', to FBI Headquarters, 4/4/66. 455 :\ll'morandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60. ,,~ Ibid. ""Memorandum from S. B. Donahoe to W. C. Sullivan, 9/15/61. ". :\fl'lllorandum from Donohue to SUllivan, 9/16/61; memorandum from San Francise() Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 7/28/61. ". See pp. 580-1581. "0 See pp. 582-i)84. 656 Probably as a function of the FBI's contrasting organizational structure, the mail opening programs conducted by the Bureau were far more centrally controlled by senior officials at Headquarters. With one significant exception, the FBI mail programs all received prior approval from the highest levels of the Bureau, up to and including J. Edgar Hoover, and the major aspects of their subsequent operation were strictly regulated by officials at or near the top of an integrated chain of command. A. Interruzl Authorization ",Vhile the documentary record of FBI mail opening programs is incomplete, that evidence which does exist reveals J. Edgar Hoover's explicit authorization for the following surveys: -The extension of Survey No. 1 to Los Angeles, Boston, Seattle, and Washington, D.C., on August 4, 1961; 461 -The re-authorization of Survey No.1 in New York, on December 22,1961; 462 -The re-authorization of Survey No.1 in New York and Washington, D.C., on April 15, 1966; 463 -The extension of Survey No.2 to three additional postal zones in New York and its Implementation with FBI rather than Post Office employees, on August 31, 1961; 464 and -The institution of Survey No.6 in San Francisco, on November 20, 1963.~5 The documentary evidence also reveals authorizations from former Associate Director Clyde Tolson and/or the former Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, William C. Sullivan, for the following surveys: -The extension of Survey No. 1 to Detroit on April 13, 1962;466 The extension of Survey No. 2 to Detroit on October 4, 1961 ;467 -The re-authorization of Survey No.2 in New York on December 26, 1961; 468 and -Administrative changes in the filing procedures for the Survey No.5 on June 28, 1963.469 Further, unsigned memoranda and airtels from Headquarters, "Director, FBI," authorized the extension of Survey No.2 to San Francisco on October 18, 1961,470 and the institution of Survey No. 4 on December 21, 1962.471 Bureau procedures normally require that such memoranda and airtels must be seen and approved by at least an 481 Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/4/61. ... Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/61. ... Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/15/66. 484 Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/31/61. ... Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/31/61. ,.. Memol"andum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 4/13/62. ,., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/4/61. '''Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office. 12/26/61. ... Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 6/28/63. <TO ;\f('morandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 10/18/61. m Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/21/62. 657 Assistant Director, and there is no reason to assume that this did not occur in these instances. Despite the absence of some authorizing documents, witness testimony is consistent-and often emphatic-on the point that unwritten Bnreau policy required .J. Edgar Hoover's personal approval before the institution of a new mail opening program or even the initial use of mail opening as a technique in specific espionage cases.412 The approval of at least the Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelligence Division, moreover, was reqnired for the periodic re-au~horization or the extensions of existing mail surveys to additional CIties, as well as for their termination, upon the recommendation of the field office involved. The only snrveys for w~ich this policy ,:"a~ apparently violated were Survey No. 7 and pOSSIbly-though thIS IS unclearSurvey No. 1. The testimony of senior FBI officials conflicts on whether Hoover actually authorized the formal institution of Survey No.1 in New York in 1959, or whether he merely approved the general concept of a mail opening program utilizing the recently acquired knowledge of the "indicators," but not Survey No.1 in particular. The former heads of the Es.rionage Research Branch at Headquarters and of the Espionage DivIsion at the New York Field Office both believe the former to be the case; 413 the Section Chief of the section at Headquarters out of which the program was run testified to the latter.414 Even if Hoover only approved the general concept of such a project, however, he was soon aware of the program, and, as noted above, authorized its extension to four additional cities in August 1961. Survey No. 7 was initiated by the San Francisco Field Office on its own motion without prior a.rproval from Washington. When Headquarters was advised of the Implementation of this program,416 ranking FBI officials immediately demanded justification for it from the Field Office,416 subsequently determined the justification to be inadequate, and ordered its termination as a generalized survey.471 The last sentence of the instruction to end the program warns: "Do not initiate such general coverage without first obtaining specific Bureau authority.418 Unlike most of their CIA counterparts, then, it appears that the Bureau's mail opening programs were-with one clear exceptionpersonally approved by the Director before their implementation, and at .the higl~est levels of the organization before major changes in theIr operatlon. In the one certain case where prior Headquarters approval was not seenred, the field office which implemented the programs was reprimanded. B. Admini8tratit'e Oontrols by Headquarters FBI Headquarters exerted tight, centralized control over the mail opening programs in other ways as well. One manifestation of this control was found in the periodic evaluations of each program required of e"ery participating field office for the benefit of Head- <72 For pxamplp, Moore, 10/1/75, p. 60; Wannall, 10/13/75, pp. 70, 71. 4T.l Moorp, 10/1/75, pp. 58-60; FBI Sppdal Agent #2 testimony, 9/16/75, p. 18. m Branigan, 10/24/75, Hparings, vol. 4, p. 152. <:;. Mpmorandum from San Frandsco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/61. ~Ipmorandumfrom FBI Hpadquartprs to San Francisco Field Officp, 2/3/61. 471 Mpmorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Officp 2/28/61. 47' Ibid. ' 658 quarters. In general, written evaluations were submitted semiannually ,for the first few years of the operation of a program in a city; and annually thereafter.479 These evaluations frequently contained such headings as: "Origin i" "Purpose i" "Scope i" "Cost i" "Overall Value i" and "Operation of Source." Every field office was also obligated to determine whether the counterintelligence benefits from each program justified its continuation in light of manpower and security considerations i on the basis of this recommendation and other information supplied, Headquarters then decided whether to re-authorize the program until the next evaluation period or order its termination. The net effect of this system of periodic reexamination was that FBI officials were far better informed than were CIA officials of the true value of the programs to their or~anization. It was difficult for a pro~ram to continue unproductively without the knowled~e of the highest ranking officials of the Bureau: as noted above, several programs- Surveys No.2, 3, and 7-were in fact discontinued by Headquarters before 1966 because the results as set forth in the evaluatIons were felt to be outwei~hted by other factors. . Also in contrast to the CIA mail opening programs, the Bureau programs were conducted at the field level with Special Agents who were experienced in intelligence work and given detailed instructions regarding the "indicators" and other selection criteria.480 No control procedure could ever eliminate the individual discretion of these agents-ultimately, selection was based on their personal judgment. But Headquarters ensured through the training of these agents that their judgment was at least more