CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS

104
DDA: Directorate for Administration, established in 1950, responsible
for personnel, budget, security, medical services and logistical
support for overseas operations.
DDOI: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, second person in line
of command of CIA.
DDI: Directorate for Intelligence, created in 1952, responsible for
production oJ finished intelligence (excluding scientific and
technical intelligence since 1963) and for collection of overt
information.
DDP: Directorate for Plans, created in 1952 from the integration of
OSO and OPC, also known as the "Clandestine Service." Responsible
for clandestine collection, counterintelligence, and covert
operations. Renamed the Directorate for Operations in 1973.
DDR: Directorate for Research. created in 1962, immediate predecessor
to the Directorate for Science and Technology.
J)DS&T: Directorate for Science and Technology, organized in 1963,
combining OSI, the Data Processing Staff. the Office of ELINT,
the DPD. and a newly created Office of Research and Development.
Responsible for research development and operation of technical
collection systems and for production of finished scientific
and technical intelligence.
DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency, created by Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara in 1961, responsible for production of military
intelligence.
DPD: Development Projects Division, a component of the DDP, responsible
for overhead reconnaissance. Transferred to DDS&T in
1963.
EIO: Economic Intelligence Committee. a subcommittee of the JAC
created in 1951, charged with interdepartmental coordination of
economic intelligence activities and the production of publications.
Continued under USIB.
ELINT: Electronic Intelligence, technical and intelligence information
derived from the collection (or interception) and processing
of foreign electromagnetic radiations such as radar.
ERA: Economic Research Area, established in 1950 as a component
of ORR. responsible for production of economic intelligence.
Eventually developed into OER.
EX0 0 M: Executive Committee, established in 1965 for the management
of overhead reconnaissance, giving the CIA and the Department
of Defense decisionmaking authority over the national reconnaissance
program.
FEID: Foreign Broadcast Information Division, as element of CIG
which monitored overseas broadcasts. Became a component of the
DDI in 1952; renamed the Foreign Broadcast Information Service
in 1965.
GMAIO: Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee,
a USIB subcommittee established in 1958, responsible for interdepartmental
coordination of intelligence related to guided missiles.
GM10: Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee, an lAC subcommittee
created in 1956, responsible for interdepartmental coordination
of intelligence related to guided missiles. Succeeded by
GMAIC in 1958.

lO:S
ORA: Geographic Research Area, created in 1950 as a component
of ORR; in 1965 transferred to OBI, which was renamed Office
of Basic and Geographic Intelligence; OBGI became the Office
of Geographic and Cartographic Research in 1974.
lAB: Intelligence Advisory Board, an advisory group to the DCI,
composed of the heads of the military and civilian intelligence
agencies. Existed for the life of CIG.
lAO: InteUigence Advisory Committee, created in 1947 to serve as
a coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements
among the Departments. Merged with USCIB in 1958 to form
USIB.
10 Staff: Intelligence Community staff, established in 1972 as a replacement
for the NIPE staff. Responsible for assisting the DCI
in the management of intelligence community activities.
IOAPS: Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, a component
of the CIG. which handled the administrative aspects of
CIG's contacts with the Departments.
INR: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the State Department's
intelligence analysis component.
IRA0 : Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, an interdepartmental
group established in 1971 to advise the DCI in preparing
a consolidated intelligence program budget for the President.
Members included representatives from the Departments of State,
Defense, OMB, and CIA.
JAEIO: .Toint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, a subcommittee
of USIB, responsible for interdepartmental coordination of
intelligence relating to atomic ener!!y.
JAG: .Toint Analysis Group, an interdepartmenta'l body established
in 1962. to provide regular assessments on Soviet and Chinese future
military strengths.
KIQs: Key Intelligence Questions, initiated in 1974 and designed to
produce intelligence on topics of particular importance to national
policymakers, as defined by the DCI.
MBO: Management by Objectives, a system established in 1974 to
mea.<;ure performance against explicitly stated goals.
MONGOOSE: Operation MONGOOSE, a program conducted between
1961 and 1962, aimed at discrediting and ultimately toppling
the Castro government.
NIA: National Intelligence Authority, supervisory body of the Central
Intelligence Group (CIG), comprised of the Secretaries of
State, War; and Navy, and the personal representative of the
President.
NIE: Nntional Intelligence Estimate, a predictive judgment on the
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and courses of action of foreign nations.
It represents the composite view of the intelligence
community.
NlOs : National Intelligence Officers. a senior group of analysts, organized
in 1973 to replace ONE. Responsible for the management
of intelligence collection and production.
NIPE Staff: National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff, established
in 1963 under the DCI to serve as a coordinating body in
the management of interdepartmental intelligence activities. Replaced
by IC Staff in 1971.

106
NIPP: National Intelligence Projections for Planning, interagency
assessments on Soviet and Chinese future military strengths, produced
by the JAG.
NIHB: National Intelligence Review Board, established in 1968, to
advise the DCI in making judgments on foreign intelligence
resource needs. Replaced in 1971 by IRAC.
N18: National Intelligence Survey, a compendium of factual infot;mation
on foreign countries drawn from throug-hout the intellIgence
community. The program was terminated in 1974.
NPIO: National Photographic Interpretation Center, established in
1961 under the direction of the DCI to analyze photography derived
from overhead reconnaissance.
NSC: National Security Council, the senior decisionmaking- body in
the Executive branch. Established in 1947, comprised of the
President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense
with representatives of the .JCS, Special Assistant to the
President and other officials attending- as required.
NSO/D: National Seeurity Couneil Intelligence Directive, a directive
issued by the NSC to the intelligence agencies. NSCIDs are often
augmented by more specific DCIDs and by internal departmental
or agency regulations.
OOB: Onerations Coordinating- Board, established in 1953 to replace
the PSR as It senior review body for covert operations. Its members
included deputy-level officials from the Departments of State,
Defense, the office 'of the President, and from the foreign aid
program.
OOD: Offi('e of Collection and Dis<;emination. a component of the DDI
charged with the dissemination of intelligence and the storage and
retrieval of unevaluated intelligenee. Renamed the Office of Central
Reference in 1955; renamed the Central Reference Service in
1967.
001: Office of Current Intelligence, a component of the DDI, established
in 1951. Responsible for the production of current intelli~
nce in numerous areas.
OEB: Offi('e of Economic Researeh, a component of the DDI,
established in 1967. Responsible for production of economic
intelligence.
ONE: Office of National ERtimates, organized in 1950, to produce
National Intelli~nce Estimates. Dis.<:olved in 1973.
00: Office of Operations, a component of the DDI. charged with th~
collef'tion of overt information. Dissolved in 1965. oPO: Office of Policy Coordination, a component atta('hed to the CIA
but reportin~ to the Departments of State and Defense. Established
in 1948 with re<:ponsibility for the conduct of covert operations.
Mer~ed with ORO in 191)2 to form the DDP.
OPB: Offif'e of Political Re-Sffirch. established in 1974 as a component
of the DDI. Responsible for long-term political research.
OBF: Office 0" Research and "Evaluation, a component of CIG and
CIA. established in 1946. Responsible for int-elligence production
and interagency coordination. Dissolved in 1951.
oBB: Office of Research and Reports, e,.<rt:ablished in 1950, became a.
component of DDI in 1952. Responsible primarily for economic
and strategic research. Dissolved in 1967.

107
OSI: Office of Scientific Intelligence, created in 1949. Responsible ror
basic science and technical research. Became a component of the
DDI in 1952. Transferred to the DDS&T in 1963.
OSO: Office of Special Operations, a component of CIG and CIA,
established in 1946. responsible for espionage and countel'espionage..
Merged with OPC in 1952 to form the Directorate for Plans.
OSR: Office of Strategic Research, established in 1967 as a component
of the DDL combining military intelligence units in OCI and
ORR.
OSS: Office of Strategic Services, U.S. intelligence agency from
1942-1945. Responsibilities included research, analysis, espionage
and overseas operations.
PBCFIA: President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities, an advisory body created in 1956 by President Eisenhower.
Renamed President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB) in Hl61.
rSB: Psycholog'ical Strategy Board, a subcommittee of NSC established
in 1951, chaTged with directing psychological warfare progTams.
Its members included departmental representatives and
Board staff members. Replaced by OCB in 1953.
SEC: Scientific Estimates Committee, a subcommittee of the lAC,
established in 1952, charged with interagency coordination of
scientific intelligence and the production of publications. Renamed
the Scientific. Intelligence Committee in 1959.
SIOl/fT: Signals Intelligence, which involves the interception. processing,
analysis and dissemination of information derived from
foreig'Il electrical communications and other signals.
SlllIE: Special National Intelligence Estimate, request by policymakers
for a judgm(:mt on a particular question.
SPO: Special Procednres Group, a component of OSO, established
in 1947. Responsible ior the conduct of covert psychological
operations.
SSTJ: Strategic Services Unit, a component of the ~Var Department
charged with clandestine collection and counterespionage. Transferred
to CIG in 1946.
STVNCC: State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee, established in
1944, the predecessor body to the NSC.
TSD: Technical Senices Divisi.on, a component of the DDP, engaged
in research and development to provide operational support for
clandpstine activities. Transferred to DDS&T in 1973.
USCIE: United States Communications Intelligence Board, established
in Hl46 to advise and make r€'(',ommendations on communicn.
tions intellig-ence t.o the Secr€'tarY of Deranse.
[lSIB : Ul.lite-d ~tates Intdlig-cnce Board, an int.erdppartment.al body
est.ahhsh€'d 1ll 1!E18. throngh the merger of the lAC and the
USCIB. Responsible for coordinating intelligence activities
among the Departments.
70-725 0 - 76 - B

INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1
I. Backgrownd
The First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourth Amendment
ri~ht to be secure in one's person, papers, and home have been
violated in recent years. Although these rights have been abridged in
time-honored ways, in some cases the abridgement has taken place in
ways that could not have been forese€n by the framers of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. A partial list of means employed follows:
Breaking and entering into offices and homes ;
Opening of letters in the Postal System;
Bugging or nse of hidden microphones with no party to the
conversation witting;
Wiretap of telephone communications;
Intercept of telephone communications without actual connection
to wires; and
Intercept of facsimile or printer communication.
Although files have existed for many years in all societies, and have
sometimes been used to pernicious ends, technology has now made available
to the managers of personal files gre,ater speed and efficiency in
the retrieval of data, as it has to managers of inventory files, of airline
reservations, of the corpus of legal decisions, and of the United States
House of Representatives Computer Based Bill Status System. In
recent years, too, heightened public sensitivity and legislative activity
have begun to introduce legislat,ion, guidelines and standards regarding
governmental and private files on individuals, granting the individual
in many cases the right to know of the existence and the content
of such a file, and to be able to challenge information which may be
found in that file (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 "F.S.C. 552A). Computer
technology may not have been instrumental in the misuse of CIA or
IRS files to provide information to the White House on U.S. citizens,
but the future impact of such technology must be assessed.
It is a logical possibility that the modern technological tools employed
in the exercise of other rights and freedoms for the general and
individual good might inadvertently result in such general exposure
that the First and Fourth Amendment rights could no longer be preserved.
or that their preservation "auld require severe restriction of
other rights and freedoms with major damage to society. For example,
such might be the impact of (fanciful and unphysical) spectacles
which. while restoring perfC<.'t vision to older people. endowed them as
well with t,he ability to look throngh envelopes and walls.
A second logical possibility is that the general exercise of technology
for individual good and the good of society does not in itself
imperil the rights under discussion, but that specific targeting of this
technology toward individuals can imperil these rights. In this case,
the particula.r threat to these rights could of course be removed byoutlawing
the subjoot toohnology and enforcing suoh laws. It may be,
1 This staff report was prepared for the Select Committee by Richard Garvin,
consultant.
(109)

uo
however, that comparable protection of these rights may be obtainable
by legal restrictions on the use of such technology, for such invasion,
without denying society benefits which would otherwise be obtainable.
If similar guarantee of rights may be achieved in this way, the banning
of technology (even if politically feasible) would be an exaggerated
remedy.
Finally, in some cases new technology may aid in restoring privacy
against invasion by people or tools. An old example is the use of locks
on doors; newer ones are the use of encryption for written communications
and for the privacy of information in files. On the other hand,
it would be inappropriate to require the individual to go to great cost
to {>reserve his rights if such preservation could be obtained at lesser
SOCIal cost. e.g. by restrictions of the actions of individuals who would
intentionally violate these freedoms or whose activities might inadvertently
imperil these rights. Thus, the expectation of prIvacy for
the contents of a post card sent through the mails is quite different
from that of a first-class letter in a sealed envelope, and the cost of an
envelope is not regarded as an excessive charge for the guarantee of
privacy. As the human senses and capabilities of vision, hearing, and
memory are expanded by the use of new tools, what is the place for the
analog of better envelopes'
I/. Oovert Observation and Intercept
Oovert hearing (hidden microphones).-It has always been possible
for a person to secrete himself, unbeknownst to the participants in &
conversation, in such a way as to hear the conversation and so to violate
an expectation of privacy ("eavesdropping"). No doubt mechanical
aids in the form of tubes were used at times to make eavesdropping
easier and less dangerous. Furthermore, rooms equipped with speaking
tubes to convey orders to another part of a building were vulnerable
to another kind of eavesdropping in which the use of the apparatus
was other than that intended.
Microphones were in use in the 19th century for telephone communication
and more recently for radio, public address, and recording.
The present state of microphone technology is apparent to us all,
with microphones a few millimeters across and a millimeter thick
common in portable cassette recorders in use for business, education,
and pleasure throughout the world. Over the last few years, the development
of integrated-circuit technology and its extremely wide use in
such recorders, in stereo equipment, and in calculators has provided
not only tre possibility but also the widespread capability to house
amplifiers in a soace ofa few cubic millimeters and with power consumption
of microwatts. Thus, microphones can be hidden in walls or
moldings of rooms, in furnishings, or in personal possessions. They
can be left behind by visitors or can be introduced as part of the normal
resupply or refurbishment process.
Microphones can be accompamed by self-contained recorders or ean
transmit the signal (usually after amplification) either along nearinvisible
wires or bv radio. In the case of wire or radio transmission,
there would normally be a recorder or more powerful relay at some
small distance of a few meters to a few hundred meters. The power
requirements for microphones and amplifiers can be provided by batteries,
by conne~tion to the normal building power supply, ft'om the

111
teleph.one s,ystem, or ?y silicon or other cells converting sunlight or
r~mlIght mto electncal power. Microphones can also be provided
WIth po,,:er. by t~e absorption of radio <,>r microwave signals, and can
retransmIt mtellIgence on the same carrIer waves. In addition to dedicated
wires or radio transmission, the microphone signal can also be
transmitted on the building power line or on the telephone lines, if
any. Under most circumstances, the a:bility with further advance of
technology to make microphones still smaller would not be of great
utility. They are already small enough to l?ose a near-maximum threat.
Not only are apparatus containing mlCrophonesavailable by the
tens of millions throughout the world, but the components are also
common articles of commerce and can be assembled by anyone of millions
of people. Many rooms are now permanently equipped (entirely
overtly) with microphones for use in recording conferences or in picking
up clearly comments made by an audience dur,:ing question period.
Such microphones could easily feed recorders, wires, or transmitters
at other times as well. Furthermore, every loudspeaker, whether builtin
or part of a portable electronic device, is capable of working as a
microphone in just the same way. Individuals with impaired hearing
have particularly small microphone-amplifiers, some of them concealed
in the frames of eye glasses.
A slightly different kind of covert hearing is said to be pm~sible by
detecting with laser beams the vibration of ordinary windows enclosing
a room in which the target conversation is taking place. Another
approach to overhearing conversations outdoors is to use large directional
microphones distant as much as one hundred meters.
Retarding the further development of microphone technology for
commercial purposes would be of little help, even if it were feasible,
given the already small size of microphones. It seems likely that privacy
can be adequately protected against covert hearing in the UnIted
States by proper legislation and enforcement requiring a warrant for
the exercise of covert hearing capability. There being no expectation of
privacy against a person present,legislation in the future, as now,
should not restr.ict covert recording or retransmission by a person
present, whether that person partiCIpates in the conversation or not.
Of course, covert hearmg capability can be banned administratively
from designated premises, as it is now, by those in control of the
premises--e.g., "no microphones, radios, recorders, etc. at defense installations"
(or on premises operll;ted by the XYZ company).
Oovert seeing (hidden cameras).-Hidden cameras (whether electronic
or film) can imperil Fourth Amendment rights in analogous
fashion to hidden microl?hones. Observation through a crack or peephole;
personnel observatIon via a partially transparent overt mirror;
large automatic or remote-control cameras or TV-type sensors behind
an overt mirror; small cameras behind a small aperture-this series
represents the application of technology to the goal of covert seeing.
Vision comparable with that of a person can be obtained through a
hole about 3 mm (lis-inch) in diameter. A 1 mm hole would permit
commercial TV-quality picture. Reading the text of papers on a desk
across the room will require a larger aperture. Unlike microphones,
such cameras are not yet common or cheap. A film camera taking a picture
every!) seconds would need a considerable film supply and would
have to be quiet if covert; a TV camera capable of communicating even

112
at such a rate. with human vision quality is feasible: but is at prei"ent
costly. ·With time. the technology of fiber-optic signal communication
will allow unobtrusive relay from a hidden camera. A command link
could direct the view of the camera to,vard the interesting portion of
the room, saving power and communications rate (as could built-in
intelligence at a later time).
Clearly, the invasion by covert seeing of privacy would be intentional.
not the result of innocent exercise· of rights on the part of others.
As such. preservation of such privacy can look toward legislation and
the enforcement thereof, with such unconsented observation available
onlv under warrant.
Wiretap of telephone lines.-Anywhere on the line running from the
telephone instrument through the building to the junction box and on
to the local exchange (typically a mile or so from the subscriber's instrument).
connection to the line or proximity to that line will allow a
high-quality telephone conversation to be provided for listening or
recording. For many decades there has been no need for physical contact
with the line to allow "wiretap," and no telltale click or change in
quality is necessary or likely.
The technology needed for wiretap (whether by contact or noncontact)
is primitive compared with that used for covert hearing.
There is no way in which this technology can be outlawed without outlawing
telephones themselves. However, in this field particularly, there
is no necessity to abandon the protection of privacy. The intercept of
communications from telephone lines may readily be controlled by
legislation and by the requirement of a warrant for such actions by
government bodies.1
&
Intercept of voice fr01n domestic micro-ware relay.--In the United
States, most telephone calls beyond the local area are now transmitted
via microwave relay. Towers about 20 miles apart contain receiving
aI:tennas, amplifiers. transmitters, and transmitting antennas. The
mIcrowave relay system operates near 4000 megahertz and 6000 megahertz.
at wavelengths on the order of 6 centimeters.
The transmitte'd beam from each of these relay towers has an angular
width on the order of one degree and so can be picked up well over a
wedge some 20 miles long by a third of a mile wide. Leased-line services
such as the federal government FTS system, 'VATS lines, and individual
corporate "private-line" networks occupy permanent positions
in the frequency spectrum in those relays which are used to carry the
signals (not always by the most direct path) over the fixed network.
Direct-distance-dialing calls, constituting the bulk of the traffic, cannot
be so precisely located. In general. however, these DDD caUs are preceded
by digital information which serves to direct the call to the receiving
telephone number and to indicate the calling telephone number
as well.
At present. an individual with an instruction manual and a few
thousand dollars worth of equipment can set up a makeshift antenna
and listen or record continuously calls on any desired fixed-assigned
channel. In principle, even the DDD calls could, at substantially larger
investment, be matched with a list of "interesting" telephone numbers
I. Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 2510-2520).

113
So as to record only those calls originating from or directed to a given
subscriber number.
These voice messages, having traveled by wire at least some distance
may be from the telephone instrument. legally afforded the same protection
as calls carried on wire from sendor to receiveI'.2 However,
questions of extra-territoriality arise. There appears to be no way in
which individuals on foreign embassy and consular properties can be
forbidden from listening into those microwave links which pass their
territories. It must be anticipated that certain powers will use such
information not only for afl'airs of state,B but also simply to earn funds
by taking advantage of information which is obtained in this way.
Communication in regard to commodity markets, stock exchanges, and
biddin!7 prices for large contracts an convey information which can
have substantial value.
Given this peculiar situation, one might judge that the threat to
privacy from all but extra-territorial intercept is adequately controllable
by a legislative ban on su('h intercept (and the requirement of
warrants for government "search"), and that the rather limited exposure
to personnel controlled by foreign powers and based outside
the reach of U.S. law can be controlled by other means. Voice links
carrying defense information are all encrypted. Other important
information of the federal government can })(> rerouted to avoid some
small number of possible listening posts. Direct-distance-dial calls
eventuaJly will be relayed with the destination and origination information
going over separate channels. When all-digital transmission
is used to carry voice, encryption can be available at negligible cost.
It could be implemented with separate keys for each microwave link,
or encryption could be done at the point of digitizing each signal, or
both.
Intercept of non-voice from domestic microwave relay links.-Many
channels on U.S. microwave relay are devoted to the transmission of
non-voice information (facsimile machines, teletype, telex service,
other printer traffic). The comments above regardin~ the intercept of
voice communications from such microwave links apply with equal
force to the intercept of non-voice communications. There is, however,
a major difference. Existing law protects only communications from
which intelligence can be "aurally acquired," 4 so there is at present no
legal bar to the intercept of such non-voice communications.
At pre,ent, the value of the average non-voice communication relayed
over the microwave net is probably greater than that of the averap.:
e voice communication. Even if non-voice were protected by new
legislation, it would still be subject to intercept from extraterritorial
sites. Fortunately, the protection of non-voice data t.ransmission by
means of encryption is far easier than is the case for voice and is practica
I now over all telex and printer links. Several machines and
electronic devices of varying effectivl:'ness are available to provide
end-to-end transmission security. The National Bureau of Standards
'18 U.S.C. 2511.
• Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the
United States, .June 1975. p. 8.
418 U.S.C.2510(4).