informed than that of the Office of Security "interceptors" in the CIA's New York project, who were neither foreign intelligence experts nor given guIdance beyond the Watch List Itself as to which items to select.481 At both the Field Office and the Headquarters levels, moreover, responsibility for the operation of the programs was not diffused, as it was in the CIA's New York project but was centralized in the hands of experienced senior officials within a single chain of command. O. Knowledge of the Mail Opening Programs Within the FBI Officials of the Domestic Intelligence Division at Headquarters carefully controlled knowledge and dissemination procedures of their mail opening programs within the FBI itself. Knowledge of the operations was strictly limited to the Domestic Intelligence Division. The Criminal Division, for example, was never advised of the existence of (and so never levied requests on) any of these programs, but an internal memorandum indicates that it may have received information ~enerated by the programs without being advised of the true source.482 Some FBI witnesses assigned to espionage squads which were en~aged in mail opening even testified that they were unaware of other mail opening programs bein~ conducted simultaneously by other espionage squads in the same field office.483 ..... Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 69. ... Branigan, 10/9/75, pp. 21, 22; FBI Special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, p.24. <8, See pp. 574-575. "'Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/28/61; see p. 600. "'Staff Summary of FBI Special Agent #6 interview, 8/21/75; staff summary of Special Agl'ut #7 interview, \)/15/75; FBI Special Agent #1 statement, 9/10/75, p. 57. 659 The direct dissemination of the photographic copies of letters or abstracts between field offices was prohibited, but Headquarters avoided some of the problems caused by restricted knowledge in the CIA programs by requiring these offices to paraJ!hrase the contents of letters in which other field offices might have an mtelligence interest and disseminate the information to them in sanitized form. Thus, control over the major aspects of the programs was concentrated at the top of the FBI hierarchy to a degree far greater than that which characterized the CIA programs. With few exceptions, senior officials at Headquarters initially authorized the programs, maximized central influence over their actual operation, restricted knowledge of their existence within the Bureau, and regulated the form in which information from them should be disseminated. V. EXTERNAL AUTHORIZATIONS Despite the differences between the FBI's and the CIA's mail opening programs with regard to internal authorization, the respective patterns of authorization outside the agencies were clearly parallel. There is no direct evidence that any President or Postmaster General was ever informed about any of the FBI mail opening programs until four years after they ceased. While two Attorneys General may have known about some aspect of the Bureau's mail interceptions-and the record is not even clear on this point-it does not appear that any Attorney General was ever briefed on the full scope of the programs. Thus, like the CIA mail opening programs, the Bureau programs were isolated even within the executive department. They were initiated and operated by Bureau officials alone, without the knowledge, approval, or control of the President or his cabinet. A. PQst Office Department The FBI mail opening programs, like those of the CIA, necessitated the cooperation of the Post Office Department. But the record shows that the Bureau officials who secured this cooperation intended to and did in fact accomplish their task without revealing- the FBI's true interest in obtaining access to the mail ; no high rankmg Postal official was apparently made aware that the FBI actually opened first class mail. 1. Postma.~ters General There is no evidence that any Postmaster General was ever briefed about any of the FBI mail opening programs, either by the FBI directly or by a Chief Postal Inspector. Henry Montague, who as Chief Postal Inspector was aware of the mail cover (as opposed to the mail opening) aspect of several Bureau programs, stated that he never informed the Postmaster General because he "thought it was our duty to cooperate in this interest, and really, I did not see any reason to run to the Postmaster General with the problem. It was not through design that I kept it away from ... the Postmaster General. ... It was just that I did not see any reason to run to [him] because he had so many other problems." 485 g. Chief Postal 111.'spectors It is certain that at least one and probably two Chief Postal Inspectors were aware of the fact that Bureau agents received direct access 485 Henry Montague testimony, 10/2/75, p. 31. 660 to mail, and in one case permission may have been given to physically remove letters from the mailstream as well, but there is no direct evidence that any Chief Postal Inspector was ever informed that FBI agents actually opened any mail. 'Olifton Camer.-Clifton Garner was Chief Postal Inspector under the Truman administration during the period when Z-Coverage may have been reinstituted in Washington, D.C. No FBI testimony or documents, however, suggest that his approval was sought prior to this reinstitution, nor can he recall being contacted by Bureau officials about such a program.486 David Stephens.-Henry Montague testified that prior to the 1959 implementation of Z-Coverage in New York, when he was Postal Inspector in Charge of that region, he was instructed by Chief Postal Inspector David Stephens to cooperate with Bureau agents in their proposed program of special "mail covers." 487 As Montague recalls, Stephens approved the "mail cover" operation and left the mechanical arrangements up to him. Donald Moore has also testified that Stephens must have been contacted by Bureau officials in Washington prior to the implementation of Survey No.1 in the same year,48'7a although he did not participate in any such meeting himself, and no other FBI official who testified could shed any light on who might have made such contact. There is no evidence, however, that Stephens was ever informed that mail would actually be opened by Bureau agents in either program. Henry Montague.-As Postal Inspector in Charge of the New York Region, Montague followed David Stephens' instructions to cooperate with the FBI regarding Z-Coverage and made the necessary mechanical arrangements within his office. He stated, however, that he was told by the Bureau representatives who came to see him, including Donald Moore (whose testimony is consistent) ,488 that this was a mail cover rather than a mail opening operation.489 He was simply informed that the Bureau had an interest in obtaining direct access to particular mail for national security reasons and that his cooperation would be appreciated. While he realized that even this type of access was highly unusual, he agreed because "... they knew what they were looking for; we did not.... rT]hey could not give any names to the Postal Service, as far as I knew, for mail to look for. . . . [P]erhaps they knew who the agent might be, or something of this sort, which knowledge was not ours and which, at that time, I did not feel was in our province to question." 490 Montague also acknowledged that.during his tenure as Postal Inspector in Charge of the New York RegIOn, he may have known of an FBI operation at Idlewild Airport (Survey No.1) as well, but stated that he had no "positive recollection" of it.491 As qhief Postal Inspector from 1961 to 1969, Montague personally authOrIzed Postal Service cooperation with the Bureau's programs in : Staff summary of Clifton Garner interview, 8/22/75. Montague, 10/2/75, pp. 6, 8. ..... Moore, 10/1/75, p. 62. ... Moore, 10/1/75, p. 70. ... Montague, 10/2/75, pp. 13, 15. ... Montague, 10/2/75, p. 11. - Montague, 10/2/75, p. 17. 