114
has begun the promulgation of a national standard for data security
via encryption, which apparently satisfies the ooncerns of the United
States Government for maintaining the privacy of non-defense
information.
Intercept of voice or 'IUYn-voice from domestic communication satellite
links.-About half the international common-carrier communications
originating in the U.S. goes by satellite and half by submarine
cable. A rapidly increasing fraction of purely domestic communica·
tions is now relayed by satellite. Present satellites may receive com
munications from anyone of a number of ~round stations and simpl~
rebroadcast the signal at a different frequency, covering the conti·
nental United States with the microwave beam. For some communica·
tions with multiple addressees, this large potential receiving area is
an advantage; for most communications with a single addressee, the
particular grouncl Rtation to which thp DH'Ssa.'!"e is addressed will
recognize the digital address and record or retransmit the message
into the local net (or print it and put it into an envelope for delivery,
etc. ).
Modern relay satellites are in stationary orbit, so that a fixed antenna
·can be used to receive si~nals, rather than'the tracking antenna initially
required for the lower-orbit satellites, Thus, anywhere in the large area
illuminated by the satellite microwave beam, a relatively simple antenna
ann amplifier would allow intercept of messages relayed by
satellite. The satellite transmits microwave energy not only onto the
land mass of the U.S.. but also onto adjacent waters and countries, includin~
Cuba. Non-U.S. citizens on non-U.S. territory are completely
free to receive satellite relay of domestic F.S. communications and to
do with this information whatever they will.
Although some satellite relay is digital in nature and thus readily
protected by encryption at negligible added cost, the voice communication
is primarily analog (whereby the intelligence is carried by continuous
ampliturle or frequency modulation as is the common case for
terresl-rial multiplex relay). Encrypted voice communication would require
a wider channel at present than is needed by analog voice, but
the arlditional cost for privacy via encryption might be small even so,
since the satellite resource is a small part of the end-to-end communications
('ost.
Unfortunately, domestic sntellite relay. as presently practiced, is an
example of a case in which the indisputable benefits of technology
brin~ with them a threat to privacy. In this case. it is not the application
of technolo~to intercept but the technological nature of satellite
transmission which makes intercept as easy outside U.S. territory as
within, thus puttin~ protection of privacy outside the reach of U.S.
law. Technology in the form of encryption provides an adequate solution.
This remedy is available now for non-voice communication and
coulO be used wit'h equal ease for digital voice. Aside from encryption,
satellite voice communication coulrl be providerl some degree of protection
in the near future by avoiding fixed-assignment schemes for
users desiring privacy.
III. File Technology
Some examples of current statu8.-Among the early large computerized
file-orienterl systems were the airlines seat reservations systems
now in use by all U.S. airlines. The overall system accommodates thou

115
sands of flights per day, with a hundred or more seats per aircraft, and
can handle reservations months in the future. A reservation can be
made, queried, or cancelled within seconds from many hundreds or
thousands of terminals. Some of the records may contain little more
than the name of the passenger; others may include a complex continuing
itinerary, with hotels, car rental, telephon~ numbers, and the like.
Seismic data bases are used by oil exploration companies to hold
seismic reflection data and core logs. The former is the pattern of reflected
sound waves versus time at various microphones which are
sensitive to signals from a small explosion at the surface of the ground.
The reflection comes from change of structure at different levels in the
earth below. Core logs (or bore logs) may measure the detailed ground
conductivity, water content, radioactivity content, and the like in tens
of thousands of oil exploration wells. The material is kept computer
accessible so that it can be retrieved and processed in a timely fashion
as new tools are developed or as new information makes it desirable
to compare with old information in the neighborhood.
Several government echelons have tax data bases. At the city or
county level, such a data base may include details about every dwelling
in the city. Such data bases crrn be particularly useful in case a blanket
reassessment is desired.
The Xew York Times Information Bank ("NYTIB") provides at
the New York Times building hoth abstracts and full texts of articles
published in that newspaper. From remote terminals, subscribers can
search the compendium of abstracts for all articles which have been
published in the New York Times and may request photocopies of the
full articles whose abstracts satisfy the search criteria. The abstract
searching can be full-text search, i.e., a search on the name "Harold
Ickes" might result in a sheaf of abstracts, accompanying stories most
of whose headlines say nothing about Ickes, but may refer to Roosevelt.
Full-text search capability is used in several states for purposes of
law and legal decisions. In addition to struggling with the often inadequate
index to such a corpus, an attorney can undertake a full-text
search for statutes or cases which have some characteristics in common
with his current concern.
The United States House of Representatives Bill Status Office
handles over 1000 telephone inquiries each day concerning the status
and content of legislation which has been introduced into the House.
All these are file-oriented systems, some of which may retrieve files
according to the index system under which they were prepared; others,
as \ve have seen, have a full-text search capability, such that a file can
be retrieved in accordance with its cmllent rather than heading.
Computer file systems are now in common use for text preparation
and editing. A draft letter, report or publication is typed at a terminal
connected with a computer (or sometimes at a stand-alone system).
At any time, portions of the draft can be displayed, typed out locally
or on a fast printer. The typist can enter corrections into the computer
system (including global changes, e.g. to change the group of
characters "seperate" every place it may occur into the group
"separate"), can rearrange paragraphs. append additional files, and
the like. .

116
Use of files in intelliqenee work.-The work of intelligence agencies
and their analysts is in large part the production or reports. There
are routine periodic reports, reports in response to specific tasking on
questions of concern to national leaders, reports which are initiated
internally to the agency in response to some fact or complex of facts
which seems to require attention at a higher level. In presenting any
such material, the analyst needs to obtain as much other information
about the subject (What is the significance of the appointment of an
unexpected person as premier?) as is possible. There is a strong analogy
to the NYTIB which should also serve to provide responsible reporters
with other information on the subject of current interest (earlier,
perhaps contradictory speeches of public officials, and the like).
Intelligence files may also have agents' reports, which are in the
nature of fragmentary newspaper articles except that they are secret.
Raw intelligence files may also contain the full text of foreign radio
broadcasts as transcribed and circulatpd in printed fonn by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). If plaintext messages
of a foreign military command are available, tliPY "'ill also be
filed, and for efficient search and retrieval preferably in a computer
store.
The use of computers in all these file applications---eommercial,
educational, and intelligence-is motivated by the same drive for effic~
ency, reliability and the capability to retrieve materials at places,
tImes, and by persons other than those who have filed them. Computers
at present are not normally used to store pictures or things,
but indexes to such collections can as readily be placed in the computer
as can any other kind of information. In contrast with a single
physical file of paper documents, the computer store never suffers
from the document's unavailability because it is on somebody else's
desk. Multiple copies of a micro-image store can also satisfy the
requirement for multiple simultaneous use, but cannot be updated
or searched so readily as can a computer store.
Neo;r-~erm future file technoloqy: performance and c08t.-In any
case, It IS not the purpose of this note to design a file system for the
intelligence community, but rather to inquire as to crrtain aspects of
privacy in regard to such files. The Privacy Act of 1974 is both the
~esult and cause of increased int~rest in design of safeguards, which
I~ at present the concern of an actIve subset of data-processing profesSIOnals
and of a number of existing organizations,5 including the Privacy
Protection Studv Commission, but a brief discussion of near-term
future technology may be of help. '
qbviously; concern regarding files and privacy is with the chain
of mformatIon from collection through stora!!e and retrieval. One
worry is that some government organization by the expenditnre of
enough money, could have the capability to "know eYerything about
everyone" at any time. Becanse there is no general public right of
• See for instance National Bureau of Standards Publications: FIPS PUB41"
Computer Security Guidelines for Implementing the Privacy Act of 1974" (SD
Catalog Number C13.52 :41) and "Executive Gude to Computer Security" (Available
from thf' Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, XBS, Washingtion,
D,C. 20234).

117
access to the files of the inteJligence agencies, it is of interest to know
what these capabilities might amount to, as a guide to the introduction
of safeguards.
In order to provide some intuitive feeling for the magnitudes involved,
consider the storage of full page, double-spaced text. Such a
page may have thirty lines of sixty-five letters or digits, or about 2,000
characters per page. Except as noted, it is assumed that a character
requires one "byte" (8 bits) of storage, although by appropriate coding
of text, one can store as many as thr~ characters per byte.
Using a typical modern disk-pack magnetic storage device, storage
of 300 million bytes can be obtained for a rental of about $1500 per
month, or some '$5 per month per million characters. Such a device
can transfer about 1.2 million characters per second, so it would require
250 seconds to search its entire contents if the logical search
device could operate at the storage data rate. Search is normally done
by a query, looking for an exact match in the data stream as it is
brought from the store. Examples of simple queries are: "theft of
sHvice" in the case of the legal corpus; "Chamberlain/Munich" in
the case of the NYTIB (where the "/" simply means that both "Chamberlain"
and "Munich" should be in the same document) ; "seperate"
in the case of ordinary text processing where the properly spelled
word "separate" is to be substituted. Such queries against a small data
base are handled well by a general purpose computer. Indeed, large
data bases also have some structure which can often be used to reduce
by large factors the amount of data which actually has to be searched.
But even if the data base has little structure, one could imagine
streaming the entire data base past some modest special-purpose electronic
device (a "match register") which may detect a match against
the query and divert the matching document into a separate store,
where it may be brought to the attention of the analyst. In large production,
such a match-register might be bought for $100 in modern
integrated-circuit technology. In any case, the cost of special-purpose
match-registers would be small compared with the cost of the massive
store and will henceforth be neglected here.
By such techniques, as many queries as are desired may be entered
from terminals and simultanously matched against the entire data
stream. If the data base is entirely in this type of storage (at a present
cost of $5 per month per megabyte, or 50 cents per month per nominal
file of 50 typed pages) any query can be answered within five minutes.
Of course, a single query might lead to many other sequential queries
before all the desired facts are at hand, but the time is measured in
minutes, not months.
Given that most queries need not be answered in minutes, one can
ask the cost of a slower system. There are now commercially available
tape library products, of which a typical one can store 35 billion characters
at a cost of about $18,000 per month (so 50 cents per million
characters per month). This particular device can deliver data ata
rate of 0.8 million characters per second, so that it would require some
twelve hours for such a store to be searched entirely for as many
queries as have been presented. The range of cost associated with such
a system with current technolQgy and twelve-hour response time thus

118
goes from $10 million per month for a system capable of storing 50
pages on each of 200 million individuals (without encoding) to about
$200,000 per month for a system storing the same amount of information
on each of 10 million individuals, with the characters compacted
into more efficient form for storage.
So much for the neal' term technology. It is being developed in this
country and abroad entirely for commercial purposes. It serves highly
important functions in allowing any organization-eommerce, industry,
government, and the professions-to manage information
quickly and accurately.
Yet fresh in our memory is the use by the 'White House of the CIA
to provide a "psychological profile" on Daniel Ellsberg. An ordinary
file drawer would be adequate if one kne\v long in advance that information
would be requested on this particular person. Given the unusual
nature of the case and the non-existence of that particular file drawer,
it would be technically possible to search all government files for documents
which mentioned the name in question. This would bring to
light, of course, income tax returns, military service history, all employees
for whom social security tax had been paid in the past by the
individual in question, names of relatives, etc. This material would
not be found in intelligence files, but it could be found if the queries
were made available to cooperating individuals with access to files in
non-intelligence agencies like the IRS, Selective Service, and the like.
Additional important information might be Rvailable by use of the
NYTIB as a commercial subscriber.
Thus the problem in regard to those intelligence agencies with large
files of raw data is to ensure that these files are used only in support
of the authorized mission of the agency and are not exploited for purposes
of improving prospects of incumbent officials in an election, of
punishing those on an "enemies list," and the like. But it is no longer
enough to proscribe the creation of specific files on U.S. citizens; it is
now possible to recreate such a file from the central file in less than a
day, or to answer questions from the central file without ever having
a manila folder or file drawer labelled "John Smith." There must
therefore be control over the queries asked of the file, of whom, and
by whom. It is just as important to ensure that information given
freely by individuals to non-intelligence agencies is not exploited
for unauthorized purposes and is not accessible to unauthorized
individuals.
The computer technology which makes possible rapid access to large
masses of information also allows in principle for control of access
to that information. Measures for preventing illegitimate use of goverrunent
files could be proposed by the Executive, which can obtain
help from equipment manufacturers, organizations experienced in
computer use and analysis, and from the scientific societies. Such
measures could be embodied in Executive Orders. Their adequacy and
the need for legislation providing criminal and civil penalties should
be the subject of Congressional hearings and research.
Safeguards which are being considered and partially implemented
in non-intelligence files are the following:
1. There should be a limitation as to who can keep files on
individuals. (But clearly the New York Times is allowed to
put their own newspaper into computer-readable form. And

119
is it a file on an individual if the individual's name is only
mentioned in a larger document?) ;
2. Individuals should be allowed access to their files (for
repayment of the actual cost of search) and to receive the
information in the file on them. (But if the file is very large,
such access might be made very expensive. On the other hand,
if the access were treated like an ordinary query in the example
above, the cost might be quite reasonable.) ;
3. The individual should be allowed to write into the file in
order to contest the facts or in order to present his own point
of view; .
4. There should be limitations on those who gain access to
the file or who can receive information from the file;
5. Duplication of the file should be limited and unathorized
access prevented;
6. There should be an indelible record of 'who has queried
the file and what questions were asked, so that failure of
access limitations will not go undetected.
Among the safeguards for any system should be adequate requirements
for identification of terminals from which queries are being
made, identification and authorization of the inviduals who query;
a complete record of the queries (with terminal and individual identification),
adequate security against transmitting large amounts of information
and the like. The moment-by-moment execution of these
controls on access is the task of the set of computer instructions known
as the "operating system." 6 Although the design of an adequate operating
system is a difficult task, the detailed specification of the controls
is itself non-trivial and must be done with some understanding of
what is technically feasible at present. Fundamental to the continued
effectiveness of such safeguards is the maintenance of the integrity of
the main program which controls the computer. Even in highly classified
applications, there is no reason for this main operating program
to be classified, and a source of strength should be public scrutiny of
this operating system. Clearly, the introduction of access controls
should not wait for the perfect operating system.
No matter what the safeguards, individuals might be able to gain
access to some information for which they are not authorized. Adequate
legislation, criminal penalties, and the enforcement of these
laws should deter many who might otherwise try. Data security measures,
such as encryption of the file itself, can help also.
What must be particularly guarded against is not so much the misuse
of intelligence files but the misuse of information freely given or
collected for authorized purposes and which is then turned to an improper
use. Indeed, open analysis by all those concerned should lead
to an understanding of the protection which may be provided.
• An introduction to the problem can be found in "The Protection of Information
in Computer Systems," J. H. Saltzer and M. D. Schroeder, Proc. IEEE, Vol.
63, No.9 (September 1975), pp. 1278-ff.

ADDEXDA TO THE IXTERDI REPORT OX ALLEGED
ASSASSINATIOX PLOTS
The following sections are intended to supplement the Committee~s
Interim Report on alleged assassination plots.' One of these sections
summarizes evidence involving the plot against Chilean (jeneral Rene
Schneider which has come to the Committee~s attention since the issuance
of the Interim RBport. Two other principal seetions-"The 'Special
Operations' r nit" and "The Question of Discrediting Action
Against Jack Anderson"-report on the COlllmittee staff inquiry into
al1egations of CIA involvement in assassination planning; neither inquiry
revealed evidence of such planning. Finul1y, some miscellaneous
corrections of errata in the previous report and some additional pieces
of evidence are included.
1. SCHNEIDER CASE
Since the issuance of the Committee's IntBrim Report on al1eged
assassination plots involving foreign leaders~ the Committee has received
statBments from two sources to supplement its earlier inquiry
into the death of Chilean General Rene Schneider: 2 (1) former President
Richard M. Nixon's responses to written interrogatories from the
Committee; and (2) the recent statements and testimony of Edward
Korry, former United States Ambassador to Chile.
1 The Interim Report was published on November 20 (legislative day, November
18),1975 (9lth Cong., 1st Sess.; Report No. 94-465).
2 With respect to the death of General Schneider, the Committee found: "On
October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days
earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an
obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President
of Chile. The United States Government supported and sought to instigate
a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns
and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. Although
the CIA continued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the record
indicates that the CIA had withdrawn active support of the group which carried
out the actual kidnap attempt on October 22, which resulted in Schneider's death.
Further, it does not appear that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to
coup plotters in Chile was used in the kidnapping. [The Committee found] no
evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that "United States officials specifically
anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction." (Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities,
United States Senate, 11/20/75, p. 5; hereinafter cited as Interim
Assassination Report.)
(121)

122
A. Interrogatory Responses of Richard M. Nimon
Of the 77 written interrogatories submitted to former President
Richard Nixon by the Select Committee on February 4, 1976, 36
dealt with Chile. Of these, all but eight specifically related to the events
discussed in the Schneider chapter of the CommIttee's Inwrim Assassination
Report.
In summary, Mr. Nixon's responses to the Committee's inwrrogatories
included the following statements relevant to the subject covered
in the Inwrim Report.3
-According to the former President, the purpose of the September
1970 White House meeting, attended by Mr. Nixon, CIA Director
Richard Helms, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs Henry Kissinger. and Attorney General John Mitchell was to
discuss "the prospect of Salvador Allende's election to the Presidency
of Chile." 4 Mr. Nixon stated that he informed Director Helms that
he wanted "the CIA to determine whether it was possible for a political
opponent of Mr. Allende to be elected President by the Chilean
Congress." 5 "Specific means" to be used by the CIA to prevent Allende
from taking office were not discussed; "general means" were. These
included "the direct expenditure of funds to assist Mr. Allende's opponents,
the termination of Uniwd States financial aid and assistance
programs as a means of adversely affecting the Chilean economy, and
the effort to enlist support of various factions, including the military,
behind a candidate who could defeat Mr. Allende in the congressional
confirmation procedure." ~
-Mr. Nixon stawd that he was not aware that from Sepwmber 15,
1970, to mid-October 1970 "the CIA was attempting to promote a
military coup in Chile." 7 With the exception of a mid-October discussion
with Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon stated: "I do not presently
recall being personally consulted with regard to CIA activities in
Chile at any time during the period September 15, 1970 through
October 24, 1970." 8
In mid-October 1970, Mr. Nixon was informed by Dr. Kissinger
that "the CIA had reported to him that their efforts to enlist the support
of various factions in attempts by Mr. Allende's opponents to
prevent Allende from becoming president had not been successful and
likely would not be." According to Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger informed
him that "under the circumstances he had instrucwd the CIA to
abandon the effort." 9 Mr. Nixon stated that he informed Dr. Kissinger
that he agreed with that instruction.
-Mr. Nixon stated that he did not receive information "concerning
plans for a military coup in Chile involving the kidnapping of General
Rene Schneider." 10 He also stated that he was unaware that "the
CIA passed machine guns or other material to Chilean military officers
known to the CIA to be planning a coup attempt." 11
Mr. Nixon's statements regarding the events surrounding the death
• The full text of the Committee's interrogatories and former President Nixon's
responses (hereinafter cited as Interrogatories) is set forth at pp. 143-171.
• Interrogatory 39.
5 Ibid.
• Interrogatory 45.
7 Interrogatory 51.
• Interrogatory 49.
• Interrogatory 52.
10 Interrogatory 54.
u Interrogatory 55.

123
of General Schneider contrast with evidence received previously by
the Committee. All CIA officials stated that they interpreted President
Nixon's September 15 instruction as a directive to promote a military
coup in Chile in the Fall of 1970; both CIA documents and the testimony
of President Nixon's Assistant for Xational Security Affairs,
Dr. Kissinger, are consistent with this interpretation.12 Mr. Nixon has
stated that he instructed Richard Helms to determine whether it was
possible for a political opponent of Mr. Allende to be chosen as President
by the Chilean Congress. He further stated that he "informed ~1r.
Helms that to be successful. any effort to defeat ~fr. Allende would
have to be supported by the military factions in Chile." 13 ~Ir. Xixon
stated that he did not recall, however, instructing the CIA to promote
a coup in Chile.14
Of equal importance is the controversy surrounding whether the
'White House knew of the CIA's continuing efforts to promote a coup
in Chile after mi~-October. 1970. According to an October 15 CIA
memorandum Dr. Kissinger instructed DDP Thomas Karamessines at
a 'White House meeting to suspend coup planning by "de-fus[ing]
the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily" and Kissinger also "instructed
~Ir. Karamessines to prl:'serve Agl:'ncy assets in Chile. working
clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency
operations against Allende in the future." 15 Kissinger testified-and
his former deputy, Alexander Haig agreed-that after October 15, the
W:hite House neither knew of nor specifically approved CIA coup
plans in Chile. CIA officials, however, testified that their encouragement
of coup planning by the Chilean military after October 15 was
kno"'n to and thus authorized by the -White House.16 Mr. Nixon's recollection
is that in mid-October he had agreed with Dr. Kissinger's
instruction to the CIA to abandon its effort in Chile to prevent Allende
from becoming President, Mr. Nixon did not recall "being personally
consulted with regard to CIA activities in Chile" between October 15
and the October 24 vote in favor of Allende.
The clear import of ~Ir, Xixon's statements. is that the CIA was
pursuing coup plans in Chile without sufficient authority. His statement
with respect to the September 15, 1970, White House meeting is,
however. at \'ariancp with those of CIA officials and his Assistant for
National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger. With respect to the midOctober
instruction if Mr. Nixon's statements accurately describe the
events, and if Dr. Kissinger unambiguously informed the CIA on
October 15 to suspend all coup plans in Chile and gave no indication
12 See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 228, 233; e.g., Richard Helms, 7/15/75,
pp. 6--7, 10-11; Chief, Chile Tagk Force, 7/31/75, p. 53; Deputy Chief, WH Division,
7/15/75, p. 20; Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 9/16/70; CIA Cable
236, Headquarters to Station, 9/21/70; Cable 240, Headquarters to Station,
9/21/70; Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 12.
13 Interrogatory 39.
14 Interrogatories 39, 45.
J;'or a full account of the evidenc'E' in the Committee's record relating to the
question of authorization for the CIA to promote a coup in Chile, see the Interim
Assassination Report, pp. 225-254. Richard Helms' notes of his Septemher 15,
1970 monthly meeting with President Nixon and his testimony about the meeting
is included at pp. 227-228. See also the Committee Staff Report "Covert Action in
Chile. 1963-1973" (l2/1R/75).
15 CIA )Iemoranclum of COll\'ersation/Dr. Kissinger/)Ir. Karamessines/General
Haig, at the White House, 10/1;;/70.
16 See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 227, n. 1: 246-247; 2;)0-253; e.g.,
Karamessines, 8/6/75, pp. 8, 72-73, 89,
70-725 0 - 76 - 9

124
of support for renewed coup planning before October 24, then the
CIA would have been acting in contravention of ·White House policy.
On the. other hand, if, as .CI~'\.. officials testified, the coup activity ,vas
authoI'lzed from the begmlllng and the White House was kept informed
untIl the end, then the accounts of Mr. Nixon and Dr.
Kissinger are called into question.
B. 8tatemcllt8 and 1'e8tinwny of EdwaTd lIf. [{on'!!
FO~'llIer u.s. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry has testified and
subnntted statements to the Committee since the issuance of its Interim
Heport all assassination plots." He made the following comments with
respect to the Schneider case:
17 ~Ir. Korry appeared before the Committee in public session on December 4.
Hl75. to testif~' on Chile. In addition to his testimony, Mr. Korry submitted a 2Hpage
letter, with accompanying documents, detailing his views on events in
Chile. His testimony and letter (with accompanying documents) are contained
in the Senate hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," De('
ember 4 and 5, 1975. l<'inally.~Ir. Korry was deposed uy the Committee
on February 24, 1976, in a six-hour session. During his testimony and deposition,
and in various letters to the Committee, Mr. Korry objected to several items in
the Schneider chapter of the Committee's Interim Assassination Report.
The following points, among others, were made by Mr. Korry: (1) Korry
stated that his two-phase proposal (see Interim Assassination Report, p. 229)
of June 18, 1970, had been requested the previous January "by the State Department"
and CIA representatives in response to his suggestion that the Chilean
presidential election be viewed in two phases ("one up to September 4th and
then between September 4th and October 24, 1970"). He was asked to "submit
with dollar figures a precise scenario for a phase one and a phase two" (Korry
deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 20-26). (2) Referring to the 40 Committee's directive
of September 14 (see Interim AssassInation Report, p. 230) "to go directly to
President Frei" about a plan to prevent Allende's confirmation, Korry testified
that he "refused to go" see President Frei (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 36).
Despite Korry's statements that he "would not approach Frei ... even indirectly"
(Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 43-46), on Septemlber 16, 1970, in response
to the 40 Committees instructions, Ambassador Korry cabled Undersecretary
of state U. Alexis Johnson: "I am extremely grateful for the confidence
and support of President Nixon and the Forty Committee.... To provide that
moral base (so that President Frei will feel there is sufficient justification to
move against Allende) is largely our task. . . . It is highly unlikely that I
shall be able to see Frei. I cannot go to the presidential palace without creating
a storm: I cannot go to his home anymore since it is subject to the same observation
that my residence is. There are no U.S. visitors ... in sight to prOVide
an innocuous cover for another talk. Hence I delivered my message to Frei one
hour after receipt of your message through [an intermediary] that there was
no point in further analysis of the situation ... we were prepared to give appropriate
support if Frei could decide his own course, but if he preferred to live
interminably the Hamlet ... I would take [his] indecision to mean that he had
opted for a Communist Chile." (3) Although he did refer to General Schneider
in a September 21. 1970, situation repOrt to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary
Charles Meyer. (See Interim A~sassination Report p. 231.) Korry told the
Committee that this was "an assessment pro,ided by the Chileans," it was not
a reference to kidnapping or assassination, and he was not personally advocating
any action with respect to Schneider. (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 57---63.)
Korry also stated that, months earlier, he had reported the view that Schneider's
constitutionalist "doctrine" would prevent the Chilean military from intervening
in the electoral process:
"I met with General Schneider myself in the middle of the spring of 1970
to understand exactly what he stood for. I reported promptly thereafter what
the Schneider doctrine wa~ and said it was immutable and said that it would
prevail in the military.
"The military attachl'. subsequently to my recollection ... repeated again and
again that the Schneider doctrine was a fact and as long as Schneider was in
that job, nobody would ever move." (Korry deposition, 2/24/75, p. 60.)