661 at least two instances, and in one case possibly approved the removal of selected letters by Bureau agents to a point outside the postal facility in which they worked. According to a 1961 FBI memorandum, it was recommended by Bureau officials and approved by Director Hoover that Postal officials in 'Washington should be contacted "to explore the possibility of instituting" Survey No. 2.492 In February of that year, Donald Moore met with Montague about this matter, explaining only-according to both Moore and Montague-that the program would involve screening the mail and that it was vital to the security of the country"~J3 The fact that the FBI intended to open selected items was apparently not mentioned. Because he "felt it was our duty to cooperate with the Agency which was responsible for the national security in espionage cases," 494 Montague agreed to assist the Bureau. On this occasion, however, he indicated that he would prefer to have postal employees rather than FBI agents conduct the "cover" since "it was our position that whenever possible ... the mail should remain in the possession of the Postal Service." 495 Less than two years later, Montague did allow Bureau agents to screen mail directly in Survey No.4. A 1962 FBI memorandum noted that the FBI liaison to the Post Office approached him on December 19 to secure his approval for the Bureau's plan to cover mail from Miami to a Latin American country.496 According to this memorandum, :Montague did approve and authorized the removal of selected letters to the FBI laboratory as well. The former Chief Postal Inspector remembers ap-proving the screening aspects of the project and knowing that mall left the custody of postal employees,497 but cannot recall whether or not he specifically granted his permission for flying certain letters to Washington.498 He testified, in any event, that he was not informed that mail would be opened.499 In June 1965, Montague reconsidered his original approval of the project, possibly in light of Senator Edward Long's investigation into the use of mail covers and other techniques by federal agencies. A .Tune 25, 1965. FBI airtel from the Miami office to Headquarters reads in part: "[The Assistant Postal Inspector in Charge of the Atlanta Region] said that due to investigations by Senate and Congressional committees, Mr. Montague requested he be advised of the procedures used in this operation." 500 Montague had appeared before the Long Subcommittee and had testified on the subject of mail covers several times earlier that year, but he recalls that his concern in determining the procedures used in Survey No.4 in June focused more on the new Postal regulations regarding mail covers that were issued about that time than on the Senate hearings.50l Regnrdless of his motivation, Montague asked the Assistant Postal Inspector in Charge to ascertain the details of the Miami operation; the procedures were described ... Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan 8/31/61. '.3 Montague, 10/2/75, p. 25; Moore, 10/1/74, p. 66. ' ... Montague, 10/2/75, p. 26. "" Montague, 10/2/75, p. 28. ... Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 12/21/62. .., Montague, 10/2/75, pp. 55, 71. ... Montague, 10/2/75, p. 60. ... Montague, 10/2/75, p. 55. """ Memorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarter~, 6/25/65. 601 Montague, 10/2/75, PP. 69, 70. 662 to this postal official by representatives of the Miami Field Office, apparently without mention of the fact that mail was actually opened; and the Assistant Postal Inspector reported back to Montague, who found them to be acceptable and did not withdraw his support for the survey.502 Montague has stated that he was never informed that FBI agents in Survey No.4 or in any of the other Bureau programs intended to or actually did open first class mail. This testimony is supported by that of Donald Moore, who on at least two occasions was the Bureau representative who sought Montague's cooperation for the programs. Moore does not believe that he ever told Montague that mail would be opened; 504 he said, moreover, that it was "understood" within the Bureau that Postal officials should not be informed.505 Of his meeting with Montague about Z-Coverage, for example, Moore stated: "I am sure I didn't volunteer it to him and, in fact, would not volunteer it to him" because of the belief that such information should be closely held within the Bureau.506 He added that it was a general, though unwritten, policy that whenever Bureau agents contacted Postal officials concerning- the mail programs "it was understood that they would not be told [that mail opening was contemplated]." 507 Montague, for his part, did not specifically warn FBI agents against tampering; with the mail because they were Federal officers and he trusted them not to do so. He stated: I do not recall that I asked [if they intended to open mail], because I never thoug-ht that would be necessary. I knew that we never opened mail in connection with a mail cover. I knew that we could not approve it, that we would not approve any opening of any mail by anybody else. Both the CIA and the FBI were Government employees the same as we were, had taken the same oath of office, so that question was really not discussed by me.... With regard to the CIA when they first started [in 1953], we did put more emphasis on that point that mail could not be tampered with, that it could not be delayed, because, according to my recollection, this was the first time that we had had any working relationship with the CIA at all. With the FBI, I just did not consider that it was necessary to emphasize that point. I trusted them the same as I would trust another Inspector. I would never feel that I would have to tell a Postal person that you cannot open mail. By the same token, I would not consider it necessary to emphasize it to any great degree with the FBI.50S In short, it does not appear that any senior postal official knew that the FBI opened mail. Postal offici'als did cooperate extensively "'2 :\lemorandum from Miami Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 6/21)/65; Monta~ ue,10/2/75,p.71. 504 Moore, 10/1/75, pp. 65, 66, 70. 505 Moore, 10/1/75, p. 79. 50< Moore, 10/1/75, p. 70. w'Moore,10/1/75,p.79. Wi Montague, 10/2/75, PP. 15, 16. 663 with the Bureau, but out of trust did not ask whether mail would be opened and because of a concern for security they were not told. B. Department of Justice The record presents no conclusive evidence that any Attorney General ever knew of any of the FBI mail opening programs. The evidence summarizPd below, dops suggest that one and possibly two Attorneys General may have been informed of selected aspects of the Bureau's mail operations. but generally supports the view that no Attorney General was ever briefed on their full scope. 1. Robed F. Kennedy New York Field Office Briefings.-On April 5, 1962, and again on November 4, 1963, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy visited the FBI's New York field office was briefed in foreign espionage matters. The person who briefed him on these occasions, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge for the Espionage Division, testified that he may have mentioned the mail intercept projects then being conducted by the New York field office to the Attorney General, but has no definite recollection whether he did or not. 509 Other participants at these briefings could not recall the technique of mail opening being discussed,510 nor do the internal FBI memoranda relating to the briefings indicate that the topic arose.511 The Baltch Case.-It is also possible, though again the evidence is far from conclusive, that Robert Kennedy learned that mail opening was utilized in the Baltch investigation, which is described on page 648. On .Tuly 2, 1963, FBI agents arrested two alleged Soviet illegal agents who used the names Robert and Joy Ann Baltch; ,they were indicted for espionage on July 15. Several conferences were held between FBI representatives and Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, .J. 'Walter Yeagley, regarding this case and the possibility that some of the evidence was tainted.512 Yeagley subsequently briefed Kennedy on the problems involved in prosecuting the Baltehs.r.13 Donald E. Moore, who was one of the FBI representatives who discussed the Baltch case with Yeagley, testified that he believed, though he had no direct knowledge, that the fact of mail opening did come to the attention of the Attorney General in this context.5H Yeagley, however, cannot recall being specifically advised that mail was opened (although he knew that a "mail intercept or cover" had occurred) and stated that he did not inform Kennedy about any mail openings.515 609 FBI Special Agent #2,9/16/75, pp. 44-47. 