125
- KOlTY took issue with the view, expressed in the Committee's Report
and by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. that the line separating
Track I and Track II often lwcame hlurred.18 According to KOITy:
~Iuch is made in tIll' assassination report of the "two tracks"
that the U.S. policy followed in Chill' in September and
October of 1f)70. The report stit~hes a new myth to suit some
consciences or some ambitions or some institutions. There are
many who it might wish the public awl history to believe
that no real difference existed between the diplomatic Track
I that I followed. and the co\'ert military Track II that the
"White "White launched. It is hog\vash. Ti-ack I followed Mr.
Frri. then the President of Chile and its constitutional leader.
It adopted certain minimal and cosmetic suggestions put forward
by one purportedly in President Frei's confidencr.
Track I led nowhere beeause President Frei \vould not encourage
or lead any Chilean military action, and because I
would IlPither have the United States through the CIA, or
anyone else even in the private community, assume a responsibility
that had to be Chilean. I never informed President Frei
of tl~e money which was authorized for work for Track 1, and
not a penny; as you also say. \vas spent on it.
Track II. on the other hand. did not deal with Frei. did
not seek his concurrenee. did not follow his lead, did not prrtend
to be \vithin any eonstitutional framework of Chile.'9
In his deposition of February 24. 1976, KOITy qualified his assertion
of the differenees behwen Traek I and Track II. which was to be
carried out without his awareness. 'Vhcn asked if Tracks I ltnd II
blurred together in that they both sought the same objective, he
replied: .
You could say blurring of objective. And at the point of
inspiration. But at the point of execution, there was no blurring
whatsoever.2o
-There were numerous referpnces in tht' Interim Assassination Report
to United States contact with retired Chilean General Roberto
Viaux, a Chilean coup-plotter, and the coup-oriented activities of a
United States military attache assigned to Santiago.21 In his letter to
Spnator Church. Korrv stated that these activities were contrary to
the instructions he hac!' issued \vhile in Chile: .
A. I barred. from 1969 on, any U.S. Embassy or U.S. military
contact with the circle around General Viaux. I renewed
this ban in the strongest tenDS again and again in 1970 and
thereafter. I checked periodically by direct questioning of the
CTA and of the military attaches, and by corroborative in\
·estigation. to satisfy myself that this order was being carried
out.
B. I barred the CIA, in late 1968 or early 1969, from any
o~rational contact with the Chilean military without my
pnor knowledge and approval, (I can recall no permissive
mstance), from any physical contact with a colonel or higher
18 See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 229-232.
" Hearings, Vol. 7. "Covert Action:' December 4 and ;', 1975, pp. 30--31.
20 Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 100.
2l Interim Assassination Report. pp. 235--246.

126
rank, from any contact with Frei or any ~Iinister or deputy
Minister, from any contact with any major political figures
without my prior apprO\'al (rarely given) or any contact
with the head of, or a leading figure in a government agency
aside from the approved liaison with the Chilean police. I
checked in every conceivable way, regularly.22
-The Committee noted in its Interim Assassination Report that
Ambassador Korry had informed the 40 Committee that the Chilean
military would not move against Allende after he received the plurality
in the presidential election of September 4, 1970.23 In his testimony
before the Select Committee, Korry added:
I consistently warned the Nixon administration, starting
in early 1970, months before the election, that the Chilean
military ,vas no policy alternative in Chile. I was pressed in
September and October by Washington to develop possible
scenarios for independent Chilean military intervention in
Chile. Without exception, my responses excluded all possibilities.
Indeed, I warned gratuitously and very strongly on
two occasions that if anyone were considering such schemes,
it would be disastrous for U.S. interest.'l.24
Korry then cited two cables he sent after the September 4 election:
Let me read from two cables sent to Undersecretary of
State U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Henry Kissinger, so that the
public can judge for itself.
One, on September 25: "Aside from the merits of a coup
and its implications for the United States, I am convinced we
cannot provoke one and that we should not run any risks simply
to have another Bay of Pigs. Hence I have instructed our
military and CAS", that is, the CIA, "not to engage in the
encouragement of any kind."
Again, on October 9, to the same two addresses, "Eyes
Only," "In sum, I think any attempt on our part actively to
encourage a coup could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure. I am
appalled to discover that there is liaison for terrorists and
coup plotting, names deleted. "I have never been consulted or
informed of what, if any, role the United States may have in
the financing of" names deleted. "An abortive coup, and I and
my chief State coleagues, FSO's are unalterably convinced
that this is what is here under discussion, not more beknownst
to me, would be an unbelieved disaster for the
United States and for the President. Its consequences would
be to strongly reinforce Allende now and in the future, and
do the gravest harm to U.S. interests throughout Latin
America, if not beyond." 24a
-Ambassador Korry also told the Committee that in late September
or early October 1970, he became suspicious that "the CIA was
22 Hearings, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975, pp. 122-123.
os Interim Assassination Report, pp. 230, 250.
24 Hearing-s, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975, pp. 31--32.
24. Ibid.. p. 32,

127
'up to s.omething behind my back.' " 25 According to Mr. Korry, he
asked Ius Deputy Chief of Mission to investigate. Keither he nor his
deputy were able to uncover any factual basis for Korry's suspicions. 26
-Mr. Korry testified that in the period September 15 to October
15, 1970, he informed the Frei government of the identity of a
likely as~assin of Allende, "a military man who was then involved in
provocatIve acts, bombings throughout Santiago." 27 This man, Major
Arturo Marshal, was arrested shortly thereafter, a few days before
the shooting of General Schneider.
-Mr. Korry also informed the Committee that in the final two
weeks of the so-called Track II period he met with President Nixon
in the White House. According to Korry :
I told President Nixon in the Oval Office in mid-October
1970 that the United States had to avoid a self-fulfilling
prophecy however correct my reporting and analysis might
be, by seeking generally an understanding with Allende,
starting even before his inauguration. I said this effort need
not prevent subsidies by the CIA to non-conformist media
and to non-conformist, non-extremist political parties which
we knew, we knew from superb CIA penetrations and from
excellent State Department reporting were soon going to be
squeezed to the walU8
-Finally, Mr. Korry objected to the fact that the Interim Report
attributed sole authorship 29 of the so-called "nuts and bolts" 30 cable
to him. He has asserted that, his cable had a CIA designation, and that
the Santiago CIA Station at least concurred in the wording of the
cable.
Mr. Korry also stated that the idea for such a severe cable originated
not with him but with President Frei: "President Frei asked
the Ambassador [Korry] through the minister of national defense
for a statement that could be used" in Frei's negotiations with the
Chilean military.31 Korry said that the harsh language of the cable
was a deliberate overstatement of the repercussions an Allende administration
could expect from the United States:
I had to retain the confidence of an administration in
Washington that I believed would inevitably get involved in
military relationships with the Chileans....
25 Ibid. The Committee noted in its Interim Assassination Report (P. 227)
that on September 15, 1970, President Nixon had informed CIA Director Helms
that there should be no U.S. embassy involvement in what became known as
Track II.
2O Ibid.
~ Ibid., p. 31.
28 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
.. Interim Assassination Report, p. 231.
30 That cable read: cc Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to
reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our
power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a
policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist
society in Chile. Hence, for Frei to believe that there will be much of an
alternative 'to utter misery, such as seeing Chile muddle through, would be strictly
illusory. (Situation Report, Korry to Meyer and Kissinger, 9/21/70.)
S1 Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 68.

128
I know I deliberately, and the embassy knew it, overstated
the message . . . in order to prevent and halt this damn pressure
on me to go to the military.32
II. THE "SPECIAL OPERATIO~S" UNIT
On December 26, 1975, the New York Times reported that former
CIA officer E. Howard Hunt, Jr., told an interviewer that:
[H]e was told in the mid-1950s that the CIA had a small
unit set up to arrange for the assassination of suspected double
agents and similar low-ranking officials ... Hunt said he recalled
having been told by CIA fOuperiors in 1954 or 1955
that Boris T. Pash, an Agency official, was in charge of the
assassination unit.33
Hunt was also reported to have said that he once met with Colonel
Pash and broached the subject of planning an assassination of a suspected
double agent.
The Committee staff ilwestigation concluded that a special unit
headed by Colonel Push in the early days of the CIA was assigned,
among other things, responsibility for assassinations and kidnappin¥
s-including any which might be directed against double agentsin
the event that such operations were authorized. ""Ve have found no
evidence, however, that this unit performed any covert action involving
assassination or kidnapping operations.34 Although the "Special
Operations" unit had genl~ral jurisdiction for assassination or kidnapping,
it appears that no such operations were ever seriously considered
by this unit.
A. Program Branch 7: A Special OpemtwTt8 Unit 'With Assa8sination
Jurisdiction
Boris T. Pash, an Army colonel specializing in intelligence and
counterintelligence, was assigned to the CIA from March 3, 1949, to
January 3, 1952, and worked in connection with the CIA. on several
projects after that date.35 In the formative years of the CIA, Pash
served as Chief of Program Branch 7 (PB/7), a "special operations"
unit within the Office of Policy Coordination, the original clandestine
services organization ,vhieh was eventually transformed into the DirectoratB
of Plans. The responsibility for standard forms of covert action
was assigned to the six other program branches within OPC's Staff 3 :
political warfare, psychological warfare, economic walTare, eseape and
evasion, sabotage, and countel'sabotage.36 Accordin~ to Colonel Pash,
PB/7 was responsible for "such activities which the oth(>r six branches
didn't specifically have." 31 Pash testified that PB/7 was "not opera-
82 Ibid., Pp. 74-76.
33 New York Times, December 26,1975, p. 9.
.. Due to the fact that CIA has no record of documents which deal wi'th this
aspect of Pash's unit (CIA letter to Select Comrnittelo', January 16, 1976). the
Committee has relied upon the testimony of the principal witnesses. It should
be remembered tllat this 'testimony relates to events that transpired twenty-five
years ago.
a:; CIA letter to Select Committee, January 16,1976.
'"Director of Operations Planning (Staff 3), January 1, 1976, pp. 4-5.
'" Colonel Boris 1.'. Pash testimony, p. 13.

129
tional," but rather involved in the planning of "special operations"
such as promoting defections from Communist countries, facilitating
the escape of prominent political refugees, disseminating anti-Communist
propaganda behind the Iron Curtain, and contingency planning
for the death of foreib'1lleaders, such as Stalin.38
Howard Hunt's testimony pointed to an additional function of Program
Branch 7. Hunt stated that, based on "hearsay" from his superiors
in the CIA's Southeast Europe division in the early 19508, he
had the "distinct impression" that Colonel Boris Pash had run a unit
which would arrange an assassination mission if it were required.39
The Director of Operations Planning for OPC, who supervised
program branches, confirmed the fact that Colonel Pash's Program
Branch 7 unit was responsible for assassinations and kidnapping as
\vell as other "special operations." 40 The supervisor testified that he
consulted with Frank Wisner, the Director of OPC, who agreed that
Pash should have jurisdiction over assassinations.4
! Kidnapping was
also part of PB/7's "catch-all function," according to the supervisor"
kidnapping of personages behind the Iron Curtain ... if they were
not in sympathy with the regime, and could be spirited out of the country
by our people for their 0\Yl1 safety; or kidnapping of people whose
interests were inimical to ours." 42
Boris Pash testified that he did not believe that he had been charged
with responsibility for assassinations, but allowed for the possibility
that he was viewed as if he had such responsibility:
It is conceivable to me that, if someone in OPC had thought
that an assassination program and policy should be developed,
the requirement might have been levied on PB/7 because of
the "catch-all" nature of its responsibility ... I was never
asked to undertake such planning. It was not my impression
that such planning was my responsibility. However, because
of the "catch-all" nature of my unit, it is understandable to
me that others on the PP [Political and Psychological Warfare]
Staff could have had the impression that mv unit would
undertake such planning.43 •
The Deputy Chief of PB/7, who served under Pash, testified, however,
that he had a clear recollection that the written charter of the
"special operations" unit included the following language:
PB/7 will be responsible for assassinations, kidnapping, and
such other functions as from time to time may be given
it ... by higher authority." ..
He said that the charter also assigned to PB/7 responsibility for
any functions not specifically assigned to the other program branches.45
3S Boris Pash testimony, pp. 16-18, 20.
39 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 1/10/76, pp. 33, 36, 51.
.0 Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/"16, pp. 16, 18, 24-26.
U Ibid., p. 14.
•• Ibid., p. 18.
.. Boris Pash affidavit, 1/19/76.
.. Deputy Chief, PB/7, testimony, 1/5/76, p. 19-79. The CIA was unable to
locate a charter for Program Branch 7. (CIA letter to Select Committee.
1/7/76.)
.. Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 19.

130
The Deputy Chief did not recall any discussion at the CIA of the assassination
or kidnapping aspects of this charter because, compared
to the charters of the other program branches, he believed that PB/7's
charter was "more secret than imy of the others." 46 lIe construed the
charter's reference to "higher authority" to include "State Department,
Defense Department, Xational Security Council, the PreSIdent
of the United States." 47
Boris Pash did not recall "particular wording" in a charter that included
a reference to assassinations, but he did not dispute the accuracy
of the Deputy Chief's testimony: "It could have been there
without my recalling it, but I didn't give it any serious consideration
because I knew that ... it would be beyond us." 48
The Director of Operations Planning did not recall the charter of
PB/7, but he testified that whether or not there was a written directive
"it was clear" to everyone in OPC that assassination and kidnapping
"was "'ithin the purview" of Pash's responsibilities.49 The Director
testified that "the heads of the program branches" were all involved in
general discussions of assassination as a tactic, although the subject
did not have a high priority.50 The Director of Operations Planning
said that Colonel Pash was entrusted with this jurisdiction not because
he had performed any assassination in the past, but because he
had a general background in clandestine operations in World War
II.51
Xone of the witnesses testified that any actual assassination operation
or planning "'as ever undertaken by PB/7, which was disbanded
along with the other program branches when the DDP was formed in
late 1952.52 Pash testified that he was "never in charge of or involved
.6 Ibid.
<7 Ibid.
.. Pash, 1/7/76, p. 22. Pash speculated that the reason he may have dismissed
charter language relating to assa"sination was that he saw it as a part of the
wartime mentality carried into the CIA's clandestine sen'ices by former officers
who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II :
"I probab'y just sort of glanced over it, thinking well, this is a typical OSS
approach to things .. , to them using words like that is maybe a common
thing. , .. I think they felt big in talking that way.
", , . There were some very good men in OSS, some dedicated men, , .. But
also there were a lot of entrepreneurs and adventurers.... So when the CIA
was formed, a lot of these people with these wild ideas and wild approaches
were there. So, of course, when you say you're in charge of 'all ot.her activities'
... these fellows might have ideas [such as] ... 'it's easier to kill a guy than
to worry about trailing him'." (Pash. pp: 15-16, 22.)
•• Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, pp. 18-19,26.
50 Ibid. p. 12. The Director explained the re~son for discussion of assassillation
in the early phase of organzing OPC after 'Vorld 'Var II:
"One of the things that was taken into account and was discussed on a sort
of last ditch basis was assassination ... [Ilt was a matter of keeping up with
the J oneses. Every other power practiced, and as far as I know still practices,
assassination if need be. So, reluctantly we took that into account." (Director
of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 8.)
5' Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 23. It should be noted that,
among his noteworthy activities in military intelligence, Colonel Pash' was decorated
for his leadership of the Alsos :\Iission to protect nuclear secrets at ;the
end of World 'War II. ' I
., Each area division in the DDP subsequently performed the functions which
the program branches had handled.

131
in any assassination planning, nor ever requested to do so." 53 Pash's
Deputy said that no action or planning was ever undertaken pursuant
to that portion of the PE/7 charter which assigned responsibility for
assassination and kidnapping.54 The Director of Operations Planning
testified that he knew of no assassination mission or planning,
including contingency planning, by Pash or anyone in OPC.55
The only consideration of assassmations that the Director was aware
of was the general discussion among Pash and other program branch
chiefs in the process of establishing ope.56 Likewise, Howard Hunt
,vas una,vare of any assassination planning or attempts by Pash.51
B. The llunt-Pash Meeting and the Handling of Double Agent
PToblem8
Howard Hunt testified that he once met with Boris Pash and his
Deputy to discuss "on hypothetical basis" a method of dealing with a
situation in which the CIA suspected that a double-agent was undermining
the Agency's liaison with a group in -West Germany. Although
suspicion had not yet focused on a particular agent, Hunt described
his inquiry to Pash as "a search mission to determine the alleged capability
of Colonel Pash in 'wet affairs' ... that is, liquidations, would
have any relevance to our particular problem." 58 Hunt said that Pash
"seemed a little startled at the subject. He indicated that it was something
that would have to be approved by higher authority and I withdrew
and never approached Colonel Pash again." 59 Nonetheless, it was
Hunt's impression even after leaving the meeting with Pash that assassination
was one function of Pash's unit,60
Hunt testified: "I never asked [Pash] to plan an assassination mission,
I simply asked if he had the capability." 61 Pash did not encourage
the discussion, according to Hunt, and "made it very clear that if anybody
was going to get approval for such a thing, it would have to
be ... my division; ... he was not going to go forward." 62 Hunt stated
that he believed that Pash was referring to Frank "VisneI' as "higher
authority," but Hunt did not think that Wisner ever considered the
idea: "no direct approach ora request for such approval was ever
made." 6'
Colonel Pash testified that he did not i'ccall any incident like the
One described by Hunt: "I deny that I have ever talked to him about it
and that he ever asked me about-it.:' 64 Pash did not recall "any dis-
53 Pash, 1/7/76, pp. 23-25, 33. Pash added that he was philosophically opposed
to assassination except in extreme situations where "if you don't do it, the United
States is destroyed." (Pash, p. 28.)
50 Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 64.
66 Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 25.
56 Ibid., p. 26.
• 7 Hunt, 1/10/76, pp. 12-13.
56 Hunt, 1/10/76, pp. 8-11. Hunt said that "liquidations" included "removals"
by assassination or kidnapping.
•, Hunt, 1/10/76, p. 10.
60 Ibid. p. 38.
11 Ibid. p. 52.
62 Ibid. p. 38.
63 Ibid. p. 35.
.. Pash, 1/7/76, p. 41.

132
cussion of any double-agent-type activity anyplace." 65 The Deputy
Chief of PB/7 also said that he knew "absolutely nothing" about the
incident recounted by Hunt,66
Pash stated that PB/7 ,,-auld not have dealt with double-agent
problems because his unit was more oriented to planning rather than
"operational" activity.67 Likewise, Pash's Deputy Chief testified that
PB/7 never handled double agent problems.68
The Director of Operations Planning testified, however, that Pash's
unit would have had responsibility for the planning aspects of dealing
with a double-agent problem. But the Director was not aware of any
specific instances in which the "Special Operations" unit had to handle
a double-agent problem. The Director said that assassination or complete
isolation ,\as generally regarded as the means of dealing with
a suspected double-agent.69
O. Assassination Suggestions Rejected by OIA Headquarters
The Deputy Chief of the "Special Operations" unit recounted two
instances where assassination was seriously suggested and, in both
instances, was quickly and firmly rejected at CIA headquarters.
1. Asian Leader
The Deputy Chief testified that in the summer of 1949, while he was
serving as Acting Chief of PB/7 because Boris Pash was out of the
country, the Chief of the CIA's political warfare program branch
approached him to request the assassination of an Asian leader. After
attending a planning meeting at the State Department, the Chief of
the political branch-who was the CIA's liaison with the State Department-
told Pash's deputy that the Asian leader "must be sent to
meet his ancestors." The Deputy Chief of PB/7 testified that the
political branch chief assured him that there was "higher authority"
for this request,70
The Deputy Chief referred the request to OPC Director Frank
Wisner's assistant. Soon thereafter Wisner's assistant told the Deputy
Chief: "It has gone right to the top, and the answer is no . . . we
don't engage in such activities." He instructed the Deputy Chief to
65 Ibid. pp. 38, 48-49. Pash also stated: "Mr. Hunt claims to h'lYe discu~sed
the alleged assassination matter with me sometime in 1954 and 1955, at least two
years after I left the Agency.... I categorically deny having had any discussion
on any "ubiect whatsoeyer with Mr. Hunt during tho"e years." (p. 33) Hunt
testified that his meeting with Pash could have occurred before 1950 or after
1953-Hunt was on assignment to a non-European nation in the interim-but
that it was much more likely that the meeting took place in 1954 or 1955, during
which period Hunt was dealing with operations in West Germany. (Hunt.
1/10/i6, p. 44--45.) It should be noted that Pash did undertake certain projects
in liaison with the CIA after his formal assignment terminated in January 1952.
.. Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 73-74.
61 Pash, 1/7/76, pp. 37-38, 48-49.
.. Deputy ChIef, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 67.
• 9 Director of Operations Planning, pp. 27, 34. He testified: "In the international
clandestine operations business, it was part of the code that the
one and the only remedy for the unfrocked double-agent was to kill him ...
and all double-agents knew that. That was part of the occupational hazard of
the job.... So in a shadowy sort of a way, we did have in mind that possibly
as a last ditch effort [assassination] might come up. But it didn't come up within
my time there because we were very slow in getting off the ground on any of
these activities." (Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 9).
70 Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 28, 30, 34.