510 Staff Summary of FBI Special Agent #7 interView, 9/15/75; staff summary of Courtney A. Evans interview, 9/17/75; staff summary of FBI Special Agent #3 interview, 9/19/75. 511 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/5/62; memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 11/4/63; memorandum from C. A. Evans to Mr. Belmont, 11/4/63. 012 Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 10/3/64. 5" Ibid. 514 Moore, 10/1/75, pp. 38, 39. 51' J. Walter Yeagley statement, 10/15/75; staff summary of J. Walter Yeagley inteniew, 10/10/75. 664 Other Espionage Oases.-Internal FBI memoranda concernin~ at least two other espionage cases that were considered for prosecution while Kennedy was Attorney General, also raise the possibility that .Justice Department attorneys, includin~ Yeagley, may have been advised of mail openings that occurred.516 Yeagley cannot recall being so advised, however, and, as noted above,stated that he never informed the Attorney General of any mail openings.511 There is no indication in the memoranda, moreover, thllit these matters were ever raised with Kennedy. 2. Ni, hola8 deB. Katzenbru:h The Baltch Oase.-The Baltch case did not come to trial until early October 1964, when Nicholas deB. Katzenbach was Acting Attorney General. At the time the trial commenced, FBI representatives, including Donald Moore, conferred with Thomas K. Hall, a Justice Department attorney who was assigned to the case, again on the subject of tainted evidence.518 Hall then discussed the case with Katzenbach and, according to an FBI internal memorandum, "Katzenbach recognized the problems, but felt in view of the value of the case, an effort should be made to go ahead with the trial even if it might be necessary to drop the overt act where our tainted source is involved...." 519 Because he subsequently determined that the case "could not be further prosecuted without revealing national security information," 520 however, Katzenbach ordered the prosecution to be dropped entirely. In fact, there were at least two sources of tainted evidence other than mail opening involved in the Baltch case-a surreptitious entry and a microphone instaUation-and it is only these which Katzenbach recalls. 521 He testified that although he did discuss the taint issues with both Hall and .Joseph Hoey, the United States Attorney who originally presented the government's case, neither of them brought to his attention the fact of mail opening.522 Hoey's recollection supports this contention: a Bureau memorandum suggests that Hoey may have learned of a "mail intercept" in the case,523 but he recalls neither being informed of an actual opening nor conferring with the Acting Attorney General about any issue related to mai1.524 Assistant Attorney General Yeagley recalls discussing the case generally with Katzenbach also, and "may have informed him of the mail intercept or cover which had occurred." but Yeagley stated that he had no definite knowledge himself that the "intercept or cover" involved the actual opening of mail, and so would not have been in a position to advise him that it did.525 '" :\Iemorandum from ·W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/11/64 ; memorandum from ~Ir. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 8/1V64. 511 Yeagley statement, 10/15/75; Staff summary of Yeagley interview, 10/10/75. 518 Memorandum from D. E. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 10/2/64. 51. Ibid. '" Nicholas deB. Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 203. =Ibid. ... Ibid. 523 Memorandum from Moore to Sullivan, 10/2/64. '" Staff summary of Joseph Hoey interview, 11/24/75. ... Yeagley statement, 10/15/75; staff summary of Yeagley interview, 10/10/75. 665 Katzenbach has testified that he was never 'aware of the Bureau's use of mail opening in any espionage investigation.526 He added: Even if one were to conclude that the Bureau did in fact reveal that mail had been opened and that this fact was r('layPd by lawyers in th(', [Baltch] ease to me, I am certain that that fact would have been rE'VPaled by the FBI-----<alld I would have accepted it-as an unfortunate aberration, just then diseoverpd in the context of a Soviet E'spionage investigation, not a massive mail-opening progmffi. In that event, nothing ,vould have IE'd me to deduce that tIl(' Bureau was, as a mattE'r of policy and practice, opening letters.527 The Long Subcommittee Hearings.-According to Donald Moore, he and Assistant Director Alan H. Belmont did inform Mr. KaJtzenbach at the time of the 1965 Long Subcommittee hearings that Bureau agents screened mail both inside and outside postal facilities as a matter of practice, although he does not claim that the subjE'ct of actual opening arose. In February of that yE'ar, the Long Subcommittee directed Chief Postal Inspector Montague to provide it with a list of all mail covers, including those in the areas of organized crime and national security, by federal agencies within the previous two years. As a result of this and other inquiries by the Subcommittee, especially regarding electronic surveillance practices, President Johnson requested Katzenbach to coordinate all executive department matters under his investigation.528 In executing this responsibility, Katzenbach met with Moore, Belmont, and Courtney Evans, a former FBI Assistant Director who had retired from the Bureau but was then working as a special assistant to the Attorney General, on February 27, 1965, to discuss problems raised by the Subcommittee which affected the FBI.529 One of the subjects discussed at that meeting was the question of Bureau access to the mail. Four days earlier, the Chief Postal Inspector had testified before the Subcommittee that he had no knowledge of any case in which mail left the custody of Postal employees during the course of a mail cover.530 At the time, Montague did know that this practice had occurred 53l-indeed, as Chief Postal Inspector he had approved the direct screening of mail by FBI agents in Survey No.4 532_but he believed that "there was an understanding . . . that national security cases were not included within this particular part of the hearing." 533 According to Moore, Katzenbach had been made aware of the possible ""6 Nicholas deB. Katzenhaeh testimony, 10/11/75, p. 35. "" Katzenhaeh statement, 12/3/75, He~rings, Yo1. 6. p. 204. 528 Katzenbaeh statement. 12/R/75, Hearings, Yo1. 6, p. 204, memorandum from A. H. Rehllont to ~Ir. Tolson 2/27/65. "29 Ibid. ' G30 Henry Montague testimony, Senate ·Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure Hearings, 2/23/65, Part I, pp. 210-212; Montague 10/2/75, p.66. 031 ~Iontagu{', 10/2/75, p. 71. ~'12 :\Iontagne, 10/2/75, p. 55. "''' Montagne, 10/2/75, p. 66. 666 inaccuracy of Montague's testimony, and the Bureau officials consequently "pointed out [to the Attorney General] that we do receive mail from the Post Office in certain sensitive areas...." 534 Moore believes moreover, that they informed him that this custody was granted in on-going projects rather than isolated instances.535 Katzenbach acknowledged that he was aware, while Attorney General, that "in some cases the outside of mail might have been examined or even photographed by persons other than Post Office employees," 536 but he stated that he never knew the FBI ga:ined custody to mail on a regular basis in large-scale operations.537 He also testified that thE' time of the February meeting he considered Montague's testimoney to be "essentially truthful." 538 While the record shows that he spoke to Senator Long less than a week after this meeting,539 Katzenbach stated that this was in regard to the requested list of all mail covers by federal agencies rather than the issue of mail custody.540 The testimony of Courtney Evans, who was also present at the February 27 meeting, supports that of Katzenbach: at no time, Evans said, was he personally ever made aware that FBI agents received direct access to mail on an on-going basis.541 Moore does not claim that he told Katzenbach that mail was actually opened by Bureau agents. According to him, this information was volunteered by neither Belmont nor himself and Katzenbach did not inquire whether opening was involved.542 When asked if he felt any need to hold back from Katzenbach the fact of mail openings as opposed to the fact that Bureau agents received direct access to the mall, Moore replied: "It is perhaps difficult to answer. Perhaps I could liken it to ... a defector in place in the KGB. You don't want to tell anybody his name, the location, the title, or anything like that. Not that you don't trust them completely, but the fact is that anytime one additional person becomes aware of it, there is a potential for the information to ... go further." 543 Probably the strongest suggestion in the documentary evidence that Katzen'bach may have been made aware of actual FBI mail openings at the time of the Long Subcommittee hearings is found in a memorandum from Hoover to ranking Bureau officials, dated Maroh 2, 1965. This memorandum reads, in part: The Attorney General called and advised that he had talked to Senator Long last night. Senator Long's committee is looking into mail covers, et cetera. The Attorney General stated he thought somebody had already spoken to Senator Long as .... Moore, 10/1/75, p. 31. G,,,, Moore, 10/1/75, p. 44. """ Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 205. 537 Katzenbach testimony, 10/11/75, p. 35. 538 Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 205. 53\} Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 205; memorandum from ,J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont. Gale, Rosen. Sullivan, and DeLoach. 3/2/65. 640 Katzenbach statement. 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 205. G41 Courtney A. Evans affidavit. 10/21/75. ... Moore, 10/1/75, p. 33. ... Moore, 10/1/75, p. 48. 667 he said he did not want to get into any national security area and was willing to take steps not to do this. The Attorney General stated that Mr. Fensterwald [Chief counsel to the Subcommittee] was present for part of the meeting and Fensterwald had said that he had some possible witnesses who are former Bureau agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and if not, it is their own business, but if they were, we would want to know. The Attorney General stated the Senator promised that he would have a chance to look at the names if he wanted to, personally and confidentially, and the list would have any names involving national security deleted and he would tell the S-enator how many but no more.544 Katzenbach testified as follows concerning his passage: [Even] assuming the accuracy of the memo, it is not consistent with my being aware of the Bureau's mail opening program. Had I been aware of that program, I naturally would have assumed that the agents had been involved in that program, and I would scarcely have been content to leave them to their own devices before Senator Long's committee. Moreover, it would have been extremely unusual for ex-FBI agents to be interviewed by the Senate committee staff without revealing that fact to the Bureau. In those circumstances both the Director and I would have been concerned as to the scope of their knowledge with respect to the very information about mail covers which the Senator was demanding and which we were refusing, as well as about any other matters of of a national security nature. If the witnesses in fact existed (which I doubted strongly), then both the Director and I wanted to know the extent of their knowledge about Bureau programs, and the extent of their hostility toward the FBI. That is a normal concern that we would have had anytime any ex-FBI agent testified before any Congressional committee on any subject.545 The most that can reasonably be inferred from the record on possible knowledge of FBI mail opening by Attorneys General is this: one or two Attorneys General may have known that mail was opened in connection with particular espionage investigations, and one Attorney General may have learned that the FBI regularly received mail from the Post Office and that five former FBI agents possibly opened mail. Evidence exists which casts doubt on the reasonableness of even these inferences, however. More significantly, there is no indioation in either the documents or the testimony that the approval of any Attorney General was ever sought prior to the institution of any Bureau 50' Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach, 3/2/65. ... Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 205, 206. 69-984 0 - 76 - 43 668 program, and despite a clear opportunity to inform Attorney General Katzenbach of the full scope and true nature of these operations in 1965, he was intentionally not told. In the name of security, the Bureau neither sought the approval of nor even shared knowledge of its p'rograms with the Cabinet officer who was charged with the responsibIlity of controlling and regulating the FBI's conduct. The first uncontroverted evidence that any Attorney General knew of the FBI mail opening programs is not found until 19'70, four years after the programs were terminated. John Mitchell, upon reading the 1970 "Huston Report", learned that the Bureau had engaged in "covert mail coverage" in the past, but that this practice had "been discontinued." 1">46 While the report itself stated that mail opening was unlawful,541 however, Mitchell did not initiate any investigation, nor did he show much interest in the matter. He testified: I had no consideration of that subject matter at the time. I did nat focus on it and I was very happy that the plan was thrown out the window, without pursuing any of its provisions further.... I think if I had focused on it I might have considered [an investigation into thl'.8e acts] more than I did.548 O. Presidents There is no evidence that any President was ever contemporaneously informed about any of the FBI mail opening .programs. In 19'70, Bureau officials who were involved in the preparatIOn of the "Huston Report" apparently advised Tom Charles Huston that mail opening as an investigative technique had been utilized in the past, for this fact was reflected in the report which was sent to President Nixon.55o VI. TERMINATION OF THE FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS A. Hoover's Decision to Terminate the Programs in 1966 1. Timing By mid-1966 only three FBI mail opening programs continued to operate: Z-Coverage in New York and Washington, Survey No.1 in those same cities, and Survey No.4 in Miami. Three of the programs- No.2, No.3, and No.7-and the extensions of Survey No.1 to four cities other than New York and Washington had all been terminated prior to 1966 because they had produced no valuable ~ounterintelligence information while tying up manpower needed III other areas.551 Two of the programs-Surveys No. 5 and 6--had been suspended in ,January 1966 for security reasons involving changes in local postal personnel and never reinstituted. As the San ... See Senate Select Committee Report on the Huston Plan, p. 61; Special Repo1't: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970, p. 29. "7 Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970, p. 30. "8 .Tohn X. ::\Iitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 145. ..., Special Report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970, p.29. 551 See pp. 653-654. 669 Francisco Field office informed Headquarters in May of that year in regard to both programs: "While it is realized that these sources furnished valuable information to the Federal Government, it is not believed the value justifies the risk involved. It is not recommended that contact with sources be re-instituted." 552 The remaining three programs were aU terminated in July 1966 at the direct instruction of J. Edgar Hoover. Apparently this instruotion was delivered telephonically to the field offices; 553 no memoranda explicitly reflect the order to terminate the programs. There is no evidence that the FBI has employed the technique of mail opening in any of its investigations since that time, although the FBI continued to receive the fruits of the CIA's mail opening program until 1973. 