133
inform anyone involved of this position and to destroy any document
related to the incidtmt. The Deputy Chief followed these instructions.
The Deputy Chief speculated that Wisner's assistant had been referring
to the Director of Central Intelligence when he said that the
matter had gone to the "top." 7l
fJ. East Asian Leader
The Deputy Chief testified that during his tenure at a CIA's station
in Asia, \"here he served after PB/7 \"as disbanded, he sent a
cable to headquarters from the station outlining a proposed media
propaganda program. He later learned that the other station officers
had attached an additional paragraph to his cable suggesting that an
East Asian leader should be assassinated to disrupt an impending
Communist conference in 1955.72
A reply cable was received immediately from CIA headquarters
disapproving the recommendation to assassmate the East Asian leader.
According to the Deputy Chief, the cable "strongly censured" the
Station and indicated "in the strongest possible language this Agency
has never and never will engage in any such activities." The cable
added: "immediately proceed to burn all copies" of any documents
relating to this request." The Deputy Chief testified that a senior
representative from CIA headquarters arrived shortly at the station
to reprimand the officers involved in the incident.73
III. THE QUESTION OF DISCREDITING ACTION AGAINST JACK ANDERSON
The Washington Post recently reported that, "according to reliable
sources," former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt, Jr., "told associates
after the 'Watergate break-in that he was ordered in December 1971 or
January, 1972, to assassinate syndicated columnist Jack Anderson."
The Post further reported that Hunt had said that the order, which
came from a "senior official in the Nixon vVhite House," was "cancelled
at the last minute but only after a plan had been devised to make
Anderson's death appear accidential." 74
According to the newspaper article, Hunt's "alleged plan"
... involved the use of a poison to be obtained from a
former CIA physician, said the sources, who added that the
poison was a variety that would leave no trace during a
routine medical examination or autopsy.
Hunt told the sources Anderson was to be assassinated because
he was publishing sensitive national security information
in his daily newspaper column ...75
The Committee staff has found no evidence of a plan to assassinate
Jack Anderson. However, a White House effort was made in consultation
with a former CIA physician to explore means of drugging
Anderson to discredit him by rendering him incoherent before a public
'11 Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 35-37.
72 Ibid., pp. 47-48, 50.
73 Ibid.. pp. 50-51, 56-57.
7< Washington Post, "Hunt Told Associates of Orders to Kill Jack Anderson,"
by Bob Woodward, 9/21/75, p. AI, A.20.
715 lbid-., p. 1.

134
aJ;>pearance. This effort apparently never proceeded beyond the plan-
Dlngstage. .
The Committee staff inquiry into allegations of CIA involvement
in this matter produced no evidence of such involvement.
A. The 11£eeting Between Howard Hunt and Oharles Oolson
Howard Hunt testified that somewhere in late 1971 or early 1972
Special Counsel to the President Charles Colson called Hunt into his
office and asked him to find a means of discrediting newspaper
columnist Jack Anderson:
Mr. Colson at that juncture was-appeared rather nervous.
He . . . had a common wall with President Nixon's suite in
the Old Executive Office Building, and although he did not
glance in that direction, my impression was that he had been
with the President not too long before ... [W]hat he
indicated to me was that :Mr. Anderson had become a great
thorn in the side of the President and that . . . it was
thought that one way to discredit Anderson was to have him
appear incoherent or rambling on a radio broadcast. . . .
Mr. Colson asked me" if I could look into iU6
Hunt testified that neither Colson nor anyone else ever mentioned to
him the possibility of assassinating Anderson, even in the sense of
contingency planning.77
Hunt stated that Colson never explicitly mentioned any discussion
with President Nixon about discrediting Jack Anderson.7B Hunt's
impression that Colson had recently spoken with the President before
giving him the Anderson assignment was an "inference" Hunt drew
from Colson's demeanor:
Colson was normally a highly controlled individual. ... He
was agitated when he called me in, sort of talking to me and
rifling through papers on his desk, which was very much
unlike him, and the inference I drew from that was that he
had just had a conversation with the President. So when I
accepted the assignment I assumed, as I usually do with
Colson, that he was either reflecting the desires of the Chief
Executive or else that he, as a prescient staff officer, was
attempting to find a solution to a problem that was troubling
his chief.79
Like Hunt, Charles Colson testified that he "never heard anyone
discuss any plan to kill Jack Anderson," nor did anyone ever request
him to make such a plan.80 Colson could not, however, "discount the
possibility of having said something in jest" along this line.8!
Colson testified that he was asked "many times" by President Nixon
to take action to discredit Jack Anderson; and action was "probably"
taken in response to those requests.82 Colson did not recall being asked
78 Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 4---5.
77 Ibid., pp. 11, 15.
78 Ibid., p. 11.
70 Ibid., p. 10.
BO Charles Colson testimony, 3/6/76, pp. 7, 20.
81 Ibid., p. 10.
... Ibid., p. 34.

135
by the President to find a means of drugging Jack Anderson or
rendering him incoherent during a public appearance.83
Colson said that the only discussions that he recalls initiating
"involving Howard Hunt regarding Jack Anderson would be during
the ITT flap" when he sent Hunt to interview ITT lobbyist Dita
Beard.8~ Colson testified that his logs show that he met with Hunt on
March 14, 1972, and he assumed that the ITT affair was the subject
of that meeting.85 Colson did not recall if the subject of drugging Jack
Anderson was raised during those discussions.86
Despite Howard Hunt's testimony that the discussion of drugging
Jack Anderson was at Colson's initlative,81 Colson recalled "Hunt on
a couple of occasions coming to me with some hare-brained schemes,
something to do with drugging involving Jack Anderson." Allowing
for the possibility that a serious discussion of the subject took place
which he did not recall, Colson said that as a routine matter he "would
dismiss" most such suggestions coming from Hunt.s8 Colson said that,
in the context of casual storytelling, as opposed to planning an operation
lI;gainst a specific target, he recalled hearing Hunt describe techniques
for the covert administration of drugs :
I do recall him telling me about the CIA inducing drug reactions
and how they did it, and the fact that it could be entered
into a person's body through bodily contact.89
The only serious discussion with Hunt about the effect of drugs on
a specific target that Colson recalled involved a plan to disorient
Daniel Ellsberg, which Colson said "never received a very sympathetic
reaction" from him.90
B. Hunt a:nd Liddy Discuss Drugging Techniques with a Former
01A Physicia:n
Howard Hunt testified that within a few days of the meeting in
which Colson assigned him to "look into" means of rendering Jack
Anderson-incoherent during a public appearance, Hunt "got in touch
with a retired CIA physician" and arranged to meet for lunch at the
Hay-Adams Hotel in ·Washington. D.C.91 Hunt then contacted G.
Gordon Liddy, "who at that point had just left the White House and
moved over to the Committee to Re-elect the President," to invite
Liddy to attend the luncheon meeting.
.. Ibid., pp. 33-35.
.. Ibid., p. 24.
.. Ibid., pp. 23, 29.
.. Ibid., p. 24.
8'1 Hunt, 1/11/76, p. 10.
M C()ll<on, pp. 24-25.
.. Ibid., pp. 30--81.
OG Ibid., pp. 17, 31, 35.
01 Hunt, p. 5. Thp physician testified that he received Hunt's telephone
call shortly prior to March 24, the day on which the meeting took place. (Former
CIA Physician testimony, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Health of the
Committee of Labor and Public Welfare and the Senate Subcommittee on Admini!<
trative Practice and Procedure of the Committee of the Judiciary, 11/7/75, pp.
38,40.) This plillces the Hay-Adams Hotel meeting within ten days of the ColsonHunt
meeting of l\!arch 14, 1972, which was recorded in Colson's logs.

136
Hunt said he contacted the former CIA physician because "he had
sOllle knowledge of the unorthodox administration of behavior-changing
or altHing substances." Hunt said that he never contacted anyone
who was a current CIA employee in relation to this matter.92
Hunt stated that he invited Liddy to attend the meeting: "because
Liddy also was interested in Jack Anderson." He said that he explained
to Liddy while ,,-alking to the Hay-Adan~s Hot~l that Colson
"wants me to find out something about hallucmogelllc drugs and
their applications to a particular individual, in this instance Jack
Anderson, and Colson wants him to appear incoherent and rambling
during a broadcast." 93
The former CIA physician testified that he met with Hunt and
Liddy ait the Hay-Adams Hotel on March 24, 1972. He said that he
knew Hunt from their previous work at the CIA; during the meeting,
"Hunt said that he had an office in a part of the 'White House." The
physician described the purpose of the meeting as follows:
I was asked if I could help them provide behavior altering
medication to an individual, unidentified, and in no way
could I detect of whom they were speaking. I said I could
not. I had retired in 1971. . . . I had no access to any kind of
medicines. So I did not provide it.94
The former CIA physician testified that Hunt wanted an "LSD-type
drug" in order "to make someone behave peculiarly in a public situation."
95
Despite his inability to provide a behavior-altering substance, the
former CIA practitioner of "occupational medicine" testified that he
discussed with Hunt and Liddy the operational problems involved in
administering such a drug through ingestion or absorption through the
skin.96 According to Hunt, they discussed various means of administering
a drug: pamting the steering wheel of a car "for absorption
through the palms of the hand," switching bottles in a medicine cabinet,
or dropping a pill into a cocktail. Hunt added that during the
meeting with the doctor there was no discussion of techniques of
assassination.97
Hunt said that he made it clear to the former CIA doctor that he
was making this inquiry on behalf of the White House.98
Hunt did not ask the former CIA physician to procure any drugs
because he "felt confident ... that if the time came when any controlled
substance were needed, that Mr. Liddy could secure what was
.2 Hunt, pp. 5, 13, 17.
'3 Ibid., pp. 12-13. G. Gordon Liddy submitted a sworn statement to the Committee
indicating that he would refuse to answer any questions on this subject
under his Fifth Amendment privilege and that he would continue to refuse
to answer such questions even if he were granted use immunity. (G. Gordon
Liddy affidavit, 2/8/76.)
.. CIA physician, 11/7/75, pp. 38-39.
.. Ibid., pp. 38-42.
96 Ibid., pp. 40-42.
97 Hunt, 1/11/76, PP. 6, 14.
98 Ibid., p. 19.

137
necessary through a secure source" within the Treasury Department,
where Liddy previously worked.99
C. Report to Colson on the Impracticability of Drugging Anderson
Hunt testified that, while walking back to their offices, he and Liddy
"discussed the matter ... pointing out the impracticability of utilizing
[the] administration methods indicated" by the former CIA physician:
'Ve almost had to have him under clinical conditions to make
sure that A, he got a measured amount of the substance, whatever
it might be, and that the timing was just right, and that
he would be able to sit down or stand up at the lecture platform
in apparently good condition, that at least he would
be navigable to get there before he began to talk and make a
fool out of himself. . .. None of these conditions pertained
at all.10o
Hunt said he promptly reported to Charles Colson that he met with
"a former CIA phYSIcian who knows something about these things"
and "in terms of what Mr. Colson was thinking about it was impractical
and we should just forget about it." 101
Charles Colson testified that he did not recall receiving such a report
from Hunt nor did he recall whether he ever learned that a meeting
took place between Hunt and a former CIA physician.102
"That was the end of the affair," Hunt said. The proposal to drug
Jack Anderson "never advanced beyond simply tbe informationgathering
phase. There was never any proposal or any further reference
made to it." According to Hunt, Colson did not seem to be disappointed
and did not ask him to explore other alternatives.103 Hunt
concluded:
I don't think Colson would have been willing to let that thing
drop on the basis of simply my preliminary inquiry if he were
under great pressure from the Chief Executive.104
Thus, although the prospect of drugging columnist Jack Anderson
was explored by White House personnel, it appears that the planning
was terminated in an early stage.
Il\) Ibid., p. 6.
100 Ibid., p. 9. Hunt said they considered the possibility that Anderson's car was
chauffeured and, if he droye his own car, that he would be wearing gloves in
the wintertime or would have moist palms in the summer, eliminating the possibility
of absorption of a drug on the steering wheel. Second, they decided that a
surreptitious entry to place a fake medicine bottle was impractical; it was impossible
to know who- would swallow the drug or to control when it would be
taken. Finally, Hunt understood that Anderson did not drink and thus could not
be drugged b)' mrans of a pill in a cocktail. (Ibid., pp. 7-8.)
101 Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 8, 14.
102 Colson, 3/6/76, pp. 27, 33. Colson did recall "Hunt at one time or another
talking about having met with CIA doctors" in connection with consideration
of coyert ac;ion against Danipl Ellsberg." (Ibid.. p. 28.) Colson also said that his
logs do not show a meeting with Hunt after their meeting on March 14, 1972.
(Ibid.. pp. 28-:L9. I
103 Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 8-9, 15.
Ill< Ibid., P. 15.

138
IV. :MISCELLANEOUS EVIDENCE AKD ERRATA
A. Aurand Affidavit
After the publication of the Interim Report, the Committee received
the follo"'ing sworn statement from retired Vice Admiral E. P.
Aurand:
. . . it was my honor to serve President Eisenhower as his
Naval Aide during his second term (1957-61). My position
was not one which included the regular discussion of high
matters of state with the President. Therefore, the few occasions
on which he did mention such problems to me were
personally momentous and I recall them clearly. On one of
these occasions, he mentioned that the assassination of a certain
dictator (Fidel Castro) had been hypothetically suggested
to him. His reaction was that even if it would do any
good, which he doubted, it was immoral in the first place and
might bring on a wave of retaliatory assassinations which
could be counter to world peace, his highest priority.105
B. Affidavit of Eisenhower Administration Officials
In January 1976, the Committee received a statement signed by
Eisenhmver administration officials Gordon Gray, C. Douglas Dillon,
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, John S. D. Eisenhower, and Dr.
Marion 'V. Boggs requesting the Committee to "disavow" the portion
of the findings of the Interim Report on assassination allegations
which stated that "the chain of events revealed by the documents and
testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the
plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower."
On February 2, 1976, Select Committee Chairman Frank
Church and Vice-Chairman John Tower responded to this request,
as follows:
After reviewing the evidence in the Lumumba case once
again, we remain convinced that the language used in the
Committee's findings was warranted. Thus, we have decided
that the Committee cannot accede to your request for a disavowal
of the portion of the findings of the Report which
stated that "the chain of events revealed by the documents
and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference
that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by
President Eisenhower." 'Ye can only assure you that the
Committee was mindful of the considerations you have raised
when it wrote, at this same portion of the report:
"Xevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony
by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity
and lack of clarity in the records of high-level policy meetings
to preclude the Committee from making a finding that
the President intended an assassination effort against
Lumumba." 106
'''' E. P. Aurand affidavit, 12/24/75.
106 The Committee cited the countervailing testimony from officials in the Eisenhower
administration in its Interim Assassination Report on the LUll1umba case,
both in the discussion of Robert Johnson's testmony and in a separate section
entitled "Testimony of Eisenhower 'White House Officials" (Interim Assassination
Report, pp. 55-60; 64---65.)

139
In summary, the argument advanced as the basis of the request was
as follows: (1) Robert .Johnson's testimony that he received the
impression that he heard a Presidential order for the assassination of
Lumumba at an XSC meeting is contradicted by the testimony of all
others who were in attendancp at that meeting and who appeared
before the committee. (2) The "reflsonable inference" about Presidential
authorization bv President Eisenhower in the Lumumba case
w'as not drawn in the Castro case in relation to President Kennedy."OGa
")<,, The notarized statement submittpd bJ' :\Iessrs. Gray, Dillon, Goodpaster,
J. 8. D. Eisenhower, and Boggs stated in pertinent part: [page citations are to the
Interim Assassination Report].
"As tar as the record discloses, Robert H. Johnson was the only llerson from
whom the COlllmittee received testimony who thought he had heard President
Eisenhower say something that appeared to order the assassination of LUlllumba
and from a reading of the above quotation from his testimony it can be said
that it was somewhat ambivalent.
"By contrast, :\Iarion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18, 1960,
as Acting Executive SecretaQ' of the XSC, states, after reviewing the :\Iemorandum
of Discussion of the :\Ieeting :
"I recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no independent recollection
of any statements or discussion not summarized in the memorandum.
Specifically, I have no recollection of any statement, order or
reference by the President (or anyone else present at the meeting)
which could be interpreted as favoring action by the United States
to bring about the assassination of Lumumba." (page 59)
"Marion Boggs was Robert H. Johnson's superior officer in the NSC staff.
"Gordon Gray, who was Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and responsible for the organization of XSC meetings, specifically
impugned Johnson's testimony after hearing about it for the first time
when he appeared before the Committee. The Committee report says that Gray
testified that, despite the prevalent attitude of hostility toward Lumumba in the
Administration, he did not recall President Eisenhower "ever saying anything
that contemplated killing Lumumba." (page 64). Gray was head of the NSC staff
and, therefore, was Robert H. Johnson's ultimate superior officer.
"It seems noteworthy that the Committee did not take specific note Of the
fact that Robert H. Johnson's testimony was said to be incorrect by two of his
superior officers nor of the fact that the August 18, 1960, meeting was the first
of only two NSC meetings ever attended by Robert H. Johnson, when President
Eisenhower was present.
"Additionally, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary to
President Eisenhower, was listed among the participants of the NSC meeting of
August 18, 1960, and when asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort
during the Eisenhower Administration, he replied unequivocally:
"* * * at no time and in no way did I ever know of or hear about any
proposal, any mention of such an activity. * * * (I) t is my belief that
had such a thing been raised with the President other than in my
presence, I would have known about it, and * * * it would have been a
matter of such significance and sensitivity that I am confident that
* * * I would have recalled it had such a thing happened." (page 64)
"Furthermore, John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Goodpaster
as Assistant "White House Staff SecretllJry, was quoted as saying that
nothing that came to his attention in his experience at the White House "can be
construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of
or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans." (page 65)
"Acting Secretary of State, C. Douglas Dillon, attended the NSC meeting of
August 18, 1960, and testified, after reviewing NSC documents and being informed
(Continued)

140
In response to this argument, it should be noted that no witness in
any .of th.e other c~ses.put forward eye-witness testimony about any
presIdentlal authorIzatIOn. It should also be noted that Johnson's testlmony
was unambiguous all the central point: although he allowed for
the possibility that what he heard was actually dis-.:ussion of some more
general political action, it was his "clear impression' that he heard
an order for the assassination of Lumumba.,o7
Xevertheless, if the account of this XSC meeting by one "'itness were
the only evidence on presidential authorization before the Committee
in the Lumumba case, we do not doubt that the findings would have
been phrased in much the same lllanner as in the other ca.3es.
The Lumumba case was distinguished, however, by the presence of
a strong "chain of eYents," culminating in the dispatch of a CIA
scientist to the Congo in late September 1960 on an assas"ination mission,
that appeared to originate in a particular meeting over which
(Oontinued)
of Robert Johnson's testimony, that he did not ",remember such a thing" as a
"dear cut order" from the President for the assassination of Lumumba.
(page 58)
"Finally, as has been pointed out, the Committee stated that "the chain of
events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable
inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by
President Eisenhower. Xevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by
Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity and lack of clarity in
the records of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from making
a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba."
(page 2(3)
"It is noted in this regard that, concerning the findings with respect to assassination
attempts involving Fidel Castl'o, the Committee's report ,reads:
"In view of the strained chain of assumptions and the contrary testimoney
of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both
Eisenhower and Kennedy, the Committee makes no finding implicating
Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves." (page 264)
"We must point out that all of the Presidential advisors, the men closest to
President Eisenhower, similarly gave contrary testimony in the case of the
Lumumba allegations, as to any involvement on President Eisenhower's part.
The Committee, in our judgment, was remiss in failing to point this out, as they
did when President Kennedy's name was joined with that of President Eisenhower
in the case of allegations regarding Castro.
"We do not undertake to evaluate the treatment given by the Committee to
testimony concerning the extent to which President Kennedy and his senior
advisors had specific knowledge of and involvement in the assassination plotting
and efforts against Castro. In relation to the treatment given to Robert Johnson's
testimony in the Lumumba case the contrast is, to say the least, significant.
Robert Johnson was not an advisor to President Eisenhower and was certainly
not one of those closest to him; in any case he has himself expressed doubt regarding
the interpretation of what he heard.
"Finally the Committee disclaims "making a finding" that President Eisenhower
intended an assassination effort against Lumumba. Yet in the very preceding
sentence the Committee stated that "a reasonable inference' 'is permitted
that Eisenhower authorized the plot-a statement that has the form of a finding
and has been so taken in news reporting.
""'e can only conelude that the COllImittee's work has Iwen compromised
by the inclusion of this reference to a "reasonable inference." 'We, therefore, call
upon the Committee to disavow the statement that "a reasonable inference" is
permitted as to President Eisenhower's involvement in the Lumumba matter."
107 See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 55--60.

141
President Eisenhower presided, probably the NSC meeting of August
18, 1960.108
lOS This chain of events was summarized in the Interim Assassination Report at
pp. 52-5:!, as foliO"S:
"'I'he chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with the testimony
that President J.~isenhower made a statement at a meeting of the Xational
~ecurity Council in the summer or early fall of 1960 that came across to one
staff member in attendance as an order 101' the assassination of Patrice
Lumumba. The next link is ,a memorandum of the Special Group meeting of
August 25, 1900, which indicated that when the President's 'extremely strong
feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action' were conveyed, the
~1JecJaI Group
"... agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out
'consideration' of any particuLar kind of activity which might contribute to
getting rid of Lumumba. (~pecial Group Minutes, t>/:!5/6U.)
"The following day, CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special
Group meeting, personally cabled to the Station Officer in Lcopoldville that
Lumumba's RK\10YAL l\lU~T BE A...'I URGEXT AND PRUIE OBJEC'l'IVE
... A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT AOTIOX'. YOU CAN ACT ON
YOUR OWN AU'l'.HORITY WHEltE TDlE DOES NOT PERMIT REFJ.~RRAL
HERE. (CIA Cable, Dulles to ~tation Officer, 8/26/60.)
"Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Hichard
Bissell-the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against
Lumumba took place--testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth
of the ~pecial Group meeting and signaled to him that the President
had authorized assassination as one means of effecting Lumumba's 'removal.'
(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. i:l3-34, 61--62; see Section 7 (c), infra) Bronson Tweedy,
who had direct operational responsibility at Headquarters for activities against
Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure,
inclUding assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba
from a position of influence. (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5.)
"On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweed~' cabled Station Officer Hedgman
to expect a messenger from CIA Headquarters. Two days later. in the presence
of the President at a meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles
stated that Lumumba 'would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet
disposed of.' (Memorandum, 460lh XSC Meeting, 9/21/60.) Five days after this
meeting. CIA scientist, Joseph Scheider, arrived in Leopoldville and provided the
Station Officer with toxic biological substances, instructed him to assassinate
Luummba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation.
"Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that it will not
support an absolute finding of Presidential authorization for the assassination
effort against Lumumba.
"First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration responsible to the
President for national security affairs and present at the XSC meetings in
question testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledgt
of, an assassination operation.
"'Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Council
and its Special Group do not record an explicit Presidential order for the
assassination of Lumumba. The ~ecretary of the Special Group maintained that
his memoranda reflected the actual language used at the meetings without omission
or euphemism for extremely sensiti"e statements. (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 19.)
All other NSC staff ex~utivesstated however, that there was a strong possibility
that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted
from the record or handled by means of euphemism. Several high Government
officials involved in policymaking and planning for covert operations testified
that the language in these minutes Clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated
at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political
threat; other officials testifled to the contrary."

142
Taking this chain of circumstances together with all the testimony
and documents of the period, the Committee felt constrained "from
making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort
against. Lumumba" but obliged to point out that, in this case, the evidence
was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the
plot to assassinate LUll1umba was authorized by President Eisenhown,"
whether explicitly or implicitly.'09
O. Typographica7 Error
The last sentence in the first paragraph on page 65 of the Interim
Report contained a typographi'cal error. The sentence should read as
follows: "As a participant at XSC meetings who frequently attended
Oval Office diseussions relating to national security affairs, John Eisenhower
testified that nothing that came to his attention in his experience
at the 'White House 'can be construed in mv mind in the remotest
way to mean any Presidential knowledge of ~r concurrence in any
assassination plots or plans.' " 110
100 Interim Assassination Report. p. 263.
110 John Eisenhower testimony, July 18, 1975, pp. 4, 14.

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