2. Reasons Given the perceived success of these three programs the reasons for their termination are not entirely clear. While all FBI officials who testified on the subject were unanimous in their conclusion that the decision was Hoover's alone, none could testify as to the precise reasons for his decision. At least three possible reasons are presented by the record. First, the Director may have believed that the. benefits derived from mail opening were outweighed by the need to present espionage cases for prosecution which were untainted by use of this toohmque. Regardless of whether or not the mail opening in the Baltch case was actually a factor in Acting Attorney General Katzenbach's decision to drop the prosecution, for example, Bureau officials believed that their use of the technique in that case did in fact preclude prosecution.554 On a memorandum dealing with the evidentiary issues in the Baltch case, Hoover wrote the following notation: "We must immediately and materially reduce the use of techniques which 'taint' cases." 555 Second, Hoover may have believed that the Attorney General and other high government officials would not support him in the FBI's use of questionable investigative practices. It is known that Hoover cut back on a number of other techniques in the mid-1960's: the use of mail covers by the FBI was suspended in 1964,556 and in July 1966the same month which saw the end of the mail opening programsHoover terminated the technique of surreptitious entries by Bureau agents.557 In a revealing comment on a 1965 memorandum regarding the Long Subcommittee's investigation of such techniques as mail covers and electronic surveillance, Hoover wrote: I don't see what all the excitement is about. I would have no hesitance in discontinuing all techniques-technical coverage [Le. wiretapping], microphones, trash covers, mail covers, etc. While it might handicap us I doubt they are as valuable 652 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/66. Ii63 Wannall Testimony 10/13/75, p. 45. ... Seep. 646. ... Memorandum from W. A. Brani~an to W. O.Sullivan, 9/29/64. ,... Ibid. '"' Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to 0. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66. 670 as some believe and none warrant FBI being used to justify them.s58 His lac~ of support from above had been tentatively suggested by some WItnesses as a reason for this general retrenchment. Donald Moore, for example, surmised that: There had been several questions raised on various techniques, and some procedures had changed, and I feel that Mr. Hoover in conversation with other people, of which I am not aware, decided that he did not or would not receive backing in these procedures and he did not want them to continue until the policy question was decided at a higher level.559 While former Attorney General Katzenbach testified that he was unaware of the FBI mail openings, his views on this subject tend to support Moore's. He speculated that the reason the programs were terminated in 1966 may have related to the then-strained relations between Mr. Hoover and the Justice Department stemming from the case of BZMk v. United States 559a and the issue of warrantless electronic surveillance.56o Hoover had wanted the Justice Department to inform the Supreme Court, in response to an order by the Court that the type. of warrantless microphone surveillance that occurred in that case had been authorized by every Attorney General since Herbert Brownell. Kalzenbach, not believing this to be so, approved a Supplemental Memornndum to the Court which simply stated that microphone installations had been authorized by longstanding "practice." According to Katzenbach, "this infuriated Hoover.... He was very angry, [and] that may have caused him to stop everything of this kind." 561 A third, related reason was suggested by W. Raymond Wannall, former Assistant Director in charge of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division. Wanna-II 'believed that there was a genuine "question in [Hoover's] mind about the legality" of mail opening, and noted that by at least 1970, as expressed in one of the Director's footnotes in the Huston Report, Hoover clearly considered mail opening to be outside the framework of the law.562 This footnote also suggests that, like CIA officials, Hoover was concerned that the perceived illegality of the technique would lead to an adverse public reaction damaging to the FBI and other intelligence agencies if its use were made known. His note to President Nixon read: The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage [i.e., mail opening] because it is clearly illegal and it is likely that, if done, ~nformation would leak out of the Post Office to the press and serious damage would be done to the intelligence community.563 558 :\Iemorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 2/27/65. ... Moore, 10/1/75, p. 29. " 9°385 U.S. 26 (1966). """ Katzenbach, 10/11/75, p. 58. r>6l Ibid. ,.. Wannall, 10/13/75, p. 79. "'Special Report: Interagency CommiJttee on Intelligence (Ad H~), June 1970, p. 31. Hoover permitted the Bureau to receive the fruits of illegal mail opening by the CIA, however. 671 B. Recommended Reinstituti()lTl, 1. Within the Bureau, Whatever the reasons for it, the FBI Director's decision to terminate all mail opening programs in 1966 was not favorably received by many of the participating agents in the field. As one official of the New York Field Office at the time of the termination testified: . . . the inability of the government to pursue this type of investigative technique meant that we would no longer be able to achieve the results that I felt were necessary to protect the national security, and I did not feel that I wanted to continue in any job where you are unable to achieve the results that really your job calls for.... That was a big influence on my taking retirement from the FBI.564 Several recommendations came in from the field to consider the rein8rtitution of the mail opening programs between 1966 and the time of Hoover's death in 1972.564 None of them was successful. A 1970 internal FBI memorandum, for example, reflects the recommendation of the New York office that the programs be reinstituted,565 but Headquarters suggested that this course was "not advisable at this time." 588 Underlining the words "not advisable," Hoover noted: "Absolutely right." There is no evidence that any recommendation to reinStitute these programs ever reached the desk of an Acting Direotor or Director of the Bureau after Hoover's death. ~. Huston Plan The only known attempt to recommend reinstitution of FBI mail opening by officials outside the FBI is found in the Huston Report in 1970.561 The Rer,ort itself stated that mail opening did not have the "sanction of law,' 568 but proceeded to note several advantages of relaxing restrictions on this technique, among them: 1. High-level postal authorities have, in the past, provided complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program. 2. ThIS technique involves negligible risk of compromise. Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence, and personnel involved are highly trained, trustworthy, and under complete control of the intelligence agency. 3. This coverage has been extremely successful in producing hard-core and authentic intelligence which is not obtainable from any other source ... 569 "'" FBI Special Agent #2. 9/16/75, pp. 61, 62. It should be noted that this view ignores the availability of the warrant procedure for opening mail when there is probable cause to believe that a crime--including espionage--has occurred or is about to occur. .... Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 54. .... Ibid. ... Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, 3/31/70. '"" See generally, Senate Select Committee Report on the Huston Plan. """ Special report: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970, p.30. ... Ibid. 672 Primarily because of the objections Hoover expressed in the footnote he added, which are discussed above, this aspect of the Huston Plan was never implemented, however. Vll. LEGAL AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WITHIN THE FBI During the years that the FBI mail opening programs operated, Bureau officials attempted only once, in 1951, to formulate a legal theory to justify warrantless mail opening, and the evidence suggests that they never relied upon even this theory. At the same time, there is little in the record (until Hoover's comment in the 1970 Huston Report) to indicate that Bureau officials perceived mail opening to be illegal, as many CIA officials did. The FBI officials who directed the programs apparently gave little consideration to factors of law at all; ironically, it appears that of the two agencies which opened first class mail without warrants, that agency with law enforcement responsibilities and which was a part of the Justice Department gave less thought to the legal ramifications of the technique. Despite its inattentive attitude toward legal issues, the Bureau was at least as concerned as the CIA that disclosure of their programs outside the FBI--even to its own overseer, the Attorney General, and especially to Congress-would, as Hoover wrote in 1970, "leak ... to the press and serious[ly] damage" the FBI.574 To avoid such exposure, the Bureau, like the CIA, took measures to prevent knowledge of their programs from reaching this country's elected leadership. A. Oonsideration of Legal FMtorS by the FBI 1. Prior to the Oommencement of Mail Opening Programs In the Post-War Period In June 1951, when the Washington Field Office recommended to Headquarters that consideration should be given to the reinstitution of Z-Coverage, it was specifically suggested that Bureau officials determine whether or not Postal Inspectors have the authority to order the opening of first class mail in espionage cases.m Headquarters conducted research on this possible legal predicate to the peacetime reinstitution of the program, and the results were summarized in a second memorandum on Z-Coverage in September 1951.576 The b/lsic conclusion was that Postal Inspectors nad no authority to open mail; only employees of the Dead Letter Office and other persons with legal sea.rch warrants had such power. It was argued, however, that Postal Inspectors may have sufficient legal authority to open even first class mail whose contents were legally non-mailable under 18 U.S.C. Section 1717. This class of non-mailable items included, and includes today, "[e]very letter in violation of sections ... 793, 794 [the espionage statutes] of this title ..." Since it was a crime to mail letters whose contents violated the espionage statutes, it was reasoned, it may not be unlawful to intercept and open such letters, despite the general prohibition against mail opening found in 18 U.S.C. Sections 1701, 1702, and 1703. The study concluded: ... it is believed that appropriate arrangements might be worked out on a high level between the Department and the .,. Spe p. 670. 6" Memorandum from E. T. Turner to C. E. Hennrich, 6/25/51. ..8 Memorandum from C. E. Hennrich to A. H. Belmont, 9/7/51. 673 Postmaster General or between the Bureau and the appropriate Post Office officials whereby the mail of interest to the Bureau could be checked for items in violation of the espionage and other security statutes which are itemized in Title 18, U.S. Code Section.... It is respectfully suggested that appropriate discussions be held on this matter.571 This theory ignores the fact that the warrant procedure itself responds to the problem of non-mailable items. If, on the basis of an exterior examination of the envelope or on the basis of facts surrounding its mailing, there exists probable cause for a court to beleive that the espionage statutes have been violated, a warrant may be obtained to open the correspondence. If the evidence does not rise to the level of probable cause, the law does not permit the mail to be opened. There is no indication, in any event, that discussions were ever held with any Postmaster General or Attorney General in an attempt to either test or implement this theory. While Z-Coverage was in fact reinstituted after this study Wl\S made, it was conducted with FBI personnel rather than Postal Inspectors, and its mail opening aspect was apparently unknown to any high-ranking Postal officials. In regard to the recommendation that "appropriate discussions be held on this matter," Assistant to the Director Alan Belmont penned the notation, "No action at this time. File for future reference." 518 2. Post-1951 After the mail opening progra,ms were underway, there was apparently no further considera,tion by FBI officials of the legal factors involved in the operations. Unlike that regarding CIA mail opening, the documentary record. on the FBI programs does not oontain references (until 1970, four years after the programs ceased) to the illegality of mail opening; nor does it suggest that mail opening was considered legal. At most, the record reveals the recognition by Bureau officials that evidence obtained from their surveys was tainted and, hence, inadmissible in court,519 but not the recognition that the technique was invalid per se. Indeed, after the Supreme Court decisions in Narvlone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) and 308 U.S. 338 (1939), this distinction was explicitly made in the area of electronic surveillance: while the Nardone decisions prohibited the admission in court of evidence obtained from wiretapping, the cases were not interpreted by the Bureau to preclude use of the technique itself, and the practice continued.58o The testimonial record, moreover, clearly suggests that leg'ltl considerations were simply not raised in contemporaneous policy decisions affecting the various mail surveys: W. Raymond Wannall, William Branigan, and others have all so testified.581 None of these officials has any knowledge that any legal theory-either the one which was filed for "future reference" in 1951 or one based on a possible "national security" exception to the general prohibition against mail opening-was ever developed by Bureau officials after 1951 to justify their programs .n Ibid. 618 Ibid. 679 Memorandum from Branigan to Sullivan, 9/29/64 ; memorandum from Moore to Sullivan, 10/2/64. 5BO Re{' Spnate ReleC't CommitteE' RE'port on FBI EIE'ctronic Surveillance. 661 Branigan, 10/9/75, pp. 13, 39, 40; Wannall, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 149. 674 legally, or that a legal opinion from the Attorney General was ever sought. To these officials, such justification as existed stemmed not from legal reasoning but from the end they sought to achieve and an amorphous, albeit honestly held, concept of the "greater good." As William Branigan stated: "It was my assumption that what we were ) doing was justified by what we had to do." 582 He added that he believed "the national security" impelled reliance on such techniques: The greater good, the national security, this is correct. This is what I believed in. Why I thought these programs were good, it was that the national security required this, this is correct.583 At least some of the agents who participated in the mail opening program have testified that they believed the surveys were legal because they assumed (without being told) that the programs had been au~ thorized by the President or Attorney General, or because they assumed (again without being told) that there was a "national security" exception to the laws prohibiting mail opening.584 Those officials in a policymaking position, however, apparently did not focus on the legal questions sufficiently to state an opinion regarding the legality or illegality of the programs. nor did they advise the field offices or participating agents about these matters. Only in the 1970's, at least four years after the FBI mail opening programs ceased, is there any clear indication that Bureau officials, like those of the CIA, believed their programs to be illegal. As noted above, Hoover's footnote to the 1970 Huston Report described the technique as "clearly illegal;" and in the recent public hearings on FBI mail opening, W. Raymond Wannall testified that, as of 1975, "I cannot justify what happened...." 585 In light of the Bureau's major responsibilities in the area of law enforcement and the likelihood that some of the espionage cases in which mail opening was utilized would be prosecuted, it is ironic that FBI officials focused on these legal issues to a lesser degree than did their CIA counterparts. But the Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division made a clear distinction between law enforcement and counterintelligence matters; what was appropriate in one area was not necessarily appropriate in the other. As William Branigan again testified: In consideration of prosecuting a case, quite obviously [legal factors] would be of vital concern. In discharging counterintelligence responsibilities, namely to identify agents in the United States to determine the extent of damage that they are causing to the United States we would not necessarily go into the legality or illegality We were trying to identify agents and we were trying to find out how this country was being hurt, and [mail opening] was a means of doing it, and it was a successful means.58G 68S Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 41. ... Ibid. ... FBI Special Agent #2 statement, 9/10/75, p. 10; Staff Summary of FBI Special Agent #7 interview, 9/15/75, Vincent E. Ruehl; 10/14/75, pp. 70, 72. ... Wannall, 10/24/75, Hearings, vol. 4, p. 170. ... Branigan, 10/9/75, pp. 40-41. 675 B. Concern with Ewpo8ure Although Bureau officials apparently did not articulate the view prior to 1970 that mail opening was necessarily illegal, they did believe that their use of this technique was so sensitive that its exposure to other officials within the executive branch, the courts, Congress, and the American public generally should be effectively prevented. This fear of exposure may have resulted from a perceived though unexpressed sense that its legality was at least questionable; it was almost certainly a consequence of a very restricted, even arrogant, view of who had a "need to know" about the Bureau's operations. But whatever its source, this concern with securit~ clearly paralleled the CIA's concern with the "flap potential' of their projects and resulted in similar efforts to block knowledge of their use of this technique from reaching the general public and its leaders. The reluctance of FBI officials to disclose the details of their programs to other officials within the executive branch itself has been described above: there is no clear evidence that any Bureau official ever revealed the complete nature and scope of the mail surveys to any officer of the Post Office Department or Justice Department, or to any President of the United States. It was apparently a Bureau policy not to inform the Postal officials with whom they dealt of the actual intention of FBI agents in receiving the mail, and there is no indication that this policy was ever violated.587 When Attorney General Katzenbach met with Donald Moore and Alan Belmont on the subject of Bureau custody of mail, Moore testified that he did not inform the Attorney General about the mail opening aspect of the projects because of security reasons: "anytime one additional person becomes aware of it, there is a potential for the information to ... go further." 588 One Bureau agent at Headquarters who was familiar with the mail programs (but not in a policy-making position) also speculated that the questionable legal status of this technique may have been an additional reason for not seeking the Attorney General's legal advice. He testified as follows: Q. Do you know why the opinion of the Attorney General was apparently or probably not sought? A. Because of the security of the operation. I would imagine that would be the main reason. It was a program we were operating. We wanted to keep it within the Bureau itself-and the fact that it involved opening mail. Q. What do you mean by the last statement, "... the fact that it involved opening mail"? A. That was not legal, as far as I knew.589 With respect to the Justice Department generally, only the minimum knowledge necessary to resolve a specific prosecutive problem was imparted. Donald Moore said of his meeting with Assistant Attorney General Yeagley about the Baltch case, for example, that he did not ~isc1ose to him the FBI's general use of this technique: "I am sure It was confined to the issue at hand, which was anythmg at all which lI87 See p. 662. ... Moore 10/1/75, p. 48. ... FBI Special Agent #5, 10/10/75, p. 30. 676 involved the prosecution of Baltch." 590 Even the term "mail opening" was avoided, and the more ambiguous term "mail intercept" was used: 591 while susceptible of only one meaning within the FBI, the latter term was apparently misinterpreted by Yeagley and other Justice Department officials with different assumptions about Bureau operations.592 The FBI's concern with exposure extended to the courts as well. In an internal memorandum regarding the Baltch case, it was written that "under no circumstances is the Bureau willing to admit [to the court] that a mail intercept was utilized...." 593 Similarly, FBI officials, like their counterparts in the CIA, did not want their use of this technique known to Congress. One senior Bureau official testified that the FBI feared that the Long Subcommittee's 1965 investigation could publicly expose the mail programs; 594 another that such Congressional exposure could "wrack up" the Bureau.595 Attorney General Katzenbach had been requested by the President to coordinate executive branch responses to inquiries by the Subcommittee, but the FBI was apparently not content with hIS efforts in preventing the disclosure of "national security" information generally. To ensure that their mail surveys, as well as certain practices in the area of electronic surveillance, remained unstudied, Bureau officials themselves directly attempted to steer the Subcommittee away from probing these subjects. Alan Belmont's February 27, 1965, memorandum reflecting his meeting with the Attorney General about Henry Montague's testimony on mail custody, reads in part: "I told Mr. Katzenbach that I certainly agree that this matter should be controlled at the committee level but that I felt pressure would have to be applied so that the personal interest of Senator [Edward] Long became involved rather than on any ideological basis." 596 The memorandum continues: "1 called Mr. DeLoach [an Assistant Director of the FBI] and briefed him on this problem in order that he might contact Senator [James 0.] Eastland in an effort to warn the Long committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense. (Of course, I made no mention of such a contact to the Attorney GeneraL)" According to an FBI memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover himself subsequently contacted Senator Eastland, who, he reported, "is going to see Senator Long not later than Wednesday morning to caution him that [the chief counsel] must not go into the kind of questioning he made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department." 591 The strategy worked. The Subcommittee never learned of the FBI's ~se of mail opening as an investigative technique. Despite the fact that III 1965 the FBI conducted a total of five mail opening programs in ... Moore, 10/1/75, p. 49. 501 Moore, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 160. "I Staff summary of Yeagley interview, 10/10/75; Yeagley statement, 10/15/75; Staff Summary of Hoey interview, 11/24/75. ... Memorandum from Moore to Sullivan, 10/2/64. ... Moore, 10/24/75, hearings, Vol. 4, p. 162. ... Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 50. .... Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 2/27/65. 501 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach, 3/1/65. 677 the United States-and despite the fact that in that year alone more than 13,300 letters were opened by CIA agents in New York-the Subcommittee, the general public, the Attorney General, and apparently even Henry Montague himself accepted as true Montague's testimony that year that: The seal on a first-class piece of mail is sacred. When a person puts first-class postage on a piece of mail and seals it, he can be sure that the contents of that piece of mail are secure against illegal search and seizure.598 ... Statement of Henry B. Montague before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 2/23/65, p. 3.
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